THE QUARTERLY OF THE TEXAS STATE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
VOLUME IV. APRIL, 1901. NUMBER 4.
PUBLICATION COMMITTEE. John H. Reagan. George P. Garrison. Bride Neill Taylor. Z. T. Fulmore. C. W. Raines. EDITOR. George P. Garrison. AUSTIN, TEXAS: PUBLISHED QUARTERLY BY THE ASSOCIATION. Price, FIFTY CENTS per number. [Entered at the Postoffice at Austin, Texas, as second class matter.]
CONTENTS.
The San Jacinto Campaign Eugene C. Barker.
Documentary Selections: Houston's Report of the Battle of San Jacinto, 260; Santa Anna's Report of the Campaign, 264; Moseley Baker's Letter to Houston, 272; Delgado's Account of the Battle, 287; J. H. Kuykendall's Recollections of the Campaign, 291; Labadie's Account of the Campaign, 307; Houston's Speech in the United States Senate, 316; Burnet's Narrative of the Campaign, 325; R. J. Calder's Recollections of the Campaign, 334; Zuber's Account of the Camp at Harrisburg, 338; Alsbury's The Burning of Vince's Bridge, 339; Turner's Account of the Battle, 340.
Book Reviews and Notices.
Notes and Fragments.
The Texas State Historical Association.
PRESIDENT.
John H. Reagan.
VICE-PRESIDENTS.
Guy M. Bryan. F. R. Lubbock.
Julia Lee Sinks. T. S. Miller.
RECORDING SECRETARY AND LIBRARIAN.
George P. Garrison.
CORRESPONDING SECRETARY AND TREASURER.
Lester G. Bugbee.
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.
President John H. Reagan.
First Vice-President Guy M. Bryan.
Second Vice-President Julia Lee Sinks.
Third Vice-President F. R. Lubbock.
Fourth Vice-President T. S. Miller.
Recording Secretary and Librarian George P. Garrison.
State Librarian C. W. Raines.
Fellows Z. T. Fulmore for term ending 1903.
John C. Townes for term ending 1902.
R. L. Batts for term ending 1901.
Members Rufus C. Burleson for term ending 1905.
W. J. Battle for term ending 1904.
Beauregard Bryan for term ending 1903.
Dora Fowler Arthur for term ending 1902.
Bride Neill Taylor for term ending 1901.
The Association was organized March 2, 1897. There are no qualifications for membership. The annual dues are two dollars. The Quarterly is sent free to all members.
Contributions to the Quarterly and correspondence relative to historical material should be addressed to
GEORGE P. GARRISON, Recording Secretary and Librarian, Austin, Texas. All other correspondence concerning the Association should be addressed to LESTER G. BUGBEE, Corresponding Secretary and Treasurer, Austin, Texas.
Vol. IV. APRIL, 1901. No. 4.
The publication committee and the editor disclaim responsibility for views expressed by contributors to the Quarterly.
[Introduction: In this paper little claim is made to originality of matter. I have been able to find but few documents bearing directly upon the San Jacinto campaign that were unknown to others who have handled the subject,—and those few are not of great importance. But from all of the available material I have attempted to construct a clear and absolutely unpartisan narrative, a task which can hardly be said to have been accomplished with any degree of success as yet by any historian save Bancroft. To this end, I have confined myself strictly to a narration of facts, avoiding—so far as is consistent with an intelligent treatment of the subject—any expression of personal opinion or discussion. And where, upon disputed points, it has been necessary to choose between conflicting statements, I have endeavored to present in the notes both sides of the question, in order that the reader may draw his own conclusions.
A word is necessary concerning the material in English for a history of this campaign. Though there is a good deal, very little of it is contemporaneous, Houston's letters, published in the appendix to Yoakum's History of Texas, a few letters and proclamations in the Archives of Texas, and some newspaper clippings, circulars, and letters in the Austin Papers being all of such a character that I have found. Most of the remainder was written at various dates between 1837 and 1860, while Houston was prominent in politics and had both devoted friends and bitter enemies, and is strongly colored by personal prejudices. In presenting the main facts from different view points, however, and acting as checks upon one another, these documents are valuable, but need to be used with caution.
Several documents are published supplementary to this paper, the object being to popularize much that has hitherto been practically inaccessible to the public. Those written by Kuykendall, Turner, and Baker, now appear in print for the first time, and Santa Anna's Report is new in English; the first two, with Houston's official report of the battle of San Jacinto, are published in full, but in the extracts from Baker's letter and all the other documents only the main narrative has been retained. The documents are arranged in the chronological order—so far as I have been able to determine it—in which they were written. They are sparingly annotated, and unless otherwise indicated the notes are those of the respective writers. To each one of them I have prefixed a brief bibliography, and a summary covering disputed points.
On account of space limitations, it has been necessary to select the documents printed, and to omit some that are well worth publication. The published works used in addition to these in the preparation of this paper will be found in the attached list (pp. 344-45), which, though not intended to be exhaustive, contains, I believe, all the important material at present known upon the subject.
In the notes to this paper, for the sake of convenience, citations to Foote's Texas and the Texans, Kennedy's Texas, Yoakum's History of Texas, Bancroft's North Mexican States and Texas, and Brown's History of Texas are made by the name of the author instead of by the title of the book.]
The so-called San Jacinto campaign 1 occupied just one month and ten days of the spring of 1836, beginning with Houston's assumption of the command at Gonzales (March 11), and ending with the battle of San Jacinto. During the first five weeks of this time the chief occupation of the Texan army consisted apparently in the effort to keep out of reach of the Mexicans, but for the last five days it assumed a more belligerent policy, and, in the end, almost annihilated the enemy on the field of San Jacinto. Before commencing the narrative, however, it will be necessary to glance, first, at the distribution of Texan and Mexican forces at the beginning of the campaign; and then to take a brief retrospect of Texan affairs for the preceding few months.
Santa Anna had arrived in Bexar (San Antonio) on February 23, 1836, with an army 2,500 or 3,000 strong, 2 and sat down to the siege of the Alamo, defended by a hundred and fifty-six men under command of Colonels Travis and Bowie. Another division of 900 or 1,000 men 3 was advancing from Matamoros under General Urrea towards San Patricio and Goliad.
The Texan volunteers had successfully measured arms with Mexican regulars in the fall and winter of 1835 at Gonzales, Goliad, Lipantitlan, Concepcion, and San Antonio; and besides the garrison in the Alamo at this time, there were nearly five hundred men with Fannin at Goliad, about a hundred with Johnson and Grant at San Patricio, and some four hundred on the march to concentrate at Gonzales.
The consultation which met October 16, 1835, but, from scarcity of members, did not organize until November 3, had declared that Texas would “defend with arms the republican principles of the constitution of 1824” against the centralizing encroachments of Santa Anna, and, on November 12, elected Sam Houston commander-in-chief of “all the forces called into service during the war,” giving him the rank of major-general. And Houston, without attempting to assume command of the volunteers then besieging San Antonio, had established his headquarters at San Felipe and begun with scant success the work of organizing a regular army.
The Mexicans had temporarily abandoned Texas after the evacuation of Bexar by General Cos, about the middle of December, and the General Council, encouraged by promises of generous support from the republicans of Mexico and desiring to secure the contentment of their volunteers by keeping them busy, determined to direct an attack upon Matamoros and continue the war in the enemy's country. Governor Smith was opposed to this expedition, but the Council having authorized it over his veto and separately commissioned both J. W. Fannin, Jr., and F. W. Johnson to prepare for it, he ordered General Houston, on January 6, to proceed to Goliad, to take charge of the troops there and at San Patricio and Refugio and lead them upon Matamoros. The latter found the forces at these places unprepared and in considerable confusion, and becoming convinced that the expedition was foredoomed to failure, returned to Washington, reported as much to the governor on January 30, 4 and obtained a furlough until March 1 to treat with the Indians of East Texas, a task that had been imposed upon him by the General Council a month before. 5
Houston, however, did not leave the frontier without making a strong effort to prevent the expedition which he was convinced could not succeed. Hearing of Governor Smith's deposition from office, he assembled the volunteers and declared the undertaking unauthorized; and such was the effect of his speech that when Johnson arrived at Refugio he found that of the men there and at Goliad barely a hundred would follow him without the order of the governor. 6 Temporarily relinquishing the Matamoros plan perforce, then, he and his colleague, Dr. Grant, advanced with this small party to San Patricio. Here half of them were surprised by Urrea during the stormy night of February 27 and either killed or captured, Johnson and three companions only escaping. The remainder of the company, returning from a foraging expedition three days later, were ambushed near the town, and only two or three escaped the slaughter.
Fannin, who had arrived in the meantime at Refugio, being apprised of the approach of the enemy and the disaster to Johnson and Grant's party, moved back to Goliad and began preparations to hold that post with nearly five hundred men, volunteers chiefly from Georgia and Alabama.
Meanwhile the provisional government, through the quarrel between the governor and General Council, had become thoroughly disorganized; but fortunately a resolution had been passed in December, in spite of the governor's veto, authorizing the election of delegates to a convention at Washington, March 1. The representatives had plenary power to formulate a government ad interim, and when the convention assembled, independence was declared and immediate steps taken to organize a republic; while General Houston—a delegate, strangely enough, from Refugio, though he was a resident of Nacogdoches,—was formally re-elected commander of the Texan forces, 7 and urged to place himself at the head of the troops then in Gonzales and hasten to the relief of the Alamo.
To take up now the San Jacinto campaign, on Sunday, March 6, when Santa Anna had just concluded the storming of the Alamo, General Houston made a farewell speech to the convention and began his journey to Gonzales. Having been informed of the alarming situation of the garrison in Bexar through a letter from Colonel Travis to the convention, dated March 3, 8 he formed, as he went, a plan for its relief. Fannin, at Goliad, was ordered to advance with the bulk of his division to the west bank of the Cibolo and await there the arrival of the commander-in-chief who would join him with all the forces from Gonzales and march to Travis's rescue. 9 On reaching Gonzales, however (March 11), he was met by a rumor that the Alamo had been captured, and privately confiding in its truth, though pretending to disbelieve it, he dispatched an express to Fannin, countermanding his previous order and instructing him, “as soon as practicable,” to fall back to Victoria. 10
At Gonzales Houston found, according to his own report, “three hundred and seventy-four effective men, without two days' provisions, 11 many without arms, and others without any ammunition;” 12 and although a few had served under Austin and Burleson the preceding year, the most of them were entirely innocent of any knowledge of military discipline. While waiting, therefore, for confirmation of the fall of the Alamo, he seized the opportunity to organize his force. A regiment was formed with Edward Burleson for colonel, and Sidney Sherman and Alexander Somervell lieutenant-colonel and major respectively. Houston regretted, however, that he had not time to teach the men “the first principles of the drill.”
Deaf Smith, Henry Karnes, and R. E. Handy, sent out on the morning of the 13th with instructions to approach near enough to San Antonio to learn the fate of the Alamo, met Mrs. Dickinson, the wife of a lieutenant killed in the Alamo, some twenty miles from Gonzales, and learned that the worst had happened, and that a division of the enemy under General Sesma was already on the march eastward. They returned with her to camp, where they arrived about twilight, and her report threw both army and town into the greatest consternation. Thirty-two of Santa Anna's victims had left their homes in Gonzales no longer than two weeks before, and the grief of their stricken families was intense. Others, with ears only for the news that the Mexicans were advancing, hastened to flee for their lives—a few of the little army who had left their own families unprotected doubtless among them. 13 Houston himself thought his position too advanced and his force too small to meet the enemy at Gonzales, and in the midst of the general excitement ordered his men to prepare for retreat. Some of his few baggage wagons being surrendered to the helpless citizens of the town, the soldiers were forced to destroy all clothing and stores, except what they could carry on their persons; 14 and his only two pieces of cannon were thrown into the Guadalupe. Before midnight he was on the march, 15 his plan, as reported by himself at the time, being to halt on the Colorado until strengthened sufficiently to meet any force that the Mexicans might dare to send against him. 16 And before morning Gonzales was burned to the ground, that it might not afford shelter and supplies to the approaching enemy. 17
At the Colorado, Houston would be near the most populous section of the state where he could easily command its resources and receive quick reinforcement; while so long as he could hold that line, the Mexicans would be restricted to an uninhabited country, where they could do no damage to Texas, and whence, if held long enough in check, they might be compelled to withdraw merely through failure of their own supplies.
After receiving several small reinforcements along the line, the army reached Burnham's crossing on the Colorado in the afternoon of the 17th, when Houston reported his strength as six hundred men. 18 Remaining here two days, they crossed the river and descended the east bank to Beason's Ford, near the present town of Columbus, where they pitched camp for nearly a week.
Before leaving Burnham's however, a scouting party, consisting of Deaf Smith, Henry Karnes, R. E. Handy, and three others, was sent back toward the Navidad to reconnoitre, and encountering a similar body of the enemy at Rocky Creek, they took one prisoner and learned that General Sesma was near with a considerable force. 19 The latter, indeed, who had left Bexar on the 11th with orders from Santa Anna to proceed through San Felipe and Harrisburg to Anahuac, encamped the night of the 21st 20 on the west bank of the Colorado, only two miles above the Texans. He had but 725 men, 21 and having already asked for reinforcements, and finding the river well defended, he made no attempt to cross.
In this position the two armies remained five days, Houston receiving reinforcements all the time until, by the 26th, he could have mustered from twelve to fourteen hundred men, 22 though the two cannon for which he had sent William T. Austin to Velasco did not arrive. Several prisoners were taken from time to time, and almost the exact strength of the enemy being learned, 23 the Texans became eager to fight. Houston, too, up to the very day of his retreat, seemed to think it desirable to engage Sesma here, 24 but suddenly changed his mind, and late in the afternoon of March 26th began to fall back towards the Brazos.
Why he took such a step is not evident. 25 So long as he remained on the Colorado he received daily reinforcements—as he himself said, his force was rapidly becoming “respectable.” And though considerable excitement had been created by the refugees from Gonzales, it had been largely allayed through his assurances that the enemy should not pass the Colorado. It seems likely, indeed, that merely by holding that line, without risking a battle, his strength would soon have become sufficient to encounter the combined Mexican army. When, however, along with the news of Fannin's misfortune, it became known that the Texans were falling back from the Colorado, the wildest confusion seized upon all east of that river. Reinforcements on their way to join the army faced about, and fled with their families to put them in safety beyond the Sabine. And many of the volunteers already with Houston—either with or without permission—left him for the same purpose, so that when he reached the Brazos his force was reduced more than half. 26
Arriving at San Felipe on the 28th, the little army remained over night and set out the next day for Groce's, fifteen or twenty miles up the river. Many thought that since most of the settlements were down the river, the movement should be made in that direction, and Moseley Baker and Wily Martin refused to follow Houston further. 27 The former, therefore, was ordered to guard San Felipe with his company of a hundred and twenty men; 28 while the latter, with a hundred men, 29 was sent to hold the crossing at Fort Bend. Dissatisfaction, indeed, was general throughout the ranks, and was only increased by the difficulties of the march through muddy roads and a driving rain. After encamping near Mill creek on the night of the 29th and marching but a few miles the next day, they came to Groce's on the 31st and went into camp for nearly a fortnight. 30
Santa Anna, in the meantime, having ordered General Gaona to diverge from his original route to Nacogdoches and advance from Bastrop upon San Felipe, and Urrea to march upon Brazoria, started five hundred men under Colonel Augustin Amat to reinforce Sesma, and leaving General Filisola at Gonzales, to take command of these and superintend their passage of the Guadalupe, pressed on to join Sesma himself. 31 This he did on the east bank of the Colorado, that general having just crossed at the Atascosita ford, and together they hastened after Houston to San Felipe, the ruins of which they reached April 7. 32 Finding the crossing here in possession of Baker's company, Santa Anna made a reconnoissance for several miles up and down the swollen river in the hope of discovering a ford where he might cross and surprise Baker by a night attack. But failing in this, he ordered the construction of two large flat-boats, and then, too impatient to remain inactive while this was being done, for he desired to end the campaign before the rains rendered the country impassable, set out down the river with five hundred grenadiers and fifty cavalry, looking for more expeditious means of crossing. 33 After three days he gained possession of the ferry at Fort Bend, 34 and was joined on the 13th by Sesma, who had been awaiting in vain at San Felipe the arrival of Gaona and Filisola.
Here Santa Anna learned that the seat of government was only twelve leagues distant and unprotected, and that by a rapid march he might succeed in capturing the President and all his cabinet, among them his old enemy, Lorenzo de Zavala. Abandoning, therefore, what was perhaps his original plan of pursuing Houston and forcing a battle near Groce's, 35 he left Sesma with a part of his division, and sealed instructions to Filisola when he should come up, and with the rest of Sesma's force—seven hundred infantry, fifty cavalry, and a six pound cannon—hastened on towards Harrisburg. Reaching that place during the night of April 15th, the Mexicans found it abandoned, and only three printers captured in the office of the Telegraph and Texas Register informed them that the officers of the government had departed that morning for Galveston Island, and that Houston was at Groce's with eight hundred men. A reconnoitering party sent out towards Lynchburg reported that settlers in that direction uniformly declared that Houston intended retreating to the Trinity by way of Lynch's Ferry, and Santa Anna, by his own account, formed the plan of intercepting him there. Ordering Filisola, who had now come up with Sesma, to reinforce him with five hundred picked infantry (infantes escogidos), he set fire to Harrisburg 36 and pushed on to overtake his scouts at New Washington—having sent them there, it would seem, for purposes of plunder.
In marked contrast with the impetuosity of Santa Anna was Houston's long delay in the bottom opposite Groce's. He sought to employ his leisure in the better organization of his forces; a new regiment was formed with Sidney Sherman as its colonel, and numerous promotions were made in consequence. A medical staff also was created, and specific duties assigned to each of the six or eight physicians with the army. But the troops looked askance at the non-combative policy of their commander, and, so far from discipline's being promoted by these changes and the long halt, almost open mutiny was the result. The belief became general, in fact, that Houston desired to avoid a conflict altogether, and that his only movement from the Brazos would be to continue the retreat eastward—most likely towards Nacogdoches. Such a contingency was freely discussed, and officers and men alike boldly canvassed the advisability of electing a more aggressive leader. 37 The civil authorities, too, became uneasy at the continued inactivity of the army, and began to urge General Houston to bestir himself. General Rusk, the Secretary of War, was sent to the field in the hope of inaugurating a more vigorous policy, and President Burnet attempted to sting the commander into action by the information that he was becoming the laughing stock of the enemy, and that the salvation of Texas depended upon his fighting. 38
Despite the general dissatisfaction, however, the army was gradually reinforced to almost its size on the Colorado. 39 General Rusk arrived on the 4th, and in consultation with Houston on the night of the 11th it was decided to cross to the east side of the river. This operation—rendered very tedious on account of the absence of a ferry boat and the presence of several wagons with their ox teams and some two hundred horses—was completed by means of the steam tug Yellowstone on the 13th, before which time Houston was apprised of the passage of the river by the enemy at Fort Bend. 40 Orders had already been issued to the scattered detachments at San Felipe, Fort Bend, and Washington to join the main army at Donoho's, a few miles east of Groce's, and thither Houston took his way in the afternoon of the 14th, the difficulties of his march being increased by the addition to his train on the 11th of the “Twin Sisters,” two six pound cannon presented to Texas by the people of Cincinnati.
At Donoho's Baker and Martin came up, both of the opinion that this was only another subterfuge of the commander-in-chief's to avoid the enemy, and very much disgusted. The latter, according to Houston's account, refused to fall into line with his company, and was ordered to hasten to Robbins' Ferry on the Trinity to protect the families crossing there from the Indians. 41 The whole army, in fact, was in doubt of Houston's plan, and the belief was quite common that he intended falling back as far as Nacogdoches; in which case the general sentiment favored the election of a new leader. 42 The road to Harrisburg diverged from the one to Nacogdoches a short distance from McCurley's, some fifteen miles east of Donoho's, 43 and it was felt that here the die would be cast. There was probably considerable relief among the men, therefore, when, instead of an attempt to lead them towards Nacogdoches, they were allowed without opposition to keep the road to Harrisburg. 44
The hypothesis that Houston's plan was to retreat to Nacogdoches, or perhaps to the Sabine, had at this time probably little to support it beyond his apparent reluctance to face the enemy, and the known fact that there was a large body of United States troops at Fort Jessup, near Natchitoches in Louisiana, whose protection from both Mexicans and Indians many relied upon, in case the worst came, and Texas had to be temporarily abandoned. But subsequent knowledge of the sympathy of General Gaines, who commanded these troops, and of the attitude of President Jackson towards the Texas question has, it is sometimes fondly contended, clearly proved that Houston's purpose throughout the campaign was to draw Santa Anna to the Sabine, where it was hoped that he might inadvertently offer General Gaines an excuse for taking up the war and establishing a protectorate of the United States over Texas. 45
As a matter of fact, some negotiations were made to enlist the support of these forces; but they were made by the civil government and the citizens of Nacogdoches, and it is doubtful whether Houston at the time knew anything about them. 46 The following letter from the Secretary of State, Sam P. Carson, 47 gives the first suggestion of these overtures:
“His Excellency David G. Burnet.
48“12 o'clock. News—good news.
“I have just heard through a source in which Judge Hardin has confidence that a company or battalion of U. S. troops left Fort Jessup eight or ten days since, crossed the Sabine and were marching towards the Nesches. I believe it to be true. Gen. Gaines is there and doubtless my letter by Parmer had the desired effect. Jackson will protect the neutral ground, and the beauty of it is, he claims to the Nesches as neutral ground. I should like his protection that far at present. If we are successful, we can hereafter negociate and regulate boundaries. This news, just arrived, has infused new life into people here, and be assured I will keep the ball rolling. * * *
“Carson.”
The letter bears no date, but was certainly written in the earlier part of April, probably on the 4th. 49
By way, as he would perhaps have expressed it, of “keeping the ball rolling,” Carson pushed on to Fort Jessup—officially, it is presumed, since he was still Secretary of State—and tried the efficacy of a personal appeal to General Gaines. His formal report to the President and cabinet gives the result of the interview, together with some other interesting information:
“Nachitoches, April 14, 1836. “To his Excellency David G. Burnet and the Cabinet of the Republic of Texas.
50“Gentlemen: On my arrival here last night I met with Gen'l Gaines and have had with him a full and satisfactory conversation. His position at present is a delicate one, and requires at his hands the most cautious movements. The object of the concentration of forces at Jessup is to protect the frontier and neutral ground, also to keep the Indians in check and repress savage aggressions. This he is bound to do in fulfillment of treaty stipulations between the government of the United States and Mexico. * * * Gen'l Gaines * * * issued an order to prepare thirteen companies to march this evening to the Sabine, with two field pieces with seventy-five rounds for each and thirty-five rounds for the infantry—also twelve days provisions, etc.
“I herewith send you a copy of his requisition upon the government of Louisiana to furnish a brigade of mounted volunteers: 51 a similar request has been made to the governors of Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama, requiring, however, only a battalion of the latter in consequence of the Florida war. He will have in a few days (say 20 or 30) from 7 to 8,000 men with him. You will perceive that we cannot use Indian auxiliaries unless in self defense. The treaty referred to requires the United States to put such conduct down. ***
“I cannot state positively what Gen'l Gaines may do, but one thing I think I may say, that should he be satisfied of the fact that the Mexicans have incited any Indians, who are under the control of the United States, to commit depredations on either side of the line, he will doubtless view it as a violation of the treaty referred to, *** and be assured that he will maintain the honor of his country and punish the aggressor, be he who he may. Now the fact is that the Mexicans have already with them a number of the Caddoes, some Cherokees, and Indians of other tribes which are under the protection and control of the United States. It is only necessary then to satisfy Gen'l Gaines of the fact, in which case, be assured he will act with energy and efficiency. The proofs will, I have no doubt, be abundant by the time he reaches the Sabine; in which case he will cross and move upon the aggressors. ***
“Yours, “Sam P. Carson.” “P. S. I have written Gen'l Houston and requested him to forward the communication to you.”
General Gaines did, indeed—upon information furnished him mainly, however, by the Committee of Safety and private citizens of Nacogdoches—advance to the Sabine with thirteen companies; but finding there that the Indians had killed but one man, and that not in such a manner as to indicate a “spirit of general hostility towards the inhabitants,” he contented himself with halting on the left bank of the river and sending a warning message to the Cherokee chief Bowles. 52 That he was in eager sympathy with the Texans and was possessed of an almost feverish desire to help them is certain, but the simultaneous reports that Santa Anna had been defeated and captured at San Jacinto and that “the Cherokee and other Indians in Texas from our side of the national boundary-line are disposed to return to their villages, plant corn, and be peaceable,” 53 relieved him alike of the necessity and the pretext. Nevertheless, he remained encamped on the Sabine until the fall of 1836, keeping a vigilant eye upon Texas, and bristling at every fresh rumor of renewed aggressiveness on the part of Mexico.
Whether Houston ever received Carson's letter, informing him of the movements of General Gaines is questionable. 54 At any rate,—either voluntarily or constrained by the mutinous sentiment of his troops—he proceeded to Harrisburg, arriving opposite its site in the forenoon of the 18th. The Texans rested here until the following morning, and during their halt two couriers were captured, bearing dispatches from Filisola and the Mexican government to Santa Anna, from which Houston first definitely learned that the latter was leading the troops to the east of him.
On the morning of the 19th both Houston and Rusk made encouraging addresses to the soldiers, declaring that they were now going to fall upon the enemy, and urging them to avenge their comrades of the Alamo and Goliad. After leaving in camp here his baggage train and some hundred and fifty or two hundred sick and inefficient, with seventy-five men under Major McNutt to guard them, 55 Houston marched down the left bank of Buffalo bayou, and crossing below the mouth of Sims's bayou, pressed on across Vince's bridge towards the San Jacinto. The march was kept up till nearly midnight, when the exhausted men were allowed to rest for a few hours. At daybreak, however, they were again put in motion, and when, about six o'clock, a halt was made for breakfast and the scouts came galloping up and reported that they had discovered the advance guard of the enemy returning from New Washington, the half-cooked food was bolted down and a hurried march continued to Lynch's Ferry, where they arrived early in the forenoon.
Almost immediately upon their arrival at the ferry, the enemy's advance guard was seen approaching, and the Texans fell back about half a mile, to establish themselves in a live-oak grove on the bank of the bayou. In front of them, and extending to the right towards Vince's bayou, was a prairie, perhaps two miles in width, bounded on the south by a marsh; to the left was the San Jacinto river; and at their back, Buffalo bayou. 56 Into this prairie the Mexicans soon filed from the direction of New Washington—which they had just burned—and formed their camp near the southern edge.
Early in the afternoon Santa Anna advanced his artillery—one six-pounder 57—under cover of the cavalry, and fired a shot at the Texans, but this being immediately returned from the “Twin Sisters,” the cannon was hastily withdrawn to the protection of a cluster of timber, from which it continued to be fired at intervals throughout the afternoon. 58 A few hours later, Colonel Sherman, according to his own account, asked and obtained permission to advance with mounted volunteers and attempt to capture it. 59 But he got into a rather lively skirmish with the Mexican cavalry, creating a good deal of excitement in the Texan camp thereby, and returned with two men seriously wounded, one of whom afterwards died. Nothing else of interest occurred during the rest of the afternoon. 60
On the morning of the 21st, General Cos arrived with some four hundred men, and increased Santa Anna's strength to eleven hundred and fifty or twelve hundred. 61 This gave the latter considerable advantage over Houston, who had but seven hundred and eighty-three men, 62 and the Texans became apprehensive that in consequence their general would again try to avoid a battle and continue the retreat across the San Jacinto. As time passed and no preparation was made to attack, their fears, they thought, were verified, and the old question of deposing the commander-in-chief was revived. 63
Some time during the forenoon Deaf Smith left camp to destroy Vince's bridge 64—not, as is quite popularly believed, for the purpose of making the approaching conflict a death struggle, but to obstruct the march of additional Mexican reinforcements. 65 And about midday Houston consented to a council of war in which it was decided to attack the enemy at daybreak the following morning; but this decision being rather sullenly received by the majority of the army, the question was submitted directly to them through their respective captains, and settled in favor of immediate attack. 66
About three o'clock in the afternoon of April 21st, therefore, Houston gave the order to prepare for action. The line having been formed, an advance was made upon the enemy which took them almost completely by surprise, most of the officers—Santa Anna included—being asleep. The Mexicans made one confused effort to sustain the charge, then broke and fled in utter panic. The Texans pursuing, the rout became a slaughter which only stopped at nightfall,—though the battle proper lasted perhaps not more than thirty minutes. Practically the entire Mexican force was either killed or captured, and of the Texans, two were killed and twenty-three wounded—six mortally. 67 The following day Santa Anna was captured and brought into camp, when an armistice was arranged between him and Houston providing for a cessation of hostilities until a permanent peace could be negotiated. And in the meantime Filisola was to fall back from Fort Bend to San Antonio, and cause Urrea to do the same from Victoria.
From San Jacinto Santa Anna was taken with the other prisoners to Velasco, and there on May 14 the treaty of that name was arranged between himself and the government of Texas. The public treaty provided, among other things, for a cessation of hostilities; the immediate withdrawal of the Mexican forces beyond the Rio Grande; the restoration of property taken by the Mexicans; and, finally, that the Texan army should not approach nearer than five leagues to the retreating Mexicans. At the same time a secret agreement was made with the captive dictator in which the government promised, in return for his solemn pledge to use his influence in securing an acknowledgment of Texan independence, to immediately liberate him and send him to Vera Cruz. 68
On May 26th, General Filisola ratified the public treaty and fulfilled its provisions by abandoning Texas; but through the interference of the enraged army the Texan government was compelled to break the secret articles, and Santa Anna was detained a prisoner until late in 1836, when he was sent to Washington, D. C. Quite naturally he felt himself absolved from his promise to labor for Texan independence. And though this was practically established by the battle of San Jacinto, it was not until the settlement of the Mexican War by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 that Mexico formally renounced her claims to Texas.
I. Houston's Report of the Battle.
[The original of this report has been lost, but numerous copies of it have been published. The first was issued in pamphlet form from New Orleans in 1836. Other copies may be found in Kennedy, II, 222-27; Yoakum, II, 498-502; Brown, II, 18-23; Dewee's Letters from Texas, 194-200; Linn's Reminiscences of Fifty Years in Texas, 203-9; and probably elsewhere. A Spanish translation occurs in Caro's Verdadera Idea, 106-13.]
Headquarters of the Army, San Jacinto, April 25, 1836. To His Excellency David G. Burnet, President of the Republic of Texas.
Sir: I regret extremely that my situation, since the battle of the 21st, has been such as to prevent my rendering you my official report of the same, previous to this time.
I have the honor to inform you, that on the evening of the 18th inst., after a forced march of fifty-five miles, which was effected in two days and a half, the army arrived opposite Harrisburg. That evening a courier of the enemy was taken, from whom I learned that General Santa Anna, with one division of choice troops, had marched in the direction of Lynch's ferry on the San Jacinto, burning Harrisburg as he passed down. The army was ordered to be in readiness to march early on the next morning. The main body effected a crossing over Buffalo bayou, below Harrisburg, on the morning of the 19th, having left the baggage, the sick, and a sufficient camp guard in the rear. We continued the march throughout the night, making but one halt in the prairie for a short time, and without refreshments. At daylight we resumed the line of march, and in a short distance our scouts encountered those of the enemy, and we received information that General Santa Anna was at New Washington, and would that day take up the line of march for Anahuac, crossing at Lynch's Ferry. The Texian army halted within half a mile of the ferry in some timber and were engaged in slaughtering beeves, when the army of Santa Anna was discovered to be approaching in battle array, having been encamped at Clopper's point, eight miles below. Disposition was immediately made of our forces, and preparation for his reception. He took position with his infantry and artillery in the center, occupying an island of timber, his cavalry covering the left flank. The artillery, consisting of one double fortified medium brass twelve-pounder, then opened on our encampment. The infantry, in column, advanced with the design of charging our lines, but were repulsed by a discharge of grape and canister from our artillery, consisting of two six-pounders. The enemy had occupied a piece of timber within rifle shot of the left wing of our army, from which an occasional interchange of small arms took place between the troops, until the enemy withdrew to a position on the bank of the San Jacinto, about three-quarters of a mile from our encampment, and commenced fortifications. A short time before sunset, our mounted men, about eighty-five in number, under the special command of Colonel Sherman, marched out for the purpose of reconnoitering the enemy. Whilst advancing they received a volley from the left of the enemy's infantry, and after a sharp rencounter with their cavalry, in which ours acted extremely well and performed some feats of daring chivalry, they retired in good order, having had two men severely wounded and several horses killed. In the meantime, the infantry under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Millard, and Colonel Burleson's regiment with the artillery, had marched out for the purpose of covering the retreat of the cavalry, if necessary. All then fell back in good order to our encampment about sunset, and remained without any ostensible action until the 21st, at half past three o'clock, taking the first refreshment that they had enjoyed for two days. The enemy in the meantime extended the right flank of their infantry so as to occupy the extreme point of a skirt of timber on the bank of the San Jacinto, and secured their left by a fortification about five feet high, constructed of packs and baggage, leaving an opening in the center of the breastwork in which their artillery was placed, their cavalry upon their left wing.
About nine o'clock on the norning of the 21st, the enemy were reinforced by 500 choice troops, under the command of General Cos, increasing their effective force to upwards of 1,500 men, whilst our aggregate force for the field numbered 783. At half past three o'clock in the evening, I ordered the officers of the Texian army to parade their respective commands, having in the meantime ordered the bridge on the only road communicating with the Brazos, distant eight miles from our encampment, to be destroyed, thus cutting off all possibility of escape. Our troops paraded with alacrity and spirit, and were anxious for the contest. Their conscious disparity in numbers seemed only to increase their enthusiasm and confidence and heighten their anxiety for the conflict. Our situation afforded me the opportunity for making the arrangements preparatory to the attack, without exposing our designs to the enemy. The first regiment, commanded by Colonel Burleson, was assigned the center. The second regiment, under the command of Colonel Sherman, formed the left wing of the army. The artillery under the special command of Colonel George W. Hockley, Inspector-General, was placed on the right of the first regiment; and four companies of infantry, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Henry Millard, sustained the artillery upon the right. Our cavalry, sixty-one in number, commanded by Colonel Mirabeau B. Lamar, whose gallant and daring conduct on the previous day had attracted the admiration of his comrades and called him to that station, placed on our extreme right, completed our line. Our cavalry was first dispatched to the front of the enemy's left, for the purpose of attracting their notice, whilst an extensive island of timber afforded us an opportunity of concentrating our forces and deploying from that point, agreeably to the previous design of the troops. Every evolution was performed with alacrity, the whole advancing rapidly in line and through an open prairie, without any protection whatever for our men. The artillery advanced and took station within two hundred yards of the enemy's breastwork, and commenced an effective fire with grape and canister.
Colonel Sherman with his regiment, having commenced the action upon our left wing, the whole line at the center and on the right, advancing in double-quick time, rung the war cry, “Remember the Alamo!” received the enemy's fire and advanced within point blank shot before a piece was discharged from our lines. Our lines advanced without a halt, until they were in possession of the woodland and the breastwork, the right wing of Burleson's and the left of Millard's taking possession of the breastwork; our artillery having gallantly charged up within seventy yards of the enemy's cannon, when it was taken by our troops. The conflict lasted about eighteen minutes from the time of close action until we were in possession of the enemy's encampment, taking one piece of cannon (loaded), four stands of colors, all their camp equipage, stores and baggage. Our cavalry had charged and routed that of the enemy upon the right, and given pursuit to the fugitives, which did not cease until they arrived at the bridge which I have mentioned before, Captain Karnes, always among the foremost in danger, commanding the pursuers. The conflict in the breastwork lasted but a few moments; many of the troops encountered hand to hand, and not having the advantage of bayonets on our side, our riflemen used pieces as war clubs, breaking many of them off at the breech. The rout commenced at half past four, and the pursuit by the main army continued until twilight. A guard was then left in charge of the enemy's encampment, and our army returned with their killed and wounded. In the battle our loss was two killed and twenty-three wounded, six of them mortally. The enemy's loss was 630 killed, among whom was one general officer, four colonels, two lieutenant-colonels, five captains, twelve lieutenants. Wounded: 208, of which were: five colonels, three lieutenant-colonels, two second lieutenant-colonels, seven captains, one cadet. Prisoners, 730; President-General Santa Anna, General Cos, four colonels, aides to General Santa Anna, and the colonel of the Guerrero battalion are included in the number. General Santa Anna was not taken until the 22nd, and General Cos on yesterday, very few having escaped.
About six hundred muskets, three hundred sabres and two hundred pistols have been collected since the action. Several hundred mules and horses were taken, and near twelve thousand dollars in specie. For several days previous to the action our troops were engaged in forced marches, exposed to excessive rains, and the additional inconvenience of extremely bad roads, illy supplied with rations and clothing; yet, amid every difficulty, they bore up with cheerfulness and fortitude, and performed their marches with spirit and alacrity. There was no murmuring.
Previous to and during the action, my staff evinced every disposition to be useful, and were actively engaged in their duties. In the conflict I am assured they demeaned themselves in such manner as proved them worthy members of the Army of San Jacinto. Colonel Thos. J. Rusk, Secretary of War, was on the field. For weeks his services had been highly beneficial to the army; in battle he was on the left wing, where Colonel Sherman's command first encountered and drove the enemy. He bore himself gallantly, and continued his efforts and activity, remaining with the pursuers until resistance ceased.
I have the honor of transmitting herewith a list of all the officers and men who were engaged in the action, which I respectfully request may be published as an act of justice to the individuals. For the commanding General to attempt discrimination as to the conduct of those who commanded in the action, or those who were commanded, would be impossible. Our success in the action is conclusive proof of such daring intrepidity and courage; every officer and man proved himself worthy of the cause in which he battled, while the triumph received a lustre from the humanity which characterized their conduct after victory, and richly entitles them to the admiration and gratitude of their general. Nor should we withhold the tribute of our grateful thanks from that Being who rules the destinies of nations, and has in the time of greatest need enabled us to arrest a powerful invader, whilst devastating our country.
I have the honor to be, with high consideration, Your obedient servant, Sam Houston, Commander-in-Chief.
II. Extract from Santa Anna's Report.
[Santa Anna's report of the San Jacinto campaign to the Minister of War and Marine is dated March 11, 1837. The copy from which this is translated is published in Ramon Caro's Verdadera Idea de la Primera Campaña de Tejas, 78-106. An almost complete copy may also be found in Filisola's Memorias para la Historia de la Guerra de Tejas, II, 453-70. Though extracts of the report have from time to time been translated, no complete translation has ever appeared, I believe; nor is this one complete. The greater part of what follows (the amount being indicated by a footnote) was furnished me by Miss Shirley R. Green, of Palestine, Texas; the remainder is taken from Maillard's History of the Republic of Texas, 107-111.
Describing the campaign from the Mexican point of view, Santa Anna has this to say upon two disputed questions:
A Texan soldier captured at San Felipe declared that the town had been burned by order of General Houston.
At Harrisburg he was told that Houston would retire to the Trinity by way of Lynchburg, and he determined to intercept him.]
*** On the third day I overtook on the Guadalupe river, across from the burnt village of Gonzales, the battalions of engineers and sappers from Guadalajara, which, under the command of Colonel Agustin Amat, were marching to reinforce General Ramirez y Sesma's division.
Two days' march to the rear Lieutenant-Colonel Pedro Ampudia followed with the artillery, implements and tools, knapsacks (sacos a tierra), ammunition and supplies for the same division.
As the Guadalupe was swollen, it was not possible that the troops and train referred to should cross the river with the necessary dispatch, a delay of three or four days being imperative. *** I hastened my march, and on the fifth day arrived at Atascocita ford on said river [Colorado]. I met on the other side the division of General Ramirez y Sesma, and he informed me that the enemy having retired toward the Brazos, a chance had been given him to cross without opposition; and observing that there was only one canoe, I recommended to the permanent battalion of Aldama, under command of General Adrian Woll, the construction of rafts in order to facilitate the march of the section left with General Filisola. Believing General Gaona to be on the march toward San Felipe de Austin, according to his answer from Bastrop, a town located on the east bank of the Colorado, 30 leagues to the west of San Felipe de Austin, and General Urrea towards Brazoria, located on the west bank of the Brazos river, and twenty-five leagues to the south of the said San Felipe, I continued on the sixth with the division of General Sesma as far as the San Bernard creek, and at daybreak on the seventh arrived at San Felipe de Austin. This town, situated on the west bank of the Brazos, no longer existed, because the enemy had burned it and sent the inhabitants into the interior, as at Gonzales. An armed Anglo-American was captured among the ruins and he declared: that he belonged to a detachment of 150 men, located on the other side of the river for the purpose of defending the ford; that the towns were burned by the order of their general, Samuel Houston, in order to cut the Mexicans off from supplies; that Houston was to be found in a thicket near the crossing of the Gross [Groce's] 15 leagues 69 distant on our left with only 800 men remaining to him; and that his intention was to retire to the Trinity river, in case the Mexicans crossed the Brazos.
Our troops, seen at a distance by the detachment mentioned, were fired upon from a redoubt. * * * I immediately reconnoitered the bank of the river, right and left, for two leagues, hunting a ford by which to make a surprise by night, but all effort was fruitless. The breadth and depth of the river are great, it was swollen, and not even a small canoe was to be found. The various rivers which traverse that country present great obstacles to an invading army: they are full, and have frequent freshets in the spring, caused by the melted snows from the mountains. 70 * * *
On the 8th I ordered the construction of two flat bottomed boats, for which it was necessary to bring wood from distant points. Even after getting to work, ten or twelve days, it was estimated, would be necessary to complete them, because of the lack of carpenters; and three or four more to put them in condition for use. The loss of this time seemed to me an irreparable evil, the ending of the campaign before the rains being so important, in consideration of the condition of the army of the republic, as I shall soon be able to explain to the nation.
General Filisola did not arrive at the Colorado, and General Gaona, who was to join us, did not announce when he would do so. The condition of the hostile chief was not unknown to me. Intimidated by the successive triumphs of our army; terrified by the sight of rapid movements over ground, which by nature opposes obstacles almost insurmountable, and suffering desertion and want, which impelled him to seek safety by the retreat undertaken, nothing were easier than to follow and destroy him before he could recover himself.
We were unable to cross the Brazos at San Felipe, and in view of such previous reasons, I resolved to make a reconnaissance for ten or twelve leagues along the right bank, whose side (flanco) I judged to be covered by General Urrea's division, which, as I have indicated, was directed upon Brazoria. To that end I marched from San Felipe on the 9th with 500 grenadiers and scouts and 50 horse, leaving General Ramirez y Sesma with the rest of his division, which could reinforce that of General Gaona at any time. After three days of laborious marching and countermarching, during one of which I made on foot a journey of five leagues, I got possession of the Thompson ford, in spite of the courage of a scant detachment of the enemy which defended it, and which succeeded in wounding only one grenadier and one bugler. By this extraordinary movement, unforeseen by the enemy, I came into possession of a good flat boat and two skiffs. * * * General Ramirez y Sesma, according to my orders, joined me on the 13th. General Gaona did not appear.
Through some neighboring settlers, one of them a Mexican, I ascertained that in the village of Harrisburg, about twelve leagues distant, on the right bank of Buffalo bayou, there was located the so-called governor of Texas; Don Lorenzo Zavala; and the other leaders of the revolution, and that their capture would be certain if troops could be rapidly marched against them. The news was important. * * * I sent across the river the grenadiers and sharpshooters (Cazadores), with whom I had taken the ford, together with the permanent battalion of Matamoras, the dragoons of my escort, a six-pound gun, and 50 boxes of musket cartridges, and undertook the march to Harrisburg with this force on the evening of the 14th. I left General Ramirez y Sesma at Thompson's with the rest of his division, and left sealed instructions for General Filisola.
At night on the 15th I entered Harrisburg, lighted by several burning houses, and found only a Frenchman and two Americans in a printing house. They said that the so-called President, Vice-President, and other persons of authority had set out at midday in a steamboat for the island of Galveston; * * * that the fire which we saw was accidental, they having been unable to extinguish it; that the families had abandoned their homes by the command of General Houston; and that he was at the pass of Gross with 800 men, and two four-pound guns (del calibre de á cuatro).
The capture of the leaders of the rebellion being frustrated, and knowing the rendezvous of the enemy, and his strength, in order the better to concert my succeeding movements, I ordered that Colonel Juan Almonte with the fifty dragoons of my escort reconnoiter as far as the pass of Lynchburg and New Washington. From the latter place the said colonel communicated to me, among other things, that various settlers found in their houses had uniformly asserted that General Houston was retiring towards the Trinity by the pass of Lynchburg.
To block this pass for Houston, and to destroy at one blow the armed strength and the hopes of the revolutionists, was too important a thing to let slip. It occurred to me to take the Lynchburg pass before his arrival, and to avail myself of the advantage in position. My first command was directed to reinforcing the section accompanying me, composed of 700 infantry, 50 horse, and one cannon, until it should be superior to the enemy in number, as it already was in discipline; and I ordered General Filisola to countermand the advance of General Cos towards Velasco, which I had advised in my instructions, and to send him to join me at the earliest moment with 500 picked infantry.
Colonel Almonte being engaged at the port of New Washington on the shore of Galveston Bay, [awaiting] the enemy's ships that might arrive, and it being at the same time necessary to secure the quantity of supplies that he had captured, I made a journey to that point on the afternoon of the 18th. On my arrival there I found in full view a schooner, which for lack of wind could not get away; I intended to seize it to make use of in due time on the Island of Galveston, but when the skiffs and flatboats, which Colonel Almonte had provided himself with, were made ready, a steamship arrived and opened fire upon him. 71
Early on the morning of the 19th, I sent Captain Barragan, with some dragoons, to a point on the Lynchburg road, three leagues distant from New Washington, in order that he should watch and communicate to me, as speedily as possible, the arrival of Houston: and, on the 20th, at eight o'clock in the morning, he informed me that Houston had just got to Lynchburg. It was with the greatest joy that all the individuals belonging to the corps, then under my immediate orders, heard the news; and they continued the march, already begun, in the best spirit.
At my arrival, Houston was in possession of a wood on the margin of Buffalo bayou, which, at that point, empties itself into the San Jacinto creek. His situation rendered it indispensable to fight; and my troops manifested so much enthusiasm, that I immediately began the battle. Houston answered our firing, but refused to come out of the cover of the wood. I wished to draw him into a field of battle suited to my purpose, and in consequence withdrew about one thousand yards distance, to an eminence affording a favorable position, with abundance of water on my rear, a thick wood on my right, and a large plain on my left. Upon my executing this movement, the enemy's fire increased, particularly that of his artillery, by which Captain Fernando Urriza was wounded. About one hundred cavalry sallied out of the wood, and boldly attacked my escort, which was posted on the left, causing it to fall back for a few moments and wounding a dragoon. I commanded two companies of cazadores to attack them, and they succeeded in repelling them into the wood.
It was now five in the evening, and our troops wanted rest and refreshment, which I permitted them to take. Thus was the remainder of the day spent. We lay on our arms all night, during which I occupied myself in posting my forces to the best advantage, and procuring the construction of a parapet to cover the position of our cannon. I had posted three companies in the wood on our right, the permanent battalion of Matamoras formed our body of battle in the centre, and on our left was placed the cannon, protected by the cavalry, and a column of select companies (de preferencia), under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Santiago Luelmo, which composed the reserve.
On the 21st, at nine in the morning, General Cos arrived with four hundred men belonging to the battalions of Aldama, Guerrero, Toluca, and Guadalaxara, having left one hundred men under the orders of Colonel Muriano Garcia, with their loads in a swampy place, near Harrisburg; and these never joined me. I then saw that my orders had been contravened; for I had asked five hundred select infantry, and they sent me raw recruits, who had jointed the army at San Louis Potosi and Saltillo. I was highly displeased with this act of disobedience, and considered the new reinforcement as trifling, whereas I had before its arrival entertained well-founded hopes of gaining some decisive advantage with the new succor, which was to have given me the superiority of numbers. I disposed myself, however, to take advantage of the favorable disposition which I perceived in our soldiers on the arrival of General Cos; but the latter represented to me that having made a forced march in order to reach my camp early, his troops had neither eaten nor slept during twenty-four hours, and that while the baggage was coming up, which it would do within two more hours, it was indispensable to grant some refreshment to the soldiers. I consented to it, but in order to keep a watch over the enemy and protect the said baggage, I posted my escort in a favorable place, reinforcing it with thirty-two infantry, mounted on officer's horses. Hardly one hour had elapsed since that operation, when General Cos begged me, in the name of Don Miguel Aguirre, the commander of the escort, that I would permit his soldiers to water their horses, which had not drunk for twenty-four hours, and let the men take some refreshment. Being moved by the pitiable tone in which this request was made, I consented, commanding at the time that Aguirre and his men should return to occupy their position as soon as they should have satisfied their necessities; and his disobedience to this order concurred to favor the surprise which the enemy effected.
Feeling myself exceedingly fatigued from having spent the whole morning on horseback, and the preceding night without sleep, I lay down under the shade of some trees, while the soldiers were preparing their meal. Calling General Castrillon, who acted as major-general, I recommended him to be watchful and to give me notice of the least movement of the enemy, and also to inform me when the repast of the soldiers would be over, because it was urgent to act in a decisive manner.
I was in a deep sleep when I was awakened by the firing and noise; I immediately perceived we were attacked, and had fallen into frightful disorder. The enemy had surprised our advance posts. One of their wings had driven away the three companies (de preferencia) posted in the wood on our right, and from among the trees were now doing much execution with their rifles. The rest of the enemy's infantry attacked us in front with two pieces of cannon, and their cavalry did the same on our right.
Although the mischief was already done, I thought I could repair it, and with that view sent the battalion of Aldama to reinforce the line of battle formed by that of Matamoras, and organized a column of attack under the orders of Don Manuel Cespedes, composed of the permanent battalion of Guerrero, and the piquets of Toluca and Guadalaxara, which moved to the front with the company of Lieutenant-Colonel Luelmo, in order to check the advance of the enemy; but my efforts were vain. The line was abandoned by the two battalions that were covering it; and notwithstanding the fire of our cannon, the two columns were thrown into disorder, Colonel Cespedes being wounded and Colonel Luelmo killed. General Castrillon, who ran to and fro to re-establish order in our ranks, fell mortally wounded; and the new recruits threw everything into confusion, breaking their ranks and preventing the veterans from making use of their arms, whilst the enemy was rapidly advancing with loud hurrahs, and in a few minutes obtained a victory which they could not, some hours before, even have dreamed of.
All hopes being lost, and every one flying as fast as he could, I found myself in the greatest danger, when a servant of my aidede-camp, Colonel Don Juan Bringas, offered me his horse, and with the tenderest and most urging expressions insisted upon my riding off the field. I looked for my escort, and two dragoons, who were hurriedly saddling their horses, told me that their officers and fellow-soldiers had all made their escape. I remembered that General Filisola was only seventeen leagues off, and I took my direction towards him, darting through the enemy's ranks. They pursued me, and after a ride of one league and a half, overtook me on the banks of a large creek, the bridge over which was burned by the enemy to retard our pursuit. I alighted from my horse and with much difficulty succeeded in concealing myself in a thicket of dwarf pines. Night coming on, I escaped them, and the hope of reaching the army gave me strength. I crossed the creek with the water up to my breast and continued my route on foot. I found, in a house which had been abandoned, some articles of clothing, which enabled me to change my apparel. At eleven o'clock, a. m., while I was crossing a large plain, my pursuers overtook me again. Such is the history of my capture. On account of my change of apparel, they did not recognize me, and inquired whether I had seen Santa Anna? To this I answered that he had made his escape; and this answer saved me from assassination, as I have since been given to understand.
By what has been already explained Your Excellency will see at a glance the principal causes of an event which with good reason was a surprise. * * *
III. Extracts from Moseley Baker's Letter to Houston. 72
[These extracts are taken passim from a manuscript copy of the letter made by A. D. Darden, and deposited by Mr. Bowers in the Texas State Library. Nothing is known of the original. Baker's motive is revealed in a sentence: “In my recent canvass for the Senate, you descended from your political elevation and engaged with warmth and zeal against me.”
Summary: Houston took no part in bringing on the Texas revolution.
Houston's force at Gonzales numbered 500 men.
In the panic of retreat from Gonzales, Houston threw two cannon into the Guadalupe and destroyed much baggage, because there was not sufficient time to collect the baggage animals which were grazing. For the same reason, the picket guard was left unnotified of the retreat (but see infra, 294, 318).
At Beason's, on the Colorado, Houston had from 1,500 to 1,700 men, and sent messengers through the country assuring the people that he intended “to whip the enemy on the Colorado.” He delayed so long that both officers and men became mutinous in their desire to attack Sesma, on the opposite bank with 700 men. Houston finally promised to fight, but immediately retreated.
At San Felipe, threats were openly made to depose the commander-in-chief.
Moseley Baker refused to follow Houston up to Groce's, and the latter then ordered him to remain and guard San Felipe, and to burn it on the “approach of the enemy.”
At Groce's Houston had “not more” than 1,300 men; Baker had 85 at San Felipe; and there were 100 at Fort Bend.
At Donoho's Houston told Baker that he was marching to Harrisburg by order of the Secretary of War, and that he did so against his own better judgment.
About 500 men left the army between the Brazos and Harrisburg.
Houston had 900 men at Harrisburg.
Deaf Smith originated the idea of burning Vince's bridge.
Houston was forced to a reluctant consent to fight the battle of San Jacinto by the refusal of his army to continue the retreat.
In the beginning of the engagement, before 100 Mexicans had been killed, Houston ordered a halt. Rusk took command, and continued the battle.]
Evergreen, October —. To Gen. Sam Houston.
Sir: A regard for what I have considered the public interest has induced me for the last seven years, not only to overlook the numerous outrages I have sustained at your hands, but also in my public character at all times to appear as your friend and supporter. * * * That I now depart from my heretofore rule of action is attributable to yourself alone. In my recent canvass for the Senate, you descended from your political elevation and engaged with warmth and zeal against me. * * *
The first time that I had an opportunity of forming your acquaintance was at Nacogdoches, in the month of August, 1835. * * * One of the charges that I have made against you and to which you except is that you took little or no part in the bringing about of the revolution of Texas, and that, although you had been a resident of Nacogdoches for three years, that you had not sufficient influence to give tone to public sentiment even in your own county. This charge is unquestionably true, and yet you have permitted the idea to go forth that you were a prominent actor in the commencement of the great struggle; and you hear yourself spoken of as the Patrick Henry of the revolution without contradicting by sign or by word the flagrant mistake.
* * * I venture to assert that you never forgot how universal was the lamentation that Milam could not have lived to command the army of Texas. Had he lived the battle of San Jacinto would not have been fought, nor would a Mexican army ever have seen the eastern banks of the Guadaloupe.
* * * On your arrival at Gonzales you immediately assumed the command of the army. * * * You marshaled your forces at Gonzales, and found yourself at the head of five hundred as brave men as ever shot the rifle, the most of whom had been in the Mexican and Indian fights of the country,—the victors of Concepcion and the Grass Fight, and the capturers of Santa Anna, men anxious for a fight and burning for an opportunity of revenging the fate of their fellow citizens at the Alamo. All eyes were now turned upon you, and all anxiously awaited the first movement of their new commander. No one doubted but that the order would be to cross the Guadaloupe and fall upon Gen. Siesma, who was advancing upon us with only seven hundred men. So long had the men under your command been accustomed to whip the enemy, five, and often ten, to one, that the most enthusiastic delight existed when they found that they were about to have an opportunity of fighting them on even terms. But how astonished was that army when you ordered that at the hour of midnight a retreat would commence. * * * With so many brave men under your command, and so many rallying from the settlements to your army, you had only to give the word and then Texian rifles, as they ever did before and ever since have done, would have rushed as the whirlwind over their pusillanimous foe. You had before you the bright example of John Austin, who, with 92 men, captured the strong fort of Velasco, garrisoned by 170 men, in open assault. 73 You had before you the example of Fannin, of Burleson, and of Milam. * * * But * * * you determined that your first military act should be a retreat. * * *
But at the hour of midnight your retreat did commence, and commenced amid a scene ever disgraceful to Texian arms. You threw your only two pieces of cannon into the river; you caused many of your men to burn their tents and leave their baggage, because your order, given just before night, prevented them from finding their baggage animals; you left on post your open picket guard unnotified of your retreat; and as we passed the houses of Gonzales, our ears were met with the heart-rending shrieks of those females, who heretofore, confidently depending on Texian courage, had made no provision for a removal; and last, though not least, our way was lighted by the unnecessary and indefensible burning of Gonzales. 74 Such, sir, is a faint picture of your first military move. I will not renew your recollection by a further review of the horrors of that disgraceful night. Worn down in spirit and body, we reached, shortly before day, Peach creek, ten miles this side of Gonzales. Here your men confidently expected that you would make a stand, because on your retreat from Gonzales you said you would retreat to the tall timbers, and no one for a moment thought that you had any intention of proceeding as far as the Colorado. But you precipitately left your camp early that same morning, induced by a sound resembling that of a cannon which repeatedly elicited from you the expression that you “had no idea that the enemy would be upon you so soon,” but which we afterwards learned was only the explosion of whisky barrels in ill-fated Gonzales. You made forced marches for the Colorado amid the murmurings and complaints of your dissatisfied army. You crossed the Colorado fifteen miles above the great crossing at Beason's; taking a solitary and unusual route, one certainly which the enemy would not think of taking, and which they did not take. You remained there * * * 75days, and finally at the remonstrance of many of your officers and the universal complaints of your men, you removed down to Beason's crossing. * * * What possible reason could you have for going to Burnham's crossing? No one that I have ever heard speak on the subject has been able to assign any. * * *
You are now, sir, encamped on the eastern bank of the Colorado, with an army numbering from fifteen hundren to seventeen hundred men. But we will here make a pause, and, leaving out of the question the disgracefulness of the retreat, make some inquiry into its influence on the better interests of the country.
When you commenced your retreat from Gonzales Col. Fannin was at Goliad with five hundred men. You attempted no diversion in his favor, you attempted no co-operation, 76 you sent him no intelligence of your movements, of your ulterior intention. * * * How easy it would have been for you to have fallen down upon Victoria and by uniting with Fannin have brought off his whole detachment in safety; for your army by that time, with the numerous recruits there were coming in, would have equaled at least fifteen hundred men, a number that under any other leader would not have thought of a retreat; but would have marched to battle and to certain victory. * * *
By your retreat you abandoned the whole country west of the Colorado to the enemy; but what was still more disastrous than all, you infused a feeling of terror and dismay into the minds of the people; and so soon as it was heard that you were retreating, hundreds who were on their way to join the army at once returned for the purpose of removing their families beyond danger. The people of Texas, although aware of their vast inferiority in point of number, to the Mexicans, yet had boldly gone into a declaration of independence, reasoning from numerous battles that had occurred, that they were a full match for the Mexicans with a difference of ten to one. When the Declaration of Independence was made, it was supposed that Santa Anna had an army of ten thousand men in Texas, and yet the people, so far from running away, were hastening to the army for the purpose of “enjoying a frolic” in whipping the Mexicans, as they styled it. So soon, however, as it was found that you were retreating, a new face was given to the whole matter. It was at once said that Texas was lost, that the men we now had to fight were a different order from the Mexicans we had so often whipped. It was said that Santa Anna with choice legions was coming down upon us, and that so far from whipping them ten to one, we were unable to contend with them man to man. So soon as you crossed the Colorado the families all to the west of that river hurried away to the settlements on the east side, and by the dreadful accounts given in their terror the feeling became general, and universal consternation seized the country. Thousands who had a week before little dreamed that anything was to be apprehended from Mexicans, who were going and preparing to go to the army, were now scattered throughout the land, fleeing from the wrath behind them. The situation of things at this time was awful. You yourself perceived the magnitude of your folly and you sent messengers throughout the country, telling the people to stay at home, that you intended to fight and to whip the enemy on the Colorado. This assurance had a most salutary influence. A large number did stop in their career, and many of them were hurrying to the army when they found they were in full retreat to the Brazos. All confidence in you now was gone; people gave up the country as wholly lost, and then commenced that “runaway scrape” as 'tis called in Texas, which did not stop until many had passed the Sabine and others heard of the fortune of our arms at San Jacinto.
* * * You were now, as I have before said, encamped on the eastern bank of the Colorado. You now have an army of from fifteen hundred to seventeen hundred men, and notwithstanding the terrible panic that has siezed the country, you have every reason to believe that a short time will make it two thousand. On the opposite side Gen. Siesma, the Mexican general, is encamped with seven hundred men. Your spies assure you that no reinforcement is at hand, that his encampment can easily be approached; and one universal burst from the army desired you to lead them to the conflict; yet you hesitated. * * * Col. Sherman, who commanded the crossing at Dewees's earnestly entreated that he might be permitted to cross over with three hundred men, promising to rout the enemy or not return alive. This you declined and yet hesitated to fight. You hesitated so long that the most mutinous feeling began to show itself, and to allay the storm, you unequivocally assured the army that you would fight on the next morning at daybreak. You even went so far as to write letters to families on the Colorado to remain at home, assuring them that you would fight next morning at daybreak. * * * That morning, however, * * * broke to an army dispirited and mutinous, desperate in the highest degree; but still unresolved what to do. You had promised in the morning to fight at daybreak of the next; but on the evening of that same day you called the army together and made it a speech. You represented the imperative necessity of the encampment being removed to a place where water and grass could be had, and although this seemed unaccountably strange, when you were engaged to fight the next morning, yet your order was obeyed, and you retreated seven miles that evening. No one had the most distant conception that you were retreating from the enemy until they came up with Col. Sherman's command. *** The whole country west of that river was now possessed by the enemy; universal panic had siezed the people; women and children were flying in crowds from their homes and scattered throughout the land, presented an object of harrowing pity that made your brave army weep. Fannin had now capitulated to an overwhelming force and his fate was uncertain. Had you crossed the river and captured Siesma and his army, as you could have so easily done, you would have had such hostages as would have saved Fannin and his men from the cruel fate to which they were destined. *** But, sir, independent of all other considerations, in a military point of view, now was the time to fight. Texas, as I have before stated, had gone into this revolution anticipating that she would have to battle with the odds largely against her. If she could not whip Mexico man to man, then indeed was her cause helpless; but here by some strange infatuation, a force of seven hundred men had deliberately thrown itself in your way and you had but to reach forth your hand to capture it. If you could not destroy this force, then was utter ruin to Texas the consequence. If with two to one you were not a match for Siesma, when and where and how did you expect to contend with Santa Anna, when he should unite his detachments and marshal an army of ten thousand, as you then supposed, animated by its victories and confident of success? You could not have thought ever to have had a better opportunity than the one before you. *** As the Commander-in-Chief of Texas you could not have placed Santa Anna's forces in a more disadvantageous situation for himself or more advantageous for yourself. Siesma had seven hundred men on the Colorado before you. Santa Anna was at Gonzales, sixty miles distant, on the march with one thousand men under Filisola. Gaona was on the march to Bastrop with one thousand men, on his way to the Trinity (the upper route); Gen. Andrade was at Bexar with fifteen hundred men; Gen. Urrea at Goliad with two thousand men; and numerous small detachments scattered at different points to the west of San Antonio. Now, sir, by routing Siesma, you could have immediately have fallen upon Santa Anna on his way from Gonzales, and have given him battle with nearly two to one in your favor. A victory over him would have given you the choice of attacking Gaona or Urrea, as you might have deemed proper, without the ability on the part of one to have assisted the other. With the exception of Urrea, every detachment of Santa Anna's army was inferior in point of numbers to your own, and you then and there *** refused an