When General Lee surrendered, in early April, 1865, that part of the Confederacy east of the Mississippi was already overwhelmed and exhausted. In the Trans-Mississippi Department, however, a large area comprising western Louisiana, parts of Arkansas, and the whole of Texas was still almost untouched by invasion. The Federal forces having been kept at bay here through the war, it seemed probable that a severe struggle would be necessary for the reduction of the Confederates in this region; yet, within six weeks from the surrender at Appomattox the Trans-Mississippi Department presented a scene of universal disorder and confusion nothing short of anarchy—and that, too, without the advance of a single Federal soldier. In reality the defences of this department, and particularly of Texas, with which we are here concerned, formed simply a thin shell incapable of sustaining any heavy or prolonged attack.
In spite of peculiar advantages Texas had already shown unmistakable signs of exhaustion. Throughout the war she had suffered less than her sister States, and during the first two or three years had been fairly prosperous. She lay outside the circle of conflict, no hostile armies laid waste her towns and fields, nor withdrew her slaves from the plantations. Good crops were raised every year. During most of the time her ports were open and steamers and blockade runners made their way to and from Vera Cruz, Havana and the ports of Europe. Moreover, the Mexican border offered peculiar advantages for a safe overland trade; and through this channel the staples of Texas—cotton, wool, and hides—were exported and exchanged for necessary supplies or specie. Through the deflection of trade from its regular channels this traffic had for the most part fallen into the hands of speculators,— doubly hated as a class that reaped large profits from the danger and distress of the country while enjoying at the same time exemption from military service. The opportunities for profits in this trade were not neglected by the State and Confederate governments, and during the last two years of the war a State military board and a cotton bureau had charge of the exportation and sale of cotton and other products belonging to the State and to the Confederacy respectively, and imported in return munitions, medicines, and other military supplies. That there was much fraud and mismanagement in the whole cotton business, official and private, seems certain; there was no doubt of it at all in the minds of the people of that day.
But other causes than the fraudulent operations of private and official speculators hastened the exhaustion of the State. Repeated issues of Confederate paper money had driven out all other currency and the paper itself steadily depreciated. By March, 1865, even this was cut off, as there was no ready or safe communication with the Confederate seat of government. Taxes were extremely heavy; the tithe of the cotton taken by the Confederacy was increased to a fifth, then to a half; everything was levied upon. Military authorities impressed beef, corn, and other supplies for the army, and having no money wherewith to pay, gave worthless certificates of indebtedness which the government would not even receive in payment of taxes. 10 Driven on by its dire necessities the government had adopted desperate and oppressive regulations that destroyed its own credit and threatened the extinction of what little trade had survived in the State. During the spring of 1865 other troubles had come. A threatened attack by the Federals on Brownsville, the chief cotton depot, had diverted the export trade to the less exposed but less profitable and less satisfactory points on the upper Rio Grande. At the same time there was a serious drop in the price of cotton, a foreshadowing doubtless of the fall of the Confederacy. All trade was coming to a standstill. Although the crops had been good in 1864, they could not be marketed. There was plenty to eat, but there was very little else to be had.
The military outlook reflected the gloom of material conditions. There were probably about fifty thousand men in the Trans-Mississippi Department when Lee surrendered. A large part of these were in Louisiana near the department headquarters at Shreveport. Several thousand were in Arkansas. Possibly fifteen thousand men were under arms in Texas. Of these last some three thousand were at Galveston with others near by at Houston. Small forces were stationed at Brownsville, San Antonio, Hempstead, Sabine Pass, Marshall, and other points. All of these soldiers had for months been serving practically without pay, for they were paid in paper. They were poorly clad, and often had to furnish their own clothing and equipment. There was much discontent in the army because of alleged mismanagement and peculation in the commissary and supply departments. Swarms of deserters made their way into Mexico to Matamoras or took refuge with a body of Federals on the island of Santiago de Brazos. The conscript laws had become more and more severe, and young boys and old men were forced into the ranks. The discontent increased. Certain regiments were wholly unmanageable. 11
The people were plainly growing weary of the burdens of a hopeless war. Sherman's march through Georgia, despite the ingenious explanations of the press, had shown the utter impossibility of ultimate success. Even General E. Kirby Smith, commander of the department, sought timely provision for the future as early as February 1st, when he offered his military services to Maximilian in case of the overthrow of the Confederacy. 12 Nevertheless, when the news of Lee's surrender reached Texas in the latter part of April, it produced consternation. While it was discredited and denied at first as a “Yankee rumor,” then too fully confirmed, hope was held out still that most of the army had escaped and were with Johnston. Anxiously tidings were awaited from this general. There was a widespread belief that he was about to cross the Mississippi and join with Kirby Smith. Then came the crushing news of his surrender to Sherman. The next attack of the Federals would be upon Texas. All was gloom and anxiety.
A desperate effort was made to preserve a bold front. Governor Murrah and Generals Smith and Magruder made speeches and issued stirring addresses urging the soldiers to fight to the last. Patriotic editors demonstrated conclusively that it would be impossible for the Federals to invade Texas and maintain themselves in its vast stretches without a year's preparation; and that meanwhile help could be secured from abroad, or at least better terms would be offered than had been granted Lee and Johnston. Everywhere public meetings were held and citizens pledged themselves never to submit to Northern tyranny or to abandon the cause of the South. Meetings of a similar nature were held in the army in the effort to revive the waning devotion of the discontented and the disheartened. Most of these army meetings were meagrely attended; many of the men held aloof while others attended in order to pass resolutions expressing withering contempt for the war meetings of “exempts and details,” and bitter hatred of the cotton speculators, upon whom they placed the blame for the failure of the war. 13 But meetings and speeches and valiant “last ditch” resolutions were all in vain. The majority of the soldiers were convinced that the war was over because it was so evidently hopeless. The accumulated discontent of the past month expressed itself in desertion. Magruder declared as early as April 29 that the men at Galveston were deserting by tens and twenties every night. 14
In the meantime by order of Grant, General Pope had despatched Colonel Sprague to Shreveport to demand of Kirby Smith the surrender of the Trans-Mississippi Department upon the same terms that were granted to Lee. Smith immediately, May 9, rejected these, hoping to obtain more liberal terms. With a view to determining upon methods and means of resistance or suitable conditions of surrender, he had just before this summoned to meet him in conference at Marshall, Governors Allen of Louisiana, Murrah of Texas, Reynolds of Missouri, and Flanigan of Arkansas. All attended save Murrah, who was ill, but who sent Colonel Guy M. Bryan of his staff to represent him. It was determined to endeavor to secure more favorable terms, and meanwhile to concentrate the forces of the department at Houston to resist an expected attack upon Galveston. On May 13 the members of the conference drew up a set of terms which they ventured to demand, hoping to preserve the political integrity of their States. In substance these demands were: That officers and soldiers were to be allowed to return directly to their homes; immunity was to be guaranteed against prosecution for offences committed against the United States during the war; officers, soldiers, and citizens were to be allowed to retain their arms and to leave the country if they so desired; the existing State governments were to be recognized until conventions could be called “to settle all questions between the States;” 15 and after a certain date each State should be allowed full military authority within its own borders for the preservation of order. This conference at Marshall is notable more for what it hoped for than for what it accomplished. General Pope had already expressly disclaimed any authority to settle political questions. 16 Nevertheless, Sprague, who had been detained for this purpose, now returned to Pope bearing these demands and a letter from Smith urging reasons for their acceptance, which were chiefly the expense of prolonging the war and the possibility of “foreign complications.” 17 The Confederate authorities had already spent much vain effort in endeavoring to entangle Maximilian and the French in Mexico in an imbroglio with the United States. On May 2 Smith had made a last attempt to arouse the anxiety of the Mexican emperor at the prospect of having the distinctly hostile power of the United States re-established on the Rio Grande. 18 But such hopes were futile, if indeed Smith expected any realization of them.
Hardly was the Marshall conference concluded and the counter-demand for terms despatched to Pope when Magruder sent word from Houston that, on the night of the 14th of May, four hundred of the troops at Galveston had attempted to desert the post with arms in their hands, but had been persuaded by Colonel Ashbel Smith, aided by a couple of other regiments, to remain a while longer. The troops were all becoming unmanageable, Magruder further reported; they had lost their fighting spirit and could not be depended upon. They insisted upon dividing the public property before leaving, and he thought it best to comply with this demand and to try to send them away to their homes as quietly as possible. 19 Almost immediately came similar reports from Brownsville. The commander at that place reported that at least one-half of his troops had deserted because they thought it was of no use to fight longer, and that war meetings and speeches had no effect upon them. The troops that remained could not be depended upon. 20 Similar accounts came from other points. In many places the soldiers had taken possession of the government stores, sacked them, carried off what they could, and gone home.
The situation was fast becoming desperate, indeed. Without waiting for a response from Pope, Smith immediately despatched General Buckner as commissioner to General Canby, commanding the United States forces at New Orleans, to take up again the question of terms of surrender. He then ordered the evacuation of Galveston and, preparing to concentrate the Texas troops at Houston, he removed his headquarters thither. Before he arrived, about May 29, his army had disappeared. The long dreaded break-up had come.
The order for the evacuation of Galveston had been received on Sunday, May 21, and the movement began the next day. The troops perceived that the end had come and at once became unmanageable. Ranks were broken and almost the whole force swarmed up to Houston. Here a few men of De Bray's brigade maintained sufficient discipline to patrol the streets and preserve order. The city authorities were greatly alarmed, for wild rumors had flown about that the troops had threatened to sack and burn the town, and arrangements were hurriedly made by the mayor and citizens to feed them until they could be passed on through. Saloons were ordered closed, and the disobedient suffered confiscation and destruction of all liquors. For some reason the military patrol was suddenly withdrawn early in the morning of Tuesday, the 23rd. By 8 o'clock a crowd of some two thousand persons had collected before the doors of the Ordnance Building. It was broken into and speedily sacked. The mob then proceeded to the Clothing Bureau. Everything portable was taken. “Blankets, made-up clothing, bolts of domestic, buttons, flannels, shoes, mosquito bars, gray cloth, sides of leather, mule whips, hammers, head stalls, etc., all went into the division and were accepted as the new issue.” Soldiers, citizens, women, negroes, and children participated. Some of the soldiers held aloof. The crowd was surprisingly quiet, and by 12 o'clock it was all over. The city authorities seemed paralyzed with fear. Later in the day other troops arrived from Galveston and finding the booty gone angrily threatened to pillage the town; but some of the citizens produced part of the stores and they were redistributed among the late comers. Hastily the mayor made provision for feeding them. Again a patrol, partly of soldiers, partly of citizens, was placed over the city and within a few days quiet was thoroughly restored. 21
As the disbanded soldiery swept on homeward up through the State similar scenes, on a lesser scale, occurred in many places. There had been no personal violence at Houston, nor was there elsewhere for a time. The soldiers simply took possession of Confederate, and generally of State, property wherever they could find it, alleging that as it had originally been collected for their use and, as they had protected it, they were the nearest heirs of the defunct Confederacy and entitled to this much of the estate. Added to this was the irritating conviction that while they had suffered hardships in the army they had not been adequately supported by the mass of those who had been allowed to remain at home, and that the resources of the country had been speculated upon and wasted by the incompetent or unprincipled men into whose hands they had fallen. 22 Nor did public opinion often condemn them. It was generally felt that the soldiers had a better right to the Confederate property than any one else. 23 Private property was generally respected, but that of the State frequently suffered. At La Grange the soldiers of Fayette county held a meeting on May 27 and appointed a committee to gather up all government property in the county and distribute it, looking especially to the interest of indigent soldiers or their families. At Huntsville they levied upon penitentiary cloth, and for a time a fixed amount was given to each applicant. The towns through which they passed, usually in squads, furnished them food—“they are masters of the situation,” explains the Huntsville Item significantly. As they penetrated farther into the interior of the State they became more reckless. At La Grange and at San Antonio stores were openly pillaged. Governor Murrah, in an effort to save State property, issued a proclamation on the 25th to all sheriffs and other officers, enjoining them to gather up and preserve for future and more equitable distribution all property of the State and that of the Confederacy in which the State had an interest. It was impossible for this order to be very generally carried out. The widespread feeling of insecurity and tendency to disorder were not lessened by the presence of bodies of armed men marching towards Mexico. General Joe Shelby with a force estimated variously from three thousand to twelve thousand men was on his way to join Maximilian, 24 and levied upon the country as he passed along. Numbers of smaller groups, composed largely of late officials who had elected political exile were bound for the same destination. Governor Murrah had, on May 27, issued a call for a special session of the Legislature in July, and at the same time he proclaimed an election for a general convention. The program seems to have been “to adopt the speediest mode of harmonizing the State government with the new condition of affairs, to repeal the ordinance of secession, and to enact other legislation necessary to render Texas a faithful member of the Union.” Neither the Legislature nor the convention ever met. It was soon apparent that civil officials would not be recognized by the Federal authorities. Helpless in the midst of the general disorder, from the highest to the lowest, they gradually ceased to attempt to perform their functions. In the absence of responsible authorities lawlessness increased. Jayhawkers, guerrillas, and highwaymen appeared. An attempt was made to capture and rob the penitentiary at Huntsville. The State Treasury at Austin, left without adequate protection, was looted. Predatory bands of robbers and jayhawkers infested all the roads between San Antonio and the Rio Grande. One stage was said to have been held up on an average of once every five miles on the road from Rio Grande City to San Antonio. Affairs were not much better in other sections. Here and there the towns began to organize local police or “home guards” and to clear the country round about. The newspapers besought the people to restore order, as it was the only way by which to obviate the establishment of a military government. 25
Amid this scene of confusion Kirby Smith arrived in Houston about May 29. On the 30th he issued an address to the soldiers in which he declared that it had been his intention to concentrate the army at Houston, await negotiations and carry on the struggle until favorable terms could be secured. He was now left a commander without an army and, by destroying their organization, he declared, the men had thrown away their only chance of securing honorable terms. 26 On the same day he addressed a letter to Colonel Sprague of General Pope's staff, saying that the Trans-Mississippi Department was now open to occupation by United States troops, since the Confederate soldiers had disbanded. At the same time he declared his intention of leaving the country. 27 In the meantime his commissioner to New Orleans, General Buckner, had been discussing terms of surrender with General Canby. Buckner failed to secure the settlement of any political question, since Canby was not authorized to treat of those matters. However, a convention was finally agreed upon, May 26, providing, in substance, that the Confederate troops, officers, and men were to be paroled, and to return home, transportation being furnished them where possible. All Confederate property was to be turned over to the proper officers of the government of the United States. 28
Before General Smith had arrived at Houston, General Magruder and Governor Murrah had made an independent effort to secure favorable terms of peace for Texas. On May 24, the next day after the sack of the military stores at Houston, they appointed Colonel Ashbel Smith and W. P. Ballinger as special commissioners to proceed to New Orleans and negotiate with General Canby or other proper authority of the United States for “the cessation of hostilities between the United States and Texas.”
The commissioners arrived at New Orleans on May 29 and at once solicited a conference. They had seen in the newspapers a copy of the convention between Canby and Buckner, but hoped “to facilitate the prompt and satisfactory restoration of relations between Texas and the United States government.” Canby granted the conference, but distinctly stated that he had no authority to entertain officially any questions of civil or political character. The Texas commissioners frankly stated at the outset the actual conditions in Texas—the mutiny and the break-up in the army, the seizure and distribution of Confederate property, the helplessness of the Confederate officials. The people, they said, were heartily tired of the war and ready in good faith to return to their allegiance to the government of the United States; but they were greatly concerned with respect to the course to be pursued by the national government. The commissioners suggested that, inasmuch as the machinery of the civil government of the State was still intact and the regular election of State officers under the constitution in force in 1860 was to fall due the next August, that citizens of proven loyalty to the Union be allowed to proceed with this election. It would be a good policy to recognize the existing State government as a government de facto in preference to establishing a military government. They also pointed out the great evils to be feared from the dislocation of the labor of the State. There was more cotton in Texas than elsewhere, the crop was far along toward maturity, and its production involved the interest of all, white and black. It was of the greatest importance, therefore, that the negroes should be kept on the farms, and it was suggested that they be paid wages under proper regulations until the whole subject of labor could be properly adjusted. 29
This conference was necessarily fruitless, for not only was Canby without authority to treat upon the subjects broached by the Texans, but the United States authorities were not likely to yield on a matter of such wide importance as even the partial recognition of the “rebel” State government. As the final effort of the State authorities to save something from the wreck, it is interesting; but it seems impossible that, knowing the outcome of the Sherman-Johnston treaty, they could have hoped for very much along this line.
On June 2 General Smith went on board a United States ship of war at Galveston and formally signed the Canby-Buckner convention. The last vestige of Confederate military authority now vanished. For three weeks, however, after the surrender, the Federals were not able to send an army to take possession of Texas because of the lack of transports.
Meanwhile conditions in the State grew worse. Wild rumors were afloat of dire punishments to be inflicted upon prominent rebels by the victorious Yankees. Trials for treason before military commissions and wholesale confiscation of property were to be expected. A sort of panic seized upon many of those who had held office under the Confederacy. Others declared they could not live under the odious rule of their enemies and prepard to emigrate. A lively exodus to Mexico ensued. Among those to go were the highest officials in the State, Generals Smith and Magruder and Governors Clark and Murrah. This flight was bitterly resented by those who were left behind.
On May 29 General Sheridan was assigned to the command of the Military Division of the Southwest, headquarters at New Orleans. On June 10 he ordered General Gordon Granger to proceed with eighteen hundred men to Galveston. 30 Granger arrived at Galveston on June 19 and immediately, in conformity to instructions, assumed command of all forces in the State and issued orders declaring that by proclamation of the President all slaves were free, that all acts of the Governor and the Legislature of Texas since the ordinance of secession were illegal, that all officers and men of the late Confederate army were to be paroled, and that all persons “having in their possession public property of any description, formerly belonging to the late so-called Confederate States or the State of Texas,” should turn it over to the proper United States officer at the nearest of the previously designated stations. 31 As rapidly as possible troops were pushed into the interior of the State and posted at the most important points. The military were to serve the double purpose of carrying out the provisions of the surrender and of preserving order until a civil government could be established. Most of the troops sent to Texas were ordered to the Rio Grande as a sort of demonstration against the French in Mexico. The rest were wholly inadequate to the efficient policing of the State. The posts established were widely separated and extensive districts, comprising sometimes several counties, were without proper surveillance; and this, too, at a time when society was convulsed with sudden and momentous changes and lawlessness was everywhere. Even under these conditions General Sheridan, to provide against local resistance or guerrilla warfare, issued orders, June 30, that no home guards or bands for self-protection would be allowed anywhere in the State, on the ground that the military were sufficient for all such purposes. By the same order, neighborhoods infested by guerrillas were to be held responsible for the deeds of the latter,—an act characteristic of the harsh suspicion with which Sheridan always regarded Texas.
The military authorities now proceeded to confiscate all public property that could be found. Such as had belonged to the Confederacy or had been used in the prosecution of the war became the property of the United States, while that belonging solely to the State was held until the proper time should arrive for turning it over to the State officials. But very little of the public property had been left by the soldiers during the riotous days of the “break-up,” and the Federals charged that the Confederate officials had not observed the terms of the convention and their parole. These charges, later reiterated, were undoubtedly unjust, for the soldiers had seized most of the property before the surrender, and afterwards the officers were unable to restrain them. Many commands, in fact, had never surrendered, but simply disbanded, as has been shown, even before the convention had been agreed upon at New Orleans.
But if most forms of Confederate property had disappeared or evaded Federal confiscation, it was otherwise with cotton. When the war closed there was scattered all over the country a considerable amount of unmarketed cotton, and as soon as hostilities ceased the holders were anxious to get it to market without delay in order to obtain the enormous prices then being paid for it. General Grant had given orders to the commanders in the Southwest not to interfere with its shipment since it was to the business interests of the whole country that it be marketed, and to encourage shipment in every way. The military were forbidden to institute inquiries as to ownership, but to leave it to the treasury agents to seek out such property as belonged to the government. 32 Accordingly, General Granger, upon his arrival at Galveston issued orders to the effect that until the arrival of treasury agents all cotton would be turned into the quartermaster's department for shipment to New Orleans or New York, there to be sold to United States purchasing agents. Bills of lading were to be given and the owners were to be allowed to accompany the cotton in order to affect the sale. 33 This order was in force for little more than a month. Treasury agents soon arrived and swarmed over the State, seeking out and taking possession of everything belonging to the late Confederacy, especially cotton. Some of this cotton had actually belonged to the Confederate government; some had been set aside to pay the tax but had never been delivered; some had been purchased by the State Military Board but had never been paid for nor delivered; some had gone to pay State taxes and was now State property; but a great part had never been anything but private property. The greatest possible confusion arose in regard to the ownership of these various classes of cotton. The planter who had produced it was unwilling to give up, as Confederate property, cotton that had never been paid for, and he still claimed it as his own; nor, it must be confessed, was he always active in turning over that which had actually been paid for (in Confederate paper), or which had been raised for the government under the terms of an “exemption contract.” 34 On the other hand, the claims of the treasury agents were sweeping. By order of the general agent for Texas, H. C. Wamoth, all personal property that was “actually or constructively in the possession of the Confederate States at the time of the surrender” was to be seized. 35 In all cases persons who wished to ship cotton from any point in Texas were required to give satisfactory evidence that the cotton for shipment was not “surrendered” cotton. 36 The burden of proof, therefore, was on the owner of the cotton.
It is obvious that in the confusion involving the subject and incident to public affairs generally, it must have been no easy task even for the most upright and generous minded agent to keep clear of popular disfavor; but the almost unlimited powers delegated to these agents and the constant opportunities for fraud and peculation, with little danger of punishment, were in themselves demoralizing. There seems to have been a large amount of truth in the charges of fraud, robbery, and extortion that were made against so many of these officials. A petition to President Johnson, printed in the Washington Republican (Washington, D. C.), and signed by merchants, business men, and planters of Louisiana and Texas, declares that great frauds and acts of oppression were continually practiced by treasury agents in the matter of cotton; that the planters west of the Mississippi had rarely received anything in payment from the Confederate government, and had been informed by agents, military officials, and by the Secretary of the Treasury himself, that cotton not thus paid for or delivered would pass like any other cotton. Yet when the cotton had been sold to the merchant the treasury agent stepped in and took possession of it. Trade was paralyzed, capital made timid, and the planters were unable to sell their cotton or to hire the labor they needed. 37 A correspondent of the New Orleans Picayune, writing from Eastern Texas, gives an account of similar difficulties, and declares that every agent under whose inspection the cotton passed required new proof, which was always inconvenient to obtain. 38 Several cases of fraud came to light at Jefferson, Texas, where a treasury agent was later indicted on three distinct charges of fraud and swindling. He was released by the military authorities. Usually there was no recourse whatever for the parties claiming to have been wronged. A favorite device of the dishonest treasury agent was to hold back a lot of cotton from shipment under pretense of investigating the title until the owner was willing to give a bribe for its release. Sometimes he took possession of the cotton outright and shipped it on his own account. At other times he ordered it shipped to certain points at high rates and received a rebate on the transportation charges. 39
These troubles involved only the cotton left over from the crop of 1864, but so slowly was that erop marketed that they did not cease until the beginning of 1866.
The turmoil and confusion of the “break-up” and the general dread of all that a military occupation might entail had at first diverted public attention somewhat from the most serious problem that the close of the war had forced upon the people of the South. What was to be done with the negro? Was he to be set free, and if so, what measure of freedom should he have? How was his labor to be secured and so regulated that he should be an economically efficient member of society? What was to be his position in this society, in the broad domain of civil rights and privileges, and in political affairs? The magnitude of the problem was not at once appreciated; for the time being public attention was engaged solely with that part which was of most immediate concern, the measure of freedom to be accorded to the late slaves and the best method of securing his labor. The other and more intricate phases of the question were of later development, and the contingencies which gave rise to them were then but dimly apprehended.
It had been long foreseen that in the event of Federal victory a change in the status of the negro would be inevitable. Indeed, the certainty of his emancipation in case of the failure of the South had been wielded as a goad to a “last ditch” struggle. Yet the Confederacy itself, in final desperation proposed to grant freedom to the slaves as a reward for military service. The plan came to nothing, for the Confederate government was then on the point of collapse. Then, too, slavery as a system had already been shattered east of the Mississippi by the presence of the Federal armies. In Texas, however, undisturbed by invasions, the institution had remained essentially unimpaired. But with the break-up of the Confederate armies and the approach of the Federals the changed status of the negro was now sharply emphasized. Long before Granger's proclamation at Galveston, June 19, it was generally known that the slaves would be freed. In some cases the planters anticipated the emancipation by setting their negroes at liberty; sometimes the negroes themselves slipped away from their homes and began roaming about the country; but for the most part they were kept at home to await Federal action.
Even at this time, despite the attitude of the national authorities, there was considerable belief that slavery as an institution was not dead nor yet doomed to die. The Marshall Republican, the most important weekly of Eastern Texas, in its issue of June 16, reviewed the situation, describing the demoralization of the negroes, who were lapsing into vagrancy and consequent “filth, disease, and crime.” The negroes would not work when once it was definitely known that slavery was to cease, and the crops could neither be cultivated nor gathered. The Republican affected to believe that “the ruinous effects” of freeing four millions of ignorant and helpless blacks would not be confined to the South, but that the blight would be communicated to the North, and that “the time would come when the people of that section would be glad to witness a return to a system attended with more philanthropy and happiness to the black race than the one they seem determined at present to establish; for they will find that compulsory labor affords larger crops and a richer market for Yankee manufacturers.” The masters were advised, therefore, not to turn their slaves loose to become demoralized, but to maintain a kind and protecting care over them. “The amendment to the Federal Constitution abolishing slavery has not been ratified by three-fourths of the States, nor is it likely to be in the ensuing ten years. When the State governments, therefore, are reorganized it is more than probable that slavery will be perpetuated. We can tell better then than at present how long it is likely to endure and prepare for the change.” Emancipation, if adopted at all, should be gradual, but “there is but little reason to doubt that whether or not slavery is perpetuated in name, there will be a return to a character of compulsory labor which will make the negro useful to society and subordinate to the white race.” The Houston Telegraph, while conceding that emancipation was “certain to take place,” was of the opinion that paid compulsory labor would replace unpaid. Since the negro was to be freed by the Federal government solely with a view to the safety of the nation, his condition would be modified only so far as to insure this, but not so far as materially to weaken the agricultural resources of the country. Therefore, the negroes would be compelled to work under police regulations of a stringent character. Under this happy system insolence was to be provided against on the one hand and injustice on the other.
Such seem to have been the hopes of the well informed. To men accustomed to dealing with the indolence of the negro in slavery, such a thing as successful free negro labor was absolutely unthinkable. No other than negro labor seemed available on the great bottom farms of the “black belt”; without this labor the planting interests were threatened with ruin; and, moreover, to leave the negro the prey of the vice and misery certain to result from idleness and vagrancy would be criminal. Compulsory negro labor, then, seemed the natural and necessary arrangement. It was clear enough, too, that slavery as an institution, recognized by the constitution, could not be abolished by proclamation, and that three-fourths of the States would adopt an amendment abolishing slavery seemed preposterous. Thus the life long beliefs and prejudices of the Southerner conspired with the exigencies of the situation to lead him into a policy which, certain to be distorted in reports given to the North, was in its reaction to force upon him the very things he would have feared most,—his own disfranchisement and negro domination.
Serenely unconscious of negro incapacity and unembarrassed by constitutional guarantees, the Federal military authorities proceeded to complete the work cut out for them. In his emancipation proclamation, issued at Galveston on the 19th of June, General Granger declared that in accordance with the presidential proclamation all slaves were free, and that this involved an absolute equality of personal and property rights between former masters and slaves, the previous connection between them becoming that between employer and free laborer. Mindful of the propensities of the freedmen, he advised them to remain at home and work for wages, and warned them that they would not be allowed to collect at military posts, nor would they be supported in idleness there or elsewhere.
As long as the regular army officials were in control, that is, until the officials of the Freedmen's Bureau arrived, efforts were made to keep the negroes under strict supervision. In the published general orders of post commanders at various points during June and July, Granger's proclamation is reflected—the freedmen are repeatedly urged to stay at home and go to work for their former masters for wages; they are assured of their freedom and of protection from injustice, but are warned against vagrancy under penalty of being put to hard labor without compensation; and in many cases they are not permitted to travel on the public thoroughfares without passes from employers. 40 That the army officials failed to keep the negroes from vagrancy is not surprising. The army posts were too far apart to keep all communities under surveillance, and the freedmen themselves were too ignorant to understand that their new freedom did not mean immunity from work, and that they could not be fed and clothed forever by their liberators.
The military officials made no effort at first to superintend the drawing up of contracts between the freedman and his employer, nor to act for the freedmen in stipulating wages or other terms. The provost marshal general for Texas, Lieutenant-Colonel Laughlin, issued a statement that negroes would be allowed to make contracts with whomsoever they wished, and that both parties would be held to the terms of the contract; that “unless other regulations are promulgated by the Freedman's Bureau,” the amount and kind of consideration for labor should be entirely a matter of contract between the employer and the employees. 41 Perhaps it would have been better if the rate of wages had been fixed in some way, for some contracts were practically nullified later by the Bureau. It had frequently happened that a planter, not feeling able to pay wages,—for ready cash was scarce, political conditions unsettled, and the outlook uncertain,—had arranged for his freedman to work temporarily for food and clothing for himself and family. In most cases the freedman was to receive a part of the crop in the fall. To the childlike negro, concerned only with the immediate present, there was no difference between this and his old condition as a slave, and he soon wished to leave.
From a few sections the reports were favorable—the blacks were making contracts and remaining at work; 42 but as the summer wore on complaints came from all sides that vagrancy, theft, vice, and insolence were increasing, and that where negroes had made contracts they broke them without cause, often leaving their families for their employers to feed. 43 The Houston Telegraph thought it necessary to warn the people not to allow themselves to develop a feeling of hostility and bitterness toward the blacks, who, although they were doing very many foolish and vexatious things, were “not responsible for their own emancipation.” It would have been well if the whites generally could have shown this tolerant spirit; but for his former master to show indulgence to the freedman who broke his contract when it suited his whim, disobeyed orders just to see how it felt to be “free,” and spent most of his time “visiting around” when the crops were most in need of work, was more than could be confidently expected of the average employer. For the time being, fortunately, in the southern part of the State, where the demoralization was worst, the crops were already well advanced and would need but little attention until fall. In the north and northeast, where the Federal troops had not yet penetrated, the negroes had shown less inclination to wander about, or else their former masters had taken steps to keep them at home. While in a few instances these planters endeavord to keep their negroes in ignorance of their freedom, in most cases their efforts took the form of combinations among ex-slave holders to control the labor of their former slaves; and usually each planter agreed to hire no negro without the consent of his former master. Sometimes freedmen who broke contracts and went away were brought back by force, and in some cases the planters were guilty of needless cruelty. The army officials generally endeavored to hold the negroes to their contracts, but at the same time they refused to allow coercion on the part of employers.
The discontent grew steadily worse and found expression in a more and more insistent demand, chiefly on the part of planters and newspapers in the interior, for State regulation of black labor. The Telegraph alone pointed out that the “North would not likely allow the South thus to enjoy the fruit of the contest over slavery after having lost the contest,” and advocated securing the immigration of white labor.
Conditions in the black belt did not materially improve during the summer. There was much uneasiness because of persistent rumors that negro troops were to be sent to Texas for garrison duty; for it was generally felt that their presence could only aggravate the situation and might make it positively dangerous by inciting unruly negroes to lawlessness and precipitating racial disturbances. It was also known that the Freedmen's Bureau was to be established in Texas, and the anxiety and distrust that were felt as to its attitude on the labor question did not tend to alleviate the growing discontent. Public opinion had become skeptical of the ability of the army officials to provide the usual and necessary supply of black labor, and manifested a greater eagerness for the speedy restoration of the regular State government which could be expected to deal with the problem in a manner agreeable with the customs and social ideas of the people. For this reason, largely, the arrival of the newly appointed provisional Governor, A. J. Hamilton, who came to restore civil authority and set in motion again the machinery of State government, was greeted with expectant interest.
11. Magruder to Boggs, Official Records, War of Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XLVIII, Part II, 1271.
12. Official Records, War of the Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XLVIII, Part I, 1359.
13. The Tri-Weekly Telegraph (Houston), April 26, and throughout May, 1865; The Patriot (La Grange), May 6 and 20, 1865.
14. Magruder to Boggs, Official Records, War of Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XLVIII, Part II, 1291.
15. An expression which betrays the strong “States' rights” feeling of the conferees. Any suggestion of the authority of the national government over the States was carefully avoided. The chief “question” involved was, of course, the continuance of slavery.
16. The members of the conference sought to send Governor Allen to Washington to urge the acceptance of the proposed terms, but he was not permitted to go.
17. For the Marshall conference, see Official Records, War of Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XLVIII, Part I, 186-194.
18. Smith to Rose, Official Records, War of Rebellion, Series I, Vol, XLVIII, Part II, 1292.
19. Official Records, War of Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XLVIII, Part II, 1308.
20. Ibid., 1313.
21. The Tri-Weekly Telegraph (Houston), May 24 and 31, 1865.
22. The Tri-Weekly Telegraph (Houston), June 16, 1865.
23. The Patriot (La Grange), June 3, 1865.
24. San Antonio News, May 30, 1865.
25. Texas Republican (Marshall, June —, 1865; Tri-Weekly Telegraph (Houston), June 16, 1865.
26. Tri-Weekly Telegraph (Houston), June 2, 1865.
27. Official Records, War of Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XLVIII, Part I, 193.
28. Official Records, War of Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XLVIII, Part II, 600.
29. Official Records, War of Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XLVIII, Part II, 648 675.
30. Sheridan says in the dispatch: “There is not a very wholesome state of affairs in Texas. The Governor and all the soldiers and the people generally are disposed to be ugly, and the sooner Galveston can be occupied the better” (Official Records, War of Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XLVIII, Part II, 841). If by this it was meant that further resistance to Federal authority was contemplated, there seems to be absolutely nothing to support his statement. On the other hand, there was widespread disorder and lawlessness, but the reference could hardly have been to that.
31. These were Houston, Galveston, Bonham, San Antonio, Marshall, and Brownsville.
32. Instructions from Grant to Sheridan, Official Records, War of Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XLVIII, Part II, 639; Sheridan, General Orders. No. 3, ibid., 713; Canby, General Orders, No. 65, ibid., 694.
33. Granger, General Orders, No. 5, Flake's Bulletin (Galveston), July 18, 1865.
34. An arrangement whereby a planter had been granted exemption from military service upon condition of raising a certain amount of cotton, corn, or beef for the Confederate government.
35. Flake's Bulletin, August 30, 1865.
36. F. H. Coupland in Flake's Bulletin, July 31, 1865.
37. See Flake's Bulletin, September 6, 1865.
38. Ibid., August 30, 1865.
39. H. Ware to L. D. Evans, correspondence of Gov. Hamilton, Archives of State Department.
40. General Orders published in Texas Republican, June 23, 1865; Tri-Weekly Telegraph, June 30 and July 5; Flake's Bulletin, July 18.
41. The Tri-Weekly Telegraph, June 28, 1865.
42. Communication to Tri-Weekly Telegraph, June 28, 1865.
43. Tri-Weekly Telegraph, July 7, 1865; San Antonio Herald, July 9; Jefferson Bulletin, August —; Caddo Gazette, August —; Texas Republican, August 18; Southern Intelligencer, September 29.
How to cite:
Ramsdell, Charles W., "TEXAS FROM THE FALL OF THE CONFEDERACY TO THE BEGINNING OF RECONSTRUCTION ", Volume 011, Number 3, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, Page 199 - 219. http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v011/n3/article_2.html
[Accessed Wed Dec 3 23:47:05 CST 2008]
