When Texas in the fall of 1835 found herself at war with Mexico, her first step, after putting the country in a state of defense, was to cast about for aid. Two alternatives were presented to her: she might either ally herself with the Mexican Liberals, who were also in rebellion against the centralized government of Santa Anna; or she might declare independence, and trust to the United States for assistance to sustain it. What she did was to experiment with each course in turn; and the revolution falls thus into two phases—first, an effort to restore the “republican principles” of the constitution which Santa Anna had overthrown; secondly, a struggle for independence. Some emphasis has been laid upon the conscientiousness of the Texan colonists during the first period in adhering to their obligations to Mexico and the reluctance with which they finally threw off allegiance to their adopted country. It is no doubt true that, rather than engage in a war whose issue was at best doubtful, the majority of the colonists would have preferred to continue the old relationship with Mexico under the constitution, if peace might thereby have been restored. But in tracing the relations between Texas and the United States at this time, one is forced to question whether the Texan leaders were as sincere during the first months of the revolution in their loyalty to the constitution of 1824 as they were later on in the acknowledged war for independence; whether more confidence either in their own strength or in help from without might not have led earlier to an unqualified declaration of independence. In the fall of 1835, however, they felt that help form some quarter must be forthcoming—that alone they were incapable of resisting the forces that had already suppressed similar uprisings in other provinces throughout Mexico.
The Consultation at San Felipe, which was called partly for the purpose of determining what course to pursue, decided, November 6, against a declaration of independence by a vote of thirty-three to fifteen. On the next day a report defining the position in which Texas stood was brought in by a committee appointed for the purpose, and unanimously adopted. It stated that:
Whereas, General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, and other military chieftains, have, by force of arms, overthrown the federal institutions of Mexico, and dissolved the social compact which existed between Texas and the other members of the Mexican confederacy; now the good people of Texas, availing themselves of their natural rights,
That they have taken up arms in defence of their rights and liberties, which were threatened by the encroachments of military despots, and in defence of the republican principles of the federal constitution of Mexico, of eighteen and twenty-four. 2
2d.That Texas is no longer morally or civilly bound by the compact of union; yet, stimulated by the generosity and sympathy common to a free people, they offer their support and assistance to such of the members of the Mexican confederacy as will take up arms against military despotism.
3d.That they do not acknowledge that the present authorities of the nominal Mexican republic have the right to govern within the limits of Texas.
4th.That they will not cease to carry on war against the said authorities whilst their troops are within the limits of Texas.
5th.That they hold it to be their right during the disorganization of the federal system, and the reign of despotism, to withdraw from the union, to establish an independent government, or to adopt such measures as they may deem best calculated to protect their rights and liberties, but that they will continue faithful to the Mexican government so long as that nation is governed by the constitution and laws that were formed for the government of the political association.
6th.That Texas is responsible for the expense of her armies now in the field.
7th.That the public faith of Texas is pledged for the payment of any debts contracted by her agents.
8th.That she will reward, by donations in lands, all who volunteer their services in her present struggle, and receive them as citizens. 3
Throughout the rest of this year and the beginning of the next, the General Council of the provisional government 4 remained at least nominally faithful to this declaration. On the other hand Provisional Governor Smith was from the first an ardent advocate of an immediate declaration of independence; and it is to this difference of opinion that the long and undignified quarrel between the governor and the Council has been ascribed. 5
The attitude of the Council on this subject is no doubt partly responsible for the general impression that in the fall of 1835 the majority of the Texans, known as the conservatives, were reluctant to withdraw allegiance from Mexico—that, in spite of their declaration to the contrary, they did feel still under moral obligation to remain faithful to the constitution of 1824. 6 Stephen F. Austin, also, repeatedly offered support for such a belief. In a report made to the provisional government, November 30, 1835, after explaining at some length that the volunteers had taken up arms in defence of the constitution of 1824, he continued thus:
I have faithfully labored for years to unite Texas permanently to the Mexican confederation. ... There was but one way to effect this union with any hope of permanency or harmony, which was by admitting Texas into a state of the Mexican confederation. ...
The people of Texas desired it; and if proofs were wanting (but they are not) of their fidelity to their obligations as Mexican citizens, this effort to erect Texas into a state affords one which is conclusive to every man of judgment who knows anything about this country.
The object of the Texans, therefore, in wishing a separation from Coahuila, and the erection of their country into a state, was to avoid a total separation from Mexico by a revolution. ... 7
Later on, also, in explaining the action taken by the Consultation of San Felipe, Austin again said:
The majority of Texas, so far as an opinion can be formed from the acts of the people at their primary meetings, was decidedly in favor of declaring in positive, clear and unequivocal terms, for the federal constitution of 1824, and for the organization of a local government, either as a state of the Mexican confederation, or provisionally, until the authorities of the state of Coahuila and Texas could be restored. This measure was absolutely necessary to save the country from anarchy, for it was left without any government at all, owing to the dispersion and imprisonment of the executive and legislative authorities, by the unconstitutional intervention of the military power. Some individuals were also in favor of independence, though no public meeting whose proceedings I have seen, expressed such an idea. 8
Even William H. Wharton, one of the most radical advocates for independence, in speaking of the November declaration, said: “I do not blame the Consultation for their declaration. They were not empowered and it was not in the contemplation of those who elected them to make any other.” 9 Morfit, the agent sent out in the summer of 1836 by President Jackson to examine into the condition of affairs in Texas, also reported, August 22: “The Texans assert that this resistance was not because they even then [that is, after Cos's invasion] wished to separate from the confederacy, but, on the contrary, because they were desirous to bring back the Government to the terms of the constitution of 1824.” 10
Despite such authorities, an examination of the private correspondence of the time, principally Austin's own, and other documents that were not intended for the Mexican eye leads one to the conclusion that the declaration of November 7 and all acts in conformity thereto were not altogether the results of loyalty to the constitution of 1824, but were dictated largely by policy. William H. Wharton, in declining his appointment to go as commissioner to the United States, 11 testified to the fact that it was expediency that governed the action of the Consultation. Referring to the indefinite attitude assumed by the November declaration he said: “It was generally thought, and I then thought it a matter of policy so to declare. It was thought (by a majority over a very strong minority) that a declaration for the constitution would neutralize the prejudices or enlist the sympathies and assistance of the Federal party of the interior in our favor; and also that under such declaration we could obtain the requisite loans, etc., from the capitalists of the United States.” 12 James W. Robinson, one of the prominent members of the Consultation and who afterward became Lieutenant-Governor of the provisional government and ex-officio president of the General Council, writing from the Consultation on November 3, 1835, said: “How the convention will decide is uncertain, but the probability is in favor of the constitution as a matter of policy only, as all agree we must go, sooner or later, for independence.” 13 Robinson, it must be remembered, was also of the radical party, and his statement may be somewhat biased. But it is a well-known fact that the first report of the committee of the Consultation, 14 which John A. Wharton presented, November 4, was an absolute declaration of independence. This was even adopted; but on the recommendation of Houston, tradition says, it was reconsidered, and the declaration of November 7 took its place. 15 The motives that influenced the Consultation in making this change were no doubt the same as those expressed in a report sent in to San Felipe, November 9, by the Jurisdiction of Liberty. It said:
In behalf of their fellow citizens they [that is, the committee appointed to make the report] state that a premature declaration of independence would be inexpedient and injurious, that a temporary provisional organization of Government with a carefull attention to the development of events is the best policy; that a precipitious cesesion from the Mexican Republic might incur the reprehension, and wean from us the sympathies of many friends in the North. 16
Another argument in favor of the interpretation of the declaration of November 7 as a measure purely of expediency is the striking analogy between the present situation and that of 1832. At that time a struggle was going on in Mexico between Bustamante, who had set up a tyrannical form of government, and Santa Anna, then posing as the champion of the Constitution of 1824. In the meantime hostilities had broken out at Anahuac between the Texan colonists and Mexican troops stationed in Texas. The report had reached Mexico that it was a move on the part of the Texans for independence. Mejía, of the popular party, immediately made a truce with Bustamante's troops; and set out to Texas to suppress the rebellion. It would be well, the Texans thought, to have some excuse to give for the disturbances. They therefore drew up what were known as the Turtle Bayou resolutions, declaring in favor of Santa Anna and the Constitution of 1824. Mejía was well satisfied with these expressions of loyalty. “He was received with great ceremony at Brazoria and immediately presented with the blessed resolutions. Nothing further was needed to prove to him that the conduct of the Texans had been entirely innocent and praiseworthy.” 17 It was not strange, therefore, that in 1835 the Texans called to mind an expedient that three years earlier, under similar circumstances, had served them so effectively.
In 1835, however, a large proportion of the Texans were actually contemplating independence. But the problem of securing immediate aid against Santa Anna confronted them. The Mexican Liberals held out flattering inducements. 18 The other source, the United States, from which they were ardently hoping to receive help, was far less certain. Besides a precipitate declaration might meet with the disfavor of their neighbor on the north, 19 whose good will above all it was essential to retain. Under considerations such as these many of the radicals were induced to temporize, with the mental reservation that independence should be the ultimate aim. And in this desire it is safe to assume that a great number of the so-called conservative party also shared.
There can be no doubt that Stephen F. Austin was influenced by such considerations, and his attitude throws perhaps the truest light upon the situation in the fall of 1835. He was at the time the recognized leader of the conservatives; and he has subsequently been held up as the one man who to the last was faithful to every possible obligation to Mexico. To all outward appearance this was true. In his zeal to coöperate with the Liberal party he even incurred the suspicion of some of his own fellow citizens—so much so that he was spoken of contemptuously as a “Mexican.” Though a man remarkable for his fairness in dealing with others, his opposition to a declaration of independence in the fall of 1835 led him into bitter and unjust denunciations of his opponents—a thing that he deeply regretted afterward. 20 But the principle at stake was not loyalty to Mexico, however reluctantly he may have renounced allegiance to his adopted country when such a step became necessary. The controlling motive of his life was the welfare of his colony; and on his return from Mexico, he undoubtedly felt that the radical party, in precipitating the revolution, was endangering the very end they had in view, namely, independence. That he, too, however, had become convinced that independence must be the ultimate result, there is abundant evidence to show; and this perhaps explains the apparent inconsistency of his attitude in the fall of 1835. In a personal letter to a cousin, written August 21, 1835, from New Orleans on his return from a two years' imprisonment in Mexico, he gives the clearest exposition of his views. Having been kept in close confinement in Mexico, he was as yet unaware of the recent developments in Texas. He had, however, as he says in this letter, already come to the conclusion that the best interests of Texas demanded that she become a part of the United States. He had foreseen that the Anglo-American colonization of Texas, if unchecked, would result inevitably in her separation from Mexico, which he considered but the preliminary step to annexation to the United States. As a means of hastening the process he planned to induce a great immigration during the winter of 1835-6—`with passports, so long as the door was legally open; should it be closed, it would then be time enough to force it open, if necessary.' The immigrants should of course be slaveholders, in order to harmonize with their neighbors in the slaveholding states. When this had been accomplished, he expected “the violent political convulsions of Mexico to shake off Texas as a gentle breeze shakes off a ripe peach.” The importance of Texas to the southwest he believed would appeal to all reflecting men, but especially to Jackson and the Senate. In the meanwhile, however, everything should be governed by “prudence and an observance of appearances.” “The Mexicans,” he says, “are a strange people. Appearances mean everything to them even though they know they are being deceived. They have high ideals of national dignity, but will sacrifice national dignity and national interest, too, if it can be done so as not to arrest public attention. The more the Anglo-American population of Texas is increased the more readily will the Mexican government give it up; and the more Texas seems to oppose a separation from Mexico the less tenacious will Mexico hold to it.” 21
Again, after the decision to join the Mexican Liberals had been made, Austin wrote: “Every possible aid should be given the Federal party in the interior; but it should be done as auxiliary aid, in conformity with the 2nd article of the declaration. By doing this the war will be kept out of Texas. The country will remain at peace. It will fill up rapidly with families, and there will be no great need of a standing army.” 22
The importance of these statements lies in Austin's powerful influence. All things considered he was, without doubt, the first man in Texas. The newspapers quoted him; the private correspondence of the time also attests his popularity. Expressions such as the following were frequent: “All eyes are turned towards you . . . Texas can be wielded by you, and you alone; and her destiny is now completely in your hands. I have every confidence that you will guide us safely through all our perils.” 23
Soon after his arrival in Texas, however, Austin saw that his plan for separation from Mexico 24 would never have time to materialize. The war, indeed, was upon them. It had come, he said, much sooner than he had expected when he left Mexico or New Orleans. 25 Still he was opposed to declaring independence. The centralized government had succeeded in crushing similar rebellions throughout Mexico. Texas would do well to look to her resources before defying the strength of the “Napoleon of the West,” as Santa Anna styled himself. A declaration of independence would turn against her even the Federal party with whom there was yet an opportunity to unite. If this union were effected the war might be kept out of Texas and prevented from assuming a “national” character. 26 In the meantime every nerve should be strained to put the country in a state of preparation.
As a part of their effort in this direction there would be nothing amiss in applying to the United States, also, for sympathy and material aid. Even before hostilities began, Austin had said, “If there was any way of getting at it I should like to know what the wise men of the United States think the people of Texas ought to do.” 27 Later on, only a week after the Consultation that had declared for the constitution had adjourned, Austin wrote, “The fate of Texas depends mainly on this—we ought to get united to the U. S. as soon as possible, it is the best we can do.” 28
Nothing can be more natural than this promptness with which the minds of the Anglo-American colonists reverted to their mother-country when friction began with the Mexican authorities. Often throughout the whole colonization period there was clearly discernible among the Texan pioneers a longing for the laws and institutions they had left, and a consequent impatience at the clumsy machinery of Mexican government. There was no congeniality between the two peoples. A newspaper article signed “Jefferson” and printed in the Telegraph and Texas Register, expresses sentiments toward the Mexicans which must have been typical. In comparing the Texan revolution with the American revolution of 1776 the writer said:
We separate from a people one-half of whom are the most depraved of the different races of Indians, different in color, pursuits and character; and all of whom are divided from us by the insurmountable barrier which nature and refined taste have thrown between us—a people whose inert and idle habits, general ignorance and superstition, prevents the possibility of our ever mingling in the same harmonious family; and if possible, could only be done by self-degradation. . . . we separate from a people who not only neglected us, but drained our little resources, and threw every obstacle in the way of our advancement and prosperity. . . . [a nation] not sufficiently stable to assume a character, and consistent, in her different convulsions, only in treachery, tyranny and imbecility. 29
This article appeared in February, 1836, and was written probably by Wharton, 30 who was then on his way as commissioner to Washington. Its object had been to show the futility of further attempts to coöperate with the Mexican Liberals. But, though Wharton was unaware of the fact, it was unnecessary. During the first two months of 1836 even the most ardent adherents to the principles laid down in the November declaration had been won over, and when the convention met at Washington, Texas, March 1, 31 a declaration of independence was a foregone conclusion. On the next day, indeed, the declaration was made, and seven weeks later, on the battlefield of San Jacinto, the independence of Texas became a reality.
1. The work of the first commission.
The Texans realized that one of the first essentials in carrying on a successful revolution was money. In his inaugural address the chairman of the Consultation, Dr. Branch T. Archer, had stated: “It will be necessary to procure funds . . . in order to carry on the war in which we are now engaged; it will, therefore, be our duty to elect agents to procure those funds.” 32 November 12, five days after the expedient of declaring for the constitution of 1824 had been adopted, the Consultation decreed that a commission, consisting of Stephen F. Austin, Branch T. Archer, and William H. Wharton be dispatched to the United States furnished with such instructions as the governor and the council might deem necessary. 33
These instructions were not issued until nearly a month later, and Austin seems to have feared their power would be limited to soliciting financial aid only. He is said to have expressed an unwillingness to go at all, unless vested with authority to treat with the government for annexation. 34 Wharton at first definitely declined his appointment, but for a different reason. He was one of the recognized leaders of the radicals, as Austin was of the conservatives, and he was loud in his demand for an immediate declaration of independence. The attitude assumed by the Consultation was much too indefinite, he claimed, to induce capitalists to lend pecuniary aid. Moreover, the declaration was of such a nature as would lead to the belief that the revolution was simply an internal domestic quarrel, and on that basis the United States would refuse to interfere. He advised that a convention meet, January 15, of the coming year to declare independence and sell Texas to the United States if practicable. 35
The delay in providing instructions seems to have been due largely to doubts as to just what duties, aside from raising money, should be laid upon the commissioners, and the authority by which they should be sent out. A select committee appointed for the purpose of deciding this question reported November 21:
that upon considering the matter, they are unable to find any acts of the Convention, or of this Council, whereon to base instructions for the conduct of said agents, or any “data” which can guide your committee in an opinion of their duties, but from all the information they can obtain, your committee have concluded, that the agents should receive their instructions from the Executive; but in order to enable the Governor to give the necessary instructions, an ordinance should first be originated by the Committee of State, and passed and approved, defining in general the powers and duties of the agents, and make it the duty of the Executive to give such instructions as will be conformable to the resolutions of the Convention and the ordinances of the General Council, made with reference to the subject in view when this office was created. But your committee can not advise that the Committee of State be instructed upon this subject with propriety, until the reports of the several committees on the Military, Navy, and Finance have been received and passed. 36
Two weeks more were consumed in trying to frame an ordinance creating a loan of one million dollars, for which the commissioners were to negotiate. 37 Finally, December 4, Provisional Governor Smith, in his message to the General Council, took up the matter thus:
It must be acknowledged by all, that our only succour is expected from the East, where as yet we have not dispatched our agents, sufficient time has clapsed since the rising of the Convention, for them, by this time, to have arrived in the United States. They have called on me, in vain, day after day, time after time, for their dispatches, at least some of them, and they are not yet ready. I say to you, the fate of Texas depends upon their immediate dispatch and success. Why then delay a matter of such vital importance, and give place to minor matters which could be much better delayed? Permit me to beg of you a suspension of all other business, until our Foreign Agents are dispatched. 38
Accordingly, on the next day an ordinance was passed authorizing the governor to issue to the commissioners 39 instructions as follows: they were to negotiate a loan of one million dollars and receive donations for Texas; to purchase supplies for the government, such as munitions of war, provisions, war vessels, etc.; to appoint agents for the government in the principal cities, subject only to themselves; to grant letters of marque and reprisal; and finally to open communications with the United States government relative to the political situation of Texas, under such instructions as the governor might deem prudent, in the present revolutionary condition of Texas and Mexico. 40 On the 7th the governor's formal commission authorizing the negotiation of the loan was issued, 41 and on the 8th the commissioners' private instructions were drawn up. 42
It was this latter document which conferred upon the commissioners their diplomatic authority. After giving directions concerning the armed vessels that were to be fitted out and sent from New Orleans, the supplies to be purchased there, the loan and the donations that might be tendered, the instructions continued:
Finally, you will proceed to the City of Washington, with all convenient speed endeavoring at all points to enlist the sympathies of the free and enlightened people of the United States in our favour by explaining to them our true political situation and the causes which impelled us to take up arms; and the critical situation in which we now stand. You will approach the authorities of our Mother Country, either by yourselves, or confidential friends; and ascertain the feelings of the Government toward Texas, in her present attitude. Whether any interposition on the part of that Government in our favour can be expected, or whether in their opinion, any ulterior move on our part would to them, be more commendable and be calculated to render us more worthy of their favour, or whether by any fair and honorable means, Texas can become a member of that Republic. If not, if we declare independence, whether that Government would immediately recognize and respect [us] as an independent People. Receive us [as] allies, and form with us a treaty of Amity both offensive and defensive. If all should fail on the part of the Government, or a refusal to intermeddle in our difficulty, You will immediately notify this Government whether good or bad, of your success, 43 and govern yourselves accordingly. On the failure of success with the Government, you will redouble your energies in arousing the sympathies of the Patriotic citizens of the north to rally to our assistance. 44
It must not be supposed that enthusiasm for the Texan cause lay dormant in the United States until the coming of Austin, Archer, and Wharton. The Mexican invasion of Texas created the most intense excitement throughout the country. Spirited meetings were held in New Orleans, Mobile, Montgomery, New York, Boston, and doubtless in many other cities. 45 Volunteers from the United States had already enlisted in the Texas service, 46 and a contribution of $7,000 had come from New Orleans. 47 September 1, 1835, Henry Meigs of New York wrote to Austin:
A sympathy almost universal, exists for your welfare and that of your colony.
The Govemt of the U. S. cannot disobey the public opinion, which will insist upon your safety and well being so long as you exhibit that temperate and just view and conduct which you have always done.
In a later letter, September 29, 1835, he said:
The U states are looking to your course with deep interest. It is not possible to separate you from them long. Every political, religious and commercial tie exists between them and you.
And again, November 15.
Public sentiment is aroused for your cause. We know that you are Bone of our Bone! and Flesh of our Flesh! that none but a Republican Government can exist over you! . . .
Govermt can hardly do for you what private opinion and zeal is already active in doing. . . .
The Secretary of State (a few days ago) told me that there was but one result for your affairs—and that was, a natural and inevitable connection with the policy and Interests of your country the United States. 48
John P. Austin, also, writing from New York, November 8, 1835, 49 to his cousin, Stephen F. Austin, after dwelling upon the “general and increased interest throughout the U. States” in favor of Texas, and the disposition shown to render “prompt and efficient aid,” went on to relate a conversation held with an individual “direct from Washington—an old and intimate friend of President Jackson—who said the president had no disposition to interfere with any present aid given by the citizens of the United States, provided they did not openly violate the laws of nations.” Moreover, he stated that orders had been sent to Pensacola for men-of war to cruise in the Gulf of Mexico and that a sloop-of-war was being fitted out with all possible dispatch at Philadelphia to sail in a week or ten days to cruise between Tampico and the mouth of the Mississippi, “which,” he added, “will be very much in your favor and a great protection to vessels bound into any of your ports.” After such repeated assurances, it was quite natural, in spite of the neutrality proclaimed by the United States, 50 for the Texans to look confidently for material aid from their kinsmen on the north. Stephen F. Austin, in December, 1835, wrote that there would probably be thousands of volunteers from the United States in Texas within a few months. 51
The commissioners reached New Orleans New Year's Day, 1836. 52 Their work began most auspiciously. Indeed no one was more surprised than the commissioners themselves at the enthusiasm they found to exist. Austin wrote that it was a thousand fold greater than he had dreamed it would be. He was now convinced that Texas could obtain from the United States all the help she needed, and it was upon this assurance that he united for the first time with Archer and Wharton in the demand for an immediate and unanimous declaration of independence. 53 To make his conversion the more complete, news from Mexico stated that the Federal party had joined Santa Anna to invade Texas. If this were true, to adhere to the declaration of November 7 could do no possible good. On the other hand, the indefinite position in which it placed Texas had already done injury and would ruin the cause, except for the confident expectation that the new convention would soon meet and declare absolute independence. 54
Austin confessed now that his own impulses had long been to see Texas free from the “trammels of religious intolerance, and other anti-republican restrictions.” But he had hesitated, he said, on account of the responsibility he felt in colonizing Texas, to precipitate others into the situation which this involved, until convinced that they would be sustained. The information he had acquired on this subject since leaving Texas had fully satisfied him. 55 Elaborating these views in a letter to his cousin, Henry Austin, he said:
We can get all the aid we need to sustain our independence and I think it will not be difficult to procure the recognition of the U. S. Gov't. Nothing is wanted but union and concert of action and of purpose at home and an unqualified declaration of independence at once. That of 7th Nov'r has been made an absolute declaration of independence, by the acts of the Mexicans by submitting to centralism and of the Gov't. in invading us, and no act of that government for the sale or transfer of Texas to any one, can be or ought to be, in any manner valid, or obligatory on the people of Texas. . . .
I had no idea before I left home of the deep and general interest that is felt for the cause of Texas, or of the influence which my opinions seem to have in this country—had I known it sooner, I should have been less cautious than I have been about precipitating the people of Texas into a declaration of independence. The responsibility, however, would have been very great on me had I contributed to involve the settlers whom I had been instrumental in drawing to that country, before I was certain they would be sustained. I am now confident they will be fully and promptly sustained in their independence, and that the sooner such a declaration is made the better. Besides, the reasons for leaving open any door, however small, for a re-union with Mexico have ceased, for all parties have united against us. 56
Indeed Austin became so imbued with the American spirit of expansion that he suggested that the declaration of independence prescribe no limits on the southwest or northwest, leaving the field open for expansion beyond the Rio Grande, “and to Chihuahua and New Mexico.” 57 Wharton was not so ambitious. From Nashville he wrote Governor Smith that it was his belief that to fight for anything beyond the Rio Grande would “damn us beneath all depth in hell.” 58
In addition to the friendly interest manifested, another cause for congratulation, the commissioners felt, was that, in spite of the fact that Texas, according to her own declaration, was nothing more than a seceded state of the Mexican confederation, with no credit and no wealth except her lands, there were still found individuals who were willing to advance money with which to finance the revolution. A short time after their arrival in New Orleans two loans were negotiated, the first for $200,000, the second for $50,000. To be sure, the terms upon which these loans were secured were not all that could have been desired. The lenders, or holders of the scrip, had the right to take in return lands in Texas at fifty cents an acre. The most objectionable feature was that the lenders were allowed to choose their lands, priority of selection being reserved to subscribers of the first loan; and no further sales of lands by the Texan government were to take place until this choice was made. Moreover, in the case of the first loan, after the first payment, which was to be 10 per cent of the whole, had been made, the lenders had the right to withhold further payment, if they so desired. 59 The second loan was supposed to be a cash payment. 60 In other words, these so-called loans were nothing more than gigantic land speculations, whereby five hundred thousand acres of the choicest lands in Texas were to be secured at fifty cents an acre. 61 But they meant about sixty thousand dollars in cash for Texas, and were therefore duly gratifying. Moreover, the interest was only eight per cent, though the commissioners were authorized to offer as much as ten. 62
In communicating the transactions to the government the commissioners reported enthusiastically: “Some of the best informed persons of this place confidently assert that this loan insures the triumph of our cause and the independence of Texas. That in New Orleans, so near us, and so well acquainted with our situation, confidence enough should exist in us to induce a loan, speaks volumes in our favor and will give confidence everywhere else.” The “hundreds of capitalists,” they continued, “who would soon be in possession of stock in this loan would feel as much interest in Texas as those who had long lived there. As evidence of this fact the subscribers had already offered to send to Texas five hundred men, officered, armed, and equipped, to serve throughout the war under easy terms as regarded reimbursement when the war was over.” In conclusion they said: “Disposing of our land at fifty cents pr. acre for the purpose of getting money so particularly indispensable at this moment, appears to us very fortunate. In fact rather than have missed the loan, we had better borrowed the money for five years and given them lands in the bargain.” 63
Another piece of enterprise on the part of the commissioners during their stay in New Orleans deserves notice. This was the designing of a flag for Texas, which was intended as an appeal both to England and America for recognition. Austin first planned a flag, a draft of which was sent to Gail Borden, January 18, 1836. 64 This design was submitted to the commissioners and modified In this form Professor Garrison describes it as follows: “It had—or was meant to have—the thirteen stripes of the United States flag, with the red changed to blue, and in the upper left-hand corner, instead of stars, was the British union with red stripes on a white field. On the flag was a sun encircled by the motto Lux Libertatis, and on the face of the sun was the head of Washington, underneath which were the words, `In his example there is safety.' ” 65 The flag was not accepted by the Texas authorities, but this “mute appeal . . . [of the Texans] to their near and still nearer of kin which lay in joining the British Jack to the stripes of the American Union was at once proud and pathetic.” 66
The rest of the work of the commissioners in New Orleans consisted in supervising the purchase of supplies; 67 providing for the equipment of the schooner Ingham, late revenue cutter, for the service of Texas; appointing William Bryan general agent of the government at New Orleans, and Edward Hall purchasing agent; authorizing T. D. Owings to raise troops for Texas in Kentucky; and instructing A. J. Yates to go to New York to purchase a steam vessel to defend the Texas coast. 68 Wharton left on the 17th for Nashville. Austin and Archer remained in New Orleans throughout January.
During the next two months the commissioners slowly made their way toward Washington. They were greatly delayed on account of the frozen condition of the roads and rivers and the illness of Austin and Wharton at Nashville. 69 It had been their intention before leaving Texas 70 and while in New Orleans 71 to return home in March, perhaps in time for the March convention. By March 3, Austin and Archer had gone no further than Louisville, Kentucky, and Wharton was still ill in Nashville. Before they could reach Washington the convention undoubtedly would have declared independence and organized a permanent government. The provisional government which they represented would then no longer exist, and in that case their present credentials would be worthless at Washington. A failure on their part to receive recognition as commissioners, they realized, would be disastrous. In order now to enter into negotiations concerning recognition, it was absolutely necessary to have an official copy of the declaration of independence and new instructions from the convention. They were therefore in no haste to proceed until these documents should have been forwarded to Washington. 72 By the latter part of the month it was reported that the commissioners had arrived at their destination. 73
But in the meantime they had not been idle. In all the larger cities 74 they addressed enthusiastic gatherings, with the direct result that hundreds of volunteers, armed and equipped by contribution, flocked to Texas. 75 Even the ladies of Nashville offered the means with which to equip one company. 76 Resolutions, praying the recognition of Texas, were drawn up at these meetings and sent to Congress. Money, too, was offered on such advantageous terms 77 that the commissioners were encouraged to recommend to their government the issue of scrip bearing only five per cent interest and redeemable in tracts of 640, 320, and 160 acres at $1.00 per acre, to be located after all land claims had been definitely and finally settled. 78 Indeed from the time they reached New Orleans until they arrived in Washington the commissioners wrote always in the same cheerful tone. From Nashville, February 16, they reported to Governor Smith: “It is with the most lively sentiments of gratitude toward the patriotic and generous citizens of this free and happy land, and with renewed confidence in the triumph of our cause, that we inform you, of the universal and enthusiastic interest which pervades all ranks and classes of society in every part of this country in favor of the emancipation of Texas.” 79 Upon two things only, they urged, did the success of the cause depend. There must be union and harmony at home, and the March Convention must make a decided and unanimous declaration of independence. If these ends were achieved, the recognition of Texas, they believed, would follow. 80
From the standpoint of recognition the important results of the work of the commissioners on their way to Washington in the spring of 1836 were: (1) their own personal letters to President Jackson and to friends in Congress; (2) pamphlets containing information concerning Texas, and printed addresses which they themselves had delivered, copies of which were forwarded to Washington; and (3) the resolutions and memorials which, through the instrumentality of the commissioners, as has been noted, 81 were drawn up at public gatherings and sent to Congress. 82 As will be indicated later on, 83 these last documents and similar ones that came from other sections of the United States did far more toward bringing the question of recognition before the authorities in Washington than did any of the commissioners until Wharton was sent back in the fall of 1836. 84
There are only two of these printed addresses which remain on record to illustrate the kind of appeals the commissioners made to the people. One is that of Wharton's delivered later on in New York, April 26. 85 The other was given at this time by Austin, March 7, to an unusually large audience at the Second Presbyterian Church of Louisville, Kentucky. Wharton's address is more eloquent, perhaps, but Austin's is more worthy of note, because it deals with definite facts, is more logically written, and is better calculated to appeal to more varied interests. 86
After outlining briefly the history of the colonization movement and the origin of the revolution, with a view to showing the justice of the Texan cause, Austin went on to speak of the present situation of Texas. The declaration of November 7, 1835, he said, was “an absolute Declaration of Independence—a total separation from Mexico.” 87 But it was Mexico and not Texas who had forced this situation; it was she who had trampled under foot the Constitution of 1824 and broken faith. The object which Texas now had was freedom, which she might obtain either as an independent republic or as a part of the United States. To the United States, in either case, Texas looked for help. This the citizens of the United States ought to render for the following reasons: Patriotism called for it—the Texan cause was the same holy cause of light and liberty for which their forefathers, the founders of the great American republic, had fought and bled. Philanthropy urged it—the emancipation of Texas would not only give to her the principles of self-government, but would open the way for a `stream of light and intelligence to flow from the great northern fountain over the benighted regions of Mexico.' Precedent justified it—even the Greeks and Poles had received encouragement from the United States in their struggle for liberty. Finally cold calculating policy approved the wisdom of it—the people of the south and west must look to their interests. “By filling it [Texas] with a population from this country, who will harmonize in language, in political education, in common origin, in everything, with their neighbors to the east and north. . . . Texas will become a great outwork on the west, to protect the outlet of this western world, the mouths of the Mississippi, as Alabama and Florida are on the east; and to keep far away from the southwestern frontier—the weakest and most vulnerable in the nation—all enemies who might make Texas a door for invasion, or use it as a theatre from which mistaken philanthropists and wild fanatics, might attempt a system of intervention in the domestic concerns of the south, which might lead to a servile war, or at least jeopardize the tranquility of Louisiana and the neighboring states.
“This view of the subject,” he concluded, “is a very important one, so much so that a bare allusion to it is sufficient to direct the mind to the various interests and results, immediate and remote, that are involved.” In so “directing the mind” Austin little realized that he was helping to kindle passions which were destined to prevent for more than a decade one of the aims he had in view—annexation; and which were to have their influence, at least indirectly, in postponing until the next year the other object of his mission to Washington, namely, recognition.
From the time of their arrival in Washington, late in March, things began to look gloomy for the commissioners. Contrary to their expectations no dispatches were awaiting them from Texas. That independence had been declared they had learned through the newspapers, 88 but it was quite useless for them to present themselves to the authorities, devoid as they were of official information and the necessary credentials. This was all the more harassing as they were led to believe that the congress then in session was inclined to look favorably upon the objects they had in view. 89 April 6, they reported:
We have received the Declaration through the papers, but we have not received it officially, and it is therefore useless to us. The Government will not act upon it, until it is presented to them by some one with ministerial powers from the same Convention that made the declaration. When presented in this form, with evidence of our Capacity to maintain our Independence, we believe this Government is prepared to recognize us, and if we wish, to admit us into this Union, on liberal principles, if the people of Texas wish it. But they require a Minister with full powers to treat on the subject. If we had had these powers, Texas would have been, by this time, recognized, if not admitted into the Union. 90
Three days later Wharton wrote:
Since the meeting of the new convention we have had no correspondence with the Texas Government. We have seen the declaration in the papers but this government will take no notice of it until it is presented by an agent with credentials from the present government. Let me urge the vesting of some one with plenipotentiary powers without One Moments delau. He must be here before this congress adjourns. They I think are favourable. The next may have a preponderance of Northern and Eastern jealousy and Abolition. Let our Minister be instructed and empowered to negotiate a treaty for the admission of Texas into this union if such which God Grant is the wish of Texas. . . . Do attend if you have not done it already to sending on a Minister immediately with ple[n]ary powers to treat for the admission of Texas into this Union. Probably 2 or 3 agents would be better. 91
A. J. Yates, writing from Baltimore after Austin had joined him, also attested the friendly spirit at Washington. He said:
Everything at Washington appears very prosperous and the Congress and Government are all ready to recognize us and if desired by us to receive us on favorable terms into the Union. The Commissioners can not present themselves officially however untill they receive despatches subsequent to the adoption of the Declaration of Independence. They have received the most marked attention in Washington and both parties are warmly in our favor. I have had several conversations with the President and several of the Cabinet and members and find all unanimously ready to do all they can for us.
If the Government had done their duty on the declaration of Independence and forwarded the necessary powers and instructions to the Commissioners Congress would have decided the matter before this time. 92
Wharton complains to Burnet, April 23, that though he had “written to the government a dozen times . . . [he had] not received one line since the 20th of February last,” 93 and on the next day Austin writes Bryan, the New Orleans agent, “you and you alone have written to us, from the Government of Texas, we have not received one word, not even one.” 94
To make matters worse unofficial reports from Texas were far from encouraging. News had come that the Mexicans were again invading the country, 95 and rumors were afloat of the unseemly quarrel between the governor and his Council. 96 Realizing that nothing could be done in Washington under their present instructions, and knowing that the situation in Texas demanded the immediate aid of money and men, the commissioners decided to separate and devote their attention for the present to securing these material necessities. 97 On April 5 Austin set out to visit Baltimore. Philadelphia, and New York, while Archer on the next day left for Virginia. Wharton alone remained in Washington to keep in touch with the government. 98
From New York Austin made one other attempt to secure the active support of the United States as a nation. In sheer desperation at the repeated disasters which had befallen his country, he threw aside all ceremony, and on April 15 addressed an almost frantic appeal to “Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren, Richard M. Johnson, John Forsyth, Lewis Cass, T. H. Benton and to any member of the cabinet, or Congress of all parties and all factions of the United States.” He asked first that some of the $37,000,000 surplus in the United States treasury be devoted to the Texan cause; and second that Jackson and Congress come out openly and make the war what it alraedy was sub rosa—namely, a national war. 99 Of course nothing came of it. Richard M. Johnson, to whom it seems to have been sent, although apparently an ardent sympathizer with Texas, in his reply expressed his opinion that it would be “useless, at this time, to get our Government to go into the contest as a nation.” 100 Jackson, who also inspected the document, indorsed on the back of it the following: “The writer does not reflect that we have a treaty with Mexico, and our national faith is pledged to support it. The Texians before they took the step to declare themselves Independent, which has aroused and united all Mexico against them ought to have pondered well—it was a rash and premature act, our neutrality must be faithfully maintained.” 101
Austin spent nearly two months on his journey through Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York. 102 By the middle of May he was back in Washington, 103 which city he left May 24 for Texas. 104 If Archer went to Richmond as he planned, 105 he returned immediately, for, on April 26, all three of the commissioners attended a very enthusiastic meeting at Masonic Hall in New York City. Samuel Swartwout, who was an ardent friend of Texas, presided. Wharton was the orator of the day, and “in a strain of sublime and touching pathos” he appealed for sympathy and aid. Austin and Archer also spoke, and the result was a series of resolutions expressing deep interest in the cause and declaring it to be to the “honour of a free and powerful nation like the United States, to be the first to take her [Texas] by the hand, and acknowledge her independence.” Committees were also appointed to receive donations and to confer with the commissioners as to the best way of lending efficient aid. 106
It was about this time, and no doubt due to the joint efforts of the commissioners in New York, that negotiations were made for a loan of $100,000 on terms similar to the New Orleans loan, except that the present subscribers had the privilege of taking Texas lands at twenty-five instead of fifty cents an acre. The commissioners were not particularly enthusiastic over this arrangement, but as has been pointed out, 107 its terms were perhaps as good as those made in New Orleans, since, in the latter case, the expense of issuing stock certificates and of surveying the land was to be borne by the Texan government; in the former, by the lenders themselves. Only ten per cent of this New York loan was ever paid. 108 The commissioners admitted that this was all they counted upon getting, since they did not expect the loan to be ratified “unless the prospects of Texas were gloomy even to desperation.” 109
Wharton and Archer remained in the United States for some time after Austin's departure, but practically nothing is known of their work during this period. Finally they embarked together on the Independence, 110 and reached Texas about the middle of July. 111
In the meantime Austin, on his way home, had stopped for a few days in New Orleans. The tone of his correspondence now, contrasted with the enthusiasm with which he had written from here at the beginning of the year, tells the story of his disappointment at the outcome of the mission. The fault he charges to the Texan government alone. Conditions in Washington he had considered most favorable, and the commissioners had not been wanting in zeal. But they were rendered helpless by the negligence of the authorities at home. In a letter to President Burnet from New Orleans, June 10, Austin said:
I fully believe that nothing is wanting at Washington, to procure an acknowledgment of our independence but official information, of the true state of things at home. That is, evidence that a govt de facto is regularly organized and in operation and able to sustain the independence of Texas—that the Mexicans have been defeated, and driven out of Texas, (if the latter be the fact) or if not driven out, how far they have retreated. What is the force of the Texas army, what that of the enemy, their relative position, and the situation of the country generally. All this should be sent immediately in an official form to the representatives of Texas in Washington (Childress and Hamilton, 112 including Wharton should be still be there, or either of them who may be there) with instructions to lay it before the Govt of the U. S., without delay and apply for a recognition of our independence.
If such documents as the above had been received by the representatives of Texas before I left Washington, I believe that I could have brought on our recognition. The feeling there is decided and ardent in our favor and no time should be lost in making a proper use [of it]. 113
Six days later he wrote to Houston:
I shall do all I can to procure the annexation of Texas to the United States, on just and fair principles. . . . The first step is, a recognition of our independence; that done, the way is clear and open. If official reports in manuscript of all the principal facts in regard to the political and military state of things in Texas had been sent by the executive government of Texas to our agents at Washington, I could now have had the recognition of our independence to take home. Nothing but the want of such official documents was wanted when I left Washington. I believe that a report from you, signed by yourself, would have been fully sufficient. There were no accounts of the battle of San Jacinto, except those in newspapers. . . . I am of opinion that our independence will be acknowledged, and that Texas will be admitted into these United States, if they are regularly asked for. 114
So thoroughly convinced was Austin of the correctness of his opinions concerning the attitude of the United States authorities toward recognition, 115 that one of his first acts upon reaching Texas was to lay before President Burnet the absolute necessity of keeping in close touch with the commissioners who now had charge of the work. An entry in his private memorandum says:
The day I arrived at Velasco (late in the evening of 27th June) I represented to president Burnet the great importance of writing officially once a week if possible to the representatives of Texas at Washington City in the U. S. and stated it as my opinion that the omission of this govt in not furnishing to their representatives, whoever they might be, official reports of the battle of San Jacinto and of the organization of the Texas govt. and general situation of the country etc had been fatal to the interest of Texas, as I believed that our independence would have been acknowledged by the U. S. Govt. and Congress if those official documents had been sent on in time. Nothing of the kind was ever sent on—those of us, (Austin, Wharton, Archer, Childress and Hamilton) who were in Washington received nothing, not even one word from their Govt. and had nothing to operate with, in their exertions to procure a recognition of our independence, but newspaper accounts and private letters from individuals in Texas and N. Orleans etc I was assured that Grayson and Collinsworth (the present representatives of Texas at Washington City) should be regularly written to, and on the 9th July president Burnet wrote to them (by the schooner Comanche bound to Orleans) and enclosed certified copies of Gen. Santa Anna's letters to Gen. Jackson and Gen. Urrea, and of the treaties of 14th May etc. 116 I wrote to them at the same time. . . . I gave it as my opinion [concerning] the importance of official reports from the head of each department of the Govt. relative to the state of the public affairs of the respective branches and that such reports should be published and sent officially to the reps. of Texas in Washington to be used there in support of our application for independence, etc. 117
On the next page of this memorandum book is this entry: “July 20—Went to Velasco to meet B. T. Archer and W. H. Wharton (who had returned a few days before from the U. S.) for the purpose of making a return of our mission to the U. S. as commissioners We made our report and rendered an account of all the monies we had recd. and disbursed for Texas, and accompanied the [account] with all the original vouchers, which were passed to the Auditor for examination.” 118 The following is the report as it was rendered, July 21:
Being appointed by the Convention of November last Commissioners for raising funds and other purposes in the United States in prosecution of our duties we arrived in New Orleans on the 1st of January 1836. On reaching the city we found that the government of Texas was without funds or credit, and that the quarter Master of the army and other agents were wholly unable to procure the requisite supplies of arms ammunition provisions etc. Under these circumstances we promptly exerted ourselves to make a flat loan at a fixed rate of Interest. This, however was wholly impracticable. Capitalists would not lend at any interest without obtaining lands in payment. Impelled by the urgency of our situation we effected a loan with Robert Triplett and others which has been submitted to and modified by your Excellency and Cabinet.
We are free to admit that the terms of this loan were not such as we would have dictated—but we are bold in asserting that a loan could not at that time have been effected on better terms and we saw that the immediate procurement of funds was indispensable. This being accomplished we started for Washington City through the Western States, making it our business to hold [meetings] at prominent points, for the purpose of explaining the justice of our cause, of obtaining Volunteers and procuring memorials and petitions to the Congress of the United States for the recognition of the Independence of Texas. In addition to this we furnished the Members of congress with our printed addresses and essays in which we endeavored to develope and defend the origin principles and objects of the contest in which Texas and Mexico are engaged.
On reaching the Eastern Cities new obstacles presented themselves. The unhappy and violent differences between the late Governor [Smith] and his council were known and magnified. It was also believed that the convention of March would not declare for Independence and added to all this, we as commissioners had no power to sell the public lands. In a short time the fall of the Alamo, the Massacre of Col Fanins command, the retreat of our army, the supposed rising of the Northern Indians, the nonratification of the first loan and the neglect of the present Government to correspond with us and ratify our powers and appointment, presented insuperable difficulties. We were consequently only enabled to obtain a loan in New York on very disadvantageous terms, which has been submitted. Our main object in effecting this loan was to obtain the 10 per cent. We did not bind ourselves to recommend its ratification and did not expect that it would be ratified unless the prospects of Texas were gloomy even to desperation. Subjoined is an account of our receipts and disbursements. 119
The net results of their six months' labor in the United States were (1) three loans, which had yielded to the Texan government something like $75,000, and donations to a very much smaller amount; (2) recruits of volunteers for Texas; 120 and (3) widespread enthusiasm in the cause, which manifested itself in memorials and petitions to Congress praying the recognition of Texas.
It will be seen that in their report the commissioners confine themselves to the material side of their work. They do not even suggest that they had gone out in any diplomatic capacity, and the note of disappointment that is clearly discernible throughout the report is obviously due to their failure to accomplish anything in this direction. They no doubt had correctly interpreted the interest aroused in Congress by means largely of resolutions sent in from various sections throughout the country; and they give it as their conviction that, had they received the coöperation of the home government, recognition at this time would have been secured. If the possibility of the immediate recognition of Texas existed at all, it lay in this first session of the twenty-fourth Congress. It must be borne in mind, however, that not until March 2, when independence was declared,—indeed not until April 21, when it was won at San Jacinto,—was the situation in Texas such as would at all have justified this measure. However favorably, therefore, the whole of Congress in the spring of 1836 might have been disposed to look upon recognition, conservatism alone might have prevented any immediate action in the matter. By the time Congress assembled for its second session, December 5, 1836, other forces were at work upon whose existence the earlier commissioners had never reckoned.
2. The work of the second commission.
During the six months' absence of the commissioners in the United States important events had occurred in Texas. The long quarrel between Governor Smith and his Council had sapped all the energy of the provisional government, so that during the last seven weeks of its unworthy history it existed in name only. From January 18 to March 11, when it adjourned sine die, the minutes of the Council almost invariably read: “The Council met pursuant to adjournment. A quorum not being present, adjourned....” 121 When the Convention assembled at Washington, March 1, 122 all attention was concentrated there, and the General Council soon ceased to be.
The first work of the Convention was to declare independence. Its next was to draw up a constitution and organize a permanent government. Pending the adoption of the constitution and the election of officers for the new government, a government ad interim was necessary. By an ordinance passed March 16, the day before the Convention adjourned, this was created, 123 and David G. Burnet was placed at its head.
But it was not only in civil affairs that changes had taken place. When the commissioners left Texas in the previous December, there were no hostile forces north of the Rio Grande. In the spring of the year, however, Texas had been again invaded, and the series of disasters that had followed—the fall of the Alamo, the capture of Goliad, and the six weeks' retreat of Houston's army—were no more than might have been expected from the disorganized state of the army and the government. But the tide had turned, April 21, at San Jacinto, and not only had the whole Mexican force practically been annihilated, but Santa Anna himself was the prisoner of the Texans. Moreover, on May 14, two treaties had been made between him and the Texan authorities. According to the first or open treaty, Santa Anna had agreed that all hostilities should cease, and that the Mexicans should withdraw beyond the Rio Grande; by the second treaty, which was secret, he agreed to have the independence of Texas acknowledged by Mexico, t