In the last days of the summer of 1863 Major John Tyler, son of an ex-President of the United States, and at that time an aid on the staff of General Sterling Price, C. S. A., was making the slow and toilsome journey from his headquarters at Arkadelphia, Arkansas, to Austin, Texas. This had been a disastrous summer for the Confederacy. At Gettysburg General Lee had been thrust back and put a second time upon the defensive in Virginia; Vicksburg had been lost, the Mississippi had been seized by the Federals and the Trans-Mississippi Department cut off from Richmond. In the Trans-Mississippi Department itself, the whole of Missouri, nearly of Arkansas, and the most important part of Louisiana were in the hands of the Union forces. Texas alone was untouched by the enemy. In this desperate situation men's eyes again and again turned anxiously to Europe for some indications of the promised intervention in behalf of “King Cotton” that would secure them independence. This intervention once so confidently expected had for a brief time seemed at hand when, in the latter part of 1862, Napoleon III had addressed notes to England and Russia suggesting friendly joint offers of mediation in the American conflict; and even when this opportunity had come to nothing through the hesitation of England and Russia and the positive refusal of Lincoln and Seward to entertain the suggestion, confidence was still high in the good intentions of the French emperor. But months passed on, the inexorable enemy pushed his lines farther and farther into Confederate territory, and Napoleon III, now busied with Mexico, remained inactive as to mediation, though still protesting his good will.
Some time after Major Tyler arrived at Austin he presented a lengthy memorial to “His Excellency the Governor, the Governor-elect, and the Authorities of the State of Texas.” The essential part of that memorial is printed below. It is an appeal for Texas to take the initiative in demanding protection of France upon the basis of the guarantees in the Louisiana Purchase Treaty of 1803, on the assumption that Texas was a part of the Territory of Louisiana at that time. Obviously, the importance of the memorial lies quite as much in its origin as in its content. With whom did the plan originate? Was it Major Tyler's own independent scheme, or was Tyler only an agent of higher authorities? Could the plan have been prompted by the tortuous counsels of Napoleon III or by some of his officials in Mexico? Did it originate with the hard-pressed Confederate authorities at Richmond or with the military commanders of the Trans-Mississippi Department?
The whole memorial is based upon the belief, confidently expressed, that the French emperor is willing enough to intervene, if given the proper opportunity. There were not wanting proofs that the independence of the Confederate States was an important desideratum of his larger policies. Is it possible that Napoleon III had inspired Tyler's plan? If we accept the argument of the memorial, namely, that because of the diplomatic situation the French emperor was in no position to take the initiative but must await an appeal founded upon some definite obligation, such an assumption would do no violence to our knowledge of Napoleon's tactics. Just a year before the French consul at Galveston, M. Théron, had sent a note to Governor Lubbock suggesting that Texas might find it desirable to withdraw from the Confederacy and re-establish the old Republic—presumably under the protection of France—a suggestion which Lubbock denounced as evidence of “an incipient intrigue” and revealed to Jefferson Davis, who promptly expelled Théron from Confederate territory. However, it could not be found that the French consul had been inspired from Paris. 86 It is not likely that the French would have gone to Arkansas to secure an agent. There is nothing to show that the officials in Mexico had anything to do with Tyler's mission; for, though rumors were abroad that Marshal Bazaine had some sort of instructions to co-operate with the Confederate authorities or those of Texas if a favorable opportunity offered, these rumors have never yet been substantiated. A search through the archives of Paris or Mexico might reveal more of Napoleon's intentions.
Then if the scheme did not originate abroad, is it traceable to Jefferson Davis? It may well seem strange that Tyler should undertake a mission without the knowledge of the President, which, if successful, would be of the greatest moment to the Confederate government. We also know that Major Tyler was within a few weeks afterward promoted to a position in the War Department at Richmond, a fact which argues that he must have enjoyed the confidence of the officials there. But there is absolutely nothing discoverable in the Confederate papers to indicate that Davis or Benjamin, then Secretary of State, ever had any knowledge whatever of the memorial. Moreover, Governor Lubbock, who shortly afterward became a member of Davis's staff, seems never to have heard anything of it from Davis himself, who would certainly have sounded the ex-governor of Texas if he had had any such scheme in mind. Above all, it would have been wholly inconsistent with the character and policies of the Confederate president to revive French claims to a part of the Confederacy, claims which in view of what was transpiring in Mexico, were more likely to prove dangerous than helpful.
That Tyler could have taken up the matter on his own initiative seems equally improbable. Why should he be allowed to absent himself from his post of duty at Price's headquarters, on a five hundred mile journey, at a critical period of the campaign? 87 Is it possible that he would have undertaken a project of this kind without receiving the permission of his friend and commander? Then, was Tyler the agent of General Price or of the commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, General E. Kirby Smith? The isolation of this department, through the capture of the Mississippi by the Federals, had caused the authorities at Richmond to grant the Trans-Mississippi commander almost complete governmental powers; and at a conference of the governors of the states in that department, held at Marshall, Texas, in August, 1863, it was recommended among other things that General Smith enter into negotiations with the French in Mexico. Shortly afterward he wrote Mr. Slidell, envoy and minister of the Confederate states at Paris, to urge the necessity of an alliance between the Confederacy and France in order to protect French interests in Mexico? 88 He said nothing, however, of the treaty of 1803; and while he at once sent a copy of this letter to Jefferson Davis, he never at any time said anything of any authority given to Tyler. If Tyler was acting for the military commanders, why did he not say so in his memorial? If he was acting without their knowledge or consent, why was he not reprimanded instead of promoted?
The most probable explanation seems to be that Major Tyler was sent by his commander, Sterling Price, to induce the state officials to take the initiative in appealing to France, since the military could not themselves act in the name of the state. Moreover, we have a statement, at second hand, from Captain N. L. Norton that he accompanied Major Tyler from Price's headquarters at Austin “with instructions to secure if possible suitable action upon the part of the Texas authorities to bring to a head the proposal that it was said Marshal Bazaine was ready to make in Mexico looking to French intervention.” 89 Though this seems the most probable answer to the question, it is impossible now to determine definitely the authorship of the scheme; and it is hoped that the printing of a part of the document may attract the attention of some one who can supply the needed information. 90
Governor Lubbock never acted upon the suggestion in the memorial. He stated then that he could not do so without first consulting Mr. Davis, and the end of his term of office was too near for that. Lubbock seems also to have thought the scheme involved the secession of Texas from the Confederacy, an idea which he refused to entertain for an instant. His successor, Governor Murrah, seems never to have taken the matter under consideration at all, and what might have been an interesting and important diplomatic matter became a forgotten incident.
Of the document itself approximately the first half is omitted here, a verbose and highly rhetorical introduction for which a summary will suffice. With a candor that could never have found expression in public speech or print at that day, Major Tyler declares at the outset that the Confederacy is in a most desperate condition, that it is gradually growing weaker, that without foreign aid all the states east of the Mississippi except perhaps Virginia and the Carolinas will be in the grasp of the enemy within less than a year, that west of the Mississippi Texas alone is free and that preparations are being made even now for her invasion. 91 It is impossible to believe, he says, that the Confederacy can ever recover its lost territory and win its independence unaided. Foreign intervention is absolutely essential.
Turning now to that subject, he quotes at considerable length from an article in De Bow's Review, of 1862, in which the writer attempts to explain the diplomatic situation abroad. Great Britain is represented as having realized her great error in freeing the slaves in her tropical colonies in 1833, by which act she had diminished her tropical products and seriously endangered her trade supremacy. Fearing the competition of the semi-tropical agriculture of the Southern states, based upon slave labor, and the growing commerce of the North based upon its monopoly of the Southern market, she had set to work to undermine both by developing abolition sentiment in Europe and the Northern states. She had succeeded beyond her expectations, for now the war of subjugation waged by the free states upon the South would not only destroy the slave system and the agriculture of that region, but would inevitably crush in reaction the economic power of the North also. Great Britain believed this would relieve her of her most dangerous commercial rival, restore to her the carrying trade of the seas, discredit republican government, and maintain British political institutions in the interest of the ruling classes. Therefore she was content to see the two sections wear each other down, and had rejected Napoleon's offer of joint mediation. The Russian Czar is represented as fearing to arouse the anger of his nobles, whose serfs he had recently liberated, by inconsistently interfering in behalf of a slave-holding people. For this reason he had held aloof with Great Britain.
The “profound” and “sagacious” emperor of the French determined to elevate France to the highest position among the nations, is credited with understanding both the designs of Great Britain and the predicament of the Czar. He has no desire to see the South conquered, for then the United States is likely to become a militant empire, stretching out over Mexico, Central America and the West Indies, and thus grasping and monopolizing every great tropical product of the western world. Nor does he intend for Great Britain to reap the profits of the ruin of American commerce, if that should be the result of the war. Both contingencies must be defeated since “either would circumscribe the importance of France, diminish the influence of the French empire, wound the vanity of the French people, and endanger the present dynasty upon the throne.” To this great end he had seized upon Mexico, forestalling the United States and securing to France a rich tropical region from which could be drawn the raw materials of manufactures, a region in which the existent institution of peonage could easily be converted into the institution of slavery. It could be no part of his plans to suffer the South to be subjugated for that would inevitably bring him into conflict with the undivided United States; it must be his purpose first to secure himself in Mexico and then intervene in behalf of the South. This would break the power of the North, foil Great Britain, create an immense French empire and carry France to a higher position than she had ever held even in the days of the great Napoleon.
Closing the long quotation, Major Tyler points out that the Polish revolution and the fear of French interference there had lately caused the Czar to draw closer to the United States and Great Britain, and had forced Napoleon III to conciliate Austria by offering the crown of Mexico to Maximilian. The Emperor could not afford to risk fighting the United States, Great Britain and Russia combined, by intervening alone in the American struggle upon the vague principles of humanity and in consideration of his own selfish advantages. The principle of European balance of power would admit only of a joint intervention, and then not in behalf of the South, but in accordance with the doctrine of uti possidetis, whereby the South would be stripped of all its states now held by the North. This would leave the South weak, divided, and a possible prey to the greed of the intervening powers. How this danger could be avoided while securing effective intervention is the substance of the remainder of the document, which follows herewith. 92
Having thus, gentlemen, sincerely, according to my best judgment and conviction, unfolded our “Status,” both at Home and in respect to Foreign Nations, in the light of existing facts and future probabilities, permit me now to say it is proposed to shun all the evils that have been shadowed forth, whether to be derived from the arms of the United States, or whether from an Armed Intervention of the European Powers. It is believed that the arms of the one and the schemes of the other may be defeated; that the Confederate Cause may be made to prevail against both; that the Confederate Government may be maintained in its integrity; and that Human Liberty and Republican principles may be established triumphantly; without jeoparding the peace of Europe; and this through the instrumentality of Texas, springing out of the Wilderness, as she has done, like Israel's Host of old. Let us proceed now to this issue.
Some years ago, in the course of the career of that miracle of Genius, Napoleon the Great, while conducting the Arms of France against the combined Powers of Europe, Spain, then in possession of all South America and the greater part of North America, ceded to France the “District of Orleans and the Territory of Louisiana.” Afterwards, Napoleon, fearing that the Purchase might be seized by the Superior Maritime strength of Great Britain, and that, in conjunction with the Canadas, it would give to that Nation a Territorial extent in North America entirely surrounding and envelopeing the United States, furnishing the ultimate means of crushing out the young Republic and grasping a range of Commerce before which no other Empire could stand, sold this Purchase to the United States in the hope of substantiating those States against Great Britain and building them up into a powerful Commercial and Manufacturing Rival, but stipulating in the Deed, or Treaty of Sale, among other things, with his usual clearness of perception and sense of Justice, that, “the Inhabitants of the ceded District and Territory shall be maintained and protected by the United States in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the Religion they profess”; and, in approving the Treaty, he thus wrote to the Inhabitants, “let the Louisianians know that we separate from them with regrets, but that we stipulate in their favor everything that they can desire.” Similar guarantees in behalf of the Inhabitants had been given by France to Spain. The whole world at the time acknowledged “property” in Slaves and Slave Labor, and Negro-Slavery existed among the Inhabitants and, by the local law, extended over the whole District and Territory from the Nueces, if not the Rio Grande, to Vancouver's Island, for the Purchase itself embraced not only the States and Territories now attached to the Trans-Mississippi Department, but extended over Iowa, Minnesota, Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska, Washington and Oregon.
Here, then, were solemn Treaty Stipulations, in perfect accordance with the sense of the age, binding upon the United States to “Maintain and protect” the institution of Negro-Slavery and property in Negro-Slaves among the Inhabitants of the Louisianas, and resting in the National honor and good faith of France and Spain to exact the full measure and observance of for all time to come so long as the Inhabitants should desire it. And by the Constitution of the United States this Treaty stood as a part of “the Supreme Law of the Land.” Nevertheless, this Treaty, thus circumstanced, has been violated time and again by the United States, but never during the reign of Napoleon. Before the United States proceeded to violate it for the first time, in 1819-20, through the vote of the North in the Congress at Washington, upon the question of the admission of Missouri into the Union as a Slaveholding State, and by the application of the “Compromise line” cutting off and excluding Negro-Slaves from among the Inhabitants of the Territory north of that line, Napoleon was overthrown in France and chained to the rock of Helena, and the Bourbons, whose policy it was to ignore his acts where they could not be set aside, acceded to the Thrones of France and Spain, and those Governments lost sight of their guarantees to the Inhabitants of the Louisianas. This State of things continued, necessarily, until the resubversion of the Bourbons and the reaccession of the Napoleonic Dynasty to the Throne of France in the person of Louis Napoleon. By the fact of the reaccession of the Napoleonic Dynasty this Treaty becomes re-established in the honor of France and upon the conscience of the Emperor. And as Louis Napoleon is now recognized and acknowledged as the Lawful Sovereign of France, in right of his uncle and the French People, by the European Powers, International Law will justify him in the assertion of the guarantees of this Treaty against the United States in favor of the Inhabitants of the Louisianas, and deprives those Powers of the pretext of war for his so doing. The United States, taking advantage of the situation in France, and in contempt of their own Constitution, have not only, through the force of the North in the Union, time and again, violated this Treaty, as we have said, but they have finally driven the Inhabitants of the country who still own slaves to arms in defence of their rights under its stipulations; and now the United States threaten utterly to extinguish these rights by depriving these Inhabitants of their liberties, robbing them of their property, and abolishing Negro-Slavery. So far from maintaining and protecting the Inhabitants in the “free enjoyment” of their liberty, property and religion, the course of the United States has been and still is utterly to deprive them of liberty, property and religion, together with Life itself;—even their lands are confiscated.
All the States of the Trans-Mississippi Department would have the right, under this Treaty, not only to Appeal to France and Spain for protection, but to demand of those Governments the fulfillment of its conditions as against the United States, in the past as in the present, had they equally the power of speech and of action. But, as has been stated, Missouri with the remorseless sword of the Enemy at her throat is rendered utterly nerveless, while her Inhabitants are being ruthlessly despoiled alike of liberty and property; and Arkansas and Louisiana are so far shackled and reduced that neither of them can speak, or act, with authority. Texas alone, among them all, remains free, sovereign and independent, with the full power of speech and of action, and it is for her to decide whether she will assert the true dignity of her position, or remain silent on the subject, suffering events still to proceed until the war shall close around her borders and enfold her in its Anaconda grasp. Should she determine upon action it will be her high duty and privilege to speak to the issue not only for herself, but to represent the situation and condition of Missouri, Arkansas and Louisiana, and to embrace them in her Petition and demand. That Texas was originally a part of the Louisiana Territory, suffered to lapse through the neglect of the United States controlled by the policy of the North in the Government, can scarcely admit of a doubt. Those best versed in the history of the times of the Purchase always so asserted; and Mr. Benton in his annals of “Thirty Years” service in the Senate, as well as in his speeches upon the question of the admission of Texas into the Union, invariably styles the measure, not one of “annexation,” but of “reannexation.” She can, at this time, claim it to be her especial province to take action under the Treaty with France, and that between France and Spain, since, heretofore, while in an anomalous condition, she was debarred from speech, like an Infant at Law, and it was not until she was “reannexed” to the United States that she recovered her Status beneath the folds of its stipulations and guarantees that are now being threatened by the United States with invasion, subversion and destruction, and in defence of which she has been driven to the direful necessity of Revolution and War.
This action on the part of Texas is urged, not for the purpose of severing her from the Confederacy, but for the purpose of restoring her connections with the Confederacy. We have seen that she is isolated and cut off from the Government at Richmond, and from nearly all resources exterior to herself, and that before these connections can be re-established the Enemy must be hurled back from Louisiana and Arkansas, overwhelmed in Mississippi as well as in Tennessee, and his Fleets be expelled from the Mississippi River and destroyed in the Gulf of Mexico. These results can only be achieved by bringing to bear against the Enemy superior forces, and these forces can only be obtained from France, or from France and Spain combined. Otherwise the struggle has to be made with forty thousand men, at the most, numbering those now in the service with those that hereafter may be raised, unsupported by a Navy and a blockaded Coast, against ninety thousand, at the least, that may be increased to two hundred thousand, supported by powerful and unopposed Fleets, a mercantile marine the largest in the world, and the markets of the universe open to them for supplies. In considering the subject let us not deceive ourselves. The necessity for Foreign aid is becoming, if, indeed, it has not already become absolute, and yet, we can not afford the risk of an “armed intervention” of the Commercial Powers and the application of the doctrine of “Uti possidetis.”
But why should Texas take this step rather than the Government at Richmond, or, in other words, why should Texas originate the step though final action were had at Richmond? She should do so for the reasons that have been assigned, and because our Confederate authorities can only act through a general agency and a general delegation of powers, and, in so acting, must act for the whole, as a whole, rather than for a part in reference to the whole. To act for a part only would be to act invidiously, to regate their general authority, and to attract, in all probability, odium and denunciation. Reasons both of policy and propriety would, very likely, prevent such action though never so urgent and desirable. Doubtless, our authorities have done and are doing everything regitimately in their power to induce friendly Intervention, as they have done and are doing to repel the Enemy; but do they object to any assistance that Texas may now bring them in the way of Men and Materials of War that she alone can control, and will they object to her assistance through measures which she alone can command and inaugurate? It would be illogical so to conclude. They will be, unless I greatly err, only too happy to receive such assistance in relief of the delicacy of their position. It could not be viewed in the light of a violation of the Treaty making power confided by the States to the Confederate Government, for it would not be in the line of any new contract, or alliance, with a Foreign Power, but simply an appeal and demand that an existing contract and alliance shall be duly executed. But, under the pressure of our necessities, we willingly close our eyes to many departures from the strict rule of Civil right and Constitutional formalities in order to secure vigor and energy in the Common Cause and Success to our efforts for the general good. Let us not then impede this movement on the part of Texas by objections founded in casuistry, or oversensitive regard to the mode and manner of its conduct, its object and termination being the interests of us all and the substantiation of the Confederacy.
There is one feature associated with this Treaty that must be of an exceedingly interesting and attractive character to France, and which can not fail to excite the indignation of the French People by reason of its desecration. It will be remembered that out of the lands embraced in the “District of Orleans” the United States made an extensive donation, now comprehending much of the City of Orleans, to Gilbert Mortier de La Fayette, in consideration of his distinguished Revolutionary services, and large sums of money expended out of his private purse in support of our Troops and Arms during the War of the Revolution. This donation he consented to accept, but on discovering that the lands were, already, for the most part, occupied by Settlers, he generously and unreservedly, with his usual liberality and magnanimity of soul, confirmed them in their possessions without restriction upon their domestic usages. These Settlers were, at the time, Slaveholders, and all their usages partook of the Institution of Slavery. The United States after first oppressively compelling these “Inhabitants” to proclaim their Constitutional privilege to secede from the Union in defence of their Rights and Liberties, have now proceeded, sword in hand, to rob them of their slaves, to confiscate their Real Estate, and to deprive them even of life if prompted by revenge, or policy, equally in contempt of the Donation, of the Bounty of La Fayette under it, and of the Treaty with France. Surely neither the French Government, nor the French People, will suffer the memory of La Fayette to be thus desecrated and their National honor to be thus despised in disregard of the fundamental principles of International Law. It would be entirely proper to embrace the case in any official proceedings had upon the subject of the Treaty.
These proceedings should be, as has been suggested, in the Nature of an Appeal, or demand, upon the Emperor of the French, by Texas, endorsed, if need be and time permitted, by the Government at Richmond, covering all the “Inhabitants” of the States and Territories of the Trans-Mississippi Department, in the full light of the Provisions of the Treaty, the violations of these provisions and the oppressions of the “Inhabitants,” and the general and special circumstances involved in the conduct of the United States.
Should France, through the action of Texas in the manner indicated, be induced to interpose in behalf of the “Inhabitants” of the States and Territories of the Trans-Mississippi Department, on the basis of the Treaty of Purchase of the Louisianas, the advantages derived to the Confederacy would be incalculable, not only during the War, but after the declaration of Peace. The Power of Spain would be unavoidably involved in the direction of the action of France; and Brazil, Mexico, Italy and Austria, would be placed in the position of armed Neutrals leading to the side of France and Spain, compelling Great Britain to look well to herself before she hazarded the repose of Europe, though she were disposed to question the grounds of the interposition of France. Indeed, Great Britain, in view of her Commercial and Manufacturing interests, would, under the new situation of affairs, soon see the necessity on her part, not of opposing, but of joining in the movement. In the meanwhile, it is reasonable to suppose, the Polish difficulty would be adjusted and a Confederate Fleet liberated from the Ports of Europe to operate along the Atlantic Coast in recovery of the Cities and Harbors captured by the Enemy. As matters began to assume this shape the probabilities are that the North would gladly agree to an Armistice and negotiations for peace. But should they, under these circumstances, determine upon continuing the War their destruction would be inevitable, seeing which Great Britain would not only refuse to stir in their behalf but would immediately spring to their overthrow, as the real policy of the British Ministry is founded in the idea of the annihilation of their commercial and Manufacturing systems resting on Southern products. These products would be now for distribution throughout the world, and no longer confined to the States of the North, neither would the North any longer command and monopolize the Carrying trade of the South. They would be stripped of all their exclusive privileges heretofore enjoyed under their navigation acts, and fall like Lucifer to rise no more. A French and Spanish Fleet, and a Franco-Mexican Army, stand in readiness in the Gulf of Mexico and along its shores, almost at our doors and within our call, to advance, in conjunction with the Confederate forces under Smith, Magruder and Price, against Banks in Louisiana, and Steele and Davidson in Arkansas, while raising the blockade of New Orleans and clearing out the Mississippi River. Thus the power of the Northwestern States on this side the Mississippi would be broken, while that of the Middle and the Eastern States on the other side would be crushed beneath the hammering blows of Lee, Beauregard, Johnston and Bragg. Finally, it would remain for the Confederacy and its Allies to dictate to the Government of the North their own terms of adjustment, and everywhere the abolition sentiment would expire.
These terms of adjustment could only be such as to assure the impoverishment of the North, following their overthrow and the declaration of peace. The Northern States would be deprived of the trade of the South and the markets of the South; their ships would rot at their wharfs for the want of employment, and their Factories would crumble to their foundations. The Trade of the South would be no longer confined to Philadelphia, New York and Boston, but would be extended to London, Liverpool, Havre, Paris, Lisbon, Madrid, Vienna, Genoa, Florence, Rome, Havana and Rio Janeiro. The shipping of the South would be no longer restricted to Northern bottoms, but would command the Mercantile Marine of the World. The Staples of the South would be no longer monopolized by twenty millions of people at the North, but would be competed for by fifty millions in Great Britain and her Colonies, fifty millions in France and her Colonies, forty millions in Spain and her Colonies, forty millions in Austria, and twenty-seven millions in Italy, without regard to Brazil and Mexico. All that the South could raise would not supply her markets; and she would grow to be the richest and most glorious Confederated Republic the world ever saw, upon the ruins of the North. Thus from the thistle danger should we pluck the flower safety, avoid the doctrine of “Uti possidetis,” establish our Independence, preserve Liberty, increase our Wealth and Power, and annihilate our Enemy.
We have said that it is for Texas to accomplish these results. Eighteen months ago a writer in the “Richmond Whig,” foreseeing the time when Texas would probably be called upon thus to act and to assume the Confederate Cause, in discanting upon the aspect of public affairs and the events of the future, thus spoke:
“The Cause of Liberty is never lost. It survives the chain and the dungeon, the axe and the halter. It is immortal. Age, that brings to everything else decay and death, gives to it increase of vigor and perennial youth. Sanctified in heaven it is perpetuated on Earth. Its spirit alone animates to a noble and lofty destiny. With the sword it strikes down the oppressor's rod as the waves of the sea lashed Canute from the Shore. Who shall bid its strong pulsations to cease, or shackle its unconquerable arm? When General Washington was asked what he would do if the British forces should come to possess all of our Cities and the Country bordering the Atlantic Ocean, constituting nearly the whole of the settled portions of the thirteen original States, he unhesitatingly replied, “We shall retire across the Alleghanies and still keep up the War of Independence.” So let it be now asked what shall we do if the Enemy comes to possess himself of our Commercial Marts on the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico, and maintains occupation of all the adjacent Country, and the instant reply should be, “retire to the frontier lines of Texas with our Armies, and remove into that State our domestic Altars—our men servants and our maid servants—and there defy the World in Arms.”
“This great State, in point of geographical extent, is divided into three parts. Beginning on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, the first division is a vast Coast Prairie, extending four hundred miles in length, from the Sabine to the Rio Grande, with an average width of forty miles. In addition to the two Rivers mentioned, the Brazos, the Colorado, the Guadalupe, the Trinity, the San Antonio, and the Nueces, make their exit to the Gulf across this region and, within its bounds, their waters may be said to be navigable. The soil is a black alluvial, the deposit of unnumbered ages, formed by the recession of the waters of the Gulf, and for productiveness equal to any in the world. Under full cultivation here alone would be garnered as much Sugar and Cotton as are now produced in all America. The second division extends along the Red River and its Tributaries, covering a space as large as that occupied by either one of the older States, and consists of a soil well adapted to tobacco and the cereals, and favorably comparing with the richest grain growing and tobacco lands of the Earth. The third division, embracing the remainder of the State, in extent from three to four times the magnitude of Tennessee, or Georgia, reposes on the upper waters of the Rivers mentioned, and consist for the most part, of an elevated, rolling and perfectly salubrious Country. There is not to be found a region more productive in the natural grasses than this and, consequently, it is unexcelled for stock-raising purposes.
“Thus is this magnificent domain spread out on the map, beneath a temperate sun and in the midst of a genial clime, a glory and a blessing to the Family of Man, and the eternal abode of Liberty. Capable of maintaining in comfort a population of fifty millions of Inhabitants, the addition of ten millions would only serve to develop its agricultural resources, to give form and refinement to its social system, and strength and beauty to its political Institutions. With a Coast line, through natural advantages, of easy defence, and Vast interior Plains as inhospitable to an invading Enemy as the Steppes of Russia, alike impenetrable and unassailable if properly guarded, here might Freedom repose though surrounded by the wrecks of crushed Republics, and in the midst of the rage and agonies of groaning Kingdoms and Empires. With this Refuge and this Hope abiding with us forever, whether prostrate in defeat, or victoriously erect, let us bravely fight on, confident of reaching, in the end, the radiant goal of honor and Independence.”
With these views and sentiments, constituting Texas the Palladium of Liberty and the Home of Humanity, all will agree. Let us then, from those States oppressed by the Enemy, gather our Wives and our Children within her ample fold; unite our energies and concentrate our Armies in defence of her frontiers; rivet an Alliance with France and Spain; and lead her own People and those of Louisiana, Arkansas and Missouri, together with the entire Confederacy, to victory over the foe and the triumph of our Cause.
Not only are France and Spain interested in the Wellfare of the `Inhabitants' of the Trans-Mississippi Department, but Spain is moreover called upon to assert against the United States the provisions of the Treaty for the purchase of the Floridas, stipulating in favor of the People there no less extensive privileges than those embraced in the Treaty with France. These Stipulations, to preserve which Florida felt herself compelled to secede from the Old Union, the United States have as little regarded as those of the Treaty with France. The Rights of Property and the Rights of Persons, Life, Liberty, Religious privileges, and the pursuit of happiness, are no less desecrated and spurned in the Floridas than in the Louisianas: and it is but reasonable to suppose that Spain will appeal to the fact in taking action with France in behalf of the Confederacy.
The special advantages to be derived to Spain and France from intervening in our behalf, on the basis proposed, apart from the incentives of National honor bound by the Treaties to which reference has been made, would be secured by Commercial arrangements with the Confederate States assuring to them the chief benefits of our Carrying Trade, of our Markets, and in our Raw Materials for Manufactures. And when it is remembered that the products and exchanges of the South, alone, have already given rise to an Export and Import trade of four hundred millions a year, conducted by the North, these advantages bid sufficiently high, in themselves, apart from all other considerations, to induce their interference. Gaining these advantages they would not desire to be complicated in our Domestic Affairs and burthened with our Government, though the `Balance of Power Principle' in Europe should permit it. Similar advantages, but on a much more limited scale, having been secured in Mexico they now cast away the Government on Maximilian. While we, on our part, though restricted in our dealings to these two Nations and their Colonies, which, however, would not be the case, could very well afford to transfer our Shipping and Markets from twenty millions at the North, to ninety millions in France and Spain and their Dependencies, more advanced in Civilization and equally Wealthy. In this age the extension of Commerce and Trade, rather than the pride of Dominion, controls the policy of Nations, makes War and contracts Peace.
In conclusion, Gentlemen, again suffer me to entreat you to view our Status and that of the Enemy, not in the light of our hopes and wishes, but devoid of feeling and with a clear and unprejudiced eye; not for the purpose of generating despondency and abating our exertions, but rather to excite, if possible, to still more vigorous measures and to bring into play more potent agencies. It is true that Texas, as yet, has not felt the oppression of this War at her own doors. It is true that the fire and sword of the Enemy, and the devastation of contending armies, has not yet spread havoc and ruin throughout her borders, as in other States less favourably circumstanced. It is true that heretofore she had been the market of supplies for our Service in Beef and Oxen, horses and mules, adding to her wealth in reality; and that she is now becoming the beneficient granary, and the chief dealer in Cotton, in the line of wants of the Government, receiving much money justly in return. But thousands of her brave Sons have already fallen upon the battlefields of Arkansas, and Louisiana, and Missouri, and Mississippi, and Tennessee, and Kentucky, and Virginia, where the sword has reeked itself in blood; where fire has consumed the family rooftree; where innumerable farms, once verdant in culture, have been ravaged and left desolate; and from whence thousands upon thousands of patriotic hearts beating in the breasts of Southern Wives and Mothers, and grey-haired Sires, and pratling Infancy, have been driven out and exiled sooner than submit to the Invader. From these States the wail of suffering is heard, even now, throughout the length and breadth of Texas, along all of her thoroughfares, appealing not only for an asylum, but for sterner and more effective resistence, and retributive Justice to the foe. Every where the War is pressing upon our subsistance. Every where the War is exhausting our male population; and, I pray God, that its worst calamities, felt elsewhere, may be averted, forever, from Texas. But how is it with the North? Their land is still full of supplies, and still swarms with a superabundant population drawn from the teeming womb of Europe, converting their armies into Hydraheaded Monsters so that as fast as the head of one is crushed in another springs out to avenge its loss and inflict its deadly wounds. The waste of the battle-field is scarcely felt or cared for there. The Commercial, Manufacturing, and Mercantile Classes at the North, wielding the indigent masses of both Hemispheres concentrated there, and controlling the Government to suit themselves, feel not the War save in the increase of their gains through unlimited Army and Navy Contracts for grain, for flour, for sugar, for Coffee, for blankets, for Tents, for clothing, for medicines, for Hospitals and Hospital Stores, for Wagons and Ambulances, for Rail-road and Steamboat Transportation, for military equipments, for ordnance and ordnance stores, for ammunition and arms of all kinds, for Ship-building, for Coal and iron, and all the other means and appliances and requirements of a service that, in itself, has generated with them new and abundant fields of industrial application and profit, in the place of the old channels of occupation and investment subverted by the Civil disturbance in the Country. Their wharfs are still loaded with goods and luxuries drawn from every clime—linnens and silks and broadcloths taking the place of cotton drills and muslins;—and from the Ball Room to the Dining Room still issue the sounds of fulness and of Joy, as of yore. Why should this not be so, when the thunder of battle that has swept through the Confederacy, decimating our People, devastating our Estates, and crimsoning our land with blood, has never struck its wild alarum in their ears, save for an instant on the borders of Pennsylvania, and they only know by telegrahpic dispatches and official reports on paper that battles have been fought? No greater mistake is made by the South than the Supposition that the North is hopelessly suffering from the War, save that other mistake in which we indulge leading to the idea that the War can be made to cease, by our own exertions, without the sacrifice of either Party. It is a war of Annihilation to the one, or to the other, at least in the estimation of the North. The South must be subjugated, or the North must perish, is the only view entertained by the North. To this complexion the issue has come, and to substantiate the South and overthrow the North foreign alliances should be successfully solicited.
In the hope of the speedy accomplishment of these ends I have ventured to address you, Gentlemen; and you will pardon me if I do not condescend to notice the idle rumours afloat as to the object of my visit to Texas. They are alike unworthy of myself, of your attention, and of the sources from whence they emanate. I have approached you unreservedly, and having now performed a duty residing in my Conscience, I shall silently leave the rest to God and the Country.
Believe me to be With the profoundest respect and consideration, Your friend and Servant, John Tyler. October 27, 1863.
87. Price had just been driven out of Little Rock into Southern Arkansas by General Steele.
88. War of Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, Pt. II, pp. 993, 1003-1010.
89. Lubbock, Six Decades, pp. 313-314, note.
90. It is interesting to note that attention was called to the treaty of 1803 in March, 1862, by Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, who feared French aggression on the basis of its stipulations. See circular letter in Texas Archives, quoted in part by Lubbock, Six Decades, p. 510. The treaty was once cited also to prove that France could not intervent against the United States. Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life, I, 465.
91. Two attempts were made by General Banks to invade Texas in the fall of 1863: the first met defeat at Sabine Pass in September; the second captured and held Brownsville from November to July 30, 1864.
92. The original memorial apparently in Tyler's handwriting and signed by him is in the Texas Archives, Secretary of State's office, Austin, Texas.
How to cite:
"THE LAST HOPE OF THE CONFEDERACY—JOHN TYLER TO THE GOVERNOR AND AUTHORITIES OF TEXAS ", Volume 014, Number 2, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, Page 129 - 145. http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v014/n2/article_3.html
[Accessed Sun Nov 23 12:15:14 CST 2008]
