During the first administration of Houston the keynotes of Texan diplomatic relations with the United States were recognition of her independence and annexation. The first of these had been attained by the last official act of Andrew Jackson, but annexation met with greater difficulty. Opposition developed in the United States Congress to such an extent that the offer of annexation was withdrawn in October, 1838, two months before the close of Houston's first administration.
The election of Lamar to the presidency of Texas brought about a changed attitude in diplomatic relations. Lamar desired to see Texas develop into a great independent republic; he hoped to build up her finances, to secure the recognition of foreign powers, to gain an acknowledgment of Texan independence from Mexico, to extend her trade relations by commercial treaties, to expand the boundaries, and to establish a system of education.
It is the object of this paper to trace the diplomatic relations of Texas and the United States during this period of nationalism and to show their outcome in the second administration of Houston. The subject of annexation has recently received extended treatment from several able historians; 2 in consequence the present writer will treat that subject only when necessary to explain the course of events with which this paper specifically deals.
The most important step toward the accomplishment of Lamar's plans was to secure his country from Mexican aggression. Mexico had not acknowledged the independence of her rebellious province and was continuing a predatory warfare in the neighborhood of the Rio Grande. Torn with internecine strife, assailed by France, 3 and confronted with rebellion in Yucatan, Mexico had scant means to carry on more than guerrilla warfare against Texas. 4 The time appeared auspicious for coming to an understanding. Accordingly the plan was conceived of sending an agent to Mexico and of instructing the Minister to the United States to attempt to secure the good offices of that government in undertaking the rôle of mediator.
On February 20, 1839, Barnard E. Bee was appointed to go to Mexico. 5 The fact that he was selected shows the importance which the Texan government attached to the mission. Bee had occupied the position of Secretary of War in Houston's first administration, and resigned from the office of Secretary of State to conduct the negotiations in Mexico. 6 He was given a double commission, one as agent to the government of Mexico, the other as Minister. 7 It was not believed that he would be received in the latter capacity, as that would be a virtual recognition of the independence of Texas, hence the double commission. Bee was authorized to negotiate for peace, and to make a treaty, if it could be secured with the unconditional recognition of the independence of Texas, and if possible, with the boundary at the Rio Grande. If Mexico would not agree to that boundary, he was empowered to make a treaty of peace and recognition, leaving the question of limits to be settled by a future treaty. He was given one other alternative, as follows: “Should Mexico express a willingness to establish peace, and recognize the Independence of Texas to the extent of her original boundaries when forming a part of the Mexican Confederacy, but peremptorily refuse to admit our claims to the entire territory embraced within the limits defined by the act of Congress [December 19, 1836], you may propose a compromise by negotiating for the purchase of all that portion of it which is not within the original boundaries, at a stipulated price; but the sum to be thus stipulated for it must not exceed five Millions of dollars. . . .” 8 In other words, the offer to purchase was practically identical with the terms of the proposal which President Jackson made to Mexico in 1829. 9
On March 13, 1839, General Richard G. Dunlap was sent to the United States as Minister. 10 He was a man of high standing, having been Major-General of volunteers in Tennessee. Hearing of the Alamo disaster, he had determined to join the Texans in their struggle for independence, and offered to raise two thousand volunteers, but the battle of San Jacinto made this unnecessary. He went to Texas in 1837, and later became Secretary of Treasury under Lamar, which position he held previous to his appointment as Minister. Upon arrival at Washington he presented the idea of mediation to the State Department. Forsyth expressed a willingness on the part of the United States to interpose, but with the proviso that it would not do so unless Mexico so desired. The answer of Forsyth was indicative of the cautiousness of the Van Buren administration. The answer, however, tended to stimulate the hopefulness of Dunlap. 11
Bee, in the meantime, had arrived at Vera Cruz. He found it both convenient and discreet to stay on the French frigate La Gloire until given permission to land. 12 News of his arrival being noised abroad, the Vera Cruz Censor published an article which spoke of “the audacity of those brigands in sending us their pedlar to ask us to allow the peaceable possession of their robbery. . . .” It further stated, “The Commandant said that he was not aware of the existence of a nation called the `Republic of Texas,' but only of a horde of adventurers, in rebellion against the laws of the government of the republic.” 13 In spite of this Bee was allowed to land. General Victoria, who was in command at Vera Cruz, immediately communicated with the Mexican Council of State regarding the Texan proposals. That body unanimously rejected any overtures based upon the idea of independence. While awaiting the reply of the Council, Bee received private letters which threatened him with imprisonment. Victoria, however, treated him with courtesy, and when the rejection came, urged that Texas reunite with Mexico. On May 24, 1839, Bee informed his government that his mission had failed, and a few days later set out for the United States by way of Havana. 14
In June Dunlap, at Washington, heard of the rejection of Bee, but he still believed that Mexico would not refuse the offered mediation. He took steps to obtain an interview with Martínez, the Mexican Minister; in this he experienced considerable difficulty, but when it was once attained, he soon believed himself on confidential terms with that astute individual. 15 To fully understand Dunlap's dealings with Martínez, it is necessary to know what had been transpiring in Texas.
After the return of Bee, James Treat had been appointed by Lamar a private and confidential agent to Mexico. 16 But little is known of the life of Treat previous to this time. He assisted Texas in 1836, while in New York; he had been in Mexico, and was acquainted with political conditions there. He was recommended to the Texan government by Hamilton, Bee, Dunlap, and others. 17
The principal point in the negotiation with which Treat was entrusted was the acknowledgment of the independence of Texas, the boundary to be fixed at the Rio Grande. The instructions also said,
Before submitting this ultimatum on the subject of a boundary line, you will feel the authorities of Mexico in relation to a different division of Territory. You may suggest to them a line commencing at the mouth of the Rio Grande mid way of its channel, up that stream to the Paso del Norte and from thence a due west line to the Gulf of Calafornia and along the Southern shore of that Gulf to the Pacific Ocean. This boundary will not be strenuously insisted upon but may be intimated as a counterpoise to any extravagant expectations on the part of Mexico and as a premonition to the Government of the ultimate destination of that remote Territory.
Treat was further authorized, as Bee had been, to offer not more than five million dollars for a relinquishment of Mexican claims to the Texan side of the Rio Grande. 18
In the instructions no mention was made of mediation. Treat observed this omission and asked his government for information. 19 Burnet, Acting Secretary of State, replied that the original instructions were deficient, and added others to the effect that the treaty
shall be acted upon . . . at the city of Mexico, or the City of Washington or at the Capitol of this Republic, leaving it to the Mexican Authorities to select the location. But as the mediatorial interposition of the Government of the United States has been conditionally proffered and will be cordially accepted by this Government it would probably be conducive to the permanency of the peace to be established, to conduct the negotiations at the Capitol of that Republic. It is understood that Mr Ellis the Minister from the Government of the United States to that of Mexico, has been instructed to signify to that of Mexico the desire of the United States to see the difficulties between Texas and Mexico amicably adjusted. 20
Treat proceeded to New Orleans and then to New York for the purpose of raising funds for paying his expenses before proceeding to Mexico. 21 He communicated with Dunlap and no doubt informed him of his instructions, 22 for Dunlap now suggested to Martínez that the boundary line be settled by running it to the Pacific; in other words, the line as proposed in a part of Treat's instruction. To this the Mexican Minister replied, “Not being empowered by my official attributes to enter into any argument on the very important points to which you refer therein, I shall be constrained to limit myself solely in the present case to the communication of its contents to my Government, whose decission on the subject will be communicated at your convenience.” This letter, to quote Dunlap's expression, made him “truly happy.” 23
Dunlap's mission had thus far accomplished little. He had enemies in Texas who were at work against him; Bee was in the United States and was available. The Texan Senate refused to confirm Dunlap's nomination and Bee was appointed. 24 He did not assume his duties, however, until April 20, 1840, Dunlap remaining at his post until Bee's arrival. 25
An incident of border warfare occurred opportunely to open the way for a renewal of the request for mediation. President Lamar had issued a proclamation forbidding the citizens of Texas to participate in the domestic feuds of Mexico. A small body of troops carried the proclamation to the Federalist camp beyond the Rio Grande; while returning, they were killed by Mexicans. 26 The facts were presented by Bee to Forsyth, who coldly replied, “Northing has occurred since the communications on that subject [mediation] from this Department to the Predecessors of Mr. Bee as the Representatives of Texas here, to render a change of the determination of this Government expedient,” 27 an attitude which Dunlap had failed to grasp.
After this rebuff, Bee, who was in ill health, went to South Carolina to visit his family, remaining away from Washington until the following December. Nathaniel Amory, Secretary of Legation, was left in charge. 28 This apparently peculiar action of the Minister, for which he later was called to account, was not without reason. The securing of the mediation of the United States, the primary object of the mission, had failed; moreover, a presidential campaign was in progress, and it was hoped that the successful candidate would be more friendly to Texas than the Van Buren administration had been. 29
Complaints concerning the depredations of Cherokees, Caddos, and other tribes from the United States were frequently made by the Texan government, 30 and Bee, upon his return to Washington in December, determined to take up the question. 31 In 1838, Forsyth had expressed himself in such a manner that the Texan Minister had not seen fit to press the matter. 32 Bee found him in the same humor on this occasion. 33 He was equally cold when J. Pinckney Henderson, the Texan envoy to England, was arrested in New York on account of a responsibility incurred by endorsement of notes. Bee contended that his office of Minister should have protected Henderson from arrest and that it was the duty of the United States government to prosecute the individuals who had caused his detention. 34 After a discourteous silence of six weeks, Forsyth deigned to reply that he considered the decision of the court as ample satisfaction. Bee had had enough; he decided to postpone matters until the new administration. 35
In order to understand the future negotiations with the United States, a brief summary of the dealings of Texas with other countries seems necessary. Relations with Mexico will first receive attention. Treat had arrived at Vera Cruz on November 28, 1839, 36 and left Mexico in October, 1840. 37 He succeeded, largely through the aid of the English Minister, Pakenham, in getting his proposals before the Mexican Council. 38 But Ellis, the American Minister, was intent on pressing claims for indemnity, and gave him little or no assistance. 39 After a protracted negotiation, Mexico stood firm in refusing the Texan proposals, and Treat left the country. Soon afterward, it was decided to make no further overtures to Mexico. 40 In France, J. Pinckney Henderson had succeeded in concluding a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, on September 25, 1839. It was ratified by the Texan Senate in February, 1840. By this treaty France became the first European country to recognize the independence of Texas; the compact was also the first formal commercial treaty entered into by Texas. General James Hamilton succeeded in concluding a similar treaty with Great Britain in November, 1840; but this treaty was not ratified until June, 1842. A commercial treaty with the Netherlands was signed September 18, 1840, and was ratified in June, 1841. 41
It is time now to return to affairs at Washington. The Texas government early in 1841 decided to open negotiations with the United States in regard to the making of a treaty of commerce. Certain other questions, such as Indian depredations and extradition of criminals needed settlement. 42 The inauguration and death of Harrison delayed negotiations, and it was not until April 12 that Bee saw fit to open discussion with Webster, now Secretary of State under Tyler. Bee called upon Webster who received him in a friendly manner, whereupon the subject of a treaty was broached, Bee suggesting that the negotiations be carried on in Texas. Webster replied that he would reflect upon it, but thought that both he and the Secretary of War would prefer to attend to it at Washington, implying that he would be willing to negotiate. 43 Without waiting to follow up his first success, Bee set out for South Carolina on another visit, leaving Amory in charge. He perhaps felt justified in leaving his post, as he had not received definite authority to negotiate a treaty. He was aware, however, that his absence from Washington was displeasing to the home government. 44
Further instructions concerning negotiations having been received, Amory informed Webster that his government was desirous of concluding a treaty as speedily as possible; he reviewed the Indian question, and suggested that the negotiations be conducted in Texas and that an arrangement be made by which slaves should be allowed to accompany their masters to the United States as body-servants. This suggestion was due to the fact that the introduction of slaves as body servants from Texas into the slave-holding States had been resisted. Some of the State laws prohibited it. In consequence, a treaty allowing it would have brought the national and State governments into collision. Webster replied that he was deficient in information concerning the Indian question, but would give it his immediate attention; he again objected to negotiations being carried on in Texas, and in regard to slaves as body-servants, he did not deem it necessary to provide for it. 45
During the five years since Texas had declared her independence, in lieu of any arrangement with the United States concerning commerce, she had been placed in the anomalous position of considering the provisions of the treaty of 1831 between Mexico and the United States as binding upon her in so far as they could be applied. This treaty was about to expire, a fact which was made known to Webster. 46 But the Secretary did not see fit to take up the matter at once, being engrossed in the Maine boundary question, although frequently urged by Bee after his return to Washington in June. 47 The Texan Minister, however, busied himself with planning the articles of the treaty, and wrote for a letter of authorization to conclude the agreement at Washington. On July 27, 1841, he wrote a formal letter to Webster in which he stated four fundamental propositions upon which he thought that the negotiation should turn. These were: (1) Free navigation of the Sabine River and the right to ship goods down the Red and Mississippi rivers, (2) establishment of the right of entrepôt on boundary rivers for the transshipment to foreign places of the produce of each country from that of the other, (3) settlement of questions concerning Indian tribes along the border, (4) commercial and maritime intercourse on and near the high seas, 48 The proposal did not bring matters to a head as had been hoped, and the middle of September arrived with nothing accomplished.
On the fifteenth of that month, wearied by delay, Amory, who was again in charge, submitted a synopsis of a treaty, which, in addition to the points stated in Bee's proposal, contained the following items: (1) Provisions for consular rights, (2) right of inheritance of estates of deceased persons dying intestate when temporarily abroad, (3) the treaty to continue ten years. In addition, Bee's proposal to regulate commerce on the high seas was considerably elaborated. Five days later Amory was informed that Webster had examined the synopsis, but that, owing to press of business (meaning, no doubt, the Maine boundary negotiations) and the secretary's absence in the north, nothing would probably be done before December; but December passed without a treaty. In the meantime full powers to negotiate were received. 49
In January, 1842, news reached Washington of the disastrous end of the Texan Santa Fé expedition. Amory immediately applied to Webster for assistance in behalf of the prisoners. 50 Waddy Thompson was sent at this time to Mexico by the United States government, one of the chief purposes being to obtain their release 51 and his mission, coupled with the assistance of other foreign ministers, was successful. 52 At the same time Amory presented his request for assistance, he urged the formation of the treaty; he called the attention of Webster to the fact that the Texan planters were handicapped by not having free use of the Red and Mississippi rivers, and that they should at least have the right of entrepôt at New Orleans with freedom of reshipment to foreign ports. Webster admitted the justice of the demands, but, instead of offering to make a treaty, urged Amory to get some Southern senators to procure the passage of a resolution granting the privilege. Amory followed the advice and applied to Calhoun and others. 53
Another incident occurred in the closing months of 1841 and in January, 1842, to disturb the Texan diplomats. In September, Bee had been informed that two vessels were being built in New York which were destined for the Mexican navy. They were found to be the Liberty and the Eagle. An attempt was made by Amory to have them confiscated by the United States Government They were seized, but sufficient evidence to warrant their detention not being procured, they were allowed to put to sea. 54
During the negotiations above noted, Bee had been absent from Washington, his journey taking him as far as New Orleans. The Texan government had undergone a change, Houston having become president December 13, 1841. The frequent absences of Bee and the barrenness of results of his mission gave ample excuse for Houston to bring about a change of diplomats. The letter of recall reached Washington in January, and Amory promptly forwarded the information to South Carolina. Bee, who had returned to the latter state, replied that he expected to be retained until the treaty was concluded. Soon after, he received a second letter of recall, the contents of which determined him not to return to Washington. 55
One of the letters of recall was especially severe; it said, “I [Anson Jones] am also directed by the President respectfully to inform you that he views your long absence from Washington as a desertion of your Post, injurious to the interests of this Government and disrespectful to that of the United States.” 56 Bee was naturally angered, and in a spirited answer defended his actions; he stated that Webster had asked that negotiation of the treaty be postponed until December, and, at the same time, that General Hamilton, in a letter from England dated September 3, had requested that he forbear for special reasons from concluding a compact. Bee declared that he had taken the requisite steps to meet Webster in December and had then set out for New Orleans by way of South Carolina. 57 Bee's defense, though vigorous, was lame. He does not appear to have informed his government of Hamilton's letter, and, furthermore, he was under no obligation to comply with the request. Good diplomacy demanded caution and immediate communication with the government at home. In December Bee was in New Orleans instead of Washington, in spite of the fact that December had been named as the time for negotiations to be resumed.
Bee was succeeded by James Reily. 58 In 1839 he had been appointed one of the commissioners to negotiate a million dollar loan for the Texas government. In 1840 Lamar had nominated him for district attorney for the fifth judicial district, but the nomination meeting with opposition in the Senate, was subsequently withdrawn. 59 Riley arrived at Washington on March 8, 1842; 60 he was clothed with authority to negotiate a treaty, and was instructed to sound the United States government on the subject of annexation, a matter which had not been broached since 1838. This is a significant fact, because it shows the attitude of the new Texan administration, Houston having been again elected president, and Anson Jones, a staunch supporter of annexation, being selected as Secretary of State. 61 Two days after his arrival, Riley was received by Webster; in this first interview he took up the matter of free navigation of the Red River and found Webster's attitude conciliatory. 62
News of the invasion of Texas by Vásquez reached Reily on March 24, and the following morning he called upon Webster, urging the pressing necessity that the United States keep her frontier Indians in subjection. In response to this request two thousand troops were massed along the Red River frontier, under General Zachary Taylor. 63
Webster still delayed entering upon treaty negotiations, his attention being absorbed by the Ashburton mission and the settlement of the Mexican claims. Reily, however, was insistent. On March 28 he laid before Webster a communication urging, among other things, the questions of free navigation of rivers and interchange of mails, and President Tyler made these two matters the subject of a special message to Congress. 64
Reily kept himself informed on the subject of annexation. On April 14 he reported,
I feel satisfied fully that the administration is decidedly in favor of the policy [annexation], and that the Question is a popular one with Congress; as to what would be the majority in the Senate should that body be called upon to act, it is impossible to say two thirds of the Senate being the Majority necessary to consumate treaties. Texas is fast increasing in reputation and character, and by many Northern men is viewed as a country which would be a valuable acquisition to the United States. I am led to believe that one great reason why the negotiation of a Treaty has been postponed and still delayed is, because the administration wishes to make but one Treaty, and that a Treaty of Annexation. 65
A week after the above report was made, Reily suggested to Webster that they enter into the consideration of a treaty along the lines submitted by Bee. 66 The time of the proposal appeared auspicious, for Webster replied that he would be happy to see him at the department whenever he might call. Reily hastened to take advantage of the opening, but was doomed once more to disappointment; Webster, however, promised that he would take the various points under consideration, hoping in a short time to be able to enter fully and definitely into the subject. 67
The effect of the Mexican invasion was now shown. In May Reily was instructed by his government not to press the treaty. Owing to the excitement over the Vásquez raid, it was deemed best to “suffer matters to glide along quietly until the U States Govt decides upon the policy of annexation.” Houston did not deem the conclusion of the treaty of commerce to be of vital importance, evidently hoping that annexation would be the outcome. 68
The question of mediation, after lying dormant for two years, was now brought up again. Reily proposed to Webster that the United States, as the leading power of the continent, ought to interpose with Mexico. Webster expressed a desire that the proposal be put in writing, so that, in case of necessity, the action of the United States might be justified. This Reily did, proposing three alternatives for Mexican consideration; first, recognition of Texan independence with limits as defined by the Texas Congress in 1836; if this were refused, recognition of independence, the question of limits to be left to future negotiations, and hostilities to cease until the settlement of the question; if this also were refused, a third proposal, namely, that hostilities cease for at least five years and then not be reopened without twelve months' notice. The suggestion met with the favor of Tyler and his Cabinet; General Thompson, United States Minister to Mexico, was accordingly instructed to offer the good offices of the government at Washington to end the war. 69
Webster's letter of instruction pointed out the differences between Texas and Mexico, in language and customs, the long period since the battle of San Jacinto, and the recognition of Texan independence by many states; he stated that the ultimate reannexation of Texas to Mexico was very doubtful; in consequence the United States looked upon the war as useless, and though she could not interfere, she considered it her duty to accept the office of mediator if desired. 70
A few days after instructions were issued to Thompson, Webster received a letter from Bocanegra, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, who complained that the citizens of the United States were injuring Mexico by aiding Texas; he stated that, had it not been for this aid, the Texans would have been unable to maintain their long resistance. He assumed the position that Texas was still an integral part of Mexico, and hence he must protest against the assistance which came from citizens of the United States. 71
Upon receipt of this letter Webster penned a long communication to Thompson in which he defended the action of the United States government. He assumed that Texas had been an independent country since the battle of San Jacinto and stated that it was impossible to stop immigration into Texas. This letter had been on its way but a short time when Webster received a second letter from Bocanegra. The first communication had assumed that, though citizens of the United States were guilty of breaches of neutrality, the government was innocent. He now openly charged that the “very cabinet of the United States, and the subaltern and local authorities, do observe a conduct openly at variance with the most sacred principles of the law of nations. ...”
To this Webster replied by instructing Thompson to inform Bocanegra that the President of the United States considered the language and tone of his letter as highly offensive, that the United States had always been governed by a strict regard for neutrality in regard to the war between Mexico and Texas, and that if Mexico saw fit to change the existing relations, the responsibility remained with her. This language could not be misunderstood; the attitude of the American government was growing warlike. 72 On July 11 Reily informed his government that the relations between the United States and Mexico appeared strained, and that Tyler had remarked that he did not see how war could be averted. The President had also told Reily that he was anxious for the immediate annexation of Texas. It was feared that the Senate would not ratify a treaty, but Reily felt certain that Tyler would act at once if the Senate would consent. News came at this time that a frigate for the Mexican government was about to be launched in England. Tyler immediately ordered the frigate Mississippi to the Gulf. 73
The day after Webster's last mentioned instructions to Thompson, Bocanegra wrote a letter to Thompson in which he made most bitter complaint against the United States. The note was extremely belligerent in tone, but the disturbed condition of Mexico and her inability to cope with Texas make it appear that the utterances of her minister were gasconnade. 74 Neither was the American government in a position to desire war. To press the question of mediation might arouse the suspicions of England. The long drawn out negotiations with Lord Ashburton were coming to a close. Bocanegra's last letter, which was dated July 24, must have reached Webster about the date of the conclusion of the treaty with England, which occurred August 9, though the ratification was not exchanged until October 13. Hostilities must not break out in the interim. In consequence the proposition of mediation was not pushed with ardor. Bocanegra ceased to be beligerent, but firmly rejected the idea of American mediation. 75
The determination of Mexico to reconquer Texas was demonstrated on the day after the final rejection of the American offer. On September 11 twelve hundred Mexicans under General Adrian Woll entered San Antonio. Severe fighting took place there during the following days, and on the eighteenth the Mexican force retreated; its object had been accomplished, however, for Mexico had demonstrated that war of more than a predatory kind was being carried on. 76
The desire for a commercial treaty now came again to the fore. During the month of July, Reily continued to urge upon Webster the necessity of making such a treaty, and on August 3 his efforts met with success. 77 The draft of the proposed treaty contained twenty-two articles; the first article contained the usual compact for perpetual peace and friendship; articles II-V dealt with commercial relations, freedom of commercial intercourse to be guaranteed, and duties to be reciprocal; the free use of the Red and other rivers rising in Texas or forming boundaries between the two was provided for; right of deposit for five years and reshipment of goods to foreign ports without payment of duty in the United States was allowed; articles VI-XII dealt with blockades, rights of neutrals, prizes and contraband of war; articles XIII and XIV were for the protection of the property of citizens of either country who held property in the other, and for the free transference of such properties; articles XV-XVIII provided for a consular service; articles XIX and XX dealt with the Indian question, each country agreeing to restrain the Indians within its respective borders and to return captives; article XXI provided for extradition of criminals. The final articles stated that the agreement in regard to trade was to last ten years, except the right of deposit above mentioned, and that peace and friendship should be perpetual. 78
Reily was proud of his accomplishment, and perhaps justly. “I was here alone,” he says, “unaided, unexperienced, the representative of a young Government, destitute of political weight and whose commercial importance had not developed itself, and forced to enter upon the discussion of points and topics in which Texas felt the most vital interest, with some of the loftiest and most powerful intellects of the United States; Under such circumstances the accompanying treaty was concluded. ...” 79
The above letter and treaty do not appear to have been despatched at once to his government by Reily. Having learned that some of the tribes along the border had expressed a wish to make peace with Texas, he thought it desirable to obtain the cooperation of the United States in treaty-making. He accordingly proposed to Spencer, Secretary of War of the United States, that commissioners be sent who should be clothed with authority to make the United States the guarantor of the treaty between Texas and the Indians. This proposal met with the approval of President Tyler, who agreed to appoint the necessary commissioners. 80 Reily appears to have acted in this matter entirely upon his own initiative. His boldness perhaps was due to the fact that he had already received his letter of recall. He had previously informed his government that he desired to end his mission by August 1, and had remained at his post beyond that date because he feared that his withdrawal might be prejudicial to the ratification of the commercial treaty by the United States Senate. 81
Reily found it necessary to depart before the arrival of Isaac Van Zandt, his successor; he kept the duplicate of the treaty in his possession until early in September when he forwarded it to the Texan Department of State. Reily heard that the document was lost at sea by the destruction of the steamship, Merchant. He promptly wrote Van Zandt to send to the State Department of Texas a copy of his despatch of August 3, which included a copy of the treaty. 82
Houston sent the treaty to the Texas Senate on December 19, 1842. In the accompanying message he pointed out that article V might be considered by England, France, and Holland as discriminatory in favor of the United States. The article in question stated that cotton from either country was to be admitted by each free of duty, and that goods manufactured in either but intended for reshipment to foreign countries might be admitted free. Houston suggested that the article be so amended that it would show that the concessions were for a valuable consideration and not gratuitous and free, and therefore common to all powers with whom Texas had commercial treaties. 83
The following day the fifth article was referred to the committee on foreign relations. Two days later the committee reported that they advised its ratification without change. The vote was unanimous. It would naturally be supposed that this would end the matter as far as the Texas Senate was concerned, but such was not the case. On January 11, 1843, the President was requested to return the treaty to the Senate; two days later he complied. January 16, the fifth article was reconsidered and modified as Houston had originally suggested, and in this form it was passed.
Upon his arrival in Washington in December, Van Zandt found various letters awaiting him informing him of the course of events in his country. General Woll had invaded Texas in September, and, as we have seen, had captured San Antonio. 84 The State Department of Texas urged that the United States be requested to do all in her power to stop the war. 85 Similar requests were addressed to England and France. Van Zandt immediately presented the matter to Webster, who replied that nothing could then be expected from that source, that Santa Anna was determined to make another effort to subdue the country, and that he advised Texas to make the best preparation she could. He said that there was no prospect of any immediate difficulties of a serious nature between the United States and Mexico. In the letter in which this information was forwarded, Van Zandt communicated to his government that he had received a letter from Ashbel Smith informing him that Mexico had rejected the English offer of mediation. 86 President Tyler's message, which was sent to Congress the day before Van Zandt's interview with Webster, spoke of Mexican complaints about American aid to Texas, but was silent on the subject of mediation. 87
In spite of this Van Zandt continued to urge that the United States interfere. Webster accordingly communicated with Almonte, the Mexican Minister, stating that Mexico must cease its predatory war, and must either recognize Texan independence or make war according to the rules of civilized nations. At the same time, he suggested to Van Zandt the propriety of asking England and France to co-operate with the United States. Van Zandt replied that such a step had already been taken. Webster concluded that the proper time to urge the matter would be as soon as the results of the Mexican expedition against Yucatan were announced, for it was believed that this was about to result in failure. 88
In January, 1843, news reached Washington that Commodore Jones had taken possession of Monterey, California. Van Zandt hoped that this might precipitate trouble between the United States and Mexico. On January 25 he reported to Tyler and Webster that he had been informed that England and France were willing to mediate and suggested a concert of powers. He was assured that Thompson, the American Minister at Mexico, had been instructed to offer mediation, and stated again that, as soon as the results of the Yucatan expedition were known, the United States would make a representation to the Mexican government in which strong language would be used, and that a copy of the communication would be forwarded to the French and English governments. 89
In February Anson Jones, the Texan Secretary of State, informed Van Zandt that France would be willing to act with England and the United States. 90 Before this reached him, however, Webster had informed Van Zandt that the Mier expedition had made it impossible for the United States to interpose; he said that Thompson had reported that the feelings were such in Mexico that all attempts at interposition were useless. Van Zandt then tried another tack; he pointed out to Tyler that England's interest was to see the integrity of Texas maintained and that, if Texas were driven to the last extremity, England would assist her. A few days later Van Zandt was informed that Webster had been directed to approach the French Minister on the subject, and that if the French government would unite with the United States immediate action would be taken. 91
Van Zandt now turned his attention to an attempt to convince Webster that Texas had acted in a proper manner in the expedition against Mier. He addressed him a lengthy communication in which he pointed out the atrocities committed by Mexico, and stated that Texas was merely acting in self-defense; he closed with the following appeal for intervention:
Mexico in her whole course of conducting the war against Texas has abundantly evinced the disgraceful fact, that no treaty or convention however solemn can bind her to the observance of either justice humanity or mercy and she has thus denied those great principles which hold together the fabric of the moral Universe. If therefore other nations in view of these circumstances and all the facts now before them as well as those herein contained should refuse their interference in the premises no other course will be left to Texas in the future prosecution of the war with Mexico, than to adopt the principles of retaliation and to visit upon the people of that country the evils and cruelties which have so long been suffered by ours.
For the mass of human suffering and misery which would thus be entailed upon the unfortunate, the defenceless and the feeble my Government will then stand acquitted to itself, to the world and to Almighty God. It remains to be seen whether the civilized world will look on with indifference and witness so disastrous a catastrophe.
These facts and reflections are respectively submitted to His Excellency the Secretary of State of the United States with a firm reliance that that Government, guided by that enlightened wisdom and respect for the laws of humanity which so eminently distinguish it will give to them the consideration which their importance demands; and take such action thereon as right and justice may require. . . .
His appeal, however, appears to have been in vain, as he reported that no reply was received. 92
A few days later Van Zandt again saw Tyler. According to the former, the President seemed anxious to intervene but was fearful to act without the unanimous consent of his advisers. He said that Webster had been directed to approach the French Minister upon the subject of joint interposition but had not done so. 93 Two days later Van Zandt saw Webster, who rather testily said,
Sir; your affairs assume so many different phases that it is impossible one day to tell what will be the appearance on the next. If your Government would take the advice of its friends, to remain at home, unite among yourselves, confine your soldiers to your own territory, and to the defence of your own soil, suppress insubordination, prevent marauding parties upon the frontier and consolidate your energies, then Sir, we might be able to do something effective. 94
In February, 1843, Santa Anna adopted a new policy toward Texas. His opponents, the Federalists, had been in power during the greater part of 1842, but in the closing months of the year the Centralists regained control. Santa Anna was in retirement on his estate at Vera Cruz and from there directed the policy of his party. It was not until March, 1843, that he emerged from his retreat. His attention was now necessarily turned to the strengthening of his position, and a continuation of the war with Texas would naturally dissipate his resources, all of which were needed to cope with the political situation. 95 If Texas could be brought back into the Mexican union it would also greatly strengthen his position. The expedient, though doubtful of success, was at least worth trying.
Judge J. W. Robinson, of San Antonio, was a prisoner in the fortress of Perote. On January 9, 1843, he had addressed a letter to Santa Anna asking that he be granted an interview in which he believed he could point out a way by which Texas might be restored to Mexico. The interview was granted, and as a result Robinson was despatched to Texas with proposals for an adjustment of difficulties. The most important features which were presented to Houston were a general amnesty, that Texas acknowledge the sovereignty of Mexico, and that she have the right of representation in the national congress. 96
The proposition of Santa Anna was at first received with scorn, but a change soon followed. Houston replied that it would be impossible to treat while invasion threatened, whereupon a truce was granted and Houston was able to proclaim a suspension of hostilities on June 15. 97 In February Jones had informed Van Zandt that if the United States “would open wide the door of negotiation to Texas,” he would be authorized to make a treaty of annexation. In July the Texan government had changed its mind, for it was now believed that Mexico might acknowledge the independence of Texas, and that if that were done it would greatly simplify the question of annexation. In view of this it was believed that Texas should bend all her energies to settling her difficulties with Mexico. 98
A change favorable to Texan interests had taken place in the State Department at Washington. Webster retired in May and soon afterward Upshur was appointed. 99 A little later Van Zandt was able to inform Jones that Thompson had been directed to say that the United States deprecated the manner of war carried on by Mexico and that she should either show herself a great nation by subjecting Texas, or a magnanimous one by acknowledging her inability to do it. 100
The subject of annexation now came rapidly to the fore. In October Upshur presented the issue in uncompromising terms. Was Texas ready to negotiate a treaty of annexation or not? In December a definite answer was given by the State Department of Texas, the general purport of which was as follows: The friendly powers had interposed with Mexico; the powers, meaning no doubt England and France, which had done the most to obtain an armistice, had done it with a view that Texas was to continue as a separate and independent nation; that, though Texas was free to follow whatever course she saw fit in the future, Houston thought in the present state of her foreign relations, it would not be politic to abandon the expectations of a speedy settlement of difficulties with Mexico for the uncertain prospect of annexation to the United States. 101
This attitude on the part of Texas was foreshadowed by Tyler's annual message to Congress in December. “Nor can this Government,” the message read,
be indifferent to the fact that a warfare such as is waged between these two nations is calculated to weaken both powers and finally to render them—and especially the weaker of the two—the subject of interference on the part of stronger and more powerful nations, who, intent only on advancing their own peculiar views, may sooner or later attempt to bring about a compliance with terms as the condition of their interposition alike derogatory to the nation granting them and detrimental to the interests of the United States.
Later he says, “The Executive has not hesitated to express to the Government of Mexico how deeply it deprecates a continuance of the war and how anxiously it desired to witness its termination.” Further,
While . . . the Executive would deplore any collision with Mexico or any disturbance of the friendly relations . . . it cannot permit that Government to control its policy, whatever it may be, toward Texas, but will treat her . . . as entirely independent of Mexico. The high obligations of public duty may enforce from the constituted authorities of the United States a policy which the course perserved in by Mexico will have mainly contributed to produce, and the Executive in such a contingency will with confidence throw itself upon the patriotism of the people to sustain the government in its course of action. 102
The attitude of Houston, when made known to Tyler, as Houston probably intended, must have strengthened the views thus forcibly expressed. The subject of annexation now became the ruling idea of the closing year of the administration. As annexation is beyond the scope of this paper, we will leave it and return to the history of the commercial treaty.
When the treaty was brought up in the United States Senate it soon became evident that its ratification in toto was unlikely, articles IV and V meeting with opposition; article IV dealt with the free navigation of the rivers having their courses partly within Texas; article V we have already examined. Internal difficulties and dissensions in Texas were given as causes of the opposition; the holders of Texas bonds also made objection to the treaty, insisting that some provision ought to be made for their payment. It was feared, besides, that the unsettled condition of Texas might cause her to become subject to some other power, in which event free navigation of rivers would be detrimental to the United States. 103
To quiet these objections, Van Zandt wrote a long memorial to William S. Archer, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, its object being to justify Texas and show why the treaty was desirable. To quote from the memorial,
The continuity and juxtaposition of the two nations—the frequent intercourse between their citizens, and the growing commerce carried on between them, render it essentially necessary, in order to avoid all difficulties and embarrassments, which might arise, as well as to perpetuate and strengthen the good feelings of friendship and national concord, which it is the interest and should be the desire of both Governments to foster and preserve, that definite rules, in the nature of treaty stipulations, should be established for their mutual regulation and government. 104
Van Zandt's efforts, however, were of no avail. News of the Mier disaster arrived inopportunely; the opponents of Texas were able to gather strength by pointing out the weak condition of the country where insubordination and dissension were rife. 105 On March 3, the Senate ratified the treaty, but struck out articles IV and V. Van Zandt reported in April that no further action on the part of the Senate could be expected until the amended treaty was submitted to the Texas Senate. In December, at the same time that he stated the position of Texas on the subject of annexation, Jones informed Van Zandt that the striking out of articles IV and V rendered the treaty unacceptable to his government and that consequently it would not be ratified in that shape. 106 Thus ended the negotiations for the commercial treaty which had so long absorbed the attention of the Texan diplomats. It and the subject of intervention were now together swallowed up in the larger question of annexation.
To summarize: shortly before the election of Lamar annexation was dropped and new issues became paramount in the Texan foreign policy. Bee and later Treat were sent to Mexico for the purpose of obtaining the recognition of Texan independence, but the overtures were rejected. Dunlap and afterward Bee attempted to induce the United States to act as mediator, but the idea was received coldly by the Van Buren administration.
Texas next opened negotiations for a commercial treaty, but before much progress was made Bee was recalled by the new Houston administration and Reily appointed. The Texas government at once showed that annexation was in mind. The Vásquez raid occurring in March, 1842, the United States was again asked to mediate, and in response Thompson, the American Minister to Mexico, was instructed to say that his government would act as mediator if Mexico desired. But before the American attitude could be made known, the Mexican government charged the United States with a breach of neutrality. After a spirited correspondence, Mexico ceased to be belligerent but rejected the idea of American mediation.
The question of a commercial treaty came to the front again in July, 1842, an agreement being reached between Webster and Reily. The treaty was ratified by the Texan Senate; the United States Senate, however, accepted it in a changed form which made it unacceptable to the Texan government and it never went into effect.
General Woll's invasion having occurred, Van Zandt, the successor of Reily, again asked for American mediation, suggesting that the United States act in concert with England and France. Webster's course, however, proved dilatory.
The Texan government now tried to interest the United States by making her jealous of the growing influence of England. Early in 1843 Santa Anna opened negotiations with Texas, and the need of American assistance for the time being was not felt. Webster soon afterward retired, and Upshur became Secretary of State. The matter of annexation was now rapidly brought forward and became the absorbing question of the day.
2. Garrison, “The First Stage of the Movement for Annexation.” in The Am. Hist. Review, X, 72-96; Garrison, Westward Extension; Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas; Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk; Smith, The Annexation of Texas.
3. Bancroft, History of Mexico, V, 186-205.
4. Garrison, Westward Extension, 33; Bancroft, North Mexican States, and Texas, II, 326-332, 351.
5. Webb to Bee, February 20, 1839, Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 432-437.
6. Baker, Texas Scrap Book, 289; Texas Almanac, 1858, p. 99; Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 23.
7. Webb to Bee, March 7, 1839, Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 437-438.
8. Webb to Bee, February 20, 1839, Ibid., II, 432-437.
9. Reeves, Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, 65-67, note; Barker in The Am. Hist. Review, XII, 789.
10. Webb to Dunlap, March 13, 1839; two letters, Webb to Dunlap, March 14, 1839, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 368-376.
11. Dunlap to Lamar, May 16, 1839, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 383.
12. Bee to Webb, May 9 and 10, 1839, Ibid., II, 443-444.
13. Translation in Morphis, History of Texas, 413.
14. Bee to Webb, May 13, 24 and 28, 1839, Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 444-445, 447-450.
15. Dunlap to Forsyth, June 26, 1839, Ibid., 408-409; Dunlap to Burnet, October 12, 1839, Ibid., I, 418-421.
16. Secret Journals, 149.
17. Hamilton to Lamar, June 22, 1839, Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 450-452; note a, Ibid., II, 451; The Quarterly, XV, 316, note 2.
18. Burnet to Treat, August 9, 1839, Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 470-471.
19. Treat to Bee, August 13, 1839, Ibid., II, 475-476.
20. Burnet to Treat, August 19, 1839, Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 476-477. Smith, The Annexation of Texas, 37, says, “in the course of 1840 and 1841 a secret agent and two plenipotentiaries were sent to that country [Mexico].” Bee and Treat were sent in 1839. The present writer was in error when he stated in a recent article that Treat arrived in Mexico in 1840; see The Quarterly, XIV, 290.
21. Treat to Lamar, September 3, 1839, Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 477-478. Texas loan commissioners were then trying to raise funds in the United States, but had met with little or no success. Treat had been given a bill against the commissioners which the Bank of the United States refused to purchase. He later obtained money from the United States Bank of Pennsylvania. Ibid., II, 491.
22. Treat to Burnet, September 3, 1839, Ibid., II, 478-482.
23. Translation, Martínez to Dunlap, October 9, 1839, and Dunlap to Martínez, October 9, 1839, Ibid., I, 423-424.
24. Secret Journals, 117-118, 142, 177-178.
25. Bee to Lipscomb, April 21, 1840, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 447-448.
26. Amory to Lipscomb, May 8, 1840, Ibid., I, 452.
27. Forsyth to Bee, May 4, 1840, Ibid., I, 453.
28. Amory to Lipscomb, May 8, 1840, Ibid., I, 452; Bee to Lipscomb, December 16, 1840, Ibid., I, 471.
29. Sen. Ex. Docs., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., III, Doc. 14, p. 9; Amory to Lipscomb, November 12, 1840, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 466-467.
30. See calendar of printed correspondence for numerous documents on this subject, Ibid., I, 25-30; also Dunlap to Poinsett, April 16, 1840, Ibid., I, 446-447; Archer to Arbuckle, June 11, 1840, Ibid., I. 454; Lipscomb to Bee, March 31, 1840, Ibid., I, 463-464; Lipscomb to Bee, August 8, 1840, Ibid., I, 464-465.
31. Bee to Lipscomb, December 16, 1840, Ibid., I, 471.
32. Amory to Lipscomb, November 12, 1840, Ibid., I, 466-467.
33. Forsyth to Bee, January 23, 1841, Sen. Ex. Docs., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., III, Doc. 14, p. 55.
34. Bee to Forsyth, December 14, 1840, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 476.
35. Bee to Lipscomb, January 26, 1841, Ibid., I, 476.
36. Treat to Burnet, November 28 and 29, 1839, Ibid., II, 500-503.
37. Treat to Lipscomb, October 17, 1840, Ibid., II, 711.
38. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 41-50. Chapter II of this book covers the negotiations of Treat and Hamilton in a most commendable manner.
39. Treat to Lamar, January 18, 1840, Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 529-536.
40. Waples to Amory, January 5, 1841, Ibid., II, 72-73.
41. Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 30-31.
42. Mayfield to Bee, February 17 and March 22, 1841, Ibid., II, 75-78.
43. Amory to Mayfield, April 14, 1841, Ibid., I, 486-487.
44. Waples to Amory, January 5, 1841, Ibid., II, 72-73; Amory to Mayfield, April 23, 1841, Ibid., I, 489-493; Mayfield to Amory, April 24, 1841, Ibid., II, 86-87.
45. Amory to Mayfield, April 23, 1841, Ibid., I, 489-493.
46. Amory to Webster, May 19, 1841, Ibid., I, 496. Treaties and Conventions between the United States and other Powers (1889), 673-674.
47. Bee to Roberts, July 31, 1841, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 506-511.
48. Bee to Webster, July 27, 1841, Ibid., I, 511-513.
49. Amory to Roberts, October 12, 1841, Ibid., I, 515-518, 519-520; Roberts to Bee, September 7, 1841, Ibid. II, 96-100.
50. Amory to Jones, January 4, 1842, Ibid., I, 520-523.
51. Reily to Jones, March 25, 1842, Ibid., I, 545-547.
52. Garrison, Texas, 246; Thompson, Recollections of Mexico, 92-100.
53. Amory to Jones, January 4, 1842, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 520-523.
54. Bee to Brower, September 22, 1841, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 518; Amory to Jones, January 15, 1842, Ibid., I, 527-533.
55. Ibid., I, 534, note a; Amory to Jones, January 20, 1842, Ibid., I, 533-534; Bee to Webster, January 21, 1842, Ibid., I, 542.
56. Letter to Bee in the handwriting of Anson Jones, but unsigned, is dated December 27, 1841. A. L. in Diplomatic Correspondence with the U. S., in Texas State Library. The other letter of recall was directed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United States and was found in the same file as the first mentioned.
57. Bee to Jones, January 27, 1842, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 534-536.
58. Reily to Jones, February 2, 1842, Ibid., I, 536-537.
59. Secret Journals, 129-130, 177, 179.
60. Reily to Jones, March 11, 1842, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 540-542.
61. Telegraph and Texas Register, November 26, 1845; Jones, Memoranda and Official Correspondence, 153, 167; Smith, The Annexation of Texas, 166, thinks that Houston and Jones were not in favor of annexation but preferred to safeguard Texas as an independent nation. It appears to the present writer that more has been read into the documents than they contain, but he is not prepared to offer his full conclusions at this time.
62. Reily to Jones, March 11, 1842, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 540-542.
63. Reily to Jones, March 25 and 29, 1842, Ibid., I, 545-547, 547-550; Webster to Reily, April 7, 1842, Ibid., I, 550-551.
64. Reily to Jones, March 29, 1842, Ibid., I, 547-550; Richardson, Messages and Papers, IV, 111.
65. Reily to Jones, April 14, 1842, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 551-554.
66. Reily to Webster, April 21, 1842, Ibid., I, 556.
67. Webster to Reily, April 25, 1842, Ibid., I, 556; Reily to Jones, April 28, 1842, Ibid., I, 556-558.
68. Waples to Reily, May 12, 1842, Ibid., I, 559.
69. Reily to Jones, June 24, 1842, Ibid., I, 563-566. Smith, The Annexation of Texas, 70, says, “So far as concerned mediation we [the United States] stood perfectly aloof.”
70. Yoakum, History of Texas, II, 362-363.
71. Bocanegra to Webster, May 12, 1842, in Webster, Works, VI, 442-444.
72. Webster to Thompson, July 8 and 13, 1842, in Webster, Works, VI, 445-457, 459; Bocanegra to Webster, May 31, 1842, Ibid., VI, 457-459.
73. Reily to Jones, July 11, 1842, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 567-569.
74. Bocanegra to Thompson, July 14, 1842, House Ex. Docs., 27 Cong., 3 Sess., II, 144-154.
75. Bocanegra to Thompson, September 10, 1842, Ibid., II, 154-155.
76. Yoakum, History of Texas, II, 363-366.
77. Reily to Jones, August 3, 1842, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 576-580.
78. Text of Treaty, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 622-628.
79. Reily to Jones, August 3, 1842, Ibid., I, 576-580.
80. Reily to Spencer, August 16, and Spencer to Reily, August 17, 1842, Ibid., I, 590-593.
81. Reily to Jones, June 24, and August 18, 1842, Ibid., I, 563-466, 590-595.
82. Reily to Waples, December 12, 1842, Ibid., I, 619-621.
83. Secret Journals, 233-244, 268-269, 276-277.
84. Waples to Van Zandt, October 20, 1842, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 609-611; Garrison, Texas, 247.
85. Waples to Van Zandt, October 20, 1842, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 609-611.
86. Van Zandt to Terrell, December 7, 1842, Ibid., I, 613-618.
87. Richardson, Messages and Papers, IV, 197-198.
88. Van Zandt to Terrell, December 23, 1842, Tex. Dipl. Corr., I, 630-635.
89. Van Zandt to Jones, January 20, 1843, Ibid., II, 107-115; Van Zandt to Jones, January 25, 1843, Ibid., II, 115-118.
90. Jones to Van Zandt, February 16, 1843, Ibid., II, 125-127; Cramayel to Jones, January 28, 1843, Ibid., III, 1417-1418.
91. Van Zandt to Jones, March 13, 1843, Ibid., II, 132-138.
92. Van Zandt to Webster, March 23, and to Jones, April 5, 1843, Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 149-162.
93. Van Zandt to Jones, April 19, 1843, Ibid., II, 164-167.
94. Van Zandt to Jones, April 21, 1843, Ibid., II, 168-170.
95. H. H. Bancroft, History of Mexico, V, 252-257. The above explanation of Santa Anna's reasons is at variance with Smith, The Annexation of Texas, 42.
96. H. H. Bancroft, North Mexican States and Texas, II, 372-373. Smith, The Annexation of Texas, 42-43.
97. Jones to Van Zandt, May 8 and June 15, 1843, Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 175-176, 192.
98. Jones to Van Zandt, February 10 and July 6, 1843, Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 123-124, 195. Smith, The Annexation of Texas, 44, says, “But all this was comedy. Not only did Santa Anna expect nothing as a direct result of the peace negotiations, but the other party were of the same mind.” As far as Texas was concerned, this would appear to be an error in the light of Jones' letter of July 6. H. H. Bancroft, North Mexican States and Texas, II, 372-373, also makes light of the Robinson mission and its reception.
99. Schouler, History of the United States, IV, 439-440.
100. Van Zandt to Jones, August 10, 1843, Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 197-200.
101. Van Zandt to Jones, October 16, and Jones to Van Zandt, December 13, 1843, Ibid., II, 221-224, 232-235.
102. Richardson, Messages and Papers, IV, 261-262.
103. Van Zandt to Jones, January 20, 1843, and January 20, 1844, Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 112-115, 243.
104. Van Zandt to Archer, January 10, 1843, Ibid., II, 139-148.
105. Van Zandt to Jones, March 13, 1843, Ibid., II, 132-138.
106. Journal of Ex. Proceedings of the Senate, VI, 188-189; Van Zandt to Jones, April 5, 1843, Tex. Dipl. Corr., II, 149-153; Jones to Van Zandt, December 13, 1843, Ibid., II, 232.
How to cite:
Marshall, Thomas Maitland, "DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1839-1843 ", Volume 015, Number 4, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, Page 267 - 293. http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v015/n4/article_1.html
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