Vol. XV OCTOBER, 1911 No. 2
The publication committee and the editor disclaim responsibility for views expressed by contributors to The Quarterly.
Since 1869, when W. W. H. Davis published his popular history of The Spanish Conquest of New Mexico, practically no new light has been thrown upon the events attending the revolt of the Pueblo Indians of that province in 1680. For the preparation of that part of his book dealing with this subject, Davis used principally the Extractos of the original autos of the revolt and of the first attempt at reconquest, which he found at Santa Fé. But there have recently come to light in the Mexican archives the originals of the autos themselves, and a comparison of them with the Extractos shows that the latter are relatively very meager indeed. This fact, together with the renewed and growing interest in the history of the Southwest, is ample justification for studying anew this important period in the Spanish régime in New Mexico.
The autos referred to consist of documents drawn up, in official and authentic form during the progress of the revolt, the defence by the Spaniards, the retreat, the reorganization at Paso del Norte (Juarez), and the reconquest. They comprise acts of the Cabildo of Santa Fé; sworn declarations of witnesses to events; orders of the governor; letters written by him, Father Ayeta, and other persons prominent in the period; proceedings of juntas, or councils, held to discuss the difficulties; acts of the government at Mexico, etc. Those covering the period 1680-1682 consist of 243 folios, or twice that number of pages, small folio size, of original manuscript. They are contained in two expedientes, or groups, of documents. The first is entitled: Auttos tocantes; al Alsamiento de los Yndios de la Provincia de la Nueba Mexico. 2 The title of the second is: Autos Pertenecientes a el alçamiento de los Yndios de la Proua del Nuevo Mexico y la entrada, Y subçesos de ella que se hiço para su recuperacion. 3 These documents were found several years ago in the archives of Mexico by Dr. Herbert E. Bolton, and a complete transcript of them, as well as of those for the period following, have been secured by him. 4 The two expedientes are cited hereinafter as Auttos tocantes and Autos Pertenecientes, respectively.
There are indications that Bandelier, the authority on matters pertaining to early New Mexico, has had access to these documents, but as he has not yet revealed the source or the exact nature of his materials for this period, this fact has not been determined. 5 At any rate, no published history of the revolt has been based upon the original autos. In contrast with these, the Extractos, Davis's principal source, contain only summaries or fragments of documents selected from the whole mass of originals, and in bulk are only one-eighth or one-tenth as full as the originals, while the selection is not always the best. 6
With these and other available materials at my disposal, my ultimate purpose is to give a fuller and more critical account of the revolt as well as of the reconquest than either Davis or Bancroft were able to give with the sources at their command. The aim of this paper, however, which is only a portion of a larger and as yet incomplete monograph, is to tell only the story of the organization and the outbreak of the revolt, together with the defensive measures at once adopted by the Spaniards. It is not purposed even to discuss, except in a summary and by no means final manner, the actual conditions of the province at the time of the revolt, nor the causes and events leading up to the outbreak. The sources used in this paper consist largely of the original autos, as described above, for the period from August 9, 1680, to the 21st of that month. Some, however, dated as late as the winter of 1680-1681, at which time Otermín was attempting a reconquest of the province, have also been used. Other materials have been secured from the Bancroft Collection. To a few documents for the period known to exist I have not yet had access, but hope that they may be available for the revised and completed monograph. 7
That period of New Mexican history which may be called the era of discovery and exploration lasted from 1540 to 1596. 8 During those years there were several important exploring expeditions into what is now New Mexico, the first and most significant of which was that of Coronado, 1540-42. Nothing permanent resulted from this expedition, and partly because the Spaniards were disappointed at not having found the great wealth which they had come to believe existed in that country, New Mexico was practically forgotten for nearly forty years. With the expedition of Father Rodríguez in 1581, however, interest was revived, and from then until 1596 there were several expeditions into the territory, the most important being that of Espejo in the years 1582-83. The chief significance attached to these later entradas, aside from the revival of interest, and additional ethnological and geographical knowledge gained, lies in the fact that a shorter route to the New Mexican pueblos was opened up by crossing northern Chihuahua to the Rio Grande, and then proceeding up that river.
The actual conquest and occupation of New Mexico took place in the years 1598-99 under Don Juan de Oñate, a rich and prominent citizen of Nueva Galicia. Omitting details, which are well known, it is sufficient here to state that according to the best authorities Oñate, with about four hundred men, of whom one hundred and thirty were accompanied by their families, reached the country of the Pueblo Indians in the early summer of 1598. In July of that year they formally took possession of the province at a junta of the representatives from thirty-four pueblos, and in a short while the establishment of Spanish authority in New Mexico was complete.
The history of New Mexico as a Spanish province from 1598 to 1680 is little known in detail, due to the fact that when the natives rose in revolt in the latter year they captured the archives covering the events of that period and burned them in the plaza of Santa Fé. From 1598 to 1620 the quarrels between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities were the most noteworthy incidents, and in the end they came near bringing destruction to the whole colony. By 1630, however, the affairs were on a firmer footing, and besides the fifty friars who ministered to many thousand Christianized natives—more than 60,000 according to Benavides 9—there was also a garrison of two hundred and fifty soldiers stationed at Santa Fé. For the period from 1630 to 1680 12few authoritative sources have as yet come to light, and only occasional references to what was going on. During this time there were several expeditions to the Texas frontier, while the internal dissensions were renewed. But most important of all was the growing discontent of the natives. Interfered with in their economic and religious activities, they frequently plotted how they might throw off the yoke of oppression, and between 1645 and 1675 there were several attempts at armed rebellion. All of these, however, were easily suppressed, and it was not until 1680 that a revolt was successfully put into operation.
In this paper only a bare mention of what seems to have been the underlying causes of the revolt will be attempted, the full discussion being reserved for the complete story. 10 In the first place, as noted above, the efforts of the Spaniards to suppress not only the religious beliefs but also the ancient habits and customs of the Indians in other respects, and to make them conform to European methods of living, created friction between the two races. The Indians, however, continued well grounded in their native religious beliefs and practices, 11 and the Spaniards found it practically impossible to suppress them either by the number of missionaries brought in, or by the severity of the punishments inflicted. In 1675 these “superstitious practices” reached such alarming extremes that Governor Treviño determined to stamp them out for good. Having captured forty-seven medicine men, who were alleged to be guilty of sorcery and withcraft, he hanged three of them, as a warning to future soothsayers, and inflicted severe punishment upon the others, among whom was a certain native named Popé. Davis 11 has a wrong impression of the part which Popé took in the affairs of 1675. He makes the statement that this Indian was the leader of a band of seventy Tewa warriors who went down to Santa Fé to demand the release of the forty-seven imprisoned medicine men. Popé, however, was one of the medicine men whose release the Tewa warriors effectively demanded of Governor Treviño. 13 The story of the activities of Popé from that time until 1680 are most interesting. On being released from captivity in 1675, he returned to his pueblo, smarting under the punishment he had received, and full of resentment for the Spaniards. He at once began making preparations for a general revolt, and being driven from San Juan by the continued persecutions of the maestro de campo, Francisco Xavier, he moved his base of operations to Taos. There he arrogated unto himself supernatural power, claiming to be directed in all his movements by three infernal spirits named Caudi, Tilini, and Tleume, who visited him in the estufa of that pueblo. These spirits, it was believed, were working for a revolt in conjunction with the lieutenant of their war god, Montezuma, in the far off land of Po-he-yemu. The combined influences of all these beliefs cannot be overestimated. Other miscellaneous influences, such as the offering of prizes to the warriors by the chiefs; the belief that the Spaniards could all be driven out of the country; and the almost universal desire to return to their ancient customs, all operated to make the revolt of the Indians general.
Before taking up the subject of the organization of the revolt, a few words are necessary on the general conditions in New Mexico in 1680. At that time there were approximately 2,800 Spanish inhabitants in the province. Of this number the majority were settlers of the southern district, known as Rio Abajo, while the rest were for the most part living in the vicinity of the villa of Santa Fé. The occupation of the people was largely stock raising and intensive agriculture, and, while there was no regular presidio, there were a number of regular soldiers with headquarters at the villa. Besides the settlers and soldiers, there were the thirty-two. 14 Franciscan missionaries distributed throughout the province. The Governor and Captain-General was Don Antonio de Otermín, while his appointee, Alonso García, served as Lieutenant-Governor and Captain-General in Rio Abajo.
The Indian situation deserves a somewhat fuller treatment. The number of Christianized natives was about 16,000. This did not include the heathen tribes who were allied with the revolters, and who occupied territory extending more than two hundred leagues from Santa Fé. 15 The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico comprised three linguistic groups or stocks—the Zuñian, the Tanoan, and the Keresean (Queres). The Zuñian family occupied three pueblos in the extreme western part of New Mexico, and its total population numbered at that time about 2,500 inhabitants. The other two families were located in the valley of the Rio Grande, where they were divided into a number of tribes, or nations, as the Spaniards spoke of them, each of which was practically independent of any tribal or national domination, and free to act as its own councils saw fit. Of these two families the Tanoan was the largest, and comprised the five important tribes of the Piros, Tigua (Tiguas), Tanos (Tagnos), Jemez (Xemes or Hemes), and Tewa (Teguas) Indians. 16 The Keresean family was not nearly so large. It was divided into the Western and Eastern groups, the former comprising the inhabitants of the pueblo of Acoma and its environs, and the latter occupying the country north of the junction of the Rio Grande and Rio Jemez, and commonly known as the Queres nation. It is thus seen that there were six important tribe-nations in the Rio Grande valley. Of these only the Piros remained friendly to the Spaniards. Other details concerning individual tribes with citations of sources are given farther on.
No story connected with the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico would be adequate without some description, however brief and incomplete, of the large communal village-houses of these people, known as pueblos, which have excited the admiration and wonder of civilized men since Coronado's day. These houses, several of which are still standing, much as they were in 1680, were frequently from three to seven stories high, and were built of adobe brick, stone, and mortar with walls several feet thick. The ground floor of a pueblo was used only for storerooms and granaries for the whole tribe. They had no doors, windows, or other openings in the walls, the only means of access being by ladders to the flat roof above, and then down through a trap door. Several feet back from the edge of the roof of the first story were erected the walls of the second story, and above it similarly, in the manner of retreating terraces, were the other stories, decreasing in size as the pueblo rose. These upper stories had doors and windows opening out on the flat roofs of the ones just below them, though the only means of access from one story to another consisted of ladders, just as these were used also in getting to the first roof. The object in this was purely a defensive one, since the Indians could pull up their ladders behind them and thus convert their pueblo into a veritable fortress, from the terraces of which they could shoot arrows and hurl stones at an enemy without much danger to themselves. Some of these pueblos had as many as six hundred apartments, and were easily able to hold one thousand or more persons. Sometimes there were three or four of these buildings so arranged as to form a square or open court between them, in the center of which was the estufa, or religious and social meeting place of the whole tribe. It is thus seen that in the construction of their pueblos the Indians of New Mexico combined with the idea of defense that of adapting their houses to their communal system of government. With danger from the wandering and warlike Apache and Navajo Indians removed, however, and with modern influences surrounding these people, many of the pueblos are now being abandoned and are rapidly falling into decay.
1. The Plans of the Allies
The many revolutionary meetings of the chiefs and medicine men of the northern pueblos and the personal influence of Popé finally resulted in the formulation of plans for a general revolt. The greatest secrecy, however, was enjoined. Only the leaders were entrusted with the plot until a short while before the outbreak; and because Popé believed that his own son-in-law, Nicolás Bua, Indian governor of the pueblo of San Juan, was planning to inform the Spaniards of their evil intentions, he killed him in his own house. 17 The plans as arranged were for the Indians of the different pueblos all over the province at a set time, suddenly to seize the arms of the unsuspecting Spaniards in their midst, fall upon them, and put an end to as many of them as possible, sparing neither men, women, children, nor missionaries. 18 All the roads were to be guarded and every avenue of escape blocked for the inhabitants of the outlying districts; while the villa of Santa Fé was to be cut off from the more populous settlements of Rio Abajo, by the occupation of a district of more than thirty leagues extent in the center of the province. 19 With all the pueblos, mountain slopes, and paths infested by Pueblo warriors, who were to be aided by their ancient enemies, the Apaches, 20 it was thought that the destruction of the Governor, the people of the villa, and the few settlers from outside who might take refuge there, would be inevitable, while those who escaped the general slaughter in Rio Abajo would be killed by the allies of the Pueblos, the Mansos Indians to the south, 21 near El Paso. Having meted out their vengeance on the settlers of the different jurisdictions, robbed their houses, driven off the horses and cattle from their haciendas and estancias, burned the churches, and profaned and destroyed their sacred contents, the whole body of warriors from all over the province was to assemble at Santa Fé, 22 where the final scenes of the general slaughter, as they thought, would be enacted, and the last vestige of Spanish authority in New Mexico overthrown, after which the natives would return to their ancient customs.
2. The Arrangement of the Date, and the Notification of the Pueblos
With the plans for the rebellion formulated, and with practically all the natives of the entire province ready to obey his commands, Popé had now only to name the day. Acting, as he said, under the orders of the three infernal spirits in the estufa of Taos, 23 he sent out a cord with some knots tied in it to represent the number of days that should intervene before the revolt. Davis 24 erroneously states that these knots designated the 10th as the day for the uprising, while Bancroft 25 is under the impression that the 13th was meant. The evidence shows conclusively, however, that the knots indicated the 11th of August as the date set for the outbreak of the revolt. 26 The cord was carried from pueblo to pueblo by the swiftest runners, the chiefs of each receiving it and passing it on to those in the next. 27 In this way the message sped through the whole province as far south as Isleta, 28 only the Piros nation being slighted. The bearers were enjoined to the strictest secrecy, and were threatened with death if they revealed to improper persons the significance of the cord. 29
3. The Discovery of the Plot, and the Premature Uprising
Notwithstanding the strict secrecy that was enjoined upon the bearers of the knotted cord, the plot was discovered on the 9th of August, only two days before the uprising was to take place. Davis says that “two days before the time fixed upon, two Indians of Tezuque went down to Santa Fé, and divulged the conspiracy to the Spanish governor. They were parties to it, but betrayed their country and the cause to the enemy.” 30 In this statement the writer has again conveyed a wrong impression, for the two Indians of Tesuque did not voluntarily go down to Santa Fé to divulge the plans of the allies. The facts in the case are as follows: On August 9 Otermín learned from the Tanos, San Marcos, and La Ciénega chiefs that two Indians named Catua and Omtua had brought them the order to take part in the contemplated revolt. Immediately upon learning this, Otermín despatched the maestro de campo, Francisco Gomez Robledo, to arrest Catua and Omtua, and by him on the same day they were carried as prisoners before Governor. Having been duly sworn to tell the truth, these Indians stated all that they knew concerning the revolt. They testified that two knots in a cord, which signified the number of days that were to intervene before the revolt, had been given to them to carry in all secrecy to the Tanos, San Marcos, and La Ciénega chiefs; that with it they carried the threat of the allies that any Indian or pueblo not taking part in the revolt would be destroyed; and that the chiefs of some of the pueblos had been unwilling to receive the message which they carried. Concerning the causes of the revolt they stated that they knew nothing, since they had not taken part in the councils of the old men of the northern pueblos, where the plans for the revolt were formulated. 31
The capture of Catua and Omtua created consternation among the other natives of Tesuque, and, believing that their plans were discovered, they resolved upon haste as being their only hope to successfully carry out the revolt. Accordingly, it was decided that the plans should be put into execution prematurely that night. 32 It took time to spread the news, but practically all the northern pueblos, including San Juan and Taos, were notified in time to begin the revolt at about daybreak of the morning of Saturday, August 10. 33 In the more distant pueblos, however, as Santo Domingo and Jemez, and those of Rio Abajo, the attack began later in the day, since it took the messengers from Tesuque longer to reach them. 34 It is plain, therefore, that the statement of Otermín that at one hour of the same day the revolt began all over the province, though essentially the fact, is not literally true. 35
The actual outbreak of the revolt, as has been stated, took place on the morning of the 10th of August. It is my plan now to set forth this revolt as it actually occurred in the different pueblos. In many cases the evidence is far from being as full as is necessary for a clear understanding, while in other places there are conflicting statements not a little confusing. From all the available data bearing on each pueblo, however, an attempt has been made to put together the story for that particular place. The treatment of the subject has been from a purely geographical standpoint, beginning at the north, the hotbed of discontent, and proceeding south, though it has been found that in most cases the geographical divisions agree with the tribal.
1. At Taos and Picurís
In the extreme northern part of the province of New Mexico were the two large and populous Tigua pueblos of Taos and Picurís (Pecuries). These towns were only three leagues apart, the former being situated in a fine valley, the latter upon a height. The native populations in 1680 numbered 2,000 and 3,000 souls respectively. 36 Being of the same tribal stock, these two pueblos were closely and harmoniously allied in all their movements. A previous attempt of the Taoans to free themselves from Spanish rule, which attempt had been harshly suppressed, 37 had doubtless taught them the strength and value of unity. In the organization of the present revolt the chiefs and medicine men of these pueblos, among whom El Saca of Taos and Don Luis Tupatú of Picurís 38 deserve especial mention, played an important part in the councils of the allies. It was to Taos, moreover, that Popé moved his base of operations, when driven from his own pueblo by the threats of the Secretary of Government and War, Francisco Xavier, who desired to punish him for his alleged continued witchcraft. 39 In an estufa of Taos also were the three infernal spirits who were supposed to be guiding the movements of Popé, and it was from here that the knotted cord, calling the Indians to action on a certain day, was despatched to the other pueblos of the province. 40
The Spanish settlers in the vicinity of these pueblos were not altogether without warning that the Indians were planning a revolt, but at these places, as at the others where the news leaked out, there was confusion as to the date agreed upon; and whereas the revolt was not expected until the night of the 13th, it actually took place,
41 as has been seen, on the 10th of August. Early in the morning of that day the Taoans and their allies, the Apaches,
fell upon the settlers and missionaries of the valley, numbering seventy or more persons in all,
42 and, in the general slaughter that followed, only two escaped. These were the sarjentos mayores Sebastian de Herrera and Don Fernando de Chávez, who, leaving their wives and children dead in the pueblo, by fighting and defending themselves as best they could, finally made their way through the devastated districts, and, on the seventh day after the general convocation, came in sight of the villa, which was then being besieged by a large force of the allied nations.
43 Being unable to enter, they continued on their way south, and on the 20th of the month joined García's division of refugees below Isleta.
44 At Picurís there was the same general slaughter of Spaniards and missionaries, there being no record in my sources of any that escaped from there, nor, in fact, of the number that were living there at that time. In both Taos and Picurís the churches were either burned or profaned, the fields and houses of the Spaniards plundered, and many other devastations committed by the Indians.
45
Meanwhile the Taos and Picurís Indians, having meted out vengeance on the Spaniards in their midst, and having laid waste their fields and other property, joined the Tewa Indians and moved on to Santa Fé, which was already under siege by the Pecos and Tanos Indians. They reached it just in time to furnish much needed reinforcements for the allies. 46
2. The Revolt of the Tewa Nation
(1) Location, Population, and Revolutionary Activities of the Tewa Pueblos.—Extending north and northwest from the villa of Santa Fé to the junction of Rio Grande and Rio Chama, forming a kind of rough oval, though with no well defined boundaries, was, and still is, the country of the Tewa Indians. 47 In 1680 the population of this nation amounted to about 2,200 people, distributed among six pueblos and two small settlements. Three of the pueblos, San Ildefonso, Santa Clara, and San Juan were on the west bank of the Rio Grande. Of these the largest was that of San Ildefonso, whose population was about eight hundred souls, 48 and, strange to say, it is the only pueblo of this nation whose part in the revolt receives no mention in the documentary sources used, except that one of its chiefs, Francisco, is mentioned as having been a colleague of Popé. 49 The other pueblos, Tesuque, Pojoaque (Posoaque), and Nambé (Nanvé)—the population of the latter included that of the small outlying settlements of Jacona and Cuyamunque 50 (Cuya Mungue)—were all east of the river, and north of the villa of Santa Fé. With respect to its allies—the populous Jemez pueblos to the southwest, Pecos to the southeast, and Taos and Picurís to the north 51—the Tewa nation, therefore, occupied a most strategic position for organizing and directing the revolutionary movements; and to its inhabitants must be given the chief credit not only for the organization of the revolt, but for its having been so successfully carried out, even when the discovery of the plans called for immediate and premature action on their part.
(2) The Outbreak at Tesuque and Cuyamunque.—About two leagues north of the villa of Santa Fé was the small pueblo of Tesuque, containing some two hundred inhabitants. Of all the Tewa pueblos none was more revolutionary than this, whose chiefs had long occupied a place in the councils of the allies. 52 It is largely to the credit of this pueblo that plans for an immediate revolt were determined upon when the two messengers, Catua and Omtua, were arrested in Tesuque on August 9. For, believing that the conspiracy was discovered, the Indians of Tesuque notified the other pueblos in the province in time to begin the revolt at practically the same hour as had been the original plan. Moreover, Tesuque itself seems to have been the pueblo to strike the first blow in the revolt, for as early as the evening of Friday the 9th—doubtless after the arrest of Catua and Omtua—a Spaniard named Cristóbal de Herrera was killed there, though no details are recorded for this incident. 53 The real character of their determination, however, is shown by their attack the next morning on Father Juan Pio and a soldier named Pedro Hidalgo. According to the statement of the latter, before daybreak on the morning of August 10, he started out from Santa Fé to Tesuque, accompanying Father Pio, who was going there to say mass. 54 On reaching that pueblo they found it entirely deserted. But, proceeding, they overtook the inhabitants of Tesuque and Cuyamunque, 55 about a quarter of a league from the former pueblo, where they found many of the Indians painted in war colors, and armed with bows, arrows, lances, and shields. Father Pio, when he had drawn near to them, boldly asked, “What does this mean, my children, are you crazy? Do not disquiet yourselves, for I will aid you and will die a thousand deaths for you.” And passing quickly on to summon back to the pueblo the main body of the people, who were going toward the mountain, in order that he might say mass for them, he entered a ravine, while Hidalgo was stationed on a knoll to intercept any who might pass that way. While waiting there Hidalgo saw an Indian named El Obi come out of the ravine with a shield which the priest had carried, and also a little later he saw the interpreter of the pueblo, named Nicolás, painted with clay, and bespattered with blood, come out from the same place. These and others approached him, caught his horse by the bridle reins, and took away his sword and hat. Fearing injury at their hands, he seized his arquebus, put spurs to his horse, and was able to escape to the plain below, even dragging for some distance those who held on to him, while those from above shot many arrows at him, without effect. The priest did not come out, and Hidalgo judged, from what he had seen and experienced, that he must have been killed, and so hastened back to the villa, reaching there about seven o'clock in the morning. 56
(3) The Outbreak at Nambé and Pojoaque.—Closely associated with the neighboring pueblos, and with their chiefs represented in the councils of the allies, were the two small pueblos of Nambé and Pojoaque. The latter was one of the smallest of the Tewa pueblos, though its population at that time cannot be determined, and it was situated less than a league west of Nambé. The pueblo of Nambé was about three leagues from Tesuque, and, including the nearby settlements of Jacona and Cuyamunque, had a population of six hundred Indians. The Indians of Cuyamunque, as has already been noted, joined the Tesuque Indians in the revolt, and, though no mention is made of the fact, it is probable that the small number at the settlement of Jacona joined those of the pueblo of Nambé, doubtless feeling insecure at such a time of unrest.
In both Nambé and Pojoaque (for which the available records are very meagre), the revolt began at about the same time as in the other pueblos. When the maestro de campo, Francisco Gomez, who was despatched by Otermín with a squad of soldiers to reconnoiter the Tewa pueblos, returned to the villa on August 12, he reported among the dead at Nambé, Fray Tomás de Torres, Sebastian de Torres and his wife, and others whose names he did not give. At the same time he found that in the pueblo of Pojoaque the Indians had killed Captain Francisco Ximenes and his family, and also Don Joseph de Goitia; while, among others, Doña Pertonilla de Salas and her eight or ten children were missing. 57
(4) The Outbreak at Santa Clara and San Juan.—Situated on the west bank of the Rio Grande, only a few leagues apart, were the pueblos of Santa Clara and San Juan, while nearby was the Spanish settlement of La Cañada. 58 These two pueblos contained in 1680 a population of three hundred Indians each, and both were religious visitas of San Ildefonso, the large pueblo of their nation further south. In the revolt both Santa Clara and San Juan took a leading part, it being at the latter pueblo that the first plans were formulated by Popé and the other northern chiefs, before Popé was driven from there to Taos by the persecutions of Francisco Xavier. But, notwithstanding the active part played by these pueblos both before the revolt and afterward, the story of the outbreak as it actually occurred in them is very incomplete, and the few facts that are recorded must not be taken as a complete narrative of the events at those places. It is merely the best possible with the sources available.
The only recorded incidents of the uprising in Santa Clara took place about dawn on the morning of Saturday, the 10th of August, when the Indians of that pueblo attacked two soldiers, Marcos Ramos and Felipe López, who were in an escort with six other men led by Captain Francisco de Anaya. The two soldiers in question were slain in the pueblo, while the others, who were guarding a herd of horses on the outside, were able to escape, 59 though the wife and children of Anaya were carried off by the Indians, while a youth named Bartolomé Griego was later reported as having been killed. 60
Of the outbreak at San Juan no specific details are given, and the only martyr priest mentioned as having met his fate there was Father Juan de Morales; 61 yet we may judge that the scene there was of the same character as that at Santa Clara.
Enough has already been said to show that it was the aim of the Indians to utterly destroy all, and at San Juan and the other Tewa pueblos there was practically nothing to obstruct the vengeance of the natives as it ran its full course. In the whole nation more than thirty Spaniards were known to have been killed, while a number of others were carried off and never heard of again; 62 and there as elsewhere the churches were profaned, the houses and haciendas robbed, and many other devastations committed.
(5) The Escape of the Spaniards at La Cañada.—Of the number of Spaniards living among the Tewa Indians in 1680 no record is given, nor is there any record of any having escaped except those who were able to assemble at La Cañada. Following the outbreak of the revolt the alcalde mayor of that jurisdiction, Luis de Quintana, gathered as many of the settlers as possible at his house, where they prepared to defend themselves. From there on August 10 they sent news of the revolt of the Tewa Indians to Otermín by two messengers from Taos, who halted at La Cañada for a short while on their way to the villa, having been despatched thither by the alcalde mayor of that pueblo with further news of the revolt and conspiracy of the Indians. 63 Davis 64 says that between the 10th and 13th of August the Indians attacked La Cañada, massacred the inhabitants, and drove off the stock, while Bancroft 65 says that such was probably the case. Otermín, however, settles this question by stating that all these people were able to reach the villa on August 13th. 66 A few days after this, the two survivors of Taos, Sebastian de Herrera and Don Fernando de Chávez passed La Cañada on their flight to the south, but they found the whole district entirely depopulated and in ruins. 67
(6) Defensive and Offensive Measures of the Tewa Indians.—Meanwhile all the inhabitants of the Tewa pueblos from Tesuque to San Juan, having struck the decisive blow for their freedom in their respective pueblos, now united in two divisions, one in the pueblo of Santa Clara, and the other in the Sierra del Arroyo de Tesuque, where they fortified themselves. 68 With those at Santa Clara were gathered many of the rebels of the Jemez nation. In the squares of the pueblo they collected the property of the dead Spaniards, including a great many cattle, executing, as was said by the erstwhile rulers, all such atrocities with unparalleled shamelessness. 69 Moreover, guards were stationed along the roads in order to intercept any attempting to escape, and, in this way, every avenue leading to the villa was blocked. 70 Having thus completely rid themselves of the Spaniards living in their midst, and having robbed their fields and homes, all the Tewa warriors united with those of Taos and Picurís, and joined in the siege of Santa Fé. 71
3. The Revolt of the Tanos Pueblos, and of San Marcos, La Ciénega, and Pecos
(1) Location, Population, and Racial Affiliations of these Pueblos.—Directly south of the villa of Santa Fé was the country of the Tanos nation, containing the three pueblos of Galisteo, San Cristóbal, and San Lázaro. Southwest of the villa, and bordering on the district of the Queres pueblos, were the two pueblos of San Marcos and La Ciénega, containing a mixed population of Tanos and Queres Indians, 72 while seven leagues southeast of the villa was the large and influential pueblo of Pecos. It is interesting to note that while Pecos took a very active part with the Tewa and other northern pueblos in the organization of the revolt, nevertheless, after the outbreak, the Pecos warriors co-operated with those of Tanos, San Marcos, and La Ciénega, all of which were closely connected from a geographic and political standpoint, though racially, as has just been shown, there was no close connection. Of the Tanos pueblos Galisteo was the largest, 73 containing a population of eight hundred Indians, though Hodge 74 thinks this number included the inhabitants of San Cristóbal, which was a visita of Galisteo. Of the other pueblos in this group, with the exception of Pecos, San Marcos was the most important, having a native population of six hundred. La Ciénega and San Lázaro were its visitas. Concerning Pecos in 1680 little can be learned, though, according to Hodge, 75 its population at that time was approximately two thousand. 76 Being near the Tanos pueblos, Pecos doubtless exerted a strong influence over them, for in Coronado's time it was the boast of this pueblo that it had never been conquered, and yet could conquer any of its neighbors. 77
(2) Hostility of the Tanos Chiefs, and the Friendly Attitude of the Natives toward the Revolt.—Perhaps the most noteworthy point in connection with the revolt of these Indians is that, although the people as a whole seem to have been in a very revolutionary attitude, their chiefs were hostile to, and refused co-operation in, the execution of the plans of the allies. Notwithstanding that the captains of the Tanos had treated of rebellion for more than twelve years, 78 yet when Catua and Omtua, the Indian ambassadors from Tesuque, came to announce the plans that had been agreed upon, they found the chiefs of the Tanos, to all of whom they spoke, 79 none too enthusiastic about the revolt, while the Indians of San Cristóbal were unwilling to give assent to the message which they brought, calling as it did for a general revolt. 80 As has been stated, the real date of the planned revolt was doubtless withheld by Catua and Omtua when they realized the opposition among the leading men. The chiefs at San Cristóbal at once advised those of the other pueblos of their unwillingness to join in the rebellion, 81 and on the 9th of August the governors and captains of the Tanos, San Marcos, and La Ciénega Indians appeared in the villa to give an account of the treason, saying that it was to be put into execution on the night of the 13th. 82 The same opposition must have been met among the chiefs of Pecos at about the same time, for on the very day that news came to Otermín from Fray Juan Bernal at Galisteo of the plans as told by the Tanos chiefs, he also received a similar report from Fray Fernando de Velasco, the minister guardian at Pecos. 83
The questions now arise, why did the chiefs of the Tanos and neighboring pueblos announce to Otermín that the day set for the revolt was the 13th, when as a matter of fact it was executed on the morning of the 10th, and why did the inhabitants of these pueblos take part in the revolt in spite of the unwillingness of their chiefs to do so? The explanation of the first of these points has already been attempted (see page 103, note 4) in another connection, and the following explanation of the second, while largely inferential, seems reasonable. Since the Tanos pueblos and their neighbors did take an active part in the revolt, it is probable that the main body of the people were desirous of joining the allies from the very first, though their chiefs were not, and accordingly, when they departed for Santa Fé to divulge the plans to Otermín, the main body of the people, either because they were really desirous of revolting, or through fear of the threat which Catua and Omtua brought them from the allies to the effect that the Indian or pueblo which did not join in the revolt would be destroyed, 84 or for some other reason, took matters into their own hands, fell into line with the other revolters throughout the whole province, and, as will be seen, carried out their part of the plans in no half-hearted way.
(3) The Outbreak at Galisteo.—Following the news that the Indians of the province were planning a general convocation, a number of Spaniards living among the Tanos Indians assembled at the pueblo of Galisteo on August 9 in anticipation of any possible danger. But their number and strength were insignificant compared with that of the rebel natives, and as a result not one escaped. 85 The missionaries are the first mentioned among those slain, 86 Father Antonio and Fray Domingo de Bera being killed in the pueblo, while in a field in sight of it a similar fate befell Fray Fernando de Velasco and Fray Manuel Tinoco, minister guardians of Pecos and San Marcos, who were doubtless going to Galisteo to determine upon some action for the expected revolt of August 13. Next the Indians took possession of the cattle and property of the convent, and then falling upon the Spaniards, killed Captain Joseph Nieto, Juan de Leiva, Nicolás de Leiva, their wives and sons, robbed at the same time their haciendas, and later carried off three of the women. These three women, whom Pedro García designated as his mistresses 87 (amas), were named Lucía, María, and Juana, and they were held in captivity until after the siege of Santa Fé. In this siege the losses of the Tanos were so heavy in killed and wounded that in revenge the warriors who returned slew these captives, and likewise another girl, named Dorotea, the daughter of the maestro de campo, Pedro de Leiva.
(4) The Revolt in the Other Pueblos.—All that can be learned from the documents of the revolt at the other pueblos in this group is that after the uprising was agreed upon it was the aim of the Indians to kill all the Spaniards and missionaries among them, and, to encourage their warriors in this work, they were promised one woman for every Spaniard killed. This does not mean, as might be inferred, that they promised Spanish women for wives. Having made this offer, they ordered the rosaries to be taken off and burned, 88 after which the massacres began. At Pecos, where the chiefs had planned for the revolt with the Tewa, Taos, Picurís, and Jemez Indians for a long time, 89 the only death specifically reported was that of Fray Juan de Pedrosa, 90 though none are mentioned as having escaped, and the outrages perpetrated there, as at many of the other pueblos, must simply be taken for granted.
(5) The Escape of the Spaniards at Los Cerrillos.—The number of Spaniards in the Tanos and neighboring districts in 1680 is not recorded, though if any escaped the revolt of that year they were doubtless among the refugees at Los Cerrillos. 91 These people, mentioned as being “from the estancias and haciendas of Los Serrillos,” and whose numbers are not given, were defending themselves in the house of the sarjento mayor, Vernabe Marquez, when on the 12th of August their situation became critical, and they sent notice of their condition to the Governor, asking that aid be furnished them in order that they might be able to join him in Santa Fé. 92 Otermín despatched the necessary aid to them that night, and they and the Spaniards at La Cañada are the only two bodies of refugees that are mentioned by Otermín as being able to join him in the villa after the outbreak of August 10. 93
4. The Revolt of the Queres and Jemez Indians
(1) Location and Population of their Pueblos.—Occupying a central position in the northern Rio Grande valley and extending from the pueblo of Santo Domingo on the east to the Jemez River on the west, and from the junction of that river with the Rio Grande in the south to the Tewa nation in the north was the country of the Queres and Jemez Indians, which for administrative purposes the Spaniards organized into one jurisdiction, known as “La Jurisdicion de Yndios Xemes y Queres.” 94 Of the Queres pueblos Cochití, Santo Domingo, and San Felipe were situated on the Rio Grande; Santa Ana and Sia, two other small Queres pueblos were on the north bank of the lower Rio Jemez; while sixty miles west of the Rio Grande settlements was another large pueblo of that tribe, called Acoma. Cochití, the most northern of the valley pueblos, was on the west bank of the Rio Grande, and contained in 1680 a population of three hundred natives. 95 Three leagues south, though on the opposite bank of the river, was the pueblo of Santo Domingo, containing a population of one hundred and fifty Indians. Here was located one of the oldest and best convents in the province. Two leagues south of Santo Domingo was the pueblo of San Felipe, 96 the population of which, including that of the small pueblo of Santa Ana was six hundred. The population of Sia cannot be determined, while Acoma, which contained about fifteen hundred Indians, and which was the largest of all the Keresean pueblos, was too far removed from the sphere of activity of the valley pueblos to exert much, if any, influence upon them. It would thus be safe to say that the total population of the Queres taking an active part in the revolt of 1680 was approximately twelve hundred.
Concerning the Jemez pueblos, mention has already been made of the fact that Pecos was of that nation, and the part which it took in the affairs of 1680 and in the events leading up to them has been noticed. The only other large Jemez pueblo was that of San Diego de Jemez, the population of which, including that of five smaller pueblos, was about five thousand. These Indians according to Hodge abandoned their pueblos after the introduction by the Spaniards of improved methods of irrigation, since in that period their chief enemy, the Navajos, were not troublesome, and the pueblos were not needed for defense, while smaller settlements nearer their irrigated fields were more suitable.
(2) The Revolt at Cochití and San Felipe.—For the events of the revolt in the pueblo of Cochití practically nothing is known. No mention whatever is made of any Spaniards having visited it after the general outbreak and prior to their departure from the province, nor was there any Indian testimony taken that throws any light on the events attending the revolt there, except the statement of an Indian ambassador at the pueblo of Jemez on August 10 to the effect that all the Spaniards at Cochití, Santo Domingo, and San Felipe had been killed. 97
For the outbreak at San Felipe the only other contemporary reference is the statement of Otermín that when passed by him on his retreat down the river, that pueblo was found deserted. 98 The testimony of two natives of San Felipe who were captured the next year by Otermín, however, is interesting not only in regard to the events as they occurred there, but also for the light that it throws on the whole situation. These two Indians, who were brothers, and whose names were Juan and Francisco Lorenzo, were living at the time of the revolt on a small ranch near the pueblo of San Felipe. According to their testimony, on Saturday, “the glorious day of San Lorenzo,” they both went peaceably and as Christians to the pueblo to hear the padre say mass. But they were surprised on reaching San Felipe to be seized and held as prisoners in the plaza, while a number of the natives set out for Santo Domingo to kill, as was told them, the alcalde, mayor, the missionaries, and the rest of the people who might be there, as indeed they did. And that same evening, near prayer time, there arrived at the pueblo their elder brother named Bartolomé Naranjo, whom the Indians approached and asked if he would be on their side in helping to kill all the Spaniards and missionaries, to which their brother replied: “You are crazy in what you do, and I do not wish to join you because it is not right.” Thereupon the other Indians seized him and “treacherously” killed him. And these Indians stated further that the cause of the revolt as they heard it was that Francisco Xavier, and the sarjentos mayores Luis de Quintana and Diego López would not let them alone, and burned their estufas, and that the order to revolt came to San Felipe from the pueblos of the Tewa, having been planned, as was generally said by a native of San Juan, named Popé. 99
(3) The Revolt at Santo Domingo.—For Santo Domingo and the outlying districts the records are fuller, and quite a vivid picture of the revolt as it occurred there can be drawn. In the pueblo itself the massacre began as elsewhere on August 10. 100 It cannot be determined who were the first to fall there, though the deaths of the Reverend Fathers Juan de Talaban, Antonio de Lorenzana, the minister guardian of the convent, and Joseph Montes de Oca are first mentioned. 101 These three fathers were in the convent when attacked by the Indians, and from there, where were afterwards found signs of resistance on their part, they were dragged to the nearby church. Here all three were piled in a heap, and their decaying bodies were found two weeks later by the straggling army of refugees on its retreat from Santa Fé. Doubtless by thus piling the dead bodies of the missionaries before the Christian altars, which for eighty years had symbolized the hated domination of an unknown religion, the Indian idea of vengeance found its fullest expression. On the other hand, it is doubtful if there could have been for the padres a sweeter death, a grander sepulchre, or a crown of martyrdom quite so coveted or so glorious as that which they earned for themselves while defending the Holy Faith in the convent of Santo Domingo on San Lorenzo day.
But the slaughter was not confined to the missionaries alone, and soon a similar fate befell the other Spaniards of the pueblo, the bodies of the men later being thrown behind the church. 102 Of those who fell there are mentioned the names of the sarjento mayor, Andres de Peralta, Chief Justice and Captain of War of the pueblo, the alférez Esteban Barcía and Nicolás López, who were commanding the small group of the besieged; and Joseph de Guadarrama and wife. The Indians were led in their attack on these by an interpreter of the pueblo named Alonzo Catití, 103 who came to exercise a great deal of authority and power after the revolt. 104
In the outlying districts around Santo Domingo the devastations and atrocities committed were typical of those in other parts of the province. Between that pueblo and San Felipe, a distance of two leagues, the bodies of six dead men were left in the road. 105 Below San Felipe a little more than two leagues, at the estancia of the sarjento mayor Cristóbal de Anaya, were afterwards found the naked bodies of twelve persons, including Anaya himself, his wife, Doña Leonor de Mendosa, two soldier sons, and three children. A quarter of a league further on, the house of Pedro de Cuellar was sacked and destroyed; and still a little distance further, the house of Captain Augustin de Carbajal was robbed. Here Carbajal, his wife, Doña Damiana Dominges de Mendosa, a daughter, and another woman were killed, and their stripped bodies left in the open house. 106 All these murders were committed on Sunday, the day following the massacre in the pueblo of Santo Domingo, 107 and the fact that as many as twelve persons had assembled at one house indicates that they had done so in the futile attempt to protect themselves after having learned of the movements and plans of the Indians.
(4) The Revolt at the Jemez Pueblos, and at Sia and Santa Ana.—For the events of the revolt at the Jemez pueblos and at the Queres pueblos of Sia and Santa Ana we have the testimony of Louis de Granillo, alcalde mayor and captain of war of “La Jurisdicion de Yndios Xemes y Queres,” who with several other soldiers and one missionary escaped from the pueblo of San Diego de Jemez, being aided in so doing by the Lieutenant-General of Rio Abajo, Alonso García, who also made two autos summarizing the events of the revolt in those places. According to the testimony of Granillo, he was advised by an Indian of the pueblo of Jemez, named Lorenzo Musa, that all the natives of the province desired to revolt, and had set the night of August 10 to execute it. 108 About mid-day of the 10th of August an ambassador 109 of the enemy rode up to the pueblo singing of victory and announcing to the Indians there that already the Governor and all the Spaniards, including the missionaries, women, and children from Taos to Santo Domingo were dead; that their houses and fields had all been robbed; that only the Rio Abajo country was yet to be devastated; and that even that district was at that very moment being sacked by the Indians. 110 “Since none of the Spaniards will remain alive,” he said, “because the number of their enemies, composed of the heathen Apaches, as well as the Christian Indians, is greater, seize, therefore, your arms and kill the Spaniards and friars who are here.” 111 The brief and terse statement of Granillo, “and this in fact the said Jemez Indians did,” 112 suggests all too plainly with what receptiveness the message was received by these people who for a number of years had longed and planned to revolt. 113
In view of the manifest danger in which they were, leaving one of the missionaries dead in the pueblo, 114 Granillo, in company with the father preacher, Fray Francisco Muñoz, and three 115 other soldiers attempted to escape. The Indians, however, who had already announced their intention to kill them, 116 on seeing them mount their horses, attacked them and with the whole community of the pueblo followed, fighting them as they fled across the fields, 117 for a distance of more than two leagues, 118 when, as Granillo stated it, God was pleased that they should meet the Lieutenant-General, Alonso García, with four soldiers, 119 to whom a despatch had previously been sent for aid. 120 It was past midnight on the night of August 10 when García met Granillo and his party with the religious guardian, Fray Muñoz, fleeing in advance on horseback. 121 And the Indians, seeing the aid which the alcalde thus received, ceased fighting and following them, 122 and the party made its way to the pueblo of Sia.
At Sia they found the padre Nicolás Hurtado with three Spaniards defending themselves in the strongest part of the convent, with the beasts locked in with them. And “God was pleased” that they should escape with García and Granillo, though when the Indians noticed that they were going out, with great shouts and the ringing of bells, “they attempted to execute their treason on the said religious and Spaniards.” Thus it was with much danger that the entire party was able to make its way to the pueblo of Santa Ana, which was found deserted by men, though the women there said with much impudence that their husbands had gone to kill all the Spaniards. Leaving this place, the refugees proceeded to the pueblo of Sandia in the Rio Abajo country. 123
(5) The Revolt at Acoma.—Acoma played no important part in the events as related in the Spanish documents of 1680, since it was too far away to successfully co-operate with the valley pueblos. Otermín, however, learned from the Indian besiegers of Santa Fé that all the Spaniards there were dead. 124 Vetancur says the padre there in 1680 was Father Lucas Maldonado. 125
(6) The Number of Spaniards Escaping from these Pueblos.—As to the number of Spaniards who escaped from this jurisdiction, it is almost impossible to make an estimate. The only ones mentioned are those who were able to do so through the aid of García and Granillo, who spent the whole night of August 10 after their meeting, and the next day, in assisting refugees to a place of safety, though their activities were confined chiefly to the district of Rio Abajo. 126 It is very improbable, therefore, that many of the Spaniards who assembled at Isleta were settlers living outside of the Rio Abajo jurisdiction.
5. The Revolt of the Tigua Pueblos of Rio Abajo
(1) Location and Population of these Pueblos.—In 1680 the Tigua Indians were divided into two geographic groups, one occupying, as has already been noted, the pueblos of Taos and Picurís, the most northerly of the New Mexican pueblos, and the other located further south on the Rio Grande, and occupying the pueblos of Puaray, Sandia, Alameda, and Isleta. The largest of these latter pueblos was Sandia, with three thousand inhabitants, while only one league north was the small pueblo of Puaray with two hundred Indians, and about the same distance south was the pueblo of Alameda, with about three hundred inhabitants. 127 Eight leagues south of Alameda, where a small stream, with the Rio Grande, enclosed a fertile tract containing seven Spanish ranchos, was the pueblo and Spanish convent of Isleta, containing a native population of two thousand Indians. It was in this latter pueblo, as we shall see, that the Spanish inhabitants of Rio Abajo assembled after the revolt under the Lieutenant-General, Alonzo García, and later went out from that place, marching toward Mexico, thinking all the other Spaniards of the province were dead.
(2) The Outbreak at Puaray, Sandia, and Alameda.—In the pueblos of Puaray, Sandia, and Alameda, all of which had been planning a revolt for a long time, 128 and in the districts surrounding these pueblos, the atrocities and outrages committed were of the same fierce and unrelenting character as elsewhere, though the details for the outbreak in them were unfortunately omitted by García when he made autos summarizing the revolt in Rio Abajo. In connection with the general facts regarding the revolt of these pueblos, mention has already been made of the small force of refugees from Jemez and Sia having escaped from “La Jurisdicion de Yndio Xemes y Queres,” to Sandia in Rio Abajo, being aided in doing so by Alonzo García, to whom an appeal for aid had been previously despatched. 129 Arriving at that pueblo García and his small body of refugees found that in his absence the news of the revolt had been published among the Tigua Indians, and that all the inhabitants of Puaray, Alameda, and Sandia were under arms, having already killed many of the inhabitants of the valley, and robbed their estancias of horses, cattle, and other property, all of which they were collecting in the latter pueblo. 130 These atrocities were begun in the afternoon of August 10, doubtless as soon as news of the premature outbreak was received from Tesuque, and were continued with unabated fury, until late the next day, at which time all the settlers who had not been killed had taken refuge in the pueblo of Isleta farther south.
(3) The Escape of the Spaniards to Isleta, and the Numbers Killed in Rio Abajo.—Immediately upon arriving at Sandia on the night of August 10, and finding that the Indians of Rio Abajo were in full revolt as elsewhere, García and his small force, assisted by the two religious in their company, now formed themselves into rescue parties and that night and the following day explored all of the nearby country, as far north as Santo Domingo, 131 collecting the men, women, and children whom they found alive. Without sparing the time to take anything at all from the houses, by much effort and by literally “dragging themselves and the women and children along” in their haste, the stragglers later in the day reached Isleta, 132 the large Tigua pueblo which did not take part in the general revolt against the Spaniards. 133 The number of settlers who were finally able to assemble in Isleta, including seven missionaries, 134 was approximately fifteen hundred. Of these there were only one hundred and twenty men capable of bearing arms, 135 and these were poorly equipped, the Indians having possessed themselves of more than two hundred firearms and a large quantity of ammunition. 136
The total number killed, as reported by García, was one hundred and twenty, 137 or less than one-third of the total number killed throughout the whole province. These must have been for the most part inhabitants of Rio Abajo, though some accounted for by him were settlers of Santo Domingo and of other northern jurisdictions. In the vicinity of Sandia, which was the real center of the revolt in Rio Abajo, the slaughter must have been terrible, for this was one of the most thickly settled districts in the whole province, mention being made in the documents of seventeen haciendas and estancias on one side of the river alone from Alameda to the estancia of Juan Dominguez, three leagues below that pueblo. 138 All of these were completely devastated by the Indians, and from many of them none of the settlers escaped.
6. The Revolt at Zuñi and Other Outlying Pueblos
The part played in the revolt of the outlying pueblo of Acoma has already been treated in connection with the uprising of the 140Queres nation. The only mention made in the documentary sources of 1680 concerning the part taken by the distant Zuñi pueblos is the statement of Otermín to the effect that the Indian besiegers of Santa Fé told him that the Spanish inhabitants of Zuñi were all dead. 139
At the Moqui towns, in Arizona, inhabited by a tribe of Indians similar in their habits and customs to the Pueblos of New Mexico, though speaking a Shoshonean dialect, and who had refused on a former occasion to take part in another planned revolt headed by the pueblo of Taos, the revolutionary influence was also felt, and it resulted in the death of the four resident missionaries, and the destruction of the Christian churches. 141
Thus it will be seen how extensive was the revolt started by the northern pueblos of the province of New Mexico, who had not only these tribes as their allies, but also the inhabitants of other districts distant as far as two hundred leagues from the villa. 142
7. The Condition of the Province Following the Outbreak in the Pueblos
The condition of the province of New Mexico now beggared description. From Taos to Isleta, a distance of over fifty leagues, the whole country, with the exception of Santa Fé was devastated and depopulated. The estancias and haciendas of the Spanish settlers had been robbed both of household goods and of the horses and cattle of the fields, while many of the houses had been destroyed by fire. The churches, where not burned, had been stripped of their sacred vessels, robbed of their ornaments, and in every way as completely and foully desecrated as Indian sacrilege and indecency could suggest, 143 while the sacred vestments had been made use of by the Indians as trophies in the dances and festivities celebrating their success. 144 But sadder and more serious than all this was the number that had been killed. Throughout the entire province it had been the aim of the Indians to totally exterminate the Spaniards, and consequently no mercy had been shown, as the Spaniards never tired of telling, even to the children at the breast, nor to the zealous padres who administered the Holy Faith. In all there were more than three hundred and eighty Spanish men, women, and children, including servants, who were killed, while this number did not include the eighteen priests, two lay religious, and the prelate of the church of Santa Fé. 145 Those who were not killed, as quickly as possible after the revolt began to assemble in Isleta and in the villa, and, in this way, the Indians having got possession of more than thirty leagues in the center of the province, 146 the two divisions of refugees were completely cut off from each other, and each was led by the Indians to believe that the other had been destroyed. 147
Having thus seen how the Indians took measures to rid themselves of the Spaniards all over the province, the motives that prompted them, the execution of their designs in the different pueblos, and the resultant condition of the province, we come now to the measures that were adopted by the refugees in Santa Fé and Isleta for their defense.
1. In the Northern Jurisdictions
(1) Receipt of the News of the Revolt, and Defensive Measures Adopted at Santa Fé.—The first recorded intimation that Governor Otermín had concerning a general revolt of the natives of New Mexico came to him, as previously noted, on the 9th day of August in the form of three notices to that effect, one each being received from Taos, Galisteo, and Pecos. At the same time the Indian governors and captains of the Tanos and neighboring pueblos appeared in the villa, corroborating the reports, and designating two Indians of Tesuque as the messengers who had delivered the order to them to take part in the revolt, which they stated was to begin on the night of August 13. Upon the receipt of this intelligence Otermín lost no time in taking the matter in hand, and “with all the promptness which the case demanded” he despatched the maestro de campo Francisco Gómez Robledo to Tesuque to arrest Catua and Omtua and bring them to the villa. At the same time “with the least possible delay” he sent notices to the alcaldes mayores of all the jurisdictions in the province with instructions for them to notify the settlers in their respective districts of the plans of the Indians, 148 “in order that the churches might not be profaned,” and that a force of men might be put under arms upon the shortest possible notice. 149
In the meantime the arrest of Catua and Omtua resulted in the premature outbreak of the Indians that night, and accordingly the efforts of Otermín to thwart them in their plans proved of no avail, for in a few hours after the capture of the messengers at Tesuque the whole province, outside of the immediate jurisdiction of Santa Fé, was in arms. As a result, only the settlers nearest the villa received Otermín's orders, and the statement of Davis that “the most vigorous measures were taken to roll back the tide of rebellion,” the settlers in the north being “ordered to repair to Santa Fé,” 150 is partly fictitious and altogether misleading. In the first place, as we shall see later, Otermín was absolutely unaware of the real seriousness of the revolt until August 12, and consequently no effort was made by him prior to that time “to roll back the tide of rebellion,” and practically his only efforts after that were in defense of the villa. In the second place, none of the settlers of the province, outside the jurisdiction of Santa Fé, were ordered to come to the villa until August 13, at which time Otermín decided to call in the settlers from La Cañada, and these, who were then the only inhabitants of the northern jurisdictions alive outside of the villa, together with the inhabitants of Los Cerillos, who reached Santa Fé the night before, were, according to Otermín's sworn statement, the only inhabitants outside of the environs of the villa who were able to reach there. 151 Consequently, in those places where the settlers themselves did not learn of the plans of the Indians, they were completely taken off their guard by this sudden and unexpected revolt, with the results as previously stated in the story of the outbreak in the different pueblos.
Early on the morning of the next day (August 10) Otermín became aware of the uprising of the Indians north of Santa Fé, when the soldier named Pedro Hidalgo returned from Tesuque, only two leagues north of the villa, with the news that all the inhabitants of that pueblo and of Cuyamunque were in arms, having already killed Fray Juan Pio as he was attempting to say mass to the Christian apostates, while he himself narrowly escaped. Immediately upon the receipt of this news Otermín took active measures for safeguarding his own jurisdiction against any possible Indian hostilities. Having already dispatched his orders and advices to the different alcaldes mayores of the province, and as the tenor of his auto 152 of that date shows, having no apparent anxiety concerning their ability to cope successfully with any possible hostilities in their respective jurisdictions, Otermín now took measures to put the villa in a better state of defense. Accordingly, Francisco Xavier, the secretary of government and war, was instructed to assemble all the people of the jurisdiction of Santa Fé and its environs in the royal houses (casas reales) in order that offensive and defensive plans against the enemy might be adopted if the nature of the case should demand it (si llegare el caso). At the same time all the royal arquebuses, blunderbusses, swords, daggers, shields, and munitions which were in the armory and storehouse of the villa were taken out, that the servants who were not so provided might be supplied. And at the approach of night sentinels were placed around the villa, while a squad of soldiers was stationed in the church to guard the “Holy Sacrament and things of divine cult.” 153 All these plans had been determined upon following the arrival of Hidalgo in the villa about seven o'clock in the morning, and in less than four hours Xavier notified the Governor that they had all been put into execution as he had ordered. 154
Having adopted these defensive measures at Santa Fé, and thinking that similar ones were being adopted in the various jurisdictions, as he had ordered, it is clearly evident that Otermin believed all necessary precautions for the safety of the province had been taken. Of the movements of the Indians, and the real seriousness of the situation, however, he was in almost total ignorance, and had he but known that at that very moment the Indians all over the province were slaying the unprotected settlers, devastating their property, and profaning the churches and convents, with the aim of putting an end to the villa last, his surprise would doubtless have been as great as was his anxiety for his own and his people's safety some days later.
It was probably the kindness of fate, therefore, that new reports of the extent and character of the revolt came in gradually, as they did during this and the succeeding days, until the worst was learned and the actual siege of the villa was in progress, conducted by a horde of savage demons, who having killed as many of the settlers elsewhere as possible, now danced in their glee around the besieged refugees in the government buildings, thinking that they would fall as had the others in the neighboring jurisdictions. The next report that Otermín received, following that brought in by Hidalgo, reached him about five o'clock the same evening, when there arrived at Santa Fé the alférez Nicolás Lusero and Antonio Gómez, two soldiers who had been despatched previous to the revolt by the alcalde mayor at Taos with notices of the conspiracy and rebellion of the Indians there, but who brought other and more serious news than that forwarded from Taos. These soldiers, as before noted, had halted for a short while on their way to the villa at the house of Luis de Quintana in the La Cañada settlement, where he and the people of his jurisdiction were gathered to defend themselves from the Tewa Indians who had gone on the war path that morning before day. From Quintana, Lusero and Gómez brought to Otermín news of the murders, atrocities, and devastations already committed in those districts. It was with much danger and difficulty that they had finally been able to reach the villa, many arrows and arquebuses having been shot at them by the Indians as they fled through the woods north of Santa Fé. 155
Otermín now determined to learn the full extent of the revolt, and accordingly he ordered the maestro de campo, Francisco Gomez, to take an escort of soldiers and reconnoiter all the pueblos of the Tewa and the jurisdiction of La Cañada in order to ascertain the number of murders committed; the extent of damage done; and what remedial measures might be adopted. 156 Taking the original auto of Otermín as my authority, I find that there is no foundation for the statement of Davis that Otermín instructed Gómez to bring in the refugees assembled at La Cañada. 157 Otermín did not instruct these people to join him in the villa until August 13, and then the order was sent to their leader and alcalde mayor, Luis de Quintana, to bring them in, and not to the maestro de campo, Francisco Gómez. 158 On the 12th of August Gómez and his men returned to the villa with the report that more than thirty deaths had been accounted for in the Tewa and La Cañada jurisdictions, and that the Indians, having committed many other atrocities, were fortified in Santa Clara and the Sierra del Arroyo de Tesuque. 159 There is no foundation in the original declarasion of Gómez for the statement of Davis that he reported that the inhabitants of La Cañada had all been massacred. 160 One incident reported by Gómez, while not pertinent, is interesting. He stated that he and his soldiers captured an Indian revolter whom they admonished many times “to surrender himself in peace,” to which the apostate replied that he had rather die and go to Ynfierno that do such a thing. Accordingly the Spaniards killed him.
On the same day that Gómez returned with the report of the revolt of the Tewa Indians the inhabitants of Los Cerrillos, who were defending themselves in the house of the sarjento mayor, Vernabe Marquez, near the pueblo of San Marcos, 161 appealed to Otermín for aid, which was granted them that night, 162 thus making it possible for them to join the main body of the people at Santa Fé. 163 About the same time that this appeal came to Otermín, the news of the revolt of the Tanos, Pecos, San Marcos, and La Ciénega Indians was received. 164 This must have come as a severe shock to the Spaniards, for only a few days previous the chiefs of these pueblos had voluntarily come to Santa Fé to make known the plans of the Indians, and they more than any other would naturally have been regarded as friendly to the Spanish cause. Still later in the same day, as a fitting climax to the news that had already been received, came the first recorded intimation that the Indians of the whole province, having already wreaked their vengeance on the inhabitants in the other jurisdictions, were now making preparations to lay siege to the villa. 165
The situation was now known to be critical in the extreme, and the most energetic measures were deemed necessary in the light of all this new information. Realizing for the first time that the revolt was general; that the Indians had already possessed themselves of the property and munitions of many murdered Spaniards, whose numbers he could not estimate, through not having been able to receive any replies to the dispatches that he had sent to the alcaldes in the neighboring jurisdictions; and conscious that the churches all over the province had been profaned, and that similar outrages were likely to occur in the church and convent at Santa Fé, Otermín issued orders to the Reverend Padre Predicador Fray Francisco Gómez de la Cadena “to consummate the Holy Sacrament” and in conjunction with Padre Francisco Farfan to collect the images, sacred vessels, and other things of the church and bring them without delay to the governor's residence (Palacio). And in anticipation of the premeditated attack on the villa by the allied force of Indians, orders were issued to Quintana and all the inhabitants at La Cañada who were with him, to come at once to Santa Fé, that, all together, they “might resist the fury of the enemy” until expected aid should be received from García; 166 for it was not known that the inhabitants of Rio Abajo under the latter's command at Isleta, thinking all the northern settlers dead, were even then preparing to abandon the province in the hope of saving their own lives.
With the inhabitants of La Cañada, Los Cerrillos, and the environs of the villa all collected at Santa Fé, the whole body of refugees there numbered about one thousand persons, 167 of whom less than one hundred were men capable of bearing arms, the rest being for the most part women and children. 168 In such a precarious condition every precaution and every possible means of defense was now adopted. The entire body of the people, with all the horses and cattle and other provisions and necessities for a siege, were collected in the royal houses; entrenchments were thrown up, and fortifications and guards stationed around them; the roofs of the houses were covered with armed soldiers; and in the doors of the houses were placed the two pieces of cannon, mounted on their carriages and pointing to the openings of the street where the enemy were expected to attack. 169 In this way did the comparatively small band prepare itself to withstand successfully the attack of the combined forces of all the Indian allies.
Having taken every possible precaution in the villa, and being anxious concerning the settlers, Otermín now made final efforts to learn definitely of their fate, hoping that some of them might yet be alive. Not having heard from the alcalde mayor of Galisteo, to whom he had despatched an order three days previous by two Indian servants, nor from García in Rio Abajo, to whom at the same time he had also despatched an order by a soldier named Lucas de Ganboa, Otermín determined to make confidants of two Christian Indians, and send them to the jurisdictions of the Tanos and Queres in order that he might learn for a certainty of the true state of affairs there. Trusting these Indians because they left their families in his care in the villa, and having bestowed upon them kindnesses and presents to enlist them in this undertaking, Otermín despatched them “in the said confidence,” on Thursday, August 13, with letters and orders to the alcaldes mayores of, the Tanos and Queres jurisdictions, in case they should be found alive. 170 All that day and night the inhabitants of the villa anxiously awaited the return of the messengers and the news that they might bring. Nor did they have long to wait, for on the next morning (August 14) the two Indians came fleeing into the villa with news that confirmed the gravest fears of the Spaniards. They reported that more than five hundred Indians from Pecos, San Marcos, La Ciénega, Galisteo, San Cristóbal, and San Lázaro, led by a Tanos Indian named Juan, to whom Otermín had entrusted an order to be carried to the alcalde at Galisteo, were less than a league away, and that they were only waiting for the arrival of the Taos, Picurís, and Tewa Indians to begin the attack on the villa. This they intended to level to the ground, and after killing the Governor and all those with him they were to return undisturbed to their ancient liberties and the adoration and obedience of the gods of their fathers. 171
(2) The Siege of Santa Fé.—Completely cut off from the outside world, with the last hope of reinforcements from t