Vol. XIV JANUARY, 1911 No. 3
The publication committee and the editors disclaim responsibility for views expressed by contributors to The Quarterly
On July 3, 1910, at his home in Austin, George Pierce Garrison died of heart disease. For over a year his health had been gradually failing and he had been coming slowly to a realization of the fact that his labors were exceeding his powers of endurance. Planning to work less arduously as soon as he could dispose of the second volume of the “Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas,” which he was then engaged in editing, he was overtaken by death with the proofs of the volume upon his desk. His immediate task was nearly done, but, dying at the age of fifty-six, it can hardly be said that his life work had rounded to a perfect close. Had he been spared, his character and his influence would have continued to benefit the University of Texas, and his learning and industry would have continued to illumine the history of our country. Unfortunately, in place of his active presence, the memory of him alone now serves to guide and inspire.
George Pierce Garrison was born December 19, 1853, at Carrollton, Georgia. His father, Patterson Gillespie Garrison, and his mother, Mary Ann Curtiss Garrison, were Georgians of Georgian descent. His early experiences differed in nowise from those of the average Georgia boy of the period. He retained a pretty vivid recollection of war time and the accompanying privations, along with a considerable knowledge of negro life and character.
His early schooling was obtained at Sewanee College, Winchester, Tennessee, and at the Carroll Masonic Institute, Carrollton, Georgia. Struggling to make a living and to acquire an education, he came to Texas in 1874, where he taught school in Rusk and adjoining counties for five years. In 1879 he went to Scotland, and took the degree of L. A. (Literate in Arts) from the University of Edinburgh in 1881. Returning to Texas, he married Miss Annie Perkins of Rusk county in November, 1881, and taught school at San Marcos until the spring of 1882, when failing health forced him to quit teaching. He moved to a ranch in Hays county and busied himself with outdoor labors. His health improving, he accepted in 1884 an instructorship in English literature and history in the young University of Texas. He was made an assistant professor in 1888; an adjunct professor in 1889; an associate professor in 1891, and professor of American history in 1897.
Tuberculosis, which attacked him in 1882, seriously threatened his life in 1889. Partly by medical treatment but mainly by sheer will power he overcame this disease so thoroughly that his later years were free from the shadow of it.
In 1896 he took the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago, and in 1910 Baylor University conferred upon him the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws. The death of Judge Gould in 1904 made Professor Garrison in point of service the senior member of the faculty of the University of Texas.
Professor Garrison was one of the founders of the Texas State Historical Association and was editor of The Quarterly from its beginning in 1897 until the time of his death. To his care The Quarterly owes much of the reputation which it has acquired among historical publications in this country. He was a member of the American Economic Association, of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, of the American Historical Association, and of various local clubs and associations. He was for several years a member of the Executive Council and of the Historical Manuscripts Committee of the American Historical Association, and at the time of his death he was chairman of the new Library and Historical Commission of Texas.
For several years Professor Garrison was a member of the school board of Austin. He took an active interest in local affairs as well as in those of Texas and the United States. He was for years a member of the Methodist Church, and had much to do with the building of the University Methodist Church in Austin. His relation to his family was almost ideal. His mother, his wife, two sisters, and four daughters survive him.
Such in brief is the bald outline of a life almost heroic. His writings, most of which are familiar to the readers of The Quarterly, will be found listed below. They have been received with favor by competent critics, they have won for their author a respectable place among American historians, and they speak for themselves. Professor Jameson has said of him, “It is not too much to say that he exerted more influence than all preceding students had ever exerted,” on the history of Texas. He availed himself of all the known historical records and sources, and nothing but the discovery of new material can seriously disturb the conclusions that he reached. Out of his class room have come a number of young Texas historians who are trained in the best methods of modern investigation and who are destined greatly to elucidate the history of Texas, of the South, and of the nation. Their work, and his, form his epitaph as an historian.
But the man was greater than his works. In him the scientific historian was ever subordinate to the patriotic citizen. He studied and taught history with unflagging zeal because he firmly believed that it revealed an unceasing moral purpose running through the ages, because he thought that the experience of the past could be profitably brought to bear on the problems of the future. He was an historian because he was a public-spirited man who firmly held that an insight into the experience of our race would greatly broaden and benefit each succeeding generation.
In this feeble effort to do justice to his memory, it is needless and impertinent to attempt to take his measure as an historian, and it is far better to lay stress upon what he was rather than upon what he did. It is well to do great things but better still to be great. Yet it is no easy task to describe him as he was. A modest, patient, prudent, brave, and kindly man he was, whose demerits were few and small and whose virtues were so thoroughly blended into a fine character as to give but little place for light and shade in picturing him. Only a friendship extending over many years justifies the poor attempt here made to convey some notion of the merits of the man to those who knew him not.
The most salient feature in his life was his power of continual growth. Throughout his life he increased in moral insight and intellectual power, and at his death he was a broader man in every way than he had ever been before. It is the sad fate of most men to stop advancing at relatively early years, but in his case the advance continued to the end at an increasing rate. His progress in youth was greatly retarded by adverse circumstances. He was twenty-six years of age before he entered the University of Edinburgh, and he had money enough only for two years of study there. Attacked by tuberculosis at the age of twenty-nine, for eight years he fought a life and death struggle, winning because he possessed an indomitable spirit. So it came to pass that, beset by disease and poverty, he reached his fortieth year before he found it possible to begin his historical studies in real earnest. These long years of struggle brought out the man that was in him, and, his disease conquered, the last fifteen years of his life were years of great progress and increasing usefulness.
Although a gentle and tolerant man, desirous of finding good in all men and little prone to severe judgments, he possessed all the rigor of an old Puritan and all the firmness of a granite rock when it came to compromising with evil. In cases involving morals he carefully decided upon the course to pursue or the judgment to adopt, and, his conclusion made, nothing save new facts could bend him from it. His desire to reach a correct conclusion sometimes delayed action, but the action, when it came, was always without fear or favor. He once said, half in jest and half in earnest, “I am moved neither by tears nor guns.” He combined in a remarkable manner an absolutely inflexible morality with a just appreciation of the weakness of human nature. Slow to form an opinion, sure to look carefully at all the aspects of a situation, accustomed to balance probabilities, versed in the intricacies of human nature, Professor Garrison had many of the qualifications of a great historian.
As a teacher he was highly regarded by his students, and he had the great power of coming into sympathetic personal contact with a very large number of them. He held that the first duty of a state university was to produce intelligent and patriotic citizens, and he tried to teach history so as to make his students worthy members of a democracy, a democracy seeking justice and as mindful of duties as of rights. He was clear in exposition, interested in students and their lives, ever animated by a noble purpose; therefore one is not surprised that both the negligent and the diligent thought well of him. He insisted that education must reach every human capacity, must fit for life, but not for life in a narrowly utilitarian sense.
It is obvious to those who have read his books that Professor Garrison possessed an excellent command of the English language. As a speaker he was effective, possessing a good voice and a pleasing presence. In making impromptu addresses he was often particularly happy as is evidenced by his admirable and partly unpremeditated reply (fortunately taken down at the time and printed in Volume IX of the University of Texas Record) to the felicitations showered upon him at the dinner given in his honor at the Driskill Hotel in 1909. His written style is careful and logical, abounds in passages of real literary merit, and is garnished here and there with quiet humor. He had a most extensive knowledge of the English Bible, an accomplishment all too rare in this generation, and could quote accurately many verses and several entire chapters. He was well read in English literature and was not unacquainted with the literature of antiquity. Through life he retained a fondness for good poetry, and in his youth he wrote a few verses himself. One of his lesser accomplishments was an ability to sing negro songs after the old plantation fashion, and by doing so he sometimes surprised people who knew him only in his professorial capacity.
Southern by birth and sympathy and warmly appreciative of all that was good in the civilization of the old South, Professor Garrison was always singularly dispassionate in his view of all questions relating to the Civil War. He did much to defend the South from accusations based on defective historical knowledge, but he regarded the war as a necessary step in the welding of the United States. He knew that the progress of civilization had altered and would continue to alter the relations originally existing between the states and the federal government. For the Constitution and the Judiciary he had an intelligent appreciation, but he did not regard either as incapable of improvement. While not unmindful of the benefits to be derived from a proper organization of governmental machinery, he maintained that the liberty and welfare of a people depend more upon its own intelligence and virtue than upon paper constitutions or particular governmental forms. Long study of the governments of Great Britain and the United States finally led him to the conclusion that the American system of checks and balances was in many ways developed to such an extent as to interfere with good government and check the free development of democracy. He came to believe in placing a good deal of power in the hands of public officials and in then holding them to a strict and frequent accountability to the voters. He therefore viewed with favor the British cabinet system and the commission form of government in our American cities. He regarded the obviously waning prestige of the states as compared with the growth of federal power as an inevitable process brought about by the progress of mankind. He was, however, a firm believer in local responsibility and in local self-government in local affairs, and thought that the proper division of power between the various local governments and the general government was rather a question of business administration than a proper subject of violent partisan controversy. He followed with keen interest the growth all over the world of the power of our race to govern itself wisely and justly. In those controversies that will probably continue to agitate the world during the twentieth century, he took the part of those who regard the rights of man as superior to the rights of property. Though he was attached to Texas as few men are, his patriotism was not provincial. He was more an American than a Texan, and as an American he did not shut his eyes to the merits of other nations or to the evils that flourish amid the good in our national life.
By temperament and training, Professor Garrison was a man of deep religious instincts. Although he accepted many of the more radical results of biblical higher criticism and although he was thoroughly convinced of the substantial truth of the evolutionary conception of the universe, he found it possible in all sincerity to remain a faithful member of an evangelical church. This he did not only because he regarded the Christian church as the greatest means of individual and social regeneration but also because he believed that the essentials of Christianity are so profoundly true as not greatly to need the help of much detailed historical evidence. A reverent man, loving truth, he looked with clear vision upon the universe and found there progress and a moral order. He knew that a diligent study of nature and man, coupled with an earnest effort to carry out the precepts of the Son of Man, would lead men near to the footstool of the Most High.
In attempting to describe the character and opinions of an educated man, one feels the inadequacy of words. Because example is better than precept, it has been the custom of biographers to depiet rather by incidents and aneedoles than by labored exposition. In this account the temptation to relate certain interesting and illustrative events in the life of Professor Garrison has often arisen. But many such details are needed to give a just idea of a man, and it has been thought better here to seek emphasis by means of brevity.
In bringing this inadequate account of my friend to an end, the sadness produced by his untimely death and by my own sense of personal loss is deepened by my inability to make plain the worth of him to those who did not know him. Let us therefore measure him by his aspirations, which are to be found accurately expressed in these noble words that he loved to quote from Tennyson's “Ulysses.”
“But something ere the end, Some work of noble note, may yet be done, Not unbecoming men that strove with Gods.... 'Tis not too late to seek a newer world. Push off, and, sitting well in order, smite The sounding furrows; for my purpose holds To sail beyond the sunset, and the baths Of all the western stars, until I die. It may be that the gulfs will wash us down; It may be we shall touch the Happy Isles, And see the great Achilles, whom we knew. Tho' much is taken, much abides; and tho' We are not now that strength which in old days Moved earth and heaven, that which we are, we are— One equal temper of heroic hearts, Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.”
BOOKS
The Civil Government of Texas. Philadelphia. Eldredge and Brother. 1898.
The History of Federal Control of Congressional Elections. St. Louis. The Christian Publishing Company. 1900.
Texas: A Contest of Civilizations. Boston. Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1903.
Westward Extension (Volume XVII of The American Nation). New York. Harper and Brother. 1906.
Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas. 2 volumes. Volume I is Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1907, II; and volume II is Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1908, II (in press). Washington. Government Printing Office.
ARTICLES
“Another Texas Flag,” The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, III, 170-176. “Guy Morrison Bryan,” Ibid., 121-136. “Richard Montgomery Swearingen,” Ibid., 225-231. “The Summer School Movement,” The University of Texas Record, II, 269-274. “University Traditions,” Ibid., III, 112-118. “Address at the Installation of President Houston,” Ibid., VII, 42-45. “Historical Address at the Inaugural of President Mezes,” Ibid., VIII, 261-278. “Address at the James B. Clark Memorial,” Ibid., IX, 125-128. “The Lot of the Reformer,” a faculty commencement address, University of Texas, June 16, 1891. “Utilitarian Education,” Public Opinion, 588-589, September 19, 1891. “A Woman's Community in Texas,” The Charities Review, III, 28-46 (1893). “Texas,” Johnson's Universal Cyclopedia (1895). “Historians,” Popular Science Monthly, November, 1900. Reprinted in The Texan, December 11, 1900. “The Archivo General de Mexico.” The Nation, May 30, 1901. “Southwestern History in the Southwest,” Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1901, I, 231-242. “Connecticut Pioneers Founded Anglo-American Texas,” The Connecticut Magazine, IX, No. 3. “The First Stage of the Movement for the Annexation of Texas,” The American Historical Review, X, 72-96. “A Memorandum of Moses Austin's Journey” (1796-1797), a document edited with annotations, The American Historical Review, V, 518-542. “The University of Texas and its New President,” Review of Reviews, 682-685, December, 1905. “The Truancy of the Texas Navy,” Harper's Monthly Magazine, forthcoming.
Daughters of the Republic, Comrades, Ladies and Gentlemen:
Texas, mindful of her debt of gratitude to the great pioneer of her civilization, has always cherished his memory, and has now brought here his mortal remains for final interment. More than half a century ago a single portrait was hung in the hall of the old House of Representatives to the right of the Speaker's chair. It was the portrait of Stephen F. Austin, placed there by the men who once followed him to the wilderness in search of homes, who had shared with him its perils and who knew him best. When, in 1855, another state house was erected, the same portrait was placed to the right of the Speaker's chair, and when, in later years, this more enduring capitol was built, this full length portrait of Austin, which you see, was placed to the right of the Speaker's chair. At the request of Austin's kindred, I then presented it to a joint session of the Legislature in their name,2 and you will excuse me for remembering that I then expressed the hope that Texas some day
would bring his ashes from their resting place near the gulf and deposit them here in the State cemetery, where she has buried many of her illustrious dead. We are about to see that wish accomplished, and by your indulgence, and at the request of Austin's kindred and a joint committee of the Legislature, I will now speak of his life and services.
Liberty, regulated by law, was won for us by men of a past generation, and inasmuch as it was the most valuable heritage they could bestow, by so much it is our duty to perpetuate a knowledge of when, how, and by whom it was secured, and thus preserve the record of their services before it is obscured and clouded by tradition. In the evolution of our race the curtain is about to rise on an era in which the achievement of an invading conqueror will no longer attract, and when the people will bow with reverence only before the shrine of those who devoted their lives to the enfranchisement of man, or to lifting him up to a higher plane of knowledge. He whose coffined remains repose in that casket was the great leading pioneer of an advancing civilization in Texas.
Before reviewing his eventful career, indulge me while I speak of his birth and early life. He was born one hundred and seventeen years ago, at Austinville, in the mountains of Virginia, on the third day of November, 1793, the year when George Washington was elected President for his second term. He went, when yet a child, to the wild territory of northern Louisiana, where he became familiar with the dangers of a frontier life. His education was finished in Lexington, Kentucky, and there, while still a youth, he attracted the attention of Henry Clay. His first public service was in the Legislature of the Territory of Missouri, when he was hardly old enough to be eligible. There he met Senator Thomas H. Benton, through whose influence, and that of Mr. Clay, he was appointed, before he was thirty years old, United States judge for the Territory of Arkansas.
The present era in which man is exploring and utilizing all the forces of nature had not dawned when Austin grew to manhood. No steam vessel was seen on the river or the ocean; no thread was spun in a cotton factory; no railways were in the world; and though Franklin had brought electricity from the clouds, the telegraph and telephone were unknown.
The revolution of the American colonies in 1776 had startled the world, and the French people, roused from their servile endurance of tyranny through the centuries by the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Voltaire, and Tom Payne, and by the example of Lafayette, cut off their king's head the very year in which Austin was born, and began their career of conquest and of carnage. Spain then ruled nearly all of South America, except Brazil, and all the shores of the Pacific on both continents up to British America. But when, in 1808, Napoleon placed his brother Joseph on the throne of Spain, the spirit of revolt passed like a flash over South America and Mexico, and the patriot priests, Hidalgo and Morelos, discarded their priestly robes, and, sword in hand, led a revolt against the tyranny of the viceroys.
From 1803 to 1819 both Spain and the United States claimed the territory of Texas from the Sabine to the Rio Grande, but the treaty of De Onis in 1819 settled the controversy in favor of Spain. From 1800 until the revolution of Iturbide, Spain made but one effort to colonize Texas with a Spanish agricultural population. In 1804 that government decreed the settlement of three thousand families on the San Marcos river, but the enterprise failed. That desire to colonize had its origin in a jealous distrust of the aggressive spirit of the Anglo-Americans, and could only have been intended to establish a picket guard against their encroachments. Philip Nolan had before that led fifty armed men from the western frontier of the United States into the wilds of Texas, but he and nearly all his men were destroyed by a Spanish force on the waters of the Trinity or Brazos. In 1813 the wilds of Texas were again invaded by a lawless force of seven hundred men from the lower Mississippi, led by Guiterrez and Kemper, Magee and Perry, who, after capturing the presidio of La Bahia, and slaying most of the garrison, took possession of San Antonio, and a few miles from that city defeated a Spanish army of three thousand men commanded by Don Elisondo. They were afterwards defeated themselves in a battle near the Medina river by a Spanish army under Arredondo, in which over one thousand men were slain. The survivors of the battle were pursued and killed all along the old San Antonio road that crossed the Colorado eighteen miles below here. Their bones remained unburied until 1822, when the governor, Trespalacios, at the request of Stephen F. Austin, had their skulls gathered and interred. Again in 1815 an invading force of revolutionists from our southern states, led by Mina and Perry, and another in 1819 commanded by Long entered the territory of Texas, only to perish. More human lives were sacrificed in those lawless invasions than were slain in the Texas revolution of 1836. Our written histories tell but little of those invasions. Available sources would reveal much more.
A race hatred of Anglo-Americans so intense resulted from those repeated invasions that Salcedo, the governor of the Spanish internal provinces of the East, wrote to his superior at the capital that if he had the power he would not permit a bird to fly from the Sabine to the Rio Grande.
One man and only one, in the United States made an attempt in 1820 to secure homes in Texas for his countrymen by peaceful methods. Moses Austin, the father of him whose remains lie before us, reached San Antonio in November, 1820, but was promptly ordered by Governor Martinez to leave the territory.
Mortified and discouraged, Moses Austin on leaving the governor's office met on the plaza the Baron de Bastrop, whom he had once met in the United States, and whose influence with Martinez was great. Bastrop obtained from the governor a suspension of his order, and within a week Martinez gave his approval to the application for the introduction of immigrants.
How often the destiny of men and of states has its origin in trifles! Tracing to its remote results that accidental meeting with Baron de Bastrop, Texas was colonized; then a revolt established her independence; her annexation to the United States provoked the war with Mexico in 1846, which was terminated by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and that treaty doubled the territory of our union and carried her flag to the Pacific.
I am quite aware that much of what I have said and will yet say is trite history, but the Austins made history; and it is chiefly by its light that we can know them. Moses Austin, robbed on his return by his companions, sick and for days only saved from starvation by eating acorns, at last reached home, to die from the effects of exposure and hardships. From his deathbed he urged his son Stephen to follow up the enterprise he had begun.
The son observed that dying request, and resigned his exalted office of federal judge to establish civilization in a wild and unexplored land. We hardly know in the light of after events which most to admire, his filial respect for a dying father which caused him to relinquish in his early manhood an exalted office with its honors and a competency for life, his dauntless career in a foreign land, or the high intelligence that sustained him through every trial.
That portrait to the right of the Speaker's chair presents him as he appeared in 1824, standing under a live oak with his rifle, and clothed in buckskin. Before tracing further his career, indulge me while I read a description of the man written by his private secretary, Moses Austin Bryan.
Austin was slender, sinewy and graceful, easy and elastic in his movements, with small hands and feet, dark hair, which curled when damp, large hazel eyes, and in height about five feet ten inches. His face was grave and thoughtful, when not in the social circle, then it was animated and lit up by his gentle love, his voice was soft, though manly, his conversation fluent, attractive and persuasive, his magnetic power over others gave him great influence over the leading men of Texas, and his strong, practical intellect, his thorough forgetfulness of self and devotion to Texas, bound the great mass of the people to him.
Such was the man who, with fifteen companions, started from Natchitoches in Louisiana in July, 1821, and followed the old mission trail across Texas through the prairies and wilderness to San Antonio.3 He saw on that trail no human habitation. The Franciscan priests, with an “intendent” and an armed escort, had traveled over it in their annual visitations to the missions across the continent for a hundred years, but it had not been otherwise used, except by filibustering invaders and the wild Indians, for no commerce passed over it. Scattered along that road from San Antonio to the Colorado, Austin saw the unburied bones of the adventurers who had followed Kemper and Magee, who were pursued and slain after the battle on the Medina—ghastly reminders of Spanish resentment.
He was promptly recognized by Governor Martinez as the representative of his father, on the 12th of August, 1821, and he then explored the country between the waters of the Colorado and the Brazos—two hundred years after the pilgrims landed on the shores of New England. Going then to New Orleans, he returned with his first immigrants to the banks of the Brazos in January, 1822, and established there the first permanent settlement of American white men in Texas. Each immigrant bore a certificate of good moral character and of his profession of faith in the Christian religion. They suffered privation for the first winter, for a boat loaded with provisions was seized by the Karankawa Indians, and they passed the autumn and winter of 1822 without sugar, coffee or bread, subsisting on deer, buffalo, bear and wild horses. Another year found them abundantly supplied and contented, and by the fall of 1824 Austin had introduced four hundred families. The first immigrants were not strong enough to punish the Indians, but two years afterward Austin led a force of sixty men, and by killing half the tribe stopped their depredations.
Indulge me while I describe the men with whom Austin first settled Texas—for without that knowledge the story of their achievements would sound like romance. Active and strong of limb were they, and being inured to hardships from their childhood, their chief joy was in the excitement of the chase. Every pioneer knew that in his new home security of life must depend on a steady nerve and a sure aim with the rifle, which was his constant companion. Only the self-reliant would dare colonial perils. They were a hardy race, among whom hospitality and truth were universal. I knew many of them well fifty-eight years ago, and now assert that nowhere in the world have I ever known any class of men who excelled them in the practice of hospitality, and in that individualism and self-reliance that make the invincible soldier.
Such were the men who followed Austin to colonize Texas, and fought with Houston at San Jacinto. General Sam Houston told me once when describing that battle, at the request of Hon. A. J. Hamilton and myself, that though outnumbered two to one he never for a moment doubted the issue, for all his men were fearless marksmen, and were thirsting for revenge on account of the massacre of the Alamo.
Nor were they all destitute of culture, for Motley, John Bunton, Potter, Carson, Rusk and still others who signed the declaration of independence were all accomplished men. No degrading crime was ever charged against any of Austin's colonists on the Colorado. The luxury that enervates had never entered their rude homes, in which each one reigned, poor, it is true, but contented, for he was blessed with abundance. No miserable social distinction, based on money or fashion, divided them into sets and classes. The late John H. Reagan told me more than once that before the revolution of 1836 there were not twenty men in all the colonies who were worth five thousand dollars each. Their common pasture was the broad prairie that stretched westward seven hundred miles to the Rio Grande, while the black bear, antelope, millions of buffalo, and deer supplied them with both food and raiment. We who rejoice in fruitful fields and growing cities can never love Texas as did its first pioneers who, while it was yet vocal with the music of the wilderness, delighted in the waving beauty of its untrodden grass and wild flowers.
A change of rulers in Mexico compelled Austin to visit its capital, for the last of the Spanish viceroys had been expelled in 1821, and he needed from the government of Iturbide a confirmation of his empresario contract. He made this journey of one thousand miles over a road threatened by Indians as far as the Rio Grande, and thereafter infested by robber bands. To avoid being plundered he went on foot and alone from San Luis Pótosi to the City of Mexico disguised as a beggar, and in April, 1822, reached the Mexican capital. There he first met Santa Anna and the Emperor Iturbide, whose coronation he witnessed as he did also his abdication. During the bloody era that then convulsed Mexico, he learned to speak Spanish like his native tongue, and after securing the confidence of rival chiefs returned with his contract sanctioned and enlarged by the central authority. While watching the shifting scenes of the revolutionary drama there, he assisted in writing the first draft of the Mexican constitution, afterwards in substance adopted in 1824. This fact has been questioned by one historian who never knew Austin or had access to his papers, but it is apparently attested by his papers, which are in a vault of our State University.
Thus, one man, solitary and alone, unaided either by wealth or powerful friends, induced the Mexican government to reverse its policy of a century and permit the colonization here of the very race it had watched with jealous distrust. Calm, intellectual, self-possessed, accomplished as a scholar, gentle as a woman, yet fearless as a lion, Austin was admirably equipped for the great work before him. His greatness shines with increasing luster as we see him moving forward, still unaided, and overcoming every obstacle in his path. Milam, De Witt, Cameron, Hewitson and Robertson followed his example, and in a few years the smoke from pioneer cabins from the Sabine to the Guadalupe gave token that freedom was advancing westward—it had come to stay.
In 1823 he repaired to Monterey and obtained from the provincial deputation of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila and Texas almost plenary authority over his colony. De la Garza made him a lieutenant colonel and commander in Texas, with power to make peace or war with the Indians, to appoint judges and secure the administration of justice by an appeal to himself. The colonists knew nothing of Mexican law. Austin prescribed rules to govern them and penalties for offenses. Horse thieves and lawless men were scourged from his colonies, and Indian forays stopped by quick retaliation.
Thus Austin, who had planted the first colony, was its first commander, judge, and law-giver. Perhaps never before on this continent was any man clothed with such varied and extraordinary powers by a government to whose manners and customs he was an alien, but so justly did he rule that no one questioned or resisted his authority, and so considerate was he of the rights, the prosperity and happiness of them all, that they loved him as their benefactor, and repaid his solicitude for them by their acts of gratitude.
In 1827 he had colonized one thousand families under his enlarged contracts, and settled them from near the mountains to the gulf. Abundant harvests rewarded their labor and now there was plenty everywhere. Their land titles Austin issued from San Felipe de Austin, which was named after him. Issuing titles, adjusting surveys, reconciling differences, administering justice, preserving peace with a jealous central authority, and protecting the colonists against Indian forays had employed all his time and required constant vigilance.
If man's dignity should be measured by his usefulness to others, then no other man who ever trod Texas soil can outrank Stephen F. Austin, for this man who inspired constitutional law for revolutionary states at a foreign capital, returned to his home to eclipse that achievement by the patient toil and high intelligence which prepared a just government for his own race, and helped to establish the supremacy of equal laws. From 1823 to 1827 was the happiest period of his life in Texas, for his colonists were prospering and contented, the central government confided in him, and no ambitious leader had yet come to sow discord and weaken his authority. But ambitious men came when the colonies grew strong, and threatened eastern Texas with what was then called the “Fredonian war.” Through Austin's influence with the Mexican chief, Saucedo, peace was restored and an armed force of Mexican soldiers which had gone from San Antonio to punish the colonists was withdrawn. Thus, he who had settled the first colonists interposed to protect the Anglo-Americans in their first revolutionary outbreak.
Again in 1832, after the affairs of violence at Anahuac and Velasco, the Mexican General Mexia was sent to chastise the colonists. Austin, then at Saltillo, hastened to Matamoras, and, going with Mexia to the mouth of the Brazos at Velasco, acted as a trusted mediator and averted war. The grateful colonists gave him a banquet and toasted him as “the angel of mercy and harbinger of peace.”
Thus twice were the colonies on the verge of being invaded and destroyed before they were strong enough to make successful resistance, and twice the danger was averted by the influence and presence of their trusted leader.
But henceforth he was to suffer by imprisonment and from the treachery of friends, and, with his health destroyed, his life was to be sacrificed on the altar of duty. In 1833 he was chosen with two others by a convention of the people to go to Mexico and request for Texas separate statehood in the Mexican republic. With conscious rectitude he went, and went alone, for his associates shrank from the peril involved in the mission. While returning home, after its failure, he was arrested at Saltillo, taken back to Mexico and confined for nearly two years, a part of that time in a dungeon of the former inquisition. For three months he was imprisoned in a dark, damp cell, without a ray of light, not even being permitted to see or speak to his jailer, who fed him through a hole in his door—his only companion being a pet mouse. Money at last softened the rigor of confinement, until he was freed by a general amnesty law. Thus tortured and stripped of all except his life, his courage never failed; in the darkest hour he was willing to die for his convictions of duty to his people; for he had told the speculators at the Mexican capital who wished to remand Texas to territorial vassalage, that rather than take the fabulous price that they offered him to desert the colonists and cease his opposition to their designs, he would submit to having his arm torn from the shoulder. Never did his character shine with more luster than when he suffered, a modern Regulus, in a foreign prison. From that prison he staggered forth with wasted frame and tottering step. From the effects of the solitary confinement in that damp dungeon Austin never recovered.
His private papers showed that he expended $30,000 of his private means on that mission to Mexico, the repayment of which by Texas he never applied for, nor will any of his heirs request it. These heirs, some of whom are before me, prefer to think of that money as a sacrificial offering by their great kinsman for the separate statehood of Texas.
Thus he who had established the colonies, guarded their interest in every vicissitude, twice averted war, prescribed laws and established courts, was the first martyr to their aspirations for separate statehood.
In September, 1835, after his release from prison, Austin landed on his return home at the mouth of the Brazos. His return was hailed with acclamations of joy and banqueting, as for one risen from the grave. His advice for an immediate “consultation” of the people was quickly followed, and before six weeks had passed a little army had assembled with Austin as its chief.
The speed with which the people organized with arms in their hands may seem a mystery. But the butchery of Mexican republicans at Zacatecas by Santa Anna had alarmed the colonists for their impending fate, when the return of Austin awakened new hope. He was not yet ready for a declaration of independence, but he was determined to resist the encroachment of Santa Anna upon the republican constitution. The news of Austin's position sped quickly to the cabins of the colonists. They heard it with joy. No carpet knights were they, when home was in peril, but with a kiss to wife and babes they shouldered their rifles and formed an army. Then from the Guadalupe to the Brazos, and away up among the red lands of the east the deer were safe for a season, for the hunters had gone to seek more dangerous game. No rival chief had yet come to dispute his leadership, and on the 11th of October, 1835, Austin was chosen by acclamation to lead these hunters to the field. They chose wisely. He alone among all the men in Texas offered to pledge all his private fortune for her independence. As the journals show, soon afterward he did pledge his whole estate to obtain the first loan of money for the revolution.
Let us pause now and consider how desperate were the chances against Texas in that dark hour of her trial. We glory in the triumph of the thirteen colonies over Great Britain, but it bears no comparison to the heroic struggle of Texas for independence. The thirteen colonies had two and a half millions of people, and a wide ocean separated them from England. Texas, with less than six thousand men all told, fought a powerful republic which contained a population of over seven millions and whose boundary was contiguous to her own. England was embarrassed by a powerful opposition to the war at home begun by the elder Pitt; Texas had no friends in Mexico. England was then engaged in a European war; Mexico had only Texas to contend with. The thirteen colonies were aided by France, who sent men, ships and munitions of war; Texas, without national recognition and with no aid except from individual volunteers, won her independence single-handed and alone. The successful struggle of Texas for independence is without a parallel in the history of the world.
The men of Austin's army cried, “On to San Antonio,” and then with the assistance of such men as Rusk, Frank Johnson, Burleson, Milam, Bowie, and Fannin, the Mexicans were defeated at Concepcion and driven to the Alamo for cover. Austin was no longer the “harbinger of peace,” for he was the first leader of a Texas army against Mexican despotism, and with the prairie all burned west of San Antonio, the surrender of the Mexican General Cos was only a matter of time. During the operations before San Antonio, Austin, still suffering from his prison confinement, was so weak that his aide-de-camp, Colonel Austin Bryan, says his servant had to assist him in mounting his horse.
And now this man, who had defended the colonists in every vicissitude of fortune, was ordered by the consultation to a different field. Reinforcement from the United States was needed to help Texas in the spring of 1836 against another invading army, and in November, 1835, Austin was called on to go with W. H. Wharton and Dr. Archer and appeal for men, arms and ammunition. The selection was a wise one, and he obeyed without a murmur; he wrote to the consultation, “I am at all times ready to serve Texas in any capacity where I may be most useful, but should I leave at once, some prudence will be needed to keep this army together.” Had he been an ambitious Caesar who refused to obey the senate when ordered to turn over his legions to Pompey, discord and strife would have supplanted harmony, and freedom would have been imperiled by rival factions.
From New Orleans to the Potomac he portrayed with impassioned eloquence the dangers before his people, and their need for help; nor did he plead in vain, for he spoke to a kindred race who helped with money and munitions of war. His mission to the states kept him from San Jacinto, but the help he secured made San Jacinto possible.
San Jacinto was won, and its hero, General Sam Houston, was then elected over Austin as President of the republic in 1836, for the soldiers, flushed with victory, espoused the cause of their victorious leader. History thus repeated itself. The great author of the American declaration of independence, the greatest diplomat and statesman of them all, and the wise leaders who formed the constitution, had all to bide their time for the presidency until Washington, the military leader, had been honored.
The contest between the partisans of General Houston and those of Austin was a bitter one, but it was followed by a close friendship and alliance between those leaders under circumstances that illustrate the greatness of both men. When Houston was elected he had only San Jacinto and Santa Anna—nothing more! No military chest, no credit, no stable government, no recognition amongst the nations, no navy, no army and no means of supporting one. Then knowing what perils were before him and looking all over Texas for some statesman to aid him, he chose Austin above all others for his high intelligence and patriotism, and asked him if he would ignore the bitterness of the late contest and become his chief advisor as secretary of state. That single act lifts Houston above the plane of the ordinary statesman and marks him as a patriot and a great man; and he was appealing to a great man, for with Austin, ambition, resentment and offices were all as “wafted dust on the balances,” when Texas needed him, and he went at once to Houston's side as secretary of state. It was a noble sacrifice of pride to duty, and history records few others like it in the careers of public men. How noble was it in Houston to bow his crest before his defeated antagonist and by supplicating his aid in the most important duty before him, announce thus to his own followers that Austin was a greater man than any of them! If that thing had happened in this era of machine politics, Houston would have been denounced as ungrateful to his own partisans, and Austin as a servile sycophant. But in the light of history, their names shine like twin stars seen between sifted clouds at midnight. What an object lesson to those who, regardless of public interest, can see no virtue in a partisan opponent, and bestow favors only on the parasites who elevate them!
Never until the lamented Garrison published the diplomatic correspondence of the Republic of Texas did this generation know the great ability of Austin as a diplomat. He armed Wharton, our envoy at Washington, with convincing arguments not only for a recognition of independence, but for annexation to the Union. But there was to be no cringing supplication, for he made it plain that when Texas entered the Union it must be as a coequal sovereign, retaining full ownership of all her territory, and that it should remain as the constitution adopted eight months before had dedicated it—one-half for the people and the other half for the education of their posterity forever. That was the first keynote to all the future policy of Texas, which has kept her one and undivided from the Sabine to the Rio Grande and from the Panhandle to the gulf.
To speak of this man in the language of undeserved eulogy, would be unjust to him and his own memory would condemn it; yet we can truly affirm that such was his intellectual organism, his self-poise amid difficulties, and the purity of his private life, that few men in ancient or modern times have equaled him. I have examined his public and private correspondence now in our State University, and for years I enjoyed the friendship of his trusted friend and companion, Colonel Frank Johnson, who loved and almost idolized him. His colonists loved him as their friend and benefactor. They named their children for him, and their families rejoiced when he came. He had a welcome in every cabin—and he who never knew the comforts of home with wife and children of his own, lavished the affections of his noble nature on the children of his colonists. The purity of his life, which was revealed in his face, softened his habitual dignity, and deprived it of austerity. No ambitious warrior was he, animated by a love of conquest—he struck only in defense of home—no knight-errant, seeking fame through adventure; his greatest triumph was in the promotion of peace; no visionary dreamer intent to accomplish the impossible; his well-balanced mind measured in advance all difficulties, and they vanished before his energy.
General Sam Houston in his last great speech in the United States Senate, said:
Stephen F. Austin was the father of Texas. This is the designation justly accorded to him, as will be testified to by every man who is acquainted with the primitive history of Texas or its progress as long as he lived. Stephen F. Austin is entitled to that honor. It is due to his friends, to whom his memory is most dear and sacred. Sir, posterity will never know the worth of Stephen F. Austin—the privations he endured—the enterprise he possessed—his undying zeal, his ardent devotion to Texas and its interests and his future hopes connected with its glorious destiny.
General Mirabeau Lamar said:
The claims of General Austin upon the affections of the people of Texas are of the strongest kind. He was not only the founder of our republic, but scarcely a blessing has flowed to our country which might not be fairly attributed to his unwearied exertion for its welfare, whilst almost every calamity which has befallen it might have been averted by an adherence to his wise and prudent counsels.
The late Hon. Guy M. Bryan said of him:
The world has offered but few examples of superior intelligence and sagacity; and as for disinterestedness and intelligent philanthropy, his long-suffering for the weal of others, his patient endurance under persecution, his benevolent forgiveness of injuries and his final sacrifice of health, happiness and life in the service of his country, all conspire to place him without a rival among the first patriots and the best of men.
Such was the estimate of all men of that day, for on the 18th of October, 1839, while his memory was yet fresh in the minds of men, it was toasted, standing, and in silence, at the first banquet ever given in this city, on the day when the archives of the government were first brought here. Lamar, then President of the republic; Burleson, the shield of the frontier, and James G. Swisher, who was a captain at San Jacinto, and who fought with the forlorn hope at the capture of San Antonio in 1835, were among the guests. They drank to the memory of Austin in these words: “Whatever may be the pretensions of others, Stephen F. Austin will always be considered as the father of Texas.”
Austin, in writing to General Gaines of the United States army in 1836, said: “The prosperity of Texas has been the object of my labors, the idol of my existence; it has assumed the character of a religion for the guidance of my thoughts and actions for fifteen years, superior to all pecuniary or personal views.”
In a cold room he was writing for two days and nights his final instructions to the Texas envoy to Washington, but the labor was too much for the frail victim of a Mexican dungeon. On the 27th of December, 1836, while the Christian world was rejoicing over the advent of a Redeemer, Austin breathed his last. His dying thoughts were of Texas. In his delirium he said: “Independence is acknowledged—it is in the papers,—Dr. Archer told me so,” and then the pale messenger with inverted torch touched him, and he returned to the bosom of his God.
Every flag in the republic went to half mast, and when the papers announced that the “father of Texas is no more,” all knew who had died. President Houston and Lamar, with the heads of department, bore him to the grave, and Houston, sorrowing for a great loss to the republic, sprinkled the first dust on his coffin.
Thus his life was sacrificed on the altar of duty.
And now we will place the remains of the great patriot near the monuments of those whom he loved, and who helped him make this mighty state—Colonel Frank Johnson, his companion and friend; General Hardeman, who, when a boy, followed him, rifle in hand; Guy Bryan, his nephew, who in childhood climbed his knee and loved him; Wallace, his trusted scout; Albert Sidney Johnston, Burleson, Scurry, Frank Lubbock, and Hugh McLeod will sleep by his side, and near them Hemphill and Lipscomb! What a group of immortals will surround him!
It is not given us to know what the Great Power behind all visible phenomena did with the soul when it left its final casket; we can only hope that it found a better home. Earth and sky, the voices of nature, its harmonies and beauties, all proclaim that God is good, and that He did not plant this universal hope for immortality through tantalizing caprice. He who provides food for the hungry body, will somewhere, somehow, at some time satisfy the soul that hungers after immortality. If this hope is a vain dream, and the spirit of man is annihilated by death, like the flame of a candle blown out, then life is a tragedy so full of disappointment that he who dreads to die should fear to live. No! No! If the revolving wheel of time and change destroys no atom in all this world, how can the quick spirit of man, which is king over all, perish? Never. The strong and subtle energies of the soul will find full development beyond this transitory existence, and amid the prophetic splendors of an eternal dawn.
1. The Condition of the Problem.—A statement as to the conditions under which this paper was written is pertinent here. One has only to glance over the works in English which deal with the general history of Texas to note the absence of information bearing upon the subject which I have endeavored to treat. The standard histories of Texas give only isolated references here and there to Apache relations in Texas between 1718 and 1750. Indeed, so scanty are their accounts on this point that they may be entirely ignored. Of monographic discussions of the subject, there are none.5 Although ethnologists have written more or less of the Apaches and their various subdivisions, very little pertaining to the period and region covered by this paper has been produced.6 The reason for such a paucity of information on the subject in English works is that the material from which a history of this topic can alone be constructed has been buried hitherto in manuscripts written in a foreign language and preserved, for the larger part, in foreign archives.
Of Spanish works, only two are important for the subject. Antonio Bonilla, in his Breve Compendio, which has only recently been printed, gives a brief outline of Apache hostilities in Texas;7 and Arricivita, in his Crónica Apostólica y Seráfica (México, 1791), gives a considerable amount of information concerning the efforts of the Franciscans to reduce the Apaches of Texas to mission life. Indeed, he is practically the only one who has written anything upon this phase of the subject. In most respects, however, Arricivita emphasizes the history, if at all, from the standpoint of the missionary, to whose side he naturally inclines. At several points, nevertheless, both authors have been useful in supplementing the documents which I have used.8
Having practically nothing in print to guide me, I have had to rely almost entirely upon manuscript sources. The information herein presented has been gathered from a wide range of documents, whose originals are in the Archivo General y Público of Mexico, the archives of the College of Santa Cruz de Querétaro and of Guadalupe de Zacatecas, the state archive of Coahuila at Saltillo, the Béxar and Nacogdoches archives at Austin, Texas, the San Antonio mission records, and in other miscellaneous repositories.9
2. The Aim of This Paper.—The primary aim in writing this paper was to prepare an introduction to the history of the Franciscan missions established for the Apache Indians in the middle of the eighteenth century on the San Sabá and Nueces rivers of western Texas. To understand these missionary activities it scemed necessary to examine carefully the previous relations between the eastern Apache Indians and their Spanish neighbors. Coupled with this motive was the consideration that Apache relations, though forming a large factor in the history of Spanish colonization in western and central Texas, have been all but unknown. This consideration has seemed to justify, in this first special treatment of the subject, what may be regarded as a painful amount of detail. Since the ethnology of the eastern Apaches has been as little known as their early relations with the Spaniards, some effort has been made in the course of the study, to gather and combine what could be learned concerning their early organization and customs.10
3. Spanish Activities in Texas Before 1718.—Spanish interest in Texas began in the early sixteenth century. The description of the country given by Cabeza de Vaca and his companions in 1536 gave rise to many exploring expeditions in which Texas figured to a greater or lesser degree, but it was not until a century and a half later that definite steps were taken to occupy this region.
Fear of French aggression, a desire to open up a short route between Havana and New Mexico by way of the Bay of Espíritu Santo, and the missionary zeal of the Spanish friars led to the sending of an expedition in 1689 under Captain Alonzo de León, who found La Salle's fort and explored the Bay of Espíritu Santo. In 1690 a second expedition was led by De León. The French fort was now destroyed, and a mission was established near the Neches among the Hasinai, or Texas, Indians. A few months later a second mission was founded in the same locality.
To strengthen these missions by the erection of others, to investigate rumors of French settlements, and to secure a hold in the Cadodacho country, Don Domingo Terán de los Ríos was sent out in 1691. But his expedition was a comparative failure, and two years later the missions already established were abandoned.
It has been generally believed that the Spaniards gave little thought to Texas from the time of the abandonment of the missions in 1693 until Saint Denis's expedition in 1714. But recent investigations and many documents now available show that such is not the case. During all these years there was a steady advance of missionary work northward from Coahuila. In the years 1699-1701 the missions of San Juan Bautista, San Bernardo, and San Francisco Solano were established on the Rio Grande, and ministered to the Indians living north of that stream. About 1703 Father Hidalgo began his long-continued effort to get aid in reestablishing the missions among the Hasinai. In 1707 an attempt was made to advance the mission frontier to the Rio Frio, and in the same year Diego Ramón made an expedition to the Colorado. Two years later Fathers Espinosa and Olivares went with a party of soldiers to the Colorado, where they expected to meet the Hasinai Indians and to arrange for reducing them to mission life. During this period many of the Indians who were served at the Rio Grande missions came from the region of San Antonio. Thus, viewed from the missionary's standpoint, the establishment of a mission at San Antonio in 1718 was not a sudden advance, but merely the next logical step in the expansion of the Coahuila mission frontier.11
In 1714 Saint Denis made his overland journey into Spanish territory, which aroused the civil authorities to renewed activities, and Captain Domingo Ramón was now appointed to lead an expedition to refound the missions of eastern Texas. In the years 1716-1717 six missions and a presidio were erected under his direction between the Neches and Red rivers, and thus the Spaniards put forward an incontrovertible claim to the possession of Texas—that of actual occupation.
By this action French advance was guarded against on the Louisiana frontier. But in 1718 New Orleans was founded, and orders were given by the French for the reoccupation of the Bay of Espíritu Santo. In the same year San Antonio was founded by the Spaniards, in part as an answer to this French activity on the Gulf and in part to extend missionary work among the Coahuiltecan tribes. And thus the most important center in the history of Spanish Texas began to play a part in the life of the province.12
4. The “Apaches de Oriente.”—As has already been pointed out, the early history of the western Texas settlements, of which San Antonio was the center, is, in a very large measure, a history of relations with the Apache Indians who lived to the west and northwest. The Apaches are a branch of the Athapascan family, the most widely distributed of the North American Indian linguistic groups. The Athapascans are classified by ethnologists into three divisions, Northern, Pacific, and Southern, and the Southern is subdivied into the Navajo of New Mexico, the “Apaches,” a group of tribes called by this name, and surrounding the Navajo, and the Texas Apaches, or Lipanes. The designation “Apache” probably came from ápachu, “enemy,” the Zuñi name for the Navajos, who were called by the early Spaniards “Apaches de Nabaju.”13
Most of the information hitherto at hand concerning the Texas Apaches relates to comparatively recent times, and there has been a lack of definite knowledge of them during the early Spanish period. The period is dark enough even now, but many new facts of general importance have been gleaned during the course of the present study, and some of them may be summarized here, out of the chronological order of the narrative, by way of introduction. The details will be made to appear in the historical order in which they became known and differentiated.
The Spaniards of the latter eighteenth century, when information was relatively complete, distinguished between the “Apaches de Occidente,” or Western Apaches, and the “Apaches de Oriente,” or Eastern Apaches, the latter being the ones with which this paper deals. The principal tribes of the Eastern Apaches known at that time were the Lipan (Ypande), Natagés (sometimes called Apaches proper), and the Mescaleros.14 In the period covered by this paper (1718-1750) the tribes chiefly known in Texas were the Lipan and the Natagés, especially the former. They went under various names, and various subdivisions were sometimes distinguished. But in the early part of the period the Texas documents make no distinction, as later was the case, between the different Apache bands, but all are included under the generic name of “Apaches.” The Lipan, when first known to the Texans, lived far to the northwest of San Antonio, on the upper reaches of the Colorado, Brazos, and Red rivers, but gradually they moved south before the advancing Comanches, until by 1732 they made their home in the country of the San Sabá, Chanas (Llano), and Pedernales. About 1750 some of them established themselves on the Medina, and others pushed on to the Rio Grande. The Natagés and the Mescaleros lived far to the southwestward, in the country of the Pecos and the Rio Grande. These Eastern Apaches were not numerous, but were led by petty chiefs, which made it difficult to deal with the tribes as wholes. And in proportion to their numerical strength, their capacity to make trouble was surprisingly great. During this period they apparently did not use firearms, but fought, on horseback, with bows, spears, and darts, and had armor for both man and horse.
1. Apache Relations in Texas Before 1718.—The Apaches were well known in New Mexico at a very early date. Before the establishment of Texas they pestered the frontiers of Nueva Viscaya and Coahuila, and no sooner had the Spaniards founded San Antonio than it experienced similar visitations. In his diary of 1691, Father Massanet made the following statement concerning the Apaches, which is a good summary of knowledge of them in Texas at this time. He says, “The Apaches form a chain running from east to west, and wage war with all; with the Salineros alone do they maintain peace. They have always had wars with the Spaniards of New Mexico, for, although truces have been made, they have endured little. In the end they conquer all the tribes; yet it is said that they are not brave because they fight with armoured horses. They have defensive and offensive weapons, and are very skillful and warlike Indians.”15
Before the establishment of San Antonio the Spaniards of eastern Texas had come into contact with the Apaches through the wars which the latter waged with their inveterate foes, the “Texas.” The part of the Spaniards in these wars was, no doubt, one of the causes for the attacks which were subsequently made on San Antonio. All of the tribes east of the middle Colorado were allied against the Apaches, and many bloody encounters took place between the two groups. From the time of the first Spanish entry into their country, the “Texas” Indians enlisted the aid of the soldiers, just as a few years before they had enlisted a part of Joutel's men.16 Hidalgo tells us that in August, 1692, the soldiers joined the Texas in a campaign against the Apaches, going west-ward until the land of the enemy was reached. While the invaders were sleeping peacefully one night the Apaches attacked them, and, says our informant, had it not been for the firearms of the Spaniards, not one of them would have returned home.17 On another campaign of this early period the Texans, with the aid of the Spaniards, are said to have won a great victory over the Apaches, killing one hundred and thirty-six of their number.18 Joseph de Urrutia, the romantic character who remained in Texas after the abandonment in 1693, says, with probable exaggeration, that he lived among the Texas tribes for seven years and organized them for campaigns against the Apaches, acting in the capacity of capitán grande, and often leading more than 10,000 warriors against the common foe.19
Thus it seems that the Spaniards of Texas were first known to the Apaches in the light of foes, and that early relations between them were confined to hostile acts.20
2. Raids About San Antonio and Flores's Campaign, (1718-1723).—Had the Spaniards refused to give aid to the Texas, they might have been spared, possibly, a great deal of trouble, but at the outset they had definitely put themselves on record as enemies of the Apaches, and the latter did not forget it. The Apache terror overshadows Spanish Texas from the founding of San Antonio.
In the instructions given to Governor Alarcon, in 1718, for the planting of this new outpost, he was cautioned to be on his guard against the Apaches, and was told to organize the neighboring tribes in a defensive alliance against them, as there was much danger of attack from this “barbarous enemy.”21 These fears were quickly realized, for as soon as the Apaches learned of the establishment of Béxar they began to harass it. Before the Marqués de Aguayo had made his expedition into Texas in 1721-2,22 they had already become so bold as to attack the supply trains from Coahuila to San Antonio, stealing mules and killing the drivers.23 Aguayo fully realized the danger. In 1720 he had endeavored from Coahuila to secure peace with the Apaches, but they would make no concessions. Instead they brazenly declared their hostile intentions by hanging red cloth from arrows stuck in the ground near San Antonio.24 While Aguayo was on his way from Monclova to Texas, in 1721, his men had a skirmish just before reaching San Antonio with some Indians whom they supposed to be Apaches. Two days before his arrival there a pack train had been attacked. In consequence, several detachments were sent out from San Antonio for the purpose of checking these hostilities.25
Nevertheless, Aguayo's policy was one of conciliation. He wished to make friends of the Apaches, and as he journeyed from San Antonio to eastern Texas he erected several crosses, in order, as he said, “to exalt the cross in the midst of so much idolatry, and to leave signs of peace to the Apaches Indians, who consider them as such and know from them that Spaniards have been there.”26 No Apaches were encountered by Aguayo himself, however, and in this he was disappointed, for his plan was to take some of them prisoners and bring about peace through their mediation.27
When Aguayo reached Los Adaes he learned that Fray Joseph Pita, a lay brother of the College of the Santa Cruz de Querétaro, had been killed a short time previous while en route to East Texas. The friar had ventured forth to hunt buffalo without the protection of the soldiers, and Indians, said to be Apaches, killed him between the San Xavier and the Brazos rivers. His remains were found in 1723, as we shall see, and were taken to San Antonio by Captain Nicolás Flores.28
After Aguayo's return to Coahuila in 1722, the Apaches continued to steal horses, and on one occasion five Indians managed to make off with fifty of them. Captain Flores, with ten men, gave chase to the thieves, recovered the horses, and took back to San Antonio the heads of four of the offenders, together with some spears and some skin armor used to protect the horses of the Indians.29 Shortly after this, in April, 1722, Flores was given command of the presidio,30 and with his office he inherited the Apache trouble.
After Flores succeeded to the command of the presidio such was his vigilance, he said, that no horses were stolen from Béxar until August 17, 1723.31 Upon this date, however, a band of Apaches made a raid upon the stock of the presidio. In spite of the fact that the corral was locked and that ten soldiers guarded the gates, the Indians broke in and carried off eighty horses. Captain Flores was notified, and, although it was midnight, set out in pursuit. After a vain chase that lasted until noon of the following day, he decided to return to the presidio for reinforcements. Two days later he again set out with a force of thirty soldiers, including eight from Bahía, and thirty mission Indians, to follow the trail of the Apaches. He carried only two pack loads of flour, and relied for meat upon buffalo and deer. In five days he passed the Lomería, or range of hills, to the north, and on September 24, thirty-six days after leaving San Antonio, and after having traveled one hundred and thirty leagues, he came upon a ranchería of two hundred Apaches, constituting one of the five bands into which the enemy had divided, who sallied forth to meet him. A six hours' battle ensued, according to the report, in which the Spaniards were victorious, thirty-four Indians, including their chief, being killed, and twenty women and children taken captives. About one hundred and twenty horses and mules were recovered, together with a quantity of plunder, consisting of saddles, bridles, knives, spears, and other articles which had been stolen by the Indians. Of the Spaniards, three, including Captain Flores, were slightly wounded, and one Indian was hurt. The return to San Antonio was made in nineteen days.32
The fact that they went northward five days before entering the Lomería, and that they returned by way of the San Xavier (San Gabriel)33, where Father Pita's remains were found, would indicate a generally northward direction for the campaign. Since they were nineteen days returning and traveled one hundred and thirty leagues, the air-line distance from San Antonio could hardly have been less than two hundred miles. This would put the place where the battle occurred somewhere in the region of Brownwood, perhaps.
The foregoing account of Flores's campaign is based on the official report made by Flores to the Marqués de Aguayo, supplemented by the other accounts in so far as they do not conflict. Conflicting statements are not wanting, however. Indeed, in a later report by Flores himself we find slight discrepancies in the figures, as well as additional details. According to Fray Joseph González, missionary in Valero, who, be it noted, was not present at the battle, Flores attacked an innocent band of Apaches “behind their backs,” and killed and captured his victims while they were trying to escape. González's statement was corroborated by four soldiers of Béxar, who made a declaration containing some additional facts.34
These differing and conflicting accounts of the expedition indicate in part the dissensions which were so prevalent at this time between the missionaries and the soldiers, with their respective sympathizers, and, as will be seen presently, Flores's campaign, together with the consequences resulting therefrom, served only to increase the discord.
3. Peace Negotiations.--One important result of the campaign was to open up the way for negotiations looking to a treaty of peace with the Apaches. It had been Aguayo's idea to treat with them through captives, and it is not unlikely that Flores was acting upon the advice of his patron. Although at this time the chief object of imprisoning the Apache women and children seems to have been to bring the Indians to terms of peace, yet we can see here early hints of that Spanish custom of enslaving the Apaches which became so prevalent in Texas some years later, for Flores was charged with wishing to retain the captives as servants rather than to use them as hostages.35
Among the captives taken by Flores was a woman about forty years old, whom the captain questioned through an interpreter. He inquired the motive for the hostility of the Apaches towards the Spaniards at San Antonio and their reasons for stealing horses. She replied that it was because of the trade which the Apaches maintained with “other Spaniards” to the north, to whom they sold horses and slaves.36
This statement was to the Spaniards a confirmation of their suspicions in regard to the French, for it was assumed that these “other Spaniards” could be none other than Frenchmen who were manipulating the Apaches for their own benefit. The French had been a source of anxiety to the Spanish ever since La Salle had established his ill-fated colony at the Bay of Espíritu Santo, and it was still feared that they might try some day to wrest from Spain her northern territory. This fear had a direct influence upon relations with the Apaches, as it had upon most of their Indian relations in Texas, during the eighteenth century, and in Flores's negotiations for peace we can see the germs of a policy of alliance with the Apaches which finally, after many ins and outs, resulted in the establishment of missions for them. The Spaniards wished, among other things, to use the Apaches as a bulwark against the French and their Indian allies (the Comanches in particular), and to prepare the way for the development of trade between New Mexico, Espíritu Santo, and eastern Texas, and so strengthen Spanish hold upon that vast territory.37
Upon further examination, the captive squaw said that the Apache chiefs were anxious to be friends with the Spaniards. Hereupon Flores agreed to dispatch her as an ambassador to her people, and promised to release the prisoners if the chiefs would come and make peace. She consented to carry the proposal to the capitán grande (head chief) of her people, and promised to return in twenty days. A horse was given her, as well as many other gifts, and about October 7 she departed on her mission.38
Within twenty-two days the squaw returned, accompanied by an Apache chief, his wife and three other Apaches. Flores went out to meet them, and the chief Indian gave him a bastón (cane), saying “Dios! Dios!” They were examined by Father González, given presents, and treated in the very best style. The chief reported that as soon as the squaw returned, telling of the friendship of the Spaniards and of their desire to be at peace with the Apaches, couriers were dispatched to the other chiefs to notify them, so that a council might be held to discuss matters. He himself was joined at first by another chief, but later it was decided that only one of them should go, and the other chief gave him a gold-tipped cane (the one he had brought) and told him to go and see if the Indian woman spoke the truth; if it was so, to return and notify the five chiefs so that all of them might go to make peace.
After remaining at the presidio three days, the Indians left on November 1, promising that without doubt the five chiefs would all come to make peace.39 Nevertheless, although prospects seemed so flattering, it was to be a long time before they were realized.
Indeed, very sinister tales were told, to the effect that all of these negotiations were only a ruse on the part of the Apaches to regain their women and children. A Coahuila Indian named Gerónimo who had escaped from the Apaches to San Juan Bautista declared that the Apaches had been very much aroused by Flores's campaign and that they had assembled to march upon San Antonio, when the Indian woman arrived, telling them of what the Spaniards had promised, and that (with characteristic cunning) the Apaches had decided to postpone their plans in order to secure the release of their women and children who were at San Antonio. The capitán grande, Gerónimo's declaration continued, consoled as best he could the disappointed Indians, promising to attack San Antonio after they had secured their relatives.40 This story was confirmed by a Spaniard named Juan Santiago de la Cruz, who likewise had been a prisoner among the Apaches. He said that the Apaches were always eager for war upon the Spaniards, and that when Flores had killed some of their number on his campaign a great many tribes gathered with the intention of attacking San Antonio. But just as they were about to start, the old Indian woman arrived with a message from Flores. Two priests were sent for from another ranchería, and they read the letter, informing the Indians that Flores offered peace.41 The capitán grande now decided to send a chief, accompanied by a few men, with a bastón, to secure the release of the captives, but agreed that as soon as the latter had been given up, a great force should assault the presidio at San Antonio. With this deceitful intent, said the Spaniards, the Apaches were sent to promise peace.42
The Apaches did not return to San Antonio until about two months had passed. In the latter part of December a band of about thirty arrived at the settlement, where they were welcomed by Father González. The Indians were allowed to enter the mission, and González proposed to give up to them the women and children who were being held as prisoners. Flores, however, would not hear to this, and refused to release the hostages until all the chiefs should agree to make peace. González argued that they would probably not care to come until they should be convinced of the good intentions of the Spaniards. But Flores was firm in his decision, and the discussion waxed furious. The Indians finally took fright thereat and departed, leaving a twelve-year-old girl as an additional hostage and promising that as soon as the cold weather should be over four of their chiefs would come and make peace, but asserting that the fifth one did not wish to be the friend of the Spaniards.43
4. The Removal and Restoration of Captain Flores.—This occurrence had opened anew the quarrel between Flores and González, and the missionary began to do all in his power to secure the removal of the soldier.
In consequence of reports that Flores had allowed the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar to deteriorate, the viceroy in a letter of October 3, 1723, had warned him to be more diligent in the service of the king, and suggested that if his soldiers had been properly equipped and the presidio in good condition the Apaches would not have succeeded in stealing the eighty horses. Apparently this was a great surprise to Flores, for he claimed that he had been especially diligent in pursuing the raiding Indians, and recovering the only horses that had been stolen from the presidio during his term.44
Evidently with the view of justifying himself, on January 9, 1724, Flores appealed to González to make a statement concerning the condition of the presidio and to certify as to his (Flores's) prompt action in recovering the stolen horses.45 Flores was too late, however, for before the end of November, González, through the guardian of his college, had complained to the viceroy of Flores's conduct.46 Now, upon Flores's appeal, González took advantage of a new opportunity to complain of the captain's impolitic conduct in regard to the Apaches. He stated in his declaration that the Apaches had been grievously offended by the unwarranted attack upon them, and that the peace which had been so near to consummation had been irretrievably spoiled.47
Father Hidalgo, who was missionary at San Antonio de Valero at this time, and before whom González's declaration was made, supported his brother priest. To the latter's statement he volunteered to add his own opinion. The Apaches, he said, could have been converted long before if the presidios had been managed rightly. He thought that the poor pay of the soldiers was responsible for the class of men who usually enlisted, and that their bad habits caused the loss, not only of their own souls, but of those of the Indians as well. “Now, again,” he continued, “the captain of this presidio has disturbed the so greatly desired peace by not releasing the children of the Apaches.”48
González's opposition to Flores culminated in an effort to have him removed from his command. On March 18, 1724, he wrote to the viceroy complaining that the bad condition of the presidio was the cause of the failure to reap great harvests of souls. Since the French were anxious to ally with the Apaches, this bad state of affairs, he said, might mean ruin for the Spaniards. He told of the attack upon the corral, the stealing of the horses, the pursuit by Flores, the defeat of the Indians, the taking of the captives, and Flores's subsequent refusal to release them to their people. Finally, the priest declared, in order to repair the damage which had been done, it would be necessary that Flores be removed from his office as captain, not only because of his unchristian conduct toward the Apaches, but also because of his scandalous actions and bad example in general. As a successor to Flores, González proposed Mateo Pérez, a private soldier of the presidio of the Rio Grande.49
González also suggested a remedy for the unwise policy of Flores. It was to form a company of seventy men from the various presidios, led by Father González himself, and by going to the land of the Apaches, treating the Indians kindly, giving them back their wives and children, and bestowing upon them some presents, thus again secure peace. It was the policy of the olive branch and the sword.50
Whether or not this letter of González was the cause of the removal of Flores is uncertain. At any rate, on April 6, 1724, Flores received an order from the viceroy commanding him to give up the command of the presidio to Mateo Pérez, just as González had suggested, and to retire one hundred leagues from the “province of Texas.”51
Flores obeyed the order, and Pérez took charge in June. This did not mean, however, that the matter was settled. On the contrary, Flores began at once to exert himself to regain his command. He made a personal plea to the viceroy, giving his account of the raid and the fight with the Apaches, and furnishing testimonials from the Marqués de Aguayo and from other persons concerning his good conduct and ability. In his own defense, Flores said that he had recovered the only horses that had been stolen during his term of office, and that the presidio was in good condition, with the requisite number of competent soldiers, contrary to what González had charged. As to the latter's statement about the coming of the Apaches to seek peace, Flores said that the priest did not know what he was talking about; that the Apaches had never wished peace, but that a few of them had come to San Antonio in order to see if they could not cajole the Spaniards into giving up the captives. Flores said that he had recognized their duplicity, and had refused to treat with them unless all of their chiefs should come. These statements he substantiated by the declaration of the Spaniard, Juan Santiago de la Cruz, to the effect that the Apaches intended to raid and destroy San Antonio after they had recovered their kinspeople. Finally, Flores asked that, in recognition of his many services and on account of his family, he be restored to his command.52
To prove his good record in the service of the king, Flores enclosed a number of testimonials. One of these was from no less a personage than Fray Antonio Margil de Jesús, guardian of the College of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de Zacatecas. He stated that Flores had always gallantly and zealously served the king, and that he was worthy, not only to be restored to his command, but even to be promoted to the highest office in the province of Texas.53
The Marqués de Aguayo, in his testimonial, praised Flores very highly, and, indeed, it is from him that we learn most of the facts concerning Flores's career, as given above. He also defended Flores against the attacks made upon him by Hidalgo, whose charges, he said, were mere repetitions of those made by González.54 To offset Hidalgo's opinion, Aguayo maintained that Hidalgo was a man easily influenced, and that Father Sevillano, who also opposed Flores, was of somewhat the same nature. As to González himself, Aguayo believed that he had purposely misstated things to the discredit of Flores, and cited Flores's letters as proof. He said that Mateo Pérez had been recommended so that González could keep him under his control and so shape the affairs of San Antonio.55 Furthermore, Aguayo added, González was known to be of a turbulent disposition, as was admitted by his own college, and one who was always causing trouble.56 It is only fair to state that González and Aguayo had been personal enemies since 1722, when the former charged the latter with defrauding the government. This fact may have colored Aguayo's opinion of González.57 Finally, Aguayo recommended that Flores be restored to the command of the presidio at San Antonio and that all back pay be given him.58
In consequence of Aguayo's intervention, on May 31, 1725, the viceroy ordered that Flores should be restored to his command and that Pérez should return to his service as a private soldier in the presidio of Rio Grande.59 Thus in spite of further efforts that González may have made, Flores won his fight, and for this time, at least, the seculars triumphed over the missionaries.
5. Further Raids and Spanish Conciliation, 1724-1725.—While this controversy had been raging between Flores and González, the Apaches had continued to inflict upon the province their thefts and murders. The assurance given by the Indians who had visited San Antonio in November, 1723, that four of their chiefs would come to make peace did not prove well founded, and after some seven months of quiet the Apaches renewed their raids.60
At about midnight of March 9, 1724, Francisco Minchaca (sic), a soldier of the presidio of Rio Grande del Norte, arrived at San Antonio and reported that his companion, Antonio González, had been killed by Indians about fifteen leagues away. Flores set out at once with ten soldiers, and, reaching the scene of the attack, found the mutilated body of González. Though there were conflicting opinions as to the identity of the malefactors, there were strong indications that they were Apaches.61 On March 14th or 15th, ten Apaches, bearing the Indian captive Gerónimo, stole some horses from the corral of the presidio of San Juan Bautista del Rio Grande. Gerónimo fled to the Spaniards, gave the alarm, and the horses were recovered.62 Again, in April, the Apaches attacked some mission Indians of San Antonio, killing one and wounding another.63 About the same time they killed a Mesquite Indian at El Almagre, took another prisoner, and killed a Paquasian Indian on the upper Medina.64 Early in January of the following year these Paquasian (Paquache) Indians were attacked by the Apaches near the Nueces River. It was hoped by Father Paredes that fear of the Apaches would induce the tribe to enter the San Xavier mission, then almost extinct, at San Antonio. Similarly, some time before January, 1726, the Sanas were attacked by one hundred Apaches and driven from their rancherías.65
Thus we see that there was little cessation of hostilities. On the contrary, as Father Hidalgo said, “little by little the Apaches are showing their claws.”66
In spite of this warlike attitude of the Apaches, however, the Spaniards continued to follow a policy of conciliation. Governor Almazán had reported, on March 24, 1724, the negotiations that had been carried on with the Apaches, and said that up to that time the chiefs had not come to make peace, as they had promised to do.67 On April 25, the viceroy replying to Almazán urged upon him the importance of securing an alliance with the Apache chiefs by gentle means, which, he said, should be easy to do, since the Apaches of New Mexico were friends of the Spaniards.68 Almazán answered that he would carry out these instructions, but that he had little hope of securing any good results, as the Apaches were getting worse every day, and were making life and property unsafe. Nevertheless, he gave orders that if any Apaches should be encountered they should be brought before him so that he might give them presents and dispatch them as messengers to their chiefs, offering friendship and alliance.69
These troublesome questions were referred by the viceroy to the Marqués de Aguayo for his opinion, as an authority on Texas affairs, and in February Aguayo gave his reply. He believed that the Apaches should first be treated with “gentle persuasion”; that another one of the captives at San Antonio should be dispatched with proffers of peace, and that influence should be brought to bear upon the friendly Apaches of New Mexico, in order that they might aid in bringing their kinsmen to terms. But in case the Apaches would not admit any overtures of peace, Aguayo advised that a company of eighty Spaniards and one hundred Indian allies should make an expedition against them, entering their country from New Mexico. He suggested that the necessary soldiers could be secured by taking detachments form the various presidios, and that the “Texas” Indians would be only too glad to get a chance to fight their old enemy. Nevertheless, he thought, the best way to reach the Apaches was through their captive kinsmen, and he advised that this be attempted.70
Aguayo's advice was accepted by the viceroy, and his policy was ordered carried out, with the understanding that even in case the Apaches spurned the proposals of peace, no campaign should be undertaken until due authority was given.71 Thus we see the adoption of a definite policy toward the Apaches, that of conciliation before punishment, which was to continue in force for several years.
The line of division already observed between the missionaries and the seculars in regard to the Apaches was continued. The priests usually defended them and believed in their good intentions, while the civil and military officials, in spite of orders that they be conciliatory, habitually distrusted them. The spirit of the fathers is typified by the petition of Hidalgo, who, on March 18, 1725, asked for permission to go to the land of the Apaches to try to convert them. He wished to be unaccompanied save by a single lay brother, and hoped, by converting the Apaches to the “holy Catholic faith,” to secure the peace of the province.72
6. Information Acquired Concerning the Apaches.—Through their intimate relations with the Apaches, the Spaniards at San Antonio had become very much better acquainted with them, and by 1725 possessed concerning them considerable definite knowledge. From the correspondence of the period thus far covered we can determine the ideas of the soldiers and priests in regard to the location, organization, numbers, and general customs of the Apaches with whom they had been dealing. Up to this time very little distinction, if any, was made between the different Apache tribes, but all were included, as has been stated, under the generic name of “Apaches.” Not only were the Texas Apaches included under this term, but those of New Mexico as well, together, embracing, as they said, a range of more than five hundred leagues.73
a. Location.—It is clear that during this period the Apaches known at San Antonio were living far to the northwest. Domingo Cabello, who was governor of Texas in 1784 and who wrote an historical sketch of the Apaches, says that at the time under consideration they lived along the Rio del Fierro, three hundred leagues “from the province of Texas.” The Rio del Fierro seems to be the Wichita.74 According to Cabello's statement, the Apaches lived in that region until about 1723, when they were defeated by the Comanches, their greatest foes, in a nine days' battle, and forced to seek safety in flight.75 Going southward, they chose as their new home the region between the upper Colorado and Brazos rivers, at a distance of some one hundred and twenty leagues from the “province of Texas.” Even here, says Cabello, they did not feel safe from the attacks of the Comanches, and began to explore the land to the south with the view of moving again in case of necessity.76 Cabello's assertion as to the location of the Apaches is borne out by the various documents of this period. When Flores made his campaign in 1723 he marched for more than a month before reaching the Apachería, going, he tells us, a distance of one hundred and thirty leagues, or perhaps some two hundred and sixty miles, northwest from San Antonio. This agrees substantially with Cabello's statement. The length of time consumed by the woman in her embassy to her people77 indicates that the Apaches were a long distance away. When she departed, on horseback, she said that she would return in twenty days, and she was, in fact, gone twenty-two days.
The range of the Apaches extended much farther south, it is true. During the buffalo season, they were accustomed to move their camps to the southeast, between the middle Colorado and Brazos rivers, where the buffalo were most numerous. They stayed here only temporarily, however, retiring north at the end of the season. There is no ground for Yoakum's statement that on the coming of the Spaniards the Lipan Apaches inhabited the Gulf coast,78 and such an opinion could not be entertained by one who is familiar with the contemporary documents now available. At this time the Apaches did not habitually range below the old San Antonio road. Attention should also be called to the evident error in the map in the Handbook of American Indians, Part I, which shows the Shoshonean stock, clearly referring to the Comanches, when first known to Europeans, as extending in a narrow wedge on both sides of the Colorado to a point below Austin. At this time the Comanches were held north of the Apaches, and as the latter lived a long distance northward from San Antonio, the incorrectness of this portion of the map is readily perceived. The Comanches, in their southward migration, did not reach the Panhandle till about 1700, and it was long after this before they ranged habitually east of the lower Colorado.
b. Tribal Organization.—Through their efforts to obtain peace with the Apaches, the authorities at San Antonio learned something of their tribal organization. The Indians with whom they treated said that they were divided into five tribes (naciones), each of which was governed by his own chief or capitán. All of these chiefs, however, recognized the authority of a head chief (capitán grande), who lived still farther north.79 The squaw sent as a messenger by Flores described the method of the Apaches in making a raid, which illustrates this organization. She said that all of the five chiefs would assemble and furnish about twelve men each for the raid. When these returned, the booty was divided, and all returned to their respective homes. Without the permission of the capitán grande, however, she said, none of the chiefs dared to make an expedition.80 The names of these different bands, for such they evidently were, do not appear at this time. Moreover, the contemporary sources of the period leave us wholly in the dark as to what portion and what branch of the Apaches were being treated of. But there are indications that the principal ones were the branch that later emerged as the Lipan.
c. Numbers.—To the Spaniards at San Antonio the Apaches seemed to be a very numerous people,81 but their number was probably much smaller than was believed. Flores said that in his campaign he fought one of the five rancherías and that about two hundred warriors were engaged. If he was correct in his estimate, the total population of this ranchería could not have been less than eight or nine hundred.
d. Customs.—The equipment of an Apache warrior, the witnesses tell us, was quite elaborate. They possessed many horses, had good saddles with iron stirrups, and used bridles. Their horses were usually protected from the arrows of the enemy by buffalo skins, and the Apaches themselves used skin armor, painted variously blue, red, green, or white. No mention is made of the Apaches having firearms, and it is made to appear that they fought entirely without them. Their arrows were generally tipped with iron, we are told, and they also used a kind of iron dart (chuza) in offensive warfare. Their clothing, as a rule, was of buckskin.82
e. Intertribal Relations.—As has already been stated, the Apaches had long been foes of the Indians living to the east of the middle Colorado river, and never did the Texas Indians go out to hunt buffalo without being in danger of attack from the Apaches, who were also in the same region during the buffalo season. Less worthy foes of the Apaches were the small Coahuiltecan tribes living west of the San Antonio river and south of the Camino Real. Of the Apaches these lived in mortal dread, and we have already mentioned some of the attacks which they withstood.83 One result of Apache hostility toward these smaller tribes of southern Texas had been the formation of what was known as Ranchería Grande, which was composed of many tribes who had banded together to combat the Apaches, and which made its headquarters in the neighborhood of the Brazos.84 From the declaration of the Indian boy, Gerónimo, it may be inferred that with the Jumanes and Tobosos the Apaches maintained friendly relations.85 Indeed, the Jumanes, as will be seen, were included under the term “Apaches.”
1. The Apaches Inactive.—For several years after 1725 the documents available do not indicate that many hostilities were committed by the Apaches. On the contrary, there are indications that they were either holding themselves in reserve, for some unknown reason, or were occupied elsewhere. Thus, on July 4, 1726, Almazán reported that everything was quiet at San Antonio, and that recently the Apaches had made no hostile move.86 Sometime in 1726, it is true, the Apaches were so bold as to try to steal some horses which were being guarded by a mission Indian very near the presidio.87 In 1727 they killed near the same mission a recently converted Indian.88 But these are the only specific instances of violence by them cited by the documentary sources for some four years. It is not improbable that the Apaches made minor raids upon the Spaniards' stock. Indeed, Father Sevillano, writing in November, 1729, remarked, in connection with Apache relations at the mission Valero, that “lately, at every turn, there are tragedies in that mission.”89 But whatever troubles there may have been, they do not appear to have been of sufficient importance to merit special mention.
Yet, although the Apaches were peaceful, the quiet had a somewhat ominous appearance, and the colonists did not forget that the savages were likely to descend upon them at any time. Even the priests did not trust that the peace was permanent, but feared that the Indians might attack the presidio and burn the missions. This fear is voiced by Father Miguel Sevillano de Paredes in his report made in 1727.90
2. Rivera's Recommendations.—In 1727 Don Pedro de Rivera made a general inspection of the Spanish defenses on the frontier, and in his report of 1728 proposed a general reduction of forces in Texas. San Antonio, as well as the establishments in eastern Texas, was to be affected by this policy of retrenchment. Rivera recognized the exposed condition of Béxar and its proximity to the hostile Apaches, but, influenced, no doubt, by their recent comparative quiet, he underestimated the danger from them.91 In consequence, he recommended that the garrison at Béxar be reduced from fifty-three to forty-three soldiers, “since,” as he said, “it has no other enemies in its neighborhood than the Apache Indians, who inhabit the Lomería Grande (big range of hills), which nation is not so large as to cause anxiety to that presidio even though its garrison should be smaller than the one which now protects it.”92 He said that even if the Apaches did commit petty thieveries, through the carelessness of the soldiers, they would soon learn the consequences of their acts and would desist from them.93
3. Effect of the Recommendations.—These ill-advised recommendations at once caused a storm of protest from the missionaries. Father Vergara complained that to take ten men from the presidio of Béxar would mean the ruin of the missions at San Antonio, for the Apaches would soon learn of the reduction in forces, and would be encouraged to renew their hostilities.94
In 1731 the Querétaran missions were removed from eastern Texas, and after several other locations had been projected for them were re-established near San Antonio. The proximity of the Apaches had much to do with determining the sites, for it was deemed dangerous to establish them in any place less protected from that tribe.95 In this same year the population of San Antonio was further increased by the coming of the Canary Islanders. They were not a highly courageous lot, and their fears of the hostile Indians added considerable to the alarm felt at San Antonio. The new colonists, afraid to settle on the lands that had been assigned them some distance away, congregated under the shelter of the presidio.96 Hardly had they become established in their new home when the Apaches awoke from their inaction and began a series of raids more serious than any before experienced from them at San Antonio.
1. Renewed Raids.—The renewed hostilities began with the opening of 1731. On January 9, Fr. Salvador de Amaya and Fr. Francisco Bustamante with a small party, escorted by four soldiers, were attacked by fifty Apaches while on their way from San Antonio to Rio Grande, a woman being killed and a boy carried away into captivity. The rest of the party “miraculously” escaped with their lives.97 No attempt being made to punish this attack, the Apaches grew bolder, and before long entered the mission of San Antonio de Valero and carried away fifty burros.98 At another time they visited one of the new missions during the absence of the priest, and, putting to flight the recently congregated Indians, stole all of the horses there.99 Again, about April 15, it seems, eighty Apaches attacked a squad of soldiers who were conducting horses to the Rio Grande, at the place where the two priests had been assaulted on January 9. The soldiers were ignominously scattered and all of the horses captured.100 Later, on June 25, Fr. Zaes Monge and Fr. Benito de Santa Ana, accompained by five soldiers, were attacked by the Apaches while en route to Rio Grande. Two soldiers were wounded and all of the horses carried off.101 Thus all but the last of these raids occurred between January 9 and April 17, and the priests now cited them as evidence of the insufficiency of the escorts that were assigned them. As a result of their complaints, Rivera, now convinced of the seriousness of the Apache situation, recommended that eight soldiers and a cabo (chief) should be given them on their journeys from Rio Grande to San Antonio.102 At the same time he also recommended that permission be given to the captain of Béxar to punish the Apaches for their repeated crimes, as had been requested by Captain Almazán, for, he said, unless something were done to uphold the honor of the Spanish arms, their outrages would soon pass beyond all bounds.103 But no immediate action was taken to punish the offenders.
After these repeated attacks, there was a lull in the depredations that lasted until the middle of September. But the inhabitants at San Antonio felt anything but secure, and their alarm was materially increased in the first part of August by the capture of an Apache who declared that a great number of his people were assembling in their country preparatory to making a combined attack upon the settlement. This warning was justified, as will be seen from subsequent events.104
2. The Fight at San Antonio, September 18, 1731.—Quiet was broken by a raid on the stock of the presidio at San Antonio on September 18, 1731, at noon, when the Apaches attacked the horse herd (cavallada) and succeeded in stealing about sixty beasts. Don Juan Antonio Pérez de Almazán, who was now captain at Béxar, was at once notified, and, although he was ill at the time, set out immediately in pursuit of the offenders, dispatching a sergeant with five soldiers in advance. When Almazán overtook them, at a distance of about a league from the presidio, he found them engaged in a fight with at least forty Indians, and, as he tells us, had he not arrived at that opportune time all six would have perished.105 They were by no means free from danger with the coming of reinforcements, for the Spaniards did not number more than twenty-five men in all, while, according to Almazán, just as they arrived about five hundred Indians came out from their hiding places, all on horseback and well armed. The combined force now attacked the soldiers with great fierceness, forming their line of battle in the shape of a crescent (media luna), and gradually surrounding the small band. The battle lasted for more than two hours, and two men had been killed and thirteen badly wounded, when the Spaniards decided to dismount at the foot of a tree and sell their lives as dearly as possible, since most of the horses were disabled and some of the wounded soldiers unable to remain in the saddle. The Indians continued drawing the death circle around the Spaniards, who thought that they had only a few moments to live. But suddenly the Indians began to flee, much to the astonishment of the soldiers, for there seemed to be absolutely no reason why they should not have finished the small force and have proceeded to ravage the missions and the presidio, which would have been an easy task, for fourteen soldiers were absent on a mission to Coahuila. Almazán said that it was only by a miracle of Divine Providence that the whole settlement was not exterminated.106
The abandonment of the fight by the Indians was very characteristic of Apache warfare. They usually fought very cautiously, as they could not afford to lose many men, and a warrior was not easily replaced. Knowing that many of their own number would be killed while the Spaniards were being overpowered, and fearing that, in the meantime, reinforcements might come from the presidio, they followed their usual course and fled with the horses they had stolen. On the part of the Spaniards, this encounter is an instance of very plucky fighting, in that a small number held their own against great odds. Their remarkable resistance would have been impossible, however, if the Indians had been provided with firearms, as was the case with the soldiers.107
Three distinct tribes participated in this battle, according to the various statements made. Indeed, now for the first time, in the sources at my command, the contemporary writers distinguish the different bands of their foes. The Apache captive mentioned above,108 being shown the arrows left on the field of battle, declared that they belonged to the Apaches, Pelones, and Jumanes, “all three of which are very numerous in Indians and very warlike.”109 In a petition of the soldiers of the presidio, which will be referred to later, these same tribes were enumerated.110 It is interesting to note that Joseph de Urrutia, writing on July 4, 1733, wondered at this alliance between the Apaches and the Jumanes and Pelones, because, he said, the Apaches were formerly the enemies of these other tribes and would not admit them to their friendship. This alliance with other tribes may indicate that the Apaches were no longer as independent as they had been, and that the Comanches were pressing hard upon them,111 as we know was later the case.
3. Almazán's Report and the Authorization of a Campaign.—Almazán, in reporting these occurrences to the viceroy on December 1, 1731, complained of the lack of forces at the presidio. He said that the number of soldiers was entirely inadequate for the many occupations that were necessary, that much of the time the presidio was left without any defense except for a very few soldiers, and that the missions were exposed to total ruin. He predicted that the outrages of the Apaches would, in the immediate future, increase to such an extent that past ones, although so many, would not be a circumstance compared to those that would follow. Never before, he said, had the Apaches committed so many hostile acts as they had in this year, and such was the terror felt at San Antonio that the soldiers were preparing to remove their families to places of safety.112 He stated that it would be impossible to make the campaign for which permission had been given him before the following year, on account of the lateness of the season and the scarcity of men. He thought that a large force would be necessary, for, he said, one hundred men would have had difficulty merely in holding their own in the fight of September 8, in which only a small portion of the entire Apache nation had participated. Not more than about sixty soldiers, he said, could be secured from all of the presidios of Texas combined, while citizens (vecinos) could with difficulty be prevailed upon to engage in a campaign, because the enslaving of captives had been prohibited, thus leaving no chance for compensation by securing an Indito or Indita.113
Almazán's letter was referred to Rivera, who, apparently, was now in Mexico City, and in consequence he made two recommendations: first, that the presidio of Bahía should be removed to the Medina river, on the San Antonio road, in order to ward off the Apaches in that quarter; and, second, that the campaign be undertaken as he had before advised. Rivera was of the opinion that one hundred and fifty soldiers, reinforced by the Indian allies that could be secured, would be enough to make the expedition, and that this number could be raised from Adaes, Bahía, and Rio Grande. He did not agree with Almazán that a large force would be necessary to punish the Apaches, for, he maintained, the success of a campaign depended not so much upon numbers as upon the efficient control of the men. To support this assertion he cited several successful campaigns made by small forces, mentioning among these Flores's expedition of 1723.114 In regard to captives, Rivera implicitly yielding to Almazán's implied demand, said that great care should be taken to prevent the Indian allies from killing such captives as might be taken, and that to prevent this it would be best to send them to other provinces and bring them up in the Catholic faith.115
On January 6, 1732, the viceroy ordered that Rivera's recommendations for the removal of Bahía and for the campaign against the Apaches should be carried out.116 The first part of the order was never fulfilled.
4. The Campaign of Bustillo y Zevallos, 1732.—It was to Captain Almazán that permission was given to make the campaign, but Governor Mediavilla y Ascona, jealous of his own prestige, perhaps, asked to be allowed to lead the expedition. He did not remain in office long, however, and it fell to the lot of his successor, Don Juan Antonio de Bustillo y Zevallos. This, it would seem, occasioned a bitter quarrel between the two men.117 Affairs dragged along in the usual slow fashion, and it was not until October, 1732, that a start was made. On the 22d of that month, Bustillo, the new governor, set out from San Antonio with a force of one hundred and fifty-seven Spaniards, thirty-two of these being servants, and sixty mission Indians. He carried one hundred and forty pack-loads (cargas) of supplies and had nine hundred horses and mules, some of which were later utilized to good advantage.118 With this large company, Bustillo proceeded to the San Xavier (San Gabriel) river, where he expected to be joined by some Indians of the “Texas” tribes. They did not appear, however, because, it was said, one of their chiefs, who was called El Francés from his devotion to the French, warned his people that the Spaniards wished to lure them from home, kill them, and seize their women and children.119 Bustillo, after waiting in vain for the Texas until November 1, continued his march towards the northwest, apparently following the Little River.120 In order not to be discovered by the Apaches, whose land they soon entered, it was necessary, says Bustillo, to proceed with great caution. Spies were sent ahead, both to the north and to the northwest, but, at first, no signs of Indians were seen. This caused Bustillo to become impatient, and he resolved, as he declares, to find the Apaches even if he had to go clear to New Mexico. He now entered an unknown land, crossed strange rivers, and came into a cold, rough country. The march was exceedingly slow, and at the end of about six weeks Bustillo was, as he said, only about seventy leagues from San Antonio, although his winding course carried him, in actual distance, more than two hundred leagues. He took this roundabout way both to meet the Texas and to avoid being discovered by the Apaches, for, he said, had he gone directly into the Lomería from San Antonio, he would have been seen on the second day.121 On December 8, after mass had been said, an Indian spy named Asencio, who was one of the San Antonio mission Indians, arrived at the camp and reported that the rancherías of the enemy were about ten or twelve leagues away on the banks of the same river which the Spaniards were now following.122 Acting upon this information, Bustillo moved his camp to within about five leagues of the Indians. Here a council of war was called, at which Asencio was the chief witness. He was very badly frightened, and when questioned as to the number of the enemy, replied that he had never seen so many gathered together before in his life.123
In the council it was decided to press on towards the rancherías, and ten Indians were sent ahead as spies. Bustillo left the greater part of the expedition here, and taking one hundred men, at about sunset began his march of some ten miles to the enemy. They traveled all night, with great difficulty, because of the rough ground and their ignorance of the country. In the early morning hours Asencio, who was acting as guide, lost his bearings and did not know which way to take, but after reconnoitering a bit, he returned after daybreak and reported that a ranchería must be nearby, for he had heard the barking of dogs.
Another council was now held. Some were in favor of trying to conceal themselves until the next day, but Bustillo thought it best to attack at once before they should be discovered. At about 8 o'clock (on the morning of the 9th), absolution having been given by the priests, the company set out in two ranks, with Bustillo between them. The rancherías could now be seen at a distance of about half a league, just across the river.
No sooner had the stream been passed than the fighting began. The enemy numbered, the Spaniards believed, more than seven hundred warriors, and included members of four tribes, the Apaches, Ypandis (Lipan), Ysandis, and Chentis. They were in four separate rancherías, covering more than half a league, and their tents numbered more than four hundred. The Indians were well disciplined, and showed extraordinary courage. They were on horseback, and were armed with leather breastplates, which no lance or arrow could penetrate. They waited until the soldiers had discharged their guns, and then closed in with them in a hand-to-hand struggle. These tactics were used repeatedly throughout the battle. As fast as the Indians were killed their bodies were removed by their friends and thrown into the river. Among those who met their fate was a prominent chief, whose death caused much disturbance in the ranks of the Indians. His silver-headed bastón (cane) was taken to Bustillo by the chief of the friendly Pampopas, a mission Indian with the soldiers. The fact that this chief had such a cane indicates that he had maintained friendly relations with the Spaniards at some previous time, or had gotten it from some one who had.
The battle continued for about five hours, but the advantage of the Spaniards' firearms could not be overcome by the Indians, and at about one o'clock they retired, having been entirely driven out of their rancherías. Bustillo estimated the number of Indians killed at two hundred, although he said that it was impossible to know with certainty, for the bodies had been removed as fast as they fell. Only thirty women and children were taken prisoners because most of them had fled upon the approach of the Spaniards. About seven hundred horses124 were recovered and one hundred mule loads of peltry and other plunder captured. Not one Spaniard was killed on the field of battle, though seven were wounded, one of whom died within five days after.125
From the contemporary documents alone, no definite conclusion can be formed as to the exact locality of the place of battle. We only know from them that Bustillo had gone to the San Xavier River, on the edge of the “monte grande” (Eastern Cross Timbers), and that he had thence set out northwest, apparently following the first Brazos, or Little River.126 We are also told that “strange rivers” were crossed on the way, and that the Indian camp was about seventy leagues from San Antonio, in a very rough country, with a river running near the ranchería.127 With this meager information, the location might be assigned to various regions somewhat wide apart. Fortunately, however, later documents throw additional light upon the matter. In an investigation held at Los Adaes in 1756 for the purpose of obtaining evidence as to Texas's right to exercise jurisdiction over the San Sabá country, testimony is given showing that Bustillo's campaign took him to the San Sabá region. Five witnesses testified to the effect that they had accompanied Bustillo on the campaign, and that the battle had occurred on the San Sabá river; two said that they had afterwards been to the San Sabá river, and had been shown the battlefield; and two declared that they had heard it said and that it was generally known that they had gone to the San Sabá.128 This testimony, it would seem, should be given due credence. It shows that the Apaches were now considerably south of the country in which Flores had found them in 1723.129
After the Indians had fled, a council of war was held, and it was decided to return to the main camp where the rest of the force had been left, since the enemies, as it was said, although defeated, still had many good warriors and might attack the camp, while the Spaniards would be at a disadvantage because of their ignorance of the country. Fifty men were detailed as a rear guard. No sooner had the return march commenced, than the Apaches began to harass them. At one time an ambuscade was laid for the Indians, and this checked them somewhat. At about eight o'clock that night the camp was reached. The next day dawned upon various bands of Apaches looking down from neighboring hills, but because of the roughness of the country and the river which intervened they could do no damage. They continued to trouble the expedition, however, during the return to San Antonio, stealing horses whenever an opportunity was presented. The company reached Béxar on December 22, just two months after their departure. The return trip was made in fifteen days, while six weeks had been spent in going.130 This indicates the extreme caution with which they had proceeded, and the comparative haste they made in getting back, for it must be remembered that they had about fifteen hundred horses to impede them.
5. Efforts to Obtain Peace.—During the absence of the soldiers other bands of Apaches had raided the stock at San Antonio, and when the governor returned various petitions were made asking him not to distribute the captives, but to hold them as a means of making peace with the Apaches. To this effect they recommended that one or two of the captured women be sent as messengers to ask for peace or, if this plan should not be adopted, that another campaign be made against them with a force of three hundred men. If peace could not be secured by one means or the other, they said, it would be impossible to live in San Antonio.131
This petition was seconded by Fray Gabriel de Vergara, president of the missions of San Antonio and minister in that of Concepción de Acuña, who added the weight of his influence towards inducing the governor to send the two Indian women as messengers to their people, and to retain the rest of the captives as hostages, in order to facilitate the reconciliation. Vergara emphasized the exposed condition of the missions and of the settlement as long as the Apaches should be enemies of the Spaniards, and called attention to the danger that the English or the French would make them their allies. He believed, he said, that the Apaches would make good citizens if reduced to politic life.132
In consequence of these petitions, Bustillo, on January 4, 1733, dispatched two squaws, one an Apache and the other of the “Ypandis alias Pelones” tribe. They bore letters for their chiefs, and were supplied with horses and provisions for their journey. A sergeant and nineteen soldiers, with a priest, escorted them as far as the San Hibón River (Guadalupe), and took leave of them very hopefully and joyfully.133
One of Fray Vergara's aims in trying to secure peace is seen in his letter of January 31, 1733. On that day he wrote to the viceroy asking that attention be given to the establishment of missions for the Apaches. He referred to the good nature and truthfulness of the captives taken in the last campaign and said that it would be a “sad thing that such a multitude of souls should be eternal dwellers in the infernal caverns, because of the lack of the gospel,” especially, he continued, when there were so many priests in New Spain ready to preach to them. He again expressed his conviction that the Apaches, if reduced, would form most flourishing missions, because of the numerous and desirable people, and of the water, lands, and other conveniences offered.134
On the same date Bustillo wrote his report of the campaign enclosing the petitions and letters mentioned above.135 But just as the courier was about to leave for Mexico, smoke was seen in the distance, and as this was the signal which had been agreed upon, the letters were held back in order to report the outcome of the embassy. Two days later one of the squaws, accompanied by three warriors, arrived at Béxar. One of the men, who seemed to be an Indian of distinction, stated that he had been sent by his chief, the head of the Apache tribe, to see if the women had told the truth about the Spaniards wishing to establish friendly relations with them. The capitán grande himself, he said, was assembling his people in order that all might concur in the peace, and four chiefs would soon come with many people to conclude the negotiations. He declared that there were thirty-seven tribes along the road to New Mexico bearing the name Apache. The Indians were very much pleased, they claimed, with their kind reception and the prospect of peace, wishing to return at once and notify their chief. Bustillo detained them three days, however, feasting and regaling them, and it was not until the 5th that they set out, promising to return within two moons.136
On November 26, 1732, the viceroy had asked why the Apaches always succeeded in their attacks upon San Antonio, while no other Texas presidio was troubled by them.137 In answer to this, Captain Almazán made a statement before Bustillo on January 31, 1733, for transmission to the viceroy. He explained that the Apaches confined their raids almost entirely to the presidio of Béxar because of its proximity to their homes, and that they did not trouble Adaes or Bahía because of the distance to be traversed and the hostile Indians who intervened. Not only were the Apaches hostile to San Antonio, he said, but recently two other tribes, the Yxandi and the Chenti, had joined them. These tribes, Almazán stated, were now heard of at Béxar for the first time.138 Governor Bustillo corroborated Almazán's statement, and showed that the exposed condition of San Antonio was the explanation for the attacks made upon it.139
1. Apache Treachery and Panic at San Antonio.—Under the guise of peace the Apaches now entered San Antonio with great freedom, and for a time a spirit of seeming amity prevailed between them and the Spaniards. The latter assumed that the peace was on a firm basis and to some extent relaxed their vigilance. The evil consequences of this bad policy were soon apparent. On March 27, three warriors and a squaw, who had come in ostensibly to trade, left the presidio for their country, being accompanied, as usual, by a few soliders to see them safely out of the settlement. On this occasion they were escorted by Alferez Xavier Maldonado, Joseph Caravajal, and another soldier, the last of whom turned back to secure aid in killing some buffaloes that were seen near by. The first two continued with the Indians as far as the hill called “El Devisadero,” about one and one-half leagues away. Trusting in the treaty which had been made, they were somewhat careless, and when a band of about twenty-four Indians was seen approaching they awaited their coming without misgivings. As the savages came nearer, however, advancing in two wings, the soldiers recognized their hostile intentions. The scene was observed by the lieutenant of the presidio. He saw the two soldiers fall from their horses and their bodies surrounded by the Indians. When they were afterwards found, they presented a horrible sight. The bodies had been terribly mutilated and the bones stripped of their flesh, which had been carried away by the Apaches, says Father Vergara, to “satisfy their vengeful appetite.”140
This flagrant rupture of the peace caused a genuine panic among the inhabitants at San Antonio. They now realized that the Apaches could not be trusted. After this outbreak the raids on the stock were renewed, and no one was safe outside of the missions and presidio. Great columns of smoke were seen on the Guadalupe and Rio Grande roads, and the terrified imaginations of the people could see vast concourses of barbarous Indians assembling to destroy the settlement.141 With difficulty could the priests restrain the Indians from deserting the missions and fleeing to the forests, and, said Father Vergara, no one could blame them, for it was only natural that they should desire to preserve their lives. The neophytes, fearing that the same cruelties that had been practiced on others would be visited upon themselves, would not go out to watch the cattle.142
That the terror was not confined to the neophytes is shown by three petitions which were now drawn up. One was by the soldiers of the presidio. They said that their petition was not caused through fear for themselves, and that they only asked for permission to remove their families beyond the Rio Grande to a place of safety. As for themselves, they were willing to remain until the end, and to give up their lives in the service of the king.143
Another petition was made by the civil authorities. In it they emphasized the weakness of the presidio and the exposed condition of San Antonio, and prophesied that the Apaches would invade the place to liberate their kinsmen held as prisoners—an easy feat because of the lack of soldiers.144 Father Vergara's statement, representing the missionaries, was of a similar nature. He no less emphatically stressed the danger from the Apaches and the need for reinforcements.145
Governor Bustillo transmitted these petitions, together with his own report of the incidents related, on April 20, 1733, and fully corroborated the statements made, saying that the future of the whole settlement was in danger unless something should be done at once to relieve the situation.146
2. Provisions for Defense.—In answer to these petitions the central government took some feeble measures for the greater security of San Antonio. One of the first steps was to make Don Joseph de Urrutia captain of the presidio of Béxar, he being named because of his long experience with Indians. His order to take formal possession of the presidio was dated July 23, 1733. He was charged to secure the alliance of his old Indian friends and unite them against the Apaches, with the aim of making a campaign to compel them to remain quiet.147
The next step was to increase the garrison of forty-three men at Béxar by adding fifteen men from the presidio of Bahía and the same number from that of Adaes. These additional forces were to remain in Béxar subject to the order of the captain there as long as the hostility of the Apaches should continue. It was also provided that the governor should have authority to levy upon presidios outside of his jurisdiction in case of urgent need.148 Thus Rivera's unwise policy was reversed.
A few words concerning Joseph de Urrutia may not be out of place. He was born in Guipúscoa, Spain, about the year 1678, as is seen from a statement of his age in his testimony given in an investigation in 1738, at which time he was about sixty years old.149 He was with Terán in 1691 in the expedition to Texas, and was left, a mere youth, at the garrison established near the Neches by Terán. When the soldiers withdrew in 1693, Urrutia met with an accident on the Colorado river and was forced to remain among the Indians.150 Here he lived among the Cantujuanás, Toos, and Yemes for seven years (apparently not among the “Texas,” as has been supposed), and was made “captain general” of all the nations that were hostile to the Apaches,151 learning their languages and becoming intimately acquainted with their customs. He headed joint campaigns against the Apaches, he said, with evident exaggeration, numbering at times as many as 10,000 or 12,000 warriors.152 By 1733 he had had about forty years' experience with Indians in Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Texas,153 and was probably the best informed of all the Spaniards on Indian affairs in Texas.154
3. A Succession of Unpunished Raids, 1734-1738.—Whether or not the Apaches resented the appointment of their old enemy, Urrutia, as captain of Béxar, and therefore vented their spite upon him in the form of continued depredations, it is impossible to know, but at any rate it is a fact that from 1734 to 1738 there is very little to record save a succession of Indian raids upon San Antonio and vicinity. Strangely enough, during all this period, in spite of his reputation as a fighter, Urrutia, whatever the cause of his weakness may have been, took no effective steps toward retaliation.
Merely in order to give an idea of the troublesome nature of the Apache question, and to show what a blight they must have been to the everyday life of settlement, the narration of these attacks is necessary. In 1734, the exact date does not appear, a band of Apaches, headed by a chief called Cabellos Colorados (Red Hair) who figures prominently in Indian hostilities during this period,155 went to Béxar to barter hides and buffalo meat for various articles, avowing their friendship for the Spaniards and promising to keep peace with them. While returning to their homes, they met at a distance of about a league from the presidio two citizens of San Antonio.156 The Spaniards were seized, bound, and carried away a distance of some seven leagues, where the Indians suspended them by their hands from a tree and danced a “mitote” around them. All this was seen by a squad of soldiers sent to their rescue. They could not, however, overtake the Indians, who continued towards their country, still bearing the two captive Spaniards.157 For a long time their fate was unknown, but, later, an Indian boy, who was presented to Governor Sandobal by the Apaches, told that the captives were mades slaves for some time, being employed in dressing skins, and that when upon one occasion they had tried to escape, they were overtaken and killed.158 This report of the fate of the two Spaniards was afterward corroborated by the confession of some Apaches themselves.159
For some two years after this we hear of no outrages in the neighborhood of San Antonio. Indeed, the Apaches even professed friendship and carried on their accustomed barter at the settlement.160 But on the Rio Grande and in Coahuila, other bands of Apaches were making life a burden to the inhabitants.161 Seven Apache chiefs had established their rancherías on the Rio Grande in order more easily to make war upon the country south, and so frequently was the presidio of Rio Grande assaulted that the citizens became alarmed, just as at San Antonio, and considered the advisability of moving away.162
In 1736 San Antonio again felt their heavy hand. On September 20, Fray Francisco de Frías, with an escort of ten soldiers under the command of Bartolomé de Torralba, was returning from San Antonio to Rio Grande, after having brought the supplies for Béxar. At a place called El Atascoso, some fourteen leagues from San Antonio, they were attacked by a number of Apaches, who fought until they saw that they could not secure the horses, and then retired, having wounded, however, Torralba and a friendly Indian. The wounded officer and his soldiers returned to Béxar, fearing lest they should encounter another band of Apaches, and remained there until the wounded man was able to resume the journey.163 Four days later the new governor of Texas, Don Cárlos de Franquís, passed by El Atascoso and saw traces of the recent battle.164
After this attack the Apaches gave up all pretense of friendship with the Spaniards and ceased trading at Béxar, continuing their depredations and attacks throughout the rest of the year.165 It was thought by some that their extreme boldness was due to the fact that many soldiers were deserting from Béxar and that the Indians were aware of the weakness of the garrison.166
A short time after the attack on the convoy,167 the Apaches stole about forty horses from the mission of San Francisco de la Espada.168 While endeavoring to recover them, the soldiers found one horse which had lagged behind from weariness and which the Indians had abandoned. It was recognized as one that had been bought by Cabellos Colorados from Alférez Juan Galban in exchange for a skin.169 This indicated that Chief “Red Hair” had been implicated in the raid.
A short time after the theft of the horses from the mission Espada, the Apaches attacked and killed two Indian women of the mission of San Juan Capistrano, and a little later they killed two other Indian women of mission Concepción. At the latter time the Apaches carried away two little Indian boys who were with their mothers. One of the boys afterwards escaped and returned to Béxar, re-entering his mission. A few months later two brothers, Ziprian and Dionisio de Castro, who were cutting grass a league away from the presidio, were killed by Apaches. Their bodies were recovered and taken to Béxar for burial. In the same year three soldiers were hunting in the Galban woods (“monte q llaman de Galban”), having obtained permission from the cabo of the guard to do so. While in this pursuit they were attacked by Apaches, and one of them, Joseph Maldonado, was killed. The other two managed to escape, on account of the density of the woods and the fleetness of their horses, but the stock which they were guarding, consisting of some dozen horses, was left to the Indians. In addition to all of these outrages upon the persons of the citizens, the usual number of horses and cattle were stolen during the two years.170
It is not difficult to infer from the account of these depredations and murders that the Apaches were the most prominent feature in the everyday life of the settlers at San Antonio. They had to be guarded against constantly, as is shown by one of the orders issued by the governor.171 It was to the effect that no citizen of Béxar should discharge firearms unless he should see Indians entering the place, and that a shot was to be the formal signal of an Indian attack. If it was necessary to fire a gun for the purpose of cleaning it, license must first be obtained from the captain of the guard.172
In 1737 a most diabolical dead was committed by Apaches. Five Indian women and two Indian boys of mission San Francisco de la Espada went out to gather fruit on the Medina river, about a league from the mission. A band of Apaches attacked them, killing the five women. The two boys were carried away into captivity.173
In the month of September, 1737, an attack was made upon the stock of the presidio of Béxar which was pastured on the Rio del Cíbolo, about sixteen leagues from San Antonio. The horses had been taken to that place because the Apaches were not known to have ever frequented it. But they found it now, and succeeded in carrying off more than a hundred horses, and wounded Juan Cortinas, the cabo of the ten soldiers who were guarding the camp.174 The raid was at once reported to Béxar, and Urrutia ordered out fifty men to recover the horses.175 Three days were spent in pursuing the thieves, but they had such a good start and possessed such intimate knowledge of the country that they were not overtaken. In the camp on El Cíbolo the soldiers found an Indian who had been killed by the guard. In his hand he still clutched a knife, which Lieutenant Mateo Pérez identified as one that had been taken from his house some time before, and which had probably been bartered to the Indians when they had come to Béxar to trade.176
In consequence of this raid, the guard at El Cíbolo was increased to eighteen men and an officer, who was instructed to be especially vigilant. In spite of their precautions, on December 2, at midnight, the Apaches again assaulted the place. The horses were stampeded, driven toward the north, and secured by the Indians on the run. The soldiers were unable to prevent this because of the intense darkness of the night, and because they feared that the Indians might have another force lying in ambush, as was often the case.177 This second raid on El Cíbolo was reported at Béxar the next night. Captain Urrutia immediately ordered out a company of forty men to give chase to the thieves, but they could not be overtaken, and more than three hundred horses were lost.178
A junta (council) was now called (on the 6th), and it was determined to move the horses near the presidio, a guard of twenty men being detailed to protect them. It was seen that El Cíbolo was too far away and too easy of access for the Apaches, while it was thought that if the stock were near the presidio, aid could be given at once in case of an attack.179
4. The Imprisonment of Cabellos Colorados.—On December 11, 1737, the soldiers, going out at daybreak to count the horses, found an Apache right in their midst. He was seized and taken to the presidio, where he confessed that at a distance of about ten leagues there was a band numbering sixteen Apaches, eight of each sex, who were led by Cabellos Colorados. Their ostensible motive in visiting the presidio was to be that of securing peace with the Spaniards, but their real purpose was to spy out the location of the horses in order to steal them. Alférez Galbán with a force of twenty-eight men was sent out to seize these Indians, and they were all captured at El Chapintillo, eight leagues away, and taken to the presidio, where they were placed in confinement.180 A few days after the raid of September, the wife of Cabellos Colorados, accompanied by three other Indian women and one brave, had gone to the presidio to trade buffalo meat for tobacco. They had been kindly treated and given to understand that as long as the Apaches were quiet they would not be molested by the Spaniards. This capitana and two of her companions were among those captured with Cabellos Colorados.181
A few days after the imprisonment of Cabellos Colorados and his band, the chief asked that one of the captives be sent to inform their tribe of the arrest, so that their kinsmen might return the horses that had been stolen in the last raid, and thus secure the release of the prisoners. To undertake this embassy, choice was made of one of the squaws, who promised to return within twenty days. She did not come back until after forty days, when she reported that she had carried out her mission, and that there were some Indians nearby with sixteen horses to exchange for the prisoners in the presidio. At this time a great number of horses came into the view of the Spaniards some distance away, and Urrutia, ever wary, sent out spies to see what the Indians were about. These spies reported that there were more than a thousand armed Indians in the vicinity, and that the horses were only a ruse to draw out the soldiers so that they might be killed and the prisoners released. The Indians stayed in their camp for five days, but Urrutia, being forewarned, did not go out to meet them, as Almazán had done in 1732.182 The horses which had been brought 185by the squaw were recognized as some which belonged to various citizens and soldiers, and which had been stolen in the raids on El Cíbolo. The squaw explained that she had been unable to bring more horses at this time, but said that the capitán grande was getting them all together and would send them soon. On the following Sunday, January 28, accompanied by another squaw, she again set out from the presidio, promising to bring back the rest of the horses.183 On April 4th she returned with a different companion, but brought only buffalo meat for the imprisoned Indians and some skins for Captain Urrutia. In spite of their failure to bring the horses, they were kindly treated and allowed to leave the presidio.184 Nothing more was heard of the squaw until May 22, when an old Indian and his wife came to the presidio, carrying three small loads of buffalo meat for the prisoners and some skins to trade to the soldiers. They reported that the squaw was very far away, getting together all of the horses of the Spaniards, and that she would come with them in a short time. In order that the Spaniards might understand the delay, he said, he had come to inform them of their good intentions and to assure them that the Apaches were sincere. The old brave and his wife were gently treated, and on the 25th were sent away with presents.
Urrutia considered Cabellos Colorados the cause of many of the outrages which had been visited upon the Spaniards, for he had great reputation and influence among his people. It had been rumored, according to Urrutia, that this chief, before his imprisonment, had entered into an agreement with the capitán grande of the Apache tribes to steal all of the horses belonging to the presidios of Béxar, Rio Grande, Coahuila, and Sacramento, after which they would slaughter the inhabitants themselves.186 In view of the unsavory reputation of Cabellos Colorados and of his captivity at Béxar, Governor Orobio Bazterra, on June 28, held an investigation concerning the part played by Cabellos in the Apache depredations of the past. It was conducted in the usual Spanish way, with the customary interrogatorio, or set of questions, to which a number of witnesses gave answer. It is from the evidence given on this occasion that we get a great deal of our information concerning the depredations for the years 1734-1738, as related above. From the investigation, too, the Spaniards were confirmed in their opinion that Cabellos Colorados was a dangerous man,187 and he was accordingly kept in prison.
On the morning of August 18 the squaw who had first been sent as messenger, and the old brave, accompanied by three other Indians, returned to Béxar. They said that they had come to trade, but did not bring the horses which they had promised because the Texas Indians had attacked their ranchería, killed twelve persons, captured five boys, and had stolen not only all of the horses which the Apaches were preparing to return to the Spaniards, but also many belonging to the Apaches themselves.188
The old man declared that as soon as he had left the presidio in May he had gone to see the head chief of all the Apaches, and had told him that the Spaniards were their friends. He had now come, he said, to secure the release of Cabellos Colorados and his companions. The governor, however, objected to this procedure, telling him that he wished to test the good will of the Apaches for a while longer. Besides, he said, the captives were living comfortably, did no work, and were given the best of treatment. To this the old Indian had no answer, but he begged that Governor Bazterra should at least give up an old woman who was among the captives, saying that he would give a mule and a horse in exchange for her. The governor replied, good-naturedly, that he would release the old woman if the two one-eyed Indians who had come with the old man would stay in her place. At this all laughed and the two said they were willing to remain. The rest of the embassy wished to go back to their homes, but said that they would return soon to trade with the Spaniards and that all would be good friends. After trading their buffalo skins, buckskin, and salt for various articles, they took their departure.189
From December, 1737, until September, 1738, during the imprisonment of Cabellos Colorados and his band, there were no depredations by Apaches at Béxar, which indicated, in the eyes of the Spaniards, that this chief was a prime factor in the war waged by the Apaches.190 This could not have been entirely true, however, for although Cabellos Colorados was still in captivity, in the beginning of October, 1738, the peaceful attitude of the Apaches, which had endured for nearly a year, came to an end, and San Antonio was again subjected to their ravages. As soon as Governor Bazterra, who was at Adaes, heard of the renewal of hostilities he ordered that Cabellos Colorados and his companions, together with the chief's two-year-old daughter, should be remitted to the City of Mexico.191 It is not at all improbable that, according to the custom, he was banished to slavery in the West Indies or some other place whence he could never return.
1. The Campaign of Joseph de Urrutia.—One of the purposes of the investigation concerning Cabellos Colorados had been to bring together evidence relating to the bad faith of the Apaches, so that the viceroy might know the condition of affairs at Béxar and provide some means of relief.192
A short time before the investigation, Captain Urrutia had taken things into his own hands, and had sent in a petition to the viceroy asking permission to make a campaign against the Apaches upon his own responsibility. Such had been the effect of the repeated raids, he said, that the people of San Antonio lived in a state of constant terror, and some families had already moved away. The inhabitants were afraid to attend to their stock, “and,” said Urrutia, “their timidity does not surprise me (although I do not let them know it), for he who is not warned by the ill-fortune of others must be considered rather foolish. And, thus, Most Excellent Sir, those who can enter a presidio at night as far as the center of the plaza and who without being heard can safely remove the horses from the corral in which they are tied to the doors of the houses, are to be feared. As a result, the greater part of the Indians of the new conversions, fleeing from the tyranny of these barbarians, have deserted the missions in which they live, together with their wives and children, some retiring towards the coast of the Sea of the South, a distance of more than sixty leagues, and others toward the Big Wood (Monte Grande).”193 The presidio of Béxar, he continued, was entirely insufficient to restrain the insolence of the Apaches, and they would never be subdued until one or more vigorous campaigns should be made against them. On account of the lack of forces at San Antonio, Urrutia asked that thirty soldiers be given him from Adaes, fifteen from Bahía, ten from Rio Grande, fifteen from Sacramento, and ten from Monclova, and that the citizens of Coahuila and Nuevo León be encouraged to enlist. In this way, he said, a force of two hundred Spaniards could be raised, which, combined with as many more Indian allies from the Texas, would be sufficient to combat the Apaches. Urrutia here calls attention to his residence of seven years with the Indians of the province of Texas, his knowledge of their languages, and their love for him. He is not overmodest in proclaiming his own merits, and his statements as to the necessary qualifications of a successful governor cause us to suspect that he was “boosting” his own candidacy for that office. One of the conditions demanded by Urrutia was that he should have sole command of the expedition, without the interference of “other chiefs” who might spoil the undertaking. The expenses of the campaign were to be met by the sale of the captives that might be secured, and all of the participants were to have a share in the plunder. Although Urrutia practically asked for a licensed slave trade, he excused it on the ground of securing the conversion of these captives to the Catholic faith and of rescuing them from their barbarous state.194 The expedition was to be made in April of the following year.195
Delay ensued, however, and the proposed campaign was not undertaken until the winter of 1739.196 Details are lacking, but it is known that many captives were secured. Our only available contemporary information is obtained from Fray Santa Ana, who was strongly opposed to the campaign and who probably gives a prejudiced account. The expedition, he said, set out at a very bad season of the year, and much suffering ensued. The soldiers were disorderly, and the campaign as a whole was an abomination. He fervently prayed that no similar one should ever be made, since it was of no value to God or to the king. Indeed, said Father Santa Ana, the leaders of the campaign concealed their desire for slaves and plunder under an ostensible purpose of serving the king, and since the real motive was so low, the results were of course on the same level.197
Testimony given in 1756 shows that this campaign was to the San Sabá river, in the same region that Bustillo had reached in 1732.198
2. The Campaign from Coahuila and that of Toribio de Urrutia, 1743-1745.—Joseph de Urrutia apparently died not long after making his campaign, and in the same year, 1740, his son, Toribio de Urrutia, succeeded him as captain at Béxar. The Apaches continued to make much trouble,199 and in the latter part of 1742 the new captain asked permission to make a series of campaigns against them. His communications were submitted to Don Juan Antonio de Bustillo y Zevallos, former governor of Texas, and to Don Gabriel Costales, who had been captain at Bahía, both of whom opposed his plan. Urrutia, however, nothing daunted, repeated his request a few months later, stressing the need for the subjection of the Apaches, and adding as a further reason the possibility of securing information concerning the rich minerals with which the Apache country was supposed to abound. This last petition was referred in June to Don Justo Boneo, who had just been appointed governor of Texas.200
The attention of the government, however, seems to have been directed for a time to a campaign against the Apaches conducted from Coahuila. According to Kerlérec, governor of Louisiana, in a summary of Apache relations written in 1753, a campaign was made in 1743 which was very disastrous to the Spaniards. They had a force of two hundred men, and were commanded by the governor of Coahuila, who fell into an ambush, was dangerously wounded, and lost more than half of his men and almost all of his horses and equipment. After this, says Kerlérec, the Spaniards were content to remain on the defensive.201
This was not true for any great length of time, however, for in 1745, in spite of much opposition from the missionaries (which will be discussed later on) and after tedious delays, Urrutia finally made a campaign in April, 1745. With a force of about fifty Spaniards, the usual number of Indian allies, we may infer,202 and accompanied by Fray Santa Ana, president of the San Antonio missions, Captain Urrutia went northward from San Antonio, crossing the Colorado river about seventy leagues away. Ten leagues north of this river they found a ranchería of Apaches, “commonly called Ypandes” (Lipans), whose tents were scattered over a wide area. Many of the Indians were away at the time, and it was a comparatively easy matter to secure a number of captives, both from the Ypandes and the Natagés, which, perhaps, fulfilled the purpose of the campaign. Indeed, there is reason to suspect that this was little more than a slave-hunting expedition.203
This campaign, like those of Bustillo and Joseph de Urrutia, was later said to have been made to the San Sabá river,204 but from the contemporary documents there is no guide as to the exact location.
3. Retaliation by the Apaches.—Immediately after this campaign the Apaches showed their resentment by committing repeated depredations against the Spaniards. According to the missionaries, for almost a year previous to the campaign the Apaches had been comparatively quiet, many had asked for missions, and had given their children to the priests for baptism. But when they saw, as they said, that the Spaniards did not wish to be friends, they sent messengers (four squaws) to notify them that the peace was declared off.205 Within a space of three weeks nine persons were killed and robbed, and all the settlement molested except mission Concepción, which was under the charge of Father Santa Ana, who had shown much benevolence toward the Apaches.206 On June 30, 1745, San Antonio was given another fright by the attack made upon it by about three hundred and fifty Indians, including women and children, of the Ypandes and Natagés tribes. They planned to burn the presidio, and made the attack during the night when all the occupants of the presidio were asleep. Part of the Indians stayed in ambush just without the settlement, and the others gathered before the presidio. By good luck they were discovered by a boy, who gave the alarm, thus rousing some citizens, who held the savages back for a time. But dividing into two bands, they attacked the presidio by another street, and would doubtless have overpowered the soldiers, had not help arrived at an opportune time from mission Valero. One hundred mission Indians came to the rescue and so stoutly did they attack the invaders that they were soon put to flight. The soldiers and Indians now gave chase, but did not proceed further than a place called Buenavista, whence they were ordered back. For some unknown reason the Apaches were not organized with their usual efficiency, for under ordinary circumstances they would have succeeded in their attack.207 Among the Indians who had set out from the mission was an Apache captive, who at once joined his people. The Ypande chief, whose daughter was being held as a hostage by Father Santa Ana, inquired anxiously concerning the captives, and was told that they were being treated most kindly, and that the Spaniards wished to be the friends of the Apaches. Upon hearing this, the chief repented of his hostility, and ordered his followers to give up the attack. The chief of the Natagés opposed this plan with much vehemence, but he was finally persuaded to retire. For two months after this raid, the Apaches did not trouble the settlement, and at the end of this time a squaw, bearing a cross, accompanied by a boy, was sent to San Antonio with presents for Captain Urrutia, whom she assured that the Apaches wished to keep the peace.208
4. Troubles on the Rio Grande Border.—Although this promise to remain at peace was kept for a time, it affected only a small number of the Apaches, while along the Rio Grande depredations were multiplied to such an extent that San Antonio feared an attack from that quarter, powder being begged from Espíritu Santo in March, 1746, in anticipation of such an occurrence.209 At the same time a campaign was being planned by the captains of Rio Grande and Sacramento presidios to punish the Tobosos and the “Apaches Jumanes,” who had been very annoying.
The Apaches along the Rio Grande to the north of Chihuahua were also very troublesome at this time, and the need of retaining the presidios in their vicinity and of establishing others there may have a bearing upon the slowness of the government in founding presidios among the Apaches north of San Antonio, a project which was being agitated by the priests there.210
5. The Campaign of Rábago y Therán, 1748.—Sometime in 1748, the date is not clear, the governor of Coahuila, Don Pedro de Rábago y Therán, announced to the cabildo of San Antonio that on August 16 he intended to set out from Monclova to make war upon the Indians ravaging the frontier, and asked for volunteers from San Antonio.211 There are some indications that this plan of Rábago's was opposed by Captain Urrutia, the reason probably being that it would interfere with his own arrangements,212 which now looked toward peace. Nevertheless, Rábago carried out his plan, going by way of San Antonio, where he was joined by more than ten citizens well acquainted with the Apache country and by twenty soldiers of the presidio, including Lieutenant Galbán.213 Rábago set out from San Antonio directly to the San Sabá river region, but the Indians, learning of his approach, fled, and as a result only a few captives were taken. The campaign was consequently judged a failure, which was charged to the large number in Rábago's party.214
6. Attacks on the San Xavier Mission.—In 1746 the San Xavier mission was begun on the present San Gabriel river, near Rockdale,215 and the Apaches soon began to visit their depredations upon the new settlement. In 1748 they attacked it four times, the fiercest assault being made on May 2, when sixty Apaches appeared at the mission. Although more than two hundred persons were in the place at the time, the terror inspired by the assailants more than offset the superioritv in numbers. The houses were left to the ravages of the Indians, while the soldiers confined their efforts to guarding the stock. The Apaches succeeded in securing only a few horses, and when they saw that their attempt was being frustrated they withdrew. In their retreat they met some of the mission Indians returning from a buffalo hunt, and in the encounter which followed two of the latter were killed, their bodies being flayed, in accordance with the usual custom of the Apaches. This attack terrorized the neophytes of San Xavier, and more forces were called for to keep them from deserting the mission. The Apaches had to be guarded against night and day.216 In all of the attacks made, seven men had been killed, three being soldiers, and four Indians.217
1. The Proposals of Fray Santa Ana and Fray Guadalupe, 1743.—These Apache raids, which had continued so long, now became less frequent, due apparently to increased pressure from the Comanches, and to the peace efforts of the missionaries. In order to make these things clear, it will be best to go back and follow the thread of missionary activities since 1723 looking to the establishment of missions for the Apaches.
So far as the available records show, only three definite proposals for missionarv work among this tribe had been made in Texas previous to 1743. As has been seen, Father González, in 1723 and 1724, had labored for their conversion; Father Hidalgo, in 1725, had asked for permission to go to their land and work among them, and in 1733 Father Vergara had urged the establishment of Apache missions. Now, on March 3, 1743, Fray Benito Fernández de Santa Ana wrote a communication to the viceroy suggesting that active steps be taken for the conversion and reduction of the Apaches by missions in their own land. He believed that circumstances were especially favorable for such an undertaking, not the least important factor being the existing relations between the Apaches and the Comanches. He told of a battle between these tribes, when a band of Comanches, descending from their country, had fallen in with a superior Apache force. In spite of the disparity in numbers, not a Comanche fled, although they knew that death awaited them. Finally, all but one had been killed and the Apaches were about to dispatch him, when, as Fray Santa Ana says, “on this occasion, their fears overcame their ferocity and desire to eat human flesh,” for, recognizing the bravery of the Comanches and the danger to be incurred from them, they decided to send the sole survivor as a warning to his people, trusting that when the Comanches learned of the fate of their friends they would take care to avoid further conflicts. The Apaches had good reason to fear these foes, said Santa Ana, for the Pelones, a subdivision of the Apaches living near the Caudachos [Red] River had been forced by the Comanches to give up their lands. On account of this fear, Santa Ana believed, the Apaches would now consider entering missions, and he thought the advantage would not be on the side of the Indians alone, for such a powerful nation as the Comanches should be guarded against by the Spaniards as well, while if the Apaches were reduced they would constitute a bulwark against the advancing scourge.218
Two days later Fray Santa Ana wrote another letter to the viceroy, again setting forth the many advantages which, in his opinion, would result from the reduction of the Apaches. In the first place, he said, their conquest would prove comparatively easy, for they were far less numerous than was commonly supposed, the three tribes of Apaches, Ypandes, and Pelones not exceeding thirteen hundred warriors. As evidence of the weakness of the Apaches, he said that in no campaign which had been made against them had the Spaniards employed more than two hundred men, yet the Indians had always been defeated.219 If the Spaniards should not obtain the alliance of the Apaches, Santa Ana continued, the French would very soon occupy the territory along the Caudachos [Red] River, thus cutting off further Spanish advance toward the north. Already, said the priest, it was rumored that New France and Carolina were in communication with New Mexico and Quivira. This he did not believe, but he did believe it was true of Louisiana, whose expansion was greatly to be feared. By making friends of the Apaches and placing a presidio in their midst to restrain and protect them, New Spain, he thought, would be assured from the aggressions of other nations, and the provinces would be freed from the ravages of the Apaches themselves. Besides, there would be opened up to the Spaniards a country rich in gold, silver, iron and other valuable minerals.220 In conclusion, he protested against the campaign which was being planned by Captain Toribio de Urrutia (see ante, p. 251). Campaigns, said Santa Ana, only make the Indians worse, as had been proved time and again. For once, he suggests, kind measures should be tried, if only for an experiment; instead of distributing the captives they should be held as hostages as a means of making peace, and should be returned to the Apaches when they asked to be friends. In this way the Indians would be convinced of the sincerity of the Spaniards and their conversion would inevitably follow.221 Santa Ana's fear of French aggression was well grounded,222 but this could hardly be said of his sanguine view of prospects for the submission of the Apaches.
Father Santa Ana's letters were carried to Mexico by Fray Joseph de Guadalupe, missionary in mission San Francisco de la Espada, who upon his arrival in the City of Mexico addressed to the viceroy on his own part a communication of similar nature. Fray Guadalupe set forth particularly the advantages to result from the establishment of a garrison or presidio among the Apaches, dividing the benefits into two classes, spiritual and temporal. First, he said, a presidio among the Apaches, by aiding to resist their hostilities and keeping them from San Antonio, would be very advantageous to the missions already established, for on account of their fear of the Apaches the mission Indians could with difficulty be restrained from deserting. Second, the new conversions would increase, because the gentiles would not be afraid to enter the missions, as was now the case. Third, the conversion and reduction of the Apaches themselves would be facilitated, because since the presidio would be merely defensive and not offensive the Spaniards could gain the confidence of the Indians, and cultivate the friendship of the capitán grande, thus converting his followers. Fourth, the Apaches converted, the way would be open to convert other tribes that lived in the north to whom passage was now shut off.
These spiritual arguments, Fray Guadalupe thought, should be sufficient to move the mind of the viceroy, but, in addition, he presented some temporal advantages. First, the presidio would entail no additional expense to the crown, for some useless garrison could be utilized. Second, with the added protection, the town of San Antonio would expand very rapidly and the whole country would develop. Third, the way would be open to work the rich minerals which (according to general opinion) abounded in the hill country of the Apaches; and, finally, the entire Spanish dominion would be extended toward the north. In consequence of all these reasons, he prayed for the establishment of the presidio in the land of the Apaches.223
To Fray Guadalupe's representation the viceroy replied that such arguments were all very well in theory, but that in reality there were no useless presidios which could be moved to the Apache country.224 Santa Ana's letters were also considered, together with Toribio de Urrutia's third petition for a campaign, which had been made at this time, as has been seen, and, in view of the conflicting opinions that were presented by Urrutia and the missionaries, it was decided to submit the whole matter to the judgment of Don Manuel de Sandobal, former governor of Texas.225
2. Requests for Missions by the Apaches.—The protests of the missionaries against a campaign, as has been seen, were unavailing. Father Santa Ana seems to have made the best of the situation, however, even accompanying Urrutia on the expedition of 1745. Among the captives taken on this campaign was the seven-year-old daughter of the Ypande chief, and through her the priest tried to influence the chief himself to enter a mission. In a communication which he made to the viceroy in 1745 looking to the conversion of the Apaches, Fray Santa Ana again said that they were not nearly so formidable as was generally believed. The Ypandes, he averred, had only one hundred and sixty-six warriors, and the Natagés one hundred. By placing presidios on the San Sabá, Pedernales, Salado, and Colorado rivers all could be reduced without bloodshed, and even the Comanches would be converted.226 Besides, the Apaches themselves, he said, were anxious to enter upon mission life, for in October, 1745, a mission had been requested for the third time by the chief of the Ypandes, who asked either for a presidio and mission or for a mission without a presidio.227
As if to bear out the missionary's statement, about January 26, 1746, the wife of an Apache chief, with two boys, went to see Fray Santa Ana, bearing a request for missions. Three days later an Indian girl of Ranchería Grande who had been captured by the Apaches, was sent to San Antonio to report that the Ypandes wanted a presidio and a mission, although the Natagés were opposed to it. Two chiefs, she said, were en route to San Antonio to make a permanent peace.228
Thus we see that throughout many years the missionaries had not lost sight of the Apaches, and had several times planned to reduce them to mission life. When the new establishments for the San Xavier river were being discussed, in the years 1745-7, a patent argument in their favor was that they would serve to restrain the Apaches, who lived near by. The San Xavier was the gateway to the “Lomería de los Apaches,” and they must either be converted, it was said, or retire from their old haunts. Moreover, as has been pointed out, the Comanches were again actively pressing upon the Apaches, and it was even said that the missionaries were holding back their reports of the Apaches' request for missions until it could be learned more definitely whether they were really in earnest or merely wished to regain their captive kinsmen by this old ruse.229
3. The Sword and the Olive Branch.—By the latter part of 1748 circumstances became unusually favorable for carrying out the mission policy which was so near to Father Santa Ana's heart. The essential factors were the harmony between the priests and Captain Urrutia, who now began to work to the same end, and the Comanche attacks upon the Apaches. It had long been noted, Santa Ana tells us, that the bloodier and more severe a campaign against the Apaches might be, the more vindictively did they retaliate. This fact being recognized, it was ordered that in all succeeding campaigns no Indian should be killed save in selfdefense and that all captives taken should be treated most humanely.230
With the idea of punishing the Apaches for their attacks of 1748, and also, perhaps, as Father Santa Ana suggests, to show the Indians that the Spaniards wished to be friends, on February 2, 1749, Captain Urrutia with some two hundred men, most of them being Indian allies, set out toward the Apache country. He soon came upon a small ranchería, which offered very little resistance, and three old women and five children were captured. When Urrutia returned to San Antonio he learned that during his absence the Apaches had attacked Mission Concepción, stealing a large number of cattle. He at once determined to pursue the Indians,231 and in March set out again with about three hundred men. They had gone no farther than the Guadalupe river, however, a distance of some twenty leagues, when they encountered a ranchería of Apaches who were encamped there hunting buffalo. Fortunately, most of the Indians (who were more than four hundred in number) were away on the chase, leaving the camp with only thirty men, ninety women, and forty-seven children. These were captured232 and carried to San Antonio, where the men were imprisoned, and the women and children given into the safe keeping of the citizens and the missionaries, orders being given to treat them with the greatest kindness, but not to let them escape.233
4. The Hatchet Buried—Likewise a Horse.—Captain Urrutia and Fray Santa Ana now determined to do their best to establish a permanent and lasting peace with the Apache nation. In consequence, two women and a brave were chosen to act as messengers to their people and to tell their chiefs that if they would live thereafter in peace and friendship with the Spaniards, not only would the latter release the prisoners who had been captured on the Guadalupe, but also those who had been taken in previous campaigns. The plan was received joyously by the captives, as can well be believed, and about the middle of April the three messengers, having been rigged out as usual, were dispatched. They promised to return in three moons, declaring that they would without doubt be accompanied by all of their people.
At the beginning of August the three Indians returned, accompanied by a brave of much distinction. They reported that there were now encamped on the Guadalupe four chiefs, two of the Lipan and two of the Apache nation, with one hundred followers of each tribe, who came with the intention of effecting a peace and securing their captive kinsmen. They would wait on the Guadalupe, they said, until the Spaniards should appoint a day for them to enter the settlement. Captain urrutia received them with all consideration, gave them presents, and told them to return to the Guadalupe and tell their chiefs to come whenever they pleased, but to use smoke as a signal before starting so that they could be properly received.
The emissaries left on the 8th, and on the night of the 15th columns of smoke were sent up, in accordance with the agreement. In the meantime a large building had been constructed on the plaza, in which to receive the Indians, and on the morning of the 16th Captain Urrutia, with all his troops, the missionaries, and citizens of San Antonio, went out to meet the visitors, whom they encountered at a distance of two leagues. Here mutual expressions of joy were made, the chiefs embracing the captain and the priests with great affection. After these ceremonies were over, the whole company returned to the reception hall, where a great feast of beef, corn, squashes, and fruit had been prepared. The chiefs were not lodged with the “common herd,” but were entertained in the presidio and missions, in keeping with their superior rank. On the next day mass, attended by all the Indians and the whole settlement, was said in the parochial church, after which the formal discussion of peace was begun. On the 18th, says Cabello, the prisoners were released,234 and the 19th was given over to the ratification of the peace.
This was a great day for San Antonio. After thirty years of depredations, the harassed settlement was about to secure, as was thought, a lasting peace. Early in the morning the plaza began to fill with an eager throng. On one side were drawn up the soldiers, the priests and the citizens, while on the other were the chiefs and their followers, who had been joined by the released captives. First, a great hole was dug in the center of the plaza, and in this were placed a live horse, a hatchet, a lance, and six arrows, all instruments of war. Then Captain Urrutia and the four chiefs, joining hands, danced three times around the hole, the Indians afterwards doing the same with the priests and the citizens. When this ceremony was concluded, all retired to their respective places. Then, upon a given signal, all rushed to the hole and rapidly buried the live horse, together with the weapons, thus signifying the end of war. This over, the Indians gave great whoops, and the Spaniards cried three times, “Viva el Rey” (“Long live the king”)! Before departing the Indians promised to visit the presidio often, and were assured that they would always be welcomed. In return, they agreed to treat all Spaniards as brothers wherever they might meet. On August 20, amid manifestations of the sincerest friendship, they took their leave. Few cities of the world have ever witnessed such a scene as was thus enacted on the plaza of old San Antonio.235 Indeed, it seems probable that this instance of the burial of a live horse as a part of the hatchet ceremony is unique.
The consummation of this treaty meant a great deal to the citizens of San Antonio. The Indians were undoubtedly sincere in their desire for peace this time (the Comanches furnished motive enough), and there seems to have been confidence on both sides. Most rejoiced of all were the missionaries, who saw in this love feast the happy culmination of their labors to effect the peace of the land, and a definite step toward the conversion of the Apaches.
In spite of the apparent nearness of this much desired end, however, there was yet to be a long period of waiting before the actual founding of the missions. Yet the progress now made was never entirely lost, and henceforth it became more a question of disagreement among the Spaniards themselves as to the establishment of missions than of the unwillingness of the Apaches; for the latter, pressed by their inveterate foes, were now willing to be converted, since it meant protection by Spanish arms.
It will be interesting, by way of conclusion, to note once more the general knowledge of the Apaches possessed by the Spaniards of Texas, as evidenced by the contemporary documents between 1725 and 1750. During this period much additional specific information was acquired concerning a people that had hitherto been but indefinitely known.
1. Two Meanings of the Term “Apache.”—The term “Apache” had now come to have two significations, general and specific. The comprehensive name was still “Apache,” and in this sense it often meant to the Spaniards little more than a confederation or a geographical group. As the royal auditor said, in a communication written in 1750, “the truth is that not only these [tribes near San Antonio] are called heathen Apaches, but also all the tribes in the immense unknown spaces to the north of our governments of Sinaloa, Nueva Viscaya, Coahuila, and Texas, the entire frontier of said Apaches extending for five hundred and ninety-five or six hundred and eighty leagues, without including in this the government of New Mexico, which is on all four sides a frontier of the Apache tribe, by whom this government is surrounded and walled in.”236 To illustrate this usage again, an Indian who was captured at San Antonio, when questioned as to the number of Apache tribes, declared that, “calling them by their special names, there were thirty-seven tribes with the name Apache in the vicinity of the road to New Mexico.”237 Thus the designation “Apache,” in its general sense, was regarded as very comprehensive, just as formerly had been the case, and the expression “las naciones Apaches,” with this broad meaning, occurs very frequently in the documents throughout the period.
On the other hand, “Apache” is now used to designate also a particular tribe of Indians with whom the Texas Spaniards had especially to do. Out of the general term “Apache” which was formerly not differentiated, several distinct tribes have now emerged. We hear of the Pelones, the Ypandes (Ipandes, Ipandis, Ypandis), and the Apaches, or in the language of the Indians themselves, “Negain, Azain, and Duttain.”238 These tribes are now considered by the Spaniards of Texas to be the three main divisions of the Apaches with whom they came in contact.
It is probable that the authorities in Mexico usually employed “Apache” in the broad sense, but the people at San Antonio understood and used its restricted meaning also. Many seeming discrepancies in the sources, then, may, perhaps, be explained by considering in what sense the designation, “Apache,” was intended by the writer.
2. Location and Range.—Throughout the period from 1725 to 1749, the Apaches who troubled Texas still lived in the same general northwestward direction from San Antonio as formerly, ranging in summer to the plains of the middle Brazos and Colorado and withdrawing northwestward in the fall. Bustillo, in December, 1732, found them in the same general region where Flores had encountered them in September, 1723. All of the embassies from the Apaches to San Antonio during the period came from the north, and all the messengers sent to them went north.
Yet there was a gradual migration of the Apaches southward in the face of the Comanche pressure, and just at the end of the period this movement was very much accelerated. Bustillo's fight with them, as we have seen, took place about seventy leagues north of San Antonio, near the San Sabá river, while Flores had gone one hundred and thirty leagues before encountering Apaches. Of course, these may have been distinct rancherías, but it is certain that the Apaches had come further south. Another indication that such was the case is Bustillo's statement that he had to make a great detour in order not to be seen by the Indians immediately after leaving the presidio, for the Apaches, he said, were always near San Antonio either in large or small bands.239
By 1730, it is clear, the eastern Apaches did not customarily range southeast of San Antonio. When Father Sevillano in that year argued that a mission on the Medina river, thrity leagues below San Antonio, would be in danger from the Apaches, the other missionaries maintained that he was wrong, as these Indians did not infest even the Guadalupe country, but were to the north.240 Soon after this, however, the upper Nacogdoches road was abandoned, and that by Bahía used, for fear of the Apaches.
By 1749 the Ypandes, who had now become differentiated, had descended considerably nearer to San Antonio. The range of hills twenty leagues northwest from San Antonio was now the southeastern limit of their territory, and from their shelter they ravaged the settlements near by.241 In 1750, according to Cabello's “Informe,” there was a still further southward migration of the Apaches, who were again being closely pressed by the Comanches. In May of that year, says Cabello, the Lipanes and Apaches moved to the Medina river, eight leagues southwest of San Antonio, where they hopes to be secure from their foes.242
The period from 1725 to 1750, therefore, was one of gradual shifting to the south. As the Comanches continued to press hard upon the Apaches, the latter gave way before them, remaining in their new location until renewed pressure was exerted by their enemy. The key to Apache migration and policy during this period, and especially of the latter part, may be found primarily in the hostility of the Comanches.
3. The Different Tribes or Bands of Apaches Known in Texas.—As has been stated, several distinct bands have now emerged from the general term “Apaches,” the Ypandes, Apaches or Natagés, and Jumanes being the main divisions. Other tribal names now appearing in the documents are the Yxandi (Ysandi), Chenti, Melenudos, Mescaleros, Salineros, and Pelones.243
4. The Natagés or Apaches.—The Natagés seem to have been the tribe to which the Spaniards of Texas applied the term “Apache” in the restrictive sense. In lists which deal with the three main divisions of the Apaches I have frequently found “Apaches, Ypandes, and Jumanes”; “Natagés, Ypandes, and Jumanes”; “Apaches, Pelones, and Jumanes”; and “Natagés, Pelones, and Jumanes.” The Pelones and Ypandes, it will be seen, were often treated as identical. Knowing this, if these lists are examined, it will be seen that in none of them is there a conflict of the terms “Natagés” and “Apaches,” but, on the contrary, that they are used interchangeably. Again, it was said that the “Ypandes . . . almost always live united with the Apaches.”244 This statement, as will be seen, was true of the Natagés, or, in other words, it seems that the terms are again used interchangeably.
When Toribio de Urrutia made his campaign of April, 1745, the Natagés were met northwest of the Colorado river, a few leagues from the Ypandes. They were now probably engaged in the spring buffalo hunt. Concerning them, Father Santa Ana, who was with Urrutia, says: “The Natagés Indians, reputed among the Indians of the north as true Apaches, lived on this occasion not far from and to the west of the Ypandes. They are fewer in number, but prouder and more overbearing than the rest, and their chief man was captain of the Ypandes. . . . The body of these Natagés comprises in itself the Mescaleros and Salineros Indians, or better, shall I say that they are one and the same Indians with different names which the Spaniards have given them in the various localities [terrenos] in which they have seen them. Their own country [that is, of the Natagés] is on the said Rio Salado [Pecos], where they enter into the jurisdiction of Conchos. The Ypandes, as they are intimate friends and relatives, also go in as far as the Rio Salado in the months of June and July, and then in the autumn all go down together to the San Sabá, Xianas [Chanas, Llano], Almagre [Honey Creek245], and Pedernales rivers, from which they pass to the Colorado along that region where the road to Los Adays crosses, since this country is the home of the buffalo with which they sustain themselves.”246 The Natagés, Santa Ana also said, troubled the Rio Grande country as far west as El Paso, although they numbered less than one hundred warriors.247 This number is probably an underestimate, as in another place Santa Ana says that the Apaches [Natagés] and Ypandes have five hundred warriors combined.248
5. The Ypandes (Lipan) or Pelones.—The branch of the Apaches nearest to San Antonio and ultimately of the most importance in Apache relations were the Lipans or Ypandes.249 As has been seen, the Ypandes were closely allied with the Natagés, their chief in 1745 being from the latter tribe. Concerning them Santa Ana, who is our best informant upon Indian affairs during this period, says in 1743: “The Ypandes, who are the nearest to this presidio [Béxar] almost always live united with the Apaches [Natagés]. They have a great number of horses, but their desire for more is never satiated, on account of which and in order to steal other things they trouble all of the road to New Mexico and that which leads to Los Texas [Nacogdoches], not failing to take the lives of all they can, whether neighboring Indians or Spaniards.”250
The Ypandes were said to be identical with the Pelones, being referred to as “Ypandes alias Pelones.”251 The Pelones, it was said, were the least daring of the Apaches, and were the first whom the Comanches had compelled to give up their lands.252 They had lived farthest north from San Antonio, on the Caudachos [Red] River. According to Santa Ana, in 1745 the Ypandes had only one hundred and sixty-six warriors, and ranged along the frontiers of Coahuila and Texas.253 They were accustomed to divide into six or seven small bands, the largest not exceeding forty and the smallest sometimes not numbering more than twenty.254
It seems that since the opening of the century the Pelones (Lipanes) had changed their relations with other tribes, for Joseph de Urrutia, writing in 1733, said that at the time of his residence among the Indians of eastern Texas, from about 1693-1700, the Pelones and Jumanes were declared enemies of the Apaches, and he wondered that they were now allied tribes.255
Governor Bustillo, in 1746, mentions a tribe of “Apachez llamados los Melenudos,” who made war upon the Yojuanes and the Texas. The location assigned to these Indians, apparently northwest of the Trinity river, leads me to wonder if they may not have been Pelones.256
6. The Jumanes.—The Jumanes are a confusing element. It will assist somewhat in lessening this confusion if we bear in mind that it is clear that the term “Jumanes” was applied by the Spaniards to two distinct groups of Indians. Most commonly it applied to Indians living in southwestern Texas near the Rio Grande. But after the middle of the eighteenth century, at least, Jumane was a name applied in New Mexico to the Indians called in Texas the Taovayases—Wichita Indians always hostile to the Apaches.257
In the later seventeenth century the Jumanes of southwestern Texas had been enemies of the Apaches. These Jumanes, it seems, in the eighteenth century became allies of the Apaches, while the northern Jumanes, or Taovayases, remained hostile. According to Urrutia, writing in 1733, the Jumanes had formerly lived near the Pelones (along the Red River) and were enemies of the Apaches. He, perhaps, was thinking of the northern Jumanes. In 1731 Jumanes are spoken of as an important division of the Apaches, and after the fight near San Antonio of September 18, 1731, a captive declared that the arrows left on the field of battle belonged to the Apaches, Pelones, and Jumanes, “very numerous and allied tribes,”258 who were enemies of the Texas, Yojuanes, and other tribes of eastern Texas.259 Almazán, however, said that the Jumanes were not represented in this fight.260 In 1746 we hear of the “Apaches Jumanes” living just north of the Rio Grande. On account of their depredations it was deemed unwise to remove the presidio of Sacramento to the San Xavier country, as was petitioned for.261 These Indians were said to roam across the deserts of Coahuila as far as Saltillo, even reaching Nuevo León.262 In 1749 Jumanes, Comanches, and French were friendly, according to three Frenchmen who were captured in that year near Santa Fé.263 These Jumanes were undoubtedly Taovayases.
7. Other Bands.—In 1732 the Yxandi (Ysandi) and Chenti had joined the Apaches, and were present in the battle with Bustillo on December 9, 1732. This was the first time that the Spaniards had come into contact with them, but they were said to be no less formidable than the “Apaches.”264 The Mescaleros and Salineros, it has been seen, were regarded as merely divisions of the Natagés.
The Tobosos, living beyond the Rio Grande, were allies of the Apaches, it appears from the documents, as early as 1735.265 They were few in number, but robbed and killed in many places.266
In the list of manuscript sources given below, most of the titles designate expedientes, that is, groups of documents relating to a given subject, rather than single documents. In the text, the individual documents are cited with reference to the expediente titles given here.
Documentos para la Historia Eclesiástica y Civil de la Provincia de Texas. Libros Primero v Segundo (“Memorias de Nueva España” XXVII and XXVIII). These volumes contain various Texas documents dating from 1689 to about 1780. About 600 folios, or 1200 pages.
Testimonio del titulo de Governador y Instrucciones que se le dio a Don Martin de Alarcon pa. la entrada que hizo en la Provincia de los Tejas. 1716-1718. 16 pp.
Papeles del Pe. Hidalgo. From about 1711 to 1724. About 90 pp.
Peña, Derrotero de la Expedicion en la Provincia de los Texas, Nuevo Revno de Philipinas que de orden del Excmo. Señor Marquès de Valero, Vi-Rey, y Capitan General de esta Nueva España passa à executar el . . . Marques de S. Miguel de Aguayo, . . . que escribe El Br. D. Juan Antonio de la Peña. Mexico, 1722. About 100 pp. Also in printed form.
Letter of Aguayo to Margil, —, 1724.
Autos Hechos: Texas. Año de 1724. 36 pp.
Autos a consulta hecha del Pe. Fr. Joseph Gonzs Misionero del Presidio de San Antto Balero Contra el Capn. Don Nicolas Flores por los motivos q expressa. 1724. 55 pp.
Autos Sre. diferentes puntos Consultados por el Govr. de la Provincia de los tejas Muerte de un Correo y otras materias, etc. 1724. 77 pp.
Declaración del Indio Gerónimo que andaba entre los Apaches recibida en el Presidio de Rio ge. por el Genl. D. Blas de la Garza Falcon. 1724. 3 pp.
Autos fechos en la Bahía de el espiritu santo sobre dos muertes que ejecutaron los Yndios en los Soldados que guardavan la Cavallada de dho Presidio el dia 13 de eno. de este Año de 1724 por Dn. Ferndo. Perez de Almasan, Govor. y Capn. Genl. de esta Prova. de tejas Nuebas Philipinas. 1724. 39 pp.
Letter of Aguayo to Fray Antonio Margil de Jesús, July 4, 1724. 9 pp.
Primera entrada a la Proa de Texas hasta la Baia del Espiritu Sto. Pretende el Sor. Obpo de Guadra., etc. Liza. pedida p. el Padre Hidalgo y Fr. Franco. Bustamante para entrar a los Apaches Apostolicamte. 1725. 12 pp.
Representacion que haze Fray Miguel Sevillano de Paredes, etc., al Muy Reuo. Padre Fray Pedro Perez de Mesquia, etc., acerca de algunos puntos que se ofrezen sobre la Consistencia y adelantamiento de la Conversion de los infieles de estas Miss. (1726). 6 pp.
Visita de las misiones del Rio Grande del Norte por Fr. Miguel Sevillano de Paredes en 15 de Octubre 1727. 40 pp.
Proyecto Mandado hacer por el Exmo. Sor. Marques de Casafuerte Virev Governador y Capitan General de esta Nueba España, etc., Reducido de la visita hecha por el Brigadier Don Pedro de Rivera, etc. 36 pp.
Diligencias que hizo el colegio año de 1729 para la mudanza de las Mises. de Texas. About 40 pp.
Transsumpto de vn Memorial que por parte de este collegio se remitio al Rey en el Consejo Real de Indias estaño de 1729 en 12 de Nob. 13 pp.
B. MS. Notes. Miscellaneous, 1730-33.
Escrito del P. Sevillano pidiendo dos soldados en cada misión. 1730. 14 pp.
Order of viceroy empowering the governor of Texas to call on other presidios for troops to defend San Antonio. Decree appointing Urrutia as captain of Béxar. 1733. 6 pp.
Autos sobre las providencias dadas pr. su exa. al Governador de la Provincia de Texas pa. la pazificazn. de los Yndios Apaches y sus aliados. (Cited as Pacificacion de Apaches). 1731. 56 pp.
Carpeta de Correspondencia de las Proas. Ynternas por los años de 1726 á 1731 con los Exmos. Sres Marques de Casa y Fuerte y Conde de Fuen-Clara.-Tambien comprende alguna correspondencia hasta el año de 1736, gobierno del Yllo. Sor Vizarron (Goes to 1743 also). 93 pp.
Opinions of auditor, July 18 and 23, 1733, and decree of the viceroy, July 30, 1733.
Order of Joseph Antonio Fernandez de Jauregui Urrutia that no citizen of Béxar shall discharge firearms unless he sees Indians entering the place. 1736. 3 pp.
Residencia de Sandobal. 1736-7. About 100 pp.
Autos of Don Prudencio de Orobio Bazterra. 1737. 3 pp.
Ordenes del Virrey Vizarron sobre la visita que hizo á los Presidios y Misiones el Genl. D. Blas de la Garza Falcon. 1738. 5 pp.
Autos hechos por el Govr. de Texas Sobre la Remision de el Capn. Cabellos Colorados y otros treze Yndios e Yndias de Nacion Apache, a la Rl. Carcel de Corte, &a. 1738. 6 pp.
Testimonio de Diligencias sobre Ynfidelidad de los Apaches. (Cited as Ynfidelidad de Apaches). 1738. 24 pp.
Expendiente sobre la campaña q á su costa ha de hacer en la Prova. de Texas Nuevas Philipinas pr. el mes de Abril del sigte. año Dn. Joseph de Urrutia Capn. del Presidio de Sn. Antonio de Bexar, y demas providencias q en su respuesta se piden pr. el Sr. Auditor Pa el restablecimto. de dha Prova. 1738. 25 pp.
Libro de Cavildo formado en estte año de Mil Settesienttos quarentta y dos onse de henero de dho año—para senttar ttodas las detterminaciones de dho Cavildo—Año de 1742. 10 pp. (Records of the Villa of San Fernando.)
Entrada de los Apaches en el Presidio de Sn. Anto. año de 1745. 10 pp.
Cartas del R. P. Guardian Fr. Alonso Giraldo de Terreros, del Genl. Dn. Melchor, De Media Villa y Anchona [sic], del R. P. Presidte. Fr. Mariano de los Dolores sobre la fundacion de Sn Xavier, año de 1746. 15 pp.
Memorial del Govor. Bustillos en contra de la fundacion de Sn Xavier, presentado al Exmo. Sor. Virrey. Año de 1746. 16 pp.
Satisfaccion de los Missioneros á las objecciones hechas por el Govr. Bustillos contra las fundaciones de Sn. Xavier. 1746. 17 pp.
Suplica del P. Preste. Fr. Benito al Capn. de Sn. Anto. para que ynforma a su Exa. el estado de los Apaches, con el informe que dho Capn. hizo. Feb. 2, 1746. 5 pp. (Sub-title: Informe del P. Preste. Fr. Benito al Pe. Gn. Del Estado de los Apaches, pretende su Convn.)
Letter from Manuel de la Piszina to the Cabildo regarding a loan of powder, March 11, 1746.
Memorial del R. P. Presidente al Capn. de Sn. Antonio pidiendo fuerzaz para la defensa del Presidio y misiones de Sn. Javier, 1747. 7 pp.
Autos fhos. en virtud de superior Horn. y derrotero deel descubrimiento deel Transitto hastta la Juntta de los Rios de Conchos con el grande de el Nortte, como adentro se expressa. por el Gral. Dn. Pedro de Rabago y Theran, Governor. y Thente. de Capn. Gral de esta Provinzia de San Francisco de Coaguyla, Nueba Exttremadura, sus Prezidios, Confines, y fronterras por S. Mgttd. (que Dios gue). 1748. 26 pp.
Therán to the Cabildo, August —, 1748. 1 p.
Informe del R. P. fr. Benito de Sta Ana al Exmo sobre la fundacion de Sn. Xaxier (1752 ?). 9 pp.
Copia de Carta del P. Fr. Mariano. March 13, 1749. 4 pp.
Autos sre averiguar que rumbo han ttraido ttres Franzeses que llegaron al Pueblo de taos con la Nazon. Cumanche q. benian a hazer sus aconstumbrados resgattes. 1749-1751. 58 pp.
Testimony taken in support of the right of Béxar to exercise jurisdiction over San Sava rather than that this jurisdiction should be exercised by Coahuila or Nuevo Mexico. 1756. 19 pp.
Ynforme del Governador de Texas dn. Domingo Cabello sobre pazes de los Apaches Lipánes en la Colonia del Nuevo Santander. Año de 1784. 69 pp.
PRINTED WORKS
Arricivita, Crónica Seráfica y apostólica del colegio de Propaganda Fide de la Santa Cruz de Querétaro en la Nueva España, dedicada al Santísimo Patriarca El Señor San Joseph. Segunda Parte. México, 1792.
Bancroft, North Mexican States and Texas, I. (San Francisco, 1888.)
Bonilla, “Breve Compendio de los sucesos ocurridos en la Provincia de Texas desde su conquista, ô reduccion hasta la fha. Por el Theniente de vnfanteria D. Antonio Bonilla. Mexico, 16 de Noviembre de 1772.” (Translation in The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, VIII, 1-78.)
Clark, “The Beginnings of Texas” (in The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, V, 171-205 and VI, 1-26).
Garrison, Texas (Boston, 1903).
Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico, Part I (Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin No. 30).
Kerlérec, “Projet de Paix et d'Alliance avec les Cannecis et les avantages qui en peuvent résulter, envoyé par Kerlérec, gouverneur de la province de la Loüisianne en 1753” (in Journal de la Sociétédes Américanistes de Paris, III, No. 1).
Yoakum, History of Texas (in A Comprehensive History of Texas. Wooten, editor, Dallas, 1898).
AFFAIRS OF THE ASSOCIATION
In the sketch of General Volney E. Howard published in the October number of The Quarterly (Volume XIV, Number 2) it was stated (page 148) that he died in 1885. Judge Fulmore wishes this corrected. The date should be May 3, 1889.
Major Ira H. Evans, of Austin, has presented to the Association a copy of the Washington Spectator-Extra for June 12, 1844. It contains some valuable matter on the annexation of Texas to the United States.
The annual meeting of the Association will be held on March 2, 1911. Members will be notified by letter of the hour and place of the meeting.
