THE QUARTERLY OF THE TEXAS STATE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
VOLUME IX. JULY, 1905, TO APRIL, 1906.
PUBLICATION COMMITTEE. David F. Houston, Z. T. Fulmore, C. W. Raines, George P. Garrison, Mrs. Bride Neill Taylor. EDITOR. George P. Garrison. ASSOCIATE EDITORS. Herbert Eugene Bolton. Eugene C. Barker. AUSTIN, TEXAS: PUBLISHED BY THE ASSOCIATION. 1906.The Texas State Historical Association.
Organized March 2, 1897.
PRESIDENT,
David F. Houston.
VICE-PRESIDENTS:
W. D. Wood, Beauregard Bryan,
R. L. Batts, Milton J. Bliem.
RECORDING SECRETARY AND LIBRARIAN,
George P. Garrison.
CORRESPONDING SECRETARY AND TREASURER,
Eugene C. Barker.
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL:
Mrs. Dora Fowler Arthur, George P. Garrison,
W. J. Battle, D. F. Houston,
R. L. Batts, T. S. Miller,
Eugene C. Barker, S. H. Moore,
Herbert E. Bolton, C. W. Raines,
S. P. Brooks, Mrs. Bride Neill Taylor,
Beauregard Bryan, John C. Townes,
Z. T. Fulmore, Dudley G. Wooten.
CONTENTS.
NUMBER 1; JULY, 1905.
The Diplomatic Relations of England and the Republic of Texas J. L. Worley 1
John H. Reagan Walter Flavius McCaleb 41
A Chapter in the history of Young Territory Fannie McAlpine Clarke 51
Notes and Fragments. 63
Affairs of the Association. 65
NUMBER 2; OCTOBER, 1905.
The Spanish Abandonment and Reoccupation of East Texas, 1773-1779 Herbert E. Bolton 67
England and Mexico, 1824-1825 Frederic L. Paxson 138
Book Reviews and Notices. 142
NUMBER 3; JANUARY, 1906.
Valentine Bennet Marie Bennet Urwitz 145
Capt. John Sowers Brooks Gen. John E. Roller 157
Col. William G. Cooke Harry Warren 210
Notes and Fragments. 220
Afairs of the Association. 224
Book Reviews and Notices. 225
NUMBER 4; APRIL 1906.
The Texas Revolutionary Army Eugene C. Barker 227
The Ku Klux Klan W. D. Wood 262
Lewis Ayers Chas. H. Ayers 269
Notes and Fragments. 282
Affairs of the Association. 289
Book Reviews and Notices. 294
INDEX TO VOLUME IX.
Abad, Fr. Joseph 103
A Chapter in the History of Young Territory, by Fannie McAlpine Clarke 51-62
Adaes, Indians 53
Adaes, presidio of, 73, 75, 76, 80; citizens of ordered to Béxar 85
Affairs of the Association, note on death of Governor Lubbock, 65; announcement of annual meeting, 224; account of the annual meeting 289-91
Aguayo, Marqués de San Miguel de 73
Ais, mission at Los 73, 75
Alden, John and Priscilla 269
Allen, Ebenezer 38
Almonte 27
Anadaquas 53
Andrews, Joseph 204
Apaches 53, 68, 70, 71, 78, 93
Archer, B. F. 241, 242
Armijo, Governor of New Mexico 151
Arocha, Simon de 107, 110
Arrellano, Fr. Pedro Ramirez de 114
Arthur, Mrs. Dora Fowler 290
Atakapas 118
Austin, Stephen F., 55; Commander-in-Chief of Volunteers at Gonzales 146; 227, 238, 241, 242, 247, 250, 251
Ayers, Charles H., Sketch of Lewis Ayers 269-81
Ayers, David, 269; Lewis, 269-81; Mary Byram 269
Bancroft, L. H. 216
Bancroft Library purchased by University of California 222
Bangs, Manuel 8
Bankhead, Charles 38
Barker, Eugene C., The Texan Revolutionary Army, 227-61; Proceedings of the Permanent Council, 287-88; 289, 290; Treasurer's Report 293
Battle, W. J. 290
Baugh, John J. 237
Bautista, Presdio of San Juan de 77
Baylor, John R. 58
Beales, John Charles 8
Bedaes 53
Bee, Barnard E. 148
Bennet, Miles S., 147; Sarah J. 286
Bennet, Valentine, A Sketch of by Mrs. Marie Bennet Urwitz 145-56
Benson, George 281
Bliem, Milton J. 290
Bocanegra, Mexican Minister at Washington 26
Bolton, Herbert E., The Spanish Abandonment and Reoccupation of East Texas, 1773-1779, 67-137; 224; The Old Stone Fort at Nacogdoches 283-85, 290
Bonilla, Antonio 81
Book Reviews and Notices, Napoleonic Exiles in America, 142; The Floydada Hesperian, 225; History of Eastland County, Texas, 225; The Rise and Fall of Mission San Sabá, etc. 226, 292
Botello, Fr. Juan Garcia 115, 127
Bowie, James 248, 251, 255, 256, 257
Bowles, Chief of the Cherokees 44
Bucareli, settlement of Pilar de, 99; description of, 110; Comanche raid on 123
Bullock, Maurice 204
Bunton, J. W. 236
Burleson, Edward 232, 248, 258
Burk, Captain 237
Burnet, D. G. 239, 240
Burkley, Albert T. 14
Bradburn, J. D. 275
Brazos, Agency of 55
Brenham, Dr. R. F. 150, 218
Brister, Nathaniel 212
Brooks, John Sowers, A Sketch of by Gen. John E. Roller, 157-209; genealogy of 157
Brooks, S. P. 290
Brown, John Henry 22
Browning, Josephus 58
Brutus 6
Bryan, William 241
Bryan, Beauregard 290
Cabassas, Antonio 271
Cabello, Domingo 107, 123
Caddoes 52, 53
Calhoun, John C. 27, 29, 33
Carlisle, Robert 270, 280
Carnegie Institution, plans for work in the Mexican Archives 223
Cartmell, Tho. P. 277
Catlett, Fairfax 2
Cazorla, Captain 101, 120
Chadwick, —, Sergeant Major 177
Chambers, T. J. 235, 240, 259
Christy, William 195
Clarke, Fannie McAlpine, A Chapter in the History of Young Territory 51-62
Clendennin, Lieutenant Colonel 217
Collinsworth, George M. 251
Comanche reserve 55
Comanches 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 68, 71, 75, 77, 78, 117, 123, 184
Combes, Ellis 55
Confederacy, delegates to Provisional Congress of 45
Cooke, William G., 150; sketch of by Harry Warren, 210-19 237, 248
Cotesworth and Pryor, claimants of Mexican land grants 9
Crockett, David 183, 184, 188
Croix, Caballero de 114, 123
Cuevas, Luis G. 34
Damon, Samuel 148
Darst, Em. H. 147
Dickson, — 204
Dimit, Philip 251
Dixon, Thomas 262
Doyle, Percy W. 25
Dunbar, William 215
Dunn, John 252
Eastland County, Texas, History of, by Mrs. George Langston, review 225
Egerton, D. E. 9
Eliza Russell and Little Penn, Case of 5-8
El Lobanillo 88, 94
Elliott, Charles 8, 15, 16, 21
Empresario Claims 8
England, Diplomatic Relations of With the Republic of Texas, by J. L. Worley, 1-40; recognition of Texas, 3-4; attitude toward annexation, 16-39; friction with Texas 20
England and Mexico, 1824-1835, by Frederic L. Paxson 38
Enquisacoes 53
Evans, Capt. N. G. 59
Eve, Joseph 21
Everett, Edward 29
Escandón, José de 70
Fackler, T. M. 161
Fannin, J. W., Jr. 174, 183, 231, 233, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 248, 251, 253, 255, 256, 257.....272
Field, Joseph E. 198, 200
Fisher, William S. 202
Flores, Gil 93, 94, 97, 106, 109
Fora, Nicholás de 74
Forest, Gen. Nathan 266, 268
Freedman's Bureau 262
Fulmore, Z. T. 290
Garza, Fr. Josef Francisco Mariano de 113, 114, 132
Garrett, Jacob 288
Garrison, George P. 290
Gates, L. W. 281
Georgia Batallion 174, 187, 190
Giddings, G. A. 64
Gonzales, José 82, 245, 247
Grant, Dr. James 8, 189, 183
Green, Duff 29
Griffin, Major General C. 61
Grevenverge, Augustin de 120
Guerra 270, 280
Hagarty, Mr. 161, 164, 167
Hall, Claude V., The Floydada Hesperian 225
Hall, Edward 242
Hall, J. M. W. 277
Hamilton, James 11, 23, 27
Hamilton, Joseph 9
Hancock, John 277
Hanks, Wyatt 231, 234
Hanrick, Edward, 285; R. A., 285, gifts to the Association 291
Hardaway, Samuel 204
Heam, Robert P. 281
Henderson, J. Pinckney, 4-10, passim.
Herndon, Dr. John 215
Hervey, Lionel 138
Hogg, Governor, His Service in the Cause of Texas History 282-3
Holmes, Mrs. Katherine Ayers 269
Holt, David 204
Hood, Joseph L. 288
Houston, A. 288
Houston, David Franklin, elected President of the Association 290
Houston, Sam 15, 20, 31, 44, 45, 58, 63, 174, 215, 228, 230, 231, 232, 237, 251, 255, 258, 259
Hoxey, Asa 286
Hughes, Christopher 10
Hunter, John W., Rise and Fall of Mission San Sabá, etc., review 225
Ibarbo, Gil 84-137, passim.
Ikin, Arthur 13, 14
Indians, see Adaes, Anadaquas, Apaches, Atakapas, Bedaes, Caddoes, Comanches, Enquisacoes, Ionies, Karankawas, Keechies, Kiowas, Lipan-Apaches, Mayeses, PanisMahas (Pawnees), Pimas, Quitseis, Seris, Taguayas, Taovayases, Tejas, Tennawas, Tonkawas, Towakanas, Towash, Vidais, Wacoes, Xaranames, Yamparocks, Yscanes, Yutes.
Indian troubles in frontier provinces of Mexico 69
Indians, Reservation for 51
Invincible 6
Ionies 53
Irion, R. A. 6
Johnson, F. W. 183, 188, 213, 232, 237, 255, 257
Johnson, John B. 252
Johnston, Albert Sidney 44
Jones, Anson 15, 16, 31
Jones, M. O. 2
Karankawas 53, 71, 116
Keechies 53
Kelleheir, Lieutenant Thomas 59
Keily, James, priest 278
King, Wm. R. 33
King, Captain 199, 237, 272, 273
Kiowas 53, 54, 57
Kennedy, William 15, 22
Kotemesic, Comanche Chief 56
Ku Klux Klan, The by W. D. Wood 262-68
Lamar genealogy 292
Langston, Mrs. George, History of Eastland County, Texas, review 225
Lawrence, Captain 237
Lee, R. E. 61
Leeper, Col. M., agent for the Comanches 56
Liberals, Texan overtures to Mexican 243-47
Linares, Mission San Miguel de 73
Lipan Apaches 77
Lizardi, F. de &Co. 6-7, 22
Llewellyn, Captain 237
Loyal League 263
Lubbock, F. R., 65; memorial page 66
Luz, mission of Nuestra Señor de la 74
Macgregor, E. Murray 9
Mackay, Robert 215
Macomb, D. B. 231
Marcy, Thirty Years of Army Life on the Border 54
María, José, Indian Chief 62
Martin, Judge I. L. 219
Mathe, Nicholás de la 84, 104, 108, 119
Mayeses 116
McCaleb, W. F., sketch of John H. Reagan 41-50
McGloin, James 270, 278, 279, 280
McKenzie, Gen. R. S. 62
McKinney, T. F. 242, 246
McLeod, John D. 202
McLeod, Hugh 151, 218
McMullen, Mr. 280
Medina, Roque de 81, 104
Members elected to the Association at the March meeting 290-91
Menard, Peter J. 288
Mexia, General 245
Mezières, Atanacio de, 91, 92; death of 134
Milam, B. R. 213
Millard, Henry 232
Mills, R. Q. 42
Miracle, Julian 246, 247
Mississippi, frigate 24
Moore, S. H. 290
Mora, Juan de 106
Mordecai, Benjamin 204
Montezuma 22, 23
Murphy, William S. 28
Nacogdoches, Mission at, 73; Beginning of modern town, 123, 129; The Old Stone Fort at, by Herbert E. Bolton 283-85
Nacogdoches (Indians) 53
Navarro, Miss Angela, 219; José Antonio, 150, 218; Lucio, 219; Pedro Golindo 115
Neighbors, R. S. 51, 56
Neill, J. C. 231
New Orleans Grays 212
Nacona Peta, Comanche Chief 59
Notes and Fragments: G. A. Giddings to his Parents, April 10, 1836, 63; Laying of the Texas Stone in Sloat Monument, 220-22; Governor Hogg's Services in the Cause of Texas History, 282-83; The Old Stone Fort at Nacogdoches, 283-85; Immigration to Texas and the Domestic Slave Trade, 285-86; Thomas J. Pilgrim, 286-87; Proceedings of the Permanent Council 287-88
O'Boyle, Daniel 278
Oconor, Hugo 81, 93, 74, 96, 105, 113
Ogilvey, James 8
Oldham, William 232
Opelousas 118
Orcoquisac 74, 75, 76, 80, 108
Orcoquisacs 116
Osborn, Abraham, 276, 277; Bebecca 269
Ovedsitas 92
Panis-Mahas (Pawnees) 92
Parker, Cynthia Ann, 60; Isaac, 60; Quanah, 61; Daniel, 288; Silas M. 238
Parilla Colonel 71, 108
Parliament, Debates in 1836 concerning Texas 1
Parrot, T. F. L. 232
Paso Tomás 99, 100, 107
Paxson, Frederic L., England and Mexico, 1824-1825 138-143
Pearson, Captain 183, 188, 193, 237
Perry, A. G. 288
Perry, James F. 250
Pettus, Samuel 212
Pettus, William 253
Pierson, J. G. W. 288
Pilgrim, T. J., 286-87; Mrs. T. J. 154
Pimas 69, 70
Placido, Chief of Tonkawas 61
Poinsett, J. R. 139
Poe, George W. 236
Quitseis 116, 117
Raines, C. W., Governor Hogg's Service to the Cause of Texas History, 282-3; 290 293
Ramirez, Father, President of the Texas Missions 91
Rate, Lachlan M. 15
Reagan, John H., a sketch of, 41-50; Resolutions on death of 289-90
“Red Rovers” 207-209
Reilly, James 24
Reynolds, Walt 58
Ripperdá, Baron de 81, 82, 85, 90, 94, 97, 102, 104, 110, 113
Rivera, Pedro de 73
Robbins's Ferry 100
Roberts, A. 239
Robinson, Charles H. 271
Robinson, James W. 239
Roller, Gen. John E., Captain John Sowers Brooks 157-209
Ross, L. S., 56, 58; S. P. 55
Royall, R. R. 248, 281
Rubí, Marques de, 72; inspection and recommendation by 74-79
Rusk, T. J. 253-259
Russell, Joseph 6
Saligny, Dubois de 34
San Antonio, storming of in 1835 213
Santa Fé expedition 217-19
Santo, or Vigotes, Tejas chief 83
San Saba, mission burned, 71; Presidio of, 80; Rise and Fall of, by J. W. Hunter 226
Santa Anna 34, 188, 194, 239, 271
Seris 70
Shackleford, Jack 197, 209
Shain, Charles B. 203
Shaw, James B. 151
Sherman, Sidney 258
Smith, Ashbel, 15, 20, 28, 31; “Deaf Smith,” 147; Henry Smith, 230, 232, 234, 238, 243, 246, 255, 270 278
Smuggling 103, 119-123
Solis, Gaspar José de 283
Somervell, Alexander 258
Stevens, Thaddeus 262
Stevenson, Andrew 3
Sublett, Philip A. 232
Swisher, J. M. 277
Taguayas 125
Taovayases 71, 92, 94, 108
Taylor, Mrs. Bride Neill 290
Taylor, John 10
Tejas 52, 53, 93, 116
Tennewas 54
Terrell, George W. 35
Texas, mission San Francisco de los 72
The Texan Revolutionary Army, by Eugene C. Barker 227-261
The Spanish Abandonment and Reoccupation of East Texas, 1773-1779, by Herbert E. Bolton 67-137
Thomas, George H. 57
Thompson, H. L. 6
Thwaites, R. G. 222
Toby and Brother 240
Tonkawas 53, 123, 126, 133
Towakanos 53, 94, 116, 123
Towash 53
Townes, John C. 290
Treasurer's Report 293
Treat, James 20
Travis, W. B. 231, 234, 236, 238, 240, 250, 256, 257
Turner, John 278
United States, volunteers from in Texas Revolution 236, 240, 242
Upshur, A. P. 28
Urrea, Gen. 273, 274
Urwitz, Marie Bennet, article by 145-56
Van Dorn, Maj. Earl 56, 61
Van Zandt, Isaac 31
Vidais 92, 100, 105, 109, 116
Vidal, Marcus 120
Viesca, Governor 245
Vigotes, or Santo, Tejas chief 83-87
Wacoes 53
Ward, Lieutenant Colonel 199, 213, 274, 275
Warren, Harry, article by 210-19
Washington, Lewis 204
Webster, Daniel 26
Westover, Ira W. 281
Wharton, W. H. 2, 241
Whitman, George 285
Widen, L. E. 290
Williamson, R., 161; R. M. 233, 285
Winkler, E. W. 224, 289
Woll, General Adrain 25, 155
Wood, W. D., The Ku Klux Klan 262-68, 290
Worley, J. L., Diplomatic Relations of England and the Republic of Texas 1-40
Wyatt, Captain 237
Xaranames 116
Ybarbo, 80-137; passim 283
Yamparacks 54
Yscanes 117
Ysurrieta, Juan 111
Yutes 70
Vol. JULY, 1905. No. 1.
The publication committee and the editors disclaim responsibility for views expressed by contributors to The Quarterly.
(1) The Debate of 1836 in Parliament.
England and the Republic of Texas became interested in each other at an early date. On August 5, 1836, only five months after Texas declared her independence, she was the subject of a debate in the British House of Commons in which questions concerning the new republic were considered at some length. Some of the debaters spoke of the aggressive policy of the United States and expressed apprehension of the results to England of the ascendency which that nation would gain in the Southwest and on the Gulf of Mexico if it should annex Texas, of which there seemed some fear. The principal consideration involved, however, was the matter of slavery. England had a treaty with Mexico for the abolition of the slave-trade, and it was feared that if Texas established her independence this trade would be reopened with her. It was England's policy to secure the universal abolition of the trade by treaties with the principal nations of the world. Viscount Palmerston, the foreign secretary, expressed it as his opinion that no doubt need be entertained of the propriety of the conduct of the United States in the matter, and that no action need be taken on the subject of the slave-trade until it was certain that the Texas revolution was successful. 2
2. Rumors of the Sale of Texas by Mexico to England.
In the spring of 1837 an interesting incident took place at Washington. Fairfax Catlett, the secretary of the Texas legation there, who was temporarily in charge of its affairs, was shown a letter to the American State department from M. O. Jones, the American consul at the City of Mexico, in which Jones said that a proposition was before the Mexican Congress to sell Texas to England in order to pay the Mexican debt in England amounting to some sixty-eight million dollars. 3 Jones added that the measure would probably pass, but said nothing as to whether England had suggested it or concurred in it. Catlett, of course, felt it his duty to write at once to Forsyth, the American secretary of state, asking that the United States prevent any such sale and pointing out that Mexico would be unlikely to make such a proposition unless she had previous assurance that it would be acceptable to England. In his letter, however, he spoke of the United States as the “parent commonwealth” of Texas, and Forsyth was so unwilling to have a letter containing such language among the papers of his department that he persuaded Catlett to take the letter back. Catlett reported that he had been told by Crallé (the Washington editor and relative of Calhoun) that the matter had been proposed to England and rejected by her. Earlier in the year William H. Wharton, then one of the agents of Texas at Washington, had written to his government that Forsyth had shown him a letter from Andrew Stevenson, United States minister to England, in which Stevenson said that Lord Palmerston had admitted that Mexico had applied to him for aid against Texas, but had said that he had refused the application. Evidently, therefore, there was nothing in the story. 4
Nothing further seems to have come of the incident, but it, as well as the debate of 1836, is instructive as showing the position of the parties at that time: Texas independent of Mexico, but still at war with that country and anxious to become annexed to the United States; Mexico unwilling to recognize her defeat and unfriendly to the United States; England and the United States watchfully jealous of each other. For commercial reasons England befriended Mexico, and was anxious both as Mexico's friend and as the enemy of slavery to keep Texas out of the American Union. The impulse to territorial expansion that has always characterized the American people induced them to desire the annexation of Texas, but the slavery question complicated the matter. The politicians of the Southern States for the most part favored the annexation of Texas because of the existence of slavery in that region, on account of which the admission of Texas would mean the strengthening of the position of slavery in the United States. There came to be a string movement in the Northern States against annexation for the same reason, and those States were so far successful in securing the adoption of their policy that it was known that Texas could not be admitted into the Union until she secured the recognition of some of the principal European powers.
1. The first application by Texas unsuccessful.
In this state of affairs the Texas government naturally desired the recognition of England as the leading commercial country of the world and the country most deeply interested in the welfare of Mexico. Early in 1837 English recognition was the subject of communication between the Texas government and its agent at Washington, and the view was advanced that negotiations between Texas and England would arouse the annexationists of the United States to immediate action, lest Texas should become so bound up by treaties with England that annexation would become impossible. On June 20, 1837, President Houston signed a letter accrediting General J. Pinckney Henderson to Lord Palmerston as the diplomatic agent of Texas. Henderson was accredited also to the French government as agent, and he was given credentials as minister to the two countries to be presented when the primary purpose of his mission, the securing of English and French recognition, had been accomplished. He proceeded to London immediately and on October 13 was received by Lord Palmerston. Palmerston appeared to take a lively interest in affairs in Texas, but was doubtful as to the possibility of recognition, which he promised, however, to lay before the cabinet. The matter was put off for some time, but on December 27 Henderson was informed that Texas could not at that time be recognized. The reason assigned for the decision was doubt of the ability of Texas to maintain her independence, but Henderson was led to believe that this was in reality a less potent factor in determining the action of the ministry than the political situation in England, the fact that slavery existed in Texas, and the interest of the English creditors of Mexico which made it undesirable to do anything that would imperil the cordial relations of England and Mexico. England's commerce with Mexico, besides, was important, and the government hesitated to take any step that might force English merchants to divide their market with other countries. Another consideration with the British ministry was the likelihood of the annexation of Texas to the United States. This was frequently brought out in the intercourse of Henderson and Palmerston. Palmerston seemed from his language to consider it unnecessary to recognize the independence of Texas if Texas was soon voluntarily to surrender this independence, but no doubt he gave more thought to the possibility that by recognizing Texas he would remove an obstacle to the annexation of Texas to the United States. Henderson pressed his application vigorously, but felt assured by the end of the year that recognition was out of the question. 5
2. Establishment of commercial relations—Texas clearances recognized in English ports.
Henderson's next move was to go to France and secure the recognition of the government of Louis Philippe; but before leaving England he made an arrangement with Palmerston by which commerce could be carried on between the ports of England and Texas. The Texas government wished to negotiate a commercial treaty with England, but the English government, unwilling to give Texas the recognition that this would involve, found a means by which it could evade the question of recognition and trade with Texas without a commercial treaty. After much delay Palmerston notified Henderson that for purposes of trade Texas, until she should be recognized either by Mexico or by England herself, would be treated as a part of Mexico, and that vessels under the Texas flag or with clearances from Texas custom-houses would be admitted into English ports under the terms of the commercial treaty between England and Mexico, in spite of the fact that their papers would show on their face that they were issued by the authorities of Texas and not of Mexico. The arrangement was rather peculiar and, from the Texas standpoint at least, undignified, and Henderson seems to have chagrin at it; but the temper of Lord Palmerston toward him was such that any concession was a matter of congratulation on Henderson's part. 6
3. British Claims and Demands Upon Texas.
(1) The cases of the Eliza Russell and the Little Penn.—At this period occurred an episode which added interest to the relations of the governments of England and Texas and on one occasion at least threatened to destroy their friendship. Texas was maintaining a small fleet under the command of Captain H. L. Thompson in the Gulf of Campeachy to prey on Mexican commerce. The British schooner Little Penn, bound from Liverpool to Tabasco in Yucatán, ran aground on the Alacranes, a shoal on the Yucatán coast, in the summer of 1837. Her cargo was owned by F. de Lizardi and Co., a house with offices in England and Mexico, and was consigned to a Mexican citizen. As it was found impossible to save the Little Penn, the consignees and the Mexican authorities at Campeachy sent out two Mexican vessels, the Paz and the Abispa, to rescue her cargo. These two vessels were loaded with the greater part of the cargo of the Little Penn. The Paz made her way safely to Campeachy, but the Abispa fell into the hands of the Brutus and Invincible, two of the Texas vessels cruising in the neighborhood. As Captain Thompson found the Abispa to be a Mexican vessel and was shown no papers indicating that the cargo was other than Mexican goods, he sent her into Matagorda, Texas, where the vessel and cargo were condemned as prize. It was claimed, and apparently with truth, that the officers of the Brutus and Invincible boarded the wreck of the Little Penn and stripped her of everything of value found on board. 7 From these facts Lizardi and Co. submitted to the British government their claim against Texas for damages to the extent of some £3640. On August 3, a few days after the capture of the Abispa, the Texas vessels chased and captured the British schooner Eliza Russell, bound from Liverpool to Sisal, Mexico, owned and commanded by Captain Joseph Russell, with a miscellaneous cargo of merchandise, part of which was consigned to Mexicans at their own risk. This vessel was taken as a prize off the Campeachy coast and sent to Galveston. On her arival there she was released by order of the executive government, but by storms that arose at the time she was delayed and injured, so that Captain Russell presented to the British government his claim for some £865 damages caused by the detention. The Texas government at once acknowledged that it was at fault in the case of the Eliza Russell, and R. A. Irion, the secretary of state, directed Henderson to express to Lord Palmerston his regrets at the occurrence and to assure him that Russell would receive compensation for his injuries. Palmerston brought the Little Penn claim to Henderson's attention in January, 1838. The Texas government at all times asserted its willingness to settle all just claims against it, but for one reason or another it postponed a long time the settlement of these two claims. President Houston promised to recommend an appropriation to pay the amount asked by Captain Russell, but Congress delayed action because Russell neglected the advice of the Texas government to maintain an agent in Texas to deal with Congress directly. Various objections were raised to the payment of the Little Penn claim. The facts that the evidence upon which it was based was Mexican, that the claimants, Lizardi and Co., were really a Mexican house even though they had an office in England, and that the case had already been decided against them by a Texas prize court, were among these objections. The scruples of the government could hardly have been lessened by its extreme poverty, or by the fact that, as Lizardi and Co. were agents in London for the Mexican government, a payment to them was felt to be almost equivalent to a payment to the enemy themselves. The two claims were at first pressed vigorously by the British government. In October, 1839, Lord Palmerston became so impatient on the subject that he wrote a forcible letter to Henderson in which he said that “under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government would be justified in sending out a Ship of War to Texas” with instructions “to take all necessary for enforcing the payment of the claims;” but he said the government was always “anxious to avoid the employment of compulsory measures,” and had therefore determined “to make one more application on these matters, through you, to the Texian authorities.” This letter drew forth a protest from Henderson, but the Texas Congress made an appropriation for the payment of Captain Russell; for some reason, however, the appropriation was allowed to lapse, and payment was not finally made until September, 1843, more than six years after the injury took place. The Little Penn claim seems never to have been paid by Texas, for the last obtainable reference to the subject is a letter dated February 22, 1845, in which the secretary of state of the republic sets forth the grounds on which the refusal of Texas to pay the claim had been based. In fact, by this time the zeal of the British government in the cause had waned, and there was no longer any fear of “compulsory measures” on the part of England. The claims were indeed small in amount and never of any great significance in determining the relations of the two countries, except that they probably added to the unfriendliness with which the Melbourne ministry for a time looked upon Texas; but the incidents occupy so large a part of the diplomatic correspondence between the two countries that they are deserving of some notice. 8
(2) Empresario claims.—Several claims to lands in Texas were presented during the same period. In August, 1839, James Ogilvy laid claim for himself, as assignee of the empresario grant of Manuel Bangs and for the Scottish heirs of Doctor James Grant, to some four hundred sitios of land in the Rio Grande country. The grants had been forfeited for non-fulfillment of their terms, but he claimed the non-fulfillment was caused by the breaking out of war between Texas and Mexico. These claims were referred to in general terms by Palmerston in a letter of October 23, 1839, in which he also mentions the case of certain British subjects resident in Texas who had been driven from their homes and rendered destitute by the war and who were then living in abject poverty in New Orleans and Matamoras. Henderson gave Palmerston very little encouragement as to these refugees, saying they must have been among the persons who deserted Texas in her hour of need and so could have no valid claim. The empresario claims continued to come in. In February, 1843, Charles Elliot, the British chargé d'affaires, laid before the Texas government the claim of John Charles Beales, a British subject, to large tracts of land on the Colorado, Nueces, and Arkansas Rivers and on the Rio Grande. Beales claimed, like Ogilvy, that, though his grants had been declared forfeited by the Texas government for non-fulfillment of the conditions, under which he was, among other things, to bring a certain number of colonists into Texas, this non-fulfillment was caused solely by the outbreak of the Texas revolution. He had spent large sums of money in the effort to fulfill these conditions, and would have been successful but for the reason given. He claimed also that under the Texas land laws the courts were unable to entertain a suit brought by him to recover the grants. In September, 1842, the claims of Cotesworth and Pryor, George O'Gorman, and D. E. Egerton, similar to that of Beales, were submitted to the Texas government. Some correspondence on the subject of these various claims followed, in which the Texas government denied that the courts were not open for the claimants to obtain redress in the ordinary way. Some discussion arose also as to the reservation in the original grants of the power to revoke them at the pleasure of the grantor. The claims at best had no more than an equitable standing, and they were not favorably looked upon by the Texas government because of the long period that was allowed to elapse before they were presented to the government, and because no record of the grants was to be found in the Texas land office. Indeed the British chargé d'affaires prosecuted the claims in a rather lukewarm manner, and finally admitted in October, 1843, that the evidence upon which they were based was insufficient, and that he did not think the British government would wish the Beales claim, at any rate, to be pushed until it was better substantiated. Since the subject does not arise again in the diplomatic correspondence of the Republic, the claims must have been dropped at this point. As the Texas government pointed out, though the for very large tracts of land, the grants upon which were based would all have expired under their own terms shortly after the outbreaks of the revolution, if not before, so that the losses sustained by the claimants as a result of the forfeitures must have been insignificant, if they existed at all. 9
(3) Claims for British negroes held in Texas.—Early in 1840 Commander Joseph Hamilton of the British navy arrived in Texas with credentials from E. Murray Macgregor, governor of the Windward Islands, addressed to “His Excellency the President or Officer Administering the Government of Texas,” empowering him to demand of Texas and to identify and recover certain British negroes supposed to be detained in slavery in that republic. One of the negroes in question was said to have been sold from among the crew of a British vessel in 1833 or 1834, and several others had been unlawfully introduced into Texas by John Taylor of Barbados. When Hamilton closed his mission on April 21, 1840, he was able to report that he had recovered five of the negroes he was seeking. The exertions of the Texas government in his behalf seem to have been satisfactory, for about a year later Lord Palmerston wrote to President Lamar expressing the thanks of Lord John Russell, the colonial secretary, for a letter written to Russell in October, 1840, on the subject. 10
4. Failure of Henderson's mission.
When General Henderson went to Paris in 1838 he took with him letters of introduction from Palmerston to Earl Granville, the British ambassador at Paris, through whom he was able to keep informed as to Palmerston's attitude in the matter of recognizing Texas. Having obtained French recognition and negotiated a commercial treaty with France, he returned to Texas, but stopped in London long enough to see Lord Palmerston and to ascertain that the English government was still unwilling to go the length of recognition. By this time Texas and the United States had become somewhat piqued by England's delay in the matter. Christopher Hughes, who represented the United States at Stockholm, interested himself personally relative thereto, and spoke a good word for Texas to Lord Palmerston. Cass, the United States minister at Paris, corresponded with Henderson and advised him to secure the recognition of as many Continental powers as possible, and so to force England into recognition by the strength of European public opinion. Henderson spoke of the possibility of inducing England to grant recognition by laying discriminating duties upon her commodities, but the Texas government seems to have been wise enough to understand the undesirability of a commercial war with that country, except as a last resort. 11
5. Recognition secured.
(1) Treaties signed by Palmerston and Hamilton.—In December, 1839, General James Hamilton of South Carolina, who had manifested a deep interest in Texas, and who was at this time engaged in an effort to sell the bonds of the republic to American and European capitalists, was sent to England as Texas agent to secure recognition, with authority to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce with England, to treat under British mediation for peace with Mexico and for the establishing of the Texas-Mexican boundary, and to come to an agreement with the British holders of Mexican bonds. He appears first to have gone to France and then to the Netherlands and Belgium, to which countries he was also accredited. On July 28, 1840, Hamilton wrote from The Hague that he had seen Lord Palmerston, who said unofficially that if Hamilton would come to England after attending to his other business he would be willing to take up with him the matter of recognition and a commercial treaty. On November 6 he reported that he and Palmerston had agreed on a treaty of commerce and navigation which was to be signed shortly. On November 13 the treaty was signed by Palmerston and Hamilton at London. It made the customary provisions for the carrying on of commerce between the two countries. Each of the two, in the matter of import duties and the like, was the privileges granted to the most favored nation. For eight years of the duration of the treaty vessels owned and commanded by Texas citizens and manned by a crew of whom at least three-fourths should be Texas citizens were entitled to be considered as Texas vessels under the treaty, whether built in Texas or not. The treaty was to continue for eight years, and was to be effective thereafter until terminated by either party on twelve months' notice. 12 On November 14 Palmerston and Hamilton signed a convention providing that England should offer her mediation between Texas and Mexico, and that, if within six months of this offer Mexico should conclude a treaty of peace with Texas, then Texas should assume one million pounds sterling of the Mexican foreign debt contracted prior to January 1, 1835. The details of this transfer of the debt were to be arranged between Mexico and Texas. The ratifications of the convention were to be exchanged at London within nine months. By this treaty it was hoped that Texas might enlist in her behalf the interest of the Mexican bondholders, who had theretofore been antagonistic to Texas because by her revolt she weakened Mexico financially. Thus it was thought by the Texans that England's mediation might be stimulated; while, on the other hand, the assumption of the million pounds of debt was held out as a bribe to the Mexican government and a salve to the wounded pride of the Mexican people. At the same time a third treaty was signed, for the suppression of the African slave-trade. It was England's policy at this period to have the slave-trade branded as piracy by treaties contracted with all the principal powers of the world, and Lord Palmerston insisted on negotiating such a treaty with Hamilton, to whom, apparently as well as to the Texas people in general, it was very unpalatable. The treaty designated certain waters in which vessels of the British navy that had received authority for the purpose from the Texas government might search Texas vessels and, if they were found to be engaged in the slave-trade, take them to designate ports for condemnation, and corresponding authority was given to the Texas navy. It may seem strange that England should have insisted on making such a treaty with Texas, considering the improbability that Texas vessels would for some time at least engage in any considerable numbers in the slave-trade or in any other trade. Palmerston's conduct in the matter was probably explained for the most part by a desire to justify his recognition of Texas; for antislavery feeling was strong in England at the time, and Palmerston felt that he could not afford to grant recognition to Texas until she should make some concession to it. It is possible also that he looked forward to a time when Texas would have a merchant marine large enough to make such a treaty desirable, and he saw that the present weakness of Texas which made such a treaty almost useless also made it easily obtainable; while the strength which she might later attain would make the treaty desirable but also difficult to be secured. And he seems to have had another and more immediate reason for his policy. The British government was anxious to conclude such a treaty with the United States. The United States, while desiring the abolition of the African slave-trade, was unwilling to grant to another power the right to search American vessels. England hoped that by getting the assent of as many other powers as possible to similar arrangements she might be able to force the United States government to surrender its prejudices and give its assent also. In this way the treaty with Texas, even though unimportant in itself, was considered important in its bearing on the relations of England and the United States. 13
(2) Reasons for offering recognition at this time.—Palmerston's reasons for recognizing Texas when he did are not altogether clear. Such uncertainty as he had entertained concerning the ability of Texas to maintain her independence was by this time no doubt resolved. The action of the United States, France, and the Netherlands in granting recognition gave Texas a secure place as a nation, and so destroyed one of Palmerston's main reasons for declining to recognize her. England wished, for political and commercial reasons, to hold a position of influence in the Texas situation, and to continue to hold this position it was necessary that England should now follow suit in recognizing Texas and henceforth deal with her as an independent power. 14 England's policy was, as has been said, to prevent the annexation of Texas to the United States. Texas, when she first was recognized by the United States, had applied for annexation also; but the Van Buren administration, for political and from a fear of taking action that might put in a false position, had declined to consider the proposition at that time. Thus at the period of Hamilton's mission annexation was not a live issue, and Palmerston felt that if recognition must come, which now appeared to be the case, it had best come at such a time as this, when it would seem to give least encouragement to the annexation impulse.
(3) Exchange of ratifications postponed and delayed.—The three treaties were at once sent to Texas for ratification. The commercial treaty and the treaty for mediation were sent out by Arthur Ikin, and they were immediately ratified by the Texas government and were returned to England, where the ratifications were to be exchanged. Hamilton for some reason did not send to Texas the treaty in regard to the salve-trade until January, 1841, when Albert T. Burnley, who was his associate as financial agent of Texas, left Europe. Thus it did not reach Texas until the adjournment of Congress, and the Senate did not act on it until January, 1842. In the meantime Lord Palmerston, who apparently suspected that the Texas government was attempting sharp practice toward him, insisted on delaying action until the ratifications of all three treaties could be exchanged at one time. Thus, although the treaties by which England proposed to recognize Texas were signed in the fall of 1840, the recognition was not finally consummated until the summer of 1842. This disappointed Hamilton, who held a commission as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to England, but who until the recognition finally took place could be received only as a mere diplomatic agent. Before recognition was actually realized his mission had come to a close. The offense to Hamilton's dignity was not the only inconvenience that Texas suffered as a result of the delay in recognition. For by this time a consul of London had been appointed in the person of Arthur Ikin, and, as he could be granted no exequatur so long as his country was unrecognized by the British government, he was for some time unable to perform his consular functions. After finishing the negotiations in England Hamilton returned to the Continent, where he stayed for the greater part of the time during the remainder of his mission; and meanwhile, although Ikin was left in charge of Texas affairs in London, relations between England and Texas were at a standstill. Hamilton hoped that the Texas cause might be advanced by the fall of the Melbourne ministry, which was now clearly about to give way; but the Peel ministry, by which it was succeeded, with the Earl of Aberdeen as foreign secretary, was equally obdurate in its refusal to put either the commercial treaty or that for mediation into effect without the treaty for the suppression of the slave-trade. The ratifications were all, under the terms of the treaties themselves, to be exchanged at London within nine months of the date of signature, but Hamilton signed with Aberdeen a protocol by which the date for the exchange was advanced to August 1, 1842, so that the treaties were prevented from lapsing. 15
(4) Ratifications exchanged and Elliot sent to Texas as chargé d'affaires.—In December, 1841, the term of the Lamar administration expired, and Sam Houston again became president with Anson Jones as secretary of state. The new administration proceeded to make a clean sweep of the diplomatic and consular service. Jones wrote a curt dispatch to Hamilton in which he directed him to return to Texas at his earliest convenience, and stated that it was not thought necessary to send him formal letters of recall, as diplomatic relations had not been established with any of the courts to which he was accredited. This statement was true enough; but it did very scant justice to Hamilton, who in negotiating treaties with England and the Netherlands had done all that could have been expected of him and more than his predecessor had done, and who was in no way responsible for the delay of the Texas government in ratifying the treaties. He seems to have been already on his way home when his recall was sent out, for on February 8, 1842, he wrote to Jones from Austin. At the same time Ikin was removed from the Texas consulate at London and replaced by William Kennedy with the rank of consul-general. Kennedy's tenure of the office was short, for after Texas had finally been recognized he accepted the position of British consul at Galveston and was succeeded in London by Lachlan M. Rate. Ashbel Smith was appointed Texas chargé to England and France as successor of Hamilton, and on his arrival in London in May, 1842, he took up with Lord Aberdeen the matter of exchanging the ratifications of the treaties. Aberdeen at first thought that this action should be delayed until August 1, according to the terms of the protocol he had signed with Hamilton; but Smith succeeded in persuading him so to hasten matters that the ratifications were finally exchanged on June 28. It was claimed that the delay was due, in part at least, to the remonstrances against recognition made by the Mexican chargé d'affaires. Some influence had been brought to bear on Sir Robert Peel by O'Connell and others to refuse to ratify the treaties and decline to recognize Texas, but Peel had replied that the Melbourne ministry had pledged the national faith by entering into the treaties, and that he could not decline ratification. On May 31, 1842, Lord Aberdeen signed a letter accrediting Captain Charles Elliot of the British navy to the Texas government as British consul-general. Elliot's commission in this position was dated August 20, 1841, but his appointment was not completed at the time owing to the delay in regard to the treaties. On the day that the ratifications were exchanged Aberdeen signed a letter accrediting Elliot as chargé d'affaires to Texas, and Elliot proceeded at once to his post, announcing his arrival in Texas in a letter of August 23, 1842, to Secretary Jones from Galveston. He continued to hold the post of chargé d'affaires until Texas was annexed to the United States, and his relations with the Texas government were most cordial. He became the friend of Anson Jones in particular. Texas had for a long time wished that England would maintain an agent of some sort in Texas, but the English government had been unwilling to take the desired action. Now that the appointment had been made, the convenience of the arrangement from the standpoint of the Texas government was apparent. Negotiations in regard to the various English claims against Texas and, in large part, those in regard to the British mediation in Mexico were thereafter carried on in Texas, which made it possible to proceed with much greater expedition. 16
1 The motives.
The key-note of England's dealing with Texas during this period was opposition to the annexation of that country to the United States. That she should have exerted herself to this end appears strange to one looking back from the present time, for it now seems to us that annexation was from the beginning a certainty. And this view was certainly taken in England by some at least. In January, 1837, Wharton wrote from Washington that the English and French governments seemed to consider annexation inevitable and would not resist it. The Liverpool Mercury is reported as saying in 1844 that England in opposing annexation was opposing the natural course of human events, and that she should after all look upon it as favorable to her interests, since it would remove a cause of jealousy between England and the United States and would strengthen the American free-trade party. The English government, however, seems never to have taken this view. Perhaps it felt that the case of Texas might turn out to bear some resemblance to the case of Canada, which, from its geographical and economic position and because of ties of race and language, might also have been expected eventually to become a part of the United States, but which had never done so. Granting the possibility of keeping Texas out of the Union, England's motives for doing so were strong.1 In the first place, at that time English relations with the United States were by no means cordial, 17 and England had good cause to feel jealous of the encroachment of her American rival upon her political and commercial position in the Southwest. England was not only a heavy creditor of Mexico and the principal country trading with her, but English influence was dominant there politically. In fact, England's position was such that the felt justified in speaking of her “ascendency” in the Gulf of Mexico. Annexation of Texas to the United States, would threaten very seriously this ascendency.2 A second reason for England's policy was her fear for Mexico's safety in the event of the annexation of Texas. It seemed certain that annexation would cause a war between Mexico and the United States which would result in disaster to Mexico. This would still more seriously impair English ascendency in the Southwest. By maintaining the independence of Texas, a buffer would be secured between the two countries, and war between them would be averted. The expansionist tendencies of the American people seem to have created a distinctly unfavorable impression in England. Some suspicion was probably entertained of a conspiracy such as was afterwards charged against the leaders of the Southern States, to detach Texas from Mexico and add it to the slave territory of the United States by sending American settlers into it, wresting it from Mexico, converting it into a republic, and finally annexing the republic to the United States. At any rate the English feeling on the subject seems to have been voiced by the Earl of Clarendon, who in a speech in the House of Lords in April, 1845, said that the restless and encroaching people of the United States would not in case of annexation be long without indulging their national taste for a boundary quarrel or establishing a cause of war with Mexico, and spoke of “a recent declaration made by the highest authority” according to which it had “for the last twenty years been the settled policy of the American Government to gain possession of Texas.” It was natural that with such an opinion of the United States England should wish to see that country separated from Mexico by an independent State if possible.3 A third reason for England's desire for the continued independence of Texas was the fact that so long as Texas remained independent England would be able to secure favorable terms for commerce with her, with a possibility of the ultimate conversion of Texas to free-trade; but, if she entered the American Union, England's products would be shut out by the high tariff maintained by the United States. A specific motive mentioned in some of the letters of the time was England's desire to set up Texas as a rival of the Southern States of the Union in the production of cotton, with the expectation of obtaining cotton more cheaply from Texas on account of special commercial favors which England hoped to be able to persuade Texas to grant her. It was more than hinted at times that England hoped to be able to break down the American tariff by importing goods into Texas and smuggling them across the border into the United States, but it is of course unlikely that there was any basis for the charge.4 A fourth reason for England's conduct, and the one that attracted most attention, was her attitude toward slavery, of which she was the avowed enemy. By her treaties with the principal commercial nations she had almost broken up the slavetrade, and she now hoped to see the institution of slavery itself everywhere abolished. She regretted that it existed in Texas, but hoped through her moral influence and by giving financial aid if necessary to stamp it out there. By so doing she would surround the slave States of the Union with a belt of free territory, thereby preventing the expansion of slavery which seemed essential to the continued existence of the institution itself. But, if Texas should become annexed to the United States, all this would be changed; for the Texas influence would be thus given permanently to the support of slavery, and it would become almost useless to hope for abolition, either in Texas or in the other Southern States. From this point of view it was desirable for England to keep Texas independent as long as possible, even supposing that she must ultimately become a part of the United States; for it might be possible in no very long time to stamp out slavery in Texas if isolated, and so to ensure ultimate abolition in the South. The American statesmen sometimes claimed that England hoped that by securing abolition in Texas she could make Texas a refuge for fugitive slaves from the Southern States, but it is unlikely that the English ever allowed themselves seriously to entertain such an idea, especially because of the fact that the United States would never have tolerated any such condition very long, even if the people of Texas could have been imagined willing on their part. 18
2. English mediation with Mexico.
(1) Mediation offered under the treaty.—While Texas and the United States desired annexation on general principles, this desire was much intensified by the fact that it was thought that only by annexation could Texas secure relief from the predatory warfare waged against her by Mexico. Hence it was England's part to endeavor to restore peace between Texas and Mexico, and England had recognized the fact long before this time. In December, 1839, before Hamilton's appointment as diplomatic agent of Texas, Richard Pakenham, the British minister to Mexico, wrote to him that he had been instructed by Lord Palmerston to offer England's good offices on behalf of Texas with the Mexican government, but that the state of public opinion in Mexico was such that he was able to secure nothing more than an assurance from Cañedo, the Mexican minister of foreign affairs, that commissioners from Texas would be listened to, with the distinct understanding, however, that no proposition for the surrender of the Mexican right of sovereignty over Texas would be entertained. In spite of this reservation, James Treat was sent to Mexico in the spring of 1840 as the confidential agent of Texas; but, as might have been expected, he was able to accomplish nothing. When Smith went to England to Exchange the ratifications of the treaties he found the British government not over-enthusiastic on the subject. Annexation was not at that time looked upon as an immediate probability, and consequently the British ardor for securing peace between Texas and Mexico had cooled somewhat. Lord Aberdeen told Smith that there was little chance for the success of British mediation with Mexico, saying that Pakenham had carried on a voluminous correspondence with the Mexicon government on the subject and had been unsuccessful. As Smith pointed out to the Texas government, it was to the interest of England to act in the matter no more energetically than necessary, since any action on the subject jeopardized the friendship of Mexico and England. When the treaties were ratified, however, it became England's duty to renew the offer of her mediation, and Pakenham was accordingly directed again to lay the matter before the Mexican government. On August 30, 1842, he wrote to Lord Aberdeen that Mexico had declined to accept the offer. The fact seemed to be that Santa Anna's tenure of the presidency of Mexico was dependent on his large army, and he needed the Texas question as an excuse for keeping up its numbers. 19
(2) Friction between England and Texas.—During the same period in which England was offering her mediation under the treaty, Lord Aberdeen exerted himself in another way to secure peace between Texas and Mexico. In the spring of 1842 President Houston proclaimed a blockade of the Mexican ports as a measure of war between the two countries, and one of Ashbel Smith's first duties in England was to notify Lord Aberdeen of the existence of this blockade. Aberdeen spoke at the time of the unfortunate results likely to arise from the blockade. It would, of course, be highly injurious to England and would be of comparatively little value to Texas. Moreover, as Aberdeen pointed out, it would be very apt to result in friction between Texas and the powers trading with Mexico. The move was certainly an unfortunate one unless it was designed to bring home to England the fact that war was still being waged against Texas and thus stimulate her mediation. Even in this case it would have had the disadvantage of making it less easy for England to mediate successfully. In a few days the subject came up in the House of Commons, where Disraeli by a question elicited from Sir Robert Peel the fact that the blockade would be recognized by England although Texas herself at that time had not obtained final recognition. Aberdeen at once asked, however, that the Royal West India Mail Steamers be excepted from the blockade, saying that they carried only passengers and mail and no freight and that they had been excepted from the blockade that France had recently maintained against Mexico. The request was granted, but before news of this action reached England the blockade was revoked by a proclamation of President Houston on September 12. Houston acted at the suggestion of Captain Elliot and of Joseph Eve, the United States chargé d'affaires to Texas. It is likely that by so doing he averted disagreement with England; for on September 21, 1842, the blockade had been raised but before the news had reached England, Aberdeen notified Smith that, since the dispatches from Pakenham showed that the blockade was not being efficiently enforced, the British government would no longer recognize it. The fact was that the Texas navy was not strong enough to maintain such a blockade, and that during the summer the Texas vessels had been withdrawn for repairs and refitting, with the intention of resuming the blockade in the fall. Of course no such blockade as this would be respected when it inconvenienced the commercial powers of the world. There was even fear that Spain, which inclined to favor Mexico against Texas, would send out a warship to force the blockade. President Houston thus acted discreetly in allowing Elliot and Eve to persuade him to raise the blockade. 20
During the first six months of Smith's stay in Europe the greatest share of his attention was occupied by an incident which in its ultimate outcome was unimportant, but which from the light it casts on the attitude of the English government is very instructive. On May 6, 1842, four days before Smith's arrival in London, William Kennedy, the Texas consul-general at that place, wrote to John H. Brower, the Texas consul at New York, in regard to a vessel, the Guadalupe, that was being built at Liverpool for the Mexican government. She was an iron war-ship of about seven hundred tons, and was to be ready for sea in June. The matter is mentioned in the first letter written from London by Smith, who also speaks of another war-ship, the Montezuma, being built at London for Mexico, and says that he will protest to the British government in order, if possible, to prevent their departure from England. He had an interview with Lord Aberdeen on May 31, when the subject was brought up. Aberdeen did not think that the government would be willing to detain the vessels, and thought that its policy would be to permit both Mexico and Texas to obtain in England such supplies as they wished. The Montezuma turned out to be even larger than the Guadalupe. Smith received reliable information that they were being built for use against Texas and Yucatán, and that they were contracted for by Lizardi and Co., the Mexican house with which Texas was already unpleasantly acquainted. Their crews were recruited in England, and their commanders were officers in the English navy. Smith exerted himself energetically to prevent the vessels from sailing. On June 14 he sent a formal protest to Lord Aberdeen, declaring that the incident was inconsistent with the friendly relations existing between England and Texas. Aberdeen, however, declined to act, merely stating that the government had refused to grant permission to arm the vessels in English ports. On July 1, Smith wrote Aberdeen again, calling attention to reports that the vessels were built under the auspices of Lord Melbourne's ministry, and that the admiralty had furnished the plans and models for them and had assigned officers to command them, although they were built expressly to act against Texas. Aberdeen replied that the vessels were not armed, and that no officers of the British service would be permitted to serve in the Mexican navy against Texas. In the meantime the Gaudalupe sailed. Smith felt that the resolution of the government was such that nothing could be gained by pressing his views upon it, and accordingly went to France. The incident, however, had gained some notoriety, and on August 2 was the subject of comment in the House of Commons. Here the matter would probably have ended, and the Montezuma would doubtless have been allowed to depart in peace, but for the interference of General James Hamilton, who was again in England in a personal capacity. He and a certain nobleman who brought the matter to his attention sought to obtain a letter of marque from the Texas government enabling them to take the Montezuma as a prize on the high seas, but when they found this impossible they proceeded against her under the Foreign Enlistment Act, by which the treasury board was empowered to seize and confiscate vessels equipped, furnished, fitted out, or armed to make war against a country at peace with England. The vessel was seized under this act by the commissioners of customs; but when the treasury board was appealed to it was decided that, while the law had been violated, the violation was unintentional. This decision was based on the argument that the Montezuma was technically a British vessel, as she was not formally to be turned over to the Mexican government until she reached Vera Cruz, and she was technically only a merchant vessel, since she carried her guns in the hold instead of on the swivels that had been prepared for them. Accordingly, after a detention of almost a month, she was released, but only after her crew had been reduced to the number properly required to man a merchant vessel of her size, and after her guns, carriages, and military stores had been sent ashore. Even then the subject was not dropped, for Hamilton sought to have her seized by the British naval officer in command at Havana, where she was to touch on her way to Mexico. Hamilton's conduct in the matter was, of course, by no means altruistic, since he and his associates would have profited by the condemnation of the Montezuma; and it was considered particularly indelicate in that he, although his relations with the Texas administration were by no means cordial, undertook to act almost as if he had been an official representative of Texas and consistently therewith submitted to the Texas government an “official” report of the action he had taken. Smith afterwards conducted an extended correspondence on the subject with Aberdeen in which the points of international law involved were discussed at some length, and in which considerable tartness was developed on both sides. Smith of course accomplished nothing in regard to the vessel itself, since it had sailed long before the correspondence was more than well under way; but he hoped that by reiterating his protests on the subject until the British government was, as he said, thoroughly tired of the matter, he might at least impress his objections very strongly on the government's memory and make it very cautious in regard to repeating the offense of which he complained. Through James Reily, the Texas chargé d'affaires at Washington, the matter was brought to the attention of President Tyler, who undertook to send the United States frigate Mississippi into the Gulf for the protection of Texas. Throughout this whole affair, the attitude of the English government was that of defending English commerce above everything else. It would not, to the detriment of this commerce, forbid the fitting out of Mexican vessels in England or the purchasing of supplies by Mexico for use against Texas so long as any color of legality could be found to justify its doing otherwise. Apparently it had no desire to befriend Mexico against Texas nor any to continue the war between the two countries. As Lord Ashburton and Fox, the English minister to the United States, told Henry Clay in the spring of 1842, England would be as likely to aid Spain in reconquering the Low Countries as to aid Mexico in reducing Texas, and in the relations between Texas and Mexico her first desire was for peace. And yet the building of the vessels in England was likely to encourage the early renewal of active hostilities on the part of Mexico. England's desire for peace at this time was by no means so acute as it afterwards became, and just now it was easily overpowered by considerations of commercial gain. 21
(3) Suspension of hostilities with Mexico.—On January 31, 1843, Jones directed Smith to protest to the English and French governments against the uncivilized warfare waged against Texas by Mexico. On June 10 Jones sent to Smith a formal declaration to be laid before England and France informing them that, unless before the meeting of Congress in the following December peace or a satisfactory armistice had been concluded between Texas and Mexico, Texas would commence offensive war. Before this declaration, however, was presented, other instructions were received by Smith, and it was only shown informally to the English and French governments; for on June 9 Captain Elliot received a letter from Percy W. Doyle, the British chargé d'affaires in Mexico, who said that Santa Anna had agreed to order a cessation of hostilities if President Houston would do likewise, and to receive commissioners from Texas. Houston accordingly proclaimed a cessation of hostilities on June 15. By July 24 Elliot was able to state the Mexican position more clearly. Mexico still insisted, he said, on a recognition of her sovereignty over Texas in any agreement that might be reached, and he thought there was little likelihood of her receding from the demand. He was very anxious, however, to have Texas enter upon the negotiation for what it might be worth, and thought that Texas by making the nominal concession of Mexican sovereignty could obtain peace, security, and virtual independence. The English government was not so enthusiastic on the subject, for Smith said that Aberdeen and Addington had told him that they had heard Santa Anna was going to make propositions to Texas concerning it, but they thought that, since Santa Anna had said that he could not maintain his position for two days if he should entertain the question of recognizing the independence of Texas, these propositions did not promise a permanent peace. Aberdeen said that he did not think the propositions had anything to do with English mediation. But the Texas government took the matter up and sent commissioners to negotiate with General Woll. After some delay the commissioners drew up and signed an armistice, which the Texas government refused to ratify because in form it was not sufficiently respectful to Texas, and also because the Mexican government failed to give notice that it had ratified the proposed agreement. Accordingly by July, 1844, the Texas government informed Smith that General Woll had announced the renewal of hostilities between Texas and Mexico. 22
(4) Proposal for joint mediation.—From the first Texas felt unwilling to rely on the efforts of England alone for the restoration of peace with Mexico. Some weeks before the treaty between England and Texas on the subject of mediation went into effect Anson Jones directed Smith to urge joint interposition by England, France, and the United States. Smith was in France when he received Jones's instructions on the subject, and he at once took up the question with Guizot, the French premier. In the latter part of August, 1842, he wrote to Lord Aberdeen on the subject, saying he understood that the French ambassador in London was instructed to lay the matter before the English government. The proposal was, indeed, at once accepted by France, but it was very distasteful to England, which wished no coadjutors in its position as closest European friend of Texas. Before the end of August Smith had returned to London, where he saw Lord Aberdeen and Addington, his under-secretary. They were of the opinion that Texas should rely on mediation by England alone, since England's relations with Mexico were much more cordial than those of France or the United States. For France had not long before maintained a blockade of the coast of Mexico, while the United States was very nearly at war with Mexico owing to correspondence between Daniel Webster, the American secretary of state, and Bocanegra, the Mexican minister at Washington, in regard to the relations of Texas and their respective nations. England's unwillingness to enter into the joint mediation proposed was no doubt intensified by the fact that her own relations with France were then very cool. In this state of affairs Texas appealed to the governments of England, France, and the United States separately to put an end to the war being waged against her by Mexico, but assured England that Texas was relying on the powers which had offered their friendly mediation and would use no other means to effect an adjustment. It is difficult to reconcile these two acts, but some light is thrown on the subject by the fact that the assurance to England was given for the immediate purpose of conveying the news that Texas did not intend in the matter to make use of the services of General Hamilton, who had proposed to end the war by a secret negotiation at Washington between himself, the American government, and Almonte, the Mexican minister. The English and French governments, however, decided to exercise their mediation, but to act independently. By the end of the year Smith had expressed it as his opinion that English mediation under the treaty negotiated by Hamilton and Palmerston was utterly hopeless, and the Texas government felt that war must be actively renewed unless friendly powers succeeded in prevailing upon Mexico to make peace. 23
3. Annexation Promoted by English Efforts to Secure the Aboli- tion of Slavery in Texas.
(1) Reported utterances of Aberdeen. — Aberdeen's policy during this period was such as indicates that he felt that he had the Texas situation still in hand. He seems to have considered that there was no reason to fear that annexation would soon again become an active issue. Thus, at a time when the situation was really delicate and when the success of his policy demanded the greatest caution on his part, he undertook an aggressive measure by which he played directly into the hands of his opponents. The annexation party in the United States under the leadership of such men as John C. Calhoun and President Tyler was preparing to make annexation the foremost issue in American politics, and it was bad policy on England's part to take any steps that would give color to the assertion that she was interfering in Texas in such a way as to disturb the interests of the United States. Such a step was taken by Aberdeen in his stand on the question of slavery in Texas. It was perfectly well known that England desired to see the universal abolition of slavery. This desire as to Texas had been avowed by Lord Palmerston when he first came into relations with General Henderson. The subject had not been pressed, however, and it was in the background until 1842. In July of that year, as Ashbel Smith reported, he was approached by a person in the confidence of the British government, who suggested that slavery should be abolished in Texas, England reimbursing Texas for financial losses resulting from the abolition; or, as an alternative, that Texas should be divided on the line of the Colorado River into two states, of which the eastern should be slave-holding and the western free-soil. Smith was told at the time that Aberdeen was cognizant of the plans and had said that by the division of Texas into two parts as suggested the whole of that country would ultimately become non-slaveholding. Smith, however, did not take the matter seriously, and the subject seems to have been forgoten until a year later. In the summer of 1843 a general anti-slavery convention met in London, and as was natural the subject of slavery in Texas came up for consideration. J. P. Andrews, a lawyer from Houston, Texas, was present in the interests of abolition. A committee of which Andrews was a member waited on Lord Aberdeen, who informed it that England “would employ every legitimate means to attain so great and desirable an object as the abolition of slavery in Texas.” The convention made many suggestions as to the means of obtaining abolition, one of which, the guaranty by England of a loan to Texas to be used in paying for slave property held in the Republic, was said to have been endorsed by Aberdeen. Smith felt it necessary to tell Aberdeen that Andrews in no sense represented the government or the people of Texas, and to state that it would be impossible for Texas to accept anything in the nature of a British subsidy for the abolition of slavery, without a greater sacrifice of national dignity than she was willing to make. 24
(2) England's stand for abolition brings annexation.—This would probably have ended the matter if it had not now come to the attention of the government of the United States. But on August 8 Abel P. Upshur, the American secretary of state, wrote to William S. Murphy, the American chargé d'affaires in Texas, that he had just learned of the Andrews movement in England through a private letter from a citizen of Maryland. This letter afterwards became the subject of some notoriety and is thought to have been written by Duff Green, who was a friend of John C. Calhoun, and who was then in London. Green in his letter said without qualification that Aberdeen had agreed to guarantee the interest on a loan to be made to Texas for the purpose of extinguishing slavery. Upshur, who was somewhat exercised on the subject, instructed Murphy that the United States could not permit any such interference. On August 18 Lord Brougham, who was one of the most conspicuous of the English abolitionists, brought up the subject of slavery in Texas in the British House of Lords. In reply to his questions on the subject Lord Aberdeen spoke at some length, saying among other things that the government would make every effort to affect abolition in Texas, and that Brougham could not entertain a more ardent desire to put an end to slavery than was entertained by Aberdeen himself. He intimated very strongly that he was negotiating with Texas on the subject, but declined to communicate any definite information at the time. On hearing of this Upshur wrote to Edward Everett, American minister at London, directing him to obtain further information in regard to Aberdeen's negotiation with Texas. Everett communicated with Ashbel Smith, who was entirely in the dark on the subject and supposed that the negotiation was being carried on in Texas by Captain Elliot. Aberdeen, however, in an interview gave Everett the truth of the matter. With Texas directly no negotiations had taken place; but this statement could not have been meant to cover Aberdeen's tentative suggestion during the summer of 1842 of the plan for England's assisting Texas with money in the policy of abolition which Smith had reported. As to the proposal made by the abolition convention, which he was said to have endorsed, he declared that it had been promptly rejected. He said that the negotiation to which he referred in his speech in the House of Lords was the negotiation that he was carrying on with Mexico for the restoration of peace with Texas; for he entertained some hope that Mexico could be induced to recognize Texas on the condition, more or less clearly expressed, of the abolition of slavery by Texas. He told Everett that England would not interfere improperly in the domestic concerns of Texas or the United States and had nothing in view toward Texas that need cause any anxiety in the United States. Aberdeen by this time saw that, through the agitation in the United States to which he had given rise, he had materially injured his own cause; for it was clear that the Southern party, which was particularly interested in the annexation of Texas, proposed to use English interference in Texas as a strong argument to hasten annexation by appealing to the suspicion with which England was in general regarded by the American people. Accordingly on December 26 he wrote to Richard Pakenham, who was now British minister to the United States, making a definite statement of the policy of the English government with reference to Texas. He said that so far as England's desire to see Texas recognized by Mexico was based on selfish motives at all, it was based on England's interests as a commercial power having dealings with Texas. She had no desire to acquire any undue influence in Texas with regard to slavery or any other matter, and while her desire to see slavery everywhere abolished was perfectly well known she had no notion of acquiring a dominant influence in Texas or of influencing the United States through Texas. This dispatch Pakenham was directed to lay before Upshur, and a copy was sent to Elliot and by him delivered to the Texas government. Pakenham did not deliver the letter to the American government, however, until February 26, 1844. As this was only a few days before the accident on board the Princeton by which Upshur was killed and the business of the state department disarranged, Pakenham was not answered until April 18. Calhoun, who had by this time succeeded Upshur as secretary of state, then wrote Pakenham a diplomatic note expressing his concern at the statement in Aberdeen's letter that Great Britain desired and was constantly exerting herself to procure the general abolition of slavery throughout the world, and stating that as abolition in Texas would be injurious to the interests of the United States it would be necessary for that nation to adopt the most effectual measures to prevent the bringing about of abolition through undue influence exerted on the part of England. Several notes accordingly passed between Calhoun and Pakenham on the subject. On May 17, 1844, the matter came up again in the House of Lords, where Lord Brougham took occasion to say that nothing that he or Aberdeen had said justified the inference that England, although deploring the existence of slavery, ever contemplated any interference with the institution in America. These incidents served to bring out the attitude of England on the question of slavery, and slavery in Texas in particular; but they were not able to counteract the effects produced by the events of the summer of 1843. For in October, 1843, less than two months after Lord Aberdeen used in the House of Lords the language that caused the excitement, Upshur informed Isaac Van Zandt, the Texas chargé d'affaires at Washington, that recent happenings in Europe had given a new interest to the subject of annexation, and that he was prepared to make propositions on the subject to Van Zandt as soon as the latter should be authorized to receive them. The result of this was that when Calhoun wrote Pakenham his note of April 18, 1844, he was able to inform him at the same time that he had negotiated a treaty of annexation with Texas. 25
(3) England aroused by prospect of annexation.—The representatives of the English government had learned before this that Texas was again actively engaged with the annexation question. In March, 1844, Elliot in a note to Anson Jones asked whether Texas was considering the American propositions for annexation, saying that Mexico could not be expected to enter into any arrangement with Texas as long as annexation was immediately in view. Jones said in reply that, since Texas had given up hope of peace with Mexico, and since the door to annexation had been unexpectedly opened, the Texas Congress had instructed President Houston to negotiate on the subject, in accordance with which instruction General Henderson had been sent to Washington. Ashbel Smith wrote on June 2 that the annexation treaty was receiving much attention in England, and that England and France had instructed their ministers at Washington to protest against it. This action was not to be taken, however, until the annexation treaty should be ratified, and hence the protest was apparently never made. The new agitation of annexation seems to have taken England by surprise, for it had been thought that the known anti-annexationist views of President Houston were a sufficient guaranty that no proposals for annexation would be considered. England and France were acting in concert on the Texas question, as Aberdeen told Smith at the time. Aberdeen, when he first heard of the annexation treaty, seems to have felt that he had been tricked, but Smith was able to set the matter before him an a light more favorable to Texas. Smith expressed to Aberdeen his personal opinion that if England and France would compel Mexico to make peace with Texas Texas would be willing to reject annexation. Mexico was now on less cordial terms with England than formerly on account of commercial restrictions laid on foreign commerce by the former. There was talk of Mexico's being compelled by England and France to remove the restrictions, and for a time diplomatic relations between England and Mexico were broken off. On June 24 Aberdeen informed Smith that if the annexation treaty failed of ratification by the United States Senate (which had actually happened on June 8) England and France would be willing to enter into a “diplomatic act” with Texas, the United States, and Mexico, settling the boundaries of Texas and guaranteeing its independence, and he added that if Mexico refused to accede to the act they would force her to acquiesce in it. The result of such an act would have been to guarantee Texas against molestation from Mexico on condition of her giving England and France a negative on the annexation of Texas to the United States. Smith advised against the arrangement, thinking that Texas would lose more than she would gain by it. The Texas government was willing to negotiate with England on the subject, but insisted on negotiating in Texas. This last point was still unsettled when Smith was granted leave of absence and George W. Terrell appointed to occupy temporarily his position. Terrell in January, 1845, brought the matter fairly before Lord Aberdeen, who expressed his willingness to carry on the negotiation in Texas, intimating that instructions on the subject had already been sent to Elliot. 26
(4) Defection of France and change in the attitude of Mexico. —England was by this time thoroughly aroused to the danger of annexation unless determined measures were at once taken to prevent it, for she saw that the Texas people were strongly in favor of it, and that the American government had come to take the same position. In this state of affairs Lord Aberdeen was no doubt annoyed by indications that France, which was acting in concert with England, was not disposed blindly to follow the English policy, which was now to interfere authoritatively to prevent annexation. In January, 1845, Lord Aberdeen brought to Terrell's attention published letters of John C. Calhoun and William R. King, the American minister at Paris, which developed the fact that Guizot had told King that France would not consider annexation of sufficient importance to interrupt friendly relations with the United States. Aberdeen investigated the matter through Lord Cowley, the British ambassador at Paris, who reported that Guizot had told him that France was ready to unite with Great Britain and to go the whole length proposed by her, this being the guaranty of the recognition of the independence of Texas without further molestation, and that the two powers were prepared at any moment to sign with Texas a diplomatic act making the guaranty. The conflict between Guizot's statements to King and to Lord Cowley was not irreconcilable, but it seems to have given Aberdeen a feeling of uncertainty. Before the end of the month Terrell learned from Aberdeen that the French government, in view of a new development, no longer considered a diplomatic act necessary, though Guizot still spoke of a certain “moral guaranty which the two governments will have given to Texas, if at their instance she shall withhold her assent to annexation to the United States.” This Aberdeen understood to mean the moral obligation under which England and France would rest to maintain the independence of Texas if at their solicitation she should decline annexation. The new development in question was a change of attitude on the part of the Mexican government. Aberdeen received from the British minister to Mexico a written avowal from Santa Anna of his willingness to recognize Texas with the Colorado River as boundary. The proposed boundary was of course preposterous, but Aberdeen considered Santa Anna's avowal distinctly encouraging, since it admitted the principle of recognition, which had theretofore been persistently denied, while there would be a probability of his agreeing to more favorable terms at a later date. In December, 1844, a revolution took place in Mexico, by which Santa Anna was deposed and Herrera made president. The new government was disposed to continue the efforts to make peace. By May 9, 1845, Terrell was able to report that Aberdeen had received information that the Mexican government was willing to recognize Texas if that republic would declare against anexation. England and France accordingly agreed to mediate between the two countries. On March 29 Ashbel Smith, whom Anson Jones, the new president of Texas, had made secretary of state, signed preliminary proposals for a treaty, which were put before the Mexican government through the English and French representatives in Texas and Mexico. Mexico was to recognize Texas, in return for which Texas was to bind herself not to become annexed to any other country. Boundaries were to be decided on in the final treaty, and if the parties could not agree the subject was to be submitted to umpires. To give the mediating powers time to submit these proposals to Mexico, Smith signed a protocol with Elliot and Count Dubois de Saligny, the French chargé d'affaires in Texas, agreeing on the part of Texas not to accept any proposals for annexation to any other country for ninety days. This provision was practically nullified by a reservation made by Smith that if the people of Texas should decide to pursue the policy of annexation the Texas government might notify England and France to that effect and without any breach of faith be at liberty to consummate the same. The proposals were laid before the Mexican government, which on May 19, through Luis G. Cuevas, minister of foreign relations, accepted them. Lord Aberdeen in the meantime was exerting himself in other ways to prevent annexation. As early as July, 1844, Smith had written home from London suggesting that England and France might be willing to make commercial concessions to Texas to induce her to remain independent. Accordingly the subject was mentioned in instructions furnished to George W. Terrell when he was sent out to take Smith's place. In February, 1845, Terrell brought the matter before Lord Aberdeen, who at first was unwilling to take it up. Terrell, however, by pointing out to him the fact that England by admitting Texas goods on specially favorable terms would give the opponents of annexation a strong argument with which to advance their cause, was able to persuade Aberdeen to change his opinion; for he finally promised to lay the matter before the cabinet and board of trade and said that important modifications in the tariff were likely to be made at the present session of parliament, when Texas would receive the most liberal treatment consistent with England's treaty obligations. The English government also sought to recover as much as possible of the ground that had been lost by the movement for the abolition of slavery in Texas. Aberdeen was very anxious to have it understood that he did not seek to have abolition made a condition of the recognition of Texas by Mexico. In June, 1844, he told Ashbel Smith that he regretted the agitation that had been caused by the discussion of abolition in Texas, and said that thereafter he would have nothing to say on the subject. In a conversation in February, 1845, Terrell obtained a very explicit statement concerning abolition from Lord Aberdeen, who said that England might have made her recognition of Texas contingent on abolition; but that, now that she had recognized Texas, she had no right to interfere in the matter and did not intend to do so. He was disposed indeed to subordinate everything in his dealings with Texas to his desire to prevent annexation, for it was still quite clear that this would mean war between Mexico and the United States and disaster to Mexico. 27
(5) Annexation in spite of English opposition. — The annexation movement, however, had now proceeded entirely too far to be stopped. It had been the leading issue in the American presidential campaign of 1844, and had received a triumphant sanction from the people. Consequently at the session beginning in December, 1844, resolutions for the annexation of Texas were presented to Congress and finally passed just before the close of the session. The matter was then at the disposal of the Texas government. The opponents of annexation in Texas, of whom Terrell was one of the most prominent, entertained hopes that the matter would be allowed to rest until the next regular session of the Texas Congress, which would meet in December, 1845, and that in the meantime Mexico might be brought through England's mediation to offer such terms as would cause the people of Texas at least to hesitate before accepting the American proposals for annexation. But feeling in Texas was so strong that it became apparent that this course would not be adopted. The Texas Senate refused to confirm the nomination of Terrell to the mission to England and France, and Ashbel Smith was sent out again, reaching London on May 14. His mission had scarcely any other purpose than to explain to the English and French governments that Texas was fully resolved by this time to accept annexation on the terms of the joint resolution passed by the American Congress. He suggested to Aberdeen at his first interview that it might be desirable to have definite proposals from Mexico for submission to the Texas people at the same time that the annexation question should be submitted to them. Aberdeen had small hope that Mexico would be willing to recognize Texas, saying that while the policy of recognition might commend itself to the government it would be so unpopular with the Mexican people that there could be no hope of its adoption. He intended to press the subject upon Mexico, but on account of the jealousy of the people of Texas and the United States and the unwillingness of France to unite with England in the use of compulsion he would use only moral suasion. Aberdeen decided also not to enter into new commercial arrangements with Texas just then, probably thinking it undersirable at a time when the continued independent existence of the republic was a matter of much doubt. Smith intimated in his correspondence that England was disposed to leave Mexico to the consideration of the arguments already presented to her in the interest of Texas. He said that if the next mails from Mexico brought no news of a change in that country's attitude toward Texas he would then, pursuant to his instructions, notify the English and French governments that Texas would no longer look for a settlement of its affairs from the mediation of friendly powers, but would rely solely on its own resources, pursuing its welfare and honor as seemed best, and that if it chose to maintain its independence it would force the acknowledgment thereof from Mexico. His second and last dispatch from London, written on June 3 on the eve of his return to Texas, while making no mention of this notification, left the inference that it had been made, for he said he considered his longer stay in London unnecessary. By his departure he in fact broke off relations between England and Texas by admitting that annexation was a practical certainty. Smith's action was, of course, taken in ignorance of the course pursued by General Herrera's government. By the proposals signed by the minister of foreign relations, Cuevas, on May 19, 1845, and transmitted to President Anson Jones on June 2 by Captain Elliot the very alternative which Smith had spoken of as so desirable was put before the people of Texas. By accepting the proposals of Cuevas Texas would be assured of peace with Mexico while she would retain her independence and the friendship of France and England. If she preferred, however, to become annexed to the United States she could do so by accepting the proposition offered by the American Congress. Jones on June 4 issued a proclamation informing the people of Texas that the alternative existed. On June 6 an extraordinary session of the Texas Congress met on Jones's call at Washington, Texas, to consider the question of annexation, and such other matters as might be laid before it. The proposals of the Mexican government, were submitted to the Senate, but they were rejected, and soon afterwards Congress adopted the resolutions accepting the offer from the United States. Jones also called a convention to meet at Austin on July 4, and to this convention he submitted both the resolutions for annexation and the Mexican proposals. But the convention, like the Congress, approved the terms of annexation and disregarded the proposals of Mexico, proceeding to the adoption of a constitution for Texas as a State of the American Union. Thus the hopes of England were finally disappointed, and the English policy was definitely defeated. 28
(6) Effect of annexation on treaties.—Elliot, who had gone to Mexico in the spring of 1845 to assist Charles Bankhead, the British minister to Mexico in persuading the Mexican government to accept the preliminary proposals of Texas, on his return to Texas went at once to the United States on personal business and returned to Texas only for a brief stay. His last interchange of notes with Allen, the Texas secretary of state, was of an interesting nature. In the debate in the House of Lords on May 17, 1844, to which reference has already been made, Lord Aberdeen, speaking of the treaty of annexation that was then under consideration, had said that the annexation of Texas raised a question new and unexampled in the history of public law, which would receive serious attention from the government. This Everett interpreted as referring to the effect of annexation on the previously existing obligations of the two countries involved. In December, 1845, Lord Aberdeen directed Elliot to notify the Texas government that the obligation of the treaties between Texas and Great Britain would not be impaired by the voluntary surrender by Texas of her independence but would continue in precisely the same condition as if Texas had remained an independent power, and that so long as they should remain in force Great Britain would be entitled to require that the engagements contracted by them be fulfilled on the part of Texas as they would be fulfilled on the part of Great Britain. Ebenezer Allen, the secretary of state of Texas, replied with propriety that during the independence of Texas her treaty obligations had been faithfully maintained, and that they would continue to be so maintained; but that after the organization of the State government should succeed to that of the Republic (which happened, in fact, on February 19, 1846) the settlement of all questions growing out of her treaty relations with foreign powers must, so far as Texas was concerned, be referred to the government of the United States. Allen's stand here was quite in accord with international law, and it seems to have satisfied the English government, for no further correspondence took place on the subject between Elliot and Allen. Probably Lord Aberdeen in making the protest desired merely to get his position on record for use in case any unforseen complication should arise as a result of annexation. 29
While the English policy had been an unqualified failure, so far as the attainment of its ultimate objects was concerned, it was by no means without significance in the history of the world. England had been unable to prevent the annexation of Texas to the United States and had been unable materially to influence the question of the abolition of slavery either in Texas or in the Southern States, but she had started out with some reasonable hope of success and had made her influence decidedly felt. It was, of course, impossible for an English statesman to judge accurately the state of public feeling in Texas and the United States on such matters. If Lord Palmerston and Lord Aberdeen had been able to understand the real feeling for annexation in Texas and the United States they would probably have been sufficiently convinced of the impossibility of persuading Texas to remain independent, or if they had embarked on an anti-annexation policy they would have pursued it more vigorously. They would certainly not have acted as Aberdeen did in the matter of the anti-slavery agitation, and they would certainly have presented their arguments to Texas in a more attractive form than they in fact adopted. They would have used their mediation with Mexico in a more authoritative manner, and would have shown less hesitation in the matter of granting commercial concessions to Texas. They seem, in fact, to have looked upon annexation as a possibility much more remote than it really was. They were evidently justified in coming to this conclusion, in view of their imperfect information. And depending upon this conclusion as they did, their plans were eminently reasonable. Distrustful of the United States as they were at the time, to establish in the Southwest an independent English-speaking republic, depending mainly on English protection and submissive to English influence, by means of which republic they might hope to defend Mexico against encroachments from the United States, to protect their own ascendency in the Southwest, and to deal an effective blow at the American tariff and the Southern institution of slavery, was a dream that English statesmen were, from their own standpoint, fully justified in cherishing and one that they are scarcely to be blamed for seeking to realize, even if they had known from the beginning that the chances were against their success. As the matter worked itself out, however, England's conduct contributed to an effect directly contrary to that which she sought to produce. Her interference was never energetic enough to give a rallying-point to the anti-annexationist movement that really existed in Texas while it was strong enough to furnish a powerful argument to the party in Texas and the United States that favored immediate annexation. The annexation party in Texas, indeed, sought by coquetting with England to stimulate the annexationists of the United States. England by her efforts thus really assisted annexation and retarded abolition. The outcome showed England's fears for Mexico to have been fully justified, for the Mexican war resulted quite as mischievously to Mexico as England could have expected, and the advance of the United States to the Rio Grande did in fact give that country the ascendency in the Southwest that had been possessed by England.
When John H. Reagan passed away peacefully in his home at Fort Houston, near Palestine, Texas lost her most distinguished citizen, the South one of her most loyal champions, and the Union an ardent patriot. The last survivor of the Confederate Cabinet, he belonged to a period of our history, which, in this strenuous age is already remote, mediæval.
He was born so long ago as October 8, 1818, in Sevier County, Tennessee. The Reagans were of mixed ancestry—English, Irish, German, Welsh—and it would be difficult to say which strain predominated in the character of their most distinguished scion. In a sense he combined them all, being English in his love of order, Irish in his prediction for politics, German in his desire for knowledge, Welsh in his persistence of purpose.
The date of his birth was not an inauspicious one, so far as the West was concerned; for the riflemen of his own State, who, under Jackson at New Orleans, had aided in destroying Packenham's army, were but returned from the war. In every village resounded the songs of triumph; in every household the frontiersmen taught their children reverence for the Stars and Stripes, and pointed prophesies of the coming power and glory of the United States. It is no wonder that young Reagan came to love the Union with an “almost extravagant devotion.” It is a fact, which has been all too slow of recognition, that the Westerners—the early settlers of the Mississippi Valley—were the first devotees of the Constitution, most of whom indeed had borne arms in the revolution, making possible a Constitution by their victories, rendering it inviolable by their successes in the second war against the King. Love of country is a virtue bearing its finest fruit in the hearts of those who live nearest to mother-earth, and no nearer can civilized man than lived the pioneers who first broke through the Alleghanies. Among them axe and rifle were inseparably associated; and he that laid the wilderness with the one, was ready with the other to conquer the enemies of his country.
A pioneer was Judge Reagan's father, fresh from the ranks of the Revolutionary army. He settled in the mountains of East Tennessee, acquiring a small landed estate; and here his son was born into the world—a world that was all too hard and poverty-stricken. There was no refuge from the unrelenting environment, while over all brooded the spirit of the wilderness as yet unconquered, as if inviting conquest. It was truly a time when familiarity with the axe and rifle was of infinitely more consequence than knowledge of books. And into this régime young Reagan was thrust. In early life he busied himself on the farm and in the tanyard of his father, and while still a youth took part in some minor skirmishes with the Indians. But thirst for knowledge soon made him a captive, and the log schoolhouse with its puncheon benches proved a prison of the most delightful character, and to the close of his life he remained a student. During his residence in Washington he worked hard at whatever subject he had in hand. Senator R. Q. Mills has said of him that often returning late at night from some social function he could see the lights gleaming in the judge's rooms. He almost eschewed society in that quest which never ended.
Endowed with this longing after knowledge, nothing short of its gratification could satisfy the eager youth; so at a tender age he set out in pursuit of an education. This pursuit led him far from home, and over a very harsh and jagged way. Yet he went bravely, conquering as he went. For he managed to accumulate money and, perhaps better, to make friends. With the money he returned to school, and what with outside labors, mornings, evenings and Saturdays, he managed to secure several sessions at an academy and a so-called college. Then he entered the school of schools—life— hewing wood and drawing water in order to be able to continue his exploration of the realms of wisdom. But, in all charity, the byways of the Tennessee of that day were not lined with educational institutions, nor were those that here and there managed to exist celebrated for their teachers. Indeed the modern over-vaunted cultural influences were wanting in large measure—the time was not yet. But, perhaps better than all, because rarer in this day of graft and pompous formality, he imbibed those principles which have always distinguished gentlemen of the South—knightly respect for woman, watchful care of his own honor, whole-hearted hospitality, simplicity of every day life (a lost art), and an ardent love of country. Frontier-born and bred, he entered life endowed with an intuitive faculty of meeting emergencies on the spot, with a tact useful later in placating antagonists of various types. He had other qualities of the frontier, too—force, directness, frankness, patience, courage,—scarcely ever found in the same degree in the settled centers of society. The temptation to contrast him with Senator Hoar is very strong, for they were in many respects at antipodes,—in many, shoulder to shoulder. It is sufficient to know that one was born in Concord—the Concord of Emerson and Hawthorne—and the other in Tennessee—the State of Sevier and Jackson.
Politically, Judge Reagan was a Democrat of the Andrew Jackson type. As a boy, he grew up under this influence, for “Old Hickory” had assumed his sway in Tennessee. Besides, Democracy of this sort could exist only on the frontier or in the communities but newly sprung from the loins of society. The application of the dogmas of such a Democracy as was held by the West from 1800 to 1850 was impossible in a society which had begun to build cities and establish factories. And all his life Judge Reagan stood for the simplest governmental forms, looking with alarm upon the innovations of latter-day administrations. Chiefest of his cares, the core of his code of statecraft, was the individual. Like Jefferson, he desired to throw about the weak all the legal protections possible, realizing, as the father of ultra Democracy did, that without the erection of barriers the individual was but a pigmy in the power of harpies. Thus it was the tremendous growth and influence of trusts filled him with forebodings of disaster. In his opinion it was all wrong, and to be reprobated. Principles were everything to him. As a candidate for governor, he refused to permit his name to go before the nominating convention because some of the planks in the platform ill-accorded with his views. Nor can it be charged that it was fear of defeat that prompted the act, for no man ever faced issues more fearlessly.
Judge Reagan was twenty-one years of age when he crossed the Sabine into the Republic of Texas. There still rang the echoes of the Texas Revolution, which in itself had been but a protest against governmental machinery—a conflict between Anglo-Saxon and Spanish institutions. The wars with the Indians which followed were also in the nature of simplifying the problems of government, and here, as a young man, he launched forth boldly, taking part in the Cherokee War. In the decisive battle he tried to save the life of Chief Bowels, the last great figure of this famous tribe, whom he had seen under unforgettable circumstances—in a conference with Sam Houston. The young man's gallantry on this occasion brought him an invitation to join the regular army, then under the command of Albert Sidney Johnston. But this was declined because it did not seem to open up a career. All his life, however, he had a strong desire for the military.
Not long after the close of the war he became deputy public surveyor, and striking out westward from Nacogdoches, he first marked out the lands in what is now Kaufman, Van Zandt, and other counties. Then, in regular course, he was elected justice of the peace; read law and was sent to the legislature; was chosen district judge, obtaining the title which clung to him to the end. In 1856 he was nominated for Congress by the Democrats, the representative of the district then being an American or Know-nothing—Judge Evans, a man of force and ability. While it was wholly against his wish, he was practically forced to accept the nomination. Taking the field, in one of the most sensational contests in the annals of the State, he triumphed completely. Two years later he was again nominated and again elected, although he opposed some of the slogans of his party, namely, filibustering, and the opening of the African slave trade. In the halls of Congress he was one of those who stood most stoutly for the preservation of the Union, his great speech on that subject being one of impelling force. It breathes an air of heroism, when,—the Crittenden Compromise having failed and the secession acts of several States having passed,—on the floor of the House he declared:
“I have loved the Union with an almost extravagant devotion. I have fought its battles . . . in times when the result for the Union seemed hopeless. If I believed we could have security of our rights within the Union, I would go home and fight the battles of the Union in the future with the same earnestness and energy that I have done in the past.”
On the other hand he incisively pointed out that the framers of the Constitution had recognized slavery, and that the laws formulated since the foundation of the Union had done likewise. “What right, therefore,” he asked, “had the North to force the South to abandon the institution?” To him it was a question of abstract right, and he hesitated not to follow the fortunes of his State, although it grieved him to sever the old allegiance. But the die was cast, and, toward the end of January, 1861, he, along with many Southern members, withdrew from the Capitol.
This was the beginning of the crucial period, for while en route home he learned of his election to the so-called Secession Convention of his State, which met at Austin. Here it was in a prophetic interview which he had with Governor Sam Houston, who stood aloof from the convention, that the latter pronounced his dismal forecast: “The people are going to war on the question of slavery, and the firing of the first gun will sound the knell of slavery.” Houston's own attitude, too, was discovered, for, while he strongly opposed the secession movement, he gave out that he would never take arms against his own people.
But, spite of the tremendous influence of the governor, the convention passed the ordinance which parted it from the Union, and Judge Reagan was chosen one of the six delegates to the Provisional Congress of the Confederacy. The other members were General Waul, Judges Gregg and Ochiltree, and former United States Senators Hemphill and Wigfall. The latter was a man of marked ability, and, throughout the life of the Confederacy exerted unusual influence in directing the affairs of State. Indeed, toward the close his attacks on the government were so bitter that Judge Reagan visited him in a vain effort to stay his tongue. In Montgomery, however, there was unanimity of action, Texas members taking no mean part in the discussions which led up to a constitution. Judge Reagan bore himself creditably, but to his surprise, there came one day notice of his appointment by President-elect Davis to the portfolio of postmaster-general. He accepted the rôle with misgivings, for he was aware that the attendant difficulties had deterred at least two other distinguished men from assuming the post. And the task might well have deterred him, for in all soberness, it was no simple matter to organize and set into operation a postal system of the magnitude demanded by the seceding States,—a system which was to be subjected to the severest tests. Here was his great triumph. The year prior to the outbreak of the war the expenditures of the government in connection with the postal service in the South reached the sum of $2,879,530; the receipts, but $938,105, leaving a deficit of nearly two millions. The situation was not encouraging; however, he not only gave the Confederacy better mail service for vastly less than the cost under the Union, but actually year after year, while the financial condition of the Confederacy steadily grew worse, he increased the net returns of his department. Even the last year of the war the surplus in the treasury credited to his department was no mean sum. This was a splendid achievement—an achievement proclaiming extraordinary executive ability.
Apart from Mr. Reagan's duties as postmaster-general of the Confederacy, he was one of the most faithful and trusted of President Davis's advisers. On many points of policy he took issue, not only with the other cabinet members, but with the president as well. At the very first meeting of the Cabinet in Montgomery, when the question as to the proper distribution of the troops came up, he urged the despatch of the most of them to Kentucky, alleging that here was a weak spot in the defences. And so it proved, and the point had been decided against him by the doctrinaire policy of interfering in no State without leave! Possibly, however, the most conspicuous instance of his opposition concerned the plan of the campaign of 1863. He objected in no minced words to sending General Lee into Pennsylvania, urging on the other hand the relief of General Pemberton and the capture of General Grant's army, which, it is now strongly believed, was feasible. The next step was the re-conquest of Tennessee and Kentucky—the third and final, the return to Virginia to relieve the army of Lee in case it had been beset by the Army of the Potomac. But the Cabinet and the president and General Lee himself were all opposed to this programme, and the course was elected which eventuated in Vicksburg and Gettysburg. But even after the decision had been made, Judge Reagan wrote a final note to the president appealing in vain for a reconsideration of the question; and this document now lies in the national archives, its own commentary.
It was a marked characteristic of the man that when once a conclusion was reached he held it with a pertinacity recalling the elder Pitt. He had definite ideas on whatever matter came before him, and was conspicuous in the Cabinet for his clear-cut conceptions of what was best to be done under the circumstances. On the field his coolness and bravery were admirable, and in the fighting around Richmond several times he was under fire, while on one occasion his wit and that of Colonel Lyon probably saved the capital from Sheridan's cavalry. When the flying detachment of hostile horsemen appeared, Colonel Lyon and Judge Reagan, ridind out along the lines, happened at the moment to be at a section quite destitute of defenders. Thereupon they rode back and forth behind the breastworks as though giving orders—and the blue-coats fled.
After the fall of Richmond and the surrender of Lee's unvanquished though beaten army, he displayed his genius for dealing with pressing problems of state. General Johnston's fragment of an army, facing the hosts of General Sherman, could but choose to lay down its arms, and the terms of surrender were certain to constitute a precedent which might involve the whole of the Confederacy. This Judge Reagan realized, and, first of all the Cabinet, drew up and submitted for its consideration a tentative agreement, which, indeed, was finally accepted almost in toto by the victorious general. After that it would have been indeed difficult for the United States government to have turned upon its path and to have prosecuted the Confederates for treason—it was a weighty point won.
However, even though Lee and Johnston were no longer in the field, hope was not abandoned by the executive as to ultimate triumph; and as the bedraggled companies of Confederates, under General Breckinridge, beat on southward, Judge Reagan's was one of the stoutest hearts. This was shown by his appointment to the portfolio of secretary of the treasury, Mr. Trenholm having resigned on account of illness. Thus, acting in the double capacity of postmaster-general and secretary of the treasury, he went bravely on with President Davis when others fell away from him and his sinking cause to fly, as Benjamin did, in disguise to friendly shores, or to caress, as some did, the conqueror.
On May 10, 1865, the Davis party was captured and hurried northward. At Hampton Roads, where the prisoners were separated, Judge Reagan besought General Wilson, who was in command, to be allowed to accompany Mr. Davis, who, as many thought, was certain to be executed. Long afterward Judge Reagan again met General Wilson, who smilingly remarked that he remembered well the day the judge had begged to be shot. That was typical of the man. He knew that he was as guilty, morally or otherwise, as his chief, and that whatever fate befell that chief was meet for his adviser. And it was no pose on the judge's part. He had moral and physical courage of a superior order; no peril, no menace ever moved him a hair's-breadth from his purpose.
Imprisoned in Fort Warren, Boston Harbor, a few cells removed from Alexander H. Stephens, far from losing heart, he straightway set about ways and means to secure the readjustment of the States on lines acceptable to both sections. His Fort Warren letter, all things considered, was nothing short of prophetic. It urged the people of Texas to recognize the loss of their cause and to accept the legitimate fruits of the war, if they would escape heavier calamities. He foresaw, as scarcely any other southern man did, the horrors of reconstruction, and strove manfully to avoid them. Even after his release and return on parole to Texas, he never ceased his vigilance, urging in a letter to Governor Throckmorton, and in one to the people of the State, that the amendments to the Constitution needs must be accepted. Alas! his advice fell on deaf ears, and he was held up to censure by those he sought to save, many of whom came, with bitterness, to see that he was right.
It was while in prison, too, and ignorant of what fate awaited him, that he wrote his justly memorable letter to President Johnson. It discussed the case of Jefferson Davis, whom the government was preparing to arraign on the charge of treason. For legal acumen and argument, possibly this letter remains Judge Reagan's masterpiece. Certainly it was, and is, unanswerable.
At length came his release from Fort Warren. Defeated and disfranchised, the man rose superior to all obstacles. He retired to his farm at Fort Houston and laid his hand to the plow, looking not backward. When his disabilities had been removed by Congress he resumed the practice of law, and in 1875 was returned to Congress, his service being continuous up to his election to the Senate in 1887. During this period his most distinguished labor was on the Committee on Commerce. For eight years he served as chairman, securing the passage of the present interstate commerce law in the face of bitter opposition.
Not less important, if less conspicuous, was the rôle he played on many occasions—the rôole of impugner. If ever there was in Congress a man who could scent corrupt legislation from afar, it was John H. Reagan. One instance will suffice. In its original form he opposed with all his might the famous Union Pacific Railway “enterprise,” fearlessly pointing out the hiding places of corruption. And there were hiding places we have since discovered; and there were money-changers in the lobbies of the Capitol. He was himself, on one occasion, approached by the tempter; but in his public life of over fifty years there has yet to appear the charge that his fingers were soiled by a dishonest dollar. So honorable was his career that the State chose to honor him by elevating him to the post of Senator; and here again, we find that his every thought was how best to serve his people.
If he had not on other occasions shown that no sacrifice was too great for him to make, his resignation from the Senate to accept the appointment of railroad commissioner of his State would abundantly prove it. Not alone was the post of chairman of the commission less remunerative than that of senator, but to withdraw from Washington to Austin to undertake the arduous labor of organizing a system which should curb the rapacity of the roads of the State might well have deterred the hardiest. And yet the Senator, despite his seventy-two years, took up the burden and carried it to a most successful ending. After ten years of this exacting routine he retired to his home and began—a labor which had been alas! all too long neglected—his Memoirs. Year after year he had planned to take up this work, so much demanded by the public, but his sense of duty and service were to him inexorable. Happily, when the final summons came, the written record was complete.
Up to the very last Judge Reagan never lost interest in politics, and it can be said without fear of contradiction that his influence did more than all else to secure for Judge Parker the support of Texas and the South. He was deeply concerned in the so-called reorganization of the Democratic party, eager to see the two parts again united; and the result of the election cast him down in spirit, for he realized that the organization he had seen control the government for decades was no longer intact, and that a period of political chaos was already entered upon — a period in which the trusts and protected industries promised to riot and the people to suffer.
For a number of years the judge served as president of the Texas State Historical Association, manifesting a warm interest in all that pertained to the annals of so splendid a Commonwealth. He himself had seen her as independent Republic, as State, as member of the Confederacy, and again of the Union. It was a long period and a brilliant one—and Judge Reagan's life had been woven into the fabric of the history of the State; woven in the warp and woof—woven imperishably.
The settlement of the portion of Texas designated on the maps for so long as “Young Territory” was retarded by the incursions of hostile Indians until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. After the annexation of Texas to the United States the Texas tribes were placed under the control of the Federal government which assumed the duty of protecting the Texan frontier from depredations by the savage tribes. As fully two-thirds of the state was unsettled at that time, one of the first acts of the national authorities to accomplish this purpose was the establishment of a cordon of forts from the Red river to the Rio Grande. Of these forts, Richardson, Belknap, Camp Cooper, and Phantom Hill were located in Young Territory. It was impossible for these garrisons, though well disciplined troops under efficient officers were stationed in them, to prevent frequent raids into the region whose unexcelled grazing facilities sustained countless herds of buffalo, antelope, deer, and mustangs, forming an ideal hunting ground for the red man and which, moreover, he claimed as his birthright. It is not strange that the fierce aboriginal tribes looked with jealous ire upon the gradual encroachments of the dominant race upon the Paradise of their savage tastes, or that they should wage a cruel and merciless warfare on the weak settlements of the daring intruder.
It was thought the native tribes of Texas—about 20 in number—were entitled to a domicile in the state on some of its vast unoccupied domain in order to reclaim them from the savage condition by instruction in the arts of civilization. The legislature of Texas set apart 55,728 acres of land to be reserved to the United States for this purpose. Under the supervision of Maj. R. S. Neighbors, two agencies were located, one on the main Brazos river, below the junction of the Clear Fork, called the Brazos Agency, and the other sixty miles west on the Clear Fork, called the Comanche Reserve. 32
The native tribes of Texas consisted of two classes, the agricultural and the nomadic. Twelve of the agricultural class belonged to the Caddo family, and inhabited that part of the state lying east of the Brazos river, while the range of the class that depended on the chase for a subsistence was found in the western portion. Though at the time the Caddo tribes were first encountered by the white man they existed in separate tribes, they had a tradition that they had in time past been confederated and formed one nation, which similarity of language, tribal government, and laws of inheritance and marriage substantiate. They were more advanced towards civilization than any tribes north of Mexico, living in villages of good tents, wearing dress and ornaments, and cultivating the ground, producing crops of corn, melons, pumpkins, etc., which they providently stored for winter use. Though making incursions into other regions for the purpose of hunting, they always returned to their permanent home. Coronado encountered the Tejas Indians in the plains region and made use of them as guides to his expedition in 1540, and commends them for their faithfulness. Their village was on the east side of the Neches river, where Father Manzanet, who accompanied DeLeon's expedition into Texas for the purpose of dislodging the French in 1690, finding them so amenable and kindly, established the first Texas Mission, San Francisco de los Tejas, for their benefit. The good father expresses surprise at their crude civilization, and their system of tribal government, and above all at their ideas of religion, which recognized a chief spirit whom they called “Ayimat Caddo,” and included a dim, undefined conception of a future state, as evidenced by the custom of burying provisions and weapons with the dead. He notes the deference paid by the tribe to its head chief or governor, who lived in a larger and better furnished house than the others and exacted a degree of reverence from his people that was suggestive of the ceremonies of royal courts among civilized peoples. 33 It was from this tribe that the state took its name, Tejas or Texas.
All the Caddo tribes—Caddoes, Adaes, Bedaes, Keechies, Nacogdoches, Ionies, Anadaquas, Wacoes, Tawakanos, Towash, Enquisacoes, and Tejas—although at the time of the establishment of the reserve many of them were only feeble remnants, were placed upon the Brazos Agency and called for convenience “Caddoes.” The Tonkawas, though a nomadic tribe, as they were pacific and always friendly to the whites, were also placed upon this reservation.
The nomadic tribes of Texas were the Karankawas, Lipans, Tonkawas, Kiowas, Apaches, and Comanches. The Franciscan missionaries who had labored in Texas during the preceding century to civilize the more interesting and kindly disposed agricultural tribes had not been neglectful of these more ferocious denizens of the province, and had established missions for some of them. The Karankawas were a fierce tribe of gigantic size, who inhabited the coast region, and for whose benefit Mission Refugio was established; but at this period they had entirely disappeared. The Lipans ranged from the Brazos to the Mexican frontier along the foot of the mountains. They had acquired the Spanish language, and at an earlier date than the establishment of the reserves they emigrated to Mexico, but often made incursions on the southwestern frontier. In the war for Mexican independence, they fought on the side of the Republicans against the Spanish. The Tonkawas ranged between the Brazos and the Nueces from the coast as far inward as the upper Colorado. La Salle encountered them on the lower Guadalupe and was kindly treated by them. The Mission of Our Lady of Guadalupe was established for their benefit, the ruins of which may still be seen in Mission Valley. As this tribe was a bitter foe of the Comanches, who had almost destroyed them, they were placed among the friendly tribes on the Brazos Agency. The Apaches, whose village was at Bandera Pass, were a ferocious tribe that devastated the southwestern frontier from the earliest settlement of it by the Spanish. There are ruins in the upper Nueces which no doubt were missions established for them by the zealous fathers, who displayed not only fervid zeal, but courage of a high order in their attempt to civilize the fierce Texan tribes. After annexation, the Apaches, on account of the protection given their habitual range by the United States forts, had fallen back into New Mexico. The Kiowas claimed the Pan Handle of Texas for their range, and had made a treaty in 1853, agreeing to keep the peace and refrain from all hostilities for an annual payment of $18,000 for ten years. How well it was kept will hereafter be seen. Finally must be named the numerous and powerful Comanches, a tribe of ferocious savages. All of the nomadic class were fearless horsemen, though awkward and ungainly on foot, supplying themselves in early times with horses from the herds of wild mustangs that roamed the western plains, and in later days by appropriating the numerous caballadas of the ranches of the settlements. Colonel Marcy, in his Thirty Years of Army Life on the Border, published in 1866, estimates their number at twelve to eighteen thousand. They were in three grand divisions, called by themselves, respectively, the Tennawas, Yamparacks, and Comanches, of which only the two latter ranged as far south as Texas. The band which was the dreaded foe of the Texan frontier was the last of these, or the Southern Comanches, for whom the Comanche Reserve on the Clear Fork of the Brazos was established.
Like all the other tribes, no matter how savage or migratory, the Comanches had their tribal laws, to which they clung with pertinacity. Their chiefs were elective and exercised a patriarchal rather than despotic control. They had a head chief and each clan or band had a chief besides, and all questions pertaining to the tribe were settled by a council. They called themselves “Naini,” live people, as opposed to the peaceful tribes upon whom they had always preyed, and who held these ferocious foes in as great dread as did the white settlers. Though enemies of the Tonkawas, the Comanches were in alliance with the Apaches and Kiowas. There is a tradition that the Comanches were at first friendly to the Americans, though always the foes of the Spaniards. The San Saba Mission was successfully maintained for a long period for the benefit of these Indios bravos until mines were opened; and it may readily be conjectured that, in forcing these untutored savages to labor in them, a repetition of the cruel treatment which history records was practiced in New Mexico and elsewhere under rigid Spanish taskmasters, had its share of the destruction of the mission. Stephen F. Austin narrates that on one of his trips to Mexico he was captured by a party of this tribe and released when they discovered he was an American. There are not wanting other instances of this tribe's fidelity to the white settlers in Texas. They made a treaty with the German Colony of Bettina, agreeing to vacate Fisher's Grant, lying between the Llano and San Saba rivers in the heart of their range, which they faithfully kept, never molesting the colonists in any way. 34 But whatever the cause, the Comanche finally became the Hun of the Texan frontier—a dread scourge. Their path was marked with gory victims, while others were torn from their homes by ruthless hands to endure a captivity worse than death.
The Texas Almanac for 1859 describes the two Indian reserves as follows:
“This reservation . . . called the Brazos Agency, . . . contains about eleven hundred souls. . . . On this reserve there are six hundred acres of land in successful cultivation in wheat and corn. The mode of culture is the same, or similar to that of the Americans. The Brazos Reserve Indians have made extraordinary progress in civilization since their settlement in 1853; and are very honest, trustworthy and industrious. They have a school, under the charge of Mr. Ellis Combes. Mr. C. reports fifty scholars in regular attendance; and, judging from the interest taken in this educational enterprise by the Old Indians, he is inclined to the opinion that good results will come of it. On this Reservation there are several good houses built expressly for the transaction of all and any business connected with the Indians. These buildings are situated near the center of the Reserve, in a very pretty mesquite valley, the approach to which affords a most lovely and sightly landscape. Capt. S. P. Ross, an Old Texan, and a worthy man, is the Special Agent of the United States Government, in charge of the Brazos Agency. . . . His salary is $1500 per annum.
“The Comanche Reserve is about sixty miles distant from the Brazos Agency, and is located on the Clear Fork of the Brazos River, forty-five miles above its confluence with the Main Brazos. Their Reserve extends over four leagues of land and contains four hundred souls—all Comanches, known as the Southern band of that tribe. Their head chief is a good man, and has been a valuable auxiliary in the reclamation of these Indians from savage life. He is known by the name of Kotemesie. The Comanches have not made the same progress as the Brazos Reserve Indians—not that they are any more indolent or lazy, but because of their total estrangement heretofore from the manners and customs of the white man. The Indians on the Brazos Reserve have always lived near, and frequently among the white settlers, while the Comanches have been outside of all intercourse of a friendly nature. This agency is furnished with all necessary buildings and, like the Brazos Agency, is supplied with competent and trustworthy farmers and artisans. The Comanches have a good crop this year, and will most probably make sufficient to bread themselves. Col. M. Leeper is their Agent, with a salary of $1500 per annum.
“The United States Government has been very liberal in its appropriations for the benefit of the reclaimed savage, and has spared neither trouble nor expense in the furtherance of the peace policy. . . .
“Maj. Neighbors disburses annually about $80,000 for the use of the Texas Indians.”
In spite of these favorable reports of the attempt to civilize these tribes and domicile them in their native land, to which they clung with all the devoted patriotism of people of a higher order of civilization, Indian depredations with harrowing details of murder and capture of women and children were reported constantly. The troops at the posts were frequently compelled to follow the trail of the marauders in order to recapture prisoners and other property, which, if successfully accomplished, was generally at the cost of a bloody encounter.
In 1858 L. S. Ross, familiarly known as “Sul Ross,” a youth of eighteen years, while at home on a vacation from college, organized a company of one hundred and thirty-five warriors of the friendly tribes on the Brazos Agency and joined an expedition under Maj. Earl Van Dorn commanding the U. S. forces in this section of the frontier against the Comanches. October 1, 1858 the party came upon a large Comanche village on the False Washita River, in the Indian Territory. A sharp conflict followed, in the course of which ninety Indians were killed and a considerable number captured, either wounded or unhurt. The whites lost five killed and several wounded, including Ross and Van Dorn. In this battle was captured from the Comanches a little white girl who seemed to be about eight years of age. Nothing could be learned of her relatives, and she was adopted by the young captain, taking the name of Lizzie Ross. She afterwards married a merchant who lived near Los Angeles, California. She died there two years ago.
Gen. Winfield Scott, commander-in-chief of the U. S. army, on hearing of this expedition, wrote to Ross, then an unknown Texas youth, commending his bravery, and offering to help him to a place in the regular army, but he declined the unusual offer and returned to college.
The severe punishment thus inflicted on the hostile tribe was easily forgotten and they were soon on the war path again. The reserves on the Clear Fork and Brazos were located in a region possessing unexcelled grazing facilities, and the Texan stock raisers, in constantly increasing numbers, braved the dangers of Indian attacks and brought their herds hither to fatten upon the rich pasturage. The reserve Indians were accused of committing depredations as well as the hostiles, and conflicts ensued in which a number were killed. The average citizen would not discriminate between the two classes of Indians. There was in his eyes “no good Indian save a dead one,” and he looked on the “Reserves” as pampered wards of the government, drawing rations, arms, and ammunition free of expense to prey upon the helpless settlements. This was no doubt literally true of the Comanches, for many of the raiders the troops were so often compelled to follow were drawing supplies at the Reserve.
The result was the experiment of domiciling the Texas tribes within the state, which proved a failure, and in August, 1859, Maj. Geo. H. Thomas, of the United States army, transferred the tribes to the Indian Territory. The Indians went away reluctantly and were so incensed at their removal that they began at once a series of depredations on the frontier of Texas. The annuity paid by the government to the Kiowas was also withdrawn in this year on account of their failure to keep their treaty obligation. They attacked the settlements of Texas and enacted some fearful tragedies. The Comanche tribes formed a confederation with the avowed object of driving the Texans from their usurped possession of the Indian ranges.
An account of the shocking crimes committed by these lawless tribes on the upper Brazos alone would fill a volume. One of the most noted is subjoined. In June, 1860, Josephus Browning was killed and his son Frank severely wounded by a party of Comanches on their ranch on the Clear Fork near the mouth of Hubbard creek. A party was immediately organized by John R. Baylor, Walt. Reynolds, and other well known citizens to go in pursuit of the Indians. On the 28th of June, they overtook them on Paint Creek, and a severe fight ensued, in which 13 Indians were killed. The victors returned to Weatherford with the scalps of the slain savages, and also the scalp of a white woman, whom the Indians had killed in their raid, and which they had in their possession. Besides these ghastly trophies, the victors had bows and arrows, darts, quivers, shields, lances, and tomahawks. The news of the success of the party in avenging the Browning murder was received with great rejoicing by all classes throughout the settlement; for, besides the attack on the Brownings, the horrible killing of Mrs. Sherman, and many other outrages were still fresh in the peoples' memory. The occasion was celebrated by a public barbecue on the square in Weatherford, at which stirring speeches were listened to by a vast assemblage from every portion of the surrounding country. In the evening a dance was given at the court house, and on a rope stretched diagonally across the large room were hung the arms and equipments captured by the party and also the scalp of the white woman, as well as those of the slain warriors—grewsome decorations for a scene of festivity. General Baker exhibited these trophies of the Paint Creek fight in many other places, and everywhere among the settlers arose the cry, “Exterminate the Indians.” 35 Governor Houston, though a life-long advocate of the peace policy in dealing with the native tribes, was forced, by the terror of the people on the frontier because of the imminent danger that threatened them from incursions of these powerful and merciless tribes, the Comanches and Kiowas, to order the enlistment of state troops to assist in protecting the exposed region. Among those who applied to him for a commission to raise a company of Rangers was young Sul Ross, who had just completed his college course and returned to the state. Receiving the commission from the governor, he enrolled sixty men as rangers and established his camp at Fort Belknap, in the old Brazos Agency.
About this time some outrages were committed in Palo Pinto and Jack counties, contiguous to the country in which Ross's camp was located, and he determined to chastise the daring savages. Leaving twenty men to guard his post, he supplied their places in his command with twenty picked cavalrymen of the 2nd Regiment of the United States army, then stationed at Camp Cooper, in the old Comanche Reserve, under Capt. N. G. Evans.
He led his company into the “Indian country,” as the district north of the Clear Fork was then called, and on December 9, 1860, he came on a large Comanche village at the head of Pease River. In the course of the fight that followed the attack on the vallage, Captain Ross, who was accompanied by Lieut. Thomas Kelleheir, saw a party of three Indians, two of them upon one horse, and the other mounted alone. He followed the two that were mounted double, and Lieutenant Kelleheir followed the third. Captain Ross shot and killed the Indian that was riding behind, and this one, in falling, dragged the other from the horse. The survivor let fly a number of arrows at his pursuer, but by and by a shot from Captain Ross's revolver struck his elbow and disabled him. Ross demanded his surrender, but he refused; and, shortly afterwards, as he was singing his death song, a young Mexican killed him. He proved to be a noted chief, Peta Nocona, whom Ross had known well in former days.
When Captain Ross returned to Lieutenant Kelleheir, he found him cursing his luck because the Indian whom he had followed and captured was a squaw; but Ross called his attention to her blue eyes and told him she was at least no Indian squaw.
And she did indeed turn out to be a white woman. When the gallant young ranger, Capt. Ross, returned to Camp Cooper from his expedition against the Comanches with a female captive who showed her white blood, even though bronzed with exposure and having the habits of an Indian, the news was published extensively among the settlements. Among those who journeyed to this frontier post to examine the captive in hopes of finding a lost child or relative, was the venerable Isaac Parker, for whom Parker county was named. He hoped to hear of a long-lost niece who was stolen from Parker's Fort, in Limestone county, May 19, 1836, by the Comanches. They were emboldened by the confused state of affairs in the province of Texas during the struggle for independence to make an invasion of the unprotected settlements. Attacking Parker's Fort, containing thirty-five persons, they killed all who were able to bear arms and carried several of the women and children off into captivity, but all the captives had been recovered except two, a girl and a boy. Many attempts had been made to recover these children by the Parker family, and the state had offered a ransom for them; but all efforts to recover them had failed, and a quarter of a century had now elapsed since their capture!
The age of the captive woman suited that of the object of Mr. Parker's search, but such a lapse of time would have transformed a child of nine beyond recognition in a life of ease; and how much more in the life of hardship among a roving tribe like the Comanches who, like all other savages, make drudges and slaves of their women! The captive had lost all knowledge of her native tongue, and maintained a stolid silence when addressed by her aged uncle. At length he said very distinctly to the interpreter, “The girl's name was Cynthia Ann.” The familiar name aroused dim recollections of her past life, which time and suffering had wellnigh obliterated. The moment she heard her name she sprang to her feet and patting herself on the breast with joy beaming in her eyes, said excitedly, “Cynthia Ann! Cynthia Ann!” “I was convinced, says Mr. Parker, “of her identity and that in this poor creature I saw my long-lost niece.”
She returned with her uncle to his home in the county that now bears his name. She had an infant with her at the date of her capture, and had left two other children with the Indians. She gradually adapted herself to a civilized life, learning to spin, weave, and sew, and made herself generally useful in domestic life. It has been said that she was not contented, and more than once attempted to escape and return to the Indians, but if this is true, it was because of her desire to recover her other children —a hope she was often heard to express. But death ended her checkered career before this hope was realized. Her little child died shortly before its mother. 36 Her son Quanah is now chief of the tribe, living in peace and quiet on the princely reservation of over three million acres set apart by the general government for the three roving tribes, Apaches, Kiowas, and Comanches, in the southwestern part of the Indian Territory, in which Fort Sill is located.
When the Civil war began in 1861 the federal forts on the frontier were abandoned and some of them destroyed by the Union troops. Some of the officers resigned their commissions in the United States army and joined the Confederates, among them R. E. Lee, in command of Ft. Mason, and Maj. Earl Van Dorn. The gallant young Texan, Sul Ross, disbanded his company and enlisted in the Southern army as a private, but was soon promoted from one office to another still higher until he became a brigadier general of cavalry, the youngest of that rank in the service. His experience as a ranger fitted him well for the arduous campaigns of the fierce struggle. He was in one hundred and thirty-five engagements of greater or less importance and had seven horses shot from under him, but was never wounded during the whole war. The same kind Providence that protected him from the rude Comanche's battle-axe preserved him from the shot and shell of his more civilized foe.
The hostile tribes, still chafing under their forcible removal from Texas and seeing the frontier denuded of troops, renewed their attacks on the settlements, and many of the latter were abandoned. Some of the reservation Indians enlisted in the Union army, being within the Federal lines, but Placido, chief of the Tonkawas, refused to enlist, saying “he could never fight against Texas.” In a mêlee which ensued he and a number of his men were killed. So great was the devotion of this simple tribe to their native land, they gradually came back, or a part of them, to the Clear Fork, where they were for a time allowed to stay on a reservation set apart for them near Fort Griffin. This was a post that was established after the civil war, when the Federal troops reoccupied the Texan frontier, and named for Maj. Gen. C. Griffin, commanding the military district of Texas. For many years succeeding the war, Indian incursions continued, in spite of the vigilance of the troops, under the determined and gallant Gen. R. S. Mackenzie, and the desperate efforts of the long-suffering and revengeful frontiersmen. Fort Griffin was in the great buffalo range, and became the base of supplies for the buffalo hunters. These hunters soon denuded the adjacent region of the vast herds of this noble American species that had been from time immemorial the chief support of the wild tribes inhabiting the plains of the Northwest. Adventurous stockmen soon overspread the splendid pastoral section with their herds of cattle from the more settled portion of the state, and ranches of the crudest description, consisting of rude huts or “dug-outs” and picket corrals in the midst of open, unfenced ranges were established. Soon some of the counties were organized, and the district known as Young Territory disappeared from the maps of the state.
With the removal of the Tonkawas the last vestige of the native Texan tribes disappeared from the state. The wide variation in the two classes of our native tribes was mostly the result, no doubt, of the difference between the fertile, well-watered region of eastern Texas, where a subsistance was easily obtained, and the arid plains of the west, with their vast herds of herbivorous animals. But who can tell how great an influence the devoted Franciscan missionaries, who first chanted the Te Deum in these wilds two centuries ago and labored faithfully among these poor children of nature for a whole century, may have had on them? The partial knowledge of Spanish existing among them and the common occurrence of Spanish names such as Placido, José Maria, Santa Anna (names of noted chieftains), are conclusive evidence of it to the reflecting mind. We can but believe, had patience had “her perfect work” with these aborigines of our state, and the seed sowed by the pious fathers been carefully nurtured, many dark pages in our history might have been avoided. Instead of having only rude monuments, a few painted rocks with quaint picture inscriptions, many blood-stained battlefields and desecrated village sites, a collection of rude arms, shields, and savage ornaments, and the names of a few cities, mountains, and streams, to remind us of these tribes, we might have had happy and peaceful races lifted from barbarism to civilization to bless the coming of the Anglo-Saxon to his Paradise!
NOTES AND FRAGMENTS.
Texas, Four Miles from Headquarters. April 10, 1836.
Dear Parents:—Since I last wrote you I have been engaged in arranging an expedition against the Indians, who have committed many depredations against the frontier. On my return to the settlements, I learned that our country was again invaded by a merciless horde of Mexicans, who were waging a war of extermination against the inhabitants. A call was made for all friends of humanity to rise in arms and resist the foe. Men were panic stricken and fled, leaving their all behind them. I could not reconcile it to my feelings to leave Texas without an effort to save it. Accordingly, I bent my course for the army and arrived last evening at this place. I shall enter camp this morning as a volunteer. The army, commanded by General Houston, is lying on the west side of the Brazos, 20 miles from San Fillippe. The enemy is at that place waiting an attack. It is reported Houston will attack them in the morning. What will be the result, or the fate of Texas is hid in the bowels of futurity. Yet, I think we are engaged in the cause of justice, and hope the God of battles will protect us. The enemy's course has been the most bloody that has ever been recorded on the page of history. Our garrison at San Antonio was taken and massacred; so another detachment of seven hundred, commanded by Col. Fanning, and posted at La Bahia, after surrendering prisoners of war, were led out and shot down like bears. Only one escaped to tell their melancholy fate. In their course they show no quarter to age, sex, or condition, all are massacred without mercy. If such conduct is not sufficient to arouse the patriotic feelings of the sons of liberty, I know not what will. I was born in a land of freedom, and taught to lisp the name of liberty with my infant tongue, and rather than be driven out of the country or submit to be a slave, I will leave my bones to bleach on the plains of Texas. If we succeed in subduing the enemy and establishing a free and independent government, we will have the finest country the sun ever shone upon, and if we fail we shall have the satisfaction of dying fighting for the rights of man. I know not that I shall have an opportunity of writing to you for some time, but shall do so as often as is convenient. Be not alarmed about my safety. I am no better, and my life no dearer than those who gained the liberty you enjoy. If I fail you will have the satisfaction that your son died fighting for the rights of man. Our strength in the field is about 1500. The enemy is reported 4000 strong; a fearful odds you will say; but what can mercenary hirelings do against the sons of liberty?
Before this reaches you the fate of Texas will be known. I will endeavor to acquaint you as soon as possible. I am well and in good spirits and as unconcerned as if going to a raising. The same Being who has hitherto protected my life can with equal ease ward off the balls of the enemy. My company is waiting, and I must draw to a close, and bid you farewell, perhaps forever. More than a year has elapsed since I saw you, yet, the thought of friends and home are fresh in my memory, and their remembrance yet lives in my affections and will light a secret joy to my heart till it shall cease to beat. Long has it been since I have heard from you. How often do I think of home and wish to be there. The thought of that sacred spot haunts my night-watches. How, often when sleep has taken possession of my faculties, am I transported there, and for a short time enjoy all the pleasures of home; but the delusion is soon over, and the morning returns and I find my situation the same. Dear friends, if I see you no more, remember Giles still loves you. Give my love to my sisters, brothers, friends and neighbors. I would write more if time would permit, but its fleeing steps wait for none. You need not write to me as I do not know where I shall be. With sentiments of sincere respect I bid you farewell.
Your Affectionate son, G. A. Giddings.
AFFAIRS OF THE ASSOCIATION.
The memorial page in this issue serves as a reminder not only that another Texas veteran is gone, but also that the Republic of Texas will soon have passed beyond the memory of any living man. Ex-Governor Lubbock, who was in his ninetieth year when he died, was barely thirty when Texas became a State of the Union. It was, of course, but natural that he should take a special interest in the history of whose making he had seen so much. For seven years he was one of the vice presidents of the Association, and he was rarely absent from its meetings.
Ex-Governor Lubbock was a man of most exalted character, which was evident in all his conduct, both public and private. It is hoped that a suitable appreciation of him will be prepared ere long for publication in The Quarterly.
Frances Richard Lubbock.
Clerk of House of Representatives of the Second Congress of Texas, 1837-1838.
Comptroller of the Republic of Texas, 1838-1841. Presidential Elector, 1856.
Lieutenant-Governor of Texas, 1857-1859.
Governor of Texas, 1861-1863.
Lieutenant-Colonel in the Confederate Army, 1863.
Aid-de-Camp to President Davis and Colonel of Cavalry, 1864.
State Treasurer, 1878-1891.
Treasurer of the Texas Veteran Association, 1892-1905.
Fourth Vice-President of the Texas State Historical Association, 1898-1905.
Born, October 16, 1815.
Died, June 23, 1905.
2. Niles' Register, LI 38-40.
3. Catlett to Henderson, April 29, 1837.
4. Catlett to Henderson, May 7, 1837.
5. Wharton to Austin, Jan. 6, 1837; Wharton to Rusk, Feb. 12, 1837; Hunt to Henderson, Apr. 15, 1837; Houston to Palmerston, June 20, 1837; irion to Henderson, June 25, 1837; Henderson to Irion, June 25, Oct. 14, and Dec. 22, 1837, and Jan. 5, 1838.
6. Henderson to Irion, Jan. 5, 1837, and Jan. 30, and Apr. 12, 1838.
7. See extract from records of navy department of Texas filed with letter of Elliott to Terrell, Dec. 13, 1842.
8. Henderson to Irion, Nov. 5, 1837, and Jan. 30, and Mar. 8, 1838; Thompson to the secretary of the navy, Aug. 29, 1837; Irion to Henderson, Aug. 23, 1837, and Nov. 28, 1838; Henderson to Palmerston, Oct. 30, 1839; Palmerston to Henderson, Oct. 23, 1839; Elliot to Terrell. Dec. 13, 1842; Elliot to Jones, Aug. 17, 1843; Jones to Elliot, Sep. 4, 1843; Smith to Elliot, Feb. 22, 1845.
9. Ogilvy to Pakenham, Aug. 20, 1839 (two letters); Palmerston to Henderson, Oct. 23, 1839; Henderson to Palmerston, Oct. 30, 1839; Elliott to Jones, Sep. 30, 1842, and Feb. 4, Aug. 17, and Oct. 28, 1843; Jones to Elliott, Sep. 19, 1843.
10. Macgregor to Lamar, Dec. 26, 1839, and accompanying document marked “D”; Palmerston to Lamar, Apr. 8, 1841.
11. Henderson to Irion, Apr. 12, 1838; Hughes to Jones, June 10, 1839; Henderson to Burnet, Aug. 5, and Oct. 11, 1839.
12. This treaty may be found in Gammel's Laws of Texas (Austin, 1898), II 880-885.
13. Hamilton to Lipscomb, July 28, 1840, and Jan. 4, 1841; Burnet to Hamilton, Dec. 23, 1839; Hamilton to Jones, Feb. 18, 1842; Hamilton to Lamar, Nov. 6, 1840; Gammel, Laws of Texas, II 886-904.
14. Smith to Jones, June 3, 1842.
15. Hamilton to Lipscomb, Dec. 3, 1840, and Jan. 4, 1841; Ikin to Mayfield, May 18, and June 3, 1841; Burnley to Burnet, Feb. 21, 1841; Miller to Jones, Jan. 22, 1842; Hamilton to Jones, Feb. 18, and Mar. 4, 1842; Kennedy to Jones, May 6, 1842; Smith to Jones, June 3, 1842.
16. Jones to Hamilton, Jan. 26, 1842; Hamilton to Jones, Feb. 8, 1842; Kennedy to Smith, June 30, 1842; Smith to Jones, June 3, June 18, July 3, and July 4, 1842; Jones to Aberdeen, Mar. 4, 1842; Aberdeen to Jones, May 31 and June 28, 1842; Elliot to Jones, Aug. 23, 1842; Irion to Henderson, May 20, 1838; Jones to Kennedy, Feb. 28, 1842.
17. The dispute over the northeastern and northwestern boundaries of the United States was causing much ill-feeling between the two countries while English recognition of Texas was yet in question.
18. Wharton to Austin, Jan. 6, 1837; Niles' Register, LI 38-40, LVI 161, 166 (Upshur to Murphy, Sep. 22, 1843), 167-171 (Upshur to Everett, Sep. 28, 1843, and Upshur to Murphy, Jan. 16, 1844), 273-274; Terrell to Clarendon, May 5, 1845; Clarendon to Terrell, May 10, 1845; Smith to Van Zandt, Jan. 25, 1843; Smith to Jones, July 2, 1843.
19. Pakenham to Hamilton, Dec. 12, 1839; Smith to Jones, May 17, and Oct. 17, 1843.
20. Smith to Jones, June 3, June 18, and Sep. 8, 1842; Smith to Aberdeen, Dec. 10, 1842; memorandum, Sep. 10, 1842; Aberdeen to Smith, Sep. 21, 1842; Terrell to Smith, Aug. 20, 1842.
21. Kennedy to Brower, May 6, 1842; Smith to Jones, May 17, June 3, June 18, July 12, Aug. 13, Oct. 19, and Dec. 30, 1842; Russell to Smith, June 4, 1842; Aberdeen to Smith, Sep. 27, and Nov. 8, 1842; Smith to Aberdeen, June 14, July 1, Sep. 14, Sep. 19, Oct. 10, and Dec. 12, 1842; Reily to Jones, Apr. 14, and July 11, 1842.
22. Jones to Smith, Jan. 31, June 10, June 15, and July 14, 1843; Elliot to Jones, June 10, and July 24, 1843; Jones to Ellliot, June 15, 1843; Smith to Jones, June 16, 1843; Van Zandt and Henderson to Calhoun, May 15, 1844.
23. Jones to Smith, June 7, 1842; Smith to Guizot, Aug. 15, 1842; Smith to Aberdeen, Aug. (no day given, but evidently in latter part of month), 1842; Smith to Jones, Aug. 31, Oct. 17, and Nov. 30, 1842; Terrell to Smith, Oct. 15, and Dec. 7, 1842; Hamilton to Jones, Nov. 24, 1842; Jones to Van Zandt, Dec. 25, and Dec. 26, 1842.
24. Henderson to Irion, Oct. 24, 1837; Smith to Van Zandt, Jan. 25, 1843; Smith to Jones, July 2, and July 31, 1843.
25. Niles' Register, LXV 49 (“Debate in Parliament relative to Texas”), LXVI 164-165 (Upshur to Murphy, Aug. 8, 1843), 166-167 (Upshur to Everett, Sep. 28, 1843), 169 (Everett to Upshur, Nov. 3, 1843), 170 (Upshur to Thompson, Nov. 18, 1843), 171 (Pakenham to Upshur, Feb. 26, 1844), 172 (Calhoun to Pakenham, Apr. 18, 1844), 202-203 (Pakenham to Calhoun, Apr. 19, 1844, Calhoun to Pakenham, Apr. 27, 1844; Pakenham to Calhoun, Apr. 30, 1844), 225 (“Annexation of Texas”); Everett to Smith, Oct. 24, 1843; Smith to Everett, Oct. 31, 1843; Aberdeen to Pakenham, Dec. 26, 1843; Upshur to Van Zandt, Oct. 16, 1843.
26. Elliott to Jones, Mar. 22, 1844; Jones to Elliot, Mar. 25, 1844; Smith to Jones, Jan. 29, June 2, June 14, and June 24, 1844; Jones to Smith, July 14, and Aug. 1, 1844; Terrell to Smith, Jan. 21, 1845.
27. Terrell to Smith, Jan. 21, Jan. 27, Feb. 13, and May 9, 1845; Smith to Jones, June 24, and July 31, 1844; Jones to Terrell, Oct. 29, 1844; “Conditions preliminary to a Treaty of Peace between Mexico and Texas,” Mar. 29, 1845; Jones, Republic of Texas, 473-474; Cuevas's “Declaration,” May 9, 1845.
28. Terrell to Smith, May 9, 1845; Smith to Terrell, Feb. 10, 1845; Smith to Allen, May 17, and June 3, 1845; Jones to Alleye de Cyprey, June 6, 1845; Brown, History of Texas, II 305-307.
29. Jones, Republic of Texas, 441, 443, 452-453, 468-471, 508; Niles' Register, LXVI 252 (Everett to Calhoun, May 18, 1844); Aberdeen to Elliot, Dec. 3, 1845; Elliot to Allen, Jan. 4, 1846; Allen to Elliott, Feb. 4, 1846; Hall, International Law (5th ed.), 103.
30. Thanks are due to the Review of Reviews for permission to make use of certain portions of my article entitled “John H. Reagan—A Character Sketch,” appearing in the May issue of that magazine.—W. F. M.
31. Called in the statutes “Young Land District.” See Gammel, Laws of Texas, IV 791.—Editor Quarterly.
32. The Texas Almanac, for 1859, p. 130.
33. The Quarterly, II 302-309.
34. The Quarterly, III 36-39.
35. Smythe, Historical Sketch of Parker County, 138-140.
36. For a more detailed narrative of this episode, see De Shields, Cynthia Ann Parker.
How to cite:
"Issue View", Volume 009, Number 1, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online. http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v009/n1/issue.html
[Accessed Sun Nov 8 10:14:14 CST 2009]
