The Mejía Expedition extended over a period of not more than thirty or forty days during the summer months of 1832. However, in the consideration of this important affair, it will be necessary not only to relate the happenings during the course of it, but also to take note of the preceding incidents in Mexico which constituted the occasion. Nor would the subject be complete without a statement of the purpose for which Mejía left Tampico, and without an account of the results which he accomplished. Hence, my object will be to set forth as thorough and exhaustive an explanation of all these matters as, within the limits of this paper, is possible.
The causes, which in the end brought about the Plan of Vera Cruz and the Mejía Expedition, began operating, it may be said, precisely on the first day of January, 1830. On that day, Bustamante, the vice-president of the Mexican Republic, assumed executive control, and a short time afterwards, having selected his ministry, he inaugurated one of the most despotic administrations that Mexico has ever seen. Congress was forced to legalize the revolution by which he had gained supreme sovereignty over the state. The power thus attained was used to persecute the adherents of the “yorkino or popular party,” to abridge the freedom of the press, and to contaminate the courts of justice and equity. Under such circumstances the people became restless, and frequent insurrections broke out in various parts of the federation which were as often crushed by the arms of Bustamante. 1
The Houses, during the session of 1831-1832, were the mere tools of Bustamante and his cabinet. They even went so far as to establish “special courts to terrorize those discontented with the existing order of things, giving the government almost unlimited powers, decreeing proscriptions, and rewarding crime. It [the Congress] permitted the executive, without protest, to modify or construe the laws at will.” 2
Such was the status of the Mexican government when the command stationed at Vera Cruz, unable longer to stand the arbitrary acts of the existing government, published the Plan of Vera Cruz, on the night of January 2, 1832. On the invitation of Ciriaco Vasquez, commandant general of Vera Cruz, the officers of that force met, and, fearing that civil war was imminent and desiring to avoid this grave calamity, adopted the following resolutions, which were collectively known as the Plan of Vera Cruz:—
Art. 1.“The garrison of Vera Cruz renews the declarations made by the plan of Jalapa, to resolutely sustain its oath to preserve the federal constitution and the laws.
Art. 2.“It beseeches the vice-president to dismiss the ministry, whom public opinion accuses of promoting and protecting centralism, and of tolerating abuses against civil liberty and individual rights.
Art. 3.“Two officers of this garrison will be commissioned to present this proclamation to General Don Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, and to petition his honor to accept it and condescend to come to this place and take command of the troops.
Art. 4.“In such case, the garrison will abstain from directing any procedure and from taking final steps in this affair, since General Santa Anna will send this act, and the declarations which he judges convenient, to the Vice-President and to the other authorities of the federation and the states, dictating the other measures which may be opportune for carrying out the noble aims of those who may join us.” 3
Santa Anna was not slow to recognize his constituents in Vera Cruz, and on the afternoon of the 3d he arrived in that city, where he “was received with shouts by the troops of the garrison and a portion of the people.” 4
The Plan of Vera Cruz and its adoption by Santa Anna aroused no little uneasiness at the capital, and when the general addressed a communication to Bustamante expressing his desire to see the peaceable dissolution of the cabinet, the crisis came. The ministers surrendered their portfolios, but congress would not countenance their resignations. Hence, the only alternative left to the government was to attempt to stifle the incipient rebellion. This it did, and the opposition met with several reverses during the months of January and February, 1832. 5
The Mexican nation at first exhibited some hesitancy in acquiescing in the “plan,” but with the beginning of spring the standard of insurrection was floated at various places. Fernandez, the ex-governor of Tamaulipas, declared his adhesion to the party at Vera Cruz. General Moctezuma, the commandant at Tampico, “coinciding with this step, issued a proclamation in the city of Tampico on the 20th [March], placing himself at the disposal of General Santa Anna.” 6
A struggle for supremacy at once began in the quarter where the revolutionary ideas had gained a fast hold between the followers of absolutism on the one hand and the supporters of liberalism on the other. Moctezuma was besieged by General Mier y Terán, the principal commandant of the Eastern States. Later Terán drew his battalions away, and began recruiting and strengthening his lines. This threatening attitude led the commandant of Tampico to believe that Terán was preparing for a second and fiercer attack on his charge.
The foregoing summary furnishes an outline of Mexican history from 1830 to 1832, and also gives the cause for the declaration of the plan of Vera Cruz and, hence, the ultimate reason, as we shall see forthwith, for the Mejía expedition. This brings us to the next phase of our subject, which is the true starting point of this paper.
Col. José Antonio Mejía, of the Mexican army, had, some time during the spring of 1832, placed himself and his entire force under Moctezuma's orders. Laboring under the impression that Tampico would be assailed, as noted above, General Moctezuma ordered this officer to sail against Soto la Marina and Matamoros, which strongholds were defended by the “ministerial” troops, in order to attract Terán's attention thither. 7 In accordance with these instructions, Mejía passed out of the harbor of Tampico on the 22d of June, 1832, 8 with a fleet “composed of a brig, two schooners, and two other small ships,” 9 having on board some three hundred soldiers. 10 Mejía's first point of assault was Soto la Marina, but Sergeant Major Micheltorena had thrown up fortifications along the strand, and, in this way, baffled the commander of the expedition. Thus the squadron was compelled to proceed to Matamoros, or rather, Brazos de Santiago, 11 where it anchored at four o'clock in the afternoon, June 26, 1832. 12 Lieut. Col. Alexander Yhari, with a considerable number of men prepared to oppose the debarkation of the Santa Anna soldiers, “but the brave chief of the detachment of the Liberating Army,” says the Boletín, “advanced in a pilot boat, took the schooner Juanita, anchored within Pistol shot of the point occupied by Yhari, and covered the landing of his troops from the launches. As soon as the landing was effected, Yhari was invited to pronounce for Santa Anna, which he refused to do, but his troops immediately proclaimed the plan of the free, and with enthusiasm joined their Standard.” 13 “Immediately after taking possession of the Brazos Santiago,” continues the Boletín, “a party of one hundred infantry with two pieces of artillery, marched to Boca Chica, where they raised an intrenchment. 14 On the 27th, the force was augmented by a number of the military and citizens who hastened with delight to sustain the cause of the free, or perish in the attempt.
“On the 28th a party of 54 or 60 cavalry were discovered approaching, 15 and it was the desire of the commander in chief not to injure them, altho' he knew the obstinacy of the officer, Don Ignacio Rodriguez, who commanded them and who retired with his troops and occupied a position on the main road.” Lieutenant Gonzales then took the leadership of Rodriguez' men and “joined the lines of Colonel Mejía. At the same time a party of 40 infantry of the 11th battalion also joined Colonel Mejía's division.” 16
With his original companies and with those of the Bustamante party who had declared for Santa Anna, Mejía made his triumphal entry into Matamoros, June 29, without any resistance, 17 either on the side of the citizens, or on that of the hostile soldiery. The Boletín notes that “Colonel Mejía's division of the liberating army is therefore in full possession of this town, increased by a great number who have joined it. The utmost tranquillity prevails; the inhabitants are tranquil, because they now see the falsehood of what has been stated by the enemies of the cause which was proclaimed by the heroic conqueror of Tampico, Genl. Antonio Lopez de Santa Ann.” 18
Prior to Mejía's capture of Matamoros, Colonel José Mariano Guerra, the “ministerial” commandant of that place, retired to San Fernando de Presas with about seventy of his presidials. 19 Here Guerra obstinately remained, drilling and equipping his men, and preparing to defend himself to the last extremity should he be attacked by Santa Anna's adherents. Nor at first would he consent to an interview with Mejía, although the latter expressed this desire time and again. Finally, however, on July 4, Guerra received an express from Colonel Mejía, stating that the Texas colonists had stormed Fort Velasco, and that Colonel Ugartechea had been forced to capitulate. Moreover, Mejía added that they should drop their enmity for the present and coöperate to save Texas for the Mexican confederation. 20 On the following day, July 5, the “ministerial” commandant, who had been expecting Col. Paredes y Arrillaga to come to his aid with three hundred men, was informed that, on account of Terán's death, he (Paredes) could not move his division until new orders were transmitted from Commandant Don Ignacio Mora. Then Guerra made the best of his opportunities by signifying his acquiescence in Mejía's proposed meeting. Thus at 4:30 P. M., July 6, the two colonels met at Palo Blanco and agreed to a convention, which may be summarized as follows:
The compact recounted that Colonel Mejía, being in possession of Matamoros and consequently of all branches of the administration, had intercepted various letters from Fort Velasco and other Texas points addressed to the commandant of that place, and that by these communications he had been informed that the Texas colonies were in rebellion and threatened to attack Anahuac and Velasco. This attitude of the Anglo-Americans endangered the integrity of the Mexican territory, and hence it was highly essential that the Mexican forces should attempt to defend the colonies. Mejía had therefore desired, at any rate, to impart the news of the recent events in Texas to Guerra, and with this aim in view he had invited the latter to an interview.
By the articles which succeeded this review of the late occurrences it was agreed (Art. 1) that Mejía should proceed to Texas for the purpose of succoring the Mexican military, and preserving the integrity of the national domain. Moreover, (Art. 2) Guerra pledged himself to aid Mejía in this undertaking with all his resources and to force all the authorities of Matamoros to do likewise. Mejía promised (Art. 3) to leave immediately for the Texas ports. It was specified (Art. 4) that there should be an armistice between the contending partisans. Further, (Art. 5) there was a provision that the persons, property, and rights of the citizens of Matamoros and its environs, whether of one party or the other, should be equally guaranteed and respected. Again (Art. 6), should Mejía see fit to put into the Brazo on his return from the colonies, it was declared that his right to do so would not be questioned, and that Guerra should give him any assistance needed. Finally, (Art. 7) it was said that the two colonels would decide as to what should de done with the prisoners et cetera in Matamoros which had been seized by Mejía. 21
For the better understanding of the expedition which followed it will be worth while to depart from the thread of the story at this point, and take cognizance of the trend of events in Texas for the two years previous to 1832.
Anglo-Americans from the United States were invited by the Mexican colonization laws to come to a land blessed with all human requirements, rich and free, the beautiful province of Texas. They from the North were offered broad domains and equal rights with the native Mexicans, if they would swear allegiance to the flag of their benefactor, and accept, or adhere to, the Catholic creed. Many of our ancestors took advantage of this Latin liberality, and during the years from 1825 to 1830 pioneers flocked to the future “Lone Star State.”
At length the Mexican government determined to check the influx of these immigrants into Texas. The effort was made in the enactment by the general Mexican congress of the decree of April 6, 1830. The motive for the passage of this decree was that the Mexicans were jealous of the growing power and influence of the Texas colonists, and they feared that the Texans would join hands with their countrymen in the United States with the object of annexing Texas to the republic of the North. Hence, it was extremely necessary that Texas should be severed entirely from Northern tutelage, and such a law as that of April 6, 1830, was thought to be the only true way to attain the cherished end. Article eleven of this act was intended to prevent further settlement within the Texas borders by immigrants from the United States. Perhaps this section would not have had its immense significance to the colonists, if the law had not at the same time provided the means of its enforcement. By article four the Mexican executive was empowered to seize those lands which he might deem suitable for fortifications and arsenals. Moreover, in clause fourteen, the president was given leave to expend as much as five hundred thousand dollars in the construction of forts and posts along the Texas frontiers. 22
Soon after the decree of April 6 was published, in accordance with the articles cited above, General Mier y Terán, the principal commandant of the Eastern States, erected fortresses at Anahuac, Velasco, Nacogdoches, Tenoxtitlán, and elsewhere, and garrisoned them with the lowest types of Mexican soldiery under the command, in some instances, of exceedingly insolent officers. For at least two years the colonists lived under the hated rule of this despotic Mexican military, which set at naught alike the civil jurisdiction of the State of Coahuila and Texas and the individual rights of the citizens. The Texans were seriously offended by the conduct of the authorities, and they accordingly enumerated their grievances as follows:
1.“Don José Francisco Madero was appointed, in 1832, by Coahuila-Texas its commissioner to survey the lands in the District of Nacogdoches, east of the San Jacinto, and to grant landtitles to the inhabitants of that community. He arrived in Jan., 1831, and had progressed some with his duties, when he and his surveyor, José Maria Carbajal, were arrested by the commandant of Anahuac, J. D. Bradburn, because the aforesaid surveyors were operating in opposition to the edict of April 6, 1830.
2.“On Dec. 10, 1831, Bradburn annulled the Ayuntamiento of Liberty, legally established by Madero, and set up one of his own at Anahuac.
3.“Bradburn appropriated lands to his especial benefit without having the proper authority for so doing.
4.“This same officer prohibited the holding of an election for choosing the Alcalde of Liberty and the members of the Ayuntamiento, and threatened the people with military force if they attempted this.
5.“Peaceable and quiet citizens were taken into custody, because they expressed their opinions concerning Bradburn's illegal acts.
6.“Bradburn had induced servants to quit their masters, offering them protection, and, when called upon by the owners to deliver them up, had enlisted them into his rank and file.
7.“In the month of May, 1832, seven of the leading citizens were apprehended by Bradburn, who, on being asked to give the prisoners over to the civil magistrates, declared that he would send all of them to Mexico to be tried by a Military Tribunal.” 23
This last arbitrary step brought the matter to a point and the wronged colonists about Bradburn's ears. Feeling that they had been unjustly abused the residents of this province were not long in coming to the conclusion that the best and only way to procure their rights and liberties was by force of arms. About the first of June, 1832, Anahuac was therefore assailed by a party of Anglo-Americans. Some days later the colonists stirred up trouble with Colonel Ugartechea, at Fort Velasco, because he would not permit the passage of the schooner Brazoria, which had on board some cannon that the insurgents were anxious to use in the reduction of Anahuac. After a battle of eleven hours, Commandant Ugartechea ran up the white flag. Immediately thereafter he wrote to Guerra concerning his plight, and it was these letters which Mejía intercepted, which he transmitted to Guerra on July 4, and which brought about the interview between the two on July 6, 1832. 24
However, before returning to Matamoros and Mejía, attention must be called to the fact that not all of Texas even tacitly sanctioned the events at Anahuac and Velasco. Indeed, so far were they from being enthusiastic over the deeds of their fellow-citizens, that the people of San Felipe and Matagorda cried out in a way that was very injurious to the cause of the insurgents.
The action taken by the townsmen of San Felipe clearly shows the existence of a conservative spirit. Acquainting themselves with the character of the late disturbances and the critical situation in Austin's colony, the ayuntamiento, together with seventy representative residents of San Felipe, assembled on June 25, 1832, and in a series of resolutions 25 they declared themselves, in a most decided fashion, as opposed to the “precipitate steps recently taken at Anahuac and Brazoria.” 26 The meeting prayed that all who had become entangled in the troubles should return to their homes, and that an investigation should be made of the conduct of Bradburn. In the sixth resolution it is stated that the convention would resent any attempts against the government to which all had sworn obedience, and which had heaped upon them with a beneficent and liberal hand favors and acts of kindness. The inhabitants, moreover, expressed their desire of coöperating with the political chief in reëstablishing order and tranquillity in their department. Finally, the colonists invited the districts of the municipality of San Felipe to join with them.
Again, on June 30, came an urgent appeal from the “peace party” to the colonists to save their adopted country from its impending ruin. In an address of the given date from the ayuntamiento of San Felipe to the public, that body exhorted all true men to support the Mexican laws and the constitution. “Act now in your movements promptly and rapidly,” wrote the council, “and unite heartily with us in order to save the colony and other fellow-countrymen from the destruction which threatens them, so that our sons in future centuries may have the happiness of counting their ancestors as among the number of those who, in the year 1832, saved the municipality of the town of San Felipe from the terrible effects of anarchy and confusion, and the consequent annihilation with which these two menaced it.” 27
In pursuance of the San Felipe declarations, which besought the aid of the districts of the municipality of San Felipe, the residents of Matagorda convened on July 2, 1832, and proclaimed themselves in favor of the government and the constitution of the United Mexican States. They deeply deplored the untimely affairs at Anahuac and Brazoria, and promised the political chief their moral support in the forthcoming investigation of these occurrences. 28
With this evidence that there was, previous to Mejía's coming, a sharply defined division in political sentiment in Texas, the reader is prepared to follow the narrative of the expedition from Matamoros.
After the conference with Guerra, Colonel Mejía returned from Palo Blanco to Matamoros, and made preparations to reëmbark his troops. On the 8th of July he left the latter place and marched toward Brazos Santiago with his whole force, now composed of about four hundred soldiers. The embarkation took place on the 10th, and Filisola says that the expedition sailed on that day to Tampico, it being Mejía's aim to rejoin there the cavalry which he had dispatched overland. 29 Suarez y Navarro gives the same time for the departure of Mejía from Brazo. He writes that “having provided all that was necessary, he set sail on the 10th of July for Tampico, with the object of joining General Moctezuma,” but as the general had gone to San Luis, Mejía failed to see him. 30 Austin wrote from Matamoros on the 9th that Mejía would leave on the 10th, but for Texas. 31
There is, however, sufficient evidence to prove that Mejía's squadron quitted Brazos Santiago on July 14, 1832. It is a well-established fact that the expedition arrived off the mouth of the Brazos River on the 16th, and Mejía's own words show that he must have gone out from the Brazo July 4, late in the evening. He tells us: “I sailed from Matamoros with the Fleet and forces under my command, and in forty hours anchored off the Bar of this river.” 32
If, then, Mejía did start to Texas on July 14th, and there seems no way of denying it, we must, nevertheless, attempt to explain the date of the 10th of July, as the time of his sailing. The only solution for the problem is that he left Brazos Santiago twice—once on the 10th, and again on the 14th. As Suarez y Navarro says, Mejía went to Tampico on the 10th, and, not finding Moctezuma there, he immediately came back to the Brazo. Then on the 14th he passed out of the Matamoros port for the second time, and made his way to Texas. 33
Prior, however, to the Texas expedition, Mejía and Guerra, had urged Col. S. F. Austin, who was at Matamoros on his way home from the State legislature, to accompany the troops to Texas. This Austin consented to do, in order that he might contribute whatever service he could to his adopted country. He says in a letter to Colonel Mejía:—“I must say I am satisfied that there are no views among the colonists of Texas which endanger the integrity of the Mexican territory, and that the disturbances there have resulted from the arbitrary acts of the Military officials of the General Government. . . . Notwithstanding, I believe it of the highest importance to go to Texas for the purpose of calming the tumults and reëstablishing harmony.” 34
Austin's presence on the expedition perhaps obviated much trouble and many inconveniences between Mejía and the colonists, and for this reason it has been considered essential to dwell at some length upon his connection with the Texas voyage.
At six o'clock in the afternoon of July 16, the flotilla reached the mouth of the Brazos River, and, after having exchanged communications with John Austin, the second alcalde, Mejía and Austin proceeded to Brazoria. 35 The people of the precinct had previously appointed a deputation to wait upon the two gentlemen, and “on their arrival on the east bank of the Brazos, they were saluted with the firing of 3 cannon,—and after partaking of some refreshments, at Major Brigham's, crossed the river, at the bank of which they were received by the committee and by two of the signers of the Turtle Bayou resolutions 36 who were present (Capt. Wiley Martin, and Luke Lessasier),—conducted to a pavillion erected for the purpose, and saluted by one gun.” Speeches followed. “After which a further salute of 21 guns, a feu de joy, from one of the companies who were in the action at Fort Velasco, were fired, when the Colonels were escorted to the residence of John Austin Esq. 2nd Alcalde, by a numerous body of our citizens who, on returning to town, manifested their joyful feelings by illuminations, bon-fires, firing of cannon, &c, all the night.” 37
The next day at three o'clock a meeting of the townsmen of Brazoria was held for the purpose of explaining the causes of the “late disturbances” in Texas. The remaining days of the week were spent in gigantic preparations for a “public dinner and ball” to the eminent visitors. We are told that “last evening (Sunday, July 22) a splendid dinner and ball were given at Brazoria in celebration of the constitution, and in honor of its distinguished advocate, Genl. Santa Anna; at which Col. José Antonio Mexia, and Col. S. F. Austin, were invited guests.
“The dinner party was such as an occasion of patriotic rejoicing should always produce—it was large, cheerful, and convivial; and full of republican feeling and generous enthusiasm.” Toasts to the health of General Santa Anna, to the separation of Coahuila and Texas, and sundry others were heartily responded to by all. 38
Colonel Mejía had remained in Brazoria for six days and had been convinced, we may be sure, of the loyalty of the colonists in that section, when he decided to continue his expedition to Galveston with the object of bringing the Anahuac garrison over to his standard. Thus “on the afternoon of the 23rd Col. Mexia, having regulated the custom-house department, and other public matters, at Brazoria, in the most satisfactory and harmonious manner, departed to embark for Galveston and Anahuac”. 39 Granting that the ships did not leave Velasco before the morning of the 24th—for some time must be allowed for the trip from Brazoria down and for the arrangements to make sail—the conclusion is reached that on that same day, the 24th, Mejía arrived in Galveston Bay. 40 On crossing the bar, his men described two or three vessels which were coming out, bearing the troops formerly stationed at Anahuac, under the command of Sergeant Major Felix Subarán. Mejía was informed that the soldiers under Subarán had joined the republiccan party and were now on their way to swell the ranks of Santa Anna. Learning this he started on his return to Tampico, “without having heard the least report from the men who were going out from Galveston, or offering them convoy, much less money”. 41
It is probable that Mejía, on his return journey, stopped for a short period at Matamoros, as he had reserved the right to do so in the compact of July 6, and, as Matamoros was in his direct route, he may have called there for supplies, etc. 42 Thence he went direct to Tampico, where he arrived on the 28th of July. The exact date, however, is not of especial importance, since his commission was really finished, with the exceptions which will soon be taken up, when he left Galveston Bay.
The work of the Mejía expedition was not altogether completed by the adhesion of the municipality of Brazoria and the companies of the Anahuac stronghold. On the contrary, Piedras at Nacogdoches still maintained his power, and sundry districts had neither declared for nor against the plan of Vera Cruz. One of the colonists wrote that “Col. Mexia had not marched on Nachidoch on account of the Scarcity of provisions nor had he heard from them. He however left if with the Americans to send Col. Piedras on to the westward a prisoner, to take him without bloodshed if possible, if not, to use force”. 43 Thus the Texans fell heir to the unfinished part of Mejía's mission, and it devolved upon them to oust Piedras and to take such further action relative to the Plan as best suited their ideas and wishes. This phase of the subject—the aftermath of the expedition—will be discussed in full under the next sub-head, as will also the various steps taken by the colonists anent the Plan before Mejía's expedition to Texas.
When the Texans found themselves before Anahuac in June, 1832, bearing arms and endeavoring to persuade Colonel Bradburn to respect their liberties and think as they did along certain American lines, they appear to have suddenly suspected that Mexico would deem their deeds rebellious. The colonists well knew what they were battling for, but the question was, could the Mexican nation understand the meaning and character of their grievances, or would it not rather be inclined to misinterpret their operations and attribute to them a great deal more significance than was their due? Now there were two parties in Mexico—one headed by Bustamante and upholding absolute principles, the other, with Santa Anna as the nucleus, supporting “democratic-republican-federal” ideas. Hence, the colonists had two chances of putting themselves in the right with part of the Mexicans at least by sanctioning the “platform” of either side. Being Americans it was the most natural, and in fact the only, measure the “rebels” could take, to declare for Santa Anna—the defender of republican principles. Therefore, although the impression survives that the men congregated around Anahuac accepted the Plan of Vera Cruz simply as a pretext for having attacked that place, there seems no reason to doubt that, so far as they were inclined to take part in national politics at all, they would have preferred the party of Santa Anna to that of Bustamante.
Again, the circumstances surrounding the case favored the Texans. The Anahuac garrison belonged to the “ministerial,” or Bustamante, faction; and, if the colonists were fighting against the adherents of this faction, it would, in the nature of things, be out of place for them to be attached to the same party. Hence, they adhered to the other. But I repeat that they must have been pleased to sustain political theories similar to those under which they had been reared.
On June 13, 1832, the “farmers” in their camp at Turtle Bayou, six miles north of Anahuac, concurred in what were named “the Turtle Bayou Resolutions,” in favor of the plan of Vera Cruz. These resolutions are as follows:
“Resolved—That we view with feelings of the deepest regret, the manner in which the government of the Republic of Mexico is administered by the present dynasty. The repeated violations of the Constitution; the total disregard of the laws; the entire prostration of the civil power; 44 are grievances of such a character, as to arouse the feelings of every freeman, and impel him to resistance!
“Resolved—That we view with feelings of the deepest interest, and solicitude, the firm and manly resistance which is made by those Patriots under the highly talented and distinguished chieftain Santa Anna, to the numerous encroachments and infractions which have been made, by the present Administration, upon the Laws and Constitution of our beloved and adopted country.
“Resolved—That as freemen devoted to a correct interpretation and enforcement of the constitution and laws, according to their true spirit, we pledge our lives and fortunes, in support of the same, and of those distinguished leaders who are now so gallantly fighting in defense of civil Liberty.
“Resolved—That all the people of Texas, be invited to coöperate with us, in support of the principles incorporated in the foregoing resolutions.” 45
These resolutions were signed by Wiley Martin, John Austin, L. Lesassier, W. H. Jack, H. B. Johnson, and R. M. Williamson.
The reception of the plan by the Texans in general will now be described. The different municipalities will be taken up in the order in which they declared themselves concerning it, and the action of each will be followed out as completely as possible.
At Victoria.
The sentiments heralded in the declarations just noted were at once ratified in some portions of the country. In an address delivered by W. D. C. Hall of the precinct of Victoria during Mejía's sojourn in Brazoria, he remarked that the inhabitants of his district had been informed of the Turtle Bayou pronunciamento. The speaker then continued that “we were rejoiced to see this declaration, for such had been for a long time our own feelings and wishes—The people of this precinct, therefore, immediately met and concurred in the declaration for the constitution and Santa Anna.” 46
At a second assemblage in the town of Victoria, the residents again sanctioned the principles of the “liberal party”. We are told that “at a large and respectable meeting of the citizens of the Precinct of Victoria convened according to public notice on the 16th of July, they unanimously Re-solved to succeed or perish in the cause of the constitution and Santa Anna, or in other words the plan of Vera Cruz.” The body then elected a committee of vigilance for the promotion of their cause. “On the night of the same day the committee `learned of' the arrival of Col. Mexia, a friend and officer of Genl. Santa Anna, at our port, from Matamoros. . . . bringing us the joyful intelligence of the surrender of Matamoros”. 47 On hearing this welcome news the convention reiterated its strong attachment to the plan.
With these more or less fragmentary notices of the reception of the plan of Vera Cruz at Victoria, we will now pass on to Brazoria where the enthusiasm for Santa Anna was made more manifest than anywhere else in Texas.
At Brazoria.
One of the objects for which Mejía came to the colonies was to promote the cause of the “liberal” leader and to disseminate the principles recently inaugurated by the Vera Cruz garrison. He revealed his real intention in a letter to the second alcalde of Brazoria, John Austin, enclosing a copy of the compact between himself and Guerra of July 6, in which he pointed out what would have been his course toward the disturbers of the peace, “had the late movements . . . been directed against the integrity of the national territory”. But, as he had been assured by sundry respectable men that the recent events “were on account of the colonists having adhered to the Plan of Vera Cruz,” the colonel affirmed that his troops, led by himself in person, would support and “protect their adhesion to the said plan”. 48 The mild and conciliatory tone of this note was due in great part, no doubt, to the influence of Stephen F. Austin, who, it will be recalled, accompanied the expedition to Texas.
The alcalde, in answering this communication, informed Mejía that a delegation, which had been selected by the people of Brazoria, would present him with some resolutions adopted a few days before anent the Plan of Santa Anna. Moreover, he said that the acts aimed at explaining the motives by which the Texans had been governed, and contained their “true sentiments”. Austin detailed at length the reasons for attacking the Mexican soldiery, and gave the result in each case.
“This, Sir,” he concluded, “is what has passed. I hope it will be sufficient to convince you that these inhabitants have not manifested any other desire or intention, than to unite with Genl. Santa Anna, to procure the establishment of peace in the Republic, under the shield of the Constitution and Laws . . . and that the sovereignty of the States shall be respected”. 49
On the 16th day of July, 1832, the residents of the community gathered and resolved to continue their adhesion to the plan of Vera Cruz, which action was taken before they learned of Mejía's having anchored at the mouth of the Brazos. 50 The following day, having heard in the meantime of the arrival of the forces from Tampico, the citizens appointed a delegation to welcome Colonel Mejía to Brazoria. 51
This delegation met the commander of the fleet after his debarkation at Velasco, and escorted him to Brazoria. William H. Wharton, the chairman of the reception committee, immediately after the arrival of the party, read the following characteristic address:
“Col. Mexia: We view you as a fellow struggler in the same field with ourselves, and as the harbinger of the happy intelligence that the cause of the constitution and Santa Anna, or, in other words, the cause of truth and justice and liberty has triumphed most signally and gloriously. We hail the day of your arrival among us, in the sacred cause you came to advocate, as the brightest one that ever shone on the prospects of Texas.” The colonists felt in duty bound “to go heart and hand” with Santa Anna, “and not 24 hours have elapsed, since, in a numerous and public meeting, we resolved to succeed or perish with him. We declared for his cause, sir, when it was in doubt, and now that it is triumphant, we give you the most solemn pledges, that in putting down the present violators of the constitution, and bringing the government back to a strictly legitimate mode of procedure, Genl. Santa Anna shall have our warmest support and our most zealous coöperation.” 52
Mejía was apparently completely won over by all this effusion of eloquence and flattery, and he replied in choice terms that it pleased him mightily to perceive the devotion of the Texans “to the Mexican confederation, to the constitution, and to his excellency, Genl. Lopez de Santa Anna”. Moreover, the aims which the colonists sought to attain were the same as those proclaimed in Vera Cruz—“Federation, Laws, and a Liberal Ministry, which will respect the general constitution and the sovereignty of the States”. The Colonel continued that “the cause which you have thus adopted is that of the people against oppression; that of the friends of federal institutions against the military and oppressive government which the ministers of Genl. Bustamante wished to establish. These being the principles which influence this respectable community, I should be inconsistent with my own, were I not to offer them my friendship, and the support of the chiefs under whose orders I am acting.” 53
Not only were the people of Brazoria formal supporters of the plan of Vera Cruz, but they even permitted their ardor and admiration for Santa Anna to gain such a hold upon them that their impulsive expression betokened their warm feeling. Stephen F. Austin remarked that “on my arrival at Brazoria I found all the people unanimous and very enthusiastically in favor of the Plan of Santa Anna. They received Señor Mexia with the greatest pleasure and with a joy and happiness which I have never before seen in this country upon any occasion.” “Long live the constitution and the laws; long live the rights of the States; long live the Mexican Federation; and long live Santa Anna, the heroic defender of them,” were some of the distinguishable exclamations which arose from the crowd. 54
From the citations made in the last few paragraphs, the fact that the Anglo-Americans settled in and around Brazoria were firm supporters of the constitution, as against arbitrary government, is clearly obvious.
At San Felipe.
Under Section II mention was made of the resistance of San Felipe and Matagorda to the movements under taken by some of the colonists for the dismantling of Anahuac and Velasco. The observations there recorded gave evidence conclusive that these townships were uncompromisingly opposed to the action taken against the military posts and hostile to the principles sanctioned in the camp at Turtle Bayou. However, not more than a month had elapsed when the source of this conservatism—the village of San Felipe—declared vigorously for Santa Anna. This peculiar move seems anomalous and contradictory, and, although such is really the case, the explanation is not deep seated.
Horatio Chriesman, the alcalde, in defending the acts of the ayuntamiento, tells us that “it was necessary to take the step which has been taken, toward unifying public opinion and avoiding the sad results of disunion—It was the duty of the Ayuntamiento to apply remedies, and two were presented: the first was civil was within the municipality—; the other, to unify public opinion, and thus to establish harmony. The latter was adopted; and I believe that your Honor will say that the Council has done its duty as guardian of the public peace.” 55 Again, Col. S. F. Austin said that “it is not difficult to imagine that the presence of Col. Mexia exerted a decisive influence upon public opinion”. 56 These instances clearly show that the revulsion of sentiment of the San Felipe citizens was because they wished to ward off a clash with the Mexican troops under Mejía, and desired to be guaranteed in the possession and continuation of their rights—both personal and political.
The first news of the coming of Colonel Mejía reached San Felipe on July 20, 57 and the inhabitants of the latter community appear to have suddenly become eager upholders of Santa Anna. A squad of men was organized under the name of “the Santa Anna Volunteer Company,” and Colonel Austin who arrived at San Felipe on the 25th, was grandly received by the “republicans”. At 4 o'clock on the same afternoon citizens and soldiers alike met and swore fealty to the constitution of 1824. 58
The alcalde of San Felipe ordered, on July 20, an extra session of the ayuntamiento for the 26th of the same month. 59 In accordance with this notice the council convened on the appointed day and considered the question concerning the plan. It pointed out that Colonel Mejía had manifested his determination to aid the Texans in furthering Santa Anna's intentions, and that, since these aims had been highly approved by all classes, the ayuntamiento was, therefore, almost compelled to conform to them. 60
The ayuntamiento assembled again on the 27th, but this time its number was increased by the presence of many other residents. Austin expressed his opinion that the colonists in mass ought to adopt the plan of Santa Anna, and they at length did so, unanimously and rejoicingly, 61 in the following manner:
The ayuntamiento advanced practically the same reasons for joining with their fellow-countrymen, as had been put forward on the day before, and resolved (Art. 1) that they would adhere solemnly to the Plan, and to the “planks” of the liberal “platform.” In the second article it is specified that in supporting these principles, the inhabitants “have no other object in view, than to contribute their feeble voice and aid in sustaining the constitution, and the true dignity and decorum of the national flag, and the rights of the State of Coahuila and Texas which have been insulted by military encroachments in these colonies since 1830, and that they will be at all times ready to take up arms in defence of the independence and constitution of their adopted country and the integrity of its territory”. The remaining sections are the so-called “additional articles,” on the privileges of freemen, and on the formal presentation of copies of these declarations to various persons. 62
Austin's Colony was thus identified as a firm center of federalism, and as a staunch friend of General Santa Anna.
At Nacogdoches.
The earliest intimation that we have of the people of the Nacogdoches Department embroiling themselves with the troubles of 1832, is given by Col. Piedras, the commandant of the frontier, stationed at Nacogdoches, in the report of his relief expedition to Anahuac. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities at Anahuac, Piedras was apprized of it, and, on June 19, he set out with a small force with the intention of succoring the besieged Bradburn. Having advanced as far as Fort Terán, the company was met by a messenger from Anahuac by whom Piedras was informed that the colonists had declared for Santa Anna, 63 and that they were in communication with the residents of the Ayish Bayou, Bevil, and other places. The commandant of the frontier feared that the people of Ayish would be won over to the insurgents' cause, and hence he delayed in order to guard his rear. At Sabine, which he reached some days later, Piedras' worst anticipations were realized on his being told that meetings had already been held at many points in the district of Ayish, and that the settlers there had sanctioned the Plan. Although the precise date is not found, it may be inferred from the incidents mentioned in the report that the proceedings of the Ayish Bayou inhabitants occurred about June 24. 64
Piedras returned to Nacogdoches on the 11th of July where he heard that the Ayish Bayou colonists had not gone any further than to announce their acceptance of the Santa Anna plan. 65 He “doubled his guards,” however, made tremendous preparations for war, and sent a commission into the Ayish precinct to inquire into the real status of matters there—what was the purpose of those Americans and upon what forces they counted. The deputation brought back word that the only design of the citizens of Ayish was to uphold the constitution and Santa Anna against military tyranny and despotism, and to aid the civil authority and the people of Nacogdoches against the colonel of the frontier. 66
Piedras complained, on July 24, that there were sundry foreigners of American extraction stirring up the Texans by “drinking Santa Anna's health in public” and by otherwise spreading revolutionary ideas. Moreover, the plan was greeted with applause by the folk in general, but he exclaimed stoutly that he would hold out to the bitter end in the impending struggle, even though “the Alcalde and his Ayuntamiento” had turned from him. 67
The commandant made his assertion good by declining all stipulations set down by the partisans of the opposition. “Day after day, time after time,” says Frost Thorn of Nacogdoches, “the citizens of this village called on him for that object [i. e., to induce him to join Santa Anna]; I myself urged the case on him so repeatedly that I was fearful he would arrest me if I persisted—and as a stronger argument I showed him a Letter I had received from Mr. S. M. Wms. noting the arrival of yourself [Austin] and Coln Mehir &that the Colonists would assist Coln. M. if needed, &c, &c.—his replies I will not pretend to state to you, but they were all full of fight, &If in justification to the cause, &to counteract any false representation that might be made, you should wish to be made acquainted with the efforts the citizens used to prevent the effusion of Blood, a Note from you to the Alcalde of this district to take evidence will be immediately attended to—&It will appear that there was the utmost courtesy on the one Side &the most determined obstinacy on the other.” 68
On August 1, Colonel Piedras issued a statement 69 that “my officers and troop have resolved to sustain the government, the constitution, and the laws to which they have pledged themselves, and will not declare against them.” This action greatly exasperated the American settlers, and “the residents of the different districts of Ayish, Taja, 70 Sabine, Bevil, and Nacogdoches” convened on the next day, August 2, and adopted the appended articles:—
Art. 1.“That we pledge ourselves to our country and to each other in the presence of Almighty God, with all the justifiable means at our command, and under the banners of Santa Anna to defend the constitution and the federal-republican principles and the rights of the States—
Art. 2.“We consider that Señor Piedras ought to be required to approve the cause of the worthy Santa Anna,” and, should he refuse, he shall be relieved of his command.
Art. 3.provided that in case Piedras should offer resistance, a committee would demand that he turn over the troops to some officer inclined toward Santa Anna, and, if he refused, he would be forced to do so by means of arms. 71
The colonel very naturally would not consider the above orders, and hence it became essential to resort to arms. After a battle, lasting some six hours, the “ministerial” forces were obliged to retreat, which they did during the night of August 2 and in the direction of the Angelina river. 72
Some time on August 3, Piedras resigned the command of his soldiers, and on August 4, there was a meeting of the officers of the twelfth battalion at the Rancho de la Angelina where all sanctioned the plan of Vera Cruz. They invited their former colonel to join the republicans and regain his old position, and agreed to a provision that in case he did not accede, he was to be arrested and sent on to Mexico, a political prisoner. 73
The Anglo-American forces at Nacogdoches, on August 6 ratified the step taken at Angelina on the 4th, and on the 14th of the same month, the ayuntamiento of Nacogdoches, after relating the series of happenings which led up to the expulsion of Piedras, observed that the blood of eight patriots had sealed “their adhesion to the constitution and laws, and to the sustentation of the civil magistrates against military aggressions—under the banners of the invincible Genl. Santa Anna.” 74
The formal acknowledgment of the plan of Vera Cruz by the ayuntamiento of Nacogdoches is probably the last notice of the long-debated question in that vicinity, as the solution of the problem had been previously discovered and executed—viz., the ejection of Piedras.
At Bexar.
A little after the middle of July, 1832, Stephen F. Austin had begged the political chief at Bexar—the head of the local government in Texas—to call his ayuntamiento together for the purpose of upholding “the truth and the constitution.” 75 No voice, however, was raised by the authorities of San Antonio concerning this matter until several weeks later.
The news came to Bexar during the last week in August that on the 11th the plan of Vera Cruz had been proclaimed in Leona Vicario by the governor of the State. It was likewise added that the legitimacy of Pedraza's election to the presidency of the republic in 1828 was fully recognized. A contemporary document 76 states that “the Political Chief solemnly declared that the officials, all the people, and the military garrison of this city were from this moment [Aug. 30] attached to the Plan of Santa Anna . . . and consequently to the eligibility of Señor Gomez Pedraza, as President of the Republic”. 77 The same afternoon the convention of the citizens was celebrated in the main plaza by the firing of cannon and the chiming of bells. 78
At Goliad.
The last district to assert itself as to the plan of Vera Cruz was the municipality of Goliad. This town, however, took no action until about August 24 (with the exception of some irregular proceedings on July 14), when several of the most prominent persons forwarded the sanction of the civil officials to San Felipe. It will perhaps not be out of place to quote the entire communication, as it so clearly depicts the actual condition of affairs in Goliad.
“Sir:—The undersigned native citizens of the U. S. of A.—merchants residing here—have with much Satisfaction Seen the Declaration of your Ayuntamiento in favor of the plan of Santa Anna—the worthy Patriot and Defender of the Constitution and Laws of this Country.
“We perceive with increased Satisfaction, that the unanimous voice of the inhabitants of your Colony are in accordance, and we heartily concur with them. We approve the document (which will reach you by this same conveyance) addressed by the civil authorities of this place to those of yours.
“For your information we would advise you that the military force now here consists of between 50 &60 men. Most of them it is Supposed would join the Standard of Santa Anna,—Should oppt'y. offer, and the civic authorities and the citizens are undoubtedly favorable to him. These are now quiet, because they have neither force to commence, nor resources to Sustain, a Contest.” 79
Although, the writers of this note claim that the soldiers in the post of Goliad would perhaps amalgamate with the Santa Anna followers, still at the time the council met to pass upon the measures taken at San Felipe for the constitution, the commandant of the garrison refused to be present, and openly manifested his intention of remaining true to Bustamente, “untill compelled by force of arms to act otherwise”. 80
The military must have reconsidered and decided that its enmity was uncalled for, because on September 1, a committee waited upon the chief officer, and the latter came over to the federal party. The ayuntamiento assembled on the same day and publicly solemnized the resolutions embracing the faith of the Vera Cruz troops. At three o'clock in the afternoon, the townsmen and “civic militia” marched together through all the streets of the city, and announced aloud their love for and interest in the heroic General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna; while the commandant and the alcalde, now the best of companions, watched the final fusion of the discordant elements in Texas during the year 1832. 81
The question as to Mejía's real object in coming to Texas has often been raised, and has been only partially answered. In my opinion the answer is that it was primarily to preserve Texas to the Mexican confederation, and secondarily to promote the cause of Santa Anna.
As to the first of these objects, it has been observed heretofore that, when intelligence came to Mejía and Guerra of the disturbances in the province of Texas, they forthwith dropped their differences and coöperated “to save Texas to the Mexican confederation.” 82 Again, Mejía in writing to Alcalde John Austin, remarks that he would have proceeded very harshly had the movements in the colonies “been directed against the integrity of the national territory.” 83
In the second place Mejía aimed at diffusing liberal tendencies. It is only needful here to read his own words in proof of this statement. The colonel declared that since the colonists had clung to the Plan, he would “unite with them to accomplish their wishes, and that the forces” under his command would “protect their adhesion to the said plan”. 84
2. Ibid., 104.
3. Miguel M. Lerdo, Apuntes Históricos de Vera Cruz, II 363-364, notes (Translation).
4. Ibid., 365.
5. Bancroft, History of Mexico, V 107 et seq.
6. Juan Suarez y Navarro, Historia de Mexico y del General Santa Anna (cited in further notes as Historia de Mexico) 282.
7. Filisola, Memorias para la Historia de la Guerra de Tejas (ed. 1848, cited in further notes as Memorias), I 254-255; Suarez y Navarro, Historia de Mexico, 314. Filisola mentions only Soto la Marina, but Suarez y Navarro adds Matamoros. From the account of what followed we may be sure that Mejía's intention was to fall upon both places See further the Texas Gazette (published at Brazoria), July 23, 1832.
8. Texas Gazette, July 23, 1832.
9. Guerra to principal Commandant of Coahuila and Texas, July 16, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives. These five vessels were “the Brig of War Santa Anna, and the armed schooners Moctezuma of Vera Cruz, Moctezuma of Tampico, Adela, and Ameria.” See translated extract from the Matamoros Boletín in Texas Gazette, July 23, 1832.
10. Austin to Perry, June 29, 1832, and Austin to Ugartechea, July 2, 1832, Austin Papers. Filisola says: “two hundred and fifty or three hundred infantry of the citizen soldiery and some regulars.” Memorias, I 225.
11. Filisola, Memorias, I 226.
12. Extract from Matamoros Boletín in Texas Gazette, July 23, 1832. Austin, writing to Ugartechea from Matamoros, July 2, 1832, says that Mejía “disembarked in the Brazo on the 25th.” Suarez y Navarro (Historia de Mexico, 314) also says that he landed on the 25th. I have followed the newspaper statement, as probably more accurate.
13. The Boletín states that Yhari had four hundred men in his guard. Filisola (Memorias, I 226) says that Yhari was taken prisoner together with three or four men who had served him.
14. Filisola (Memorias, I 226) says that Mejía went to Boca Chica with his whole force.
15. Filisola's statement (Memorias, I 227) is as follows (translation) : “At dawn Mejía put his lines in motion, and pushed onward. Nearing la Burrita he descried a body of 70 or 80 cavalry drawn up in battle array.”
16. Filisola (Memorias, I 228) writes that fifteen recruits of the eleventh battalion of the twelfth infantry incorporated themselves in Mejía's ranks. Thus, setting aside as gross exaggeration the statement made by the Boletín that Yhari had four hundred soldiers and accepting Filisola's account of three or four, we may be able to reconcile the discrepancies and get at the number of men who actually went over to Mejía. Filisola says that eighty in one group and fifteen in another allied themselves with him at la Burrita, while the Boletín makes these groups respectively sixty and forty. Hence, practically one hundred men were added to Mejía's forces while at and around Matamoros.
17. Austin to Ugartechea, July 2, 1832 (Austin Papers); Filisola Memorias, I 228. Austin writes that Mejía “took possession of this city on the 28th the slightest disorder or confusion not having arisen.”
18. Texas Gazette, July 23, 1832.
19. Guerra made this move at 6 P. M., June 28. (Filisola, Memorias, I 247.) The statement of the Boletín as translated for the Texas Gazette is that “Col. Guerra with the troops in this town, Lojexo and others well known for their anti-liberal principles precipitately fled, giving the most barbarous orders to his troops, such as to bayonet the pack mules loaded with baggage and ammunition, should they be overtaken.” (See also Austin to Ugartechea, July 2, 1832. Austin Papers.)
20. Mejía had overhauled a mail packet from Brazoria and had discovered thereon some letters from Colonel Ugartechea to Guerra from which he learned of the events in Teaxs. (Filisola, Memorias, I 247-248; Guerra to commander in chief of Coahuila and Texas, July 16, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 6.)
21. Filisola, Memorias, I 256-259.
22. Mexico had reserved, by Art. 5 of the national colonization law of Aug. 18, 1824, the right to establish arsenals in Texas. (Oldham and White's Digest, Laws of Texas, 761-763.)
23. Texas Gazette, July 23, 1832; Mrs. Holley, Texas (1833), 146-149.
24. For a more detailed account of these events see the article, The Disturbances at Anahuac in 1832, in the last number of this magazine.—Editor Quarterly.
25. Preserved in the Nacogdoches Archives, box 2, no. 104.
26. Brazoria was the Anglo-American settlement on the Brazos just above Velasco and was the center of insurrection in that quarter.
27. Translated from the address in the Nacogdoches Archives, box 2, no. 92.
28. Diplomatic Correspondence, Texas Archives, Department of State, box 13, no. 1238.
29. Memorias, I 261.
30. Historia de Mexico, 316.
31. Austin to governor of Coahuila-Texas, July 9, 1832. Austin Papers.
32. Texas Gazette, July 23, 1832; Mora to Elosua, same date (Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 8).
33. It is about the same distance from Brazos Santiago to Tampico as it is from the former to Velasco. Hence, if Mejía completed the journey from Brazos Santiago to Velasco in forty hours, it is reasonable to suppose that he could have gone to Tampico in the same length of time. This would have given him ample opportunity to make the round trip to Tampico with some hours to spare within the four days limit.
34. Guerra to Austin, July 7, 1832; Mejía to Austin, July 8, 1832; Austin to Mejía, July 9, 1832 (translation of copy). Nacogdoches Archives, box 2, no. 80. Also Austin to Guerra, July 10, 1832 (translation of copy). Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 19.
35. Austin to Ramón Musquiz, July 18, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 5.
36. See under IV below.
37. Texas Gazette, July 23, 1832.
38. Ibid.
39. Mrs. Holley, Texas (1833), 142.
40. Traveling at the rate at which he came from Brazos Santiago to Velasco, he should have made the bar of Galveston in six or seven hours.
41. Filisola, Memorias, I 258-261.
42. H. More to — Perry, Aug. 5, 1832. Austin Papers.
43. Ibid.
44. A manuscript copy of the resolutions in Spanish preserved in the Nacogdoches Archives (box 1, no. 10) has an additional clause here, which is translated as follows: “and the substitution in its place of a military despotism.”
45. Edward, History of Texas, 186-187.
46. Texas Gazette, July 23, 1832.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Texas Gazette, July 23, 1832.
50. Austin to Musquiz, July 28, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 13.
51. This is the delegation referred to in the letter from John Austin quoted above.
52. Texas Gazette, July 23, 1832.
53. Ibid.
54. Austin to Musquiz, July 18, 1832; the same to the same, July 28, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, nos. 5 and 13. (Translation.)
55. Chriesman to Musquiz, Aug. 22, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 15. (Translation.)
56. Austin to Elosua, Aug. 21, 1832, in Austin Papers; Austin to Musquiz, July 28, 1832, in Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 13. (Translations.)
57. Chriesman to Ramón Musquiz, Aug. 20, 1832. Bexar Archives.
58. Mrs. Holley, Texas (1833), 142-145.
59. Ibid.
60. Copy of proceedings of town council of San Felipe, July 26, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 10.
61. Austin to Musquiz, July 28, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 13.
62. Mrs. Holley, Texas (1833), 152-154.
63. This refers to the Texans at Turtle Bayou.
64. Piedras to Elosua, July 12, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 18.
65. Ibid.
66. Proceedings of ayuntamiento of Nacogdoches, Aug. 6, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 14.
67. Piedras to Elosua, July 24, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 9.
68. Thorn to Austin, Aug. 28, 1832. Austin Papers.
69. See proceedings of ayuntamiento of Nacogdoches, Aug. 6, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 14.
70. For Tenaha.—Editor Quarterly.
71. Proceedings of ayuntamiento of Nacogdoches, Aug. 6, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 14.
72. Austin to Musquiz, Aug. 15, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 16.
73. Proceedings of ayuntamiento of Nacogdoches, Aug. 6, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 14.
74. Proceedings of ayuntamiento of Nacogdoches, Aug. 6, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 14.
75. Austin to Musquiz, July 18, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 2.
76. Resolutions adopted by citizens of San Fernando, Aug. 30, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 44, no. 1363.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid. See also Garza to ayuntamiento of Bexar, Aug. 30, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 2, no. 66.
79. Western et al. to S. F. Austin, Aug. 24, 1832. Austin Papers.
80. Western et al. to Austin, Aug. 25, 1832. Austin Papers.
81. Proceedings of a meeting at Goliad, Sept. 1, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 44, no. 1368.
82. Filisola, Memorias, I 256.
83. Texas Gazette, July 23, 1832. Also Guerra to Mora, July 16, 1832. Nacogdoches Archives, box 1, no. 6.
84. Texas Gazette, July 23, 1832.
How to cite:
Turner, F. H., "THE MEJÍA EXPEDITION ", Volume 007, Number 1, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, Page 1 - 28. http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v007/n1/article_3.html
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