1. The Spanish Establishments.—The desire of Spain to fasten her claims on eastern Texas had resulted by 1719 in what was at best a very weak hold on that region. Its maintenance was in the immediate charge of the Francisean friars of Mexico, backed by a military force never exceeding twenty-five soldiers. Six straggling missions, scattered the Neches River within a few miles of the Red, had been erected in 1716 by a mere handful of missionaries. The missions were, San Francisco de los Téxas, on the Neches; La Purísima Concepción, on the Angelina; San Joseph, north of Nacogdoches, among the Nazonis; Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, at Nacogdoches; Nuestra Señora de los Dolores, at modern San Augustine; and San Miguel de los Adaes, some seven or more leagues southwest of Natchitoches, Louisiana. 2 The first three were under the charge of the Franciscan College of Querétaro, with their capital at the Mission of La Purísima Concepción, the last three under that of Zacatecas, with their capital at the Mission of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe. 3 The small garrison of soldiers that protected them was near Mission Concepción. In the center of the province were the as yet weak Mission of San Antonio de Valero and the presidio of San Antonio de Bexar, established in 1718 by Father Olivares and Governor Alarcón.
The condition of these establishments was far from flourishing. The expedition of Alarcón had been charged with the replenishment of the impoverished missions of eastern Texas and the settlement of their surrounding Indians in pueblos. 4 These things, however, it failed to do, and the missionaries continued to suffer from extreme want. In the years 1717 and 1718 the crops of beans and corn failed, and the Spanish were forced to resort to wild herbs; game was so scarce that the unpalatable crows were used for meat; while the church supplies, the wax for candles and the necessary articles for the celebration of the mass, were all but exhausted. Urgent requests for alleviation were sent to the home government both before and after Alarcón's expedition, but for various reasons no relief came. 5
Thus when our narrative opens, there were in eastern Texas a few missionary priests caring for the six missions, relying for supplies on the inadequate providence of the government authorities in the City of Mexico, and contending with the cupidity of the surrounding Indians. The latter's hostility could be kept in check only by constant gifts, as they were continually alienated by the indiscreet acts of the military, and were in natural antagonism to the chief aim of the missionaries, which was to settle them in pueblos as a first step to their christianization and civilization. 6
2. The French Establishments.—Facing the Spanish establishments in eastern Texas were the outposts of the French in western Louisiana. In 1698 they had made a settlement at Mobile, twelve leagues from the Spanish fort of Pensacola. Their occupation had rapidly extended westward, and by 1717, as an obstacle to Spanish encroachment through Texas and as a base for western Indian trade, they had erected a presidio at Natchitoches, 7 not far from los Adaes. As early as 1717 it was evident that they had designs on the interior Cadodacho lands, 8 designs which were consummated in 1719.
The committing of Louisiana to a rich trading company in 1712 had made its extension and occupation by the French much more probable, for on the success of the commercial enterprise depended the personal fortunes of the promoters of the company. The extension of French influence, which, for trading purposes, was naturally toward the west, made it a factor in Spanish activities in eastern Texas. Thus the Spanish missionaries, in addition to their other difficulties, had to contend with the inherent racial advantages possessed by the French of easy and rapid amalgamation with the aborigines, for French priest, French soldier, and especially French trader, each readily made the Indian his friend. 9
3. Change in the French Frontier Policy.—The Aguayo expedition, which is the theme of this paper, had its cause in a crisis in the affairs of this Texas-Louisiana Frontier. For some time there had been evident a tendency toward a more positive policy on the part of the two nations occupying this border territory. At first the political policy of both had been mutually forbearing, inconsistent, and self-damaging. As regards France, while she consistently claimed Texas after La Salle's attempted settlement, she made no definite effort to occupy the country. Moreover, the persistent efforts of the authorities in Louisiana, beginning with 1712, to open up a land trade with Mexico resulted in the occupation of eastern Texas by Spain in 1716 with six missions and a presidio with twenty-five soldiers. As for Spain, she maintained a jealous, but inactive attitude, until, stirred by imminent danger of a French occupation, she was aroused to spasmodic and weak efforts to secure her claim on Texas, first in 1691 and again in 1716. But the history of early Spanish missions in Texas is a history of successive failures on Spain's part to properly support establishments that were destined to guard what was clearly a danger point. This failure had led one of the early fathers 10 to seek aid among the French of Louisiana, and a later one not to disdain a clandestine encouragement of the French trader at the very time that the latter was carrying French influence into regions claimed by Spain. 11
On account of the forbearance on the part of the French and their avowed eagerness for trade, it has been said and implied that the French of Louisiana were willing, anxious, even solicitous, that Spanish establishments be made in eastern Texas, as a means to promote trade on the border. 12 There seem to be good grounds to doubt the truth of this in general, and by 1719 there are evident signs of the existence of an aggressive policy on the part of the French. Some of the indications that the French did not wish to encourage Spanish settlements in eastern Texas are the following: First, there is a manifest dissatisfaction on the part of the French authorities with the outcome of St. Denis's enterprise, which resulted in the Ramón expedition and the founding of six missions and a presidio in eastern Texas in 1716; 13 second, this feeling of dissatisfaction and disappointment was converted into a desire to resist, and resulted in an aggressive movement on the part of the French in 1719, when, at the order of Bienville, the Governor of Louisiana, Blondel, the commandant at Natchitoches, attacked the mission of los Adaes and brought about for some time the general and complete abandonment of eastern Texas. 14 This aggressive French movement was the immediate cause of the Aguayo expedition, whose object was the reoccupation of the abandoned province.
4. Spanish Fears of the French.—Even before the advent of St. Denis in Mexico, Spanish officials had apprehended danger from the French. As a barrier to those who had advanced as far as Natchitoches after the Ramón expedition of 1716, the missions of San Miguel de los Adaes and Nuestra Señora de los Dolores were established in 1717 along the route formerly used by the French through Texas to Mexico. 15 In the same year an attempt was made to anticipate the French at the Cadodachos, 16 and in 1719 La Harpe learned from the missionary at the mission of los Adaes that Alarcón had ordered an establishment among the Nassonites. 17
Fears of aggression from this quarter were frequently expressed by the missionaries who were in Texas at the time. In June, 1718, Father Olivares at Mission San Antonio de Valero, in writing to the viceroy, said that the French had won the Indians over by their gifts and their disinterestedness, and warned him of danger from this source should war break out, “for they [the French] are supplying the Indians with arquebuses in addition to their arrows.” 18 Father Espinosa, priest at Concepción, on the Angelina, commenting on French influence, relates that at the reception of Alarcón in 1718, the Indians on the frontier “fired off more guns than all the Spaniards put together,” and that in that one mission he had out of curiosity counted ninety-two guns in the Indians' possession. 19 And in the letter of July 2, 1719, by the two missionary presidents, Margil and Espinosa, to the viceroy, an important source for the period, reference is made to former letters they had written expressing similar, if not more personal, fears of the French. 20
Finally, these fears, together with other difficulties of the missionaries, were presented at the viceroy's court by a special messenger. About the middle of 1718, the fathers in eastern Texas were driven to a high degree of impatience by Alarcón's delay at San Antonio, and despaired of getting any relief from him at all. Father Margil sent for Father Espinosa, therefore, and at the former's mission of Dolores a conference was held, at which six religious were present. It was there decided to send two representatives to Mexico, one from each college of friars, to make a personal appeal to the government, in the hope of removing certain misconceived prejudices, and of awakening the authorities to the real danger of the situation in Texas. President Espinosa was the Querétaran representative chosen, and Fray Mathías Sanz de San Antonio, the Zacatecan. These two had gone as far as San Antonio when they met Alarcón 21 just starting for Espíritu Santo and eastern Texas. Father Espinosa, thinking it best to be present at the visitation of the missions under his charge, returned to eastern Texas, by way of Espíritu Santo, with Alarcón, leaving Father Mathías to bear the mission to the home government. 22
The latter sped on to Mexico, where he arrived in November, 1718, and remained till February, 1719. The burden of his complaint to the home government as summarized by Espinosa was: “The manifest risk of losing that province [Texas], on account of the proximity of the French, who were penetrating [adjacent lands] with new settlements, and had a fortification with many people and arms on the Cadodacho River; that information was had that they were settling the banks of the Palizada [the Mississippi] in force; and that it was to be feared on good grounds that they would attach the Téxas Indians to their side, because they fondled them much, giving them firearms in exchange for horses.” 23 Father Mathias's mission was successful as far as orders for relief of the situation were concerned, but ineffective as far as action went. The viceroy, to the end that the Indians might be subjugated and the French restrained, ordered that Spanish families should be sought and sent to Texas to form villas; issued a despatch authorizing the syndic to collect the alms which the king set aside for missionaries; and ordered that alms be collected from the royal treasury at Zacatecas. But nothing was done, and the Texas missionary left the capital in disgust for Zacatécas, February, 1719. 24
1. The Breach of Peace in Europe, January, 1719.—The proverbially slow working of the Spanish governmental authorities allowed time for the fulfillment of the prophecies and the justification of the fears of the missionaries. Before anything was done to strengthen the frontier, menace was offered by the French, and the Spanish missionaries were driven from eastern Texas.
This occurrence was the immediate result and the reflection of European complications. Out of the aspiration of Philip V to the French throne came the unnatural union between France and England in the Triple Alliance, and finally the political isolation of Spain in the formation of the Quadruple Alliance. Spain's retaliatory and aggressive policy carried out in her occupation of Sardinia and her invasion of Sicily was the signal for the declaration of war against her by France, January 9, 1719. 25
2. The Capture of Pensacola by the French, May, 1719.—On April 20, Bienville, the French governor at Mobile, received the declaration of war and an order from the Company of the Occident, then in charge of Louisiana, to seize Pensacola immediately. 26 On May 14 the French sea force surprised and captured the fort. This was the first news the Spanish of Louisiana had of the existence of war, and they claimed an unpardonable breach of faith by the French in not having given the customary two months' notice. 27
On June 29, the viceroy, by letter from Salinas, the governor of San José, received news of the fall of Pensacola, and immediately began elaborate preparations for its recapture. His fleet, however, did not arrive in time for the retaking of the fort. According to stipulations, the French were to transport the Spanish garrison to Havana and thence to Spain. When, however, the French frigates bearing the prisoners neared Havana, they were accidentally met by a Spanish fleet, commanded by D. Alonso Carrascosa de la Torre, and captured. Changing his original plans, Carrascosa now veered toward Pensacola, and on August 7 recaptured the place without resistance. 28
The French under Bienville and Serigny now concentrated their forces, increased by a number of Indian allies and, aided by a newly arrived fleet, again captured Pensacola, September 17, 1719. It finally returned to Spain by treaty in 1721. 29
3. Blondel's Attack on los Adaes, June, 1719.—From this minor war movement in Louisiana, a still smaller one penetrated to the forlorn province of Texas, and swept back for two years from its eastern portion to San Antonio, all vestige of Spanish occupation. Though the act in itself was insignificant, the effects were far from being so, and on the minds of the Spaniards, filled as they were with fears of an impending danger from that source, it made a deep impression. The contemporary writings of the missionaries, which are our principal sources for this event, are laden with details, and the accounts which they present, told with all the charm and naïveté of the simple-hearted padres, are not without humor to the modern reader.
Just what caused the Spaniards to leave eastern Texas in 1719 has been variously misrepresented. One extreme view is that St. Denis, with a large body of French and Indian allies, attacked their settlement at los Adaes; another, which is just as untrue, is that there was no attack at all, and that the missionaries fled without cause. The most important available document for this event is the letter of July 2, 1719, to the viceroy from the two presidents of the missions in Texas. 30 Written under the actual stress of the flight, it gives exact and somewhat graphic details of the plight, fears, and wants of the small band which was expected to hold Texas for His Spanish Majesty. The writers, Fathers Margil and Espinosa, were at the time of the writing at Mission Concepción on the Angelina, where they remained for about twenty days after the rest of the Spaniards had retired toward the Trinity. 31
The facts in the case, as gathered from this letter and other sources, seem to be that about the middle of June, 1719, 32 a month after the capture of Pensacola, the French commandant at Natchitoches went in person to the Mission of San Miguel de los Adaes and captured its occupants. This was not in itself a prodigious feat, for these at the time numbered two—a lay brother and a ragged soldier. It so happened that the missionary priest and his companions were absent on a spiritual errand to their superior, Father Margil, at the Mission Dolores, and so were providentially saved from arrest. Seemingly satisfied with his work, Blondel started home, taking in his custody the lay brother, the soldier, the sacred vessels, ornaments, and other utensils from the mission church. He did not spare even the chickens, which were to repeat in a lesser degree the exploits of the geese of Rome. Not submitting willingly to captivity by the French, they made desperate efforts to escape, and the wild flapping of their wings so frightened the horses that Blondel, the commandant, was thrown. In the consequent confusion, and with the aid of some friendly French soldiers, the lay brother made his escape. So, the Spanish chronicler continues, “Monsieur Commandant returned to his presidio, glorious in the triumph over one worthless soldier and the captured chickens, whose lives were presumably not spared, . . . since they had so treacherously threatened that of their captor.” 33
4. The Retreat of the Spanish across the Trinity, June-September 1719.—The lay brother fled back to Margil's mission, the bearer of his own startling news and of more given him by the friendly French soldiers. His was the first intimation the Texas Spaniards had that their stronghold of Pensacola had been captured. The French soldiers had told him that a hundred men were hourly expected from Natchitoches to mete out a fate like that of los Adaes to the rest of the Texas missions. Speeding the lay brother on with the news to the other missions, Father Margil buried his iron tools and implements, gathered together his ornaments, and retired to Concepción. 34 The information had spread terror to the other missions. The captain, who then was Domingo Ramón, and his few soldiers at the presidio of Nuestra Señora de los Dolores, adjacent to the mission of Concepción, were for immediate flight; the eight women at the presidio clamored to be allowed to retreat, willing to risk the Indians and the wilds alone with two soldiers. On Father Margil's arrival, the religious held council. According to the fathers, they tried to induce the captain to await further developments, since the Indians had offered to put out spies and warn them of any French advance, and the fathers urged that there could be no immediate danger, as they were then more than a hundred leagues away from the French. But persuasion was of no avail, we are told, and in spite of opposition, the families, soldiers, and some of the religious to whom the spirit of fear had been communicated, began their withdrawal, and camped half a league from the Mission of San Francisco de los Téxas, just east of the Neches River. Father Espinosa remained in his mission of Concepción, trying to quiet the Indians who rebelled at the Spaniards' leaving. In order to assure them that the Spanish intended to return, he finally left some of the fixings of the mission in their care. But when he retired to Mission San Francisco, the Indians followed, determined that the Spaniards should not withdraw. Thus it was decided that the rest might retreat, but not beyond the farthest ranches of the Téxas Indians, while the two presidents should go back to Concepción. The captain, perhaps fearful of punishment for the act, hesitated to leave them, and only on receipt of a written statement that they were remaining voluntarily, would he consent to it. Two of the soldiers volunteered to stay with them, and the same day that the rest of the company left westward, Espinosa and Margil returned to the former's mission, where they remained about twenty days. Learning, however, that the captain and the rest of the force were going beyond the specified place, they felt constrained, for evident reasons, to follow them. 35
On July 2, from Mission Concepción, on the Angelina, the letter which we are following in the narrative, signed by the two presidents of the missions, was sent to the viceroy by two messengers. Word was likewise sent to the captains of the presidios of Béxar and the Rio Grande, and to the Governor of Coahuila, telling them that the company of soldiers and the priests were retiring, but that if armed help came the former would return to their presidio and the latter to their missions. The letter relates the events as given above, and adds that there were well-grounded fears that the French would continue their advance. The missionaries attributed their inability to resist the present hostile movement to the general failure of the government to properly support them, and, in particular, to the failure of Alarcón to follow his instructions. They complained, on the one hand, that they had not been informed of the existence of war, that the French had been steadily advancing for three years, that they had distributed guns by the hundreds among the Indians; and, on the other hand, that the Spanish occupation had made no advance for three years, that their former petitions, impressing on the authorities the danger from the French, and their requests for fifty men to settle the Cadodachos had been disregarded, and that since Alarcón's departure, they had not had a single letter from Mexico. They had less than twenty-five soldiers, they continued, mere boys, poorly clad, without mount or arms, a laughing stock to the very Indians. The crops, which had failed the year before, promised to be better, but they must now be left to the ravages of the Indians; the tools and implements which had been secured at the cost of money, time, and labor, must be abandoned. In order to appease the threatened wrath of the savages, who so objected to the Spaniards' retiring that they stole the horses and cattle, they had promised that they would retire but a short distance and return as soon as they met assistance—adding that it was only on account of future danger that they retired at all. The fathers closed their letter with a passionate appeal that the viceroy, “remembering the blood of the Son of God, shed for these poor gentiles, will moisten his pen in it to write with his own hand what may be best for the good of their souls, the service of the King and Lord, and the consolation of these afflicted missionaries.”
The best evidence we have that the missionaries were truthful in their claim that they wished to remain, and that they did not abandon their missions precipitately to the plunder of the Indians—doubted as it is by some 36—is that the presidents actually did remain alone about twenty days at the mission of Concepción. Seeing, however, that the rest of the force continued to retreat beyond the specified distance, they followed. Their first camping place was within the limits of the Téxas Indians, but moving later on, they stopped on the boundary of the Téxas country. Here they remained through July, August, and September. 37
5. Evidence that a Real and not an Imaginary Advance of the French Caused the Retreat of the Spanish.—Leaving the refugees camped near the edge of the Téxas country, let us turn to consider some points that have arisen in regard to the events just narrated. First, it has been seriously doubted whether the French made any demonstration against the Spanish, and whether the missionaries had any real or tangible danger from which to flee, it being maintained that their flight was due to imaginary fears. 38
But the weight of contemporary Spanish sources on this subject seem incontrovertible. The letter of Fathers Espinosa and Margil was written only ten days after the news of the happening at los Adaes had been received, and was sent to the viceroy at the time. Had such an account come later, in self-defense, the charge of fabrication might be considered; but it was written under the stress of events. Furthermore, it is hardly conceivable that such a tale could have been composed without any foundation whatever, even under compulsion. The letter was in fact but a logical sequel to those of 1717 and 1718 in which the government had been warned of facts which would make such an occurrence possible. Another source of undoubted excellence is Espinosa's Chronica Apostolica y Seraphica, and the essential facts and details which it contains harmonize completely with the letter of July 2. 39 A later piece of evidence that the French did make a hostile demonstration is found in the Peña Derrotero. We are told that on the arrival of Aguayo at los Adaes, the cazique of that tribe expressed his joy at the Spaniards' return, saying that “at the time of the French invasion,” 40 his Indians had been forced by the French to remove from their lands, because they had shown regret at the Spanish retreat, and that the French had persecuted them, taking their wives and children for slaves when they left the country. 41
Such is the evidence afforded by the contemporary Spanish sources, and with it contemporary French sources are in complete agreement. First, Bienville, two years after the event, says that he ordered such an attack on the Spanish mission. He was at the time of his statement, December 10, 1721, protesting against a Spanish establishment at los Adaes, and after expressing surprise at such a step, he adds, “Besides there is no one who does not know of the order which I gave on the occasion of the declaration of war to sieur Blondel, Commandant of said Natchitoches, to go with a detachment to the place where the Reverend Father lived to compel him to retire with his domestics.” 42 Second, Blondel admitted that he had gone in person to los Adaes and had taken possession of the ornaments and sacred vessels. 43 Third, he was taken to task for this act by La Harpe upon the latter's return to New Orleans, where he said “he learnt some of the circumstances regarding the expedition of M. Blondel to the Mission of los Adaes.” 44 Fourth, all the reports that reached La Harpe at the Nassonites were to the effect that the French had driven (avaient chassé) the Spaniards out of los Adaes. In the course of his explorations of Red River, La Harpe arrived at the Nassonites, April 5, 1719. 45 His first intimation of hostilities came June 16 through some Nadaco savages. They brought “very confused news about the Spanish, who, they said, were angry with us that we had driven them out from los Adaes, 46 and that the governor of the Assinais and his warriors were retiring from their presidio.” 47 The next information that the French trader received came from the Oulchionis, 48 June 24. They added the information that the French were at war with the Spanish, and that they had been sent by the chief of the nation to ask the Nassonites to declare in favor of the French. La Harpe's third and fullest information was brought by Saint François, a corporal whom he had sent immediately after the first news of June 16, to learn further of the matter. Saint François had left June 20, 49 and had gone as far as the Amediche, 50 where he remained till after the retreat of the Spaniards beyond the Trinity, and returned August 1. 51 He bore the intelligence that Monsieur Blondel, the commandant at Natchitoches, had driven the Recollect Fathers out of the Mission of los Adaes. 52
Blondel's testimony, given at the time, November, 1719, casts light on the subject because of its interesting contradictory nature. When taken to task by La Harpe for having driven the Spaniards out of los Adaes, he assured the latter “that he had gone there only with the intention of protecting that mission from the aggressions of the Indians, who when they knew the breach between us [the French and Spanish] would not have failed to destroy it”; but that the fathers, not knowing his intentions, had fled, abandoning the sacred vessels and other effects “of which the Indians had taken possession.” 53 Thereupon La Harpe dictated a letter which Blondel should write to the fathers. In it he expressed the fears that he had entertained for them on account of the Indians, and stated that he had gone there to protect their reverences. He did not find the reverend father there, however, and Brother Manuel, not trusting in his (the Frenchman's) promises, had fled, abandoning the effects, of which he (Blondel) had taken possession “to prevent their profanation by idolaters.” He assured the priests that should they be sent for, the ornaments would be gladly delivered. 54 It is true that Blondel does not mention the soldier which the Spanish claim he captured, but it is curious to note that when scolded by La Harpe, he declared that the Indians had taken the ornaments, but when writing to the fathers he was forced to admit that he had taken them and had them in his possession. This little incident in itself betrays a lack of candor in Blondel's position, and leaves something to be explained by those who say that there was no attack on los Adaes.
The other extreme view taken of the matter is that St. Denis, at the head of a French and Indian force, attacked the Mission of los Adaes and drove the Spaniards back; and the impression is left that such is the view given by Spanish writers and sources. Bancroft says that, “a party of French and Indians from Natchitoches took possession of the Mission of San Miguel de los Adaes,” and cites indefinitely some of the best secondary Spanish authorities. 55 Now, as a matter of fact, no such allegation is made by contemporary Spanish sources available for this paper, and they include all those cited by Bancroft, and more. First, as to the commander of the forces, various assertions are made by English writers: Dr. Garrison is the only recent writer that correctly states that “Blondel must be the commander of the attacking force, if there was any attack at all”; Bancroft suggests the probability of Blondel's connection with the affair; while in other works such as Thrall, Yoakum, and Brown, La Harpe and St. Denis are given credit for the attack. The last mentioned writer gives all the credit to La Harpe. 56 The fact is that no mention is made of St. Denis or La Harpe in this capacity by either French or Spanish contemporary sources, while Blondel is unequivocally named as the leader of the French. It is also noteworthy that secondary writers such as Villa-Señor (Theatro) and Cavo (Tres Siglos) do not mention the first two. It is true that other early Spanish writers, as Bonilla and Altamira do erroneously name St. Denis as the leader of the invading force. They are, however, not contemporary. 57
As to the composition of the force, Bancroft states that “a party of French and Indians” took possession of los Adaes. He also claims, without specifying citations, to have had access to “Spanish authorities which imply that St. Denis was in command of a party composed mainly of Natchitoches and Cadodachos Indians.” 58 It is improbable that these Spanish sources were contemporary. Indeed, of those he cites only one could be called such, and him Bancroft misrepresents. No primary source available for this paper gives any indication of this being the fact. 59 The only mention of Indians by Spanish contemporary sources is that the French were trying to ally themselves with the Indians, 60 and feared that the latter would be perverted by them. 61 Later writers like Bonilla have distorted the facts.
It is doubtless true, however, that the contemporary sources left exaggerated impressions of the French invasion. Having had real grounds for alarm, the Spaniards allowed their fears to assume magnified proportions. Still, though this is true, irrefutable facts should correct the impression made by writers who represent the withdrawal of the missionaries as an unworthy flight on groundless fears and without real cause.
6. The Character of the Retreat.—Writers also represent the withdrawal as a precipitate retreat to Bexar. Though the company finally retired there, they did not do so immediately, but camped for three months west of the Trinity, waiting for reinforcements. They stayed at their camp through July, August, and September, 62 suffering from want, being irregularly supplied with meat, having poor flour, and being totally without salt. Finally, despairing of succor, all except Father Espinosa, who had gone ahead to Mexico, retired in September or October to San Antonio de Valero, where the religious of the two colleges erected straw huts, and lived until Aguayo came in April, 1721. It was while waiting here that Father Margil, under Aguayo's patronage, founded the Mission of San Joseph y San Miguel de Aguayo. 63
1. The Marquis of Aguayo.—The answer of Spain to the French act of aggression and the consequent abandonment of eastern Texas was the appointment of a capable governor for the provinces of Texas and Coahuila, and the adoption of vigorous measures to reoccupy the abandoned country. The appointment fell to the Marquis of San Miguel de Aguayo, and to him also was committed the work of reoccupation. The marquisate of San Miguel de Aguayo embraced a large portion of the present State of Coahuila, and the Marquises had long been distinguished men in Coahuila and Neuvo León. One of the principal haciendas of the family was San Francisco de los Patos, between Saltillo and Parras, a place still in existence and with the same name. Comparatively little is known to us of the early, or indeed of the later, career of this particular Marquis. His name and title as given in the official print of the Peña Derrotero is “D. Joseph de Azlor, 64 Knight Commandant of the Kingdom of Aragon, Governor and Captain General 65 of the said Province of Texas, New Philipines, and of this of Coahuila, New Kingdom of Estremadura.” He had served the King in Spain before going to Mexico, and when our story opens he was evidently stationed in some military capacity on the northern frontier, with headquarters either at Los Patos or Parras. In 1716, writing from Santa Maria de las Parras, he says that he has been there four years. 66
He first comes to notice in relation to Texas in connection with the quest of the Gran Quivira, which, since the time of Coronado, had gradually receded from far off Kansas toward the Téxas country. In a correspondence with the viceroy in 1715 and 1716, Aguayo asked that Joseph Urrutia 67 be sent to discover the Gran Quivira, of whose wonders and riches he had heard from an Indian from the interior during his sojourn among the Texas tribes. 68
The crisis in the Texas affairs seemed to offer Aguayo a chance to gratify his ambition, and as soon as he heard of the French attack, he offered “his life, sword, and property” in the service of the king. The answer to this offer was his appointment to the governorship of Texas and Coahuila and the further commission to head the expedition that was to reoccupy Texas. 69 He apparently took possession of his office December 19, 1719. 70 He is lost sight of, almost completely, after the expedition, but was evidently on the northern frontier, where, “for ten years, he has defended the country from the attacks of the Indians, giving continuous help to the presidios and neighboring places, and contributing at the same time, with his kindness and gifts, to the pacification of the revolting tribes.” 71 The last we hear of him is that he was appointed Mariscal de campo in 1743.
2. Instructions for the Expedition.—A year before the French attack, June 11, 1718, the king had sent the viceroy a royal cédula, whose specific instructions met exactly the demands of such an emergency. This cédula had been written at the instance of a letter from the viceroy, in which he reported the conditions in Texas which had brought about the Alarcón expedition, and of letters from Gregorio de Salinas, of Pensacola, telling of the danger that the French would occupy Espíritu Santo Bay. The king's cédula ordered that no French ships be allowed in any Spanish port; and charged the viceroy to exert himself to supply and maintain the Texas missions, and to place the greatest number of missionaries at San Antonio, on account of its being the nearest settlement to Espíritu Santo. He ordered that at the latter place there should be erected a fort, on the spot where La Salle's had been; that to facilitate this work two ships should be sent from Vera Cruz; and that for military and religious reinforcements, soldiers and missionaries should be sent from the various presidios and missions in Mexico where their service was not especially required. Particular care was to be exercised in selecting the leader of the enterprise, and he was to be instructed that “if Frenchmen, by land or sea, should attempt another entrada [he] should place the commander in the Castle of Acapulco, and the rest in the mines of Mexico.” 72 On November 1, 1719, the king issued another order. 73 It can not be said with certainty that this was based on a knowledge of the occurrences in Texas, but it repeated in effect the foregoing one of June 11, 1718, and added that “since la Movila, Massacra, and the rest of the territory belonging to my royal crown is now occupied by the French with no right whatever, you [the viceroy] shall make the necessary provisions to cause them to abandon it, dislodging them from it.” 74 And it does seem that it was on the basis of these two royal orders that the viceroy issued his instructions to Aguayo. In these, the viceroy specified, in addition to what the king had ordered, the erection of a fort on the Cadodacho River. A copy of the instructions was sent to the king, August 8, 1720. 75
In the midst of his preparations, October 5, 1720, Aguayo received word from the viceroy which modified his original instructions. The latter had been sent news of the truce between the two nations, and accordingly modified his orders, so that Aguayo was to maintain only a defensive war with the French. 76 The viceroy at the same time made known to Aguayo the instructions contained in a despatch from the king regarding intercourse with the French. One of the provisions of the instructions was to admit those Frenchmen who might wish to join the Spanish force or to live among the Spaniards. 77
By March 16, 1721, the king seems to have returned in some degree to his original intent, as expressed in the cédula of November 1, 1719. In 1720 (August 16), the viceroy had written to the king, telling him that notwithstanding the fact that the premises of the king's previous orders had been changed by the suspension of arms, he had, nevertheless, sent Aguayo to establish a presidio among the Cadodachos, and to increase the forces occupying Texas. In the cédula of March 16, 1721, the king approved these measures of the viceroy, and ordered that “if the French make any movement in continuance of their designs, you will have them thrust by force from the province of Texas and from the rest of what they have occupied in the last war.” 78
On May 26, 1721, due doubtless to the treaty made between the two countries, the king ordered the viceroy to suspend immediately the execution of what he had ordered in his cédulas of November 19, 1719, and March 16, 1720, though still approving the plan for the erection of a presidio at the Cadodachos and the occupation of Espíritu Santo Bay. 79
3. Espinosa's Work of Preparation.—As we have seen, Father Espinosa had left the retreating party of Spaniards at the Trinity, and had gone to hurry up matters. He had gone first to the Rio Grande and finally to Mexico, where he was influential in bringing about the expedition that was to reoccupy eastern Texas. On his way he had met the new governor, Aguayo, at Monclova, and, arrived at the City, he used his personal influence with the viceroy and the judges. What he urged most persistently was the sending of married soldiers and settlers, included in which should be mechanics and craftsmen—all to go voluntarily and be paid by the government for two years in advance. The head of a family was to receive what was equal to a soldier's salary for a year, while the wife and the boys over fifteen were to receive half as much. The settlers, on their arrival in Texas, were to be given land, which could be transmitted from father to son. Espinosa reasoned that this arrangement would insure the parents' interest in Texas for their children's welfare, and the latter's interest, as in their fatherland.
Before he left the City, Espinosa succeeded in securing a viceregal decree embodying what he desired relative to the families, and he had also gotten seven, who were in distress, to volunteer to go to Texas. He was, however, disappointed in the final outcome and arrangements, for the rest of the expedition was not so selected, but was recruited from different cities, and in general from the jails. 80 At any rate, the families must have played a minor part in the expedition, for they are mentioned but once in the Derrotero, 81 and Espinosa says no more about them.
4. Supplies and Recruits.—Preparations for the expedition went on apace. On receipt of the news of the trouble in Texas the viceroy had ordered Aguayo to raise as large a company as possible in Saltillo and Parras. By September 5, the latter had recruited and fitted out at Saltillo, partly from his private funds, eighty-four men. When Aguayo received his commission as governor and as the head of the force that was to reoccupy Texas, he repaired to Monclova, October 21, 1719. He found the forces on that frontier scarce, and, at his instance, the viceroy decided to recruit five hundred in the districts of Zelaya, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi, and Aguas Calientes. As for funds, the viceroy appropriated thirty-seven thousand pesos, and advanced a year's salary of four hundred and fifty pesos to each soldier. Aguayo had used nine thousand of his own in recruiting and fitting out the eighty-four men at Saltillo. After much trouble and delay, caused by the extreme drought, some three thousand nine hundred and fifty horses were secured. By the middle of October, 1720, the trains of six hundred mules 82 with the clothing, arms, powder, and six cannon reached Monclova from the City of Mexico.
Interesting light is thrown on the make-up of this expedition through abuses which occurred in gathering recruits in the jurisdiction of Zelaya. 83 If we may judge that the preparation and make-up of this expedition was typical of all the early ones sent to Texas, as perhaps we may with safety, we must draw sad conclusions concerning their disorganization, disregard of viceregal orders, and the tatterdemalion character of the crowd sent to Texas. Zelaya was one of the districts chosen by the viceroy to supply the men for the expedition. Its quota was to be one hundred and twenty men and five hundred horses. Pedro de Guinda and Antonio Cobian Busto, Aguayo's representative sent to oversee the work, reported gross abuses on the part of the alcalde mayor of Zelaya in the work of recruiting. Guinda's letter stated that the alcalde had expressed himself as well pleased with the levy, since he could benefit his jurisdiction by thus getting rid of its vagabonds, and was willing to supply two hundred men instead of the one hundred and twenty; that he had appointed an excessive number of commissioners to carry out his plans; and that these, availing themselves of their position, had pressed into service two hundred and fifty men, forcibly relieving them of their private possessions, such as spurs, harness, saddles, horses, etc.; but that though they had impressed two hundred and fifty men, they had finally reported but one hundred and seventeen, having used the surplus to their own advantage by releasing such as were able to buy their freedom; and finally that of the one hundred and ten accepted out of the one hundred and seventeen, only twenty-seven were married, whereas the viceroy's order had required the recruiting of married men accompanied by their families.
On the receipt of this report, the viceroy, May 13, 1720, ordered the alcalde of Querétaro, Bentura Jaque Lorio y Quiñones, to make a secret investigation of the conduct of the alcalde of Zelaya. As a result of the “process,” the accused alcalde was almost completely exonerated. The testimony, in general, was to the effect: (1) that the reason only one hundred and seventeen were furnished was that, on various excuses, Guinda refused to accept many of those presented; and further that the alcalde had not promised two hundred men, as was charged, but had simply remarked that it would be easier to supply that number of men than five hundred horses; (2) that though some of the commissioners had been guilty of confiscating private property, all of it had been returned by the alcalde; (3) that the appointment of commissioners had been necessary, because as soon as the news of the levy had been received all the vagabonds had scattered, some to the mountains, and some to monasteries; (4) that the alcalde was not guilty of releasing men for pay, but that some had been given their freedom because they were respectable men (“hombres de bien”), an interesting commentary on those who were not released but were accepted for the expedition, and (5) that it was not that officer's fault that the wives and families did not accompany their husbands, for Guinda had rejected one hundred horses that might have served to transport the women, and moreover, had said that the families might wait till the following year and go in wagons. 84
Returning to the recruiting at Zelaya, on April 20, 1720, before a noatry public, the list of the one hundred and seventeen recruits was formally presented for inspection to the two attorneys, Guinda and Busto. Names were rejected, added, and again rejected, till the number that finally went was one hundred and ten. Most of the rejections were on the ground of physical infirmities. One was thrown out for debt, and one for being married to a mulatto. This is strange, since so many of the men accepted were mulattoes themselves. Some extracts from the list will show how detailed was the manner of registering recruits and reveal the low types of the men in Aguayo's command. Some of the entries read: “Antonio de Flores, coyote, single, inhabitant of this city [Zelaya], twenty-five years of age, tall, black hair—he has been in prison twenty-five days; Antonio Rodrigues, Spaniard, forty years of age, inhabitant of the town of San Juán del Rio, married to Juana de Dios, two children who are in that town—it is thirty days since he has been imprisoned; Juan Manuel Barrera, single, Spaniard, inhabitant of Esmiquilpa, eighteen years of age, dark complexioned, beardless,—he has been in prison twenty days; Bentura de Tobar, a free mulatto, single, inhabitant of this city [Zelaya], thirty-five years of age, good physique,—he has been in prison thirty days; Bernardo del Carpio, a free mulatto, inhabitant of Guadalajara, twenty-five years of age, small in body, blond, married in the city of Guadalajara to María Flores, Spanish, and has three children,”—and so on for the one hundred and seventeen. Of that number, seventeen were mestizos, twenty-one coyotes, forty-four Spaniards, thirty-one mulattoes, two castizos, one free negro, one Indian of Sapotlan, and one lobo; 85 one hundred and seven were taken from the jail, leaving ten of the expedition who were not jail birds; one of these went voluntarily, and one “was sent by his father.” Though Guinda said that three men were accompanied by their wives, the certified list mentions but two, Gertrudes Sicilia, wife of Juan Cristóbal, and Ana María de Aleman, wife of Juan Carranca, the latter accompanied by their two children.
Another inspection was made on the 28th, when those unable to go by reason of infirmities were rejected. The next day the surgeon was called before the proper authorities to certify as to the physical infirmities of the sick, and on the same day the authorities proceeded to the public jail where the men were called out to start on the expedition to Texas.
5. The Founding of the Mission San Joseph y San Miguel de Aguayo.—While waiting for his supplies to reach Monclova, Aguayo, at the petition of Father Margil, who was waiting at San Antonio to join the expedition when it went to eastern Texas, gave permission for the founding of another mission at San Antonio. It was situated one league from the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar, was called San Joseph y San Miguel de Aguayo, and was until 1722 the only one in San Antonio under charge of the College of Zacatecas. The viceroy approved its foundation, and provided that the customary aid be given it. 86
A good deal of opposition to the establishment of the new mission seems to have been made on the part of the friars of the College of Querétaro. On February 23, 1720, a petition signed by Father Olivares of Mission San Antonio de Valero, the alcalde, and all the cabildo, was presented to Juan Váldez, lieutenant-general and alcalde mayor of the presidio and villa of Bexar. Its object was to ask him not to give possession of the necessary lands to the missionaries of the College of Zacatecas. The reasons assigned for their opposition were, first, that the viceroy Valero had given San Antonio and its vicinity to the College of Querétaro, and second, that the Indian nations for whom the mission was being erected, the Pampopas, Suliejames, and Pastias, were “ab initio” enemies of those at the Mission of Valero, and trouble would be the inevitable result. 87
Váldez, however, in obedience to orders, was constrained to refuse the request, and required that the missionaries of both colleges, Captain Alonzo de Cárdenas and his company of eighty men, his sergeant, Nicolás Flores y Valdez, and Captain Lorenzo García, the last two having seen such a ceremony performed before, to accompany him to witness the formal giving of possession. 88 The founding was probably early in March, 1720.
1. From Monclova to the Rio Grande.—Our story of the expedition is obtained in the main from the diary of Peña, the chaplain, who accompanied it. 89 Aguayo divided the five hundred men 90 into eight companies and organized a battalion of mounted infantry, which he called San Miguel de Aragón. The following officers were selected: lieutenant-governor and captain general, Fernando Pérez de Almazán; captains, Tomás de Zubiría, Miguel Colón, Manuel de Herrera, Francisco Becerra Luque, Gabriel costales, Joseph de Arroyo, Pedro Oribe, and Juan Cantú. Of these Pérez de Almazán later became prominent as governor of Texas. Great ceremony marked the initial steps of the expedition. Three standards were blessed, one bearing a picture of Our Lady of Pilar, San Miguel, and San Rafael, with the motto inscribed, “Pugnate pro Fide et Rege”; the second having a picture of our Lady of Guadalupe, San Miguel, and San Francisco Xavier; while on the third was their patron saint, James. Mass was duly celebrated, and the day was made a feast in general. 91
Aguayo, detained by duties of his new office, in order to insure the proper forwarding of provisions for the expedition from Mexico after his departure, on November 16, 1720, sent forward his train under his lieutenant Almazán. Its composition was as follows: a picket of veteran soldiers who were familiar with the road, the equipage, the companies in the order of their seniority, the baggage, provisions, munitions of war, and, finally, the droves of animals. 92
Delayed three weeks in crossing the Sabinas, the one considerable stream between Monclova and the Rio Grande, the expedition did not reach the latter river 93 until December 20. On account of its swollen condition, the passage was not begun until after Christmas. Canoes had to be constructed, because those which the Indians made, of wood covered with skin, proved useless for lack of resin. Finally a raft of ten beams floated on barrels was successfully used. Such was the excess of cold, sleet, and snow, Father Peña tells us, that in effecting the crossing the force had to take advantage of rainy days, when the temperature moderated. The passage was finally accomplished by fifty swimmers pulling the raft after them and bearing but six “cargoes” at a time. The expedition was thus delayed till March 23, 1721. Aguayo and Father Espinosa joined the expedition before its crossing, evidently immediately after Christmas, and a few days later, Doctor Joseph Codallos y Rabal, who was coming to Texas as vicar-general of the Bishop of Guadalajara. 94 The expedition was further increased by the companies of Juan Cortinas and Alonso de Cardenas, and a Texas missionary, Benito Sánchez, 95 who was then at the Mission of San Juan Bautista on the Rio Grande.
2. Rumors of St. Denis.—While on the Rio Grande, Aguayo February 2, 1720, received disquieting tidings from Captain Mathías García, of the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar. García had been informed by some Sanas 96 Indians that St. Denis and other Frenchmen, with unknown designs, were in convocation with many Indian nations thirty miles from García's presidio. A council of war, held by Aguayo, immediately despatched one hundred and sixteen men with Captains Tomás de Zubiría and Miguel Colón under Lieutenant-Governor Almazán to investigate the report. In the meantime García had sent out for the same purpose Juan Rodríguez, a chief of the Ranchería Grande Indians, who was then in San Antonio petitioning that a mission be founded for fifty families of his nation. Juan Rodríguez returned February 25, stating that he had gone to the neighborhood of the Brazos, but had not dared to go farther; that he had not seen any of the Indians of the Ranchería Grande, whose settlement he would have passed in the distance he had covered, and who, he supposed, were at the convocation; that this supposition had, in fact, been confirmed by a Sanas Indian, who said that the Ranchería Grande Indians were at St. Denis's convocation, with many other nations, all of whom were well equipped with horses and guns, and that the gathering was between the two branches of the Brazos, above the Téxas road. 97
On account of these disquieting rumors, Aguayo hastened his passage of the Rio Grande, and set out for San Antonio March 24. In the main, his route lay on the camino real, the royal highway, then apparently well established, though now and then the expedition had to make short detours in order to avoid the brush on the road. On April 4 they reached the presidio of San Antonio, and went immediately to the mission of San Antonio de Valero, where their arrival was joyously celebrated. 98
3. Aguayo's Activities at San Antonio.—The expedition was here joined by Father Margil, of the Zacatecan missions, and by Fathers Gabriel Vergara, 99 Joseph Guerra, 100 Joseph Rodríguez, and Brothers Joseph Albadadejo and Joseph Pita. 101 Since it was near the advent of Holy Week, and the troops were in need of rest, Aguayo was prevailed upon to delay his march for a short time. To keep the men busy, however, he sent out an expedition to hunt for the salt deposits said to be near San Antonio, and made several minor raids to check the Indians who infested the nearby districts. He was further anxious to establish amicable relations with the much dreaded Apaches. 102
While still at the Rio Grande, Aguayo had sent forward a company of forty soldiers, as a vanguard, under Captain Domingo Ramón to occupy Espíritu Santo Bay. This company probably came as far as San Antonio with the detachment under Almazán. 103 At any rate, it left that place for Espíritu Santo March 10. Not having heard from it since its departure, on April 4, the day of his arrival at San Antonio, Aguayo despatched four trusty Indians to find out something about it. On the 18th, a lieutenant and four soldiers brought the news that Ramón had taken possession of La Bahía or Espíritu Santo, in the name of His Majesty, and had raised the cross and royal standard on April 4. 104 Ramón reported also that for lack of timber for building a canoe he had as yet not been able to sound the harbor. However, he described the place as a beautiful one, whose harbor could accommodate many ships. The news was duly celebrated at San Antonio. On the 26th the Marquis sent a messenger to the viceroy, informing him that possession had been taken of Espíritu Santo. Further, he assured him that he was ready to resume his march for eastern Texas, but made patent to his excellency the difficulty of keeping the army properly sustained at the distance of four hundred leagues from the base of supplies, and asked permission to start a ship plying between Vera Cruz and La Bahía, offering to bear all the expenses. Presuming that this request would be granted, he wrote at the same time to his attorney in Mexico to buy or rent such a vessel and fit it out with the requisite provisions. 105
4. The Route from San Antonio to the Neches.—On the 10th of May, Aguayo ordered that the expedition be in readiness to start again on the 13th. It had been decided in a council of war to abandon the old Texas road now, where great and many obstacles would be found in the form of brush, lagoons, large overflowing rivers, and in an unbroken course of from fifty to sixty miles through the monte grande, or Cross Timbers. Under the guidance of the Indian chief, Juan Rodríguez, they were to seek another route higher up, where the country was said to be plain and free from brush, where the rivers were divided into many smaller branches, and by which route the Cross Timbers would be avoided. The country through which their chosen route lay was infested with Indian enemies and great care was taken to insure the proper disposition of the military guards on the march.
A study of Aguayo's route may be more profitable if it is compared with the earlier and some of the later courses followed by the expeditions into eastern Texas. 106 So varied and distinct were the early routes broken by the pathfinders, and so profusely and promiscuously were names scattered on the rivers, that it is hard to make any safe generalizations. One of the most patent facts, however, is that the routes moved back from the coast, west, as far as San Antonio, and thence north and east to eastern Texas, a fairly well established road being finally laid out. However, of all the diaries studied no two seem to follow exactly the same course. De León, the leader of the first expedition to eastern Texas (1690), crossed the country far to the south and east, passing the Guadalupe, roughly speaking, in the vicinity of Victoria, turning east to La Bahía, and then northeast to the Téxas country. The expedition under Terán (1691), was the first to break the road from the Hondo to San Antonio, and to cross the San Marcos and Guadalupe as two rivers. He apparently crossed the Colorado near La Grange, the Brazos near Bryan, and the Trinity, just north of Falba in Walker County, about at the point where De León had struck it in 1690. In 1709, Fathers Espinosa and Olivares took the road still farther north, crossing the Colorado not far below Austin; while in 1716, Ramón, after crossing the Colorado near the same point, sought a new route, going as far north as the San Gabriel before turning east to the Téxas country. It will be seen that Aguayo, determined to avoid the monte grande, which started just east of the San Gabriel, led his expedition still farther north, not turning east till he struck the Brazos near Waco, and then going south and east to reach the old highway. 107
Aguayo's route, somewhat in detail, was as follows: On the 13th the long and tedious journey began. Starting northeast, it lay by the irrigating ditch of the mission of San Antonio de Valero, then veered to the east, northeast, when the expedition halted two days on both the Salado and Cíbola creeks. 108
From the Cíbola the expedition traveled over plains, which were described as literally covered with flowers, till on the 17th they crossed three rivers. The first they call San Pascual Baylon, the second they identified as the Guadalupe, and the third they named the San Ybon. 109 The one which they identified as the Guadalupe was undoubtedly the present Comal River, and their crossing was very nearly at the spot where New Braunfels now stands; the one they named the San Ybon was the present Guadalupe. For Peña describes their crossing of the former as being one-fourth of a league from the well known springs that are the source of the Comal, while the latter river he describes as having a deep bed, subject to overflows, with its sources, lying far to the north, as not having then been discovered. The crystalline water of the former, the luxuriant growth, and the surrounding plains, attracted attention to the locality as a suitable place for settlement.
With the route still lying to the northeast, with veerings to the east-north-east, by May 20, they had crossed the San Marcos, 110 not recognizing it by that name, however. Its lower branches they named las Penuelas, th