The purpose of the author in preparing this paper was primarily to review the question of the boundary between Texas and Mexico as one of the antecedents of the Texas-Santa Fé expedition. This explains why the study ends abruptly with 1840. The history of the southwestern boundary of Texas during the Spanish régime has been so thoroughly treated by different writers that a detailed discussion of it is unnecessary here. However, in order that the subject may be presented in its entirety, a brief review of the salient facts seems necessary.
1. The Spanish View.—The expedition of La Salle in 1685 aroused the Spanish to explore and temporarily occupy eastern Texas. The first mission, San Francisco de los Tejas, was established southwest of Nacogdoches near the Neches river in 1690. 2 Terán, who was made governor of Coahuila and Texas in 1691, 3 explored the country to the Red river. In 1693 Texas was abandoned, 4 and after 1700 the mission of San Juan Bautista on the Rio Grande formed the extreme Spanish outpost. 5 During the period 1716-1722, Texas was reoccupied and six missions and two presidios in eastern Texas, a presidio and a mission on the San Antonio, and a post and a mission on San Bernard Bay (Espíritu Santo) were established. 6
So far as has been ascertained, the first mention of the boundary occurred in 1721 when the governor of Coahuila and Texas stated it to be the Medina river. 7 Similar statements are found in Spanish documents in 1744 and 1746. 8 In the latter year José de Escandón was commissioned to pacify the gulf coast; the province of Nuevo Santander was established; and Escandón appears to have had jurisdiction to the San Antonio. 9 The La Fora map of 1767 placed the boundary somewhat west of the Medina. 10 In 1772 Bonilla stated that the boundary line between Coahuila and Texas was the Medina. 11 All official documents for the rest of the century placed it at the Nueces. An order of 1811 and an official map of 1816 gave the Nueces as the boundary line between Texas and Nuevo Santander, and the Medina as the boundary between Texas and Coahuila. 12
2. French Claims.—The first suggestion of a French occupation of Texas came in 1682 from Peñalosa, a former governor of New Mexico, who had found refuge at the court of Louis XIV. He proposed to settle a French colony at the mouth of the Rio Bravo, and La Salle no doubt heard of his schemes. 13 In 1684 La Salle was authorized to rule the country from the Illinois river to New Biscay. 14 He landed on the shore of Matagorda Bay the following year; he was murdered two years later, and the settlement was broken up. 15
In 1712 Antoine Crozat was given by letters patent the right to trade “in all the Lands possessed by Us, and bounded by New Mexico” 16 . . . In 1714 M. Louis de Saint Denis reached the presidio of San Juan Bautista on the Rio Grande and informed the Spanish that the French claimed to that river. In 1721 La Harpe, who had concessions on Red river and who had been carrying on a clandestine trade with the Spanish, made an unsuccessful attempt to found a colony at Matagorda bay. 17 The map of Du Pratz in 1738 gave the Rio Grande as the boundary. 18 During the administration of Barrios in Texas, which ended in 1756, there were French trading posts west of the Sabine. When the Spanish established a presidio on the Trinity in 1756 the French protested, basing their claim on the settlement of La Salle. The cession of Louisiana at the end of the Seven Years War ended the difficulty until 1800. 19
The treaty of San Ildefonso reopened the question. Louisiana was ceded “with the same extent . . . that it had while in the possession of France . . .” Victor's instructions in 1802 gave the boundary as the Rio Grande. When the country was sold to the United States the boundary was left indefinite, following the wording of the treaty of San Ildefonso. This ended the French claims to Texas. 20
During the period from 1821 to 1836 no action appears to have been taken concerning the boundary line, although there are evidences that Texans were already looking toward the Rio Grande. In 1824 Texas and Coahuila were united as a single province, Texas being known as the Department of Béxar. The court records show that at this time the Mexican inhabitants of Béxar recognized the claims of Tamaulipas (Nuevo Santander) to the lands south of the Nueces. 21
During the Fredonian war certain Texans claimed the Rio Grande as the western boundary. 22 In December, 1826, Hayden Edwards and Harmon B. Mayo, on behalf of the discontented settlers, made a treaty with the Indians. The latter were to have all territory “north of a line beginning at the mouth of Sulphur fork; thence to a point not far from Nacogdoches; thence west to the Rio Grande. All the territory south of that boundary to belong to the other party.” 23
In 1828 the State of Coahuila and Texas granted a contract to John Davis Bradburn and Stephen Staples, giving them the right to navigate the Rio Grande with steam or horse-power for fifteen years. 24 This would raise the question of jurisdiction over the lower Rio Grande. Beales and Grant in 1833 obtained a concession from Coahuila and Texas to settle eight hundred families between the Nueces and Rio Grande. Kennedy's map gives the eastern boundary of this grant as the line between Coahuila and Tamaulipas, but it is significant that the only settlement which they made was at Dolores, near the Rio Grande, and that no protest appears to have been made by Tamaulipas. Considering the Fredonian treaty, the grant of 1828, and the settlement of 1833, it would appear that at least as far as Coahuila and Texas were concerned, they considered the lower Rio Grande as within their jurisdiction. 25
In 1834 Juan N. Almonte was sent to Texas to report on its condition for statehood. In his report he says that the inhabitants claimed “that the true boundary ought to commence at the mouth of the Aransas and follow it up to its source; and from there it ought to continue in a straight line, until it meets with the Medina, where it is joined to the San Antonio. following then by the eastern margin of the same Medina as far as its source, it ought to terminate in the boundaries of Chihuahua.” This is the last mention of the Medina boundary that has been found. 26
1. The Treaty of Velasco.—Actual hostilities between Texas and Mexico began in 1835. 27 On March 1, 1836, the Texan convention met, and the following day issued a declaration of independence. General Sam Houston was elected commander-in-chief of the Texas army and David G. Burnet president ad interim. 28 The battle of San Jacinto occurred April 21, 1836. Among the prisoners was Santa Anna. 29 On May 3 Houston wrote to Rusk, the secretary of war, advising him with respect to the arrangements to be made with Santa Anna. Regarding the boundary he said, “The limits of Texas should extend to the Rio Grande, from the mouth, pursuing the stream to its most northwestern source, and thence northeast to the line of the United States.” This letter no doubt had great weight in the dealings with Santa Anna, as well as in influencing the future claims of the republic of Texas. 30
At Velasco, May 14, 1836, Santa Anna and Burnet signed the so-called treaty of Velasco. This treaty was in two parts, a public and a secret agreement. 31 In the public agreement there was no positive statement of boundary lines. Article 3 said, “The Mexican troops will evacuate the territory of Texas, passing to the other side of the Rio Grande del Norte.” This to the Texan mind of the period might be construed to mean an acknowledgment of the Rio Grande as a boundary line, but this interpretation would not hold in an unprejudiced court. The secret agreement was more explicit. Article 4 stated that, “A treaty of commerce, amity, and limits, will be established between Mexico and Texas, the territory of the latter not to extend beyond the Rio Bravo del Norte.” This statement is typical of the wily Santa Anna. Although he was a prisoner, he was guaranteeing that the Mexican government would make a treaty, but at the same time leaving a loophole for repudiation in the clause concerning boundaries. Santa Anna's meaning is made clear by a letter to Houston November 5, 1836, in which, after urging that he be sent to Washington, he says:
Convinced as I am that Texas will never reunite with Mexico, I am desirous, on my part, to improve the advantages which may offer, and avoid the sacrifices which will occur should an important attempt be made to reconquer this country, which has hitherto proved more detrimental than beneficial: consequently reducing the Texan question to this single point—the regulation of the limits between the United States and Mexico, ... which, you are aware, has been pending many years, and may be fixed at the Nueces, del Norte, or any other boundary, as may be decided on at Washington. 32
If the Texans had put the most favorable interpretation upon the wording of the treaty of Velasco, they could not misunderstand this letter. The treaty of Velasco did not place the boundary at the Rio Grande; the question of the validity of that treaty, therefore, is of no consequence. 33 A garbled statement of the treaty, often used as authority, is given by Foote. 34
2. Proposals of Austin and Wharton.—Eight days after Santa Anna's letter to Houston, Stephen F. Austin, secretary of state, wrote to W. H. Wharton, Texan Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, as follows:
As regards the boundaries of Texas, perhaps this question cannot be definitely settled at present; it may, however, be important for you to explain the views of this government on this point. You will therefore use the following as you may deem necessary. We claim and consider that we have possession to the Rio Bravo del Norte. Taking this as the basis, the boundary of Texas would be as follows. Beginning at the mouth of said River on the Gulf of Mexico, thence up the middle thereof, following its main channel, including the Islands to its most northerly Source, thence in a direct line to the United States boundary under the treaty of De Onis at the head of Arkansas river, thence down said river and following the United States line as fixed by said De Onis treaty to the Gulf of Mexico at the mouth of Sabine, thence Southwardly along the Shore of said Gulf to the place of beginning, including the adjacent islands, soundings etc ... Should it appear that very serious embarrassments or delays will be produced by insisting on the above described line, the following alterations might be made on the Western boundary—Instead of the Rio Bravo, beginning on the West of the Gulf of Mexico, half way between the mouth of the Bravo and the inlet of Corpus Christi, which is the main outlet of the Nueces river and bay into the Gulf, thence in a northwestwardly direction following the dividing ridge of high land that divides the waters of the Nueces river and bay, from those of the river Bravo to the hills or mountains in which the main branch of the said Nueces River has its Source, and thence following said ridge or chain of mountains westerly so as to strike the River Puerco or Pecos five leagues above its mouth. ... From the place where the line will strike the Puerco it is to follow the ridge or mountain that divides its waters from those of Rio Bravo, and to continue along said mountains above the head of said Puerco or Pecos to the United States line, at the head of the Arkansas River. The Bravo as a line would cut off many settlements and some villages of native Mexicans and divide the populous valley of New Mexico. It therefore may be seriously objected to. The other line along the dividing ridge includes no Mexican population except Bexar and Goliad whose inhabitants have joined the cause of Texas and are represented in Congress. ... The Salt lakes or ponds between the Nueces and Rio Bravo are of incalculable value and would supply a great amount of this article in the christalized form—the last mentioned line would divide them, the first would include them all. 35
Such in part were the instructions to Wharton, who was going on a mission to the United States to attempt to bring about two desired ends, i. e., recognition of the independence of Texas and annexation to the United States. 36 Austin could hardly have been ignorant of Santa Anna's letter to Houston, for Houston had been president since October 22. 37 He was evidently voicing the ideas of the president. The proposal of a second line is interesting in the light of happenings of the following month. The advantages of acquiring New Mexico were not entirely convincing, although at a later date the republic was willing to attempt to acquire it by force of arms. 38
In his private instructions to Wharton, Austin made it plain that the leaders who were directing affairs were not anxious for annexation. He said,
Notwithstanding the vote of the people at the September election, in favor of annexation, you are aware that very many persons of influence who voted for that measure, merely yielded to the peculiar circumstances of the time, and incline strongly to the opinion, that Texas ought to remain a separate and independent Republic. Should our affairs assume a more favorable aspect by a termination of the war, and a treaty with Mexico, and by the manifestation of a friendly disposition towards us by England and France, it will have a powerful influence on public opinion; and in all probability decide in favor of remaining independent.
Austin then explained that if the United States was inclined to be indifferent or to impose “unjust and hard terms” in receiving Texas, Wharton was to induce England and France to acknowledge the independence of Texas and to interpose with Mexico to procure an acknowledgment with the boundary line at the Rio Grande. Feeling that the size of Texas might deter the United States from admitting it, Austin gave Wharton the interesting task of showing that it was much smaller than was generally supposed. “It probably will not exceed One hundred thousand Square Miles, supposing the western boundary to be on the dividing ridge between the Rivers Nueces and Puerco, and the River Bravo, which it is probable will be the line finally established.” 39
Wharton's reply stated that he believed that Austin must be greatly in error in supposing that Texas contained only one hundred thousand square miles. He proposed a third line which would follow up the Rio Grande to the Mexican “settlement” then follow the mountains, leaving all of the valley of the upper Rio Grande to Mexico. 40
3. The Boundary Defined by the Texas Congress.—Before Wharton's letter could have arrived an act of the Texas Congress, of December 19, 1836, had defined the boundary line as beginning at the mouth of the Rio Grande and following that stream to its source. Houston's idea had evidently overruled the more cautious Austin. 41
Santa Anna was sent to Washington, reaching there January 18, 1837. 42 He conveyed the impression that he would be reinstated in power and that then all difficulty would cease. Jackson informed Wharton “that he had conversed freely with Santa Anna in regard to extending the at present open southwestern line so as to include Texas and that their views and wishes were in entire accordance.” 43 Three days later Wharton wrote to Austin that “the conclusion of the war would afford a favorable opportunity of extending by treaty the at present open South Western boundary of this Government to the Rio del Norte, with the assent of Mexico and Texas.” 44 It is evident from this that Wharton had received no information at this time of the declaration regarding boundaries. Even Austin's letter to Wharton of December 19, the day of the passage of the act, failed to mention the matter. It is evident from a perusal of the correspondence between December 19 and February 5, that the question of annexation was paramount and that the idea of boundaries had been lost in the larger question. 45
4. Expansionist Views.—In February the idea was suggested to Wharton by Jackson “that Texas must claim the Californias on the Pacific in order to paralyze the opposition of the North and East to annexation. That the fishing interest of the North and East wish a harbor on the Pacific; that this claim of the Californias will give it to them and will diminish their opposition to annexation. He is very earnest and anxious on this point of claiming the Californias and says we must not consent to less. This is strict confidence. Glory to God in the highest.” 46 This was promptly reported to Rusk in the above enthusiastic manner, and no doubt voiced the view of many Texans who wished to form a great republic. Many in eastern Texas had expressed the opinion that the eastern Mexican provinces ought to be united in one state. But the idea of Jackson was still more expansive, and it evidently pleased Wharton. 47
The recognition of the independence of Texas was the last official act of Jackson. 48 This step cleared the political atmosphere. The uncertainty of the action of the United States being ended, the Texan diplomats again took up the question of the Rio Grande boundary.
Catlett, secretary of the Texas legation, on April 15, wrote to Henderson, secretary of state, that he had conversed with General Ripley, who urged the seizure of Matamoras and Brazos Santiago and the establishment of a town on the eastern side of the Rio Grande. 49 Six weeks later Hunt urged Henderson that a loan be made, the money to be used to take up a position on that river. He believed that an offensive war should then commence at once, and be pushed, even to an advance on Mexico City. 50 In view of the fact that Texas was in a weak condition at that time, without credit abroad, with resources exhausted at home, and on the verge of anarchy, it is interesting to note the aggressive views of the diplomats. 51 In July the idea of offensive war was taking definite shape; an expedition under Felix Huston against Matamoras and Tampico was planned, 52 in spite of the fact that a large part of the Texan troops had been granted furloughs the previous May. 53 General Plummer, who was then in the United States raising troops, was expected to assist. 54
5. Moderate Wishes of the Texan Government.—In August the tone of the Texan government underwent a decided change, no doubt the financial depression above noted having its effect. Irion, secretary of state, wrote to Hunt in August as follows: “With respect to the southwestern boundary this Republic claims to the Rio Grande. Should the United States however object to this extension of our Territory insist only on the former limits of Texas, which were fixed by the Government of Mexico at the River Nueces. Should insuperable objections arise to receiving this Republic as a State negotiate for admission as a Territory.” This implies a willingness to surrender all previous positions regarding the boundary and to acknowledge the legality of the Nueces line. 55 In replying to this communication, Hunt makes no mention of the boundary; he was evidently engrossed with the larger question of annexation. 56
Nothing further of importance concerning the boundary line is found in the diplomatic correspondence until January 31, 1838. At that time Hunt wrote a lengthy despatch to Irion in which he stated that on November 15 he had believed that a war between the United States and Mexico was imminent, and that the Rio Grande would be made the southwestern boundary of the United States. 57 His despatch of November 15, however, failed to convey such an import. 58 In January he was convinced that the United States would not make war, and that the question of annexation was beset with insurmountable difficulties. He was pessimistic in regard to the Preston resolutions which affirmed the right and expediency of making the Rio Grande the southwest boundary of the United States, prophesying that they would be laid upon the table. In spite of rebuffs on the subject of annexation, the expansionist Texan view was uppermost in Hunt's mind, for in a conversation with Forsyth regarding the northern boundary, when asked as to how far Texas contemplated running that boundary, he replied, “As far as the Pacific Ocean,” but he later admitted that he had not been authorized to do so by his government. 59
March 31, 1838, Irion wrote to Hunt officially stating the boundaries of Texas as defined in December, 1836, and saying that Texas did not wish to run the northern boundary west of the 100th degree of west longitude, leaving a distance of eight or nine degrees to be run at a future time when it could be done with less expense—a statement that showed that the government was more conservative than its diplomats. 60 In spite of this, Hunt was still bent on running the line to the Pacific. He believed that the United States was “very desirous ... to procure the Bay of St. Francisco.” He urged that it would be indispensable to Texas, if the final treaty of peace with Mexico left her a separate power, to possess that fine harbor. 61 Irion replied rather testily, “You seem to entertain erroneous opinions with regard to the views of this Government in relation to our western boundary line.” He again explicitly stated the boundary, and ended by saying, “With respect to the Bay of San Francisco, the South Sea and Pacific Ocean, and the territories bordering thereon, this Government, at the present time, has no concern. ... At a future time this Government may, and probably will, by conquest or negotiation, extend its boundary to the Pacific; but during existing relations the President cannot perceive in what manner speculations concerning the territory referred to have any relevancy to the question now under consideration.” 62
6. Mediation by the United States Proposed.—The question of boundary was not again brought into the diplomatic correspondence until General Richard G. Dunlap was sent to the United States as Minister Plenipotentiary. His instructions were drawn up by James Webb, acting secretary of state under Lamar. As they evidently voice the intentions of that administration they are worthy of extended examination. The question of annexation was dropped, and instead, the United States was to be asked to become a mediator to bring to an end the difficulties existing between Texas and Mexico. In the settlement of the difficulties the boundary act of December 19, 1836, was to be insisted upon, but if Dunlap failed to get a recognition of independence from Mexico with an acknowledgment of those limits, he was to endeavor to obtain the recognition of independence, leaving the question of limits to be settled by future negotiations. If both of these propositions failed, he was to attempt to obtain an armistice for two years provided it would apply to all territory claimed by Texas, the armistice to be guaranteed by the United States. 63
After forming an opinion of the situation at Washington, Dunlap wrote to Lamar. He said that Secretary Forsyth had hinted that money would settle the difficulty with Mexico, and reminded Lamar that the matter had come up in a cabinet meeting in which it was believed that Texas might purchase the lands between the Nueces and Rio Grande “without loosing character.” He then took up the proposal formerly made by Hunt. “How would you like to have the boundary of the Republic to run to the Pacific so as to include California? This may seem too grasping, but if we can get it ought we not to take it and pay for it? Texas is the rising sun of the day. ...” 64 June 28, Dunlap again urged that money be paid to Mexico, stating, “When we commence a purchase, it may be easy to extend our limits.” 65 By August 29 Dunlap had not heard from his government regarding their views on the subject, and again inquired concerning them. 66 In October he again took up the subject although he had received no instructions. He had broached the matter to Martínez, the Mexican minister, but naturally received an unfavorable reply, 67 in spite of the fact that he made a proposal that Texas give a money equivalent. 68 On January 12, 1840, Dunlap informed Burnet that he had received notice that the Senate had refused to ratify his nomination as Minister to the United States. This did not deter him from again urging the acquisition of California, expressing the fear that the United States had designs upon that country. 69 Dunlap remained at Washington until relieved by Bee, who arrived April 20, 1840. 70
7. Refusal of Mexico to Treat with Texas.—It is necessary to turn back to the spring of 1839 to ascertain the attempts that Texas made to open direct communication with Mexico. About the time that Dunlap was sent to Washington Barnard E. Bee was sent to Mexico. Santa Anna was again in power, and it was believed that the mission would meet with success. 71 Bee was armed with a proposition to offer five million dollars for the recognition of Texan independence, but upon the condition that the boundary be placed at the Rio Grande instead of the Nueces. 72 The proposition, however, was never presented, as the Mexican government refused to receive the minister. 73
8. Attempts to Secure British Mediation.—A large amount of the Mexican debt at this time was in the hands of English bondholders. Gordon, a representative of the house of Lizardi and Company, a British firm representing Mexican interests in London, wrote to Pakenham, the British minister at Mexico, informing him of Bee's proposal. Gordon proposed that Mexico satisfy the English bondholders to the amount of $5,000,000 by locating lands for them between the Nueces and Rio Grande, receiving that amount from Texas and agreeing to the Rio Grande boundary. This plan came to naught because of the rejection of Bee. Gorostiza, the Mexican foreign minister, stated that Mexico would never consent to such a limit, and suggested that if a boundary were eventually fixed it would be desirable to have an European government guarantee it. 74 A similar proposal that England guarantee a treaty which would settle the boundary line was made by Texas. 75 England, however, refused to guarantee the line at this time. 76
Early in 1840 James Treat, who was sent to Mexico by Texas, arrived at his station. 77 He was to present a proposition that peace be made, or failing in that, that an armistice be affected, both of which propositions hinged upon the acceptance of the Rio Grande boundary. By October it was known that Treat's mission had failed, the Mexican government stating that if an armistice were feasible, the line of separation must be the San Antonio river. 78
In December, 1839, General James Hamilton was sent abroad to attempt to secure a loan of five million dollars. 79 Before going he had had considerable correspondence with Pakenham concerning the English bondholders. He urged a proposal ostensibly the same as Bee's. 80 He visited England and then France in 1840 and by February 4, 1841, he wrote that he believed the French loan would be successful. Unforeseen circumstances, however, arose and the loan was denied. 81 He afterward visited Brussels and London, but before anything definite was concluded the Lamar administration had ended. The new administration of Houston was extremely economical and immediately repealed all laws authorizing the five million loan. 82
The failure of Hamilton's overtures crippled the military program of the Lamar administration. Yoakum says, “It is believed that, had General Hamilton negotiated the loan, the army of at least ten thousand men would have marched into Mexico in 1841.” “Texas proper,” said Burnet, “is bounded by the Rio Grande: Texas, as defined by the sword, may comprehend the Sierra del Madre. Let the sword do its proper work.” 83
November 14, 1840, a treaty between England and Texas was signed, which was to be ratified in six months. It stated in part, that Texas had accepted the English offer of mediation, and were England successful in mediating with Mexico, Texas would assume one million pounds sterling of the Mexican debt, which was practically the Bee proposal which Mexico had already rejected. 84 The third part of the treaty which dealt with the suppression of the slave trade was not forwarded with the other treaties and hence the Texan congress had not had an opportunity of fair examination of the whole situation. In consequence Palmerston refused to ratify the treaties at this time. 85
Thus we find that the financial and the two chief features of the diplomatic program of Lamar's administration, namely, recognition by England and Mexico, had failed. It remained for him to put his military plans into operation in the expedition against Santa Fé in the endeavor to make good the claim to the Rio Grande. 86
9. Summary.—To sum up the situation: Between 1821 and the battle of San Jacinto, the boundary line was legally the Nueces, although Coahuila and Texas appear to have encroached upon Tamaulipas during this period. The first mention by the Texans of the Rio Grande as a boundary was made during the Fredonian war. The suggestion of that river as a boundary came from Houston before the treaty of Velasco, which treaty, however, did not definitely state the boundary line. Before the declaration of boundary by the Texan government, Austin was in doubt concerning the line, but thought that it ought to be the Rio Grande. He instructed the Texan minister to the United States to that effect, but stated that smaller limits would be accepted if the Rio Grande boundary stood in the way of annexation. The Texan congress declared the boundary at the Rio Grande soon after. The suggestion was made in 1837 by Jackson that Texas should claim California. Texan independence was recognized the same year, and in July Texas planned an offensive war against Mexico. In August a change in the views of Texan statesmen took place; Texas appeared anxious for annexation and was willing to sacrifice the land as far as the Nueces to accomplish it. In 1838 and 1839 the Texan diplomats at Washington were in favor of an expansion of territory to the Pacific, but the home government entertained no such view. In 1839, the question of annexation having been dropped for the time being, the Texan government bent its efforts upon securing the assistance of the United States to act as mediator in securing the recognition of Texan independence by Mexico, with the boundary at the Rio Grande. In the same year and in 1840 Texas made unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with the Mexican government directly. Difficulties beset the Lamar administration, Hamilton's negotiations for a loan having failed, and the treaty with England not being ratified at this time. Such was the situation when the Texan Santa Fé expedition was sent out.
2. Clark, in The Quarterly, V, 175-189.
3. Cox. ibid., V, 84.
4. Clark, in The Quarterly, V, 190-201; Bancroft, North Mexican States and Texas, I, 402-406.
5. Clark, ibid., VI, 4.
6. Ibid., VI, 20-25; Austin, ibid., VIII, 285-286.
7. Garrison, Westward Extension, 101; Cox, in The Quarterly, VI, 85.
8. Altamira, in Yoakum, History of Texas, I, 381-402; Garrison, Westward Extension, 101.
9. Bolton, in The Quarterly, VI, 187-190, 195.
10. Garrison, Westward Extension, 101; also copy of the map in possession of Professor Bolton.
11. West, in The Quarterly, VIII, 9-10.
12. Bolton, ibid., VII, 202; Garrison, Westward Extension, 103-104.
13. Miller, in The Quarterly, V, 97-112.
14. Bancroft, North Mexican States and Texas, I, 392-394.
15. Joutel, Journal of La Salle's last voyage, 54, 116, 134; Le Clercq, in Journeys of . . . La Salle (Cox, ed.), I, 216-217; Clark, in The Quarterly, V, 178-181.
16. Joutel, Journal, 213.
17. Cox, in The Quarterly, X, 9-13; Phelps, Louisiana, 66-67.
18. Ibid., X, 17.
19. Ibid., X, 21-24, 69.
20. Henry Adams, History of the United States, II, 4-6, 16-17, 43.
21. Cox, in The Quarterly, VI, 97-98; Memorial of the Texan Convention of April, 1833, to the general Congress of the United Mexican States, in Yoakum, History of Texas, I, 469.
22. Hutson, in The South in the Building of the Nation, III, 336; Foote, Texas and the Texans, I, 253-255.
23. Ibid., 357; Yoakum, History of Texas, I, 248.
24. Yoakum, History of Texas, I, 259.
25. Ibid., I, 317; Kennedy, Texas, I, map opp. 336.
26. Cox, in The Quarterly, VI, 98-99.
27. Barker, in The South in the Building of the Nation, III, 364.
28. Ibid., III, 365.
29. Barker, in The Quarterly, IV, 259.
30. Houston to Rusk, May 3, 1836, in Yoakum, History of Texas, II, 154, note 2.
31. Treaty of Velasco, in Yoakum, History of Texas, II, 526-529.
32. Santa Anna to Houston, November 5, 1836, in Yoakum, History of Texas, II, 530-531.
33. See Garrison, Westward Extension, 106, for another view.
34. Foote, Texas and the Texans, II, 526-528.
35. Austin to Wharton, November 18, 1836, in Am. Hist. Assoc., Ann. Rpt., 1907, II, 132-133.
36. Ibid., II, 127.
37. Ibid., II, 23.
38. Garrison, Westward Extension, 107-108.
39. Austin to Wharton, November 18, 1836. Private and Special instructions, Am. Hist. Assoc., Ann. Rpt., 1907, II, 138-139.
40. Wharton to Austin, December 11, 1836, Am. Hist. Assoc., Ann. Rpt., 1907, II, 151-154.
41. Garrison, Westward Extension, 106-107.
42. Wharton to Austin, January 17, 1837, Am. Hist. Assoc., Ann. Rpt., 1907, II, 176-177.
43. Wharton to Houston, February 2, 1837. Ibid., II, 180.
44. Ibid., February 5, 1837, II, 183.
45. Various letters, Am. Hist. Assoc., Ann. Rpt., 1907, II, 156-181.
46. Wharton to Rusk, No. 9 (n. d.), Am. Hist. Assoc., Ann. Rpt., 1907, II, 193-194.
47. Yoakum, History of Texas, II, 56.
48. Wharton and Hunt to Henderson, March 5, 1837, Am. Hist. Assoc., Ann. Rpt., 1907, II, 201.
49. Catlett to Henderson, April 15, 1907, Am. Hist. Assoc., Ann. Rpt., 1907, II, 207.
50. Hunt to Henderson, May 30, 1837, ibid., II, 222-223.
51. Irion to Hunt, June 26, 1837, ibid., II, 233.
52. Henderson to Houston, July 20, 1837, ibid., II, 244.
53. Yoakum, History of Texas, II, 215-216.
54. Henderson to Houston, July 20, 1837, Am. Hist. Assoc., Ann. Rpt., 1907, II, 244.
55. Irion to Hunt, August 13, 1837, ibid., II, 257.
56. Hunt to Irion, October 21, 1837, ibid., II, 266-267.
57. Ibid., January 31, 1838, ibid., II, 285.
58. Ibid., November 15, 1837, II, 267-268.
59. Ibid., January 31, 1838, II, 286-288.
60. Irion to Hunt, March 21, 1838, ibid., II, 319.
61. Hunt to Irion, April 13, 1838, ibid., II, 324.
62. Irion to Hunt, May 18, 1838, ibid., II, 327-328.
63. Webb to Dunlap, March 13, 1839, Am. Hist. Assoc., Ann. Rpt., 1907, II, 368-370.
64. Dunlap to Lamar, May 16, 1839, ibid., II, 385.
65. Dunlap to Burnet, June 28, 1839, ibid., II, 407.
66. Ibid., August 26, 1839, Am. Hist. Assoc., Rpt., 1907, II, 417.
67. Ibid., October 12, 1839, II, 419.
68. Dunlap to Martinez, October 8, 1839, ibid., II, 422.
69. Dunlap to Burnet, January 12, 1840, ibid., II, 435.
70. Bee to Lipscomb, April 21, 1840, ibid., II, 447.
71. Webb to Dunlap, March 14, 1839, Am. Hist. Assoc., Ann. Rpt., 1907, II, 376.
72. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 26-27.
73. Dunlap to Forsyth, June 26, 1839, Am. Hist. Assoc., Ann. Rpt., 1907, II, 408.
74. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 26-28.
75. Ibid., 40.
76. Ibid., 42.
77. Ibid., 41.
78. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 45-48.
79. Yoakum, History of Texas, II, 282; Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 36.
80. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 36-38.
81. Yoakum, History of Texas, II, 314-318.
82. Ibid., II, 340.
83. Ibid., II, 318.
84. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 58-59.
85. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 67-68.
86. Garrison, Westward Extension, 107-108.
How to cite:
Marshall, Thomas Maitland, "THE SOUTHWESTERN BOUNDARY OF TEXAS, 1821-1840 ", Volume 014, Number 4, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, Page 277 - 293. http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v014/n4/article_1.html
[Accessed Sat Mar 20 15:32:47 CDT 2010]
