THE QUARTERLY  OF THE  TEXAS STATE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

Vol. XIII. JANUARY, 1910. No. 3.

The publication committee and the editors disclaim responsibility for views expressed by contributors to The Quarterly.

RECOGNITION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS BY THE  UNITED STATES.¹

Ethel Zivley Ratiler.

THE MOVEMENT FOR INDEPENDENCE.

When Texas in the fall of 1835 found herself at war with Mexico, her first step, after putting the country in a state of defense, was to cast about for aid. Two alternatives were presented to her: she might either ally herself with the Mexican Liberals, who were also in rebellion against the centralized government of Santa Anna; or she might declare independence, and trust to the United States for assistance to sustain it. What she did was to experiment with each course in turn; and the revolution falls thus into two phases—first, an effort to restore the “republican principles” of the constitution which Santa Anna had overthrown; secondly, a struggle for independence. Some emphasis has been laid upon the conscientiousness of the Texan colonists during the first period in adhering to their obligations to Mexico and the reluctance with which they finally threw off allegiance to their adopted country. It is no doubt true that, rather than engage in a war whose issue was at best doubtful, the majority of the colonists would have preferred to continue the old relationship with Mexico under the constitution, if peace might thereby have been restored. But in tracing the relations between Texas and the United States at this time, one is forced to question whether the Texan leaders were as sincere during the first months of the revolution in their loyalty to the constitution of 1824 as they were later on in the acknowledged war for independence; whether more confidence either in their own strength or in help from without might not have led earlier to an unqualified declaration of independence. In the fall of 1835, however, they felt that help form some quarter must be forthcoming—that alone they were incapable of resisting the forces that had already suppressed similar uprisings in other provinces throughout Mexico.

The Consultation at San Felipe, which was called partly for the purpose of determining what course to pursue, decided, November 6, against a declaration of independence by a vote of thirty-three to fifteen. On the next day a report defining the position in which Texas stood was brought in by a committee appointed for the purpose, and unanimously adopted. It stated that:

Whereas, General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, and other military chieftains, have, by force of arms, overthrown the federal institutions of Mexico, and dissolved the social compact which existed between Texas and the other members of the Mexican confederacy; now the good people of Texas, availing themselves of their natural rights,

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SOLEMNLY DECLARE

1st.

That they have taken up arms in defence of their rights and liberties, which were threatened by the encroachments of military despots, and in defence of the republican principles of the federal constitution of Mexico, of eighteen and twenty-four.²

2d.

That Texas is no longer morally or civilly bound by the compact of union; yet, stimulated by the generosity and sympathy common to a free people, they offer their support and assistance to such of the members of the Mexican confederacy as will take up arms against military despotism.

3d.

That they do not acknowledge that the present authorities of the nominal Mexican republic have the right to govern within the limits of Texas.

4th.

That they will not cease to carry on war against the said authorities whilst their troops are within the limits of Texas.

5th.

That they hold it to be their right during the disorganization of the federal system, and the reign of despotism, to withdraw from the union, to establish an independent government, or to adopt such measures as they may deem best calculated to protect their rights and liberties, but that they will continue faithful to the Mexican government so long as that nation is governed by the constitution and laws that were formed for the government of the political association.

6th.

That Texas is responsible for the expense of her armies now in the field.

7th.

That the public faith of Texas is pledged for the payment of any debts contracted by her agents.

8th.

That she will reward, by donations in lands, all who volunteer their services in her present struggle, and receive them as citizens.³

Throughout the rest of this year and the beginning of the next, the General Council of the provisional government⁴ remained at least nominally faithful to this declaration. On the other hand Provisional Governor Smith was from the first an ardent advocate of an immediate declaration of independence; and it is to this difference of opinion that the long and undignified quarrel between the governor and the Council has been ascribed.⁵

The attitude of the Council on this subject is no doubt partly responsible for the general impression that in the fall of 1835 the majority of the Texans, known as the conservatives, were reluctant to withdraw allegiance from Mexico—that, in spite of their declaration to the contrary, they did feel still under moral obligation to remain faithful to the constitution of 1824.⁶ Stephen F. Austin, also, repeatedly offered support for such a belief. In a report made to the provisional government, November 30, 1835, after explaining at some length that the volunteers had taken up arms in defence of the constitution of 1824, he continued thus:

I have faithfully labored for years to unite Texas permanently to the Mexican confederation. ... There was but one way to effect this union with any hope of permanency or harmony, which was by admitting Texas into a state of the Mexican confederation. ...

The people of Texas desired it; and if proofs were wanting (but they are not) of their fidelity to their obligations as Mexican citizens, this effort to erect Texas into a state affords one which is conclusive to every man of judgment who knows anything about this country.

The object of the Texans, therefore, in wishing a separation from Coahuila, and the erection of their country into a state, was to avoid a total separation from Mexico by a revolution. ...⁷

Later on, also, in explaining the action taken by the Consultation of San Felipe, Austin again said:

The majority of Texas, so far as an opinion can be formed from the acts of the people at their primary meetings, was decidedly in favor of declaring in positive, clear and unequivocal terms, for the federal constitution of 1824, and for the organization of a local government, either as a state of the Mexican confederation, or provisionally, until the authorities of the state of Coahuila and Texas could be restored. This measure was absolutely necessary to save the country from anarchy, for it was left without any government at all, owing to the dispersion and imprisonment of the executive and legislative authorities, by the unconstitutional intervention of the military power. Some individuals were also in favor of independence, though no public meeting whose proceedings I have seen, expressed such an idea.⁸

Even William H. Wharton, one of the most radical advocates for independence, in speaking of the November declaration, said: “I do not blame the Consultation for their declaration. They were not empowered and it was not in the contemplation of those who elected them to make any other.”⁹ Morfit, the agent sent out in the summer of 1836 by President Jackson to examine into the condition of affairs in Texas, also reported, August 22: “The Texans assert that this resistance was not because they even then [that is, after Cos's invasion] wished to separate from the confederacy, but, on the contrary, because they were desirous to bring back the Government to the terms of the constitution of 1824.”¹⁰

Despite such authorities, an examination of the private correspondence of the time, principally Austin's own, and other documents that were not intended for the Mexican eye leads one to the conclusion that the declaration of November 7 and all acts in conformity thereto were not altogether the results of loyalty to the constitution of 1824, but were dictated largely by policy. William H. Wharton, in declining his appointment to go as commissioner to the United States,¹¹ testified to the fact that it was expediency that governed the action of the Consultation. Referring to the indefinite attitude assumed by the November declaration he said: “It was generally thought, and I then thought it a matter of policy so to declare. It was thought (by a majority over a very strong minority) that a declaration for the constitution would neutralize the prejudices or enlist the sympathies and assistance of the Federal party of the interior in our favor; and also that under such declaration we could obtain the requisite loans, etc., from the capitalists of the United States.”¹² James W. Robinson, one of the prominent members of the Consultation and who afterward became Lieutenant-Governor of the provisional government and ex-officio president of the General Council, writing from the Consultation on November 3, 1835, said: “How the convention will decide is uncertain, but the probability is in favor of the constitution as a matter of policy only, as all agree we must go, sooner or later, for independence.”¹³ Robinson, it must be remembered, was also of the radical party, and his statement may be somewhat biased. But it is a well-known fact that the first report of the committee of the Consultation,¹⁴ which John A. Wharton presented, November 4, was an absolute declaration of independence. This was even adopted; but on the recommendation of Houston, tradition says, it was reconsidered, and the declaration of November 7 took its place.¹⁵ The motives that influenced the Consultation in making this change were no doubt the same as those expressed in a report sent in to San Felipe, November 9, by the Jurisdiction of Liberty. It said:

In behalf of their fellow citizens they [that is, the committee appointed to make the report] state that a premature declaration of independence would be inexpedient and injurious, that a temporary provisional organization of Government with a carefull attention to the development of events is the best policy; that a precipitious cesesion from the Mexican Republic might incur the reprehension, and wean from us the sympathies of many friends in the North.¹⁶

Another argument in favor of the interpretation of the declaration of November 7 as a measure purely of expediency is the striking analogy between the present situation and that of 1832. At that time a struggle was going on in Mexico between Bustamante, who had set up a tyrannical form of government, and Santa Anna, then posing as the champion of the Constitution of 1824. In the meantime hostilities had broken out at Anahuac between the Texan colonists and Mexican troops stationed in Texas. The report had reached Mexico that it was a move on the part of the Texans for independence. Mejía, of the popular party, immediately made a truce with Bustamante's troops; and set out to Texas to suppress the rebellion. It would be well, the Texans thought, to have some excuse to give for the disturbances. They therefore drew up what were known as the Turtle Bayou resolutions, declaring in favor of Santa Anna and the Constitution of 1824. Mejía was well satisfied with these expressions of loyalty. “He was received with great ceremony at Brazoria and immediately presented with the blessed resolutions. Nothing further was needed to prove to him that the conduct of the Texans had been entirely innocent and praiseworthy.”¹⁷ It was not strange, therefore, that in 1835 the Texans called to mind an expedient that three years earlier, under similar circumstances, had served them so effectively.

In 1835, however, a large proportion of the Texans were actually contemplating independence. But the problem of securing immediate aid against Santa Anna confronted them. The Mexican Liberals held out flattering inducements.¹⁸ The other source, the United States, from which they were ardently hoping to receive help, was far less certain. Besides a precipitate declaration might meet with the disfavor of their neighbor on the north,¹⁹ whose good will above all it was essential to retain. Under considerations such as these many of the radicals were induced to temporize, with the mental reservation that independence should be the ultimate aim. And in this desire it is safe to assume that a great number of the so-called conservative party also shared.

There can be no doubt that Stephen F. Austin was influenced by such considerations, and his attitude throws perhaps the truest light upon the situation in the fall of 1835. He was at the time the recognized leader of the conservatives; and he has subsequently been held up as the one man who to the last was faithful to every possible obligation to Mexico. To all outward appearance this was true. In his zeal to coöperate with the Liberal party he even incurred the suspicion of some of his own fellow citizens—so much so that he was spoken of contemptuously as a “Mexican.” Though a man remarkable for his fairness in dealing with others, his opposition to a declaration of independence in the fall of 1835 led him into bitter and unjust denunciations of his opponents—a thing that he deeply regretted afterward.²⁰ But the principle at stake was not loyalty to Mexico, however reluctantly he may have renounced allegiance to his adopted country when such a step became necessary. The controlling motive of his life was the welfare of his colony; and on his return from Mexico, he undoubtedly felt that the radical party, in precipitating the revolution, was endangering the very end they had in view, namely, independence. That he, too, however, had become convinced that independence must be the ultimate result, there is abundant evidence to show; and this perhaps explains the apparent inconsistency of his attitude in the fall of 1835. In a personal letter to a cousin, written August 21, 1835, from New Orleans on his return from a two years' imprisonment in Mexico, he gives the clearest exposition of his views. Having been kept in close confinement in Mexico, he was as yet unaware of the recent developments in Texas. He had, however, as he says in this letter, already come to the conclusion that the best interests of Texas demanded that she become a part of the United States. He had foreseen that the Anglo-American colonization of Texas, if unchecked, would result inevitably in her separation from Mexico, which he considered but the preliminary step to annexation to the United States. As a means of hastening the process he planned to induce a great immigration during the winter of 1835-6—`with passports, so long as the door was legally open; should it be closed, it would then be time enough to force it open, if necessary.' The immigrants should of course be slaveholders, in order to harmonize with their neighbors in the slaveholding states. When this had been accomplished, he expected “the violent political convulsions of Mexico to shake off Texas as a gentle breeze shakes off a ripe peach.” The importance of Texas to the southwest he believed would appeal to all reflecting men, but especially to Jackson and the Senate. In the meanwhile, however, everything should be governed by “prudence and an observance of appearances.” “The Mexicans,” he says, “are a strange people. Appearances mean everything to them even though they know they are being deceived. They have high ideals of national dignity, but will sacrifice national dignity and national interest, too, if it can be done so as not to arrest public attention. The more the Anglo-American population of Texas is increased the more readily will the Mexican government give it up; and the more Texas seems to oppose a separation from Mexico the less tenacious will Mexico hold to it.”²¹

Again, after the decision to join the Mexican Liberals had been made, Austin wrote: “Every possible aid should be given the Federal party in the interior; but it should be done as auxiliary aid, in conformity with the 2nd article of the declaration. By doing this the war will be kept out of Texas. The country will remain at peace. It will fill up rapidly with families, and there will be no great need of a standing army.”²²

The importance of these statements lies in Austin's powerful influence. All things considered he was, without doubt, the first man in Texas. The newspapers quoted him; the private correspondence of the time also attests his popularity. Expressions such as the following were frequent: “All eyes are turned towards you . . . Texas can be wielded by you, and you alone; and her destiny is now completely in your hands. I have every confidence that you will guide us safely through all our perils.”²³

Soon after his arrival in Texas, however, Austin saw that his plan for separation from Mexico²⁴ would never have time to materialize. The war, indeed, was upon them. It had come, he said, much sooner than he had expected when he left Mexico or New Orleans.²⁵ Still he was opposed to declaring independence. The centralized government had succeeded in crushing similar rebellions throughout Mexico. Texas would do well to look to her resources before defying the strength of the “Napoleon of the West,” as Santa Anna styled himself. A declaration of independence would turn against her even the Federal party with whom there was yet an opportunity to unite. If this union were effected the war might be kept out of Texas and prevented from assuming a “national” character.²⁶ In the meantime every nerve should be strained to put the country in a state of preparation.

As a part of their effort in this direction there would be nothing amiss in applying to the United States, also, for sympathy and material aid. Even before hostilities began, Austin had said, “If there was any way of getting at it I should like to know what the wise men of the United States think the people of Texas ought to do.”²⁷ Later on, only a week after the Consultation that had declared for the constitution had adjourned, Austin wrote, “The fate of Texas depends mainly on this—we ought to get united to the U. S. as soon as possible, it is the best we can do.”²⁸

Nothing can be more natural than this promptness with which the minds of the Anglo-American colonists reverted to their mother-country when friction began with the Mexican authorities. Often throughout the whole colonization period there was clearly discernible among the Texan pioneers a longing for the laws and institutions they had left, and a consequent impatience at the clumsy machinery of Mexican government. There was no congeniality between the two peoples. A newspaper article signed “Jefferson” and printed in the Telegraph and Texas Register, expresses sentiments toward the Mexicans which must have been typical. In comparing the Texan revolution with the American revolution of 1776 the writer said:

We separate from a people one-half of whom are the most depraved of the different races of Indians, different in color, pursuits and character; and all of whom are divided from us by the insurmountable barrier which nature and refined taste have thrown between us—a people whose inert and idle habits, general ignorance and superstition, prevents the possibility of our ever mingling in the same harmonious family; and if possible, could only be done by self-degradation. . . . we separate from a people who not only neglected us, but drained our little resources, and threw every obstacle in the way of our advancement and prosperity. . . . [a nation] not sufficiently stable to assume a character, and consistent, in her different convulsions, only in treachery, tyranny and imbecility.²⁹

This article appeared in February, 1836, and was written probably by Wharton,³⁰ who was then on his way as commissioner to Washington. Its object had been to show the futility of further attempts to coöperate with the Mexican Liberals. But, though Wharton was unaware of the fact, it was unnecessary. During the first two months of 1836 even the most ardent adherents to the principles laid down in the November declaration had been won over, and when the convention met at Washington, Texas, March 1,³¹ a declaration of independence was a foregone conclusion. On the next day, indeed, the declaration was made, and seven weeks later, on the battlefield of San Jacinto, the independence of Texas became a reality.

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EFFORTS TO SECURE RECOGNITION.

1. The work of the first commission.

The Texans realized that one of the first essentials in carrying on a successful revolution was money. In his inaugural address the chairman of the Consultation, Dr. Branch T. Archer, had stated: “It will be necessary to procure funds . . . in order to carry on the war in which we are now engaged; it will, therefore, be our duty to elect agents to procure those funds.”³² November 12, five days after the expedient of declaring for the constitution of 1824 had been adopted, the Consultation decreed that a commission, consisting of Stephen F. Austin, Branch T. Archer, and William H. Wharton be dispatched to the United States furnished with such instructions as the governor and the council might deem necessary.³³

These instructions were not issued until nearly a month later, and Austin seems to have feared their power would be limited to soliciting financial aid only. He is said to have expressed an unwillingness to go at all, unless vested with authority to treat with the government for annexation.³⁴ Wharton at first definitely declined his appointment, but for a different reason. He was one of the recognized leaders of the radicals, as Austin was of the conservatives, and he was loud in his demand for an immediate declaration of independence. The attitude assumed by the Consultation was much too indefinite, he claimed, to induce capitalists to lend pecuniary aid. Moreover, the declaration was of such a nature as would lead to the belief that the revolution was simply an internal domestic quarrel, and on that basis the United States would refuse to interfere. He advised that a convention meet, January 15, of the coming year to declare independence and sell Texas to the United States if practicable.³⁵

The delay in providing instructions seems to have been due largely to doubts as to just what duties, aside from raising money, should be laid upon the commissioners, and the authority by which they should be sent out. A select committee appointed for the purpose of deciding this question reported November 21:

that upon considering the matter, they are unable to find any acts of the Convention, or of this Council, whereon to base instructions for the conduct of said agents, or any “data” which can guide your committee in an opinion of their duties, but from all the information they can obtain, your committee have concluded, that the agents should receive their instructions from the Executive; but in order to enable the Governor to give the necessary instructions, an ordinance should first be originated by the Committee of State, and passed and approved, defining in general the powers and duties of the agents, and make it the duty of the Executive to give such instructions as will be conformable to the resolutions of the Convention and the ordinances of the General Council, made with reference to the subject in view when this office was created. But your committee can not advise that the Committee of State be instructed upon this subject with propriety, until the reports of the several committees on the Military, Navy, and Finance have been received and passed.³⁶

Two weeks more were consumed in trying to frame an ordinance creating a loan of one million dollars, for which the commissioners were to negotiate.³⁷ Finally, December 4, Provisional Governor Smith, in his message to the General Council, took up the matter thus:

It must be acknowledged by all, that our only succour is expected from the East, where as yet we have not dispatched our agents, sufficient time has clapsed since the rising of the Convention, for them, by this time, to have arrived in the United States. They have called on me, in vain, day after day, time after time, for their dispatches, at least some of them, and they are not yet ready. I say to you, the fate of Texas depends upon their immediate dispatch and success. Why then delay a matter of such vital importance, and give place to minor matters which could be much better delayed? Permit me to beg of you a suspension of all other business, until our Foreign Agents are dispatched.³⁸

Accordingly, on the next day an ordinance was passed authorizing the governor to issue to the commissioners³⁹ instructions as follows: they were to negotiate a loan of one million dollars and receive donations for Texas; to purchase supplies for the government, such as munitions of war, provisions, war vessels, etc.; to appoint agents for the government in the principal cities, subject only to themselves; to grant letters of marque and reprisal; and finally to open communications with the United States government relative to the political situation of Texas, under such instructions as the governor might deem prudent, in the present revolutionary condition of Texas and Mexico.⁴⁰ On the 7th the governor's formal commission authorizing the negotiation of the loan was issued,⁴¹ and on the 8th the commissioners' private instructions were drawn up.⁴²

It was this latter document which conferred upon the commissioners their diplomatic authority. After giving directions concerning the armed vessels that were to be fitted out and sent from New Orleans, the supplies to be purchased there, the loan and the donations that might be tendered, the instructions continued:

Finally, you will proceed to the City of Washington, with all convenient speed endeavoring at all points to enlist the sympathies of the free and enlightened people of the United States in our favour by explaining to them our true political situation and the causes which impelled us to take up arms; and the critical situation in which we now stand. You will approach the authorities of our Mother Country, either by yourselves, or confidential friends; and ascertain the feelings of the Government toward Texas, in her present attitude. Whether any interposition on the part of that Government in our favour can be expected, or whether in their opinion, any ulterior move on our part would to them, be more commendable and be calculated to render us more worthy of their favour, or whether by any fair and honorable means, Texas can become a member of that Republic. If not, if we declare independence, whether that Government would immediately recognize and respect [us] as an independent People. Receive us [as] allies, and form with us a treaty of Amity both offensive and defensive. If all should fail on the part of the Government, or a refusal to intermeddle in our difficulty, You will immediately notify this Government whether good or bad, of your success,⁴³ and govern yourselves accordingly. On the failure of success with the Government, you will redouble your energies in arousing the sympathies of the Patriotic citizens of the north to rally to our assistance.⁴⁴

It must not be supposed that enthusiasm for the Texan cause lay dormant in the United States until the coming of Austin, Archer, and Wharton. The Mexican invasion of Texas created the most intense excitement throughout the country. Spirited meetings were held in New Orleans, Mobile, Montgomery, New York, Boston, and doubtless in many other cities.⁴⁵ Volunteers from the United States had already enlisted in the Texas service,⁴⁶ and a contribution of $7,000 had come from New Orleans.⁴⁷ September 1, 1835, Henry Meigs of New York wrote to Austin:

A sympathy almost universal, exists for your welfare and that of your colony.

The Govemt of the U. S. cannot disobey the public opinion, which will insist upon your safety and well being so long as you exhibit that temperate and just view and conduct which you have always done.

In a later letter, September 29, 1835, he said:

The U states are looking to your course with deep interest. It is not possible to separate you from them long. Every political, religious and commercial tie exists between them and you.

And again, November 15.

Public sentiment is aroused for your cause. We know that you are Bone of our Bone! and Flesh of our Flesh! that none but a Republican Government can exist over you! . . .

Govermt can hardly do for you what private opinion and zeal is already active in doing. . . .

The Secretary of State (a few days ago) told me that there was but one result for your affairs—and that was, a natural and inevitable connection with the policy and Interests of your country the United States.⁴⁸

John P. Austin, also, writing from New York, November 8, 1835,⁴⁹ to his cousin, Stephen F. Austin, after dwelling upon the “general and increased interest throughout the U. States” in favor of Texas, and the disposition shown to render “prompt and efficient aid,” went on to relate a conversation held with an individual “direct from Washington—an old and intimate friend of President Jackson—who said the president had no disposition to interfere with any present aid given by the citizens of the United States, provided they did not openly violate the laws of nations.” Moreover, he stated that orders had been sent to Pensacola for men-of war to cruise in the Gulf of Mexico and that a sloop-of-war was being fitted out with all possible dispatch at Philadelphia to sail in a week or ten days to cruise between Tampico and the mouth of the Mississippi, “which,” he added, “will be very much in your favor and a great protection to vessels bound into any of your ports.” After such repeated assurances, it was quite natural, in spite of the neutrality proclaimed by the United States,⁵⁰ for the Texans to look confidently for material aid from their kinsmen on the north. Stephen F. Austin, in December, 1835, wrote that there would probably be thousands of volunteers from the United States in Texas within a few months.⁵¹

The commissioners reached New Orleans New Year's Day, 1836.⁵² Their work began most auspiciously. Indeed no one was more surprised than the commissioners themselves at the enthusiasm they found to exist. Austin wrote that it was a thousand fold greater than he had dreamed it would be. He was now convinced that Texas could obtain from the United States all the help she needed, and it was upon this assurance that he united for the first time with Archer and Wharton in the demand for an immediate and unanimous declaration of independence.⁵³ To make his conversion the more complete, news from Mexico stated that the Federal party had joined Santa Anna to invade Texas. If this were true, to adhere to the declaration of November 7 could do no possible good. On the other hand, the indefinite position in which it placed Texas had already done injury and would ruin the cause, except for the confident expectation that the new convention would soon meet and declare absolute independence.⁵⁴

Austin confessed now that his own impulses had long been to see Texas free from the “trammels of religious intolerance, and other anti-republican restrictions.” But he had hesitated, he said, on account of the responsibility he felt in colonizing Texas, to precipitate others into the situation which this involved, until convinced that they would be sustained. The information he had acquired on this subject since leaving Texas had fully satisfied him.⁵⁵ Elaborating these views in a letter to his cousin, Henry Austin, he said:

We can get all the aid we need to sustain our independence and I think it will not be difficult to procure the recognition of the U. S. Gov't. Nothing is wanted but union and concert of action and of purpose at home and an unqualified declaration of independence at once. That of 7th Nov'r has been made an absolute declaration of independence, by the acts of the Mexicans by submitting to centralism and of the Gov't. in invading us, and no act of that government for the sale or transfer of Texas to any one, can be or ought to be, in any manner valid, or obligatory on the people of Texas. . . .

I had no idea before I left home of the deep and general interest that is felt for the cause of Texas, or of the influence which my opinions seem to have in this country—had I known it sooner, I should have been less cautious than I have been about precipitating the people of Texas into a declaration of independence. The responsibility, however, would have been very great on me had I contributed to involve the settlers whom I had been instrumental in drawing to that country, before I was certain they would be sustained. I am now confident they will be fully and promptly sustained in their independence, and that the sooner such a declaration is made the better. Besides, the reasons for leaving open any door, however small, for a re-union with Mexico have ceased, for all parties have united against us.⁵⁶

Indeed Austin became so imbued with the American spirit of expansion that he suggested that the declaration of independence prescribe no limits on the southwest or northwest, leaving the field open for expansion beyond the Rio Grande, “and to Chihuahua and New Mexico.”⁵⁷ Wharton was not so ambitious. From Nashville he wrote Governor Smith that it was his belief that to fight for anything beyond the Rio Grande would “damn us beneath all depth in hell.”⁵⁸

In addition to the friendly interest manifested, another cause for congratulation, the commissioners felt, was that, in spite of the fact that Texas, according to her own declaration, was nothing more than a seceded state of the Mexican confederation, with no credit and no wealth except her lands, there were still found individuals who were willing to advance money with which to finance the revolution. A short time after their arrival in New Orleans two loans were negotiated, the first for $200,000, the second for $50,000. To be sure, the terms upon which these loans were secured were not all that could have been desired. The lenders, or holders of the scrip, had the right to take in return lands in Texas at fifty cents an acre. The most objectionable feature was that the lenders were allowed to choose their lands, priority of selection being reserved to subscribers of the first loan; and no further sales of lands by the Texan government were to take place until this choice was made. Moreover, in the case of the first loan, after the first payment, which was to be 10 per cent of the whole, had been made, the lenders had the right to withhold further payment, if they so desired.⁵⁹ The second loan was supposed to be a cash payment.⁶⁰ In other words, these so-called loans were nothing more than gigantic land speculations, whereby five hundred thousand acres of the choicest lands in Texas were to be secured at fifty cents an acre.⁶¹ But they meant about sixty thousand dollars in cash for Texas, and were therefore duly gratifying. Moreover, the interest was only eight per cent, though the commissioners were authorized to offer as much as ten.⁶²

In communicating the transactions to the government the commissioners reported enthusiastically: “Some of the best informed persons of this place confidently assert that this loan insures the triumph of our cause and the independence of Texas. That in New Orleans, so near us, and so well acquainted with our situation, confidence enough should exist in us to induce a loan, speaks volumes in our favor and will give confidence everywhere else.” The “hundreds of capitalists,” they continued, “who would soon be in possession of stock in this loan would feel as much interest in Texas as those who had long lived there. As evidence of this fact the subscribers had already offered to send to Texas five hundred men, officered, armed, and equipped, to serve throughout the war under easy terms as regarded reimbursement when the war was over.” In conclusion they said: “Disposing of our land at fifty cents pr. acre for the purpose of getting money so particularly indispensable at this moment, appears to us very fortunate. In fact rather than have missed the loan, we had better borrowed the money for five years and given them lands in the bargain.”⁶³

Another piece of enterprise on the part of the commissioners during their stay in New Orleans deserves notice. This was the designing of a flag for Texas, which was intended as an appeal both to England and America for recognition. Austin first planned a flag, a draft of which was sent to Gail Borden, January 18, 1836.⁶⁴ This design was submitted to the commissioners and modified In this form Professor Garrison describes it as follows: “It had—or was meant to have—the thirteen stripes of the United States flag, with the red changed to blue, and in the upper left-hand corner, instead of stars, was the British union with red stripes on a white field. On the flag was a sun encircled by the motto Lux Libertatis, and on the face of the sun was the head of Washington, underneath which were the words, `In his example there is safety.' ”⁶⁵ The flag was not accepted by the Texas authorities, but this “mute appeal . . . [of the Texans] to their near and still nearer of kin which lay in joining the British Jack to the stripes of the American Union was at once proud and pathetic.”⁶⁶

The rest of the work of the commissioners in New Orleans consisted in supervising the purchase of supplies;⁶⁷ providing for the equipment of the schooner Ingham, late revenue cutter, for the service of Texas; appointing William Bryan general agent of the government at New Orleans, and Edward Hall purchasing agent; authorizing T. D. Owings to raise troops for Texas in Kentucky; and instructing A. J. Yates to go to New York to purchase a steam vessel to defend the Texas coast.⁶⁸ Wharton left on the 17th for Nashville. Austin and Archer remained in New Orleans throughout January.

During the next two months the commissioners slowly made their way toward Washington. They were greatly delayed on account of the frozen condition of the roads and rivers and the illness of Austin and Wharton at Nashville.⁶⁹ It had been their intention before leaving Texas⁷⁰ and while in New Orleans⁷¹ to return home in March, perhaps in time for the March convention. By March 3, Austin and Archer had gone no further than Louisville, Kentucky, and Wharton was still ill in Nashville. Before they could reach Washington the convention undoubtedly would have declared independence and organized a permanent government. The provisional government which they represented would then no longer exist, and in that case their present credentials would be worthless at Washington. A failure on their part to receive recognition as commissioners, they realized, would be disastrous. In order now to enter into negotiations concerning recognition, it was absolutely necessary to have an official copy of the declaration of independence and new instructions from the convention. They were therefore in no haste to proceed until these documents should have been forwarded to Washington.⁷² By the latter part of the month it was reported that the commissioners had arrived at their destination.⁷³

But in the meantime they had not been idle. In all the larger cities⁷⁴ they addressed enthusiastic gatherings, with the direct result that hundreds of volunteers, armed and equipped by contribution, flocked to Texas.⁷⁵ Even the ladies of Nashville offered the means with which to equip one company.⁷⁶ Resolutions, praying the recognition of Texas, were drawn up at these meetings and sent to Congress. Money, too, was offered on such advantageous terms⁷⁷ that the commissioners were encouraged to recommend to their government the issue of scrip bearing only five per cent interest and redeemable in tracts of 640, 320, and 160 acres at $1.00 per acre, to be located after all land claims had been definitely and finally settled.⁷⁸ Indeed from the time they reached New Orleans until they arrived in Washington the commissioners wrote always in the same cheerful tone. From Nashville, February 16, they reported to Governor Smith: “It is with the most lively sentiments of gratitude toward the patriotic and generous citizens of this free and happy land, and with renewed confidence in the triumph of our cause, that we inform you, of the universal and enthusiastic interest which pervades all ranks and classes of society in every part of this country in favor of the emancipation of Texas.”⁷⁹ Upon two things only, they urged, did the success of the cause depend. There must be union and harmony at home, and the March Convention must make a decided and unanimous declaration of independence. If these ends were achieved, the recognition of Texas, they believed, would follow.⁸⁰

From the standpoint of recognition the important results of the work of the commissioners on their way to Washington in the spring of 1836 were: (1) their own personal letters to President Jackson and to friends in Congress; (2) pamphlets containing information concerning Texas, and printed addresses which they themselves had delivered, copies of which were forwarded to Washington; and (3) the resolutions and memorials which, through the instrumentality of the commissioners, as has been noted,⁸¹ were drawn up at public gatherings and sent to Congress.⁸² As will be indicated later on,⁸³ these last documents and similar ones that came from other sections of the United States did far more toward bringing the question of recognition before the authorities in Washington than did any of the commissioners until Wharton was sent back in the fall of 1836.⁸⁴

There are only two of these printed addresses which remain on record to illustrate the kind of appeals the commissioners made to the people. One is that of Wharton's delivered later on in New York, April 26.⁸⁵ The other was given at this time by Austin, March 7, to an unusually large audience at the Second Presbyterian Church of Louisville, Kentucky. Wharton's address is more eloquent, perhaps, but Austin's is more worthy of note, because it deals with definite facts, is more logically written, and is better calculated to appeal to more varied interests.⁸⁶

After outlining briefly the history of the colonization movement and the origin of the revolution, with a view to showing the justice of the Texan cause, Austin went on to speak of the present situation of Texas. The declaration of November 7, 1835, he said, was “an absolute Declaration of Independence—a total separation from Mexico.”⁸⁷ But it was Mexico and not Texas who had forced this situation; it was she who had trampled under foot the Constitution of 1824 and broken faith. The object which Texas now had was freedom, which she might obtain either as an independent republic or as a part of the United States. To the United States, in either case, Texas looked for help. This the citizens of the United States ought to render for the following reasons: Patriotism called for it—the Texan cause was the same holy cause of light and liberty for which their forefathers, the founders of the great American republic, had fought and bled. Philanthropy urged it—the emancipation of Texas would not only give to her the principles of self-government, but would open the way for a `stream of light and intelligence to flow from the great northern fountain over the benighted regions of Mexico.' Precedent justified it—even the Greeks and Poles had received encouragement from the United States in their struggle for liberty. Finally cold calculating policy approved the wisdom of it—the people of the south and west must look to their interests. “By filling it [Texas] with a population from this country, who will harmonize in language, in political education, in common origin, in everything, with their neighbors to the east and north. . . . Texas will become a great outwork on the west, to protect the outlet of this western world, the mouths of the Mississippi, as Alabama and Florida are on the east; and to keep far away from the southwestern frontier—the weakest and most vulnerable in the nation—all enemies who might make Texas a door for invasion, or use it as a theatre from which mistaken philanthropists and wild fanatics, might attempt a system of intervention in the domestic concerns of the south, which might lead to a servile war, or at least jeopardize the tranquility of Louisiana and the neighboring states.

“This view of the subject,” he concluded, “is a very important one, so much so that a bare allusion to it is sufficient to direct the mind to the various interests and results, immediate and remote, that are involved.” In so “directing the mind” Austin little realized that he was helping to kindle passions which were destined to prevent for more than a decade one of the aims he had in view—annexation; and which were to have their influence, at least indirectly, in postponing until the next year the other object of his mission to Washington, namely, recognition.

From the time of their arrival in Washington, late in March, things began to look gloomy for the commissioners. Contrary to their expectations no dispatches were awaiting them from Texas. That independence had been declared they had learned through the newspapers,⁸⁸ but it was quite useless for them to present themselves to the authorities, devoid as they were of official information and the necessary credentials. This was all the more harassing as they were led to believe that the congress then in session was inclined to look favorably upon the objects they had in view.⁸⁹ April 6, they reported:

We have received the Declaration through the papers, but we have not received it officially, and it is therefore useless to us. The Government will not act upon it, until it is presented to them by some one with ministerial powers from the same Convention that made the declaration. When presented in this form, with evidence of our Capacity to maintain our Independence, we believe this Government is prepared to recognize us, and if we wish, to admit us into this Union, on liberal principles, if the people of Texas wish it. But they require a Minister with full powers to treat on the subject. If we had had these powers, Texas would have been, by this time, recognized, if not admitted into the Union.⁹⁰

Three days later Wharton wrote:

Since the meeting of the new convention we have had no correspondence with the Texas Government. We have seen the declaration in the papers but this government will take no notice of it until it is presented by an agent with credentials from the present government. Let me urge the vesting of some one with plenipotentiary powers without One Moments delau. He must be here before this congress adjourns. They I think are favourable. The next may have a preponderance of Northern and Eastern jealousy and Abolition. Let our Minister be instructed and empowered to negotiate a treaty for the admission of Texas into this union if such which God Grant is the wish of Texas. . . . Do attend if you have not done it already to sending on a Minister immediately with ple[n]ary powers to treat for the admission of Texas into this Union. Probably 2 or 3 agents would be better.⁹¹

A. J. Yates, writing from Baltimore after Austin had joined him, also attested the friendly spirit at Washington. He said:

Everything at Washington appears very prosperous and the Congress and Government are all ready to recognize us and if desired by us to receive us on favorable terms into the Union. The Commissioners can not present themselves officially however untill they receive despatches subsequent to the adoption of the Declaration of Independence. They have received the most marked attention in Washington and both parties are warmly in our favor. I have had several conversations with the President and several of the Cabinet and members and find all unanimously ready to do all they can for us.

If the Government had done their duty on the declaration of Independence and forwarded the necessary powers and instructions to the Commissioners Congress would have decided the matter before this time.⁹²

Wharton complains to Burnet, April 23, that though he had “written to the government a dozen times . . . [he had] not received one line since the 20th of February last,”⁹³ and on the next day Austin writes Bryan, the New Orleans agent, “you and you alone have written to us, from the Government of Texas, we have not received one word, not even one.”⁹⁴

To make matters worse unofficial reports from Texas were far from encouraging. News had come that the Mexicans were again invading the country,⁹⁵ and rumors were afloat of the unseemly quarrel between the governor and his Council.⁹⁶ Realizing that nothing could be done in Washington under their present instructions, and knowing that the situation in Texas demanded the immediate aid of money and men, the commissioners decided to separate and devote their attention for the present to securing these material necessities.⁹⁷ On April 5 Austin set out to visit Baltimore. Philadelphia, and New York, while Archer on the next day left for Virginia. Wharton alone remained in Washington to keep in touch with the government.⁹⁸

From New York Austin made one other attempt to secure the active support of the United States as a nation. In sheer desperation at the repeated disasters which had befallen his country, he threw aside all ceremony, and on April 15 addressed an almost frantic appeal to “Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren, Richard M. Johnson, John Forsyth, Lewis Cass, T. H. Benton and to any member of the cabinet, or Congress of all parties and all factions of the United States.” He asked first that some of the $37,000,000 surplus in the United States treasury be devoted to the Texan cause; and second that Jackson and Congress come out openly and make the war what it alraedy was sub rosa—namely, a national war.⁹⁹ Of course nothing came of it. Richard M. Johnson, to whom it seems to have been sent, although apparently an ardent sympathizer with Texas, in his reply expressed his opinion that it would be “useless, at this time, to get our Government to go into the contest as a nation.”¹⁰⁰ Jackson, who also inspected the document, indorsed on the back of it the following: “The writer does not reflect that we have a treaty with Mexico, and our national faith is pledged to support it. The Texians before they took the step to declare themselves Independent, which has aroused and united all Mexico against them ought to have pondered well—it was a rash and premature act, our neutrality must be faithfully maintained.”¹⁰¹

Austin spent nearly two months on his journey through Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York.¹⁰² By the middle of May he was back in Washington,¹⁰³ which city he left May 24 for Texas.¹⁰⁴ If Archer went to Richmond as he planned,¹⁰⁵ he returned immediately, for, on April 26, all three of the commissioners attended a very enthusiastic meeting at Masonic Hall in New York City. Samuel Swartwout, who was an ardent friend of Texas, presided. Wharton was the orator of the day, and “in a strain of sublime and touching pathos” he appealed for sympathy and aid. Austin and Archer also spoke, and the result was a series of resolutions expressing deep interest in the cause and declaring it to be to the “honour of a free and powerful nation like the United States, to be the first to take her [Texas] by the hand, and acknowledge her independence.” Committees were also appointed to receive donations and to confer with the commissioners as to the best way of lending efficient aid.¹⁰⁶

It was about this time, and no doubt due to the joint efforts of the commissioners in New York, that negotiations were made for a loan of $100,000 on terms similar to the New Orleans loan, except that the present subscribers had the privilege of taking Texas lands at twenty-five instead of fifty cents an acre. The commissioners were not particularly enthusiastic over this arrangement, but as has been pointed out,¹⁰⁷ its terms were perhaps as good as those made in New Orleans, since, in the latter case, the expense of issuing stock certificates and of surveying the land was to be borne by the Texan government; in the former, by the lenders themselves. Only ten per cent of this New York loan was ever paid.¹⁰⁸ The commissioners admitted that this was all they counted upon getting, since they did not expect the loan to be ratified “unless the prospects of Texas were gloomy even to desperation.”¹⁰⁹

Wharton and Archer remained in the United States for some time after Austin's departure, but practically nothing is known of their work during this period. Finally they embarked together on the Independence,¹¹⁰ and reached Texas about the middle of July.¹¹¹

In the meantime Austin, on his way home, had stopped for a few days in New Orleans. The tone of his correspondence now, contrasted with the enthusiasm with which he had written from here at the beginning of the year, tells the story of his disappointment at the outcome of the mission. The fault he charges to the Texan government alone. Conditions in Washington he had considered most favorable, and the commissioners had not been wanting in zeal. But they were rendered helpless by the negligence of the authorities at home. In a letter to President Burnet from New Orleans, June 10, Austin said:

I fully believe that nothing is wanting at Washington, to procure an acknowledgment of our independence but official information, of the true state of things at home. That is, evidence that a govt de facto is regularly organized and in operation and able to sustain the independence of Texas—that the Mexicans have been defeated, and driven out of Texas, (if the latter be the fact) or if not driven out, how far they have retreated. What is the force of the Texas army, what that of the enemy, their relative position, and the situation of the country generally. All this should be sent immediately in an official form to the representatives of Texas in Washington (Childress and Hamilton,¹¹² including Wharton should be still be there, or either of them who may be there) with instructions to lay it before the Govt of the U. S., without delay and apply for a recognition of our independence.

If such documents as the above had been received by the representatives of Texas before I left Washington, I believe that I could have brought on our recognition. The feeling there is decided and ardent in our favor and no time should be lost in making a proper use [of it].¹¹³

Six days later he wrote to Houston:

I shall do all I can to procure the annexation of Texas to the United States, on just and fair principles. . . . The first step is, a recognition of our independence; that done, the way is clear and open. If official reports in manuscript of all the principal facts in regard to the political and military state of things in Texas had been sent by the executive government of Texas to our agents at Washington, I could now have had the recognition of our independence to take home. Nothing but the want of such official documents was wanted when I left Washington. I believe that a report from you, signed by yourself, would have been fully sufficient. There were no accounts of the battle of San Jacinto, except those in newspapers. . . . I am of opinion that our independence will be acknowledged, and that Texas will be admitted into these United States, if they are regularly asked for.¹¹⁴

So thoroughly convinced was Austin of the correctness of his opinions concerning the attitude of the United States authorities toward recognition,¹¹⁵ that one of his first acts upon reaching Texas was to lay before President Burnet the absolute necessity of keeping in close touch with the commissioners who now had charge of the work. An entry in his private memorandum says:

The day I arrived at Velasco (late in the evening of 27th June) I represented to president Burnet the great importance of writing officially once a week if possible to the representatives of Texas at Washington City in the U. S. and stated it as my opinion that the omission of this govt in not furnishing to their representatives, whoever they might be, official reports of the battle of San Jacinto and of the organization of the Texas govt. and general situation of the country etc had been fatal to the interest of Texas, as I believed that our independence would have been acknowledged by the U. S. Govt. and Congress if those official documents had been sent on in time. Nothing of the kind was ever sent on—those of us, (Austin, Wharton, Archer, Childress and Hamilton) who were in Washington received nothing, not even one word from their Govt. and had nothing to operate with, in their exertions to procure a recognition of our independence, but newspaper accounts and private letters from individuals in Texas and N. Orleans etc I was assured that Grayson and Collinsworth (the present representatives of Texas at Washington City) should be regularly written to, and on the 9th July president Burnet wrote to them (by the schooner Comanche bound to Orleans) and enclosed certified copies of Gen. Santa Anna's letters to Gen. Jackson and Gen. Urrea, and of the treaties of 14th May etc.¹¹⁶ I wrote to them at the same time. . . . I gave it as my opinion [concerning] the importance of official reports from the head of each department of the Govt. relative to the state of the public affairs of the respective branches and that such reports should be published and sent officially to the reps. of Texas in Washington to be used there in support of our application for independence, etc.¹¹⁷

On the next page of this memorandum book is this entry: “July 20—Went to Velasco to meet B. T. Archer and W. H. Wharton (who had returned a few days before from the U. S.) for the purpose of making a return of our mission to the U. S. as commissioners We made our report and rendered an account of all the monies we had recd. and disbursed for Texas, and accompanied the [account] with all the original vouchers, which were passed to the Auditor for examination.”¹¹⁸ The following is the report as it was rendered, July 21:

Being appointed by the Convention of November last Commissioners for raising funds and other purposes in the United States in prosecution of our duties we arrived in New Orleans on the 1st of January 1836. On reaching the city we found that the government of Texas was without funds or credit, and that the quarter Master of the army and other agents were wholly unable to procure the requisite supplies of arms ammunition provisions etc. Under these circumstances we promptly exerted ourselves to make a flat loan at a fixed rate of Interest. This, however was wholly impracticable. Capitalists would not lend at any interest without obtaining lands in payment. Impelled by the urgency of our situation we effected a loan with Robert Triplett and others which has been submitted to and modified by your Excellency and Cabinet.

We are free to admit that the terms of this loan were not such as we would have dictated—but we are bold in asserting that a loan could not at that time have been effected on better terms and we saw that the immediate procurement of funds was indispensable. This being accomplished we started for Washington City through the Western States, making it our business to hold [meetings] at prominent points, for the purpose of explaining the justice of our cause, of obtaining Volunteers and procuring memorials and petitions to the Congress of the United States for the recognition of the Independence of Texas. In addition to this we furnished the Members of congress with our printed addresses and essays in which we endeavored to develope and defend the origin principles and objects of the contest in which Texas and Mexico are engaged.

On reaching the Eastern Cities new obstacles presented themselves. The unhappy and violent differences between the late Governor [Smith] and his council were known and magnified. It was also believed that the convention of March would not declare for Independence and added to all this, we as commissioners had no power to sell the public lands. In a short time the fall of the Alamo, the Massacre of Col Fanins command, the retreat of our army, the supposed rising of the Northern Indians, the nonratification of the first loan and the neglect of the present Government to correspond with us and ratify our powers and appointment, presented insuperable difficulties. We were consequently only enabled to obtain a loan in New York on very disadvantageous terms, which has been submitted. Our main object in effecting this loan was to obtain the 10 per cent. We did not bind ourselves to recommend its ratification and did not expect that it would be ratified unless the prospects of Texas were gloomy even to desperation. Subjoined is an account of our receipts and disbursements.¹¹⁹

The net results of their six months' labor in the United States were (1) three loans, which had yielded to the Texan government something like $75,000, and donations to a very much smaller amount; (2) recruits of volunteers for Texas;¹²⁰ and (3) widespread enthusiasm in the cause, which manifested itself in memorials and petitions to Congress praying the recognition of Texas.

It will be seen that in their report the commissioners confine themselves to the material side of their work. They do not even suggest that they had gone out in any diplomatic capacity, and the note of disappointment that is clearly discernible throughout the report is obviously due to their failure to accomplish anything in this direction. They no doubt had correctly interpreted the interest aroused in Congress by means largely of resolutions sent in from various sections throughout the country; and they give it as their conviction that, had they received the coöperation of the home government, recognition at this time would have been secured. If the possibility of the immediate recognition of Texas existed at all, it lay in this first session of the twenty-fourth Congress. It must be borne in mind, however, that not until March 2, when independence was declared,—indeed not until April 21, when it was won at San Jacinto,—was the situation in Texas such as would at all have justified this measure. However favorably, therefore, the whole of Congress in the spring of 1836 might have been disposed to look upon recognition, conservatism alone might have prevented any immediate action in the matter. By the time Congress assembled for its second session, December 5, 1836, other forces were at work upon whose existence the earlier commissioners had never reckoned.

2. The work of the second commission.

During the six months' absence of the commissioners in the United States important events had occurred in Texas. The long quarrel between Governor Smith and his Council had sapped all the energy of the provisional government, so that during the last seven weeks of its unworthy history it existed in name only. From January 18 to March 11, when it adjourned sine die, the minutes of the Council almost invariably read: “The Council met pursuant to adjournment. A quorum not being present, adjourned....”¹²¹ When the Convention assembled at Washington, March 1,¹²² all attention was concentrated there, and the General Council soon ceased to be.

The first work of the Convention was to declare independence. Its next was to draw up a constitution and organize a permanent government. Pending the adoption of the constitution and the election of officers for the new government, a government ad interim was necessary. By an ordinance passed March 16, the day before the Convention adjourned, this was created,¹²³ and David G. Burnet was placed at its head.

But it was not only in civil affairs that changes had taken place. When the commissioners left Texas in the previous December, there were no hostile forces north of the Rio Grande. In the spring of the year, however, Texas had been again invaded, and the series of disasters that had followed—the fall of the Alamo, the capture of Goliad, and the six weeks' retreat of Houston's army—were no more than might have been expected from the disorganized state of the army and the government. But the tide had turned, April 21, at San Jacinto, and not only had the whole Mexican force practically been annihilated, but Santa Anna himself was the prisoner of the Texans. Moreover, on May 14, two treaties had been made between him and the Texan authorities. According to the first or open treaty, Santa Anna had agreed that all hostilities should cease, and that the Mexicans should withdraw beyond the Rio Grande; by the second treaty, which was secret, he agreed to have the independence of Texas acknowledged by Mexico, to accomplish which he was to be liberated immediately and allowed to embark for Vera Cruz.¹²⁴ In accordance with this second treaty an attempt had been made to release Santa Anna. This, however, had raised such a storm of opposition that he had been again placed in confinement, and when Austin reached Texas, late in June, the Santa Anna excitement, as it was called,¹²⁵ was at its height. Some went so far even as to plan to take Santa Anna to the army and have him court-martialed, but against such a step wiser counsels prevailed.

It is not surprising that the makeshift government, which during the winter and spring of 1835-6 had shown itself so incapable of managing home affairs, should have proved itself also remiss in regard to its foreign agents. Indeed any statement which the provisional government could have made to its agents at Washington would have tended rather to disprove than to establish the fact that Texas was a de facto government. Besides, it was not to be expected that the United States would take any step toward recognition, seeing that Texas herself had made no definite claims to independence.

But, after the March Convention had declared independence and organized the government, it was natural to suppose that the question of recognition would be pushed forward with energy. Austin, Archer, and Wharton, although commissioned merely to feel the pulse of the government concerning recognition and annexation, confidently expected, as we have seen, to be intrusted by the Convention with the work of carrying through these measures. And such it seemed at first would be the case, at least so far as recognition was concerned; for, on March 7, only five days after independence was declared, it was resolved by the Convention:

That a committee of three members of this body be appointed to inform our commissioners now in the United States that we have declared independence, and to urge upon them the necessity of using their utmost exertions to bring about as soon as possible the recognition of the independence of Texas, by the Congress of the United States of the north, now in session.¹²⁶

If this had been done—if the government ad interim, after independence was declared, had drawn up the proper credentials for the Texan agents and followed these up with evidences that Texas had organized her government—the commissioners, at least, believed it possible that the unrestrained enthusiasm of the country at large for Texas might have prevailed, and that Congress, before adjourning for the summer, might have felt disposed to recommend unqualified recognition, and perhaps annexation as well.

But no further step was taken by the Convention, and the policy pursued by the government ad interim in its attempt to establish diplomatic relations with the United States is accountable only when one takes into consideration the great inexperience of the youthful republic. Instead of confirming the commission of Austin, Archer, and Wharton and sending them official information, first, of the declaration of independence, March 2, and, second, of the defeat of the Mexicans, April 21, a new set of commissioners was chosen after each of these events, and in neither case were the credentials issued adequate. This may be better understood by realizing that the Texans selected in each instance their most prominent and capable public men, who, they apparently thought, should thereafter be left to their own discretion, rather than hampered by unintelligent instructions from home. Only through experience in Washington did these agents gradually come to a realization of the equipment expected of them by the United States authorities. The situation, therefore, throughout the term of the government ad interim was this: The first set of commissioners, Austin, Archer, and Wharton, finding that the first thing necessary was official information that independence had been declared, spent their time, while awaiting this, in the effort to secure material aid for Texas; the second set, Childress—chairman of the committee that had reported the declaration—and Hamilton, and later on Carson, the secretary of state, were all witnesses of independence, but were enbarrassed chiefly by want of official accounts of the battle of San Jacinto; and finally, Collinsworth—Carson's successor as secretary of state—and Grayson, the attorney-general, superseding all other commissioners, were equipped with copies of the declaration and treaties with Santa Anna, but arrived in Washington after the adjournment of Congress, and bore credentials that were objected to because of their informality.¹²⁷

In accordance with the authority conferred upon Burnet as president of the newly established government ad interim “to appoint Commissioners to any foreign power,”¹²⁸ one of his first acts after the adjournment of the Convention was, March 19, to name George C. Childress as special agent, in conjunction with Robert Hamilton, “with plenary powers to open a negotiation with the cabinet at Washington, touching the political rights of the Republic; inviting on the part of that Cabinet a recognition of the Sovereignty and Independence of Texas, and the establishment of such relations between the two governments, as may comport with the mutual interest, the common origin, and kindred ties of their constituents.”¹²⁹

The wording of this commission is such as to imply that Childress and Hamilton were not looked upon as agents with coördinate powers. Moreover, in a rough draft of the commission¹³⁰ the words, “in conjunction with Robert Hamilton,” are inserted between the lines, while the rest of the document remains in the form in which it was first written for Childress alone—indicating clearly that Hamilton's name was included as an after-thought. The official letters written to them after their departure, also, go to show that Childress was regarded as the superior diplomatic agent; and one, at least, though addressed to Childress and Hamilton jointly, speaks to Childress directly and only refers to Hamilton in the third person.¹³¹

Several reasons for this discrimination suggest themselves. In the first place, if the work of securing recognition was to be entrusted to some new person, Childress was perhaps the logical man. He had been a member of the Convention of 1836 and chairman of the committee appointed to draft a declaration of independence, and the composition of that document has been ascribed to him. Moreover, for Childress's success in Washington, much reliance was based upon his former intimate acquaintance with Jackson.¹³² It may have been, too, that the government, even at that time, had it in mind to entrust Hamilton primarily with the duty of securing financial aid. At any rate he could have done very little diplomatic work, for shortly after he reached Washington Samuel Carson¹³³ arrived, bringing with him a commission for Hamilton issued by the government, April 2, instructing him to negotiate a loan for the purpose of supplying the army.¹³⁴

It was not the intention of the Texan government that these commissioners should supersede Austin, Archer, and Wharton, whose appointment had been practically confirmed, so far as the government ad interim was concerned, shortly after independence was declared.¹³⁵ But the question as to the relation of the two sets of agents was not raised until after Childress and Hamilton had left Texas. They had gone as far as Nachitoches, Louisiana, when Childress wrote back to Burnet, March 28:

I see from the newspapers, here, that Messrs. Austin, Wharton and Archer are supposed to be now at the City of Washington acting as Commissioners under the authority conferred upon them by the late provisional Government. If when Mr. Hamilton and I shall have arrived there we should find these gentlemen acting in the same capacity it would place both us and them in a very awkward situation. Will you please, in conjunction with the Cabinet, take this matter into consideration and take such steps with regard to it as you and they may think proper.¹³⁶

April 1, before this letter could have reached him at Harrisburg, the secretary of state, Samuel P. Carson, wrote:

It is desirable by the President and Cabinet that the Commissioners, Messrs. Austin, Archer, and Wharton, appointed by the provisional government should be associated with yourself and Mr. Hamilton and their aid and exertions requested in obtaining a recognition of our Independence.¹³⁷

There was really little necessity to have settled the matter. Childress and Hamilton did not reach Washington until some time ¹⁴²between May 28 and June 10,¹³⁸ while Austin, who had become discouraged, had started for Texas, May 24.¹³⁹ Wharton probably coöperated with them for a while,¹⁴⁰ but he and Archer also soon left Washington.

Childress and Hamilton seem to have expected that after their departure more specific instructions regarding their efforts to secure recognition, as well as financial aid, would be drawn up and forwarded to them. In his letter from Nachitoches, March 28, Childress said: “Please have us furnished with instructions with regard to our political and pecuniary missions.”¹⁴¹ In his communication to the commissioners, April 1, however, Carson had written: “The objects of your mission were so fully explained to you before your departure by the government that nothing further on that subject need be said. I hope to join you in a short time after this reaches you when full explanations will be given.”

Nevertheless, on the same day a document called “Private Instructions” was drawn up, but the additional light that it threw upon their course of action was of doubtful value. According to its direction the commissioners were to “hold the freeest and fullest conversation with the President and Cabinet officers . . . but should there be any reluctance on the part of the Sec of State to hear . . . a dignified elevation due to this Republic must mark . . . [their] course.” These so-called instructions go on to explain: “Your own minds will suggest the course most proper to pursue as the govt cannot anticipate occurrences which might make it necessary to deviate from strict instructions and therefore leave to you the management of the subject with full confidence that the dignity and honor of your country will be fully maintained and advanced.”¹⁴³

On the same day an informal note was addressed by Carson to Secretary of State Forsyth, introducing the commissioners and asking that they be presented also to Jackson and the Cabinet “in such a manner as may be suited to the station they occupy.”¹⁴⁴ This attempt at a letter of credence and the “private instructions”—both of which were forwarded after the departure of the commissioners—together with their original commission, which they had carried with them, apparently constituted their only credentials.

In regard to at least one other matter they were given explicit directions, which they received in the form of a confidential letter from Carson. The rumor had come that Gorostiza, the Mexican minister plenipotentiary at Washington, had been authorized to sell Texas to the United States. Against any such assumption of authority over Texas on the part of Mexico the commissioners were to enter their solemn protest, in justification of which they were to set forth the Texas declaration of Independence.¹⁴⁵

Carson had promised that he would shortly join Childress and Hamilton. Having found it necessary on account of ill health temporarily to give up his duties as secretary of state, he had been directed by President Burnet, April 1, to spend his vacation in Washington where he was to coöperate with the commissioners there “in procuring a recognition from the government of our Mother Country . . . [taking] in charge a general Supervision of all the interests and concerns of Texas in that country.”¹⁴⁶

Childress and Hamilton went together as far as Nachitoches, where they separated planning to meet again in Washington the first of May.¹⁴⁷ Carson followed them soon after their departure, but was so delayed by illness that he did not reach that city until June 22. Their work on the way up was similar to that of the first set of commissioners and productive of like results. April 18, Childress reported:

We have been endeavouring (with some success) to create as much interest as we can at these points in the South and West which we have touched at, and shall continue (through the press and otherwise) to agitate the United States as much as possible. You will have received before this reaches you accounts of the public meetings and proceedings at Natches and other places. So far as I can see the South and West is kindling into a blaze upon the subject. So great is the interest felt upon the subject, and so numerous are the applications by letters from individuals, editors etc for information . . . that . . . we have . . . been under the necessity of employing upon our own responsibility a Secretary to the Mission.¹⁴⁸

June 1, Carson wrote to Burnet from Nashville:

The enthusiastic bursts of feeling every where in this country exceeds anything I have ever witnessed.

The spirit in Congress is fine I send all the papers I can to let you see what is passing there. Public Meetings are getting up in all directions petitioning Congress to recognize our Independence. A bold move has been made in my native county (Burke No Ca) in our favor. . . .

. . . I am induced to believe that we should send on from this country every Volunteere we can. I am acting on that principle and shall not relax my efforts unless advised to do so by the Govt.

He then goes into detail concerning companies that are to go to Texas under General Dunlap and Captain Grundy.¹⁴⁹

But in regard to recognition Childress says:

We are not sanguine of getting an immediate recognition of the Independence of Texas from the Government of the United States, but will open a negotiation and continue it untill crowned with success, unless otherwise instructed by your Excellency and the Cabinet. It is of great importance, I conceive, to obtain it as soon as possible as the moral effect in our favour would be great in the United States. Many persons who now feel scruples in volunteering to take a part in the internal conflicts of a foreign country would freely do so if the independence of the party with which they sympathize was recognized by the Government of their own country.¹⁵⁰

This apparent subordinating of the question of recognition to serve material ends is readily understood when one recalls the fact that at this time the military situation was at its worst. Unless the tide were turned not only the claims for recognition but independence itself would be a thing of the past.

As soon as the commissioners reached Washington they laid their credentials before Secretary of State Forsyth. Then came accounts through the newspapers of the battle of San Jacinto and the capture of Santa Anna. For some days they eagerly awaited official reports of these events, expecting apparently that the question of recognition would thereupon be settled forthwith.¹⁵¹ But no communications from the government came, and finally, June 10, upon the basis of the unofficial accounts, they presented to Forsyth the claims of Texas to recognition as a de facto government. These communications were never answered.¹⁵² At the same time they wrote begging Burnet to forward official reports and stating the absolute impossibility of acting without them.¹⁵³ Carson also, upon his arrival, urged the same thing. He said:

In the total want of communications, from the Government, with regard to the reasons which actuate them, and indeed as to their whole policy and action except as I gather it from Newspapers and letters from individuals of Texas written to their friends in this country, I am at fault how to act and indeed frequently subjected to mortification, because of my inability to answer questions put by our best friends here, and who wish to shape their course in conformity to the wishes and measures of Texas.¹⁵⁴

Nothing more is heard of the efforts of Childress and Hamilton to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. About the time of their arrival in Washington new commissioners, Collinsworth and Grayson, had been chosen by Burnet, and Childress and Hamilton soon learned that their services were no longer required.¹⁵⁵ In a report from Washington Carson says: “I must conclude this communication with the expression of my entire approbation of the course and conduct of our agents Messrs. Hamilton and Childress, and also of the various efforts of the agents of the Provisional Government, whose reputation, as Gentlemen and Patriots, stand very high in this country.”¹⁵⁶ But the commissioners themselves doubtless felt, as had their predecessors, that they had labored in vain, whereas, except for the neglect of their own government, their efforts might have been productive of good results.

3. The work of the third commission.

On May 26, 1836, only two months after the appointment of Childress and Hamilton, all previous commissioners were recalled and James Collinsworth and Peter W. Grayson were sent by the government ad interim to Washington to solicit: (1) the intervention of the United States to stop the war upon the basis of a recognition of the independence of Texas by Mexico; (2) the recognition of the independence of Texas by the United States; and (3) the annexation of Texas to the United States upon certain specified terms.¹⁵⁷

The reason for appointing these commissioners to supersede all other diplomatic agents seems not to have been due to dissatisfaction with the work of the latter. In recalling Austin and his colleagues, May 27, the secretary of state, William Jack, explained the motives which actuated the government. He said:

I am instructed by the President and Cabinet to inform you that inasmuch as important changes have recently occurred it has been deemed necessary to dispatch to Washington two commissioners for the purpose of representing this Government there. It was conceived most advisable to select gentlemen who are now in this country, because they could be more fully informed of the views of this Govt. and the wishes and interests of the people. These Gentlemen are Peter W. Grayson and James Collinsworth, Esqrs. to whom you will be pleased to communicate any valuable information which you may possess, affording them at the same time ever possible facility in consummating the objects of their mission.

In recalling you the President and Cabinet are not unmindful of your disinterested efforts in the service of your country, but have acted on the conviction that at this crisis of affairs commissioners fresh from Texas, would from their more intimate knowledge of her present wants and policy be able to represent her more efficiently at Washington.

The confidence which your country reposes in you is entirely unimpaired, and you will be received with heartfelt greetings of gratitude upon your return.¹⁵⁸

The important changes here referred to are the defeat of the Mexicans at San Jacinto, the capture of Santa Anna, and the treaties of May 14; and, as in the case of Childress, the government now chose men best fitted to give official testimony of these events. Throughout the term of the provisional government Collinsworth had served as chairman of the Military Committee. Later on, he, as secretary of state of the government ad interim, and Grayson, as attorney-general, had both signed the treaties with Santa Anna. However unwise a change of agents in Washington may have been, the Texan authorities undoubtedly felt that the men who had left Texas at the period of her greatest despondency were incapable of representing correctly, as eye-witnesses could do, the complete victory of the Texans and the utter defeat of the enemy.

The question naturally arises why these men were not instructed to coöperate with the others, as in the case of Childress and Hamilton. So far as the records show there had been no conflict of authority between the Washington agents. But the government had been led to see the inexpediency of the wholesale appointment of agents, which until this time had gone on unchecked. It had been the policy of the commissioners sent out by the government to appoint agents in all places visited. These in turn had appointed sub-agents, and so on. In the case of financial agents, this had resulted in numerous frauds, since almost any one might claim an appointment and accept donations tendered for the cause. Accordingly, Burnet, on June 10, 1836, issued a decree revoking all agencies of this kind except that of Toby Brothers in New Orleans.¹⁵⁹ The recall of all diplomatic agents then in the United States, just two weeks previous to this decree, may have been in line with the same general policy.

On July 8, four days after the adjournment of Congress, Collinsworth and Grayson arrived in Washington. They found Jackson on the point of leaving for the Hermitage, his home at Nashville, Tennessee. In an informal interview the president gave them to understand that a secret agent had been sent to Texas to secure information,¹⁶⁰ and that nothing could be done until his return. Forsyth was non-committal. Annexation, he admitted, was a favorite measure with Jackson when it could be brought about with propriety, and at his request the commissioners drew up a careful statement of the terms upon which Texas desired admission, which was at once forwarded to the president.¹⁶¹ This, however, was all the satisfaction that could be obtained from him; and, feeling that little could be done in Washington during the summer, Collinsworth decided to go to Nashville to converse more at length with Jackson. Grayson planned at first to go to Louisville, but concluded to remain in Washington, hoping to open official communication with the authorities there.¹⁶²

Before anything could be done in Washington, however, it was necessary to have new credentials, since those the commissioners carried were not drawn up in proper form. July 15, Collinsworth and Grayson had written:

Should it be desired that we should longer represent our government here, it will be necessary to make out new commissions and forward them to the last named places, as those we have, have been deemed inadmissible in consequence of having no seal. It will be seen by reference to our constitution that in the absence of a seal of state the President may use his own private seal.

There is a further Omission on the part of the address to the President and secretary of State in omitting to state even the country they are from.¹⁶³

August 2, Grayson, who was then alone in Washington, repeated this request for new credentials:

We feel a good deal embarrassed for the want of the proper letter of credence, that is to say, one made out with all the requisite formalities of a Seal, etc. Mr. Forsyth politely gave us to understand, that he would be happy to see us at any time we might desire to converse with him; but left us to infer pretty plainly that we were not in strictness, accredited Agents, on account of the informality of the papers conferring our authority.¹⁶⁴ He intimated moreover, that some advise from our Government addressed to this, was at least of formal necessity, in regard to the persons previously here in our character, whose functions have ceased by our appointment.

If we are to continue here, of the necessity of which you and your associates in the Government will of course judge from circumstances presenting themselves, I have to request that all these formal particulars I have mentioned will receive their proper attention. Besides this I would suggest that it will be proper to have made out and sent on to us a regularly authenticated Copy under the Seal of the State, of that portion of the Ordinances of the Convention, which established the present Government ad interim.¹⁶⁵ This is necessary to show its regularity, since in the Constitution proper as printed, nothing appears, that has any reference to the present Organization.¹⁶⁶

For nearly three months after the first letter was written Grayson waited in Washington, but no new credentials from Texas came.¹⁶⁷ Finally, becoming exasperated, he withdrew to Louisville. From there, November 3, he addressed letters to Burnet and to Austin expressing his indignation. “I came here,” he said to Austin, “a few days ago, from a sort of necessity, to await further communications from Texas if any are intended.”¹⁶⁸ To Burnet he said: “Some ten days ago I arrived at this place from Washington, where I had remained until the 11th ulto., expecting to receive the credentials of our commission, in the form which had been pointed out by Maj. Collinsworth and myself, as necessary to give us official intercourse with this government. Not receiving them as I had been expecting and being not a little weary of my unrecognized character at Washington, I concluded to come to this place and await the determination of my Government on the subject of its further intercourse with this. A few days more I take it for granted, will bring us information whether our services will be longer required in this Country.”¹⁶⁹

In these letters he also stated what in his opinion was the status of the recognition question. The reason he assigns for the delay in recognition was not quite the same as that previously given by the other commissioners. They had thought it necessary only to establish the fact that Texas was independent. Grayson believed that the United States was more conservative than that, and would wait until assured that independence could be maintained. Moreover, he had come to realize that the question of annexation complicated the matter. In his letter to Austin he said:

On the subject of recognition I think Gen Jackson will still wait a little to observe the course and character of civil affairs in Texas; this being the only matter at present upon which any real doubt or solicitude remains; our Independence of Mexico being pretty generally looked upon as established.

The great misfortune of the delay to recognize consists in its bringing too near together, for the action on them by this Government of the two questions—recognition and annexation. A decent time you know ought to transpire after the disposition of the one before the taking up of the other, for reasons which will readily occur to you.

In his letter to Burnet Grayson said recognition would take place “at the earliest moment that circumstances would at all justify it in the eyes of the world.” But while he believed that the two questions should be separated he felt that Jackson was favorable to both. August 11, he had written: “There is in my mind no doubt that the present Administration, can carry the measure of Annexation. Genl. Jackson feels the utmost solicitude for it and we know how much that will count.”¹⁷⁰ He now repeated that from undoubted authority he knew the president was warmly inclined “to adopt such a course . . . as would the soonest bring about all the objects” with which he and Collinsworth had been charged—namely, recognition and annexation.

Collinsworth, who had spent nearly two months in Nashville in negotiation with Jackson, felt equally sure of Jackson's position, but he also foresaw complications. In a report of his work made from Brazoria, November 13, 1836, after his return to Texas, he says:

Without pretending to have received any official information upon the subject, . . . I think [I] may safely hazard the opinion that the present ex[ec]utive of the United States is in favor of all the measures contained in our instructions. Should the present government [that is, the permanent government under Houston]¹⁷¹ believe in the same policy, I cannot too forcibly impress upon them the necessity of dispatching some one forthwith vested with plenary powers to the court of Washington, as in my opinion much may be endangered by delay to bring these matters before the approaching session of the Congress of the United States at an early period of its session.¹⁷²

Five days previous to this in a hastily written note to Austin he had even gone so far as to sketch the terms upon which he believed annexation might be secured. He said:

I am satisfied that an union of Texas with the U States may take place this winter upon the following basis. The Gov. of the U States to assume our debts to endow liberally academies colleges etc.

The object of the U. States is the jurisdiction over the soil, its value is of no object to them.

But no legislation on private claims will under any circumstances be admitted. All claims must be settled according to the laws under which they were acquired.¹⁷³

The mission of Collinsworth and Grayson ended rather abruptly. While the former was in Nashville attempting to negotiate with Jackson¹⁷⁴ and probably while the latter was still in Louisville awaiting some answer to his communications from that place, letters from Burnet arrived announcing the fact that the September elections had been held, and informing the commissioners that the new Congress would doubtless at an early date take up the question of the appointment of an agent to Washingtion.¹⁷⁵ Thus the term of this commission expired with the government ad interim, and the status of the question of recognition was as yet practically undisturbed, so far as any efforts on the part of the Texan agents were concerned.

4. The work of the friends of Texas in the United States  Congress.

From the foregoing sketch of the work of the first three sets of commissioners it will be seen that it was the opinion of those who had labored in Washington during the first session of the twenty-fourth Congress that only the lack of official information to show that Texas was de facto an independent government had prevented recognition. Collinsworth and Grayson had carried with them all the evidence of this kind that was believed to be necessary, but they had arrived in Washington during the recess of Congress—a time when it was impossible to effect anything. They also felt, however, that as nearly as they could determine the spirit generally was favorable; and Jackson, they believed, was anxious for both measures—recognition and annexation.

Questions like these, therefore, naturally arise. To what extent were the commissioners right in their interpretation of the situation at Washington? Were they so misled by the enthusiasm for Texas expressed by private individuals throughout the country, especially throughout the Southern States which they had traversed, that they naively assumed that the government of the United States would feel equally disposed to champion their cause? Did they see only their own limitations as commissioners, and fail to detect other less obvious but perhaps equally formidable obstacles in the way of immediate recognition? To a certain extent this may have been the case. But, on the other hand, was there not some justification for their belief that the questions of recognition and even annexation were seriously discussed by the United States authorities in the spring and summer of 1836? There are at least three circumstances that seem to indicate that this was true. These are (1) the well known desire of the United States to secure Texas; (2) the evidence furnished by the congressional debates that the complication in regard to the slavery question, while clearly discernible, was as yet comparatively unimportant; (3) the actual corroboration in the debates of the opinions expressed by the commissioners.

Almost from the time that the United States definitely surrendered Texas by the treaty of 1819, it was the open policy of the government to regain in some way the lost territory. The undertaking was first entrusted to Poinsett, who spent two years, 1825-7, attempting to extend the boundary so as to include the whole, or at least a portion, of Texas in the United States. This failed, and in 1827 he was instructed to treat for a cession of the desired section for the amount of one million dollars, which later on was increased to five millions. Thus two more years were consumed, and at the end of this time Poinsett was recalled. During the greater part of Jackson's administration, that is, from 1829 to 1836, Anthony Butler was the representative of the United States in Mexico. “It was a seven years' period of cheap trickery in which, on the one hand, Mexico was led to believe that the United States government would descend to any level to accomplish the cession of Texas, and on the other, Jackson was encouraged by hopes of a cession which came to nothing.”¹⁷⁶ There can be no doubt that the relations between the United States and Mexico during this period hastened the Texan revolution.

Upon Butler's recall, Powhatan Ellis was sent as chargé, instructed to press certain claims of American citizens against Mexico. The time was most inopportune—Mexico was torn by revolution—and the result was that, in November, 1836, Ellis demanded his passports. Just previous to this, in October, Gorostiza, the Mexican minister to United States, having become exasperated by what he regarded as a refusal of the United States government to enforce neutrality, had withdrawn from Washington.¹⁷⁷ Thus, for the present, all diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico were suspended.

The events of this decade, thus briefly sketched, would seem to warrant the assurance of the Texans generally that the United States authorities would welcome the opportunity of pronouncing Mexican dominion in Texas at an end, and would gratefully accept so valuable an acquisition in case Texas chose to relinquish her independence and join the Union. Nor did the sympathy and the illegal but open assistance of the people of the United States at large tend to destroy this confidence. Naturally when war broke out the United States had at once assumed a neutral attitude. In his seventh annual message at the opening of Congress, December 7, 1835, Jackson had said:

Aware of the strong temptations existing and powerful inducements held out to the citizens of the United States to mingle in the dissensions of our immediate neighbors, instructions have been given to the district attorneys of the United States where indications warranted it to prosecute without respect to persons all who might attempt to violate the obligations of our neutrality, while at the same time it has been thought necessary to apprise the Government of Mexico that we should require the integrity of our territory to be scrupulously respected by both parties.¹⁷⁸

But laws in support of neutrality could not easily be enforced, and a rather striking illustration will show how on at least one occasion these instructions were observed. While Carson was in Nashville on his way to Washington in June, 1836, he wrote to President Burnet concerning certain volunteers who had enlisted in the Texan cause:

Seventy men are now ready to leave under Captn Grundy who is the prosecuting atty. for the United States for this District, and has formal orders to arrest and prosecute every man who may take up arms in the cause of Texas or in any way Violate the neutrality of the U. S. He says he will prosecute any man under his command who will take up arms here and he will accompany them to the boundary line of the U. S. to see that they shall not violate her neutrality and when there, if the boys think proper to step over the line as peaceable emigrants his authority in this Govt will cease and he thinks it highly probable that he will take a peepe at Texas himself. Thus you see how the neutrality of this Govt. is preserved by her civil officers.¹⁷⁹

Against such violations of national faith Mexico repeatedly protested, and the United States government as often reasserted its neutrality and disclaimed any responsibility for the conduct of private individuals. But, however sincere the intentions of the authorities at Washington, there seems to have been little disposition in some sections of the country to take such proclamations seriously,¹⁸⁰ as is witnessed by the large number of volunteers that flocked to Texas. To discourage such immigration Gorostiza, on April 1, 1836, served notice that Mexico would hold herself responsible for no engagements or debts made by the revolted Texans, nor would she consent to any alienation of her national lands in Texas.¹⁸¹ Such declaration was, of course, of absolutely no effect.

But the climax came, as Gorostiza thought, when the executive authorities at Washington refused to punish the actual invasion of Texas by United States troops. General Gaines had been stationed by the United States authorities at Fort Jessup near Natchitoches, Louisiana, with orders to preserve peace along the frontier, especially to hold the Indians in check¹⁸² He was also given permission to go as far as Nacogdoches if the hostilities of the Indians should make such a step necessary. In April, in response to a message that a force of Indians and Mexicans had united and were approaching Nacogdoches, he advanced his troops as far as the Sabine.¹⁸³ July 4, Austin wrote asking Gaines to guarantee the treaties with Santa Anna of May 14, and suggesting that his occupation of Nacogdoches would end the war.¹⁸⁴ August 4, Gaines on the basis of insufficient instructions refused to guarantee the fulfillment of the treaties,¹⁸⁵ but hearing of an Indian uprising, he had in the meantime sent a detachment to Nacogdoches. Ever since May, Gorostiza had been protesting against the authority given Gaines to cross into Texas, and now, after futile remonstrances with the authorities at Washington, who seem to have had no official notice, before September, of Gaines's movements,¹⁸⁶ he summarily demanded his passports, October 15. These events, naturally, were followed with keen interest by the Texan commissioners; and, in view of the assurances they personally had received in regard to the friendliness of the government, it is not surprising that they were confident of immediate recognition and of annexation, as well, provided they desired it. They sincerely believed that their entrance into the Union depended mainly upon the vote of the Texans themselves. And in the light of the occurrences the next ten years, one smiles at Wharton's eagerness in the spring of 1836 to return home in order to persuade the leading Texans to consent to annexation. He had just heard that Houston was opposed to such a step, and fearing the influence of the hero of San Jacinto he was anxious to see Houston before the latter's opinions were generally known. He therefore wrote Austin, May 28, that he would leave the work in Washington to Childress and Hamilton and return to Texas to exert such influence as he had with Houston. “I feel it more important than all other things in the world,” he said, “[that] the present Senate should act upon the question of annexation. . . . If we first get the leading men in favour of it in Texas will all go right. . . .”¹⁸⁷

But if this was the psychological moment to urge recognition and annexation it was allowed to pass. One can not read the debates in Congress from April 26, when the question of recognition was first discussed in the Senate,¹⁸⁸ until Congress adjourned, July 4, without being impressed, as the commissioners were, by the apparent failure on the part of Texas to take any initiative whatever in the matter. Memorials and petitions from various sections of the United States were continually arriving, but the commissioners from Texas were rendered impotent by want of the proper equipment. Indeed, it is worthy of note that, without exception, the discussions on the question throughout the first session of Congress were provoked, not by the efforts of the commissioners, but by these memorials and petitions from interested citizens of the United States.¹⁸⁹ The presence of the commissioners in Washington seems to have attracted very little attention in Congress. May 23, two months after Austin, Archer, and Wharton first arrived in Washington, Senator Morris, of Ohio, asked where were the authorized agents of Texas. Those gentlemen who were there as agents, he believed, had shown no credentials from the authorities of Texas. When he acted in the capacity of a representative he desired something official upon which to act. In reply Walker of Mississippi, an ardent friend of Texas, asserted that the Texan commissioners were public and accredited agents, not the less respectable because they were once American citizens.¹⁹⁰ On the same day Webster of Massachusetts, urging the Senate to avoid premature recognition, declared that as soon as Texas felt that she had a government she would naturally present her claims to her neighbors.¹⁹¹ One other reference is made to the commissioners. In the course of this same debate, Senator Walker speaks of them as the young Franklins from Texas, who perhaps had already presented their credentials.¹⁹² It is true the commissioners considered that their business was not so much with Congress as with the executive, but, if they had been in a position to push the work, Congress would no doubt have acted more vigorously.

To be sure, opposition to Texas as a slave holding country was already in evidence, and it grew stronger as the session progressed. As early as May 7 a debate on the subject arose in the House. John Quincy Adams, aroused by the operation of Gaines on the Texan frontier, referred to it as an attempt to conquer Texas and re-establish slavery, which had been abolished by Mexico. He was opposed to any such addition to the United States. Thompson of South Carolina in reply deplored the inopportune introduction of slavery into the debate, especially by the gentlemen who had negotiated away Texas. It had been said, he claimed, by the enemies of Adams, at the time when the treaty of 1819 was drawn up, that a leading motive for ceding to Spain this valuable territory was to prevent the addition it would make to the slaveholding interests of the United States. Thompson regretted that Adams by his present attitude should have confirmed such a statement. Adams thereupon explained his great reluctance to enter into the treaty, claiming that he was the last man in the cabinet to agree to it; upon which the discussion as regards slavery was dropped.¹⁹³

Two days later in the Senate Moore of Alabama regretted the disposition of some of the senators to disregard petitions for the recognition of the independence of Texas—a treatment they were not wont to accord to abolition petitions.¹⁹⁴ On the same day Shepley of Maine opposed the printing of the momorials. The sympathies that had been expressed for the Texan cause may have been raised, he said, “entirely by the perusal of the cruelties perpetrated in Texas. He hoped it was so. But it was possible there were other matters and motives which had their influence in operating on the feelings of a great number; and if so, any sympathies arising from such a source were unworthy of respect and consideration.”¹⁹⁵

May 16, Senator Walker of Mississippi referred to the treaty of 1819 by which five or six prospective states were torn from the Union, thus destroying the balance of power between the North and the South.¹⁹⁶ May 23, Morris of Ohio, who, on April 26, had presented the first memorial asking for the recognition of Texas, now said that he was not ready to take up the matter—that it involved a question which did not `meet the eye, which was beyond the mere recognition of independence, a question that would convulse the Union from one end to the other.'¹⁹⁷ Calhoun of South Carolina spoke of the advantage of annexing Texas, thus preventing the possibility of annoyance to the slaveholding states from that section of the country. Rives of Virginia said Calhoun had given opinions as a southern man.¹⁹⁸

On the same day Niles of Connecticut, on presenting resolutions from the legislature of his state, praying the recognition of Texas, called attention to the fact that the first state¹⁹⁹ to take such a step was in a remote part of the Union where no interested motives would be supposed to operate, and from whence there had been no emigrants to that country.²⁰⁰ This, he went on to say, should prove that there was really little foundation for all that was being said concerning local jealousy in different sections of the Union. He was aware that there were ulterior questions of a most momentous character connected with the independence of Texas. Some of these were very delicate, involving the balance of political power in regard to a particular interest, to which he would not at that time allude. If these questions had been considered by his state they had not influenced her actions which had sprung from a sense of justice and a love of liberty.'²⁰¹

The extreme caution with which it was necessary to approach such a question would naturally have prevented any free expression of opinion; at the same time, there is sufficient evidence to show that as yet the significance of the slavery question in regard to Texas was not fully appreciated. One circumstance will help illustrate this. It will be remembered that Morris of Ohio, on April 26, presented to Congress the first petition—that from Cincinnati—asking for recognition of the independence of Texas. It was he, also, who nearly four months earlier had presented the two first abolition petitions that had reached the present Congress—and these, too, had come from Ohio. In each instance one of his most bitter opponents was Porter of Louisiana. Porter's attitude toward the abolition petitions was natural; toward the petition for recognition it was determined largely by the trade interests Louisiana had with Mexico. During the last twenty months, Porter claimed, the trade between New Orleans and the Mexican ports had amounted to nearly fifteen million dollars. Was this to be thrown away, asked the senator from Louisiana, simply because the country adjoining them had no free institutions? Another consideration, he said, which it behooved Louisiana to take into account was the fact that in case of war between the United States and Mexico the western portions of Louisiana would be exposed perhaps for years to inroads of the Mexicans and their Indian allies. Her property, especially her slaves, would thus be endangered. `It was all very well,' he said, `for gentlemen who came from states where peace and security could not be disturbed by hostilities to indulge in aspirations after the happiness of the human race. But he protested against their doing so at Louisiana's expense.”²⁰²

It would be necessary to examine into the local politics of Louisiana to understand fully her attitude in regard to Texas. As has been noted,²⁰³ a memorial from Opelousas, Louisiana, praying the government to recognize Texas at the earliest period possible was presented by Senator Preston of South Carolina, June 24. But the fact that a Louisiana senator opposed recognition so vigorously at least tends to show that the importance of Texas to the slave-holding states was not generally realized.²⁰⁴

One other incident in this connection deserves mention. On his retirement from office in 1836, Governor McDuffie of South Carolina, after speaking in harshest terms of the Texans and their struggle for independence, said: “You are doubtless aware that the people of Texas, by an almost unanimous vote, have expressed their desire to be admitted into our confederacy, and application will probably be made to congress for that purpose. In my opinion, congress ought not even to entertain such a proposition, in the present state of the controversy.”²⁰⁵

These expressions from the governor of a slaveholding state, together with the preceding evidence from the congressional debates, show that the issue as regards the Texas question and slavery was by no means clearly drawn. Other interests called forth some opposition to congressional action concerning recognition. Louisiana's attitude has already been noted. Many undoubtedly were sincerely opposed to any violation of the neutrality which had been proclaimed. Some urged the preservation of the recent treaty with Mexico. Others were reluctant to provoke war with Mexico. Others still claimed to be restrained by the principles laid down in the Monroe Doctrine. Some hesitated to urge immediate recognition, because of the suspicion that would be cast on the motives of the United States should annexation follow. A few still clung to the hope of a cession of Texas by Mexico.

But the one insurmountable barrier to immediate action was the lack of authentic information upon which to base such a step. The expressions of sympathy for Texas were almost unanimous, especially in the Senate. All alike deplored the absence of any save newspaper accounts. The debates, as reported, are full of expressions such as these: “If the accounts . . . received from Texas were official, . . . he [Walker of Mississippi] would have moved a resolution for the immediate recognition of the independence of Texas”;²⁰⁶ “If the people of Texas had established a Government de facto, it was undoubtedly the duty of this Government to acknowledge their independence”;²⁰⁷ “The sole question is, has a revolution been effected in Texas? Has the Mexican Government been overthrown there? . . . [If so] then we shall violate the fundamental principle of the law of nations, if we continue to recognize the existence of the Mexican authority in a country from which it has been expelled.”²⁰⁸ Calhoun was ready to vote for annexation as well as recognition as soon as it became evident that Texas had established a government.²⁰⁹

Finally, in order to get all the light possible on the subject as well as for the moment to dispose of a question that was uselessly consuming time, it was decided both in the House²¹⁰ and the Senate to refer all memorials and petitions to committees of foreign affairs. June 18, five days after the reference, the Senate committee, of which Clay was chairman, was ready with its report. This report begins by discussing the former policy of the United States toward the recognition of a new or modified form of government, and concludes thus:

The committee has no information respecting the recent movements in Texas, except such as is derived from the public prints. . . . No means of ascertaining accurately the exact amount of the population of Texas are at the command of the committee. . . . Nor are the precise limits of the country which passes under the denomination of Texas known. . . . [Therefore]

Resolved, That the independence of Texas ought to be acknowledged by the United States whenever satisfactory information has been received that it has in successful operation a civil Government, capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an independent Power.”²¹¹

This resolution, however, while gratifying as evidence of the friendly interest felt by Congress, left the question of recognition practically untouched. But even the most ardent friends of Texas realized that, under the circumstances, it was all that could have been expected. In order, therefore, to help meet the condition named in the resolution, a motion was at once passed that the president be requested to communicate to the Senate any information in his possession, not inconsistent with the public interest, touching the political condition of Texas—the organization of its Government, and its capacity to maintain its independence; and, also, any correspondence which may have taken place between the Executive of the United States and the Government of Texas or its agents.²¹²

In compliance with this motion Secretary of State Forsyth, on June 23, wrote to the president:

The Secretary of State to whom was referred a resolution of the Senate of the 18th instant . . . has the honor to lay before the President the accompanying copies of papers addressed to and left at, the Department of State, by persons claiming to be agents of the republic of Texas; being all the information and correspondence called for by the resolution. No answers having been returned to any of these communications, they remain for further consideration, and such direction as the President shall hereafter give.²¹³

Thus, unconsciously, Forsyth gives a terse and accurate summary of all that had been accomplished with the executive authorities by the combined efforts of the six commissioners who up to this time had labored in Washington.

In communicating these documents to the Senate on the same day Jackson said:

Not having accurate and detailed information of the civil, military, and political condition of Texas, I have deemed it inexpedient to take the necessary measures, now in progress, to procure it, before deciding upon the course to be pursued in relation to the newly declared Government.²¹⁴ The “necessary measures” to which the president undoubtedly referred were those taken in dispatching to Texas a secret agent to learn the true state of affairs. Two days after Jackson's communication to the Senate, Forsyth addressed to Burnet the following letter:

I have the honor to introduce to you Henry M. Morfit, Esquire, of this city, who has been chosen to endeavor to procure more accurate and detailed information than that now in possession of the United States, relative to the civil, military and political condition of Texas. I will thank you to facilitate Mr. Morfit's inquiries in any way you can.²¹⁵

Upon th