1. The Condition of the Problem.—A statement as to the conditions under which this paper was written is pertinent here. One has only to glance over the works in English which deal with the general history of Texas to note the absence of information bearing upon the subject which I have endeavored to treat. The standard histories of Texas give only isolated references here and there to Apache relations in Texas between 1718 and 1750. Indeed, so scanty are their accounts on this point that they may be entirely ignored. Of monographic discussions of the subject, there are none. 5 Although ethnologists have written more or less of the Apaches and their various subdivisions, very little pertaining to the period and region covered by this paper has been produced. 6 The reason for such a paucity of information on the subject in English works is that the material from which a history of this topic can alone be constructed has been buried hitherto in manuscripts written in a foreign language and preserved, for the larger part, in foreign archives.
Of Spanish works, only two are important for the subject. Antonio Bonilla, in his Breve Compendio, which has only recently been printed, gives a brief outline of Apache hostilities in Texas; 7 and Arricivita, in his Crónica Apostólica y Seráfica (México, 1791), gives a considerable amount of information concerning the efforts of the Franciscans to reduce the Apaches of Texas to mission life. Indeed, he is practically the only one who has written anything upon this phase of the subject. In most respects, however, Arricivita emphasizes the history, if at all, from the standpoint of the missionary, to whose side he naturally inclines. At several points, nevertheless, both authors have been useful in supplementing the documents which I have used. 8
Having practically nothing in print to guide me, I have had to rely almost entirely upon manuscript sources. The information herein presented has been gathered from a wide range of documents, whose originals are in the Archivo General y Público of Mexico, the archives of the College of Santa Cruz de Querétaro and of Guadalupe de Zacatecas, the state archive of Coahuila at Saltillo, the Béxar and Nacogdoches archives at Austin, Texas, the San Antonio mission records, and in other miscellaneous repositories. 9
2. The Aim of This Paper.—The primary aim in writing this paper was to prepare an introduction to the history of the Franciscan missions established for the Apache Indians in the middle of the eighteenth century on the San Sabá and Nueces rivers of western Texas. To understand these missionary activities it scemed necessary to examine carefully the previous relations between the eastern Apache Indians and their Spanish neighbors. Coupled with this motive was the consideration that Apache relations, though forming a large factor in the history of Spanish colonization in western and central Texas, have been all but unknown. This consideration has seemed to justify, in this first special treatment of the subject, what may be regarded as a painful amount of detail. Since the ethnology of the eastern Apaches has been as little known as their early relations with the Spaniards, some effort has been made in the course of the study, to gather and combine what could be learned concerning their early organization and customs. 10
3. Spanish Activities in Texas Before 1718.—Spanish interest in Texas began in the early sixteenth century. The description of the country given by Cabeza de Vaca and his companions in 1536 gave rise to many exploring expeditions in which Texas figured to a greater or lesser degree, but it was not until a century and a half later that definite steps were taken to occupy this region.
Fear of French aggression, a desire to open up a short route between Havana and New Mexico by way of the Bay of Espíritu Santo, and the missionary zeal of the Spanish friars led to the sending of an expedition in 1689 under Captain Alonzo de León, who found La Salle's fort and explored the Bay of Espíritu Santo. In 1690 a second expedition was led by De León. The French fort was now destroyed, and a mission was established near the Neches among the Hasinai, or Texas, Indians. A few months later a second mission was founded in the same locality.
To strengthen these missions by the erection of others, to investigate rumors of French settlements, and to secure a hold in the Cadodacho country, Don Domingo Terán de los Ríos was sent out in 1691. But his expedition was a comparative failure, and two years later the missions already established were abandoned.
It has been generally believed that the Spaniards gave little thought to Texas from the time of the abandonment of the missions in 1693 until Saint Denis's expedition in 1714. But recent investigations and many documents now available show that such is not the case. During all these years there was a steady advance of missionary work northward from Coahuila. In the years 1699-1701 the missions of San Juan Bautista, San Bernardo, and San Francisco Solano were established on the Rio Grande, and ministered to the Indians living north of that stream. About 1703 Father Hidalgo began his long-continued effort to get aid in reestablishing the missions among the Hasinai. In 1707 an attempt was made to advance the mission frontier to the Rio Frio, and in the same year Diego Ramón made an expedition to the Colorado. Two years later Fathers Espinosa and Olivares went with a party of soldiers to the Colorado, where they expected to meet the Hasinai Indians and to arrange for reducing them to mission life. During this period many of the Indians who were served at the Rio Grande missions came from the region of San Antonio. Thus, viewed from the missionary's standpoint, the establishment of a mission at San Antonio in 1718 was not a sudden advance, but merely the next logical step in the expansion of the Coahuila mission frontier. 11
In 1714 Saint Denis made his overland journey into Spanish territory, which aroused the civil authorities to renewed activities, and Captain Domingo Ramón was now appointed to lead an expedition to refound the missions of eastern Texas. In the years 1716-1717 six missions and a presidio were erected under his direction between the Neches and Red rivers, and thus the Spaniards put forward an incontrovertible claim to the possession of Texas—that of actual occupation.
By this action French advance was guarded against on the Louisiana frontier. But in 1718 New Orleans was founded, and orders were given by the French for the reoccupation of the Bay of Espíritu Santo. In the same year San Antonio was founded by the Spaniards, in part as an answer to this French activity on the Gulf and in part to extend missionary work among the Coahuiltecan tribes. And thus the most important center in the history of Spanish Texas began to play a part in the life of the province. 12
4. The “Apaches de Oriente.”—As has already been pointed out, the early history of the western Texas settlements, of which San Antonio was the center, is, in a very large measure, a history of relations with the Apache Indians who lived to the west and northwest. The Apaches are a branch of the Athapascan family, the most widely distributed of the North American Indian linguistic groups. The Athapascans are classified by ethnologists into three divisions, Northern, Pacific, and Southern, and the Southern is subdivied into the Navajo of New Mexico, the “Apaches,” a group of tribes called by this name, and surrounding the Navajo, and the Texas Apaches, or Lipanes. The designation “Apache” probably came from ápachu, “enemy,” the Zuñi name for the Navajos, who were called by the early Spaniards “Apaches de Nabaju.” 13
Most of the information hitherto at hand concerning the Texas Apaches relates to comparatively recent times, and there has been a lack of definite knowledge of them during the early Spanish period. The period is dark enough even now, but many new facts of general importance have been gleaned during the course of the present study, and some of them may be summarized here, out of the chronological order of the narrative, by way of introduction. The details will be made to appear in the historical order in which they became known and differentiated.
The Spaniards of the latter eighteenth century, when information was relatively complete, distinguished between the “Apaches de Occidente,” or Western Apaches, and the “Apaches de Oriente,” or Eastern Apaches, the latter being the ones with which this paper deals. The principal tribes of the Eastern Apaches known at that time were the Lipan (Ypande), Natagés (sometimes called Apaches proper), and the Mescaleros. 14 In the period covered by this paper (1718-1750) the tribes chiefly known in Texas were the Lipan and the Natagés, especially the former. They went under various names, and various subdivisions were sometimes distinguished. But in the early part of the period the Texas documents make no distinction, as later was the case, between the different Apache bands, but all are included under the generic name of “Apaches.” The Lipan, when first known to the Texans, lived far to the northwest of San Antonio, on the upper reaches of the Colorado, Brazos, and Red rivers, but gradually they moved south before the advancing Comanches, until by 1732 they made their home in the country of the San Sabá, Chanas (Llano), and Pedernales. About 1750 some of them established themselves on the Medina, and others pushed on to the Rio Grande. The Natagés and the Mescaleros lived far to the southwestward, in the country of the Pecos and the Rio Grande. These Eastern Apaches were not numerous, but were led by petty chiefs, which made it difficult to deal with the tribes as wholes. And in proportion to their numerical strength, their capacity to make trouble was surprisingly great. During this period they apparently did not use firearms, but fought, on horseback, with bows, spears, and darts, and had armor for both man and horse.
1. Apache Relations in Texas Before 1718.—The Apaches were well known in New Mexico at a very early date. Before the establishment of Texas they pestered the frontiers of Nueva Viscaya and Coahuila, and no sooner had the Spaniards founded San Antonio than it experienced similar visitations. In his diary of 1691, Father Massanet made the following statement concerning the Apaches, which is a good summary of knowledge of them in Texas at this time. He says, “The Apaches form a chain running from east to west, and wage war with all; with the Salineros alone do they maintain peace. They have always had wars with the Spaniards of New Mexico, for, although truces have been made, they have endured little. In the end they conquer all the tribes; yet it is said that they are not brave because they fight with armoured horses. They have defensive and offensive weapons, and are very skillful and warlike Indians.” 15
Before the establishment of San Antonio the Spaniards of eastern Texas had come into contact with the Apaches through the wars which the latter waged with their inveterate foes, the “Texas.” The part of the Spaniards in these wars was, no doubt, one of the causes for the attacks which were subsequently made on San Antonio. All of the tribes east of the middle Colorado were allied against the Apaches, and many bloody encounters took place between the two groups. From the time of the first Spanish entry into their country, the “Texas” Indians enlisted the aid of the soldiers, just as a few years before they had enlisted a part of Joutel's men. 16 Hidalgo tells us that in August, 1692, the soldiers joined the Texas in a campaign against the Apaches, going west-ward until the land of the enemy was reached. While the invaders were sleeping peacefully one night the Apaches attacked them, and, says our informant, had it not been for the firearms of the Spaniards, not one of them would have returned home. 17 On another campaign of this early period the Texans, with the aid of the Spaniards, are said to have won a great victory over the Apaches, killing one hundred and thirty-six of their number. 18 Joseph de Urrutia, the romantic character who remained in Texas after the abandonment in 1693, says, with probable exaggeration, that he lived among the Texas tribes for seven years and organized them for campaigns against the Apaches, acting in the capacity of capitán grande, and often leading more than 10,000 warriors against the common foe. 19
Thus it seems that the Spaniards of Texas were first known to the Apaches in the light of foes, and that early relations between them were confined to hostile acts. 20
2. Raids About San Antonio and Flores's Campaign, (1718-1723).—Had the Spaniards refused to give aid to the Texas, they might have been spared, possibly, a great deal of trouble, but at the outset they had definitely put themselves on record as enemies of the Apaches, and the latter did not forget it. The Apache terror overshadows Spanish Texas from the founding of San Antonio.
In the instructions given to Governor Alarcon, in 1718, for the planting of this new outpost, he was cautioned to be on his guard against the Apaches, and was told to organize the neighboring tribes in a defensive alliance against them, as there was much danger of attack from this “barbarous enemy.” 21 These fears were quickly realized, for as soon as the Apaches learned of the establishment of Béxar they began to harass it. Before the Marqués de Aguayo had made his expedition into Texas in 1721-2, 22 they had already become so bold as to attack the supply trains from Coahuila to San Antonio, stealing mules and killing the drivers. 23 Aguayo fully realized the danger. In 1720 he had endeavored from Coahuila to secure peace with the Apaches, but they would make no concessions. Instead they brazenly declared their hostile intentions by hanging red cloth from arrows stuck in the ground near San Antonio. 24 While Aguayo was on his way from Monclova to Texas, in 1721, his men had a skirmish just before reaching San Antonio with some Indians whom they supposed to be Apaches. Two days before his arrival there a pack train had been attacked. In consequence, several detachments were sent out from San Antonio for the purpose of checking these hostilities. 25
Nevertheless, Aguayo's policy was one of conciliation. He wished to make friends of the Apaches, and as he journeyed from San Antonio to eastern Texas he erected several crosses, in order, as he said, “to exalt the cross in the midst of so much idolatry, and to leave signs of peace to the Apaches Indians, who consider them as such and know from them that Spaniards have been there.” 26 No Apaches were encountered by Aguayo himself, however, and in this he was disappointed, for his plan was to take some of them prisoners and bring about peace through their mediation. 27
When Aguayo reached Los Adaes he learned that Fray Joseph Pita, a lay brother of the College of the Santa Cruz de Querétaro, had been killed a short time previous while en route to East Texas. The friar had ventured forth to hunt buffalo without the protection of the soldiers, and Indians, said to be Apaches, killed him between the San Xavier and the Brazos rivers. His remains were found in 1723, as we shall see, and were taken to San Antonio by Captain Nicolás Flores. 28
After Aguayo's return to Coahuila in 1722, the Apaches continued to steal horses, and on one occasion five Indians managed to make off with fifty of them. Captain Flores, with ten men, gave chase to the thieves, recovered the horses, and took back to San Antonio the heads of four of the offenders, together with some spears and some skin armor used to protect the horses of the Indians. 29 Shortly after this, in April, 1722, Flores was given command of the presidio, 30 and with his office he inherited the Apache trouble.
After Flores succeeded to the command of the presidio such was his vigilance, he said, that no horses were stolen from Béxar until August 17, 1723. 31 Upon this date, however, a band of Apaches made a raid upon the stock of the presidio. In spite of the fact that the corral was locked and that ten soldiers guarded the gates, the Indians broke in and carried off eighty horses. Captain Flores was notified, and, although it was midnight, set out in pursuit. After a vain chase that lasted until noon of the following day, he decided to return to the presidio for reinforcements. Two days later he again set out with a force of thirty soldiers, including eight from Bahía, and thirty mission Indians, to follow the trail of the Apaches. He carried only two pack loads of flour, and relied for meat upon buffalo and deer. In five days he passed the Lomería, or range of hills, to the north, and on September 24, thirty-six days after leaving San Antonio, and after having traveled one hundred and thirty leagues, he came upon a ranchería of two hundred Apaches, constituting one of the five bands into which the enemy had divided, who sallied forth to meet him. A six hours' battle ensued, according to the report, in which the Spaniards were victorious, thirty-four Indians, including their chief, being killed, and twenty women and children taken captives. About one hundred and twenty horses and mules were recovered, together with a quantity of plunder, consisting of saddles, bridles, knives, spears, and other articles which had been stolen by the Indians. Of the Spaniards, three, including Captain Flores, were slightly wounded, and one Indian was hurt. The return to San Antonio was made in nineteen days. 32
The fact that they went northward five days before entering the Lomería, and that they returned by way of the San Xavier (San Gabriel) 33, where Father Pita's remains were found, would indicate a generally northward direction for the campaign. Since they were nineteen days returning and traveled one hundred and thirty leagues, the air-line distance from San Antonio could hardly have been less than two hundred miles. This would put the place where the battle occurred somewhere in the region of Brownwood, perhaps.
The foregoing account of Flores's campaign is based on the official report made by Flores to the Marqués de Aguayo, supplemented by the other accounts in so far as they do not conflict. Conflicting statements are not wanting, however. Indeed, in a later report by Flores himself we find slight discrepancies in the figures, as well as additional details. According to Fray Joseph González, missionary in Valero, who, be it noted, was not present at the battle, Flores attacked an innocent band of Apaches “behind their backs,” and killed and captured his victims while they were trying to escape. González's statement was corroborated by four soldiers of Béxar, who made a declaration containing some additional facts. 34
These differing and conflicting accounts of the expedition indicate in part the dissensions which were so prevalent at this time between the missionaries and the soldiers, with their respective sympathizers, and, as will be seen presently, Flores's campaign, together with the consequences resulting therefrom, served only to increase the discord.
3. Peace Negotiations.--One important result of the campaign was to open up the way for negotiations looking to a treaty of peace with the Apaches. It had been Aguayo's idea to treat with them through captives, and it is not unlikely that Flores was acting upon the advice of his patron. Although at this time the chief object of imprisoning the Apache women and children seems to have been to bring the Indians to terms of peace, yet we can see here early hints of that Spanish custom of enslaving the Apaches which became so prevalent in Texas some years later, for Flores was charged with wishing to retain the captives as servants rather than to use them as hostages. 35
Among the captives taken by Flores was a woman about forty years old, whom the captain questioned through an interpreter. He inquired the motive for the hostility of the Apaches towards the Spaniards at San Antonio and their reasons for stealing horses. She replied that it was because of the trade which the Apaches maintained with “other Spaniards” to the north, to whom they sold horses and slaves. 36
This statement was to the Spaniards a confirmation of their suspicions in regard to the French, for it was assumed that these “other Spaniards” could be none other than Frenchmen who were manipulating the Apaches for their own benefit. The French had been a source of anxiety to the Spanish ever since La Salle had established his ill-fated colony at the Bay of Espíritu Santo, and it was still feared that they might try some day to wrest from Spain her northern territory. This fear had a direct influence upon relations with the Apaches, as it had upon most of their Indian relations in Texas, during the eighteenth century, and in Flores's negotiations for peace we can see the germs of a policy of alliance with the Apaches which finally, after many ins and outs, resulted in the establishment of missions for them. The Spaniards wished, among other things, to use the Apaches as a bulwark against the French and their Indian allies (the Comanches in particular), and to prepare the way for the development of trade between New Mexico, Espíritu Santo, and eastern Texas, and so strengthen Spanish hold upon that vast territory. 37
Upon further examination, the captive squaw said that the Apache chiefs were anxious to be friends with the Spaniards. Hereupon Flores agreed to dispatch her as an ambassador to her people, and promised to release the prisoners if the chiefs would come and make peace. She consented to carry the proposal to the capitán grande (head chief) of her people, and promised to return in twenty days. A horse was given her, as well as many other gifts, and about October 7 she departed on her mission. 38
Within twenty-two days the squaw returned, accompanied by an Apache chief, his wife and three other Apaches. Flores went out to meet them, and the chief Indian gave him a bastón (cane), saying “Dios! Dios!” They were examined by Father González, given presents, and treated in the very best style. The chief reported that as soon as the squaw returned, telling of the friendship of the Spaniards and of their desire to be at peace with the Apaches, couriers were dispatched to the other chiefs to notify them, so that a council might be held to discuss matters. He himself was joined at first by another chief, but later it was decided that only one of them should go, and the other chief gave him a gold-tipped cane (the one he had brought) and told him to go and see if the Indian woman spoke the truth; if it was so, to return and notify the five chiefs so that all of them might go to make peace.
After remaining at the presidio three days, the Indians left on November 1, promising that without doubt the five chiefs would all come to make peace. 39 Nevertheless, although prospects seemed so flattering, it was to be a long time before they were realized.
Indeed, very sinister tales were told, to the effect that all of these negotiations were only a ruse on the part of the Apaches to regain their women and children. A Coahuila Indian named Gerónimo who had escaped from the Apaches to San Juan Bautista declared that the Apaches had been very much aroused by Flores's campaign and that they had assembled to march upon San Antonio, when the Indian woman arrived, telling them of what the Spaniards had promised, and that (with characteristic cunning) the Apaches had decided to postpone their plans in order to secure the release of their women and children who were at San Antonio. The capitán grande, Gerónimo's declaration continued, consoled as best he could the disappointed Indians, promising to attack San Antonio after they had secured their relatives. 40 This story was confirmed by a Spaniard named Juan Santiago de la Cruz, who likewise had been a prisoner among the Apaches. He said that the Apaches were always eager for war upon the Spaniards, and that when Flores had killed some of their number on his campaign a great many tribes gathered with the intention of attacking San Antonio. But just as they were about to start, the old Indian woman arrived with a message from Flores. Two priests were sent for from another ranchería, and they read the letter, informing the Indians that Flores offered peace. 41 The capitán grande now decided to send a chief, accompanied by a few men, with a bastón, to secure the release of the captives, but agreed that as soon as the latter had been given up, a great force should assault the presidio at San Antonio. With this deceitful intent, said the Spaniards, the Apaches were sent to promise peace. 42
The Apaches did not return to San Antonio until about two months had passed. In the latter part of December a band of about thirty arrived at the settlement, where they were welcomed by Father González. The Indians were allowed to enter the mission, and González proposed to give up to them the women and children who were being held as prisoners. Flores, however, would not hear to this, and refused to release the hostages until all the chiefs should agree to make peace. González argued that they would probably not care to come until they should be convinced of the good intentions of the Spaniards. But Flores was firm in his decision, and the discussion waxed furious. The Indians finally took fright thereat and departed, leaving a twelve-year-old girl as an additional hostage and promising that as soon as the cold weather should be over four of their chiefs would come and make peace, but asserting that the fifth one did not wish to be the friend of the Spaniards. 43
4. The Removal and Restoration of Captain Flores.—This occurrence had opened anew the quarrel between Flores and González, and the missionary began to do all in his power to secure the removal of the soldier.
In consequence of reports that Flores had allowed the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar to deteriorate, the viceroy in a letter of October 3, 1723, had warned him to be more diligent in the service of the king, and suggested that if his soldiers had been properly equipped and the presidio in good condition the Apaches would not have succeeded in stealing the eighty horses. Apparently this was a great surprise to Flores, for he claimed that he had been especially diligent in pursuing the raiding Indians, and recovering the only horses that had been stolen from the presidio during his term. 44
Evidently with the view of justifying himself, on January 9, 1724, Flores appealed to González to make a statement concerning the condition of the presidio and to certify as to his (Flores's) prompt action in recovering the stolen horses. 45 Flores was too late, however, for before the end of November, González, through the guardian of his college, had complained to the viceroy of Flores's conduct. 46 Now, upon Flores's appeal, González took advantage of a new opportunity to complain of the captain's impolitic conduct in regard to the Apaches. He stated in his declaration that the Apaches had been grievously offended by the unwarranted attack upon them, and that the peace which had been so near to consummation had been irretrievably spoiled. 47
Father Hidalgo, who was missionary at San Antonio de Valero at this time, and before whom González's declaration was made, supported his brother priest. To the latter's statement he volunteered to add his own opinion. The Apaches, he said, could have been converted long before if the presidios had been managed rightly. He thought that the poor pay of the soldiers was responsible for the class of men who usually enlisted, and that their bad habits caused the loss, not only of their own souls, but of those of the Indians as well. “Now, again,” he continued, “the captain of this presidio has disturbed the so greatly desired peace by not releasing the children of the Apaches.” 48
González's opposition to Flores culminated in an effort to have him removed from his command. On March 18, 1724, he wrote to the viceroy complaining that the bad condition of the presidio was the cause of the failure to reap great harvests of souls. Since the French were anxious to ally with the Apaches, this bad state of affairs, he said, might mean ruin for the Spaniards. He told of the attack upon the corral, the stealing of the horses, the pursuit by Flores, the defeat of the Indians, the taking of the captives, and Flores's subsequent refusal to release them to their people. Finally, the priest declared, in order to repair the damage which had been done, it would be necessary that Flores be removed from his office as captain, not only because of his unchristian conduct toward the Apaches, but also because of his scandalous actions and bad example in general. As a successor to Flores, González proposed Mateo Pérez, a private soldier of the presidio of the Rio Grande. 49
González also suggested a remedy for the unwise policy of Flores. It was to form a company of seventy men from the various presidios, led by Father González himself, and by going to the land of the Apaches, treating the Indians kindly, giving them back their wives and children, and bestowing upon them some presents, thus again secure peace. It was the policy of the olive branch and the sword. 50
Whether or not this letter of González was the cause of the removal of Flores is uncertain. At any rate, on April 6, 1724, Flores received an order from the viceroy commanding him to give up the command of the presidio to Mateo Pérez, just as González had suggested, and to retire one hundred leagues from the “province of Texas.” 51
Flores obeyed the order, and Pérez took charge in June. This did not mean, however, that the matter was settled. On the contrary, Flores began at once to exert himself to regain his command. He made a personal plea to the viceroy, giving his account of the raid and the fight with the Apaches, and furnishing testimonials from the Marqués de Aguayo and from other persons concerning his good conduct and ability. In his own defense, Flores said that he had recovered the only horses that had been stolen during his term of office, and that the presidio was in good condition, with the requisite number of competent soldiers, contrary to what González had charged. As to the latter's statement about the coming of the Apaches to seek peace, Flores said that the priest did not know what he was talking about; that the Apaches had never wished peace, but that a few of them had come to San Antonio in order to see if they could not cajole the Spaniards into giving up the captives. Flores said that he had recognized their duplicity, and had refused to treat with them unless all of their chiefs should come. These statements he substantiated by the declaration of the Spaniard, Juan Santiago de la Cruz, to the effect that the Apaches intended to raid and destroy San Antonio after they had recovered their kinspeople. Finally, Flores asked that, in recognition of his many services and on account of his family, he be restored to his command. 52
To prove his good record in the service of the king, Flores enclosed a number of testimonials. One of these was from no less a personage than Fray Antonio Margil de Jesús, guardian of the College of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de Zacatecas. He stated that Flores had always gallantly and zealously served the king, and that he was worthy, not only to be restored to his command, but even to be promoted to the highest office in the province of Texas. 53
The Marqués de Aguayo, in his testimonial, praised Flores very highly, and, indeed, it is from him that we learn most of the facts concerning Flores's career, as given above. He also defended Flores against the attacks made upon him by Hidalgo, whose charges, he said, were mere repetitions of those made by González. 54 To offset Hidalgo's opinion, Aguayo maintained that Hidalgo was a man easily influenced, and that Father Sevillano, who also opposed Flores, was of somewhat the same nature. As to González himself, Aguayo believed that he had purposely misstated things to the discredit of Flores, and cited Flores's letters as proof. He said that Mateo Pérez had been recommended so that González could keep him under his control and so shape the affairs of San Antonio. 55 Furthermore, Aguayo added, González was known to be of a turbulent disposition, as was admitted by his own college, and one who was always causing trouble. 56 It is only fair to state that González and Aguayo had been personal enemies since 1722, when the former charged the latter with defrauding the government. This fact may have colored Aguayo's opinion of González. 57 Finally, Aguayo recommended that Flores be restored to the command of the presidio at San Antonio and that all back pay be given him. 58
In consequence of Aguayo's intervention, on May 31, 1725, the viceroy ordered that Flores should be restored to his command and that Pérez should return to his service as a private soldier in the presidio of Rio Grande. 59 Thus in spite of further efforts that González may have made, Flores won his fight, and for this time, at least, the seculars triumphed over the missionaries.
5. Further Raids and Spanish Conciliation, 1724-1725.—While this controversy had been raging between Flores and González, the Apaches had continued to inflict upon the province their thefts and murders. The assurance given by the Indians who had visited San Antonio in November, 1723, that four of their chiefs would come to make peace did not prove well founded, and after some seven months of quiet the Apaches renewed their raids. 60
At about midnight of March 9, 1724, Francisco Minchaca (sic), a soldier of the presidio of Rio Grande del Norte, arrived at San Antonio and reported that his companion, Antonio González, had been killed by Indians about fifteen leagues away. Flores set out at once with ten soldiers, and, reaching the scene of the attack, found the mutilated body of González. Though there were conflicting opinions as to the identity of the malefactors, there were strong indications that they were Apaches. 61 On March 14th or 15th, ten Apaches, bearing the Indian captive Gerónimo, stole some horses from the corral of the presidio of San Juan Bautista del Rio Grande. Gerónimo fled to the Spaniards, gave the alarm, and the horses were recovered. 62 Again, in April, the Apaches attacked some mission Indians of San Antonio, killing one and wounding another. 63 About the same time they killed a Mesquite Indian at El Almagre, took another prisoner, and killed a Paquasian Indian on the upper Medina. 64 Early in January of the following year these Paquasian (Paquache) Indians were attacked by the Apaches near the Nueces River. It was hoped by Father Paredes that fear of the Apaches would induce the tribe to enter the San Xavier mission, then almost extinct, at San Antonio. Similarly, some time before January, 1726, the Sanas were attacked by one hundred Apaches and driven from their rancherías. 65
Thus we see that there was little cessation of hostilities. On the contrary, as Father Hidalgo said, “little by little the Apaches are showing their claws.” 66
In spite of this warlike attitude of the Apaches, however, the Spaniards continued to follow a policy of conciliation. Governor Almazán had reported, on March 24, 1724, the negotiations that had been carried on with the Apaches, and said that up to that time the chiefs had not come to make peace, as they had promised to do. 67 On April 25, the viceroy replying to Almazán urged upon him the importance of securing an alliance with the Apache chiefs by gentle means, which, he said, should be easy to do, since the Apaches of New Mexico were friends of the Spaniards. 68 Almazán answered that he would carry out these instructions, but that he had little hope of securing any good results, as the Apaches were getting worse every day, and were making life and property unsafe. Nevertheless, he gave orders that if any Apaches should be encountered they should be brought before him so that he might give them presents and dispatch them as messengers to their chiefs, offering friendship and alliance. 69
These troublesome questions were referred by the viceroy to the Marqués de Aguayo for his opinion, as an authority on Texas affairs, and in February Aguayo gave his reply. He believed that the Apaches should first be treated with “gentle persuasion”; that another one of the captives at San Antonio should be dispatched with proffers of peace, and that influence should be brought to bear upon the friendly Apaches of New Mexico, in order that they might aid in bringing their kinsmen to terms. But in case the Apaches would not admit any overtures of peace, Aguayo advised that a company of eighty Spaniards and one hundred Indian allies should make an expedition against them, entering their country from New Mexico. He suggested that the necessary soldiers could be secured by taking detachments form the various presidios, and that the “Texas” Indians would be only too glad to get a chance to fight their old enemy. Nevertheless, he thought, the best way to reach the Apaches was through their captive kinsmen, and he advised that this be attempted. 70
Aguayo's advice was accepted by the viceroy, and his policy was ordered carried out, with the understanding that even in case the Apaches spurned the proposals of peace, no campaign should be undertaken until due authority was given. 71 Thus we see the adoption of a definite policy toward the Apaches, that of conciliation before punishment, which was to continue in force for several years.
The line of division already observed between the missionaries and the seculars in regard to the Apaches was continued. The priests usually defended them and believed in their good intentions, while the civil and military officials, in spite of orders that they be conciliatory, habitually distrusted them. The spirit of the fathers is typified by the petition of Hidalgo, who, on March 18, 1725, asked for permission to go to the land of the Apaches to try to convert them. He wished to be unaccompanied save by a single lay brother, and hoped, by converting the Apaches to the “holy Catholic faith,” to secure the peace of the province. 72
6. Information Acquired Concerning the Apaches.—Through their intimate relations with the Apaches, the Spaniards at San Antonio had become very much better acquainted with them, and by 1725 possessed concerning them considerable definite knowledge. From the correspondence of the period thus far covered we can determine the ideas of the soldiers and priests in regard to the location, organization, numbers, and general customs of the Apaches with whom they had been dealing. Up to this time very little distinction, if any, was made between the different Apache tribes, but all were included, as has been stated, under the generic name of “Apaches.” Not only were the Texas Apaches included under this term, but those of New Mexico as well, together, embracing, as they said, a range of more than five hundred leagues. 73
a. Location.—It is clear that during this period the Apaches known at San Antonio were living far to the northwest. Domingo Cabello, who was governor of Texas in 1784 and who wrote an historical sketch of the Apaches, says that at the time under consideration they lived along the Rio del Fierro, three hundred leagues “from the province of Texas.” The Rio del Fierro seems to be the Wichita. 74 According to Cabello's statement, the Apaches lived in that region until about 1723, when they were defeated by the Comanches, their greatest foes, in a nine days' battle, and forced to seek safety in flight. 75 Going southward, they chose as their new home the region between the upper Colorado and Brazos rivers, at a distance of some one hundred and twenty leagues from the “province of Texas.” Even here, says Cabello, they did not feel safe from the attacks of the Comanches, and began to explore the land to the south with the view of moving again in case of necessity. 76 Cabello's assertion as to the location of the Apaches is borne out by the various documents of this period. When Flores made his campaign in 1723 he marched for more than a month before reaching the Apachería, going, he tells us, a distance of one hundred and thirty leagues, or perhaps some two hundred and sixty miles, northwest from San Antonio. This agrees substantially with Cabello's statement. The length of time consumed by the woman in her embassy to her people 77 indicates that the Apaches were a long distance away. When she departed, on horseback, she said that she would return in twenty days, and she was, in fact, gone twenty-two days.
The range of the Apaches extended much farther south, it is true. During the buffalo season, they were accustomed to move their camps to the southeast, between the middle Colorado and Brazos rivers, where the buffalo were most numerous. They stayed here only temporarily, however, retiring north at the end of the season. There is no ground for Yoakum's statement that on the coming of the Spaniards the Lipan Apaches inhabited the Gulf coast, 78 and such an opinion could not be entertained by one who is familiar with the contemporary documents now available. At this time the Apaches did not habitually range below the old San Antonio road. Attention should also be called to the evident error in the map in the Handbook of American Indians, Part I, which shows the Shoshonean stock, clearly referring to the Comanches, when first known to Europeans, as extending in a narrow wedge on both sides of the Colorado to a point below Austin. At this time the Comanches were held north of the Apaches, and as the latter lived a long distance northward from San Antonio, the incorrectness of this portion of the map is readily perceived. The Comanches, in their southward migration, did not reach the Panhandle till about 1700, and it was long after this before they ranged habitually east of the lower Colorado.
b. Tribal Organization.—Through their efforts to obtain peace with the Apaches, the authorities at San Antonio learned something of their tribal organization. The Indians with whom they treated said that they were divided into five tribes (naciones), each of which was governed by his own chief or capitán. All of these chiefs, however, recognized the authority of a head chief (capitán grande), who lived still farther north. 79 The squaw sent as a messenger by Flores described the method of the Apaches in making a raid, which illustrates this organization. She said that all of the five chiefs would assemble and furnish about twelve men each for the raid. When these returned, the booty was divided, and all returned to their respective homes. Without the permission of the capitán grande, however, she said, none of the chiefs dared to make an expedition. 80 The names of these different bands, for such they evidently were, do not appear at this time. Moreover, the contemporary sources of the period leave us wholly in the dark as to what portion and what branch of the Apaches were being treated of. But there are indications that the principal ones were the branch that later emerged as the Lipan.
c. Numbers.—To the Spaniards at San Antonio the Apaches seemed to be a very numerous people, 81 but their number was probably much smaller than was believed. Flores said that in his campaign he fought one of the five rancherías and that about two hundred warriors were engaged. If he was correct in his estimate, the total population of this ranchería could not have been less than eight or nine hundred.
d. Customs.—The equipment of an Apache warrior, the witnesses tell us, was quite elaborate. They possessed many horses, had good saddles with iron stirrups, and used bridles. Their horses were usually protected from the arrows of the enemy by buffalo skins, and the Apaches themselves used skin armor, painted variously blue, red, green, or white. No mention is made of the Apaches having firearms, and it is made to appear that they fought entirely without them. Their arrows were generally tipped with iron, we are told, and they also used a kind of iron dart (chuza) in offensive warfare. Their clothing, as a rule, was of buckskin. 82
e. Intertribal Relations.—As has already been stated, the Apaches had long been foes of the Indians living to the east of the middle Colorado river, and never did the Texas Indians go out to hunt buffalo without being in danger of attack from the Apaches, who were also in the same region during the buffalo season. Less worthy foes of the Apaches were the small Coahuiltecan tribes living west of the San Antonio river and south of the Camino Real. Of the Apaches these lived in mortal dread, and we have already mentioned some of the attacks which they withstood. 83 One result of Apache hostility toward these smaller tribes of southern Texas had been the formation of what was known as Ranchería Grande, which was composed of many tribes who had banded together to combat the Apaches, and which made its headquarters in the neighborhood of the Brazos. 84 From the declaration of the Indian boy, Gerónimo, it may be inferred that with the Jumanes and Tobosos the Apaches maintained friendly relations. 85 Indeed, the Jumanes, as will be seen, were included under the term “Apaches.”
1. The Apaches Inactive.—For several years after 1725 the documents available do not indicate that many hostilities were committed by the Apaches. On the contrary, there are indications that they were either holding themselves in reserve, for some unknown reason, or were occupied elsewhere. Thus, on July 4, 1726, Almazán reported that everything was quiet at San Antonio, and that recently the Apaches had made no hostile move. 86 Sometime in 1726, it is true, the Apaches were so bold as to try to steal some horses which were being guarded by a mission Indian very near the presidio. 87 In 1727 they killed near the same mission a recently converted Indian. 88 But these are the only specific instances of violence by them cited by the documentary sources for some four years. It is not improbable that the Apaches made minor raids upon the Spaniards' stock. Indeed, Father Sevillano, writing in November, 1729, remarked, in connection with Apache relations at the mission Valero, that “lately, at every turn, there are tragedies in that mission.” 89 But whatever troubles there may have been, they do not appear to have been of sufficient importance to merit special mention.
Yet, although the Apaches were peaceful, the quiet had a somewhat ominous appearance, and the colonists did not forget that the savages were likely to descend upon them at any time. Even the priests did not trust that the peace was permanent, but feared that the Indians might attack the presidio and burn the missions. This fear is voiced by Father Miguel Sevillano de Paredes in his report made in 1727. 90
2. Rivera's Recommendations.—In 1727 Don Pedro de Rivera made a general inspection of the Spanish defenses on the frontier, and in his report of 1728 proposed a general reduction of forces in Texas. San Antonio, as well as the establishments in eastern Texas, was to be affected by this policy of retrenchment. Rivera recognized the exposed condition of Béxar and its proximity to the hostile Apaches, but, influenced, no doubt, by their recent comparative quiet, he underestimated the danger from them. 91 In consequence, he recommended that the garrison at Béxar be reduced from fifty-three to forty-three soldiers, “since,” as he said, “it has no other enemies in its neighborhood than the Apache Indians, who inhabit the Lomería Grande (big range of hills), which nation is not so large as to cause anxiety to that presidio even though its garrison should be smaller than the one which now protects it.” 92 He said that even if the Apaches did commit petty thieveries, through the carelessness of the soldiers, they would soon learn the consequences of their acts and would desist from them. 93
3. Effect of the Recommendations.—These ill-advised recommendations at once caused a storm of protest from the missionaries. Father Vergara complained that to take ten men from the presidio of Béxar would mean the ruin of the missions at San Antonio, for the Apaches would soon learn of the reduction in forces, and would be encouraged to renew their hostilities. 94
In 1731 the Querétaran missions were removed from eastern Texas, and after several other locations had been projected for them were re-established near San Antonio. The proximity of the Apaches had much to do with determining the sites, for it was deemed dangerous to establish them in any place less protected from that tribe. 95 In this same year the population of San Antonio was further increased by the coming of the Canary Islanders. They were not a highly courageous lot, and their fears of the hostile Indians added considerable to the alarm felt at San Antonio. The new colonists, afraid to settle on the lands that had been assigned them some distance away, congregated under the shelter of the presidio. 96 Hardly had they become established in their new home when the Apaches awoke from their inaction and began a series of raids more serious than any before experienced from them at San Antonio.
1. Renewed Raids.—The renewed hostilities began with the opening of 1731. On January 9, Fr. Salvador de Amaya and Fr. Francisco Bustamante with a small party, escorted by four soldiers, were attacked by fifty Apaches while on their way from San Antonio to Rio Grande, a woman being killed and a boy carried away into captivity. The rest of the party “miraculously” escaped with their lives. 97 No attempt being made to punish this attack, the Apaches grew bolder, and before long entered the mission of San Antonio de Valero and carried away fifty burros. 98 At another time they visited one of the new missions during the absence of the priest, and, putting to flight the recently congregated Indians, stole all of the horses there. 99 Again, about April 15, it seems, eighty Apaches attacked a squad of soldiers who were conducting horses to the Rio Grande, at the place where the two priests had been assaulted on January 9. The soldiers were ignominously scattered and all of the horses captured. 100 Later, on June 25, Fr. Zaes Monge and Fr. Benito de Santa Ana, accompained by five soldiers, were attacked by the Apaches while en route to Rio Grande. Two soldiers were wounded and all of the horses carried off. 101 Thus all but the last of these raids occurred between January 9 and April 17, and the priests now cited them as evidence of the insufficiency of the escorts that were assigned them. As a result of their complaints, Rivera, now convinced of the seriousness of the Apache situation, recommended that eight soldiers and a cabo (chief) should be given them on their journeys from Rio Grande to San Antonio. 102 At the same time he also recommended that permission be given to the captain of Béxar to punish the Apaches for their repeated crimes, as had been requested by Captain Almazán, for, he said, unless something were done to uphold the honor of the Spanish arms, their outrages would soon pass beyond all bounds. 103 But no immediate action was taken to punish the offenders.
After these repeated attacks, there was a lull in the depredations that lasted until the middle of September. But the inhabitants at San Antonio felt anything but secure, and their alarm was materially increased in the first part of August by the capture of an Apache who declared that a great number of his people were assembling in their country preparatory to making a combined attack upon the settlement. This warning was justified, as will be seen from subsequent events. 104
2. The Fight at San Antonio, September 18, 1731.—Quiet was broken by a raid on the stock of the presidio at San Antonio on September 18, 1731, at noon, when the Apaches attacked the horse herd (cavallada) and succeeded in stealing about sixty beasts. Don Juan Antonio Pérez de Almazán, who was now captain at Béxar, was at once notified, and, although he was ill at the time, set out immediately in pursuit of the offenders, dispatching a sergeant with five soldiers in advance. When Almazán overtook them, at a distance of about a league from the presidio, he found them engaged in a fight with at least forty Indians, and, as he tells us, had he not arrived at that opportune time all six would have perished. 105 They were by no means free from danger with the coming of reinforcements, for the Spaniards did not number more than twenty-five men in all, while, according to Almazán, just as they arrived about five hundred Indians came out from their hiding places, all on horseback and well armed. The combined force now attacked the soldiers with great fierceness, forming their line of battle in the shape of a crescent (media luna), and gradually surrounding the small band. The battle lasted for more than two hours, and two men had been killed and thirteen badly wounded, when the Spaniards decided to dismount at the foot of a tree and sell their lives as dearly as possible, since most of the horses were disabled and some of the wounded soldiers unable to remain in the saddle. The Indians continued drawing the death circle around the Spaniards, who thought that they had only a few moments to live. But suddenly the Indians began to flee, much to the astonishment of the soldiers, for there seemed to be absolutely no reason why they should not have finished the small force and have proceeded to ravage the missions and the presidio, which would have been an easy task, for fourteen soldiers were absent on a mission to Coahuila. Almazán said that it was only by a miracle of Divine Providence that the whole settlement was not exterminated. 106
The abandonment of the fight by the Indians was very characteristic of Apache warfare. They usually fought very cautiously, as they could not afford to lose many men, and a warrior was not easily replaced. Knowing that many of their own number would be killed while the Spaniards were being overpowered, and fearing that, in the meantime, reinforcements might come from the presidio, they followed their usual course and fled with the horses they had stolen. On the part of the Spaniards, this encounter is an instance of very plucky fighting, in that a small number held their own against great odds. Their remarkable resistance would have been impossible, however, if the Indians had been provided with firearms, as was the case with the soldiers. 107
Three distinct tribes participated in this battle, according to the various statements made. Indeed, now for the first time, in the sources at my command, the contemporary writers distinguish the different bands of their foes. The Apache captive mentioned above, 108 being shown the arrows left on the field of battle, declared that they belonged to the Apaches, Pelones, and Jumanes, “all three of which are very numerous in Indians and very warlike.” 109 In a petition of the soldiers of the presidio, which will be referred to later, these same tribes were enumerated. 110 It is interesting to note that Joseph de Urrutia, writing on July 4, 1733, wondered at this alliance between the Apaches and the Jumanes and Pelones, because, he said, the Apaches were formerly the enemies of these other tribes and would not admit them to their friendship. This alliance with other tribes may indicate that the Apaches were no longer as independent as they had been, and that the Comanches were pressing hard upon them, 111 as we know was later the case.
3. Almazán's Report and the Authorization of a Campaign.—Almazán, in reporting these occurrences to the viceroy on December 1, 1731, complained of the lack of forces at the presidio. He said that the number of soldiers was entirely inadequate for the many occupations that were necessary, that much of the time the presidio was left without any defense except for a very few soldiers, and that the missions were exposed to total ruin. He predicted that the outrages of the Apaches would, in the immediate future, increase to such an extent that past ones, although so many, would not be a circumstance compared to those that would follow. Never before, he said, had the Apaches committed so many hostile acts as they had in this year, and such was the terror felt at San Antonio that the soldiers were preparing to remove their families to places of safety. 112 He stated that it would be impossible to make the campaign for which permission had been given him before the following year, on account of the lateness of the season and the scarcity of men. He thought that a large force would be necessary, for, he said, one hundred men would have had difficulty merely in holding their own in the fight of September 8, in which only a small portion of the entire Apache nation had participated. Not more than about sixty soldiers, he said, could be secured from all of the presidios of Texas combined, while citizens (vecinos) could with difficulty be prevailed upon to engage in a campaign, because the enslaving of captives had been prohibited, thus leaving no chance for compensation by securing an Indito or Indita. 113
Almazán's letter was referred to Rivera, who, apparently, was now in Mexico City, and in consequence he made two recommendations: first, that the presidio of Bahía should be removed to the Medina river, on the San Antonio road, in order to ward off the Apaches in that quarter; and, second, that the campaign be undertaken as he had before advised. Rivera was of the opinion that one hundred and fifty soldiers, reinforced by the Indian allies that could be secured, would be enough to make the expedition, and that this number could be raised from Adaes, Bahía, and Rio Grande. He did not agree with Almazán that a large force would be necessary to punish the Apaches, for, he maintained, the success of a campaign depended not so much upon numbers as upon the efficient control of the men. To support this assertion he cited several successful campaigns made by small forces, mentioning among these Flores's expedition of 1723. 114 In regard to captives, Rivera implicitly yielding to Almazán's implied demand, said that great care should be taken to prevent the Indian allies from killing such captives as might be taken, and that to prevent this it would be best to send them to other provinces and bring them up in the Catholic faith. 115
On January 6, 1732, the viceroy ordered that Rivera's recommendations for the removal of Bahía and for the campaign against the Apaches should be carried out. 116 The first part of the order was never fulfilled.
4. The Campaign of Bustillo y Zevallos, 1732.—It was to Captain Almazán that permission was given to make the campaign, but Governor Mediavilla y Ascona, jealous of his own prestige, perhaps, asked to be allowed to lead the expedition. He did not remain in office long, however, and it fell to the lot of his successor, Don Juan Antonio de Bustillo y Zevallos. This, it would seem, occasioned a bitter quarrel between the two men. 117 Affairs dragged along in the usual slow fashion, and it was not until October, 1732, that a start was made. On the 22d of that month, Bustillo, the new governor, set out from San Antonio with a force of one hundred and fifty-seven Spaniards, thirty-two of these being servants, and sixty mission Indians. He carried one hundred and forty pack-loads (cargas) of supplies and had nine hundred horses and mules, some of which were later utilized to good advantage. 118 With this large company, Bustillo proceeded to the San Xavier (San Gabriel) river, where he expected to be joined by some Indians of the “Texas” tribes. They did not appear, however, because, it was said, one of their chiefs, who was called El Francés from his devotion to the French, warned his people that the Spaniards wished to lure them from home, kill them, and seize their women and children. 119 Bustillo, after waiting in vain for the Texas until November 1, continued his march towards the northwest, apparently following the Little River. 120 In order not to be discovered by the Apaches, whose land they soon entered, it was necessary, says Bustillo, to proceed with great caution. Spies were sent ahead, both to the north and to the northwest, but, at first, no signs of Indians were seen. This caused Bustillo to become impatient, and he resolved, as he declares, to find the Apaches even if he had to go clear to New Mexico. He now entered an unknown land, crossed strange rivers, and came into a cold, rough country. The march was exceedingly slow, and at the end of about six weeks Bustillo was, as he said, only about seventy leagues from San Antonio, although his winding course carried him, in actual distance, more than two hundred leagues. He took this roundabout way both to meet the Texas and to avoid being discovered by the Apaches, for, he said, had he gone directly into the Lomería from San Antonio, he would have been seen on the second day. 121 On December 8, after mass had been said, an Indian spy named Asencio, who was one of the San Antonio mission Indians, arrived at the camp and reported that the rancherías of the enemy were about ten or twelve leagues away on the banks of the same river which the Spaniards were now following. 122 Acting upon this information, Bustillo moved his camp to within about five leagues of the Indians. Here a council of war was called, at which Asencio was the chief witness. He was very badly frightened, and when questioned as to the number of the enemy, replied that he had never seen so many gathered together before in his life. 123
In the council it was decided to press on towards the rancherías, and ten Indians were sent ahead as spies. Bustillo left the greater part of the expedition here, and taking one hundred men, at about sunset began his march of some ten miles to the enemy. They traveled all night, with great difficulty, because of the rough ground and their ignorance of the country. In the early morning hours Asencio, who was acting as guide, lost his bearings and did not know which way to take, but after reconnoitering a bit, he returned after daybreak and reported that a ranchería must be nearby, for he had heard the barking of dogs.
Another council was now held. Some were in favor of trying to conceal themselves until the next day, but Bustillo thought it best to attack at once before they should be discovered. At about 8 o'clock (on the morning of the 9th), absolution having been given by the priests, the company set out in two ranks, with Bustillo between them. The rancherías could now be seen at a distance of about half a league, just across the river.
No sooner had the stream been passed than the fighting began. The enemy numbered, the Spaniards believed, more than seven hundred warriors, and included members of four tribes, the Apaches, Ypandis (Lipan), Ysandis, and Chentis. They were in four separate rancherías, covering more than half a league, and their tents numbered more than four hundred. The Indians were well disciplined, and showed extraordinary courage. They were on horseback, and were armed with leather breastplates, which no lance or arrow could penetrate. They waited until the soldiers had discharged their guns, and then closed in with them in a hand-to-hand struggle. These tactics were used repeatedly throughout the battle. As fast as the Indians were killed their bodies were removed by their friends and thrown into the river. Among those who met their fate was a prominent chief, whose death caused much disturbance in the ranks of the Indians. His silver-headed bastón (cane) was taken to Bustillo by the chief of the friendly Pampopas, a mission Indian with the soldiers. The fact that this chief had such a cane indicates that he had maintained friendly relations with the Spaniards at some previous time, or had gotten it from some one who had.
The battle continued for about five hours, but the advantage of the Spaniards' firearms could not be overcome by the Indians, and at about one o'clock they retired, having been entirely driven out of their rancherías. Bustillo estimated the number of Indians killed at two hundred, although he said that it was impossible to know with certainty, for the bodies had been removed as fast as they fell. Only thirty women and children were taken prisoners because most of them had fled upon the approach of the Spaniards. About seven hundred horses 124 were recovered and one hundred mule loads of peltry and other plunder captured. Not one Spaniard was killed on the field of battle, though seven were wounded, one of whom died within five days after. 125
From the contemporary documents alone, no definite conclusion can be formed as to the exact locality of the place of battle. We only know from them that Bustillo had gone to the San Xavier River, on the edge of the “monte grande” (Eastern Cross Timbers), and that he had thence set out northwest, apparently following the first Brazos, or Little River. 126 We are also told that “strange rivers” were crossed on the way, and that the Indian camp was about seventy leagues from San Antonio, in a very rough country, with a river running near the ranchería. 127 With this meager information, the location might be assigned to various regions somewhat wide apart. Fortunately, however, later documents throw additional light upon the matter. In an investigation held at Los Adaes in 1756 for the purpose of obtaining evidence as to Texas's right to exercise jurisdiction over the San Sabá country, testimony is given showing that Bustillo's campaign took him to the San Sabá region. Five witnesses testified to the effect that they had accompanied Bustillo on the campaign, and that the battle had occurred on the San Sabá river; two said that they had afterwards been to the San Sabá river, and had been shown the battlefield; and two declared that they had heard it said and that it was generally known that they had gone to the San Sabá. 128 This testimony, it would seem, should be given due credence. It shows that the Apaches were now considerably south of the country in which Flores had found them in 1723. 129
After the Indians had fled, a council of war was held, and it was decided to return to the main camp where the rest of the force had been left, since the enemies, as it was said, although defeated, still had many good warriors and might attack the camp, while the Spaniards would be at a disadvantage because of their ignorance of the country. Fifty men were detailed as a rear guard. No sooner had the return march commenced, than the Apaches began to harass them. At one time an ambuscade was laid for the Indians, and this checked them somewhat. At about eight o'clock that night the camp was reached. The next day dawned upon various bands of Apaches looking down from neighboring hills, but because of the roughness of the country and the river which intervened they could do no damage. They continued to trouble the expedition, however, during the return to San Antonio, stealing horses whenever an opportunity was presented. The company reached Béxar on December 22, just two months after their departure. The return trip was made in fifteen days, while six weeks had been spent in going. 130 This indicates the extreme caution with which they had proceeded, and the comparative haste they made in getting back, for it must be remembered that they had about fifteen hundred horses to impede them.
5. Efforts to Obtain Peace.—During the absence of the soldiers other bands of Apaches had raided the stock at San Antonio, and when the governor returned various petitions were made asking him not to distribute the captives, but to hold them as a means of making peace with the Apaches. To this effect they recommended that one or two of the captured women be sent as messengers to ask for peace or, if this plan should not be adopted, that another campaign be made against them with a force of three hundred men. If peace could not be secured by one means or the other, they said, it would be impossible to live in San Antonio. 131
This petition was seconded by Fray Gabriel de Vergara, president of the missions of San Antonio and minister in that of Concepción de Acuña, who added the weight of his influence towards inducing the governor to send the two Indian women as messengers to their people, and to retain the rest of the captives as hostages, in order to facilitate the reconciliation. Vergara emphasized the exposed condition of the missions and of the settlement as long as the Apaches should be enemies of the Spaniards, and called attention to the danger that the English or the French would make them their allies. He believed, he said, that the Apaches would make good citizens if reduced to politic life. 132
In consequence of these petitions, Bustillo, on January 4, 1733, dispatched two squaws, one an Apache and the other of the “Ypandis alias Pelones” tribe. They bore letters for their chiefs, and were supplied with horses and provisions for their journey. A sergeant and nineteen soldiers, with a priest, escorted them as far as the San Hibón River (Guadalupe), and took leave of them very hopefully and joyfully. 133
One of Fray Vergara's aims in trying to secure peace is seen in his letter of January 31, 1733. On that day he wrote to the viceroy asking that attention be given to the establishment of missions for the Apaches. He referred to the good natu