British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846 (The Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, 1909). By Ephraim Douglass Adams , Ph. D. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1910. Pp. VIII, 267). 113
Confining himself rigidly to the scope of his title, and using almost exclusively the manuscript materials in the Public Record Office, Professor Adams traces in great detail the shifting policy of Great Britain toward the Republic of Texas. Briefly that policy was this. So long as Palmerston directed the Foreign Office a steady faith in the destiny of Texas manifested itself in gentle but persistent pressure upon Mexico to relinquish its claims to the province, and culminated in November, 1840, in the signature of a series of treaties by Palmerston and Hamilton (the Texan plenipotentiary) which gave British recognition to Texas. When, however, the fall of the Melbourne ministry in August, 1841, placed Lord Aberdeen in charge of foreign affairs, it might almost be said that caprice was substituted for policy in Anglo-Texan relations. Aberdeen acted as a veritable weather vane, more than once having two sets of contradictory instructions to his agents crossing the Atlantic at the same time (see especially p. 184). At first he reversed Palmerston's policy and encouraged Mexico in the hope of eventually reconquering Texas, even going the length of infringing upon strict neutrality in permitting Mexico to equip two men-of-war in England and enlist officers for them from Her Majesty's navy. Toward the end of 1842 he began to withdraw this encouragement; but as late as the close of 1843 he put little faith in the stability and importance of Texas, or in the rumors that the United States was seriously contemplating its annexation. From this restful confidence that all was right he was rudely shocked by President Tyler's message of December, 1843, and stirred to vigorous action. Overtures were made to France, and accepted by her, for a joint protest against annexation, only to be withheld as soon as Aberdeen learned from Pakenham, at Washington of the strength of annexation sentiment in the United States. From this time on, British efforts to prevent annexation were limited to trying to persuade Mexico to recognize Texas on condition of its remaining independent.
Perhaps uppermost in the minds of most students of the Texas question who read Professor Adams's book will be a sense of complaisant satisfaction that it leaves our previous conclusions upon the subject essentially unchanged. Nevertheless, the book is of distinct importance. Such a study had to be made from the British archives to settle certain doubts that have heretofore obtruded themselves into every examination of the subject; and Professor Adams has made his study with care. (1) Unquestionably one of the strongest motives influencing Northern annexationists was the belief that the United States must take Texas in order to prevent England from getting it. To what extent was this belief justified? (2) Equally strong in the South was the assurance that England wanted Texas, and added thereto was the fear that she would use her position there to direct a campaign for abolition against the Southern states. To what extent was there ground for this fear? Although the author holds no thesis and does not answer these questions categorically, his book will nevertheless probably tend to set them finally at rest: (1) England desired an independent Texas, and at one time Aberdeen was ready, jointly with France, to prevent annexation by war, if need be (pp. 159, 168); but there is no indication that the idea of incorporating the territory into the British Empire was ever seriously entertained by either Palmerton or Aberdeen. ((2) England was deeply interested in the abolition of slavery throughout the world, and Aberdeed did revolve in his mind tentative plans for effecting abolition in Texas; but in this procedure he was perfectly frank, and nothing is added to the exposition of his motives as presented in that portion of the Calhoun-Pakenham correspondence published in 1844. This is not to say, however, that there was no ground for American suspicions of British policy (p. 146).
While resolving these important doubts, Professor Adams raises anew the question of Houston's true attitude toward annexation, and plainly inclines to the belief that he sincerely desired to maintain the independent status of the Republic (pp. 131, 132, 135, 151, 161). But the evidence adduced goes equally well to strengthen the conventional view that Houston was merely coquetting with England to stimulate the jealousy of the United States.
Of positive errors discoverable by this reviewer there are not many. But Santa Anna was not president of Mexico “in 1832 and again in 1835” (p. 65, note). He was elected in 1833 for a term of four years, ending March, 1837. On page 93 we are told of the “signing” of the Texan treaties in 1842, though what is meant is that ratifications were then exchanged. There seems to be some uncertainty concerning the origin of the so-called “Robinson armistice”: on page 128 it is correctly said to have been suggested by J. W. Robinson, a Texan prisoner in Mexico, but on page 133 the statement is that “The plan had originated with Santa Anna.” On the same page (133) the date of Elliot's receipt of Aberdeen's despatch should presumably read “Early in July” instead of June, since it was dated in London on June 3 (see p. 130, note 8). Anson Jones can hardly be said to have been a “prominent revolutionary leader” (p. 196). And the name of the French chargé to Texas was not “Savigny” (pp. 208, 209, 210, 215), but Saligny. One encounters here and there an apparent tendency to accept at face value the motives of diplomats as avowed by themselves, and on page 147 there are signs of a curious faith that if they do not always tell the truth they ought to. The compact style of the book, devoid of the explanatory matter which no doubt accompanied the lectures, makes it difficult reading, and sometimes leads the writer to the statement of important conclusions without revealing the process by which he reached them; for example, one doubts the assertion on page 159 that “Aberdeen was ready [in January, 1844] to go the length of a direct prohibition of annexation in case he found France acquiescent,” until the evidence for this is later supplied (pp. 168-169) in Murphy's memorandum to Aberdeen of May 31. There is a final chapter of thirty pages, reprinted from The American Historical Review, on British interest in the annexation of California.
Eugene C. Barker .
How to cite:
Barker, Eugene C., "British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846", Volume 014, Number 4, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, Page 337 - 339. http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v014/n4/review_21.html
[Accessed Sun Nov 23 12:16:14 CST 2008]
