1. The Condition of the Problem.—A statement as to the conditions under which this paper was written is pertinent here. One has only to glance over the works in English which deal with the general history of Texas to note the absence of information bearing upon the subject which I have endeavored to treat. The standard histories of Texas give only isolated references here and there to Apache relations in Texas between 1718 and 1750. Indeed, so scanty are their accounts on this point that they may be entirely ignored. Of monographic discussions of the subject, there are none. 5 Although ethnologists have written more or less of the Apaches and their various subdivisions, very little pertaining to the period and region covered by this paper has been produced. 6 The reason for such a paucity of information on the subject in English works is that the material from which a history of this topic can alone be constructed has been buried hitherto in manuscripts written in a foreign language and preserved, for the larger part, in foreign archives.
Of Spanish works, only two are important for the subject. Antonio Bonilla, in his Breve Compendio, which has only recently been printed, gives a brief outline of Apache hostilities in Texas; 7 and Arricivita, in his Crónica Apostólica y Seráfica (México, 1791), gives a considerable amount of information concerning the efforts of the Franciscans to reduce the Apaches of Texas to mission life. Indeed, he is practically the only one who has written anything upon this phase of the subject. In most respects, however, Arricivita emphasizes the history, if at all, from the standpoint of the missionary, to whose side he naturally inclines. At several points, nevertheless, both authors have been useful in supplementing the documents which I have used. 8
Having practically nothing in print to guide me, I have had to rely almost entirely upon manuscript sources. The information herein presented has been gathered from a wide range of documents, whose originals are in the Archivo General y Público of Mexico, the archives of the College of Santa Cruz de Querétaro and of Guadalupe de Zacatecas, the state archive of Coahuila at Saltillo, the Béxar and Nacogdoches archives at Austin, Texas, the San Antonio mission records, and in other miscellaneous repositories. 9
2. The Aim of This Paper.—The primary aim in writing this paper was to prepare an introduction to the history of the Franciscan missions established for the Apache Indians in the middle of the eighteenth century on the San Sabá and Nueces rivers of western Texas. To understand these missionary activities it scemed necessary to examine carefully the previous relations between the eastern Apache Indians and their Spanish neighbors. Coupled with this motive was the consideration that Apache relations, though forming a large factor in the history of Spanish colonization in western and central Texas, have been all but unknown. This consideration has seemed to justify, in this first special treatment of the subject, what may be regarded as a painful amount of detail. Since the ethnology of the eastern Apaches has been as little known as their early relations with the Spaniards, some effort has been made in the course of the study, to gather and combine what could be learned concerning their early organization and customs. 10
3. Spanish Activities in Texas Before 1718.—Spanish interest in Texas began in the early sixteenth century. The description of the country given by Cabeza de Vaca and his companions in 1536 gave rise to many exploring expeditions in which Texas figured to a greater or lesser degree, but it was not until a century and a half later that definite steps were taken to occupy this region.
Fear of French aggression, a desire to open up a short route between Havana and New Mexico by way of the Bay of Espíritu Santo, and the missionary zeal of the Spanish friars led to the sending of an expedition in 1689 under Captain Alonzo de León, who found La Salle's fort and explored the Bay of Espíritu Santo. In 1690 a second expedition was led by De León. The French fort was now destroyed, and a mission was established near the Neches among the Hasinai, or Texas, Indians. A few months later a second mission was founded in the same locality.
To strengthen these missions by the erection of others, to investigate rumors of French settlements, and to secure a hold in the Cadodacho country, Don Domingo Terán de los Ríos was sent out in 1691. But his expedition was a comparative failure, and two years later the missions already established were abandoned.
It has been generally believed that the Spaniards gave little thought to Texas from the time of the abandonment of the missions in 1693 until Saint Denis's expedition in 1714. But recent investigations and many documents now available show that such is not the case. During all these years there was a steady advance of missionary work northward from Coahuila. In the years 1699-1701 the missions of San Juan Bautista, San Bernardo, and San Francisco Solano were established on the Rio Grande, and ministered to the Indians living north of that stream. About 1703 Father Hidalgo began his long-continued effort to get aid in reestablishing the missions among the Hasinai. In 1707 an attempt was made to advance the mission frontier to the Rio Frio, and in the same year Diego Ramón made an expedition to the Colorado. Two years later Fathers Espinosa and Olivares went with a party of soldiers to the Colorado, where they expected to meet the Hasinai Indians and to arrange for reducing them to mission life. During this period many of the Indians who were served at the Rio Grande missions came from the region of San Antonio. Thus, viewed from the missionary's standpoint, the establishment of a mission at San Antonio in 1718 was not a sudden advance, but merely the next logical step in the expansion of the Coahuila mission frontier. 11
In 1714 Saint Denis made his overland journey into Spanish territory, which aroused the civil authorities to renewed activities, and Captain Domingo Ramón was now appointed to lead an expedition to refound the missions of eastern Texas. In the years 1716-1717 six missions and a presidio were erected under his direction between the Neches and Red rivers, and thus the Spaniards put forward an incontrovertible claim to the possession of Texas—that of actual occupation.
By this action French advance was guarded against on the Louisiana frontier. But in 1718 New Orleans was founded, and orders were given by the French for the reoccupation of the Bay of Espíritu Santo. In the same year San Antonio was founded by the Spaniards, in part as an answer to this French activity on the Gulf and in part to extend missionary work among the Coahuiltecan tribes. And thus the most important center in the history of Spanish Texas began to play a part in the life of the province. 12
4. The “Apaches de Oriente.”—As has already been pointed out, the early history of the western Texas settlements, of which San Antonio was the center, is, in a very large measure, a history of relations with the Apache Indians who lived to the west and northwest. The Apaches are a branch of the Athapascan family, the most widely distributed of the North American Indian linguistic groups. The Athapascans are classified by ethnologists into three divisions, Northern, Pacific, and Southern, and the Southern is subdivied into the Navajo of New Mexico, the “Apaches,” a group of tribes called by this name, and surrounding the Navajo, and the Texas Apaches, or Lipanes. The designation “Apache” probably came from ápachu, “enemy,” the Zuñi name for the Navajos, who were called by the early Spaniards “Apaches de Nabaju.” 13
Most of the information hitherto at hand concerning the Texas Apaches relates to comparatively recent times, and there has been a lack of definite knowledge of them during the early Spanish period. The period is dark enough even now, but many new facts of general importance have been gleaned during the course of the present study, and some of them may be summarized here, out of the chronological order of the narrative, by way of introduction. The details will be made to appear in the historical order in which they became known and differentiated.
The Spaniards of the latter eighteenth century, when information was relatively complete, distinguished between the “Apaches de Occidente,” or Western Apaches, and the “Apaches de Oriente,” or Eastern Apaches, the latter being the ones with which this paper deals. The principal tribes of the Eastern Apaches known at that time were the Lipan (Ypande), Natagés (sometimes called Apaches proper), and the Mescaleros. 14 In the period covered by this paper (1718-1750) the tribes chiefly known in Texas were the Lipan and the Natagés, especially the former. They went under various names, and various subdivisions were sometimes distinguished. But in the early part of the period the Texas documents make no distinction, as later was the case, between the different Apache bands, but all are included under the generic name of “Apaches.” The Lipan, when first known to the Texans, lived far to the northwest of San Antonio, on the upper reaches of the Colorado, Brazos, and Red rivers, but gradually they moved south before the advancing Comanches, until by 1732 they made their home in the country of the San Sabá, Chanas (Llano), and Pedernales. About 1750 some of them established themselves on the Medina, and others pushed on to the Rio Grande. The Natagés and the Mescaleros lived far to the southwestward, in the country of the Pecos and the Rio Grande. These Eastern Apaches were not numerous, but were led by petty chiefs, which made it difficult to deal with the tribes as wholes. And in proportion to their numerical strength, their capacity to make trouble was surprisingly great. During this period they apparently did not use firearms, but fought, on horseback, with bows, spears, and darts, and had armor for both man and horse.
1. Apache Relations in Texas Before 1718.—The Apaches were well known in New Mexico at a very early date. Before the establishment of Texas they pestered the frontiers of Nueva Viscaya and Coahuila, and no sooner had the Spaniards founded San Antonio than it experienced similar visitations. In his diary of 1691, Father Massanet made the following statement concerning the Apaches, which is a good summary of knowledge of them in Texas at this time. He says, “The Apaches form a chain running from east to west, and wage war with all; with the Salineros alone do they maintain peace. They have always had wars with the Spaniards of New Mexico, for, although truces have been made, they have endured little. In the end they conquer all the tribes; yet it is said that they are not brave because they fight with armoured horses. They have defensive and offensive weapons, and are very skillful and warlike Indians.” 15
Before the establishment of San Antonio the Spaniards of eastern Texas had come into contact with the Apaches through the wars which the latter waged with their inveterate foes, the “Texas.” The part of the Spaniards in these wars was, no doubt, one of the causes for the attacks which were subsequently made on San Antonio. All of the tribes east of the middle Colorado were allied against the Apaches, and many bloody encounters took place between the two groups. From the time of the first Spanish entry into their country, the “Texas” Indians enlisted the aid of the soldiers, just as a few years before they had enlisted a part of Joutel's men. 16 Hidalgo tells us that in August, 1692, the soldiers joined the Texas in a campaign against the Apaches, going west-ward until the land of the enemy was reached. While the invaders were sleeping peacefully one night the Apaches attacked them, and, says our informant, had it not been for the firearms of the Spaniards, not one of them would have returned home. 17 On another campaign of this early period the Texans, with the aid of the Spaniards, are said to have won a great victory over the Apaches, killing one hundred and thirty-six of their number. 18 Joseph de Urrutia, the romantic character who remained in Texas after the abandonment in 1693, says, with probable exaggeration, that he lived among the Texas tribes for seven years and organized them for campaigns against the Apaches, acting in the capacity of capitán grande, and often leading more than 10,000 warriors against the common foe. 19
Thus it seems that the Spaniards of Texas were first known to the Apaches in the light of foes, and that early relations between them were confined to hostile acts. 20
2. Raids About San Antonio and Flores's Campaign, (1718-1723).—Had the Spaniards refused to give aid to the Texas, they might have been spared, possibly, a great deal of trouble, but at the outset they had definitely put themselves on record as enemies of the Apaches, and the latter did not forget it. The Apache terror overshadows Spanish Texas from the founding of San Antonio.
In the instructions given to Governor Alarcon, in 1718, for the planting of this new outpost, he was cautioned to be on his guard against the Apaches, and was told to organize the neighboring tribes in a defensive alliance against them, as there was much danger of attack from this “barbarous enemy.” 21 These fears were quickly realized, for as soon as the Apaches learned of the establishment of Béxar they began to harass it. Before the Marqués de Aguayo had made his expedition into Texas in 1721-2, 22 they had already become so bold as to attack the supply trains from Coahuila to San Antonio, stealing mules and killing the drivers. 23 Aguayo fully realized the danger. In 1720 he had endeavored from Coahuila to secure peace with the Apaches, but they would make no concessions. Instead they brazenly declared their hostile intentions by hanging red cloth from arrows stuck in the ground near San Antonio. 24 While Aguayo was on his way from Monclova to Texas, in 1721, his men had a skirmish just before reaching San Antonio with some Indians whom they supposed to be Apaches. Two days before his arrival there a pack train had been attacked. In consequence, several detachments were sent out from San Antonio for the purpose of checking these hostilities. 25
Nevertheless, Aguayo's policy was one of conciliation. He wished to make friends of the Apaches, and as he journeyed from San Antonio to eastern Texas he erected several crosses, in order, as he said, “to exalt the cross in the midst of so much idolatry, and to leave signs of peace to the Apaches Indians, who consider them as such and know from them that Spaniards have been there.” 26 No Apaches were encountered by Aguayo himself, however, and in this he was disappointed, for his plan was to take some of them prisoners and bring about peace through their mediation. 27
When Aguayo reached Los Adaes he learned that Fray Joseph Pita, a lay brother of the College of the Santa Cruz de Querétaro, had been killed a short time previous while en route to East Texas. The friar had ventured forth to hunt buffalo without the protection of the soldiers, and Indians, said to be Apaches, killed him between the San Xavier and the Brazos rivers. His remains were found in 1723, as we shall see, and were taken to San Antonio by Captain Nicolás Flores. 28
After Aguayo's return to Coahuila in 1722, the Apaches continued to steal horses, and on one occasion five Indians managed to make off with fifty of them. Captain Flores, with ten men, gave chase to the thieves, recovered the horses, and took back to San Antonio the heads of four of the offenders, together with some spears and some skin armor used to protect the horses of the Indians. 29 Shortly after this, in April, 1722, Flores was given command of the presidio, 30 and with his office he inherited the Apache trouble.
After Flores succeeded to the command of the presidio such was his vigilance, he said, that no horses were stolen from Béxar until August 17, 1723. 31 Upon this date, however, a band of Apaches made a raid upon the stock of the presidio. In spite of the fact that the corral was locked and that ten soldiers guarded the gates, the Indians broke in and carried off eighty horses. Captain Flores was notified, and, although it was midnight, set out in pursuit. After a vain chase that lasted until noon of the following day, he decided to return to the presidio for reinforcements. Two days later he again set out with a force of thirty soldiers, including eight from Bahía, and thirty mission Indians, to follow the trail of the Apaches. He carried only two pack loads of flour, and relied for meat upon buffalo and deer. In five days he passed the Lomería, or range of hills, to the north, and on September 24, thirty-six days after leaving San Antonio, and after having traveled one hundred and thirty leagues, he came upon a ranchería of two hundred Apaches, constituting one of the five bands into which the enemy had divided, who sallied forth to meet him. A six hours' battle ensued, according to the report, in which the Spaniards were victorious, thirty-four Indians, including their chief, being killed, and twenty women and children taken captives. About one hundred and twenty horses and mules were recovered, together with a quantity of plunder, consisting of saddles, bridles, knives, spears, and other articles which had been stolen by the Indians. Of the Spaniards, three, including Captain Flores, were slightly wounded, and one Indian was hurt. The return to San Antonio was made in nineteen days. 32
The fact that they went northward five days before entering the Lomería, and that they returned by way of the San Xavier (San Gabriel) 33, where Father Pita's remains were found, would indicate a generally northward direction for the campaign. Since they were nineteen days returning and traveled one hundred and thirty leagues, the air-line distance from San Antonio could hardly have been less than two hundred miles. This would put the place where the battle occurred somewhere in the region of Brownwood, perhaps.
The foregoing account of Flores's campaign is based on the official report made by Flores to the Marqués de Aguayo, supplemented by the other accounts in so far as they do not conflict. Conflicting statements are not wanting, however. Indeed, in a later report by Flores himself we find slight discrepancies in the figures, as well as additional details. According to Fray Joseph González, missionary in Valero, who, be it noted, was not present at the battle, Flores attacked an innocent band of Apaches “behind their backs,” and killed and captured his victims while they were trying to escape. González's statement was corroborated by four soldiers of Béxar, who made a declaration containing some additional facts. 34
These differing and conflicting accounts of the expedition indicate in part the dissensions which were so prevalent at this time between the missionaries and the soldiers, with their respective sympathizers, and, as will be seen presently, Flores's campaign, together with the consequences resulting therefrom, served only to increase the discord.
3. Peace Negotiations.--One important result of the campaign was to open up the way for negotiations looking to a treaty of peace with the Apaches. It had been Aguayo's idea to treat with them through captives, and it is not unlikely that Flores was acting upon the advice of his patron. Although at this time the chief object of imprisoning the Apache women and children seems to have been to bring the Indians to terms of peace, yet we can see here early hints of that Spanish custom of enslaving the Apaches which became so prevalent in Texas some years later, for Flores was charged with wishing to retain the captives as servants rather than to use them as hostages. 35
Among the captives taken by Flores was a woman about forty years old, whom the captain questioned through an interpreter. He inquired the motive for the hostility of the Apaches towards the Spaniards at San Antonio and their reasons for stealing horses. She replied that it was because of the trade which the Apaches maintained with “other Spaniards” to the north, to whom they sold horses and slaves. 36
This statement was to the Spaniards a confirmation of their suspicions in regard to the French, for it was assumed that these “other Spaniards” could be none other than Frenchmen who were manipulating the Apaches for their own benefit. The French had been a source of anxiety to the Spanish ever since La Salle had established his ill-fated colony at the Bay of Espíritu Santo, and it was still feared that they might try some day to wrest from Spain her northern territory. This fear had a direct influence upon relations with the Apaches, as it had upon most of their Indian relations in Texas, during the eighteenth century, and in Flores's negotiations for peace we can see the germs of a policy of alliance with the Apaches which finally, after many ins and outs, resulted in the establishment of missions for them. The Spaniards wished, among other things, to use the Apaches as a bulwark against the French and their Indian allies (the Comanches in particular), and to prepare the way for the development of trade between New Mexico, Espíritu Santo, and eastern Texas, and so strengthen Spanish hold upon that vast territory. 37
Upon further examination, the captive squaw said that the Apache chiefs were anxious to be friends with the Spaniards. Hereupon Flores agreed to dispatch her as an ambassador to her people, and promised to release the prisoners if the chiefs would come and make peace. She consented to carry the proposal to the capitán grande (head chief) of her people, and promised to return in twenty days. A horse was given her, as well as many other gifts, and about October 7 she departed on her mission. 38
Within twenty-two days the squaw returned, accompanied by an Apache chief, his wife and three other Apaches. Flores went out to meet them, and the chief Indian gave him a bastón (cane), saying “Dios! Dios!” They were examined by Father González, given presents, and treated in the very best style. The chief reported that as soon as the squaw returned, telling of the friendship of the Spaniards and of their desire to be at peace with the Apaches, couriers were dispatched to the other chiefs to notify them, so that a council might be held to discuss matters. He himself was joined at first by another chief, but later it was decided that only one of them should go, and the other chief gave him a gold-tipped cane (the one he had brought) and told him to go and see if the Indian woman spoke the truth; if it was so, to return and notify the five chiefs so that all of them might go to make peace.
After remaining at the presidio three days, the Indians left on November 1, promising that without doubt the five chiefs would all come to make peace. 39 Nevertheless, although prospects seemed so flattering, it was to be a long time before they were realized.
Indeed, very sinister tales were told, to the effect that all of these negotiations were only a ruse on the part of the Apaches to regain their women and children. A Coahuila Indian named Gerónimo who had escaped from the Apaches to San Juan Bautista declared that the Apaches had been very much aroused by Flores's campaign and that they had assembled to march upon San Antonio, when the Indian woman arrived, telling them of what the Spaniards had promised, and that (with characteristic cunning) the Apaches had decided to postpone their plans in order to secure the release of their women and children who were at San Antonio. The capitán grande, Gerónimo's declaration continued, consoled as best he could the disappointed Indians, promising to attack San Antonio after they had secured their relatives. 40 This story was confirmed by a Spaniard named Juan Santiago de la Cruz, who likewise had been a prisoner among the Apaches. He said that the Apaches were always eager for war upon the Spaniards, and that when Flores had killed some of their number on his campaign a great many tribes gathered with the intention of attacking San Antonio. But just as they were about to start, the old Indian woman arrived with a message from Flores. Two priests were sent for from another ranchería, and they read the letter, informing the Indians that Flores offered peace. 41 The capitán grande now decided to send a chief, accompanied by a few men, with a bastón, to secure the release of the captives, but agreed that as soon as the latter had been given up, a great force should assault the presidio at San Antonio. With this deceitful intent, said the Spaniards, the Apaches were sent to promise peace. 42
The Apaches did not return to San Antonio until about two months had passed. In the latter part of December a band of about thirty arrived at the settlement, where they were welcomed by Father González. The Indians were allowed to enter the mission, and González proposed to give up to them the women and children who were being held as prisoners. Flores, however, would not hear to this, and refused to release the hostages until all the chiefs should agree to make peace. González argued that they would probably not care to come until they should be convinced of the good intentions of the Spaniards. But Flores was firm in his decision, and the discussion waxed furious. The Indians finally took fright thereat and departed, leaving a twelve-year-old girl as an additional hostage and promising that as soon as the cold weather should be over four of their chiefs would come and make peace, but asserting that the fifth one did not wish to be the friend of the Spaniards. 43
4. The Removal and Restoration of Captain Flores.—This occurrence had opened anew the quarrel between Flores and González, and the missionary began to do all in his power to secure the removal of the soldier.
In consequence of reports that Flores had allowed the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar to deteriorate, the viceroy in a letter of October 3, 1723, had warned him to be more diligent in the service of the king, and suggested that if his soldiers had been properly equipped and the presidio in good condition the Apaches would not have succeeded in stealing the eighty horses. Apparently this was a great surprise to Flores, for he claimed that he had been especially diligent in pursuing the raiding Indians, and recovering the only horses that had been stolen from the presidio during his term. 44
Evidently with the view of justifying himself, on January 9, 1724, Flores appealed to González to make a statement concerning the condition of the presidio and to certify as to his (Flores's) prompt action in recovering the stolen horses. 45 Flores was too late, however, for before the end of November, González, through the guardian of his college, had complained to the viceroy of Flores's conduct. 46 Now, upon Flores's appeal, González took advantage of a new opportunity to complain of the captain's impolitic conduct in regard to the Apaches. He stated in his declaration that the Apaches had been grievously offended by the unwarranted attack upon them, and that the peace which had been so near to consummation had been irretrievably spoiled. 47
Father Hidalgo, who was missionary at San Antonio de Valero at this time, and before whom González's declaration was made, supported his brother priest. To the latter's statement he volunteered to add his own opinion. The Apaches, he said, could have been converted long before if the presidios had been managed rightly. He thought that the poor pay of the soldiers was responsible for the class of men who usually enlisted, and that their bad habits caused the loss, not only of their own souls, but of those of the Indians as well. “Now, again,” he continued, “the captain of this presidio has disturbed the so greatly desired peace by not releasing the children of the Apaches.” 48
González's opposition to Flores culminated in an effort to have him removed from his command. On March 18, 1724, he wrote to the viceroy complaining that the bad condition of the presidio was the cause of the failure to reap great harvests of souls. Since the French were anxious to ally with the Apaches, this bad state of affairs, he said, might mean ruin for the Spaniards. He told of the attack upon the corral, the stealing of the horses, the pursuit by Flores, the defeat of the Indians, the taking of the captives, and Flores's subsequent refusal to release them to their people. Finally, the priest declared, in order to repair the damage which had been done, it would be necessary that Flores be removed from his office as captain, not only because of his unchristian conduct toward the Apaches, but also because of his scandalous actions and bad example in general. As a successor to Flores, González proposed Mateo Pérez, a private soldier of the presidio of the Rio Grande. 49
González also suggested a remedy for the unwise policy of Flores. It was to form a company of seventy men from the various presidios, led by Father González himself, and by going to the land of the Apaches, treating the Indians kindly, giving them back their wives and children, and bestowing upon them some presents, thus again secure peace. It was the policy of the olive branch and the sword. 50
Whether or not this letter of González was the cause of the removal of Flores is uncertain. At any rate, on April 6, 1724, Flores received an order from the viceroy commanding him to give up the command of the presidio to Mateo Pérez, just as González had suggested, and to retire one hundred leagues from the “province of Texas.” 51
Flores obeyed the order, and Pérez took charge in June. This did not mean, however, that the matter was settled. On the contrary, Flores began at once to exert himself to regain his command. He made a personal plea to the viceroy, giving his account of the raid and the fight with the Apaches, and furnishing testimonials from the Marqués de Aguayo and from other persons concerning his good conduct and ability. In his own defense, Flores said that he had recovered the only horses that had been stolen during his term of office, and that the presidio was in good condition, with the requisite number of competent soldiers, contrary to what González had charged. As to the latter's statement about the coming of the Apaches to seek peace, Flores said that the priest did not know what he was talking about; that the Apaches had never wished peace, but that a few of them had come to San Antonio in order to see if they could not cajole the Spaniards into giving up the captives. Flores said that he had recognized their duplicity, and had refused to treat with them unless all of their chiefs should come. These statements he substantiated by the declaration of the Spaniard, Juan Santiago de la Cruz, to the effect that the Apaches intended to raid and destroy San Antonio after they had recovered their kinspeople. Finally, Flores asked that, in recognition of his many services and on account of his family, he be restored to his command. 52
To prove his good record in the service of the king, Flores enclosed a number of testimonials. One of these was from no less a personage than Fray Antonio Margil de Jesús, guardian of the College of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de Zacatecas. He stated that Flores had always gallantly and zealously served the king, and that he was worthy, not only to be restored to his command, but even to be promoted to the highest office in the province of Texas. 53
The Marqués de Aguayo, in his testimonial, praised Flores very highly, and, indeed, it is from him that we learn most of the facts concerning Flores's career, as given above. He also defended Flores against the attacks made upon him by Hidalgo, whose charges, he said, were mere repetitions of those made by González. 54 To offset Hidalgo's opinion, Aguayo maintained that Hidalgo was a man easily influenced, and that Father Sevillano, who also opposed Flores, was of somewhat the same nature. As to González himself, Aguayo believed that he had purposely misstated things to the discredit of Flores, and cited Flores's letters as proof. He said that Mateo Pérez had been recommended so that González could keep him under his control and so shape the affairs of San Antonio. 55 Furthermore, Aguayo added, González was known to be of a turbulent disposition, as was admitted by his own college, and one who was always causing trouble. 56 It is only fair to state that González and Aguayo had been personal enemies since 1722, when the former charged the latter with defrauding the government. This fact may have colored Aguayo's opinion of González. 57 Finally, Aguayo recommended that Flores be restored to the command of the presidio at San Antonio and that all back pay be given him. 58
In consequence of Aguayo's intervention, on May 31, 1725, the viceroy ordered that Flores should be restored to his command and that Pérez should return to his service as a private soldier in the presidio of Rio Grande. 59 Thus in spite of further efforts that González may have made, Flores won his fight, and for this time, at least, the seculars triumphed over the missionaries.
5. Further Raids and Spanish Conciliation, 1724-1725.—While this controversy had been raging between Flores and González, the Apaches had continued to inflict upon the province their thefts and murders. The assurance given by the Indians who had visited San Antonio in November, 1723, that four of their chiefs would come to make peace did not prove well founded, and after some seven months of quiet the Apaches renewed their raids. 60
At about midnight of March 9, 1724, Francisco Minchaca (sic), a soldier of the presidio of Rio Grande del Norte, arrived at San Antonio and reported that his companion, Antonio González, had been killed by Indians about fifteen leagues away. Flores set out at once with ten soldiers, and, reaching the scene of the attack, found the mutilated body of González. Though there were conflicting opinions as to the identity of the malefactors, there were strong indications that they were Apaches. 61 On March 14th or 15th, ten Apaches, bearing the Indian captive Gerónimo, stole some horses from the corral of the presidio of San Juan Bautista del Rio Grande. Gerónimo fled to the Spaniards, gave the alarm, and the horses were recovered. 62 Again, in April, the Apaches attacked some mission Indians of San Antonio, killing one and wounding another. 63 About the same time they killed a Mesquite Indian at El Almagre, took another prisoner, and killed a Paquasian Indian on the upper Medina. 64 Early in January of the following year these Paquasian (Paquache) Indians were attacked by the Apaches near the Nueces River. It was hoped by Father Paredes that fear of the Apaches would induce the tribe to enter the San Xavier mission, then almost extinct, at San Antonio. Similarly, some time before January, 1726, the Sanas were attacked by one hundred Apaches and driven from their rancherías. 65
Thus we see that there was little cessation of hostilities. On the contrary, as Father Hidalgo said, “little by little the Apaches are showing their claws.” 66
In spite of this warlike attitude of the Apaches, however, the Spaniards continued to follow a policy of conciliation. Governor Almazán had reported, on March 24, 1724, the negotiations that had been carried on with the Apaches, and said that up to that time the chiefs had not come to make peace, as they had promised to do. 67 On April 25, the viceroy replying to Almazán urged upon him the importance of securing an alliance with the Apache chiefs by gentle means, which, he said, should be easy to do, since the Apaches of New Mexico were friends of the Spaniards. 68 Almazán answered that he would carry out these instructions, but that he had little hope of securing any good results, as the Apaches were getting worse every day, and were making life and property unsafe. Nevertheless, he gave orders that if any Apaches should be encountered they should be brought before him so that he might give them presents and dispatch them as messengers to their chiefs, offering friendship and alliance. 69
These troublesome questions were referred by the viceroy to the Marqués de Aguayo for his opinion, as an authority on Texas affairs, and in February Aguayo gave his reply. He believed that the Apaches should first be treated with “gentle persuasion”; that another one of the captives at San Antonio should be dispatched with proffers of peace, and that influence should be brought to bear upon the friendly Apaches of New Mexico, in order that they might aid in bringing their kinsmen to terms. But in case the Apaches would not admit any overtures of peace, Aguayo advised that a company of eighty Spaniards and one hundred Indian allies should make an expedition against them, entering their country from New Mexico. He suggested that the necessary soldiers could be secured by taking detachments form the various presidios, and that the “Texas” Indians would be only too glad to get a chance to fight their old enemy. Nevertheless, he thought, the best way to reach the Apaches was through their captive kinsmen, and he advised that this be attempted. 70
Aguayo's advice was accepted by the viceroy, and his policy was ordered carried out, with the understanding that even in case the Apaches spurned the proposals of peace, no campaign should be undertaken until due authority was given. 71 Thus we see the adoption of a definite policy toward the Apaches, that of conciliation before punishment, which was to continue in force for several years.
The line of division already observed between the missionaries and the seculars in regard to the Apaches was continued. The priests usually defended them and believed in their good intentions, while the civil and military officials, in spite of orders that they be conciliatory, habitually distrusted them. The spirit of the fathers is typified by the petition of Hidalgo, who, on March 18, 1725, asked for permission to go to the land of the Apaches to try to convert them. He wished to be unaccompanied save by a single lay brother, and hoped, by converting the Apaches to the “holy Catholic faith,” to secure the peace of the province. 72
6. Information Acquired Concerning the Apaches.—Through their intimate relations with the Apaches, the Spaniards at San Antonio had become very much better acquainted with them, and by 1725 possessed concerning them considerable definite knowledge. From the correspondence of the period thus far covered we can determine the ideas of the soldiers and priests in regard to the location, organization, numbers, and general customs of the Apaches with whom they had been dealing. Up to this time very little distinction, if any, was made between the different Apache tribes, but all were included, as has been stated, under the generic name of “Apaches.” Not only were the Texas Apaches included under this term, but those of New Mexico as well, together, embracing, as they said, a range of more than five hundred leagues. 73
a. Location.—It is clear that during this period the Apaches known at San Antonio were living far to the northwest. Domingo Cabello, who was governor of Texas in 1784 and who wrote an historical sketch of the Apaches, says that at the time under consideration they lived along the Rio del Fierro, three hundred leagues “from the province of Texas.” The Rio del Fierro seems to be the Wichita. 74 According to Cabello's statement, the Apaches lived in that region until about 1723, when they were defeated by the Comanches, their greatest foes, in a nine days' battle, and forced to seek safety in flight. 75 Going southward, they chose as their new home the region between the upper Colorado and Brazos rivers, at a distance of some one hundred and twenty leagues from the “province of Texas.” Even here, says Cabello, they did not feel safe from the attacks of the Comanches, and began to explore the land to the south with the view of moving again in case of necessity. 76 Cabello's assertion as to the location of the Apaches is borne out by the various documents of this period. When Flores made his campaign in 1723 he marched for more than a month before reaching the Apachería, going, he tells us, a distance of one hundred and thirty leagues, or perhaps some two hundred and sixty miles, northwest from San Antonio. This agrees substantially with Cabello's statement. The length of time consumed by the woman in her embassy to her people 77 indicates that the Apaches were a long distance away. When she departed, on horseback, she said that she would return in twenty days, and she was, in fact, gone twenty-two days.
The range of the Apaches extended much farther south, it is true. During the buffalo season, they were accustomed to move their camps to the southeast, between the middle Colorado and Brazos rivers, where the buffalo were most numerous. They stayed here only temporarily, however, retiring north at the end of the season. There is no ground for Yoakum's statement that on the coming of the Spaniards the Lipan Apaches inhabited the Gulf coast, 78 and such an opinion could not be entertained by one who is familiar with the contemporary documents now available. At this time the Apaches did not habitually range below the old San Antonio road. Attention should also be called to the evident error in the map in the Handbook of American Indians, Part I, which shows the Shoshonean stock, clearly referring to the Comanches, when first known to Europeans, as extending in a narrow wedge on both sides of the Colorado to a point below Austin. At this time the Comanches were held north of the Apaches, and as the latter lived a long distance northward from San Antonio, the incorrectness of this portion of the map is readily perceived. The Comanches, in their southward migration, did not reach the Panhandle till about 1700, and it was long after this before they ranged habitually east of the lower Colorado.
b. Tribal Organization.—Through their efforts to obtain peace with the Apaches, the authorities at San Antonio learned something of their tribal organization. The Indians with whom they treated said that they were divided into five tribes (naciones), each of which was governed by his own chief or capitán. All of these chiefs, however, recognized the authority of a head chief (capitán grande), who lived still farther north. 79 The squaw sent as a messenger by Flores described the method of the Apaches in making a raid, which illustrates this organization. She said that all of the five chiefs would assemble and furnish about twelve men each for the raid. When these returned, the booty was divided, and all returned to their respective homes. Without the permission of the capitán grande, however, she said, none of the chiefs dared to make an expedition. 80 The names of these different bands, for such they evidently were, do not appear at this time. Moreover, the contemporary sources of the period leave us wholly in the dark as to what portion and what branch of the Apaches were being treated of. But there are indications that the principal ones were the branch that later emerged as the Lipan.
c. Numbers.—To the Spaniards at San Antonio the Apaches seemed to be a very numerous people, 81 but their number was probably much smaller than was believed. Flores said that in his campaign he fought one of the five rancherías and that about two hundred warriors were engaged. If he was correct in his estimate, the total population of this ranchería could not have been less than eight or nine hundred.
d. Customs.—The equipment of an Apache warrior, the witnesses tell us, was quite elaborate. They possessed many horses, had good saddles with iron stirrups, and used bridles. Their horses were usually protected from the arrows of the enemy by buffalo skins, and the Apaches themselves used skin armor, painted variously blue, red, green, or white. No mention is made of the Apaches having firearms, and it is made to appear that they fought entirely without them. Their arrows were generally tipped with iron, we are told, and they also used a kind of iron dart (chuza) in offensive warfare. Their clothing, as a rule, was of buckskin. 82
e. Intertribal Relations.—As has already been stated, the Apaches had long been foes of the Indians living to the east of the middle Colorado river, and never did the Texas Indians go out to hunt buffalo without being in danger of attack from the Apaches, who were also in the same region during the buffalo season. Less worthy foes of the Apaches were the small Coahuiltecan tribes living west of the San Antonio river and south of the Camino Real. Of the Apaches these lived in mortal dread, and we have already mentioned some of the attacks which they withstood. 83 One result of Apache hostility toward these smaller tribes of southern Texas had been the formation of what was known as Ranchería Grande, which was composed of many tribes who had banded together to combat the Apaches, and which made its headquarters in the neighborhood of the Brazos. 84 From the declaration of the Indian boy, Gerónimo, it may be inferred that with the Jumanes and Tobosos the Apaches maintained friendly relations. 85 Indeed, the Jumanes, as will be seen, were included under the term “Apaches.”
1. The Apaches Inactive.—For several years after 1725 the documents available do not indicate that many hostilities were committed by the Apaches. On the contrary, there are indications that they were either holding themselves in reserve, for some unknown reason, or were occupied elsewhere. Thus, on July 4, 1726, Almazán reported that everything was quiet at San Antonio, and that recently the Apaches had made no hostile move. 86 Sometime in 1726, it is true, the Apaches were so bold as to try to steal some horses which were being guarded by a mission Indian very near the presidio. 87 In 1727 they killed near the same mission a recently converted Indian. 88 But these are the only specific instances of violence by them cited by the documentary sources for some four years. It is not improbable that the Apaches made minor raids upon the Spaniards' stock. Indeed, Father Sevillano, writing in November, 1729, remarked, in connection with Apache relations at the mission Valero, that “lately, at every turn, there are tragedies in that mission.” 89 But whatever troubles there may have been, they do not appear to have been of sufficient importance to merit special mention.
Yet, although the Apaches were peaceful, the quiet had a somewhat ominous appearance, and the colonists did not forget that the savages were likely to descend upon them at any time. Even the priests did not trust that the peace was permanent, but feared that the Indians might attack the presidio and burn the missions. This fear is voiced by Father Miguel Sevillano de Paredes in his report made in 1727. 90
2. Rivera's Recommendations.—In 1727 Don Pedro de Rivera made a general inspection of the Spanish defenses on the frontier, and in his report of 1728 proposed a general reduction of forces in Texas. San Antonio, as well as the establishments in eastern Texas, was to be affected by this policy of retrenchment. Rivera recognized the exposed condition of Béxar and its proximity to the hostile Apaches, but, influenced, no doubt, by their recent comparative quiet, he underestimated the danger from them. 91 In consequence, he recommended that the garrison at Béxar be reduced from fifty-three to forty-three soldiers, “since,” as he said, “it has no other enemies in its neighborhood than the Apache Indians, who inhabit the Lomería Grande (big range of hills), which nation is not so large as to cause anxiety to that presidio even though its garrison should be smaller than the one which now protects it.” 92 He said that even if the Apaches did commit petty thieveries, through the carelessness of the soldiers, they would soon learn the consequences of their acts and would desist from them. 93
3. Effect of the Recommendations.—These ill-advised recommendations at once caused a storm of protest from the missionaries. Father Vergara complained that to take ten men from the presidio of Béxar would mean the ruin of the missions at San Antonio, for the Apaches would soon learn of the reduction in forces, and would be encouraged to renew their hostilities. 94
In 1731 the Querétaran missions were removed from eastern Texas, and after several other locations had been projected for them were re-established near San Antonio. The proximity of the Apaches had much to do with determining the sites, for it was deemed dangerous to establish them in any place less protected from that tribe. 95 In this same year the population of San Antonio was further increased by the coming of the Canary Islanders. They were not a highly courageous lot, and their fears of the hostile Indians added considerable to the alarm felt at San Antonio. The new colonists, afraid to settle on the lands that had been assigned them some distance away, congregated under the shelter of the presidio. 96 Hardly had they become established in their new home when the Apaches awoke from their inaction and began a series of raids more serious than any before experienced from them at San Antonio.
1. Renewed Raids.—The renewed hostilities began with the opening of 1731. On January 9, Fr. Salvador de Amaya and Fr. Francisco Bustamante with a small party, escorted by four soldiers, were attacked by fifty Apaches while on their way from San Antonio to Rio Grande, a woman being killed and a boy carried away into captivity. The rest of the party “miraculously” escaped with their lives. 97 No attempt being made to punish this attack, the Apaches grew bolder, and before long entered the mission of San Antonio de Valero and carried away fifty burros. 98 At another time they visited one of the new missions during the absence of the priest, and, putting to flight the recently congregated Indians, stole all of the horses there. 99 Again, about April 15, it seems, eighty Apaches attacked a squad of soldiers who were conducting horses to the Rio Grande, at the place where the two priests had been assaulted on January 9. The soldiers were ignominously scattered and all of the horses captured. 100 Later, on June 25, Fr. Zaes Monge and Fr. Benito de Santa Ana, accompained by five soldiers, were attacked by the Apaches while en route to Rio Grande. Two soldiers were wounded and all of the horses carried off. 101 Thus all but the last of these raids occurred between January 9 and April 17, and the priests now cited them as evidence of the insufficiency of the escorts that were assigned them. As a result of their complaints, Rivera, now convinced of the seriousness of the Apache situation, recommended that eight soldiers and a cabo (chief) should be given them on their journeys from Rio Grande to San Antonio. 102 At the same time he also recommended that permission be given to the captain of Béxar to punish the Apaches for their repeated crimes, as had been requested by Captain Almazán, for, he said, unless something were done to uphold the honor of the Spanish arms, their outrages would soon pass beyond all bounds. 103 But no immediate action was taken to punish the offenders.
After these repeated attacks, there was a lull in the depredations that lasted until the middle of September. But the inhabitants at San Antonio felt anything but secure, and their alarm was materially increased in the first part of August by the capture of an Apache who declared that a great number of his people were assembling in their country preparatory to making a combined attack upon the settlement. This warning was justified, as will be seen from subsequent events. 104
2. The Fight at San Antonio, September 18, 1731.—Quiet was broken by a raid on the stock of the presidio at San Antonio on September 18, 1731, at noon, when the Apaches attacked the horse herd (cavallada) and succeeded in stealing about sixty beasts. Don Juan Antonio Pérez de Almazán, who was now captain at Béxar, was at once notified, and, although he was ill at the time, set out immediately in pursuit of the offenders, dispatching a sergeant with five soldiers in advance. When Almazán overtook them, at a distance of about a league from the presidio, he found them engaged in a fight with at least forty Indians, and, as he tells us, had he not arrived at that opportune time all six would have perished. 105 They were by no means free from danger with the coming of reinforcements, for the Spaniards did not number more than twenty-five men in all, while, according to Almazán, just as they arrived about five hundred Indians came out from their hiding places, all on horseback and well armed. The combined force now attacked the soldiers with great fierceness, forming their line of battle in the shape of a crescent (media luna), and gradually surrounding the small band. The battle lasted for more than two hours, and two men had been killed and thirteen badly wounded, when the Spaniards decided to dismount at the foot of a tree and sell their lives as dearly as possible, since most of the horses were disabled and some of the wounded soldiers unable to remain in the saddle. The Indians continued drawing the death circle around the Spaniards, who thought that they had only a few moments to live. But suddenly the Indians began to flee, much to the astonishment of the soldiers, for there seemed to be absolutely no reason why they should not have finished the small force and have proceeded to ravage the missions and the presidio, which would have been an easy task, for fourteen soldiers were absent on a mission to Coahuila. Almazán said that it was only by a miracle of Divine Providence that the whole settlement was not exterminated. 106
The abandonment of the fight by the Indians was very characteristic of Apache warfare. They usually fought very cautiously, as they could not afford to lose many men, and a warrior was not easily replaced. Knowing that many of their own number would be killed while the Spaniards were being overpowered, and fearing that, in the meantime, reinforcements might come from the presidio, they followed their usual course and fled with the horses they had stolen. On the part of the Spaniards, this encounter is an instance of very plucky fighting, in that a small number held their own against great odds. Their remarkable resistance would have been impossible, however, if the Indians had been provided with firearms, as was the case with the soldiers. 107
Three distinct tribes participated in this battle, according to the various statements made. Indeed, now for the first time, in the sources at my command, the contemporary writers distinguish the different bands of their foes. The Apache captive mentioned above, 108 being shown the arrows left on the field of battle, declared that they belonged to the Apaches, Pelones, and Jumanes, “all three of which are very numerous in Indians and very warlike.” 109 In a petition of the soldiers of the presidio, which will be referred to later, these same tribes were enumerated. 110 It is interesting to note that Joseph de Urrutia, writing on July 4, 1733, wondered at this alliance between the Apaches and the Jumanes and Pelones, because, he said, the Apaches were formerly the enemies of these other tribes and would not admit them to their friendship. This alliance with other tribes may indicate that the Apaches were no longer as independent as they had been, and that the Comanches were pressing hard upon them, 111 as we know was later the case.
3. Almazán's Report and the Authorization of a Campaign.—Almazán, in reporting these occurrences to the viceroy on December 1, 1731, complained of the lack of forces at the presidio. He said that the number of soldiers was entirely inadequate for the many occupations that were necessary, that much of the time the presidio was left without any defense except for a very few soldiers, and that the missions were exposed to total ruin. He predicted that the outrages of the Apaches would, in the immediate future, increase to such an extent that past ones, although so many, would not be a circumstance compared to those that would follow. Never before, he said, had the Apaches committed so many hostile acts as they had in this year, and such was the terror felt at San Antonio that the soldiers were preparing to remove their families to places of safety. 112 He stated that it would be impossible to make the campaign for which permission had been given him before the following year, on account of the lateness of the season and the scarcity of men. He thought that a large force would be necessary, for, he said, one hundred men would have had difficulty merely in holding their own in the fight of September 8, in which only a small portion of the entire Apache nation had participated. Not more than about sixty soldiers, he said, could be secured from all of the presidios of Texas combined, while citizens (vecinos) could with difficulty be prevailed upon to engage in a campaign, because the enslaving of captives had been prohibited, thus leaving no chance for compensation by securing an Indito or Indita. 113
Almazán's letter was referred to Rivera, who, apparently, was now in Mexico City, and in consequence he made two recommendations: first, that the presidio of Bahía should be removed to the Medina river, on the San Antonio road, in order to ward off the Apaches in that quarter; and, second, that the campaign be undertaken as he had before advised. Rivera was of the opinion that one hundred and fifty soldiers, reinforced by the Indian allies that could be secured, would be enough to make the expedition, and that this number could be raised from Adaes, Bahía, and Rio Grande. He did not agree with Almazán that a large force would be necessary to punish the Apaches, for, he maintained, the success of a campaign depended not so much upon numbers as upon the efficient control of the men. To support this assertion he cited several successful campaigns made by small forces, mentioning among these Flores's expedition of 1723. 114 In regard to captives, Rivera implicitly yielding to Almazán's implied demand, said that great care should be taken to prevent the Indian allies from killing such captives as might be taken, and that to prevent this it would be best to send them to other provinces and bring them up in the Catholic faith. 115
On January 6, 1732, the viceroy ordered that Rivera's recommendations for the removal of Bahía and for the campaign against the Apaches should be carried out. 116 The first part of the order was never fulfilled.
4. The Campaign of Bustillo y Zevallos, 1732.—It was to Captain Almazán that permission was given to make the campaign, but Governor Mediavilla y Ascona, jealous of his own prestige, perhaps, asked to be allowed to lead the expedition. He did not remain in office long, however, and it fell to the lot of his successor, Don Juan Antonio de Bustillo y Zevallos. This, it would seem, occasioned a bitter quarrel between the two men. 117 Affairs dragged along in the usual slow fashion, and it was not until October, 1732, that a start was made. On the 22d of that month, Bustillo, the new governor, set out from San Antonio with a force of one hundred and fifty-seven Spaniards, thirty-two of these being servants, and sixty mission Indians. He carried one hundred and forty pack-loads (cargas) of supplies and had nine hundred horses and mules, some of which were later utilized to good advantage. 118 With this large company, Bustillo proceeded to the San Xavier (San Gabriel) river, where he expected to be joined by some Indians of the “Texas” tribes. They did not appear, however, because, it was said, one of their chiefs, who was called El Francés from his devotion to the French, warned his people that the Spaniards wished to lure them from home, kill them, and seize their women and children. 119 Bustillo, after waiting in vain for the Texas until November 1, continued his march towards the northwest, apparently following the Little River. 120 In order not to be discovered by the Apaches, whose land they soon entered, it was necessary, says Bustillo, to proceed with great caution. Spies were sent ahead, both to the north and to the northwest, but, at first, no signs of Indians were seen. This caused Bustillo to become impatient, and he resolved, as he declares, to find the Apaches even if he had to go clear to New Mexico. He now entered an unknown land, crossed strange rivers, and came into a cold, rough country. The march was exceedingly slow, and at the end of about six weeks Bustillo was, as he said, only about seventy leagues from San Antonio, although his winding course carried him, in actual distance, more than two hundred leagues. He took this roundabout way both to meet the Texas and to avoid being discovered by the Apaches, for, he said, had he gone directly into the Lomería from San Antonio, he would have been seen on the second day. 121 On December 8, after mass had been said, an Indian spy named Asencio, who was one of the San Antonio mission Indians, arrived at the camp and reported that the rancherías of the enemy were about ten or twelve leagues away on the banks of the same river which the Spaniards were now following. 122 Acting upon this information, Bustillo moved his camp to within about five leagues of the Indians. Here a council of war was called, at which Asencio was the chief witness. He was very badly frightened, and when questioned as to the number of the enemy, replied that he had never seen so many gathered together before in his life. 123
In the council it was decided to press on towards the rancherías, and ten Indians were sent ahead as spies. Bustillo left the greater part of the expedition here, and taking one hundred men, at about sunset began his march of some ten miles to the enemy. They traveled all night, with great difficulty, because of the rough ground and their ignorance of the country. In the early morning hours Asencio, who was acting as guide, lost his bearings and did not know which way to take, but after reconnoitering a bit, he returned after daybreak and reported that a ranchería must be nearby, for he had heard the barking of dogs.
Another council was now held. Some were in favor of trying to conceal themselves until the next day, but Bustillo thought it best to attack at once before they should be discovered. At about 8 o'clock (on the morning of the 9th), absolution having been given by the priests, the company set out in two ranks, with Bustillo between them. The rancherías could now be seen at a distance of about half a league, just across the river.
No sooner had the stream been passed than the fighting began. The enemy numbered, the Spaniards believed, more than seven hundred warriors, and included members of four tribes, the Apaches, Ypandis (Lipan), Ysandis, and Chentis. They were in four separate rancherías, covering more than half a league, and their tents numbered more than four hundred. The Indians were well disciplined, and showed extraordinary courage. They were on horseback, and were armed with leather breastplates, which no lance or arrow could penetrate. They waited until the soldiers had discharged their guns, and then closed in with them in a hand-to-hand struggle. These tactics were used repeatedly throughout the battle. As fast as the Indians were killed their bodies were removed by their friends and thrown into the river. Among those who met their fate was a prominent chief, whose death caused much disturbance in the ranks of the Indians. His silver-headed bastón (cane) was taken to Bustillo by the chief of the friendly Pampopas, a mission Indian with the soldiers. The fact that this chief had such a cane indicates that he had maintained friendly relations with the Spaniards at some previous time, or had gotten it from some one who had.
The battle continued for about five hours, but the advantage of the Spaniards' firearms could not be overcome by the Indians, and at about one o'clock they retired, having been entirely driven out of their rancherías. Bustillo estimated the number of Indians killed at two hundred, although he said that it was impossible to know with certainty, for the bodies had been removed as fast as they fell. Only thirty women and children were taken prisoners because most of them had fled upon the approach of the Spaniards. About seven hundred horses 124 were recovered and one hundred mule loads of peltry and other plunder captured. Not one Spaniard was killed on the field of battle, though seven were wounded, one of whom died within five days after. 125
From the contemporary documents alone, no definite conclusion can be formed as to the exact locality of the place of battle. We only know from them that Bustillo had gone to the San Xavier River, on the edge of the “monte grande” (Eastern Cross Timbers), and that he had thence set out northwest, apparently following the first Brazos, or Little River. 126 We are also told that “strange rivers” were crossed on the way, and that the Indian camp was about seventy leagues from San Antonio, in a very rough country, with a river running near the ranchería. 127 With this meager information, the location might be assigned to various regions somewhat wide apart. Fortunately, however, later documents throw additional light upon the matter. In an investigation held at Los Adaes in 1756 for the purpose of obtaining evidence as to Texas's right to exercise jurisdiction over the San Sabá country, testimony is given showing that Bustillo's campaign took him to the San Sabá region. Five witnesses testified to the effect that they had accompanied Bustillo on the campaign, and that the battle had occurred on the San Sabá river; two said that they had afterwards been to the San Sabá river, and had been shown the battlefield; and two declared that they had heard it said and that it was generally known that they had gone to the San Sabá. 128 This testimony, it would seem, should be given due credence. It shows that the Apaches were now considerably south of the country in which Flores had found them in 1723. 129
After the Indians had fled, a council of war was held, and it was decided to return to the main camp where the rest of the force had been left, since the enemies, as it was said, although defeated, still had many good warriors and might attack the camp, while the Spaniards would be at a disadvantage because of their ignorance of the country. Fifty men were detailed as a rear guard. No sooner had the return march commenced, than the Apaches began to harass them. At one time an ambuscade was laid for the Indians, and this checked them somewhat. At about eight o'clock that night the camp was reached. The next day dawned upon various bands of Apaches looking down from neighboring hills, but because of the roughness of the country and the river which intervened they could do no damage. They continued to trouble the expedition, however, during the return to San Antonio, stealing horses whenever an opportunity was presented. The company reached Béxar on December 22, just two months after their departure. The return trip was made in fifteen days, while six weeks had been spent in going. 130 This indicates the extreme caution with which they had proceeded, and the comparative haste they made in getting back, for it must be remembered that they had about fifteen hundred horses to impede them.
5. Efforts to Obtain Peace.—During the absence of the soldiers other bands of Apaches had raided the stock at San Antonio, and when the governor returned various petitions were made asking him not to distribute the captives, but to hold them as a means of making peace with the Apaches. To this effect they recommended that one or two of the captured women be sent as messengers to ask for peace or, if this plan should not be adopted, that another campaign be made against them with a force of three hundred men. If peace could not be secured by one means or the other, they said, it would be impossible to live in San Antonio. 131
This petition was seconded by Fray Gabriel de Vergara, president of the missions of San Antonio and minister in that of Concepción de Acuña, who added the weight of his influence towards inducing the governor to send the two Indian women as messengers to their people, and to retain the rest of the captives as hostages, in order to facilitate the reconciliation. Vergara emphasized the exposed condition of the missions and of the settlement as long as the Apaches should be enemies of the Spaniards, and called attention to the danger that the English or the French would make them their allies. He believed, he said, that the Apaches would make good citizens if reduced to politic life. 132
In consequence of these petitions, Bustillo, on January 4, 1733, dispatched two squaws, one an Apache and the other of the “Ypandis alias Pelones” tribe. They bore letters for their chiefs, and were supplied with horses and provisions for their journey. A sergeant and nineteen soldiers, with a priest, escorted them as far as the San Hibón River (Guadalupe), and took leave of them very hopefully and joyfully. 133
One of Fray Vergara's aims in trying to secure peace is seen in his letter of January 31, 1733. On that day he wrote to the viceroy asking that attention be given to the establishment of missions for the Apaches. He referred to the good nature and truthfulness of the captives taken in the last campaign and said that it would be a “sad thing that such a multitude of souls should be eternal dwellers in the infernal caverns, because of the lack of the gospel,” especially, he continued, when there were so many priests in New Spain ready to preach to them. He again expressed his conviction that the Apaches, if reduced, would form most flourishing missions, because of the numerous and desirable people, and of the water, lands, and other conveniences offered. 134
On the same date Bustillo wrote his report of the campaign enclosing the petitions and letters mentioned above. 135 But just as the courier was about to leave for Mexico, smoke was seen in the distance, and as this was the signal which had been agreed upon, the letters were held back in order to report the outcome of the embassy. Two days later one of the squaws, accompanied by three warriors, arrived at Béxar. One of the men, who seemed to be an Indian of distinction, stated that he had been sent by his chief, the head of the Apache tribe, to see if the women had told the truth about the Spaniards wishing to establish friendly relations with them. The capitán grande himself, he said, was assembling his people in order that all might concur in the peace, and four chiefs would soon come with many people to conclude the negotiations. He declared that there were thirty-seven tribes along the road to New Mexico bearing the name Apache. The Indians were very much pleased, they claimed, with their kind reception and the prospect of peace, wishing to return at once and notify their chief. Bustillo detained them three days, however, feasting and regaling them, and it was not until the 5th that they set out, promising to return within two moons. 136
On November 26, 1732, the viceroy had asked why the Apaches always succeeded in their attacks upon San Antonio, while no other Texas presidio was troubled by them. 137 In answer to this, Captain Almazán made a statement before Bustillo on January 31, 1733, for transmission to the viceroy. He explained that the Apaches confined their raids almost entirely to the presidio of Béxar because of its proximity to their homes, and that they did not trouble Adaes or Bahía because of the distance to be traversed and the hostile Indians who intervened. Not only were the Apaches hostile to San Antonio, he said, but recently two other tribes, the Yxandi and the Chenti, had joined them. These tribes, Almazán stated, were now heard of at Béxar for the first time. 138 Governor Bustillo corroborated Almazán's statement, and showed that the exposed condition of San Antonio was the explanation for the attacks made upon it. 139
1. Apache Treachery and Panic at San Antonio.—Under the guise of peace the Apaches now entered San Antonio with great freedom, and for a time a spirit of seeming amity prevailed between them and the Spaniards. The latter assumed that the peace was on a firm basis and to some extent relaxed their vigilance. The evil consequences of this bad policy were soon apparent. On March 27, three warriors and a squaw, who had come in ostensibly to trade, left the presidio for their country, being accompanied, as usual, by a few soliders to see them safely out of the settlement. On this occasion they were escorted by Alferez Xavier Maldonado, Joseph Caravajal, and another soldier, the last of whom turned back to secure aid in killing some buffaloes that were seen near by. The first two continued with the Indians as far as the hill called “El Devisadero,” about one and one-half leagues away. Trusting in the treaty which had been made, they were somewhat careless, and when a band of about twenty-four Indians was seen approaching they awaited their coming without misgivings. As the savages came nearer, however, advancing in two wings, the soldiers recognized their hostile intentions. The scene was observed by the lieutenant of the presidio. He saw the two soldiers fall from their horses and their bodies surrounded by the Indians. When they were afterwards found, they presented a horrible sight. The bodies had been terribly mutilated and the bones stripped of their flesh, which had been carried away by the Apaches, says Father Vergara, to “satisfy their vengeful appetite.” 140
This flagrant rupture of the peace caused a genuine panic among the inhabitants at San Antonio. They now realized that the Apaches could not be trusted. After this outbreak the raids on the stock were renewed, and no one was safe outside of the missions and presidio. Great columns of smoke were seen on the Guadalupe and Rio Grande roads, and the terrified imaginations of the people could see vast concourses of barbarous Indians assembling to destroy the settlement. 141 With difficulty could the priests restrain the Indians from deserting the missions and fleeing to the forests, and, said Father Vergara, no one could blame them, for it was only natural that they should desire to preserve their lives. The neophytes, fearing that the same cruelties that had been practiced on others would be visited upon themselves, would not go out to watch the cattle. 142
That the terror was not confined to the neophytes is shown by three petitions which were now drawn up. One was by the soldiers of the presidio. They said that their petition was not caused through fear for themselves, and that they only asked for permission to remove their families beyond the Rio Grande to a place of safety. As for themselves, they were willing to remain until the end, and to give up their lives in the service of the king. 143
Another petition was made by the civil authorities. In it they emphasized the weakness of the presidio and the exposed condition of San Antonio, and prophesied that the Apaches would invade the place to liberate their kinsmen held as prisoners—an easy feat because of the lack of soldiers. 144 Father Vergara's statement, representing the missionaries, was of a similar nature. He no less emphatically stressed the danger from the Apaches and the need for reinforcements. 145
Governor Bustillo transmitted these petitions, together with his own report of the incidents related, on April 20, 1733, and fully corroborated the statements made, saying that the future of the whole settlement was in danger unless something should be done at once to relieve the situation. 146
2. Provisions for Defense.—In answer to these petitions the central government took some feeble measures for the greater security of San Antonio. One of the first steps was to make Don Joseph de Urrutia captain of the presidio of Béxar, he being named because of his long experience with Indians. His order to take formal possession of the presidio was dated July 23, 1733. He was charged to secure the alliance of his old Indian friends and unite them against the Apaches, with the aim of making a campaign to compel them to remain quiet. 147
The next step was to increase the garrison of forty-three men at Béxar by adding fifteen men from the presidio of Bahía and the same number from that of Adaes. These additional forces were to remain in Béxar subject to the order of the captain there as long as the hostility of the Apaches should continue. It was also provided that the governor should have authority to levy upon presidios outside of his jurisdiction in case of urgent need. 148 Thus Rivera's unwise policy was reversed.
A few words concerning Joseph de Urrutia may not be out of place. He was born in Guipúscoa, Spain, about the year 1678, as is seen from a statement of his age in his testimony given in an investigation in 1738, at which time he was about sixty years old. 149 He was with Terán in 1691 in the expedition to Texas, and was left, a mere youth, at the garrison established near the Neches by Terán. When the soldiers withdrew in 1693, Urrutia met with an accident on the Colorado river and was forced to remain among the Indians. 150 Here he lived among the Cantujuanás, Toos, and Yemes for seven years (apparently not among the “Texas,” as has been supposed), and was made “captain general” of all the nations that were hostile to the Apaches, 151 learning their languages and becoming intimately acquainted with their customs. He headed joint campaigns against the Apaches, he said, with evident exaggeration, numbering at times as many as 10,000 or 12,000 warriors. 152 By 1733 he had had about forty years' experience with Indians in Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Texas, 153 and was probably the best informed of all the Spaniards on Indian affairs in Texas. 154
3. A Succession of Unpunished Raids, 1734-1738.—Whether or not the Apaches resented the appointment of their old enemy, Urrutia, as captain of Béxar, and therefore vented their spite upon him in the form of continued depredations, it is impossible to know, but at any rate it is a fact that from 1734 to 1738 there is very little to record save a succession of Indian raids upon San Antonio and vicinity. Strangely enough, during all this period, in spite of his reputation as a fighter, Urrutia, whatever the cause of his weakness may have been, took no effective steps toward retaliation.
Merely in order to give an idea of the troublesome nature of the Apache question, and to show what a blight they must have been to the everyday life of settlement, the narration of these attacks is necessary. In 1734, the exact date does not appear, a band of Apaches, headed by a chief called Cabellos Colorados (Red Hair) who figures prominently in Indian hostilities during this period, 155 went to Béxar to barter hides and buffalo meat for various articles, avowing their friendship for the Spaniards and promising to keep peace with them. While returning to their homes, they met at a distance of about a league from the presidio two citizens of San Antonio. 156 The Spaniards were seized, bound, and carried away a distance of some seven leagues, where the Indians suspended them by their hands from a tree and danced a “mitote” around them. All this was seen by a squad of soldiers sent to their rescue. They could not, however, overtake the Indians, who continued towards their country, still bearing the two captive Spaniards. 157 For a long time their fate was unknown, but, later, an Indian boy, who was presented to Governor Sandobal by the Apaches, told that the captives were mades slaves for some time, being employed in dressing skins, and that when upon one occasion they had tried to escape, they were overtaken and killed. 158 This report of the fate of the two Spaniards was afterward corroborated by the confession of some Apaches themselves. 159
For some two years after this we hear of no outrages in the neighborhood of San Antonio. Indeed, the Apaches even professed friendship and carried on their accustomed barter at the settlement. 160 But on the Rio Grande and in Coahuila, other bands of Apaches were making life a burden to the inhabitants. 161 Seven Apache chiefs had established their rancherías on the Rio Grande in order more easily to make war upon the country south, and so frequently was the presidio of Rio Grande assaulted that the citizens became alarmed, just as at San Antonio, and considered the advisability of moving away. 162
In 1736 San Antonio again felt their heavy hand. On September 20, Fray Francisco de Frías, with an escort of ten soldiers under the command of Bartolomé de Torralba, was returning from San Antonio to Rio Grande, after having brought the supplies for Béxar. At a place called El Atascoso, some fourteen leagues from San Antonio, they were attacked by a number of Apaches, who fought until they saw that they could not secure the horses, and then retired, having wounded, however, Torralba and a friendly Indian. The wounded officer and his soldiers returned to Béxar, fearing lest they should encounter another band of Apaches, and remained there until the wounded man was able to resume the journey. 163 Four days later the new governor of Texas, Don Cárlos de Franquís, passed by El Atascoso and saw traces of the recent battle. 164
After this attack the Apaches gave up all pretense of friendship with the Spaniards and ceased trading at Béxar, continuing their depredations and attacks throughout the rest of the year. 165 It was thought by some that their extreme boldness was due to the fact that many soldiers were deserting from Béxar and that the Indians were aware of the weakness of the garrison. 166
A short time after the attack on the convoy, 167 the Apaches stole about forty horses from the mission of San Francisco de la Espada. 168 While endeavoring to recover them, the soldiers found one horse which had lagged behind from weariness and which the Indians had abandoned. It was recognized as one that had been bought by Cabellos Colorados from Alférez Juan Galban in exchange for a skin. 169 This indicated that Chief “Red Hair” had been implicated in the raid.
A short time after the theft of the horses from the mission Espada, the Apaches attacked and killed two Indian women of the mission of San Juan Capistrano, and a little later they killed two other Indian women of mission Concepción. At the latter time the Apaches carried away two little Indian boys who were with their mothers. One of the boys afterwards escaped and returned to Béxar, re-entering his mission. A few months later two brothers, Ziprian and Dionisio de Castro, who were cutting grass a league away from the presidio, were killed by Apaches. Their bodies were recovered and taken to Béxar for burial. In the same year three soldiers were hunting in the Galban woods (“monte q llaman de Galban”), having obtained permission from the cabo of the guard to do so. While in this pursuit they were attacked by Apaches, and one of them, Joseph Maldonado, was killed. The other two managed to escape, on account of the density of the woods and the fleetness of their horses, but the stock which they were guarding, consisting of some dozen horses, was left to the Indians. In addition to all of these outrages upon the persons of the citizens, the usual number of horses and cattle were stolen during the two years. 170
It is not difficult to infer from the account of these depredations and murders that the Apaches were the most prominent feature in the everyday life of the settlers at San Antonio. They had to be guarded against constantly, as is shown by one of the orders issued by the governor. 171 It was to the effect that no citizen of Béxar should discharge firearms unless he should see Indians entering the place, and that a shot was to be the formal signal of an Indian attack. If it was necessary to fire a gun for the purpose of cleaning it, license must first be obtained from the captain of the guard. 172
In 1737 a most diabolical dead was committed by Apaches. Five Indian women and two Indian boys of mission San Francisco de la Espada went out to gather fruit on the Medina river, about a league from the mission. A band of Apaches attacked them, killing the five women. The two boys were carried away into captivity. 173
In the month of September, 1737, an attack was made upon the stock of the presidio of Béxar which was pastured on the Rio del Cíbolo, about sixteen leagues from San Antonio. The horses had been taken to that place because the Apaches were not known to have ever frequented it. But they found it now, and succeeded in carrying off more than a hundred horses, and wounded Juan Cortinas, the cabo of the ten soldiers who were guarding the camp. 174 The raid was at once reported to Béxar, and Urrutia ordered out fifty men to recover the horses. 175 Three days were spent in pursuing the thieves, but they had such a good start and possessed such intimate knowledge of the country that they were not overtaken. In the camp on El Cíbolo the soldiers found an Indian who had been killed by the guard. In his hand he still clutched a knife, which Lieutenant Mateo Pérez identified as one that had been taken from his house some time before, and which had probably been bartered to the Indians when they had come to Béxar to trade. 176
In consequence of this raid, the guard at El Cíbolo was increased to eighteen men and an officer, who was instructed to be especially vigilant. In spite of their precautions, on December 2, at midnight, the Apaches again assaulted the place. The horses were stampeded, driven toward the north, and secured by the Indians on the run. The soldiers were unable to prevent this because of the intense darkness of the night, and because they feared that the Indians might have another force lying in ambush, as was often the case. 177 This second raid on El Cíbolo was reported at Béxar the next night. Captain Urrutia immediately ordered out a company of forty men to give chase to the thieves, but they could not be overtaken, and more than three hundred horses were lost. 178
A junta (council) was now called (on the 6th), and it was determined to move the horses near the presidio, a guard of twenty men being detailed to protect them. It was seen that El Cíbolo was too far away and too easy of access for the Apaches, while it was thought that if the stock were near the presidio, aid could be given at once in case of an attack. 179
4. The Imprisonment of Cabellos Colorados.—On December 11, 1737, the soldiers, going out at daybreak to count the horses, found an Apache right in their midst. He was seized and taken to the presidio, where he confessed that at a distance of about ten leagues there was a band numbering sixteen Apaches, eight of each sex, who were led by Cabellos Colorados. Their ostensible motive in visiting the presidio was to be that of securing peace with the Spaniards, but their real purpose was to spy out the location of the horses in order to steal them. Alférez Galbán with a force of twenty-eight men was sent out to seize these Indians, and they were all captured at El Chapintillo, eight leagues away, and taken to the presidio, where they were placed in confinement. 180 A few days after the raid of September, the wife of Cabellos Colorados, accompanied by three other Indian women and one brave, had gone to the presidio to trade buffalo meat for tobacco. They had been kindly treated and given to understand that as long as the Apaches were quiet they would not be molested by the Spaniards. This capitana and two of her companions were among those captured with Cabellos Colorados. 181
A few days after the imprisonment of Cabellos Colorados and his band, the chief asked that one of the captives be sent to inform their tribe of the arrest, so that their kinsmen might return the horses that had been stolen in the last raid, and thus secure the release of the prisoners. To undertake this embassy, choice was made of one of the squaws, who promised to return within twenty days. She did not come back until after forty days, when she reported that she had carried out her mission, and that there were some Indians nearby with sixteen horses to exchange for the prisoners in the presidio. At this time a great number of horses came into the view of the Spaniards some distance away, and Urrutia, ever wary, sent out spies to see what the Indians were about. These spies reported that there were more than a thousand armed Indians in the vicinity, and that the horses were only a ruse to draw out the soldiers so that they might be killed and the prisoners released. The Indians stayed in their camp for five days, but Urrutia, being forewarned, did not go out to meet them, as Almazán had done in 1732. 182 The horses which had been brought 185by the squaw were recognized as some which belonged to various citizens and soldiers, and which had been stolen in the raids on El Cíbolo. The squaw explained that she had been unable to bring more horses at this time, but said that the capitán grande was getting them all together and would send them soon. On the following Sunday, January 28, accompanied by another squaw, she again set out from the presidio, promising to bring back the rest of the horses. 183 On April 4th she returned with a different companion, but brought only buffalo meat for the imprisoned Indians and some skins for Captain Urrutia. In spite of their failure to bring the horses, they were kindly treated and allowed to leave the presidio. 184 Nothing more was heard of the squaw until May 22, when an old Indian and his wife came to the presidio, carrying three small loads of buffalo meat for the prisoners and some skins to trade to the soldiers. They reported that the squaw was very far away, getting together all of the horses of the Spaniards, and that she would come with them in a short time. In order that the Spaniards might understand the delay, he said, he had come to inform them of their good intentions and to assure them that the Apaches were sincere. The old brave and his wife were gently treated, and on the 25th were sent away with presents.
Urrutia considered Cabellos Colorados the cause of many of the outrages which had been visited upon the Spaniards, for he had great reputation and influence among his people. It had been rumored, according to Urrutia, that this chief, before his imprisonment, had entered into an agreement with the capitán grande of the Apache tribes to steal all of the horses belonging to the presidios of Béxar, Rio Grande, Coahuila, and Sacramento, after which they would slaughter the inhabitants themselves. 186 In view of the unsavory reputation of Cabellos Colorados and of his captivity at Béxar, Governor Orobio Bazterra, on June 28, held an investigation concerning the part played by Cabellos in the Apache depredations of the past. It was conducted in the usual Spanish way, with the customary interrogatorio, or set of questions, to which a number of witnesses gave answer. It is from the evidence given on this occasion that we get a great deal of our information concerning the depredations for the years 1734-1738, as related above. From the investigation, too, the Spaniards were confirmed in their opinion that Cabellos Colorados was a dangerous man, 187 and he was accordingly kept in prison.
On the morning of August 18 the squaw who had first been sent as messenger, and the old brave, accompanied by three other Indians, returned to Béxar. They said that they had come to trade, but did not bring the horses which they had promised because the Texas Indians had attacked their ranchería, killed twelve persons, captured five boys, and had stolen not only all of the horses which the Apaches were preparing to return to the Spaniards, but also many belonging to the Apaches themselves. 188
The old man declared that as soon as he had left the presidio in May he had gone to see the head chief of all the Apaches, and had told him that the Spaniards were their friends. He had now come, he said, to secure the release of Cabellos Colorados and his companions. The governor, however, objected to this procedure, telling him that he wished to test the good will of the Apaches for a while longer. Besides, he said, the captives were living comfortably, did no work, and were given the best of treatment. To this the old Indian had no answer, but he begged that Governor Bazterra should at least give up an old woman who was among the captives, saying that he would give a mule and a horse in exchange for her. The governor replied, good-naturedly, that he would release the old woman if the two one-eyed Indians who had come with the old man would stay in her place. At this all laughed and the two said they were willing to remain. The rest of the embassy wished to go back to their homes, but said that they would return soon to trade with the Spaniards and that all would be good friends. After trading their buffalo skins, buckskin, and salt for various articles, they took their departure. 189
From December, 1737, until September, 1738, during the imprisonment of Cabellos Colorados and his band, there were no depredations by Apaches at Béxar, which indicated, in the eyes of the Spaniards, that this chief was a prime factor in the war waged by the Apaches. 190 This could not have been entirely true, however, for although Cabellos Colorados was still in captivity, in the beginning of October, 1738, the peaceful attitude of the Apaches, which had endured for nearly a year, came to an end, and San Antonio was again subjected to their ravages. As soon as Governor Bazterra, who was at Adaes, heard of the renewal of hostilities he ordered that Cabellos Colorados and his companions, together with the chief's two-year-old daughter, should be remitted to the City of Mexico. 191 It is not at all improbable that, according to the custom, he was banished to slavery in the West Indies or some other place whence he could never return.
1. The Campaign of Joseph de Urrutia.—One of the purposes of the investigation concerning Cabellos Colorados had been to bring together evidence relating to the bad faith of the Apaches, so that the viceroy might know the condition of affairs at Béxar and provide some means of relief. 192
A short time before the investigation, Captain Urrutia had taken things into his own hands, and had sent in a petition to the viceroy asking permission to make a campaign against the Apaches upon his own responsibility. Such had been the effect of the repeated raids, he said, that the people of San Antonio lived in a state of constant terror, and some families had already moved away. The inhabitants were afraid to attend to their stock, “and,” said Urrutia, “their timidity does not surprise me (although I do not let them know it), for he who is not warned by the ill-fortune of others must be considered rather foolish. And, thus, Most Excellent Sir, those who can enter a presidio at night as far as the center of the plaza and who without being heard can safely remove the horses from the corral in which they are tied to the doors of the houses, are to be feared. As a result, the greater part of the Indians of the new conversions, fleeing from the tyranny of these barbarians, have deserted the missions in which they live, together with their wives and children, some retiring towards the coast of the Sea of the South, a distance of more than sixty leagues, and others toward the Big Wood (Monte Grande).” 193 The presidio of Béxar, he continued, was entirely insufficient to restrain the insolence of the Apaches, and they would never be subdued until one or more vigorous campaigns should be made against them. On account of the lack of forces at San Antonio, Urrutia asked that thirty soldiers be given him from Adaes, fifteen from Bahía, ten from Rio Grande, fifteen from Sacramento, and ten from Monclova, and that the citizens of Coahuila and Nuevo León be encouraged to enlist. In this way, he said, a force of two hundred Spaniards could be raised, which, combined with as many more Indian allies from the Texas, would be sufficient to combat the Apaches. Urrutia here calls attention to his residence of seven years with the Indians of the province of Texas, his knowledge of their languages, and their love for him. He is not overmodest in proclaiming his own merits, and his statements as to the necessary qualifications of a successful governor cause us to suspect that he was “boosting” his own candidacy for that office. One of the conditions demanded by Urrutia was that he should have sole command of the expedition, without the interference of “other chiefs” who might spoil the undertaking. The expenses of the campaign were to be met by the sale of the captives that might be secured, and all of the participants were to have a share in the plunder. Although Urrutia practically asked for a licensed slave trade, he excused it on the ground of securing the conversion of these captives to the Catholic faith and of rescuing them from their barbarous state. 194 The expedition was to be made in April of the following year. 195
Delay ensued, however, and the proposed campaign was not undertaken until the winter of 1739. 196 Details are lacking, but it is known that many captives were secured. Our only available contemporary information is obtained from Fray Santa Ana, who was strongly opposed to the campaign and who probably gives a prejudiced account. The expedition, he said, set out at a very bad season of the year, and much suffering ensued. The soldiers were disorderly, and the campaign as a whole was an abomination. He fervently prayed that no similar one should ever be made, since it was of no value to God or to the king. Indeed, said Father Santa Ana, the leaders of the campaign concealed their desire for slaves and plunder under an ostensible purpose of serving the king, and since the real motive was so low, the results were of course on the same level. 197
Testimony given in 1756 shows that this campaign was to the San Sabá river, in the same region that Bustillo had reached in 1732. 198
2. The Campaign from Coahuila and that of Toribio de Urrutia, 1743-1745.—Joseph de Urrutia apparently died not long after making his campaign, and in the same year, 1740, his son, Toribio de Urrutia, succeeded him as captain at Béxar. The Apaches continued to make much trouble, 199 and in the latter part of 1742 the new captain asked permission to make a series of campaigns against them. His communications were submitted to Don Juan Antonio de Bustillo y Zevallos, former governor of Texas, and to Don Gabriel Costales, who had been captain at Bahía, both of whom opposed his plan. Urrutia, however, nothing daunted, repeated his request a few months later, stressing the need for the subjection of the Apaches, and adding as a further reason the possibility of securing information concerning the rich minerals with which the Apache country was supposed to abound. This last petition was referred in June to Don Justo Boneo, who had just been appointed governor of Texas. 200
The attention of the government, however, seems to have been directed for a time to a campaign against the Apaches conducted from Coahuila. According to Kerlérec, governor of Louisiana, in a summary of Apache relations written in 1753, a campaign was made in 1743 which was very disastrous to the Spaniards. They had a force of two hundred men, and were commanded by the governor of Coahuila, who fell into an ambush, was dangerously wounded, and lost more than half of his men and almost all of his horses and equipment. After this, says Kerlérec, the Spaniards were content to remain on the defensive. 201
This was not true for any great length of time, however, for in 1745, in spite of much opposition from the missionaries (which will be discussed later on) and after tedious delays, Urrutia finally made a campaign in April, 1745. With a force of about fifty Spaniards, the usual number of Indian allies, we may infer, 202 and accompanied by Fray Santa Ana, president of the San Antonio missions, Captain Urrutia went northward from San Antonio, crossing the Colorado river about seventy leagues away. Ten leagues north of this river they found a ranchería of Apaches, “commonly called Ypandes” (Lipans), whose tents were scattered over a wide area. Many of the Indians were away at the time, and it was a comparatively easy matter to secure a number of captives, both from the Ypandes and the Natagés, which, perhaps, fulfilled the purpose of the campaign. Indeed, there is reason to suspect that this was little more than a slave-hunting expedition. 203
This campaign, like those of Bustillo and Joseph de Urrutia, was later said to have been made to the San Sabá river, 204 but from the contemporary documents there is no guide as to the exact location.
3. Retaliation by the Apaches.—Immediately after this campaign the Apaches showed their resentment by committing repeated depredations against the Spaniards. According to the missionaries, for almost a year previous to the campaign the Apaches had been comparatively quiet, many had asked for missions, and had given their children to the priests for baptism. But when they saw, as they said, that the Spaniards did not wish to be friends, they sent messengers (four squaws) to notify them that the peace was declared off. 205 Within a space of three weeks nine persons were killed and robbed, and all the settlement molested except mission Concepción, which was under the charge of Father Santa Ana, who had shown much benevolence toward the Apaches. 206 On June 30, 1745, San Antonio was given another fright by the attack made upon it by about three hundred and fifty Indians, including women and children, of the Ypandes and Natagés tribes. They planned to burn the presidio, and made the attack during the night when all the occupants of the presidio were asleep. Part of the Indians stayed in ambush just without the settlement, and the others gathered before the presidio. By good luck they were discovered by a boy, who gave the alarm, thus rousing some citizens, who held the savages back for a time. But dividing into two bands, they attacked the presidio by another street, and would doubtless have overpowered the soldiers, had not help arrived at an opportune time from mission Valero. One hundred mission Indians came to the rescue and so stoutly did they attack the invaders that they were soon put to flight. The soldiers and Indians now gave chase, but did not proceed further than a place called Buenavista, whence they were ordered back. For some unknown reason the Apaches were not organized with their usual efficiency, for under ordinary circumstances they would have succeeded in their attack. 207 Among the Indians who had set out from the mission was an Apache captive, who at once joined his people. The Ypande chief, whose daughter was being held as a hostage by Father Santa Ana, inquired anxiously concerning the captives, and was told that they were being treated most kindly, and that the Spaniards wished to be the friends of the Apaches. Upon hearing this, the chief repented of his hostility, and ordered his followers to give up the attack. The chief of the Natagés opposed this plan with much vehemence, but he was finally persuaded to retire. For two months after this raid, the Apaches did not trouble the settlement, and at the end of this time a squaw, bearing a cross, accompanied by a boy, was sent to San Antonio with presents for Captain Urrutia, whom she assured that the Apaches wished to keep the peace. 208
4. Troubles on the Rio Grande Border.—Although this promise to remain at peace was kept for a time, it affected only a small number of the Apaches, while along the Rio Grande depredations were multiplied to such an extent that San Antonio feared an attack from that quarter, powder being begged from Espíritu Santo in March, 1746, in anticipation of such an occurrence. 209 At the same time a campaign was being planned by the captains of Rio Grande and Sacramento presidios to punish the Tobosos and the “Apaches Jumanes,” who had been very annoying.
The Apaches along the Rio Grande to the north of Chihuahua were also very troublesome at this time, and the need of retaining the presidios in their vicinity and of establishing others there may have a bearing upon the slowness of the government in founding presidios among the Apaches north of San Antonio, a project which was being agitated by the priests there. 210
5. The Campaign of Rábago y Therán, 1748.—Sometime in 1748, the date is not clear, the governor of Coahuila, Don Pedro de Rábago y Therán, announced to the cabildo of San Antonio that on August 16 he intended to set out from Monclova to make war upon the Indians ravaging the frontier, and asked for volunteers from San Antonio. 211 There are some indications that this plan of Rábago's was opposed by Captain Urrutia, the reason probably being that it would interfere with his own arrangements, 212 which now looked toward peace. Nevertheless, Rábago carried out his plan, going by way of San Antonio, where he was joined by more than ten citizens well acquainted with the Apache country and by twenty soldiers of the presidio, including Lieutenant Galbán. 213 Rábago set out from San Antonio directly to the San Sabá river region, but the Indians, learning of his approach, fled, and as a result only a few captives were taken. The campaign was consequently judged a failure, which was charged to the large number in Rábago's party. 214
6. Attacks on the San Xavier Mission.—In 1746 the San Xavier mission was begun on the present San Gabriel river, near Rockdale, 215 and the Apaches soon began to visit their depredations upon the new settlement. In 1748 they attacked it four times, the fiercest assault being made on May 2, when sixty Apaches appeared at the mission. Although more than two hundred persons were in the place at the time, the terror inspired by the assailants more than offset the superioritv in numbers. The houses were left to the ravages of the Indians, while the soldiers confined their efforts to guarding the stock. The Apaches succeeded in securing only a few horses, and when they saw that their attempt was being frustrated they withdrew. In their retreat they met some of the mission Indians returning from a buffalo hunt, and in the encounter which followed two of the latter were killed, their bodies being flayed, in accordance with the usual custom of the Apaches. This attack terrorized the neophytes of San Xavier, and more forces were called for to keep them from deserting the mission. The Apaches had to be guarded against night and day. 216 In all of the attacks made, seven men had been killed, three being soldiers, and four Indians. 217
1. The Proposals of Fray Santa Ana and Fray Guadalupe, 1743.—These Apache raids, which had continued so long, now became less frequent, due apparently to increased pressure from the Comanches, and to the peace efforts of the missionaries. In order to make these things clear, it will be best to go back and follow the thread of missionary activities since 1723 looking to the establishment of missions for the Apaches.
So far as the available records show, only three definite proposals for missionarv work among this tribe had been made in Texas previous to 1743. As has been seen, Father González, in 1723 and 1724, had labored for their conversion; Father Hidalgo, in 1725, had asked for permission to go to their land and work among them, and in 1733 Father Vergara had urged the establishment of Apache missions. Now, on March 3, 1743, Fray Benito Fernández de Santa Ana wrote a communication to the viceroy suggesting that active steps be taken for the conversion and reduction of the Apaches by missions in their own land. He believed that circumstances were especially favorable for such an undertaking, not the least important factor being the existing relations between the Apaches and the Comanches. He told of a battle between these tribes, when a band of Comanches, descending from their country, had fallen in with a superior Apache force. In spite of the disparity in numbers, not a Comanche fled, although they knew that death awaited them. Finally, all but one had been killed and the Apaches were about to dispatch him, when, as Fray Santa Ana says, “on this occasion, their fears overcame their ferocity and desire to eat human flesh,” for, recognizing the bravery of the Comanches and the danger to be incurred from them, they decided to send the sole survivor as a warning to his people, trusting that when the Comanches learned of the fate of their friends they would take care to avoid further conflicts. The Apaches had good reason to fear these foes, said Santa Ana, for the Pelones, a subdivision of the Apaches living near the Caudachos [Red] River had been forced by the Comanches to give up their lands. On account of this fear, Santa Ana believed, the Apaches would now consider entering missions, and he thought the advantage would not be on the side of the Indians alone, for such a powerful nation as the Comanches should be guarded against by the Spaniards as well, while if the Apaches were reduced they would constitute a bulwark against the advancing scourge. 218
Two days later Fray Santa Ana wrote another letter to the viceroy, again setting forth the many advantages which, in his opinion, would result from the reduction of the Apaches. In the first place, he said, their conquest would prove comparatively easy, for they were far less numerous than was commonly supposed, the three tribes of Apaches, Ypandes, and Pelones not exceeding thirteen hundred warriors. As evidence of the weakness of the Apaches, he said that in no campaign which had been made against them had the Spaniards employed more than two hundred men, yet the Indians had always been defeated. 219 If the Spaniards should not obtain the alliance of the Apaches, Santa Ana continued, the French would very soon occupy the territory along the Caudachos [Red] River, thus cutting off further Spanish advance toward the north. Already, said the priest, it was rumored that New France and Carolina were in communication with New Mexico and Quivira. This he did not believe, but he did believe it was true of Louisiana, whose expansion was greatly to be feared. By making friends of the Apaches and placing a presidio in their midst to restrain and protect them, New Spain, he thought, would be assured from the aggressions of other nations, and the provinces would be freed from the ravages of the Apaches themselves. Besides, there would be opened up to the Spaniards a country rich in gold, silver, iron and other valuable minerals. 220 In conclusion, he protested against the campaign which was being planned by Captain Toribio de Urrutia (see ante, p. 251). Campaigns, said Santa Ana, only make the Indians worse, as had been proved time and again. For once, he suggests, kind measures should be tried, if only for an experiment; instead of distributing the captives they should be held as hostages as a means of making peace, and should be returned to the Apaches when they asked to be friends. In this way the Indians would be convinced of the sincerity of the Spaniards and their conversion would inevitably follow. 221 Santa Ana's fear of French aggression was well grounded, 222 but this could hardly be said of his sanguine view of prospects for the submission of the Apaches.
Father Santa Ana's letters were carried to Mexico by Fray Joseph de Guadalupe, missionary in mission San Francisco de la Espada, who upon his arrival in the City of Mexico addressed to the viceroy on his own part a communication of similar nature. Fray Guadalupe set forth particularly the advantages to result from the establishment of a garrison or presidio among the Apaches, dividing the benefits into two classes, spiritual and temporal. First, he said, a presidio among the Apaches, by aiding to resist their hostilities and keeping them from San Antonio, would be very advantageous to the missions already established, for on account of their fear of the Apaches the mission Indians could with difficulty be restrained from deserting. Second, the new conversions would increase, because the gentiles would not be afraid to enter the missions, as was now the case. Third, the conversion and reduction of the Apaches themselves would be facilitated, because since the presidio would be merely defensive and not offensive the Spaniards could gain the confidence of the Indians, and cultivate the friendship of the capitán grande, thus converting his followers. Fourth, the Apaches converted, the way would be open to convert other tribes that lived in the north to whom passage was now shut off.
These spiritual arguments, Fray Guadalupe thought, should be sufficient to move the mind of the viceroy, but, in addition, he presented some temporal advantages. First, the presidio would entail no additional expense to the crown, for some useless garrison could be utilized. Second, with the added protection, the town of San Antonio would expand very rapidly and the whole country would develop. Third, the way would be open to work the rich minerals which (according to general opinion) abounded in the hill country of the Apaches; and, finally, the entire Spanish dominion would be extended toward the north. In consequence of all these reasons, he prayed for the establishment of the presidio in the land of the Apaches. 223
To Fray Guadalupe's representation the viceroy replied that such arguments were all very well in theory, but that in reality there were no useless presidios which could be moved to the Apache country. 224 Santa Ana's letters were also considered, together with Toribio de Urrutia's third petition for a campaign, which had been made at this time, as has been seen, and, in view of the conflicting opinions that were presented by Urrutia and the missionaries, it was decided to submit the whole matter to the judgment of Don Manuel de Sandobal, former governor of Texas. 225
2. Requests for Missions by the Apaches.—The protests of the missionaries against a campaign, as has been seen, were unavailing. Father Santa Ana seems to have made the best of the situation, however, even accompanying Urrutia on the expedition of 1745. Among the captives taken on this campaign was the seven-year-old daughter of the Ypande chief, and through her the priest tried to influence the chief himself to enter a mission. In a communication which he made to the viceroy in 1745 looking to the conversion of the Apaches, Fray Santa Ana again said that they were not nearly so formidable as was generally believed. The Ypandes, he averred, had only one hundred and sixty-six warriors, and the Natagés one hundred. By placing presidios on the San Sabá, Pedernales, Salado, and Colorado rivers all could be reduced without bloodshed, and even the Comanches would be converted. 226 Besides, the Apaches themselves, he said, were anxious to enter upon mission life, for in October, 1745, a mission had been requested for the third time by the chief of the Ypandes, who asked either for a presidio and mission or for a mission without a presidio. 227
As if to bear out the missionary's statement, about January 26, 1746, the wife of an Apache chief, with two boys, went to see Fray Santa Ana, bearing a request for missions. Three days later an Indian girl of Ranchería Grande who had been captured by the Apaches, was sent to San Antonio to report that the Ypandes wanted a presidio and a mission, although the Natagés were opposed to it. Two chiefs, she said, were en route to San Antonio to make a permanent peace. 228
Thus we see that throughout many years the missionaries had not lost sight of the Apaches, and had several times planned to reduce them to mission life. When the new establishments for the San Xavier river were being discussed, in the years 1745-7, a patent argument in their favor was that they would serve to restrain the Apaches, who lived near by. The San Xavier was the gateway to the “Lomería de los Apaches,” and they must either be converted, it was said, or retire from their old haunts. Moreover, as has been pointed out, the Comanches were again actively pressing upon the Apaches, and it was even said that the missionaries were holding back their reports of the Apaches' request for missions until it could be learned more definitely whether they were really in earnest or merely wished to regain their captive kinsmen by this old ruse. 229
3. The Sword and the Olive Branch.—By the latter part of 1748 circumstances became unusually favorable for carrying out the mission policy which was so near to Father Santa Ana's heart. The essential factors were the harmony between the priests and Captain Urrutia, who now began to work to the same end, and the Comanche attacks upon the Apaches. It had long been noted, Santa Ana tells us, that the bloodier and more severe a campaign against the Apaches might be, the more vindictively did they retaliate. This fact being recognized, it was ordered that in all succeeding campaigns no Indian should be killed save in selfdefense and that all captives taken should be treated most humanely. 230
With the idea of punishing the Apaches for their attacks of 1748, and also, perhaps, as Father Santa Ana suggests, to show the Indians that the Spaniards wished to be friends, on February 2, 1749, Captain Urrutia with some two hundred men, most of them being Indian allies, set out toward the Apache country. He soon came upon a small ranchería, which offered very little resistance, and three old women and five children were captured. When Urrutia returned to San Antonio he learned that during his absence the Apaches had attacked Mission Concepción, stealing a large number of cattle. He at once determined to pursue the Indians, 231 and in March set out again with about three hundred men. They had gone no farther than the Guadalupe river, however, a distance of some twenty leagues, when they encountered a ranchería of Apaches who were encamped there hunting buffalo. Fortunately, most of the Indians (who were more than four hundred in number) were away on the chase, leaving the camp with only thirty men, ninety women, and forty-seven children. These were captured 232 and carried to San Antonio, where the men were imprisoned, and the women and children given into the safe keeping of the citizens and the missionaries, orders being given to treat them with the greatest kindness, but not to let them escape. 233
4. The Hatchet Buried—Likewise a Horse.—Captain Urrutia and Fray Santa Ana now determined to do their best to establish a permanent and lasting peace with the Apache nation. In consequence, two women and a brave were chosen to act as messengers to their people and to tell their chiefs that if they would live thereafter in peace and friendship with the Spaniards, not only would the latter release the prisoners who had been captured on the Guadalupe, but also those who had been taken in previous campaigns. The plan was received joyously by the captives, as can well be believed, and about the middle of April the three messengers, having been rigged out as usual, were dispatched. They promised to return in three moons, declaring that they would without doubt be accompanied by all of their people.
At the beginning of August the three Indians returned, accompanied by a brave of much distinction. They reported that there were now encamped on the Guadalupe four chiefs, two of the Lipan and two of the Apache nation, with one hundred followers of each tribe, who came with the intention of effecting a peace and securing their captive kinsmen. They would wait on the Guadalupe, they said, until the Spaniards should appoint a day for them to enter the settlement. Captain urrutia received them with all consideration, gave them presents, and told them to return to the Guadalupe and tell their chiefs to come whenever they pleased, but to use smoke as a signal before starting so that they could be properly received.
The emissaries left on the 8th, and on the night of the 15th columns of smoke were sent up, in accordance with the agreement. In the meantime a large building had been constructed on the plaza, in which to receive the Indians, and on the morning of the 16th Captain Urrutia, with all his troops, the missionaries, and citizens of San Antonio, went out to meet the visitors, whom they encountered at a distance of two leagues. Here mutual expressions of joy were made, the chiefs embracing the captain and the priests with great affection. After these ceremonies were over, the whole company returned to the reception hall, where a great feast of beef, corn, squashes, and fruit had been prepared. The chiefs were not lodged with the “common herd,” but were entertained in the presidio and missions, in keeping with their superior rank. On the next day mass, attended by all the Indians and the whole settlement, was said in the parochial church, after which the formal discussion of peace was begun. On the 18th, says Cabello, the prisoners were released, 234 and the 19th was given over to the ratification of the peace.
This was a great day for San Antonio. After thirty years of depredations, the harassed settlement was about to secure, as was thought, a lasting peace. Early in the morning the plaza began to fill with an eager throng. On one side were drawn up the soldiers, the priests and the citizens, while on the other were the chiefs and their followers, who had been joined by the released captives. First, a great hole was dug in the center of the plaza, and in this were placed a live horse, a hatchet, a lance, and six arrows, all instruments of war. Then Captain Urrutia and the four chiefs, joining hands, danced three times around the hole, the Indians afterwards doing the same with the priests and the citizens. When this ceremony was concluded, all retired to their respective places. Then, upon a given signal, all rushed to the hole and rapidly buried the live horse, together with the weapons, thus signifying the end of war. This over, the Indians gave great whoops, and the Spaniards cried three times, “Viva el Rey” (“Long live the king”)! Before departing the Indians promised to visit the presidio often, and were assured that they would always be welcomed. In return, they agreed to treat all Spaniards as brothers wherever they might meet. On August 20, amid manifestations of the sincerest friendship, they took their leave. Few cities of the world have ever witnessed such a scene as was thus enacted on the plaza of old San Antonio. 235 Indeed, it seems probable that this instance of the burial of a live horse as a part of the hatchet ceremony is unique.
The consummation of this treaty meant a great deal to the citizens of San Antonio. The Indians were undoubtedly sincere in their desire for peace this time (the Comanches furnished motive enough), and there seems to have been confidence on both sides. Most rejoiced of all were the missionaries, who saw in this love feast the happy culmination of their labors to effect the peace of the land, and a definite step toward the conversion of the Apaches.
In spite of the apparent nearness of this much desired end, however, there was yet to be a long period of waiting before the actual founding of the missions. Yet the progress now made was never entirely lost, and henceforth it became more a question of disagreement among the Spaniards themselves as to the establishment of missions than of the unwillingness of the Apaches; for the latter, pressed by their inveterate foes, were now willing to be converted, since it meant protection by Spanish arms.
It will be interesting, by way of conclusion, to note once more the general knowledge of the Apaches possessed by the Spaniards of Texas, as evidenced by the contemporary documents between 1725 and 1750. During this period much additional specific information was acquired concerning a people that had hitherto been but indefinitely known.
1. Two Meanings of the Term “Apache.”—The term “Apache” had now come to have two significations, general and specific. The comprehensive name was still “Apache,” and in this sense it often meant to the Spaniards little more than a confederation or a geographical group. As the royal auditor said, in a communication written in 1750, “the truth is that not only these [tribes near San Antonio] are called heathen Apaches, but also all the tribes in the immense unknown spaces to the north of our governments of Sinaloa, Nueva Viscaya, Coahuila, and Texas, the entire frontier of said Apaches extending for five hundred and ninety-five or six hundred and eighty leagues, without including in this the government of New Mexico, which is on all four sides a frontier of the Apache tribe, by whom this government is surrounded and walled in.” 236 To illustrate this usage again, an Indian who was captured at San Antonio, when questioned as to the number of Apache tribes, declared that, “calling them by their special names, there were thirty-seven tribes with the name Apache in the vicinity of the road to New Mexico.” 237 Thus the designation “Apache,” in its general sense, was regarded as very comprehensive, just as formerly had been the case, and the expression “las naciones Apaches,” with this broad meaning, occurs very frequently in the documents throughout the period.
On the other hand, “Apache” is now used to designate also a particular tribe of Indians with whom the Texas Spaniards had especially to do. Out of the general term “Apache” which was formerly not differentiated, several distinct tribes have now emerged. We hear of the Pelones, the Ypandes (Ipandes, Ipandis, Ypandis), and the Apaches, or in the language of the Indians themselves, “Negain, Azain, and Duttain.” 238 These tribes are now considered by the Spaniards of Texas to be the three main divisions of the Apaches with whom they came in contact.
It is probable that the authorities in Mexico usually employed “Apache” in the broad sense, but the people at San Antonio understood and used its restricted meaning also. Many seeming discrepancies in the sources, then, may, perhaps, be explained by considering in what sense the designation, “Apache,” was intended by the writer.
2. Location and Range.—Throughout the period from 1725 to 1749, the Apaches who troubled Texas still lived in the same general northwestward direction from San Antonio as formerly, ranging in summer to the plains of the middle Brazos and Colorado and withdrawing northwestward in the fall. Bustillo, in December, 1732, found them in the same general region where Flores had encountered them in September, 1723. All of the embassies from the Apaches to San Antonio during the period came from the north, and all the messengers sent to them went north.
Yet there was a gradual migration of the Apaches southward in the face of the Comanche pressure, and just at the end of the period this movement was very much accelerated. Bustillo's fight with them, as we have seen, took place about seventy leagues north of San Antonio, near the San Sabá river, while Flores had gone one hundred and thirty leagues before encountering Apaches. Of course, these may have been distinct rancherías, but it is certain that the Apaches had come further south. Another indication that such was the case is Bustillo's statement that he had to make a great detour in order not to be seen by the Indians immediately after leaving the presidio, for the Apaches, he said, were always near San Antonio either in large or small bands. 239
By 1730, it is clear, the eastern Apaches did not customarily range southeast of San Antonio. When Father Sevillano in that year argued that a mission on the Medina river, thrity leagues below San Antonio, would be in danger from the Apaches, the other missionaries maintained that he was wrong, as these Indians did not infest even the Guadalupe country, but were to the north. 240 Soon after this, however, the upper Nacogdoches road was abandoned, and that by Bahía used, for fear of the Apaches.
By 1749 the Ypandes, who had now become differentiated, had descended considerably nearer to San Antonio. The range of hills twenty leagues northwest from San Antonio was now the southeastern limit of their territory, and from their shelter they ravaged the settlements near by. 241 In 1750, according to Cabello's “Informe,” there was a still further southward migration of the Apaches, who were again being closely pressed by the Comanches. In May of that year, says Cabello, the Lipanes and Apaches moved to the Medina river, eight leagues southwest of San Antonio, where they hopes to be secure from their foes. 242
The period from 1725 to 1750, therefore, was one of gradual shifting to the south. As the Comanches continued to press hard upon the Apaches, the latter gave way before them, remaining in their new location until renewed pressure was exerted by their enemy. The key to Apache migration and policy during this period, and especially of the latter part, may be found primarily in the hostility of the Comanches.
3. The Different Tribes or Bands of Apaches Known in Texas.—As has been stated, several distinct bands have now emerged from the general term “Apaches,” the Ypandes, Apaches or Natagés, and Jumanes being the main divisions. Other tribal names now appearing in the documents are the Yxandi (Ysandi), Chenti, Melenudos, Mescaleros, Salineros, and Pelones. 243
4. The Natagés or Apaches.—The Natagés seem to have been the tribe to which the Spaniards of Texas applied the term “Apache” in the restrictive sense. In lists which deal with the three main divisions of the Apaches I have frequently found “Apaches, Ypandes, and Jumanes”; “Natagés, Ypandes, and Jumanes”; “Apaches, Pelones, and Jumanes”; and “Natagés, Pelones, and Jumanes.” The Pelones and Ypandes, it will be seen, were often treated as identical. Knowing this, if these lists are examined, it will be seen that in none of them is there a conflict of the terms “Natagés” and “Apaches,” but, on the contrary, that they are used interchangeably. Again, it was said that the “Ypandes . . . almost always live united with the Apaches.” 244 This statement, as will be seen, was true of the Natagés, or, in other words, it seems that the terms are again used interchangeably.
When Toribio de Urrutia made his campaign of April, 1745, the Natagés were met northwest of the Colorado river, a few leagues from the Ypandes. They were now probably engaged in the spring buffalo hunt. Concerning them, Father Santa Ana, who was with Urrutia, says: “The Natagés Indians, reputed among the Indians of the north as true Apaches, lived on this occasion not far from and to the west of the Ypandes. They are fewer in number, but prouder and more overbearing than the rest, and their chief man was captain of the Ypandes. . . . The body of these Natagés comprises in itself the Mescaleros and Salineros Indians, or better, shall I say that they are one and the same Indians with different names which the Spaniards have given them in the various localities [terrenos] in which they have seen them. Their own country [that is, of the Natagés] is on the said Rio Salado [Pecos], where they enter into the jurisdiction of Conchos. The Ypandes, as they are intimate friends and relatives, also go in as far as the Rio Salado in the months of June and July, and then in the autumn all go down together to the San Sabá, Xianas [Chanas, Llano], Almagre [Honey Creek 245], and Pedernales rivers, from which they pass to the Colorado along that region where the road to Los Adays crosses, since this country is the home of the buffalo with which they sustain themselves.” 246 The Natagés, Santa Ana also said, troubled the Rio Grande country as far west as El Paso, although they numbered less than one hundred warriors. 247 This number is probably an underestimate, as in another place Santa Ana says that the Apaches [Natagés] and Ypandes have five hundred warriors combined. 248
5. The Ypandes (Lipan) or Pelones.—The branch of the Apaches nearest to San Antonio and ultimately of the most importance in Apache relations were the Lipans or Ypandes. 249 As has been seen, the Ypandes were closely allied with the Natagés, their chief in 1745 being from the latter tribe. Concerning them Santa Ana, who is our best informant upon Indian affairs during this period, says in 1743: “The Ypandes, who are the nearest to this presidio [Béxar] almost always live united with the Apaches [Natagés]. They have a great number of horses, but their desire for more is never satiated, on account of which and in order to steal other things they trouble all of the road to New Mexico and that which leads to Los Texas [Nacogdoches], not failing to take the lives of all they can, whether neighboring Indians or Spaniards.” 250
The Ypandes were said to be identical with the Pelones, being referred to as “Ypandes alias Pelones.” 251 The Pelones, it was said, were the least daring of the Apaches, and were the first whom the Comanches had compelled to give up their lands. 252 They had lived farthest north from San Antonio, on the Caudachos [Red] River. According to Santa Ana, in 1745 the Ypandes had only one hundred and sixty-six warriors, and ranged along the frontiers of Coahuila and Texas. 253 They were accustomed to divide into six or seven small bands, the largest not exceeding forty and the smallest sometimes not numbering more than twenty. 254
It seems that since the opening of the century the Pelones (Lipanes) had changed their relations with other tribes, for Joseph de Urrutia, writing in 1733, said that at the time of his residence among the Indians of eastern Texas, from about 1693-1700, the Pelones and Jumanes were declared enemies of the Apaches, and he wondered that they were now allied tribes. 255
Governor Bustillo, in 1746, mentions a tribe of “Apachez llamados los Melenudos,” who made war upon the Yojuanes and the Texas. The location assigned to these Indians, apparently northwest of the Trinity river, leads me to wonder if they may not have been Pelones. 256
6. The Jumanes.—The Jumanes are a confusing element. It will assist somewhat in lessening this confusion if we bear in mind that it is clear that the term “Jumanes” was applied by the Spaniards to two distinct groups of Indians. Most commonly it applied to Indians living in southwestern Texas near the Rio Grande. But after the middle of the eighteenth century, at least, Jumane was a name applied in New Mexico to the Indians called in Texas the Taovayases—Wichita Indians always hostile to the Apaches. 257
In the later seventeenth century the Jumanes of southwestern Texas had been enemies of the Apaches. These Jumanes, it seems, in the eighteenth century became allies of the Apaches, while the northern Jumanes, or Taovayases, remained hostile. According to Urrutia, writing in 1733, the Jumanes had formerly lived near the Pelones (along the Red River) and were enemies of the Apaches. He, perhaps, was thinking of the northern Jumanes. In 1731 Jumanes are spoken of as an important division of the Apaches, and after the fight near San Antonio of September 18, 1731, a captive declared that the arrows left on the field of battle belonged to the Apaches, Pelones, and Jumanes, “very numerous and allied tribes,” 258 who were enemies of the Texas, Yojuanes, and other tribes of eastern Texas. 259 Almazán, however, said that the Jumanes were not represented in this fight. 260 In 1746 we hear of the “Apaches Jumanes” living just north of the Rio Grande. On account of their depredations it was deemed unwise to remove the presidio of Sacramento to the San Xavier country, as was petitioned for. 261 These Indians were said to roam across the deserts of Coahuila as far as Saltillo, even reaching Nuevo León. 262 In 1749 Jumanes, Comanches, and French were friendly, according to three Frenchmen who were captured in that year near Santa Fé. 263 These Jumanes were undoubtedly Taovayases.
7. Other Bands.—In 1732 the Yxandi (Ysandi) and Chenti had joined the Apaches, and were present in the battle with Bustillo on December 9, 1732. This was the first time that the Spaniards had come into contact with them, but they were said to be no less formidable than the “Apaches.” 264 The Mescaleros and Salineros, it has been seen, were regarded as merely divisions of the Natagés.
The Tobosos, living beyond the Rio Grande, were allies of the Apaches, it appears from the documents, as early as 1735. 265 They were few in number, but robbed and killed in many places. 266
5. In a paper entitled “Tribal Society among Texas Indians,” by M. M. Kenney (The Quarterly, I, 26-33), the Apaches are not even mentioned.
6. Although Bandelier has made extensive investigations concerning the Apaches of the far Southwest (see “Final Report,” Part I, Papers of the Archaeological Institute of America, III, 1890), he has done little on the eastern, or Texas, Apaches.
7. The Quarterly, VIII, 3-78. Translation by Miss Elizabeth Howard West.
8. Espinosa's Chrónica Apostólica, a work of which Arricivita's is the continuation, and which deals with events in Texas history up to 1746, gives almost no information upon the subject of this paper.
9. In the preparation of this paper, fully 10,000 typewritten pages of transcripts, aggregating, perhaps, 2,000 separate documents, have been examined. Most of the transcripts are in the private collection of Dr. Herbert E. Bolton, who has kindly permitted me to use them. Other transcripts are in the Stanford University Southwestern History Collection, which is now being rapidly built up. In addition to the documents above described, I have had access to Dr. Bolton's manuscript notes, from which I have secured much information. Only those documents which have been of actual use are cited in the bibliography. In the bibliography and footnotes “B. MS.” means documents in Dr. Bolton's collection; “B. MS. Notes” means his personal manuscript notes which I have utilized.
10. Apache relations in the El Paso region have not been treated in this paper, for the reason that that region was not, in the eighteenth century, a part of Texas, and that its history in that period was more intimately connected with the history of New Mexico than with that of Texas.
11. For this paragraph I. am indebted entirely to the investigations of Dr. Bolton, recorded chiefly in his manuscript notes.
12. For general accounts of this early period see Garrison, Texas; Clark, The Beginnings of Texas; and Bancroft, North Mexican States and Texas, I.
13. Handbook of American Indians, Part I, articles under “Apache” and “Athapascan.”
14. Cabello, Informe, 1784, 38-39.
15. Diario de los Padres Misioneros, 1691, in Memorias de Nueva España, XXVII, f. 100.
16. Margry, Découvertes et Etablissements des Français, etc., III, 374-378; French, Historical Collections of Louisiana, IV (1852), 216.
17. Papeles del Pe. Hidalgo, Secs. 11 and 13.
18. Ibid.
19. B. MS. Notes.
20. Bonilla, discussing Saint Denis's encounter in 1714 with Indians on the San Marcos (Colorado) river, remarks, “naturalmente serian Apaches” (Breve Compendio, Par. 7), but this is only a supposition. Indeed, Saint Denis says that they came from the coast, in which case they must have been of Karankawan stock—certainly not Apache. (Declaración de San Denis, Memorias de Nueva España, XXVII, f. 124.)
21. Testimonio del titulo de Governador y Instrucciones que se le dio a Don Martin de Alarcon pa la entrada que hizo en la Provincia de los Tejas, 1716-1718, 11.
22. For a good account of this expedition see “The Work of the Marqués de Aguayo in Texas, 1719-1722,” a Master's thesis by Miss Eleanor Buckley, University of Texas, 1909.
23. Aguayo to the viceroy, February, 1725, in Autos Sre diferentes puntos, 71. In the first attack two drivers were killed, and on a later occasion one driver perished (Ibid.).
24. Ibid., 72. On the beginnings of Apache troubles at San Antonio, see a brief statement in Bonilla, Breve Compendio, Par. 11.
25. Peña, Derrotero of the Aguayo expedition, 6-7. One driver and a soldier had been killed in the defense of the pack train (Ibid.).
26. Peña, Derrotero, 16. It is of interest to note, as an indication of the Apache range, that Aguayo gave the name of “San Joseph de los Apaches” to an arroyo near the Brazos river, hoping that this connection with the Saint's name would have a beneficent effect upon the Apaches (Ibid., 10).
27. Ibid., 9.
28. Bahía: Autos Hechos, 4; Informe del R. P. Fr. Benito de Santa Ana, al Exmo. sobre la fundacion de Sn. Xavier, 1752, 6; letter of Aguayo, February, 1725, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 71.
29. Letter of Aguayo, February, 1725, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 72; González contra Flores, 15.
30. Captain Nicolás Flores y Valdéz had begun military service in 1696, entering the army as a private, and when, in 1701, the garrison of San Juan Bautista was established, he was one of the first to enlist. Here he served for fourteen years in the capacities of soldier, sergeant, and alférez, ranking in the last position next to the captain, as no lieutenant was assigned to that garrison. In Aguayo's expedition to Texas, Flores was made subaltern of his company. In 1720, after this appointment, he defeated a force of Indians near the Nadadores River, in Coahuila, distinguishing himself by his bravery and ability. In the expedition to Texas he served as explorer, assisted in the repairing of the missions in eastern Texas, and was employed by Aguayo in many important minor duties, all of which he performed entirely satisfactorly. Several times he was sent to bring back supplies, and he always did so with the greatest dispatch. Thus, as a reward for ability and faithful service, when Captain García was made protector of the Indians of Coahuila, Flores was appointed to succeed him at San Antonio, on April 30, 1722. He was wounded four times in different fights, and always gave a good account of himself in action (Autos hechos a consulta, González contra Flores, 12-17). Such is the account of Flores given by the Marqués de Aguayo in 1724.
31. Flores to the viceroy, no date, in González contra Flores, 28. Sometime in 1723 two citizens of Béxar encountered a band of Apaches at a place called Puerto de los Elotes, about eight leagues from the presidio. The men were searching for some strayed horses, and although they saw the Indians approach they did not anticipate any danger from them, believing them to be friendly. They soon found out their mistake, however, for the Indians at once attacked them. One of the Spaniards was killed, but his companion managed to escape through the swiftness of his horse. Returning to the presidio, the survivor gave the alarm to Captain Flores, who sent out immediately an alférez with fifteen men. When they reached the place the Indians were gone, and they found only the body of the Spaniard, who had been scalped and shot through with many arrows (Cabello, Informe, 32-33).
32. Flores to Aguayo, October 21, 1723, in Autos Hechos. Texas, 1-2; Flores to the viceroy, no date [1724], in González contra Flores, 26-27; González to the viceroy, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 22; declaration of the soldiers, Ibid., 23-27; Arricivita, Crónica, 340-341.
33. Dr. Bolton's investigation of the history of the San Xavier missions has established the identity of the San Xavier river with the modern San Gabriel.
34. In a letter to the viceroy, in 1724,, Flores said that he left twenty-four soldiers to guard the presidio; that the battle occurred after thirty days' march; that thirty-six Indians were killed; that one hundred and forty horses were recovered, including the eighty that had been stolen (González contra Flores, 26-27). González said that Flores set out with thirty soldiers and thirty-three Indians; that one hundred and eighty horses were recovered (Autos sre diferentes puntos, 22). The four soldiers testified that only seven men were guarding the horses, which were scattered at the time of the attack, and that some of these were without arms, whereas all of the numerous Indians were well armed; that the campaign had been prompted by Father González, who suggested that it would be a good time to follow the trail of the Apaches and try to convert them, and for this purpose furnished thirty mission Indians; and that Flores left González with only two soldiers, everyone else being disarmed in order to provide weapons for those who went on the campaign (Autos sre diferentes puntos, 23-27).
35. Cf. note 1, page 212.
36. Flores to Aguayo, October 21, 1723, in Autos Hechos. Texas, 2. See Bonilla, Par. 11, for early reports of French trade with Apaches.
37. See a suggestion to this effect made by Aguayo to the viceroy, November, 1723, in Autos Hechos. Texas, 20.
38. Flores to Aguayo, October 21, 1723, in Ibid., 2-3.
39. Flores to Aguayo, November 2, 1723, Ibid., 5-7; Autos sre diferentes puntos, 20. Some differences appear in the declaration of the four soldiers mentioned above in regard to these negotiations. They said that Father González wished to send the squaw as a messenger of peace, but that Flores refused, until the priest told him that dire consequences would result if she were not sent. Flores finally consented, and with much labor González succeeded in making the woman understand what was required of her. She was dressed out splendidly and despatched. When she and her companions returned, they stayed three days, but as there was no interpreter and they could not understand well what was wanted, they were given presents and sent back (Ibid.). Arricivita, Crónica, 341-343, gives an account of some of these negotiations.
40. Declaración del Indio Gerónimo.
41. Aguayo says in a letter of February 26, 1725, that two Spaniards, Fray Juan Minguez and Pedro de Villasior (sic), were at this time being held as captives among the Apaches, having been captured while on an expedition sent out from New Mexico to investigate the movements of the French (Aguayo to the viceroy, February 26, 1725, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 76). The two priests referred to may have been these same men mentioned by Aguayo.
42. Declaration of Juan Santiago de la Cruz, in González contra Flores, 18-19.
43. Almazán to the viceroy, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 16-17; Declaration of the soldiers, Ibid., 20-21. In the declaration of the four soldiers, it was said that the Indians agreed to leave four of their number as hostages if the children were given up to their parents, but Flores would not consent to it. He got excited and spoke in a loud voice, and the Indians began to gather up their effects and get out. The Indian chief took a little girl by the hand and said to Flores: “Take girl,” as if to say, “This is what you want, not peace” (Ibid.).
44. Flores to the viceroy, in González contra Flores, 26-27.
45. Petition of Flores, January 9, 1724, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 28-29.
46. Aguayo to the viceroy, November, 1723, in Autos Hechos. Texas, 29.
47. Declaration of González, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 29-31.
48. Hidalgo to the viceroy, January 14, 1724, in Ibid., 31-33.
49. González to the viceroy, March 18, 1724, Ibid., 2-9. Pérez, although well recommended by González, was not held in very high regard by Aguayo. The latter said that Pérez had served in the army for twenty years, and had never merited promotion beyond the rank of a private soldier. Pérez himself admitted that he wis illiterate and could only sign his name—and his signature was in very rustic characters. His promotion to San Antonio, however, seems to have turned his head somewhat, and he did not prove to be so peaceful and pliable as González had supposed him. He was later made lieutenant of the presidio of Béxar, and still occupied that position as late as 1738, at which time he was in his fifty-sixth year.
50. González to the viceroy, March 18, 1724, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 10.
51. Viceroy's decree, in González contra Flores, 26.
52. Flores to the viceroy, no date, in González contra Flores, 26-30.
53. Letter of Fray Antonio Margil de Jesús, July 20, 1724, in González contra Flores, 35-36.
54. Hidalgo to the viceroy, in Primera entrada a la Proa de los Texas, 8-9.
55. Aguayo to the viceroy, no date, in González contra Flores, 38-39.
56. Ibid., 43.
57. Aguayo to Fray Margil, July 4, 1724.
58. Aguayo to the viceroy, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 44.
59. Viceroy's decree, Ibid., 45.
60. Almazán to the viceroy, October 24, 1724, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 44.
61. Almazán to the viceroy, March 12, 1724, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 2; declaration of Minchaca, Ibid., 3-5; testimony of Flores, Ibid., 5-7.
González was a courier bearing dispatches from the viceroy to La Bahía, having been sent to Mexico in January preceding to give notice of the revolt of the Indians at Bahía. Minchaca served as his escort. They had left the presidio of Rio Grande on March 6, and, proceeding at a moderate pace, had reached a place called Charco de la Pita, about fifteen leagues from San Antonio, on the 9th, at three p. m. (On a map in the Austin Papers a creek by this name is shown just west of the Medina river—B. MS. Notes.) After a short rest here, they pushed on, wishing to cover a stretch of bad road before darkness should overtake them. They had gone only about a league, however, when they were attacked by six nude Indians on horseback. González was wounded by two arrows and fell from his horse, but Minchaca managed to get away by threatening his pursuers with his gun, and, keeping them at a distance, he reached a ravine half a league away from Arroyo de los Payayas. Here he unsaddled his horse and rode in to San Antonio to give the alarm (Declaration of Minchaca before Governor Almazán, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 3-5). In Flores's party sent out to investigate were ten soldiers, an Indian guide, and Minchaca himself. They reached Pita at 9 o'clock the next morning, and found the body. It had been stripped of all clothing and the Indians had followed their usual custom of mutilation. There were arrows in the stomach and back, a wound had been made by a spear, the flesh was torn away from the calf of one leg, and the scalp was gone. The courier's hat, shoes, and shield were found a short distance from the road. Flores took up the trail of the Indians and followed it until night closed in upon him, when, seeing that there was small chance of overtaking the fugitives, he decided to return to San Antonio. The identity of the Indians could not be definitely settled, but the most prevalent opinion was that they were Apaches, because they had fled in the direction of the Apache country, and the arrows found were declared by various of the mission Indians to be of Apache make. It was argued, however, on somewhat flimsy grounds, that the arrows were new and might have been imitated by some other tribe which wished to throw suspicion upon the Apaches, and which had fled in the direction of the Apacheria to strengthen this impression. Other arguments in defence of the Apaches were that the attacking Indians were nude, whereas the former were accustomed to clothe themselves in buckskin; that the Apaches used saddles, had darts and spears made of buffalo skin, and tipped their arrows with iron, while the tips of the ones found were of flint. In addition, it was asserted that if the Indians had been Apaches, they would never have allowed Minchaca to escape, but would have followed him even into the settlement and killed him there (Testimony of Flores, Ibid., 5-7). In spite of these doubts, it is probable that the offenders were Apaches, and such was later conceded, for Governor Almazán, in a letter written to the viceroy on May 1, stated that about this same time some Apaches had raided the presidio of the Rio Grande, and that, since they were in the neighborhood, it might be inferred that they were the culprits in both instances (Almazán to the viceroy, May 1, 1724, in Autos fechos en la Bahía, 35-36).
62. Declaración del Yndio Gerónimo, 3 pp. In his declaration made before Governor Falcón of Coahuila, Gerónimo stated that he was a native of Rio de Santa Helena, near Fresnillo, and that he had been left an orphan at an early age. While working for a merchant as driver (atajador), he had been captured by the Tobosos, who kept him for a year, and then traded him to the Apaches in exchange for deer skins, because an Apache chief fancied that he resembled a son of his who had been captured by the Spaniards in an assault upon Rio Grande (Ibid.).
63. Almazán to the viceroy, May 1, 1724, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 35.
64. Hidalgo to González, March 25, 1725, Ibid., 37.
65. Representacion que haze Fray Miguel Sevillano de Paredes, 5-6.
66. Hidalgo to González, March 25, 1725, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 37.
67. Almazán to the viceroy, Ibid., 19.
68. Auditor's parecer and viceroy's decree, Ibid., 42-43.
69. Letters of Almazán to the viceroy, October 24 and 25, 1724, Ibid., 44-47; 55-62. Bonilla states that Almazán at this time asked permission to make war on the Apaches, but that his proposal was not favorably received by the superior government (Breve Compendio, Par. 11). I have not seen this proposal in any of the contemporary sources.
70. Aguayo to the viceroy, February, 1725, Autos sre diferentes puntos, 63-76.
71. Auditor's parecer, March 31, 1725, Ibid., 77.
72. Petition of Hidalgo, in Primera Entrada a la Proa de Texas, 7-9; Arricivita, Crónica, 343.
73. Auditor's parecer, January 27, 1724, in Autos Hechos. Texas, 32.
74. B. MS. Notes.
75. Bancroft, in his Arizona and New Mexico, page 239, tells of a great battle in 1724, when the Comanches attacked the Apaches at Jicarilla.
76. Cabello, Informe, 32-33.
77. See page 210.
78. A Comprehensive History of Texas, I, 11.
79. Flores to Aguayo, October 21, 1723, Autos Hechos. Texas, 2.
80. Flores to Aguayo, October 21, 1723, Autos Hechos. Texas, 2-3.
81. Autos Hechos. Texas, 4; Autos sre diferentes puntos, 25; and numerous other documents.
82. Testimony of Flores, in Autos sre diferentes puntos, 7; Flores to Aguayo, in Autos Hechos. Texas, 2; Arricivita, Crónica, 340.
83. B. MS. Notes.
84. B. MS. Notes.
85. Declaración del Yndio Gerónimo, 2.
86. Almazán to the viceroy, in Mudanza del presidio, 2. In this letter Almazán gives us an idea of the size of San Antonio at this time. He says there were forty-five officers and soldiers and four citizens (vecinos) there, and that these, with their families, reached the number of two hundred persons (Ibid.).
87. The soldiers hurried to his aid, but did not succeed in reaching him until after a spear had pierced his neck (Fray Sevillano to the viceroy, 1730, asking for two additional soldiers in each mission, 19).
88. Trassumpto de vn Memorial, 2.
89. Ibid.
90. Fr. Miguel Sevillano de Paredes, Visitas de las misiones del Rio Grande del Norte, October 15, 1727, 37.
91. Rivera, Proyecto, 6.
92. Ibid., 34.
93. Ibid.
94. Vergara to the viceroy, July 20, 1729, in Diligencias que hizo el colegio, 14.
95. B. MS. Notes.
96. Cabello, Informe, 33.
97. Fr. Mezquía to the viceroy, May 4, 1731, in Carpeta de Correspondencia, 74; same to same, August 8, 1731, Ibid., 84-85.
98. Ibid., 75, 85.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Mezquía to the viceroy, August 8, 1731, Carpeta de Correspondencia, 85.
102. Rivera to the viceroy, May 26, 1731, Ibid., 82.
103. Ibid., 81-82.
104. Almazán to Casafuerte, December 1, 1731, in Pacificacion de Apaches, 5.
105. Almazán to Casafuerte, December 1, 1731, Ibid., 4. Bonilla erroneously states that this fight occurred at the end of 1730 (Breve Compendio, Par. 13).
106. Almazán to Casafuerte, December 1, 1731, Pacificacion de Apaches, 4-5.
107. Joseph de Urrutia, mentioning this battle in 1738, says that Almazán had twenty-two men and the Apaches about five hundred; that two soldiers were killed and seventeen wounded, among the latter being Almazán himself. He says that the fight occurred about half a league from the presidio, and gives as the reason for the flight of the Apaches their fear of reinforcements from the presidio (Urrutia to the viceroy, May 9, 1738, in Expediente sobre la campaña, 7-8). Arricivita says (Crónica, 344-345) that the invaders were frightened away by the yells of the mission Indians.
108. See page 226.
109. Almazán to Casafuerte, December 1, 1731, in Pacificacion de Apaches, 5.
110. Declaration of soldiers, Ibid., 15-16.
111. B. MS. Miscellaneous, 1730-1733.
112. Almazán to Casafuerte, December 1, 1731, in Pacificacion de Apaches, 6-8.
113. Ibid., 7-8.
114. Others cited were: Don Fulano de Zavala, with 100 men, defeated more than 2000 Yaquis in the province of Ostimuri; in 1693, Don Diego Vargas, with 100 men, had reduced New Mexico; Don Antonio Valverde, with 100 men, had defeated 300 Apaches in Llanos de Café; in 1696, Don Félix Martínez, with 100 soldiers, had defeated 6000 Tanos at Oñate, the capital of the province of Moqui; in 1696, Juan Isidro de Pardiñas, with a few soldiers, defeated 14,000 warriors in Tarahumara; in 1725, Joseph Balentín de la Garza, captain of the presidio of El Paso, with only thirty-five men, defeated the numerous Suma nation and its allies (Summary of Rivera's report, December 29, 1731, Ibid., 11-12).
115. Ibid., 10-12.
116. Ibid., 12. Mediavilla y Ascona, in a letter to Fray Terreros, June 28, 1746, said that this campaign was to have been made for the purpose of chastising the Apache, Yita, and Tastasagonia tribes, who made war on and terrorized the Mayeyes, Vidaes, Salineros, and the Erbipiames.
117. Cf. page 234, note, for the controversy that grew out of this.
118. Memorial del Govor. Bustillos, 1746, 6; Bustillo to the viceroy, January 31, 1733, in Pacificacion de Apaches, 32.
119. Ibid., 26; Memorial del Govor. Bustillos, 1746.
120. Pacificacion de Apaches, 26. Cabello, in his “Informe,” says that they followed the Brazos river, but he probably meant the “primer brazo,” or “first Brazos.” Dr. H. E. Bolton has identified the “primer brazo” with the present Little River, and has cleared up the confusion that has previously existed upon this point.
121. Bustillo to the viceroy, January 31, 1733, in Pacificacion de Apaches, 32-33.
122. Ibid., 27.
123. Ibid.
124. Bonilla says “ganado,” but evidently means horses (Breve Compendio, Par. 13).
125. This account is based upon Bustillo's report of January 31, 1733, in Pacificacion de Apaches, 26-36; the petition of the soldiers of Béxar, Ibid., 15-19; Escrito of Almazán before Bustillo, January 31, 1733, Ibid., 40-41; Cabello, Informe, 34. In his “Informe” Cabello gives some conflicting details. He says that Bustillo had 300 men with him; that in the battle 300 Indians were killed and thirty-eight prisoners taken; that twenty horses were stolen from the Spaniards. He said that one of the prisoners declared that the ranchería was composed of 1700 persons, 500 of whom were absent hunting buffalo (Informe, 34). Arricivita (Crónica, 345) erroneously states that the campaign was made in 1730. The details given by Bonilla agree essentially with the above account, which was written before Bonilla's work was consulted.
126. Escrito of Almazán before Bustillo, January 31, 1733, in Pacificacion de Apaches, 27; Memorial del Govor. Bustillos, 1746, 6.
127. Pacificacion de Apaches, 27, 30, 32.
128. Testimony taken in support of the right of Béxar to exercise jurisdiction over San Sava, etc.
129. In a bitter controversy that grew out of the founding of the San Xavier missions in 1746 (for account of which see Bolton, “The San Xavier Missions,” MS.), Melchor de Mediavilla y Ascona, who had been the predecessor of Governor Bustillo, denied that the latter had ever fought this battle with the Apaches. He claimed that a cannon had been fired, causing a great number of Indians to assemble, whereupon, Bustillo became alarmed and fled to San Antonio as quickly as possible (Mediavilla to Fray Alonso Terreros, June 28, 1746, 9). But Bustillo's report given in this connection agrees exactly with the one he rendered at the time of the campaign, and is corroborated by reports from the soldiers of Béxar and by Father Vergara, so that there is no doubt that he met the Indians as has been described.
130. Declaration of soldiers, in Pacificacion de Apaches, 17-18; Bustillo to the viceroy, January 31, 1733, Ibid., 30-32.
131. Ibid., 17-18, 30.
132. Petition of Vergara, December 23, 1732, Ibid., 20-21.
133. Auto of Bustillo, Ibid., 22-23.
134. Vergara to the viceroy, January 31, 1733, Ibid., 24-25; Arricivita, 345.
135. Bustillo to the viceroy, January 31, 1733, with enclosures, Pacificacion de Apaches, 26-36.
136. Bustillo to the viceroy, February 5, 1733, Ibid., 37-38.
137. Declaration (escrito) of Almazán before Bustillo, January 31, 1733, Ibid., 38.
138. Ibid., 39-40.
139. Bustillo to the viceroy, January 31, 1733, Ibid., 42-43.
140. Statement of company of Béxar, April 11, 1733, Ibid., 44-46; statement of Fray Vergara, April 15, Ibid., 47-48; statement of the cabildo of San Fernando, April 10, Ibid., 49-50; Bustillo to the viceroy, April 20, Ibid., 51-56.
141. Statement of cabildo, April 10, Ibid., 50.
142. Statement of Vergara, April 15, Ibid., 48.
143. Statement of the military company, April 11, Ibid., 44-46.
144. Statement of the cabildo, April 10, Ibid., 49-50.
145. Statement of Vergara, April 15, Ibid., 47-48.
146. Bustillo to the viceroy, April 20, 1733, Ibid., 51-56.
147. Auditor's opinion and viceroy's decrees, July 18, July 23, and July 30, 1733, 1-5.
148. Ibid.
149. Testimony of Urrutia, in Ynfidelidad de Apaches, 6-8.
150. Urrutia to the viceroy, May 9, 1738, in Expediente sobre la campaña, 8.
151. Order of viceroy empowering the governor of Texas to call on other presidios for troops to defend San Antonio (1733), 4; B. MS. Notes Miscellaneous, 1730-1733; Expediente sobre la campaña, 16.
152. Ibid., 8; B. MS. Notes, Miscel., 1730-1733.
153. Expediente sobre la campaña, 8.
154. Urrutia was not without domestic cares, for as he himself put in, “I am a poor man, burdened with years, many children, and family, without having been able to accumulate anything in so many years of service” (Ibid., 18). As has been seen, he was appointed captain of Béxar in 1733, and he held that office until 1740, when his son, Toribio de Urrutia, succeeded him.
155. Testimony of Mateo Pérez, Infidelidad de Apaches, 9.
156. These were Juan de Sartuche and Andrés Cadena (Urrutia, Ibid., 6).
157. Ibid., 6, 14.
158. Infidelidad de Apaches, 20.
159. Ibid., 6.
160. Ibid., 2.
161. In a letter of June 6, 1735, written by Don Blas de la Garza Falcón, governor of Coahuila, to the Archbishop of Mexico, an account is given to the effect that the Apaches were frequenting the territory around Saltillo and Monclova. On three different occasions they were in the vicinity of Monclova. The first time they carried away almost all of the horses in the place, those of the Tlascaltecos as well as of the Spaniards. They were pursued for seventy leagues and the stock was recovered, although the thieves escaped punishment by swimming a river (probably the Rio Grande), whose current was too swift for the Spaniards. On the second raid a number (punta) of horses were also stolen, the number of Indians being so great that the Spaniards could do nothing more than defend the main herd. These horses were also recovered. On May 3 more than 100 Apaches, divided into four bands, were in the neighborhood of Monclova and attacked different quarters at the same time, succeeding in carrying off fifty horses from Hacienda de San Buenaventura, some from Mission Nadadores, and others belonging to a citizen. Only the last were recovered (Ordenes del Virrey Vizarron, 1738, 1-2).
162. Infidelidad de Apaches, 2.
163. Infidelidad de Apaches, 3-4, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 18.
164. Ibid., 18.
165. Ibid., 3.
166. Residencia de Sandobal, 95.
167. One witness says before (Infidelidad de Apaches, 15).
168. Infidelidad de Apaches, 7, 9.
169. Ibid., 12, 18.
170. Ibid., 7, 9-10, 12, 15, 16-17, 18-19, 20-21.
171. This was Joseph Antonio Fernández de Jáuregui Urrutia, who was governor and captain-general of Nuevo León and Texas at this time. He seems to have been appointed temporarily after the trouble between Franquís and Sandobal.
172. Order of Urrutia that no citizen of Béxar should discharge firearms unless he saw Indians entering the place.
173. Urrutia to the viceroy, May 9, 1738, in Expediente sobre la campaña, 6. It was alleged that three of the women were pregnant, and that the fiends tore out the young to eat them.
174. Interrogatorio, Testimony of Mateo Pérez, in Infidelidad de Apaches, 10. In this place it is said that only fifty-eight horses were stolen.
175. Urrutia to the viceroy, May 9, 1738, in Expediente sobre la campaña, 2.
176. Infidelidad de Apaches, 3, 7, 10, 12-13, 15, 19.
177. Urrutia to the viceroy, May 9, 1738, in Expediente sobre la campaña, 2-3.
178. Ibid., 3.
179. Autos of Don Prudencio de Orobio Bazterra (1737).
180. Urrutia to the viceroy, May 9, Expediente sobre la campaña, 4; Interrogatorio, Infidelidad de Apaches, 4, 13. The alférez, Juan Galbán, was of the opinion that the Indians did not intend to enter the presidio to trade, for they had, he said, three horses and three burros that belonged to citizens of the settlement, and would have been afraid to enter with stolen property (Ibid.).
181. Interrogatorio, Infidelidad de Apaches, 4, 10.
182. Urrutia to the viceroy, May 9, Expediente sobre la campaña, 6-8 (Ibid., 7-8). Urrutia here tells of Almazán's encounter, as has been related on pages 226-227.
183. Interrogatorio, Autos fhos sobre Cabellos Colorados, 5-6.
184. Ibid., 6; Interrogatorio, Infidelidad de Apaches, 5.
185. Ibid., 5.
186. Urrutia to the viceroy, May 9, in Expediente sobre la campaña, 4-5.
187. This investigation is found in Infidelidad de Apaches, 1-22.
188. Auto of Orobio Bazterra, August 18, 1738, in Infidelidad de Apaches, 22-23.
189. Ibid.
190. Interrogatorio, Ibid., 21-22.
191. Auto of Orobio Bazterra, February 16, 1739, Ibid., 24.
192. Infidelidad de Apaches, 1-21.
193. Urrutia to the viceroy, May 9, 1738, in Expediente sobre la campaña, 5-6.
194. Ibid., 9-11.
195. Ibid., 1.
196. Testimony of Ignacio Hernández, in Testimony taken in support of the right of Béxar to exercise jurisdiction over San Sava, 8; testimony of Juan Joseph de Santa Cruz, Ibid., 13.
197. Santa Ana to the guardian, February 20, 1740, in Memorias de Nueva España, XXVIII, f. 206.
198. Testimony taken in support of the right of Béxar to exercise jurisdiction over San Sava, 8, 13. Ignacio Hernández declared that he was with Urrutia, and that as they passed along the San Sabá, the old camping places of Bustillo were pointed out (Ibid., 8).
199. In spite of the repeated hostilities of the Apaches, San Antonio was gradually assuming the proportions of a town. In 1742 plans were made for the erection of casas de justicia. A bid of $270.00 for stone alone was accepted. There was at least one regular contractor in the place, and he had his hands full, building residences for settlers. The cabildo was composed of laboring men, but they were progressive and foresaw the necessity of providing for the expansion of San Antonio. The government was in debt, not an uncommon condition for modern municipalities (Libro de Cavildo, 1-10, passim).
200. Auditor's parecer, June 27, 1743, in Carpeta de Correspondencia, 58-59; auditor's parecer, July 16, 1743, Ibid., 69-70.
201. Governor Kerlérec, “Projet de Paix et d'Alliance avec les Cannecis et les avantages qui en peuvent résulter, envoyé par Kerlérec, gouverneur de la province de la Louisianne en 1753,” in Journal de la Société des Américanistes de Paris, III, No. 1, p. 74.
202. Santa Ana to the guardian (Terreros), February 2, 1746, in Súplica del Padre Presidente, 4.
203. Santa Ana to the viceroy, May 16, 1745, in Entrada de los Apaches, 5-7, 9; Arricivita, Crónica, 346-347.
204. Testimony of Antonio Cadena, Testimony taken in support of the right of Béxar to exercise jurisdiction over San Sava, 9.
205. Santa Ana to the viceroy, 1750, Memorias de Nueva España, XXVIII, f. 137.
206. Santa Ana to the guardian, February 2, 1746, in Súplica del Padre Presidente, 3-4.
207. Arricivita, Crónica Seráfica y Apostólica, 347-348.
208. Santa Ana to the guardian, February 2, 1746, Súplica del Padre Presidente, 2.
209. Loan of powder, March 11, 1746.
210. Autos fechos en virtud, 1-2.
211. Theran to the cabildo, August, 1748.
212. From a document of 1746 (Satisfaction a las objecciones hechas, 10) it is seen that about this time Urrutia was opposing a campaign proposed by the governor of Coahuila, but it is not certain that the reference is to Rábago's campaign of 1748.
213. Testimony of Ignacio de Zepeda, Testimony taken in support of the right of Béxar to exercise jurisdiction over San Sava, 9; Testimony of Don Bernardo de Miranda, Ibid., 17-18.
214. Various witnesses, in Ibid., 3, 5, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17-18. A few years later, when the question arose as to whether or not San Sabá was within the jurisdiction of Texas, Coahuila, or New Mexico, testimony was given to show that in 1748 no other road from Monclova to San Sabá was known than that by way of San Antonio, and that Rábago's campaign was the only event that would give Coahuila any claim to the San Saba region (Ibid., passim).
215. Bolton, MS.
216. Memorial del Padre Presidente, 1-5.
217. Copia de Carta del P. Fr. Mariano, 2.
218. Santa Ana to the viceroy, March 3, 1743, Carpeta de Correspondencia, 37-40.
219. Santa Ana to the viceroy, March 5, 1743. Ibid., 61-62.
220. Ibid., 63-67.
221. Ibid., 67-68.
222. Kerlérec, op. cit., passim.
223. Guadalupe to the viceroy, ca. June 21, 1743, Carpeta de Correspondencia, 48-54.
224. Auditor's parecer, June 27, 1743, Ibid., 58-59.
225. Auditor's parecer, July 16, 1743, Ibid., 69-71.
226. Santa Ana to the viceroy, May 16, 1745, Entrada de los Apaches, 7-9, 1-4.
227. Santa Ana to the guardian, February 2, 1746, Súplica del Padre Presidente, 1-6; Visita de las misiones, 14; Entrada de los Apaches, 2.
228. Súplica del Padre Presidente, 3-6.
229. Satisfaccion á las objecciones hechas, 13.
230. Santa Ana to the viceroy, February 20, 1750, Memorias de Nueva España, XXVIII, f. 138.
231. Arricivita, Crónica Seráfica y Apostólica, 351.
232. Arricivita says that only forty-six captives were taken, together with more than one hundred horses (Ibid., 352).
233. The details of this expedition as given above are from Cabello, Informe, 35.
234. Apparently only the prisoners who had been recently captured were given up, for it was not until some months later that the citizens were compelled to give up their servants (Memorias de Nueva España, XXVIII, f. 140).
235. My authority for this event is Cabello, Informe, 36-38. I find nothing of it in other documents of the period, nor does Arricivita mention it.
236. Memorias de Nueva España, XXVIII, f. 147.
237. Pacificacion de Apaches, 37.
238. Santa Ana to the viceroy, March 5, 1743, Carpeta de Correspondencia, 61-62.
239. Pacificacion de Apaches, 33.
240. Carpeta de Correspondencia, 106; B. MS. Notes, Miscel., 1730-1733, 3. From the Rio Grande country and the region of the Pecos, however, the western Apaches extended their activities into Coahuila and Nuevo León, penetrating as far south as Saltillo and Parras. In 1735 seven Apache chiefs were established with their camps on the Rio Grande, not far from Presidio del Norte (Ordenes del Virrey Vizarron, 2). By 1743, it was said, the Apaches troubled Coahuila and Nueva Viscaya from Durango to New Mexico (Carpeta de Correspondencia, 61).
241. Memorias de Nueva España, XXVIII, ff. 101-102.
242. Cabello, Informe, 38-39.
243. Autos fhos sre averiguar, 45; Pacificacion de Apaches, 39-40; Memorial del Govor. Bustillo, 4.
244. Santa Ana to the viceroy, March 5, 1743, Carpeta de Correspondencia, 62.
245. Identified by Dr. Bolton.
246. Santa Ana to the viceroy, May 16. 1745, Entrada de los Apaches, 6-7.
247. Ibid., 4.
248. Carpeta de Correspondencia, 62.
249. Bandelier, referring to an incident of 1745, quotes from Arricivita (Crónica, 349), “Por no baxar todavía el Capitan grande Ipandi,” and adds, “This seems to indicate that the word Ipande is derived from a personal name. On page 383 we finally read `Ipandes!' ” (“Final Report,” Part I, Papers of the Arch. Inst. of America, III, 181, note 2.) It may be said, in the first place, that the inference does not seem to be warranted from the language. One might as well conclude from the phrase, “el capitan grande Apache,” an expression occurring many times, that Apache is a personal name. In the second place, the error of the inference is made plain by the fact that the terms Ipandi, Ipande, etc., were in common use as tribal names from 1732, at least, forward, occurring many times in the documents before 1745.
250. Santa Ana to the viceroy, March 5, 1743, Carpeta de Correspondencia, 62.
251. Pacificacion de Apaches, 23. There is some doubt, however, as to whether or not the Ypandes and Pelones are identical, for Santa Ana, in speaking of the main divisions of the Apaches, says that the Ypandes and Apaches [Natagés] do not number more than five hundred warriors, while the Pelones do not exceed eight hundred (Carpeta de Correspondencia, 62), thus differentiating “Ypandes” and “Pelones.” His is the only evidence, however, which I have found to offset the direct implication of the phrase “Ypandes alias Pelones.” If Santa Ana is correct, one way to reconcile the two statements is to assume that the Pelones, after being driven from their homes by the Comanches, became known later as Ypandes, while the name “Pelones” was still applied to other Indians.
252. Carpeta de Correspondencia, 39.
253. Entrada de los Apaches, 1.
254. Ibid., 6.
255. B. MS. Notes, Miscellaneous, 1730-1733.
256. Memorial del Govor. Bustillo, 4.
257. B. MS. Notes.
258. Pacificacion de Apaches, 5.
259. Ibid., 39-40.
260. Ibid., 13-14.
261. Memorial del Govor. Bustillos, 13.
262. Cartas . . . sobre la fundacion de Sn Xavier (1746), 3.
263. Autos sre averiguar, 41.
264. Pacificacion de Apaches, 39-40, 42-43, 53.
265. Ordenes del Virrey Vizarron, 2.
266. Carpeta de Correspondencia, 46, 63.
How to cite:
Dunn, William Edward, "APACHE RELATIONS IN TEXAS, 1718-1750 ", Volume 014, Number 3, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, Page 198 - 269. http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v014/n3/article_3.html
[Accessed Mon Nov 23 0:16:00 CST 2009]
