In a former paper, published in The Quarterly in October, 1911, an account was given of the revolt of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico in 1680, and of the defensive efforts of the Spaniards immediately following the revolt. That paper ended with the decision of the two divisions of refugees, at Santa Fé and Isleta, to abandon the province. It is now proposed to give a narrative of their retreat down the Rio Grande, and of their subsequent settlement at Paso del Norte, subjects on which practically nothing has been written heretofore. 12 The present paper has been based largely on the sources described in the introduction to the former. Several additional original documents, however, have been encountered in the Bancroft Collection, and have been utilized here. A large number of older secondary works, in which the Bancroft Collection is especially rich, have also been used. Without essentially changing the story of the revolt as I have previously written it, this new material will supplement it and throw additional light on certain points not clear in that narrative.
As has been pointed out in the account of the revolt, it was on August 14 that the Spanish refugees in Isleta abandoned that pueblo and began their long and perilous journey toward Mexico. The condition of these once prosperous settlers of Rio Abajo was such, however, that a hasty retreat was impossible. Most of the refugees, including hundreds of women and children, were without horses; many of them were barefooted and half-naked; while all suffered in common from a lack of food. 13 It is not surprising to learn, therefore, that for the first ten days of the retreat an approximate distance of only twenty-five leagues was covered. For the details of this stage of the journey there is no adequate account, the chief source being an auto of García dated August 24, at which time the pueblo of Socorro had been reached. In that document García unfortunately made mention of only two important succeeding events, and even neglected to give the date for one of these.
The place first mentioned as having been passed was Sevilleta, one of the pueblos of the Piros Indians. There the natives were found quiet and peaceably disposed toward the Spaniards, as is shown by the fact that they abandoned their pueblo and moved on with the refugees into the interior of the Piros nation. 14 Sometime between the 14th of August, the day Isleta was abandoned, and the 20th of the same month, García and Father Diego de Mendoza despatched letters to Leiva and Father Ayeta informing them of the revolt and of the fate which at that time it was supposed had befallen all the settlers north of Sandía. 15 This news was received by Leiva and Ayeta at El Paso on August 25, at eight o'clock in the morning. 16 The events attending the receipt of it will be discussed later.
A second and more important event had been the receipt by García of definite news concerning Otermín and the northern refugees at Santa Fé. On August 20, while García and the Rio Abajo people were halting in the pueblo of El Alto, 17 there arrived from the north Sebastian de Herrera and Fernando de Chávez, the two 18 survivors of the jurisdiction of Taos. These men first gave an account of the revolt at that pueblo. They then told of their flight for safety, and of passing on the seventh day after the outbreak of the revolt in sight of Santa Fé, where they were able to ascertain that a large number of Spaniards were besieged in the government buildings (casas reales). While viewing the progress of the siege from a distance, the Indians had been seen to attack the villa and set fire to houses, the church of San Miguel, and the living quarters of the governor, situated in the casas reales, leaving intact only two small towers of his dwelling. 19 On these towers were seen some people, though it could not be determined whether they were Indians or Spaniards. A little later Herrera and Chávez saw the smoke, and heard the dull roar, as they judged, of the Spanish artillery, after which they saw the Indians, “who actually were fighting,” 20 withdraw to the fields, setting fire to other houses as they proceeded. Herrera and Chávez, however, did not wait to see whether the enemy had withdrawn for good, or returned later to continue the siege. 21
This news brought by Herrera and Chávez was García's first information that any of the northern settlers had survived the revolt, for, as has been seen, the Indians had led him to believe that all had perished except those who were able to assemble in Isleta. Having reason to believe, therefore, that if seven days after the outbreak the Indians had not conquered the refugees at Santa Fé, they might even then be alive and still defending themselves there, García determined, if possible, to learn for a certainty their fate. 22
Such a move at that time, however, was impracticable. First of all, it was necessary to find a place where the women and children might be left with some degree of security, 23 for the dreaded Apaches, who were allied with the Christian revolters, were almost constantly in sight of the refugees. 24 Now that there was hope that some of the besieged in the villa might still be alive, the question of the rescue presented even greater difficulties than when it had come up at Isleta. Some twenty-five more leagues now lay between him and the villa. The supply of provisions, scanty in the extreme when Isleta was abandoned, had perceptibly diminished. There was no place where they might hope to replenish their food supply, or to refill their almost empty ammunition pouches. 25 Accordingly, the march was resumed from El Alto, and four days later (August 24) the pueblo of Socorro, near the center of the friendly Piros nation, was reached.
Upon the arrival at that place several circumstances combined to influence García to make arrangements at once for returning to the northern jurisdiction. The inhabitants of Socorro, like those of Sevilleta, were found quiet and still friendly toward the Spaniards. When it was learned that the latter were abandoning the province, the natives of Socorro and Sevilleta expressed their determination to go with them, being afraid, since they had not been invited to join the revolt, that the northern tribes would attack and destroy them. 26 Feeling a certain sense of security in Socorro, therefore, García decided to fortify that pueblo as a means of protection to the women and children, and, after attempting to secure men, arms, ammunition, and provisions from the supply train which was supposed by that time to be somewhere near them, to return to Santa Fé. 27
The supply train, as was pointed out in the account of the revolt, consisted of a number of wagon-loads of provisions and munitions which the government had granted for the support and protection of the missions of the province. It had left Mexico the year before in charge of Father Ayeta, the custos and procurator general of New Mexico; and, in order that it might have safe convoy, Otermín had despatched, some weeks previously, a troop of thirty men under Pedro de Leiva, to meet it at El Paso and conduct it up the river. 28 It was García's intention, upon the receipt of these reinforcements from the supply train, to leave a small garrison at Socorro, and then, with all the force that would follow him, to go to ascertain the fate of the governor, “or lose his life in the attempt.” 29
An auto setting forth the above plans, together with an order for their immediate execution, was made public in Socorro on the day of arrival at that pueblo. At the same time García gave an opportunity for anyone who might not agree to. the project, to so express himself in writing. While the men in camp were considering the proposals, García, himself, it seems, was making preparations to carry them out. But he soon found himself in a “chaos of confusion,” on account of the scarcity of arms, ammunition, and other supplies, either for an offensive or for a defensive campaign. Moreover, signs of hostility on the part of the Socorro Indians had been discovered. He therefore decided to suspend operations, call a junta of all the men of practical military experience, and to decide thereafter what was best. 30
On the same day, accordingly, all the soldiers who were at Socorro met in assembly. 31 The first man to speak was Maestre de Campo Thome Domínguez de Mendoza, a person who had held responsible positions in the province both in peace and war. Mendoza began his remarks by summarizing the events of the revolt. He told how many citizens of the province had been killed, and how the Rio Abajo survivors had been able only “by the very skin of their teeth” to assemble in Isleta. He told how, after the Spaniards had collected there, the natives of that pueblo had become warlike, and how the refugees, fearing death, had held a consultation and decided to retreat toward Mexico until they should meet the supply-train. But especially did he dwell upon the present condition of the refugees. Practically defenseless and without munitions, the camp had the dreaded Apaches ever in sight. Some of the Piros Indians, among whom the Spaniards then were, and who had hitherto shown no unfriendly disposition, were becoming hostile. This was shown by the fact that when a messenger from the northern rebels had arrived among them, they had hid him for three days, at the end of which time he was discovered. The small supply of provisions with which they had started out from Isleta was almost exhausted, while a number of refugees, including several of the religious, were ill. For these reasons, and because the actual condition of the governor's division could not be ascertained from the report of Herrera and Chávez, Mendoza was of the opinion that the force ought not to be divided, but that all should go together to meet the supply-train and its escort. Having met the train, he thought, a body of men should be sent to ascertain the fate of those in Santa Fé, in order that a true report might be sent to the King. To do otherwise would mean death to both those left behind and those in the villa. Such, he said, was what he conscientiously believed to be “most fitting to the service of God and the King,” and in the interest of the safety of the whole body of people. 32
Following Mendoza seventeen other officers spoke. All but one insisted that their force should not be divided by sending a part of them to meet the wagons, as García had ordered, since in their absence the apostates, allied as they were with the Apaches, might attack the camp, the result of which would be fatal to all. The only dissenting opinion came from Captain Don Fernando Durán y Chávez, who said that, leaving the camp guarded, it would be “fitting to return to the villa of Santa Fé in order to know for a certainty” whether its inhabitants were dead or alive. 33
Two days later (August 26), in “this place opposite the pueblo of Socorro”—from this it seems that they had already moved out of Socorro—the last man gave his opinion. This was Sarjento Mayor Luis de Granillo, also referred to as “Alcalde and capitan á guerra of the jurisdiction of the Xemes and Queres Indians, procurator general of these provinces, and regidor of the villa of Santa Fé.”
The account, given elsewhere, which at that time he made of the revolt at Jemez, Sia, and in Rio Abajo, is fuller and even more important than the opinion which he expressed concerning the question at issue. Suffice it to say here, therefore, that having called attention to their lack of supplies, and to the fact that the majority of the people at Socorro were “naked, on foot, and barefooted,” all of which caused “shudders of horror at the sight thereof,” Granillo emphatically declared that the whole body of the people ought to go on together to meet the wagons, before the Indians might advance and destroy them all. 34
At the same time that Granillo gave his opinion García himself drew up an auto summarizing his reasons for continuing the retreat. He stated that in the junta, where all the many difficulties that surrounded them had been fully discussed, he had come to realize that there was nothing else to be done, especially since they had no suitable place in which to resist the enemy in case of an attack. Considering, therefore, his obligation to so many defenseless women and children, he deemed it best to reserve all his efforts until after he had met the wagons containing the royal alms, concerning which he had lately had occasion to be alarmed, because of the report that the Indians down the river were allied in the revolt. (It will be remembered that the northern tribes told the Spaniards while the revolt was in progress that all who might escape them would be killed by the Mansos Indians.) Therefore, having recorded all the autos of the revolt and of the march, together with all the opinions of the men as expressed at Socorro, that all might stand as evidence of his reason for such action, García ordered that the retreat should be continued at once. 35
On September 4, when next heard of, García and the Rio Abajo refugees were at a place called Fray Cristóbal, described as being sixteen leagues south of Socorro, six leagues beyond the inhabited part of the province, nine leagues below the pueblo of Senecú, and approximately fifty-seven leagues from the pass of the Rio del Norte. 36 On the details of the retreat from Socorro thither no light is thrown, nor is it stated when that place was reached. September 4, at Fray Cristóbal, however, proved an eventful day. At that time, or perhaps earlier, García received a letter written by Father Ayeta at El Paso on August 28. In this letter Ayeta notified the lieutenant-general that Leiva would start on August 30 from El Paso with aid for the Rio Abajo refugees. 37 On the same day Father Francisco Farfan and four soldiers reached Fray Cristóbal from the northern division of refugees with a letter 38 and certain instructions from Otermín for García. Otermín states that he sent orders for the Rio Abajo people to return to the pueblo of Senecú, 39 nine leagues above Fray Cristóbal, there to await the arrival of the northern division. Father Sierra writing at Fray Cristóbal on September 4 states that the Rio Abajo division was instructed to await Otermín's division in whatever place his message should be received. 40 Whatever the order, it is certain that either García did not construe it to mean that he was to return to the pueblo of Senecú, or else ignored it. Shortly after receiving this news, accompanied by six men 41 he set out to meet the governor with some horses, 42 leaving in command in his place Maestre de Campo Thome Domínguez de Mendoza. 43
In his letter to García, Otermín had instructed the lieutenant-general to notify Father Ayeta to send him much needed aid as soon as possible. 44 Accordingly, before setting out to meet the governor, García wrote to Ayeta advising him of the above-mentioned facts. At the same time Father Antonio Sierra wrote to Ayeta giving him more detailed information concerning the ruin which had befallen his religious order. Both letters were despatched from Fray Cristóbal on September 4 by the same messengers who had brought Ayeta's letter of August 28. 45
From this time until the Rio Abajo people were overtaken by Otermín's division on September 13, very little light is thrown upon events at Fray Cristóbal; what is known can best be discussed in subsequent pages.
As was pointed out in the story of the revolt, when García and his soldiers evacuated Isleta on August 14, it was with the hope that they would soon meet the wagon train of supplies which Father Ayeta, the custodio and procurador general of New Mexico, was conducting from Mexico for the missionaries of the province. 46 Later, as we have just seen, Socorro was abandoned for the express purpose of meeting these wagons so that the immediate wants of the refugees might be relieved sooner and that an expedition might be better equipped and sent to ascertain the fate of the northern settlers. At that time the train was supposed to be proceeding up the river at no great distance below Socorro, safely escorted by Pedro de Leiva and some soldiers whom Otermín had previously despatched to meet them. In this, however, the refugees were mistaken, for at that time the train was still at Guadalupe del Paso, over seventy leagues south of Socorro, and it was not until August 25 that Father Ayeta and Leiva at that place received news of the revolt. From that time on the activities of Father Ayeta, who was to become the real savior of the New Mexican refugees, are both interesting and important, for it was he who was to furnish supplies for the actual wants of the people, and who was also to go in person to Mexico City to report on the condition of affairs following the revolt and the things needed for a reconquest of the province.
Before discussing the efforts put forth after August 25 by Father Ayeta and Leiva at El Paso for succoring García's division, which then was supposed to contain all the survivors of the revolt, it is necessary at this point to correct some of the misleading statements that have been made concerning the supply-train which Ayeta had in his charge at that time. Bancroft, 47 for instance, says in substance that in 1676 the condition in New Mexico was such that a reënforcement of forty or fifty men was needed at once if the province was to be saved; that Father Ayeta, having gone to Mexico for succor, was preparing to start with a wagon train of supplies for the missionaries; that he made an earnest appeal for fifty men and one thousand horses to accompany the train; that the junta approved the measure on September 9th, perhaps of 1677; 48 that the viceroy reported to the king his resolution to send aid on January 13, 1678; that the king approved on June 18th; and finally, that after an unaccountable delay, the train started from the city of Mexico on the 29th or 30th of September, 1679. From these statements it can readily be seen that Bancroft supposed that only one supply-train was sent from Mexico City, in charge of Ayeta, for the succor of the northern provinces between 1677 and 1680, when, as a matter of fact, there were two. For a clear understanding of the whole situation a brief summary of the facts is pertinent.
It was the policy at that time for the king to grant every three years, for the support of the religious order in New Mexico, the sum of 61,440 pesos, paid at his command by the Real Hacienda of Mexico. 49 In 1676 Father Ayeta went to Mexico City to collect this triennial gift, which he planned to transport to New Mexico in twenty-five wagons. 50 But besides this commission, he was entrusted with another. In September of that year Ayeta, with authority from and in behalf of the governor of New Mexico and the Cabildo of Santa Fé, presented a formal petition to the viceroy, Don Payo de Rivera, asking for reënforcements in the form of men, arms, horses, and ammunition to enable the province to withstand the continued invasions of the Apaches and their heathen allies. 51 The number of men asked for was fifty, to be armed and provided with twelve horses each, and whose duty it should be to guard the frontiers. In addition, arms for fifty citizens of the province, one thousand horses in all, and supplies sufficient to conduct the same to New Mexico were asked for, all to be provided at an approximate cost of 14,700 pesos, besides the supplies which were to be carried to the religious. 52 To support the petition which he presented, Father Ayeta included in it transcripts of the royal cédulas of June 3, 1570, May, 1600, and May 20, 1620, giving the viceroys authority to take such measures as might be deemed necessary for the pacification of the Indians of New Spain. Father Ayeta concluded by urging that the authority thus granted by the royal cédulas cited be applied in the case of New Mexico before it should be too late. 53
Besides his own petition, Father Ayeta presented also an opinion (consulta) from the definitorio of the Franciscan missions of New Mexico, and a report (informe) made by the governor of that province. 54 These reports, after they had been presented to the viceroy, were referred by him to the auditor general de guerra, Don Francisco Fernández Marmolejo. On September 2, Marmolejo, in a report to the viceroy, favored sending the desired aid to New Mexico. 55 The viceroy next sent the petition of Father Ayeta and the accompanying autos to the royal fiscal, Don Martín Solís de Miranda. That officer in reviewing the conditions in New Mexico as he found them stated in the autos of the governor and definitorio of the province, pointed out in substance that the invasions of the Apaches and their allies had been so disastrous that five settlements had been totally destroyed; that churches had been burned, and their furnishings, including an image of Nuestra Señora, carried off by the apostates to be made use of in their dances and sacrileges; that on October 7, 1672, Father Pedro de Ayala, minister of the pueblo of Ajusco, had been killed, and likewise that on January 23, 1675, the same fate had befallen Father Alonso Gil de Avila, 56 minister of the pueblo of Senecú; that the natives had lost their respect and reverence for the missionaries; that the defensive force in the frontier settlements amounted to only five soldiers; that Santa Fé itself had only ten such defenders, while many of the citizens of the villa had neither arms nor horses, since they had been carried off by the Indians. 57 Accordingly it was stated that if the request was not granted the danger was imminent not only that all the settlements of New Mexico, but even those of Nueva Vizcaya, would be destroyed. 58
For all the above reasons, the fiscal stated in his report to the viceroy on September 5, 1676, that he thought it would be inexcusable not to grant the aid asked for by the governor and the definitorio of New Mexico, pointing out that royal authority was not lacking, as the cédulas cited by Father Ayeta showed. At the same time he recommended that the viceroy refer the matter to the Junta General de Hacienda. 59 This was done, and on September 9, 1676, 60 it was resolved by that body that the viceroy should order the officials of the royal treasury to aid “this time only and no more” the province of New Mexico, with the people, arms, horses, and munitions asked for. 61 Accordingly, the treasury officials were instructed to provide all the necessaries and entrust them to Father Ayeta, who was to conduct them to New Mexico in the twenty-five wagons in which he was also to carry the supplies for the missionaries. 62
On September 22, 1676, the treasury officials, with the help of Father Ayeta, compiled a detailed estimate of what should be bought, together with an itemized account of the cost. Money was allowed for the following: fifty soldiers to guard the frontiers; eight women to accompany the train to make tortillas and cook for the men; one thousand horses (to be bought in Guadiana, now Durango), twelve being allowed to each frontier guardsman; twelve men to drive the horses; supplies for the caravan sufficient to last six months, the usual time required to make such a journey from Mexico City to Santa Fé; and other miscellaneous provisions. The total cost was 14,700 pesos. 63
The aid thus granted by the Junta General and collected and paid for by the treasury officials, was sent to New Mexico in 1677. Proof of this is shown by the following facts. In a royal cédula 64 of June 18, 1678, the king stated that on January 13 of the same year the viceroy wrote to him giving an account of the appeal for aid which had been received from New Mexico, and informing him that after the matter had been deliberated upon in the Junta General, that body had made provision for the aid in men, arms, horses, and munitions asked for, 65 before referring the matter to him, since the total cost of the supplies did not amount to more than 14,700 pesos. The king concluded the cédula by adding that he approved all that had been done for the support of New Mexico, and asked that he be kept informed as to the condition of affairs there and the results which might follow the grant of supplies. Again, in a cédula of June 25, 1680, the king mentioned the fact that on June 18, 1678, he approved the aid of people, arms, and horses which the viceroy “sent to the provinces of New Mexico in 1677.” 66 This is conclusive proof that the supply-train which left Mexico in 1679 was not identical, as Bancroft supposed, 67 with the one which Ayeta asked for in 1676 and received in 1677.
Concerning the supply-train that left Mexico in 1679, some facts are known. In the early part of that year Father Ayeta returned to Mexico to receive the triennial gift of 61,440 pesos. 68 At the same time he represented to the authorities in Mexico in a letter directed to them and dated May 28, 1679, the advantages and benefits that had resulted from the aid that had been sent in 1677, and asked, for the greater security of those provinces, that fifty more soldiers be provided for a period of ten years, so that a presidio might be established. 69 The matter was taken under advisement by the fiscal of the Audiencia in Mexico City, but that official recommended that the matter of sending further aid to the secular authorities of New Mexico be suspended for the present, 70 thereby causing the plan to fall through. On June 19, 1679, the viceroy wrote to the king informing him of the facts stated, and at the same time enclosed affidavits of the correspondence between Ayeta and the Mexican authorities. 71 In reply the king issued a cédula of June 25, 1680, in which he stated that, because of the benefits that had resulted from the former aid that had been sent to New Mexico, proof of which was contained in the letter of Father Ayeta of May 28, 1679, he ordered the viceroy to apply all the means possible for supplying New Mexico with such aid and defence as might be deemed useful and necessary. He concluded by stating that “you know this [the conversion of the Indians of New Mexico] is my principal care and desire”; and by requesting that he be informed on every occasion offered concerning the state of affairs in that turbulent province. By the time this cédula reached New Spain, however, the ruin which Father Ayeta had asserted to be imminent, had already befallen unfortunate New Mexico.
Having failed in his efforts to secure aid for the secular authorities in the province, Ayeta started from Mexico City on Saturday, September 30, 1679, 72 with twenty-eight wagon loads of provisions for the missionaries, though at the start two of the wagons broke down. 73 According to Ayeta's own statement, besides the alms which he was carrying to the missionaries of New Mexico, he also carried 14,000 pesos' worth of supplies for other northern settlers and missionaries which he had asked for and received. Of this amount 8000 pesos' worth belonged to Captain Joseph de Retes for citizens of his province, while the other 6000 pesos' worth consisted of clothing for the missionaries of the same district. 74 It is thus seen that there was no “unaccountable delay” in the departure of the 1679 supply-train, as Bancroft has stated. 75
The progress of the wagons from Mexico had been slow, and although six months was the time usually required for such a trip to Santa Fé, by August 25, 1680, they had not passed beyond the monastery of Guadalupe, near the pass of the Rio del Norte. 76 When the wagons reached that place I do not know, yet it is possible that they had been there for some time. The river was on a rise, due to the melting of the snow on the mountains, which usually begins earlier in the summer, and this may account for the caravan's not having continued further. With the wagons at this time were the soldiers under the command of Pedro de Leiva, who had been despatched by Otermín to meet them at El Paso and conduct them up the river. This fact should be noted, for had there been any troops with the wagons that set out from Mexico in September, 1679, as Bancroft supposed, it would have been unnecessary for Otermín to send his own much-needed soldiers to meet and escort them.
It was from these wagons and the escort that was with them that García was expecting to secure aid. On September 4, however, at which time he set out from Fray Cristóbal to meet Otermín, García had not heard anything in reply to the letters which he and Father Diego de Mendoza had sent to Leiva and Father Ayeta previous to August 20, the day that Herrera and Chávez overtook the Rio Abajo division with news which seemed to indicate that some of the northern settlers had survived in Santa Fé. These letters of García and Father Mendoza were received by Leiva and Father Ayeta at El Paso on August 25, at eight o'clock in the morning. Immediately Leiva and his men assembled to confer upon the bad news which they contained, while the religious repaired to the monastery of Guadalupe for a season of prayer. It was finally decided to prepare and start aid to García by August 28. Accordingly the 26th and 27th were spent in unloading the wagons, and in making necessary preparations. On the night of the 27th, as Father Ayeta affirms, the full danger surrounding all was realized. The departure of the supplies was delayed, and on August 28, instead of despatching them as intended, 77 Ayeta sent a letter to García by Indian runners, informing him that aid would be started on August 30, and suggesting that in the interim he should halt in some convenient place, attempt to fortify it, and then send messengers to guide the train, which would by that time be on the way. Ayeta requested this because, as he stated, they were all badly confused on account of the meager reports which at that time they had received. 78 At El Paso the 28th and 29th were spent in arming and equipping the servants (mosos) whom Leiva's escort of twenty-seven 77 men had with them when they came from New Mexico, that they might accompany the aid sent to the refugees further up the river. It was found that in all there were seventy-eight arquebuses in first-class condition, and with these fifty-one more men were armed. 80 Before starting Ayeta insisted upon the selection of Leiva as provisional governor, Ayeta himself conducting the election; for, having reason to believe that Otermín was dead, he objected to their setting out without an authorized leader. Thereby, Ayeta stated, all the inconveniences that might arise, in case of Otermín's death, from the rivalry for leadership, were averted. On the 30th the cavalcade, consisting of seventy-eight soldiers and four missionaries, set out under Leiva's command. Of these, the twenty-seven men who had come from New Mexico, Ayeta remarked, formed the bulwark of strength. 81 Among the things mentioned by Ayeta as having been carried by Leiva and his men were eleven complete outfits for horses; 82 coats of mail, helmets, etc., which Ayeta had for the protection of the men conducting the wagons; four pounds of powder and a hundred bullets in each pouch; 4000 bales of provisions (balas de refaccion); and two cases of powder. 83 It is thus seen that Leiva was better prepared to furnish means of defense to the refugees than to succor their bodily wants. And, as we shall see, the supplies which he carried proved wholly insufficient for the 2500 persons whom he met later. Ayeta instructed Leiva that as soon as he should meet the refugees, he should send the women and children to El Paso, since Leiva and his men were fully determined to continue as far as Santa Fé for the purpose of aiding the governor if possible, or at least of learning the northern settlers' fate, so that a true and accurate report might be sent to the king. 84 It was Father Ayeta's purpose to send back with a second consignment of supplies the men whom Leiva might detail to accompany the women and children to the pass, together with as many other men as he could spare from the train guard, as well as some men who were with a pack train which he had despatched to Casas Grandes for aid. In order to hasten these arrangements, Ayeta himself remained at El Paso, engaged, as he himself states, in making meal, hardtack, cocinas, and bullets. 85
As we have already seen, the letter which Ayeta sent to García on August 28 had been received by him at Fray Cristóbal by September 4. On the same day he and Father Sierra sent other letters to Father Ayeta briefly informing him of some of the events that had taken place in the northern jurisdictions, of the retreat of the survivors of those jurisdictions, and of Otermín's request that aid be sent him at once. The messengers bearing these letters set out from Fray Cristóbal on the morning of September 4, but through fear of the enemy they soon deviated from the camino real. That evening, toward sundown, while resting on a mountain, they descried Leiva proceeding up the river. The runners, by signals, informed him that the lower camp of refugees was only nine leagues further on. The messengers then continued their journey, reaching El Paso prior to the 8th of September. 86 The news which they carried was Ayeta's first information that the governor and the northern settlers were not all dead. From the fact that at sundown on September 4 Leiva with his supplies was only nine leagues from Fray Cristóbal, Ayeta judged that he must have reached the Rio Abajo people by September 5, and that from there he had proceeded with succor for Otermín. 87 More will be said on this point in connection with Otermín's retreat, which will now be considered.
On August 21, as previously noted, Governor Otermín and the survivors of the siege of Santa Fé decided to evacuate that place. It was their purpose in so doing to unite with the Rio Abajo refugees, who, as they thought, were in Isleta, but who, as we have just seen, had already begun to retreat a week previously, and were at that time nearing the pueblo of Socorro, twenty-five leagues further south. The events of the retreat of Otermín's division are much more fully recorded than are those connected with the retreat of García's division, and from the governor's autos we can get a very good account of his movements up to the time when the Rio Abajo division was overtaken.
The first halt mentioned after the abandonment of Santa Fé was made near the pueblo of San Marcos on August 23. On that day while the army was resting at an arroyo near that place, the sarjento mayor, Bernabé Marquéz, and eight other soldiers, brought into camp a captive Tewa Indian named Antonio. Otermín thereupon took the opportunity, as he ever afterward did when a rebel was captured, to examine the prisoner concerning his knowledge of the revolt, and his reasons for taking part in it. According to his own testimony, Antonio had been a servant of Marquéz, and, as such, had been with him in the casas reales during the progress of the siege. However, because he believed that the Spaniards would either be destroyed or else forced to leave the country, and not wishing to go with them in the latter case, he decided to desert his master. The day after making his escape he learned that the Spaniards had abandoned Santa Fé. Thereupon he returned thither, where he found a great many Indians ransacking the casas reales and carrying out what property the Spaniards had been unable to take with them. Among those taking part in this pillage, Antonio recognized a large number of Indians from Taos and Picurís, though there were also natives from every part of the province. A Tesuque Indian, named Roque, in commenting upon the number of dead Indians to be seen in the houses, streets, and plaza, had told him that the rebels did not regard their loss any greater than that of the Spaniards; and further, that it did not make any difference if the latter had gone away, 88 since the Indians could live as they wished and where they pleased. Roque also told Antonio that the rebels were talking of uniting in a narrow pass near the house of Cristóbal de Anaya, for the purpose of again attacking the Spaniards when they should pass that place. 89 On the next day Antonio left Santa Fé, where pillage had not yet ended, and went back to the estancia of his former master. There he was found hiding in a field when captured and carried before the governor. 90
The next day the army had proceeded about a league from San Marcos, when two divisions of Indians were seen on some rocks and mesas, making smoke signals to their allies. There was no offer of battle, however, and soon afterward the army reached Santo Domingo. There were found the dead bodies of the priests and of the other residents of the pueblo. The church, convent, and sacristy had been practically unharmed, and in them were found the images and other furnishings, all of which were collected and turned over to Father Francisco Gómez de la Cadena. Passing Santo Domingo the march was continued until sundown, no more Indians being seen that day.
The next morning a ruse of the enemy came near costing the Spaniards the lives of some of their men. While the army was preparing to break camp, a small number of Indians was noticed on the other side of the river with some horses ranging at large, evidently to induce the Spaniards to attempt to take them. One of the soldiers, Juan Ramos, however, on going down to the river, discovered that a large body of the enemy was in ambush on the other bank. As soon as they became aware that they were detected, and that their intentions were understood, the Indians rose up from their hiding place and fired two shots at him. Many other Indians, on foot and on horseback, now joined those in ambush on the west bank, where they made hostile demonstrations, though they did not attempt to cross the swollen river. Otermín at once gave the order for the army to proceed; after which a number of Indians swam the stream and followed the Spaniards at a safe distanse. A little later the Christian Tanos Indian before-mentioned, Pedro García, closely pursued by the apostates, was able to join the Spaniards. This Indian, it will be recalled, was at Galisteo when the revolt began there, but not wishing to take part in it had attempted to escape to the Spaniards with his wife and an orphan Indian girl. The two women, however, were captured by the rebels, as García would have been had not a number of Spanish soldiers gone out to meet and rescue him. The Indians made no offensive movements, however, and some time later the pueblo of San Felipe was reached. That pueblo, like the others, was found entirely deserted. No more Indians were seen at all until sundown, when a number were noticed spying on them from the mesas, though they gave no signs of hostility.
The next morning at daybreak still other Indians were seen watching the movements of the Spaniards. Some of these spys, as soon as the refugees broke camp, swam their horses across the river and inspected the abandoned camping place of the retreating army, after which they recrossed the stream. Although some of the Indians came so close as to be clearly seen by the Spaniards, no hostilities were begun by either side.
As the Spaniards now approached the narrow pass near the house of Cristóbal de Anaya, Otermín ordered the utmost care and vigilance to be observed, for it was there, the Indian Antonio had said, that the natives were to make another attack. To guard against this, Otermín ordered that the height be covered with mounted soldiers, and that the people generally prepare themselves to resist the enemy in case the necessity should arise. With these preparations made, the march was continued, unmolested by the Indians, though a large number of them were seen on the mesas. A quarter of a league further on the estancia of Pedro de Cuellar was reached, and a little beyond that, those of Cristóbal de Anaya and Agustin de Carbajal. At those places the murders and atrocities elsewhere noted were ascertained. The Spaniards by that time had marched more than ten leagues. Otermín decided to call a halt, therefore, in order that the Indian Pedro García might give an account of the revolt at Galisteo, the story of which has been already related. 91
Having heard García's account, the order was given to march, and later in the day (August 26) the pueblo of Sandía, two and one-half leagues further on, was reached. There were seen evidences of many outrages committed both in the church and convent. The doors of the former had been stormed, and the images, pictures, vases and other ornaments had been taken out. All of the altars had been desecrated in the most indecent manner, while on the main altar only a wooden image of St Francis, with its arms broken and otherwise mutilated, remained. The church, having been filled with straw, was ready to be burned; in fact, it had been set afire in several places, though the fire had apparently gone out without having done much damage. In the convent the portería was open, while the doors to the cells had all been torn off, and everything in them had been carried away by the enemy. All the broken images found in the church and convent were put in the custody of Father Gómez de la Cadena, as were some other images and pieces of silver found in the houses of the pueblo. The march was now continued for half a league, when a large number of Indians, some of them mounted and others on foot, were seen on the hills, where they had collected a large herd of cattle. From there the enemy with “much shamelessness and daring” began to harass the Spaniards, shouting and making hostile demonstrations, even shooting at them with arquebuses. Otermín at once called a halt and sent a squad of fifty soldiers to dislodge the Indians, who immediately fled to the mountains, driving their cattle before them. Being relieved from immediate danger, and seeing that the Indians had set fire to the church at Sandía, Otermín, in retaliation, ordered the soldiers to return and burn the whole pueblo. This being done, the retreat down the river was continued.
After leaving Sandía, the next half of which there is any mention was made three leagues below at the estancia of Doña Luisa de Trujillo. No date is given for this stop. At this place, some soldiers, on seeing a large number of cattle grazing on the west bank of the river in the hacienda of the lieutenant-general, Alonso García, asked permission to swim the river and drive them across. But as soon as the Indians, who were ever on the alert, saw this attempt, they came from the mesas on their horses and drove all the cattle away. From this place the army next marched four leagues to the hacienda of Los Gómez “without seeing more of the enemy; and throughout the entire distance thither from Sandía [seven leagues], everything was found deserted and robbed both of cattle and of household goods, many haciendas on either side of the river being sacked and robbed by the enemy.” Soon after leaving Los Gómez, an Indian on horseback was captured in the road, and from his testimony Otermín learned that García and all the people who had escaped from Jemez, Sia, and Rio Abajo had assembled in Isleta on the day following the revolt, and later had left there in a body.
This was Otermín's first information that the Rio Abajo people were not in Isleta. Since learning from the captured Indians at Santa Fé of the assembling of the Rio Abajo people at Isleta, and throughout the entire retreat, the hope of uniting the two divisions in Isleta had been paramount in the mind of the governor. There, and there only, did he look for reënforcements and for the alleviation of the necessities of his foot-sore and half-starved people. Not knowing of the efforts that had been made by García to get in communication with him, nor of the extreme want which had pressed upon the latter's division, it had never occurred to Otermín that they would abandon the province and leave him and his division to their fate. 92 But the governor did not commit himself on the matter, and at such a time and under such circumstances this was wise. Sorely disappointed at such discouraging news, there was only one thing for him to do, and that was to continue his retreat by forced marches as best he could.
This course was followed, and the day after learning of the abandonment of Isleta by García, that pueblo was reached by the northern refugees. No dates for the halts made on their retreat thither can be determined after August 26, at which time the army, after marching a little over three leagues that day, was a short distance below Sandía. 93 Otermín states, however, that he reached Isleta more than twenty days after the Rio Abajo people left it, 94 which, according to his own statement, would make it September 3 or later when he arrived there, 95 for García left that pueblo on August 14. If this be true, Bancroft is wrong in stating that “Isleta was reached on the 27th; but the refugees under Captain Garcia had left this pueblo thirteen days before and gone south to Fray Cristóbal.” 96
Otermín found Isleta absolutely deserted, both by refugees and native inhabitants. Suffering as he was from scarcity of provisions and horses, he decided to continue the retreat until advice could be sent to those further down the river, with orders to wait for him and in the meanwhile to send him, if possible, some horses and carts to help transport his tired and foot-sore followers. From the hacienda of Francisco de Valencia, 97 according to Otermín's own statement, he sent four soldiers, accompanied by Father Francisco Farfan, 98 to overtake the Rio Abajo people, which they did at Fray Cristóbal. The letter which these messengers carried from Otermín to García, of which mention has been made in connection with García's movements at Fray Cristóbal, was written from the house or place of Tome or of Bartolomé Domínguez, 99 thirty leagues above Fray Cristóbal, 100 and therefore fourteen leagues above the pueblo of Socorro. The events attending the arrival of the messengers at Fray Cristóbal, with the news which they brought from the northern refugees, have already been noted. 101
On September 6 Otermín's division reached Alamillo, three and one-half leagues above Socorro. The first recorded act of the governor after arrival there was to question more fully Don Pedro Nanboa, the Indian who had been captured in the road further up the river, in order to find out and record what he knew of the motives that had prompted the Indians to revolt. Parts of this Indian's testimony have been cited as authority for various preceding statements, and need not be repeated here.
On the same day, Lieutenant García, who had been overtaken at Fray Cristóbal by the four soldiers of Otermín's division, arrived in the camp. Otermín at once put García under arrest for having abandoned his jurisdiction and having retreated with many soldiers from the province, without authority from his superior, who had expected to find him and his division in Isleta. However, that the matter might be fairly adjusted, and that it might be known for what reasons García had gone out, Otermín gave him opportunity to clear himself of the charge, but ordered that until this was done, he should be imprisoned. 102
García had not come unprepared to defend himself, but had brought with him all the autos which he had drawn up since the revolt. Before presenting these he stated briefly that on the day of the revolt the alcalde mayor at Jemez, Luis de Granillo, had appealed to him for help; told of his efforts all that night and next day to aid the survivors of his jurisdiction; how having seen them safely in Isleta, he and his sons had made futile efforts at their home north of that pueblo to get in communication with the governor; how the reports of the death of the northern inhabitants had caused the people at Isleta to become restless and impatient to leave the country for their own safety; and finally, how the best possible means, as it seemed, had been adopted at Isleta for the safety of those under his command. In support of what he had stated he presented thirteen written folios containing the record of his movements and the opinions of his men given at Isleta and at Socorro. He also stated that upon receipt of the first intelligence that the northern settlers were on their retreat south of Isleta he had gone to meet them with some horses. Lastly, he reminded the governor that he was a man who had served his majesty with one hundred horses, six sons, and all his goods in the most severe conflicts of the province, frequently taking part in campaigns in which he had risked his life, and often with very considerable damage. For all these reasons he begged Otermín 103 to release him and absolve him from all blame and punishment. The governor did not at once reply to this defense, desiring first to read the autos presented by García. He then ordered them placed with his own, promising the lieutenant-general that justice would be done him. 104
After these proceedings the march was again resumed. Shortly afterward, when only about a league below Alamillo, a cloud of dust was detected in the distance. It was caused, as was soon evident, by a body or horsement approaching. This cavalcade, on coming up, was found to be a party of over forty Spanish soldiers and four religious under the command of Pedro de Leiva. Bancroft 105 erroneously states that Leiva had only thirty men when he met Otermín at Alamillo on September 6. The document does state that when the cavalcade was first seen by Otermín's division it was estimated that it contained upwards of thirty men, and that when it came nearer Leiva, “the leader of thirty men whom his lordship had despatched” to meet the wagons in charge of Ayeta, was recognized. 106 A few lines further along in the original document, however, it is positively stated that Leiva had with him forty soldiers and four religious when he and Otermín met. 107 In justice to Bancroft 108 it may be stated that the Extractos, his source for this matter, contain only the first few lines of the document dealing with the meeting of Otermín and Leiva, and consequently fails to record later and much more important statements found in the original. As has been pointed out, on September 4 Leiva was only nine leagues from Fray Cristóbal, with the aid that left El Paso on August 30, and, as Ayeta supposed, he doubtless reached the former place on September 5. Having met the Rio Abajo people, and learning that Otermín and his division were near by, Leiva, it seems, leaving some thirty of his men at Fray Cristóbal, decided to continue with the rest in his party until they should meet the governor, as was done the next day. As soon as the troopers recognized Otermín, overjoyed at having met him and his division, they saluted him heartily with a volley. 109 For when they left the pass they had thought the governor and all the northern settlers were dead, and, as Father Ayeta in his letter to the viceroy written the day after their departure stated, there were not three of the men whom Leiva had brought with him to the pass who had not lost, as they then supposed, either father, mother, or children, while all had cause for grief in the loss of more distant relatives and friends.” 110 It is needless to comment, therefore, upon the joy of these men at actually meeting and finding alive a thousand or more of their countrymen and friends whom they had but lately mourned as dead. Otermín was so moved by the expressions of generosity and loyalty of Leiva and his men, who, as they themselves stated, were determined when they left El Paso to continue until they might know the governor's fate, whatever the cost, that he ordered his acknowledgment and appreciation recorded. 111
At this point several errors made by well known historians should be noted. Davis 112 and Prince 113 both correctly state that at Alamillo Otermín met Leiva with forty men, yet both err in saying that Alamillo was above Isleta, and that several days after meeting Leiva at the former pueblo, Otermín reached Isleta. As a matter of fact, Alamillo, one of the Piros pueblos, was over twenty leagues south of Isleta. Alamillo was not reached until September 6, whereas Otermín had left Isleta several days earlier. Furthermore, Prince states that after meeting Leiva and before Isleta had been reached, Otermín received four wagon loads of corn from “Father Ayeta of El Paso,” while García, who had already “marched to El Paso . . . responded . . . with a portion of his own scanty store.” In the light of facts already stated it will be seen how incorrect and confused are these statements of Prince.
By this time Otermín had completed his examination of the autos presented by García for his defense. He thereupon declared him a free man, and absolved him from all blame for having abandoned the province without superior authority. At the same time, he ordered Francisco Xavier, Juan Lucero de Godoy, and Luis de Quintana to state to García that he was prompted to absolve him because the retreat of the Rio Abajo division had not been with evil intent, but rather had been begun at the request of all those at Isleta and with the agreement of all that they ought not to delay in setting out for Mexico, for the reasons expressed in their autos. 114 When notified of the decision of the governor, García expressed his thanks for the justice and kindness shown him. 115 With this, the last incident connected with the arrest and trial of García, which, as far as can be judged, was more or less a matter of form, was closed.
The next day (September 7) the northern division reached Sorocco. There, notwithstanding the supplies Leiva had brought, Otermín clearly saw the impossibility of continuing to the pass of the Rio del Norte without additional supplies, for the route lay through a country inhabited by hostile Indians and so nearly desert that it would be impossible to secure any sustenance whatever in it. Accordingly, as the only thing left for him to do, he ordered a company of men to set out at once for El Paso, where were the wagons of provisions in charge of Ayeta, to conduct them up the river with all haste for the aid of his suffering and fatigued people, who had come that far, for the most part, on foot and with a very limited supply of food. 116 Davis errs again by stating that at Alamillo “a council of war was called by Otermín, when it was decided to continue the march to Salineta there to await a supply of provisions.” 117 Taking the above-cited auto of Otermín as authority, no council of war was held at either Alamillo or Socorro. On the contrary, Otermín, at the latter pueblo, apparently independent of suggestions from anyone, 118 decided to send to the pass for aid. Moreover, La Salineta is not mentioned at all in this connection, and the error of Davis' statement that they were to proceed to that place to await provisions is evident when it is understood that La Salineta was only four leagues above El Paso, 119 while Socorro was about seventy-five leagues above La Salineta. 120
On the same day that Otermín decided to send this company of soldiers to meet Father Ayeta he received a letter from Father Diego de Parraga written at Fray Cristóbal, stating that the Rio Abajo people were in grave necessity, and asking that they either be supplied with provisions or else allowed to proceed on their journey in the hope of getting aid sooner. Otermín thought it strange that he should receive such a letter from Parraga, since Thome Domínguez de Mendoza had been left in command of the Rio Abajo refugees by García when the latter started north to meet the governor. At the same time his own troubles were sufficient in themselves, for by that time the people in his charge had reached the point where they were living on roasted corn. Worried at receiving such a letter under those circumstances, Otermín replied to Parraga the next day as follows:
Reverend Father Preacher Fray Diego de Parraga: Today, the birthday of our lady, I received the letter which your paternity writes from Fray Cristóbal, which it seems to me is the only letter I have had from you in all the time of your government. In it you tell me that that camp contains 1,500 souls, and, because of having exhausted the supplies which were taken out with them, if they remain there longer a great ruin may be looked for. On account of this you ask that I supply them, or that I order them to proceed on their journey until near El Paco, where they can have aid. In reply let me say that Thome Domínguez de Mendoza, in whose care and disposition the camp was left, on account of the absence of the lieutenant general in coming to find and to see me, has not written me, nor sent me any message in regard to this matter [of going to El Paso] nor of the other [the condition of the Rio Abajo refugees]. In regard to the other, provided it be thus, as I am sure it is, it is a serious affair in a desert place like this, and so many leagues from the villa, that supplies should be asked of one sufficient for the sustenance of more than 1,500 persons—from a man who with 1,000 mouths [to feed], after he had seen himself in the dangers so manifest by the many conflicts with the Indians, finally had to set out, opening up the road with arms in the hand, bringing so many people in his charge on foot and barefooted, without food, not only because there was none, but because there was nothing on which to bring it. [However we trusted] in providence and his Divine Majesty has not failed to put before us a free table in the campaigns, of roasting ears, squashes, and other grains. And I passed through all this in order to bring myself nearer to give aid [to those in Isleta] where I judged I would find your paternity and others in an extremity similar to my own. After making the enemy retire with such great losses, I could well have remained at home, at least long enough to make a little matalotaxe for my journey to Isleta, which, as I said above, was the place where I judged all the people must surely remain until they should learn for a certainty whether or not the governor with all the people of the villa were dead. Finally I come here from Isleta, with entrails dragging, as they say, in order to overtake the people of this kingdom, so that, united, I might see and discuss the best method to be taken for the preservation of our lives and for the greater service of both majesties. And now that I am so near to achieving the purpose which has brought me to unite ourselves here, your paternity comes to me for permission to march on to El Paso. If your paternity wishes to go alone, do what you think best, my father, but in regard to that camp, such does not comport with the service of God and his majesty. And if today they are on the point of suffering ruin on account of failing supplies, I say [in reply] that we are suffering the same ruin here, because we have no other provisions than a little mutton and beef, and that even with these articles your camp is better supplied today. Let the maestre de campo, Pedro de Leiva, return to El Paso with all the people that he brought, and with the religious that came with him, with earnest entreaties to the Reverend Father Fray Francisco de Ayeta to aid [us] at once in our extreme necessity. I do not doubt that his reverence will do this; and when we find ourselves with that aid we will strive for what is most fitting to the service of both majesties. In the meantime I will go little by little to join that camp, in order that, being together, we may be more secure from Apache invasions, for we are in the middle of their country. May God guard your paternity many years. Place in front of Socorro, September 8, 1680. I kiss your Reverence's hand.
Your servant, Don Antonio de Otermín. 121
13. Auttos tocantes, 28.
14. Auto of García, in Auttos tocantes, 21-22.
15. “Autto (de Otermín),” in Auttos tocantes, 15.
16. “Carta del Padre Visitador a el Exmo. Sr. Virrey,” in N. Mex. Doc., I, 565. I have not had access to the letters of García and Mendoza to Leiva and Ayeta.
17. I can find no other reference to the location of any peublo by that name. The document reads, “estando yo con todos los Vezos del Rio en el puesto del pueblo del alto.” I think it possible, however, that García only meant to designate his stopping place as “el puesto del alto” (the place of the height), without any intention of referring to a pueblo by that name.
18. Auto of Otermín and Herrera in Auttos tocantes, 70.
19. Auttos tocantes, 23.
20. Auto of García, in Auttos tocantes, 22.
21. Auttos tocantes, 23.
22. Auto of García, in Auttos tocantes, 22.
23. Ibid., 23.
24. Auttos tocantes, 23 and 24.
25. Auttos tocantes, 23.
26. Auto of García, in Auttos tocantes, 21.
27. Ibid.
28. Auttos tocantes, 23, 26.
29. Auto of García, in Auttos tocantes, 21-22.
30. Ibid.
31. Auttos tocantes, 22. The original sources for the events here recorded are a series of autos signed by García and the different men who expressed their opinions concerning his plans. All these autos, with the exception of that of Luis de Granillo, and the last one of García, were written “en el pueblo del socorro en Veinte y quatro dias del mes de agosto de mil y seis cientes y ochenta anos.” The last two in question, however, were written “en este paraje enfrente del pueblo del socorro en veinte y seis dias del mes de agosto.” It thus appears that García did not record his answer to the opinions expressed by his officers until the second day following the council, at which time the pueblo of Socorro had already been abandoned.
32. Auttos tocantes, 22-23.
33. Ibid., 23-27. The names of the men above referred to are herewith given. The maestre de campo, Juan Domínguez de Mendoza; the sarjentos mayores, Don Pedro Durán y Chávez, Sebastian de Herrera, Don Fernando de Chávez, Cristóbal Enríquez, Antonio de Salas; and the captains, Felipe Romero, Pedro Marquéz, Ignacio Baca, Juan Luis the elder, Joseph Tellez Xiron, Pedro de Sedillo, Juan Luis the younger, Diego Domínguez de Mendoza, Antonio de Alviçu, Pedro Varela Xaramillo, and Don Fernando Durán y Chávez.
34. Auttos tocantes, 27-28.
35. Auto of García, in Auttos tocantes, 29.
36. “Autto (de Otermín),” in Auttos tocantes, 31; Auto of Otermín, in Ibid., 12; “Carta del Padre Fr. Francisco de Ayeta escrita al R. P. Comisario General (Dec. 20, 1680),” in N. Mex. Doc., I, 543; “Autto y dilijencia,” in Auttos tocantes, 43; Vetancur, Chronica de la Provincia del Santo Evangelio de Mexico, 98. Lummis in his translation of Escalante's “Letter” (Land of Sunshine, XII, 250) calls this place San Cristóbal, and in brackets states that the text has it “fray” Cristobal. The latter is correct, and Lummis is wrong in judging that the halt was made at San Cristóbal, instead of Fray Cristóbal, for the former was a Tanos pueblo, south of Galisteo, while the latter was only a designated halt of the Rio Abajo people in the unsettled part of the province between Socorro and El Paso.
37. “Carta del R. P. Procurador F. Francisco de Ayeta al Exmo. Sr. Virrey,” in N. Mex. Doc., I, 526.
38. I have not had access to this letter but am dependent for the fact that it was written upon, “Carta del R. P. Procurador Fr. Francisco de Ayeta al Exmo. Sr. Virrey (Sept. 11, 1680),” in N. Mex. Doc., I, 527; “Carta del Padre Fr. Antonio de Sierra para el Padre Visitador (Sept. 4, 1680),” in Ibid., 522.
39. “Mandamto de Prision contra la persona del theniente gel alonso garçia,” in Auttos tocantes, 13.
40. “Carta del Padre F. Antonio de Sierra para el Padre Visitador (Sept. 4, 1680),” in N. Mex. Doc., I, 520-21.
41. N. Mex. Doc., I, 521.
42. Notificasion y Prision—,” in Auttos tocantes, 14. Gregg (Commerce of the Prairies, Vol. I, p. 127) and Davis (The Spanish Conquest of New Mexico, p. 298) say that García carried provisions and some carts. I can find no evidence of his having carried other than Vestias. It must be remembered that at the time García left Fray Cristóbal Leiva had not reached that place with the aid which he had started out from El Paso with on August 30. García was therefore in no condition to furnish Otermín with supplies.
43. “Carta (de Otermín á Parraga),” in Auttos tocantes, 31.
44. “Carta Del teniente Gral Don Alonso García para el Rdo Padre Procurador (Sept. 4, 1680),” in N. Mex. Doc., I, 519.
45. “Carta del R. P. Procurador Fr. Francisco de Ayeta al Exmo. Sr. Virrey (Sept. 11, 1680),” in N. Mex. Doc., I, 526.
46. The Quarterly, XV, 147.
47. Arizona and New Mexico, 171.
48. The copy which I have used of the proceedings of the Junta General herein referred to reads, “Mexico nuebe de Septiembre de mil seyssientos y settenta y seys años” (see “Autos tocantes á socorros del Nuebo Mexco. —,” 4), while Bancroft's own copy reads, “9 de Setiembre de 1676 años” (see N. Mex. Doc. MS., I, p. 509).
49. Report of Ayeta to the Junta General, January 9, 1681, in Auttos tocantes, 107; Proceedings of the Junta General, January 17, 1681, in Ibid., 114.
50. “Autos tocantes á socorros del Nuebo Mexco—,” 1.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., 1-2.
54. “Autos tocantes á socorros del Nuebo Mexco—,” 2. I have not had access to the original documents referred to above, but the latter are mentioned and summarized in the autos of the viceroy and the other officials contained in “Autos tocantes á socorros del Nuebo Mexco—.”
55. “Autos tocantes á socorros del Nuebo Mexco—,” 2.
56. Bancroft mentions this occurrence in his Arizona and New Mexico, p. 171. The copy of the source cited by him reads, “y al Padre Fr. Alonso Gil de Avila Ministro del pueblo del Renecuey el dia 23 de Enero del año pasado de 1675.” The copy which I have used reads, “y al Padre fray Alonso Gil de Abila ministro del Pueblo de Zenecú en el dia Veinte y Tres de henero del año passado de seyssientos y settenta y cinco.” On page 182 op. cit., Bancroft cites Arlegui (Chronica de la Provincia de S. Francisco de Zacatecas, ed. 1737) for his authority in stating that “a P. Alonzo Gil —, in this revolt (1680) or some other, appeared at the window of the church where the Christians had taken refuge, and was shot while trying to appease the rebels.” In this connection Bancroft fails to note that beyond all reasonable doubt the Father Alonso Gil de Avila mentioned in his copy of the source cited is identical with the Father Alonso Gil mentioned by Arlegui in the passage cited. According to that author (Chronica, etc., p. 250, ed. 1737), Father Gil and some Spaniards were besieged in the church (at Senucú). The priest, on appearing at the window with a crucifix in his hand in the attempt to pacify the natives, was shot in the breast with an arrow, from the effects of which he died shortly afterward at the foot of the crucifix in the altar. The other Spaniards in the church were soon afterward aided by some soldiers and all escaped.
57. “Autos tocantes á socorros del Nuebo Mexco—,” 2-3.
58. Ibid., 3.
59. Ibid., 3.
60. See note 2, page 146.
61. “Autos tocantes á socorros del Nuebo Mexco—,” 3.
62. Ibid., 3.
63. “Autos tocantes á socorros del Nuebo Mexco—,” 5-8.
64. In Nuevo Mexico Cėdulas (Bancroft Collection), folio 9-11.
65. “y consultandolo vos con la Junta Gral de la Hazienda dispusisteis el socorro qe. se resolvio de cinqta. hombres,” etc. N. Mex. Céd., 10.
66. Cédula of June 25, 1680, in Auttos tocantes, 94. “—que por zedula de Diez y ocho de Junio de mil seiscientos y setenta y ocho le aprove el socorro de gente Armas y cavallos que el año de seiscientos y setenta y siete remitio a las Provas del nuevo Mexico.”
67. Arizona and New Mexico, 171.
68. Report of Ayeta to the Junta General, January 9, 1681, in Auttos tocantes, 107. Proceedings of the Junta General, January 17, 1681, in Ibid., 114.
69. Cédula of June 25, 1680, in Auttos tocantes, 94.
70. Ibid.
71. I have not had access to the letter of June 19, 1679, from the viceroy to the king, nor to the letter of May 28, 1679, from Father Ayeta to the viceroy. They are both mentioned and summarized, however, in the royal cédula of June 25, 1680, in Auttos tocantes, 94-5.
72. Robles, “Diario de los Años 1665 a 1703,” in Doc. Hist Mex., 1st series, volume 2, page 289. Notwithstanding that this is the same authority cited for his statement, Bancroft says that the train left Mexico on the 29th or 30th of September. (Arizona and New Mexico, 171.) I can find no authority in the sources used by Bancroft for his further statement that with the wagons went some troops (Ibid., 172), and, as I have already pointed out, the sources which I have used state plainly that the request for troops in 1679 was not granted.
73. Robles, “Diario,” etc., p. 289. It will be remembered that Ayeta carried twenty-five wagons in 1677.
74. Report of Ayeta to the Junta General, January 9, 1681, in Auttos tocantes, 107.
75. Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, 171.
76. Carta de Ayeta á el Virey, in N. Mex. Doc., I, 565.
77. “Carta del Padre Visitador a el Exmo. Sr. Virrey (Aug. 31, 1680),” in N. Mex. Doc., I, 569-71.
78. I have not had access to the letter of August 28 from Ayeta to García, but the above information is summarized in the “Carta del R. P. Procurador Fr. Francisco de Ayeta al Exmo. Sr. Virrey (September 11, 1680),” in N. Mex. Doc., I, p. 526.
79. Ayeta speaks as though Leiva had only twenty-seven men under his command at the pass, though Otermín states that he had despatched Leiva with thirty men to meet the wagons. “Autto (de Otermín),” in Auttos tocantes, 15.
80. “Carta del Padre Visitador a el Exmo. Sr. Virrey (August 31, 1680),” in N. Mex. Doc., I, p. 571. Don Juan Villagutierre y Soto-mayor, who published in 1701 his Historia de la Conquista y Redvcciones de los Itzaex y Lacandones en la America Septentrional, and who was, therefore, practically speaking, contemporary with the revolt, has a fairly good, though brief account of the Indian uprising in New Mexico in 1680, notwithstanding a number of manifest errors. In Book III, Chap. XI, p. 206, for instance, he states that Leiva had one hundred men when he started out from the pass, and that he carried an abundance of all that was necessary for the refugees. The letter which I have cited as the source for my statement was written by Father Ayeta the day after Leiva and his party left El Paso. In this letter Ayeta definitely settles the question by stating that seventy-eight soldiers and four religious formed the relief party. Moreover, while Ayeta does not give a detailed inventory of all that these men carried, we know that there was not an abundance of all that was necessary for the refugees, as Villagutierre has stated. This is shown by the fact, as will be pointed out more fully later on, that the day after Leiva met the northern division near Alamillo, Otermín, realizing the impossibility of proceeding to El Paso without additional supplies, despatched urgent requests to Ayeta for further aid, and, as we shall see, before this reached them they were in the direst necessity. (See Auto of Otermín, in Auttos tocantes, 31. In this connection it may also be stated that Francisco de Thoma in his Historia Popular de Nuevo México makes the mistake of saying that Leiva set out from the pass with thirty men. Op. cit., p. 93.)
81. N. Mex. Doc., I, 572-3.
82. Once ternos de armas enteras de caballos.
83. N. Mex. Doc., I, 573-4.
84. “Autto (de Otermín),” in Auttos tocantes, 15.
85. “Carta del Padre Visitador a el Exmo. Sr. Virrey (August 31, 1680),” in N. Mex. Doc., I, 575.
86. Letter of Ayeta to Otermín, September 8, 1680, in Auttos tocantes, 41.
87. “Carta del R. P. Procurador Fr. Francisco de Ayeta al Exmo. Sr. Virrey (September 11, 1680),” in N. Mex. Doc., I, p. 526-28.
88. He evidently meant that it did not matter much that the Spaniards, instead of having been killed, had only been driven out.
89. This is the only evidence that the Indians had any such intentions. It seems strange that such a plan was not carried out, however, for the Spaniards would doubtless have been an easy prey for the Indians had they attacked them in the open.
90. Declaracion de un indio alsado,” in Auttos tocantes, 9.
91. For the events of the retreat from San Marcos to the house of Cristóbal de Anaya, see “Auto de marcho y paraxez,” in Auttos tocantes, 10. It is apparent from the narrative of the retreat recorded in this auto that Otermín heard García's testimony on August 26. Proof of this is as follows: The auto begins, “Despues de lo susodho aviendo salido deste Paraje marchando el dia Veinte y quatro,” etc. Sixteen lines further along in the copy which I have used occurs the following, “y otro dia la mañana,” etc., which would make the date the 25th. Twenty-one lines below this we read, “y otro dia al amaneser,” etc., which manifestly indicates the 26th. The auto is closed with the order of Otermín for Pedro García to be examined. The next auto contains this Indian's testimony, yet it is dated, “En el paxe (sic) de junto ala estançia del Sarjento mor. xptoval de anaia en beinte y çinco dias del mes de agosto.” Following this document is another auto containing the continued narrative of the retreat. It begins, “de este Paraxe salimos marchando el dia Veinte y seis.” It is thus seen that there is confusion in regard to the date. Since Otermín does not mention having halted at this time longer than to hear García's story, I believe that the weight of evidence points to the 26th as the day that that Indian's testimony was recorded.
92. “Carta (de Otermín á Parraga),” in Auttos tocantes, 31-32.
93. Auto of Otermín, in Auttos tocantes, 12.
94. Ibid. “y aber veinte dias y mas que La jente que seguia al dho theniente del rio avaxo.”
95. It should be held in mind that it took from the 21st to the 26th of August for Otermín to march from Santa Fé to the house of Cristóbal de Anaya, a distance, according to the governor's own statement, of “more than ten leagues.” (See “Auto de marcha y paraxez,” in Auttos tocantes, 10.)
96. Arizona and New Mexico, 181. The error is copied by Twitchell, The Leading Facts of New Mexican History, 364. The notes given by Twitchell at this point, purporting to come from manuscripts, are obviously taken from Bandelier's Final Report, Part II, 221, and 233. De Thoma (Historia Popular de Nuevo Mexico, 93) errs in stating that Leiva had thirty-seven men when he met Otermín.
97. “Mandamto de Prision contra la persona del theniente gen alonso garçia—,” in Auttos tocantes, 13.
98. “Carta del Padre Fr. Antonio de Sierra para el Padre Visitador (September 4, 1680),” in N. Mex. Doc., I, 522.
99. García implies that the letter was written from the house of Bartolomé Domínguez. (See “Carta del teniente Gral Don Alonso Garcia para el Rdo Padre Procurador,” in N. Mex. Doc., I, 514.) Ayeta positively states that the letter was written from the place of Tome Domínguez. (See “Carta del R. P. Procurador Fr. Francisco de Ayeta al Exmo. Sr. Virrey,” in Ibid., 527.)
100. “Carta del R. P. Procurador Fr. Francisco de Ayeta al Exmo. Sr. Virrey (September 11, 1680),” in N. Mex. Doc., I, 528.
101. For the events of the retreat of Otermín from the estancia of Cristóbal de Anaya, not otherwise referred to, see Auto of Otermín, in Auttos tocantes, 12.
102. “Mandamto de Prision contra la persona theniente gen alonso garçia,” in Auttos tocantes, 13.
103. “Notificasion y Prision—,” in Auttos tocantes, 14-15.
104. “Autto (de Otermín),” in Auttos tocantes, 15.
105. Arizona and New Mexico, 181.
106. “Autto (de Otermín),” in Auttos tocantes, 15. “Luego Yncontinente en dho dia mes y año dhos yendo marchando su SSa con el ejerçito al paraje vna legua mas alla del Pueblo del alamillo se descubrio a trecho vna polvadera en la qual se rreconosio Venir Cantidad de hasta treinta Personas da acavallo y reconosiendo quienes podian ser se vido que era el mro de campo Po de leiva cavo y caudillo de treinta honbres que su SSa abia despachado a escoltar y convoiar la haçienda de las limosnas,” etc.
107. “y el dho mro de campo Po de leiva aviendose encontrando con el ejerçito traiendo consigo mas de quarenta soldados y quatro Relijiosos del horder del Señor Sn franco Reconosiendo a su SSa todos hiçieron la salva con mucho regosijo,” etc.
108. Twitchell (Leading Facts of New Mexican History, p. 365) has repeated the mistake of Bancroft in saying that Leiva had with him thirty men when he and Otermín met. He states also that “Otermín was also reënforced by a command of thirty men under the Maestro de Campo, Pedro de Leyba, who had come with Lieutenant General Garcia from Fra Cristobal.” Leiva, however, did not accompany García from Fray Cristóbal. The latter left there on September 4 (“Carta del Padre Fr. Antonio de Sierra para el Padre Visitador,” in N. Mex. Doc., I, 521; “Carta Del teniente Gral Don Alonso Garcia para el Rdo Padre Procurador,” in Ibid., 518), while the former at sundown on that day was nine leagues below Fray Cristóbal (“Carta del R. P. Procurador Fr. Francisco de Ayeta al Exmo. Sr. Virrey,” in Ibid., 527). Moreover, García met Otermín at Alamillo, and Leiva met him a league below that pueblo.
109. “Autto (de Otermín),” in Auttos tocantes, 15.
110. “Carta del Padre Visitador a el Exmo. Sr. Virrey,” in N. Mex. Doc., I, p. 573.
111. “Autto (de Otermín),” No. 2, in Auttos tocantes, 15.
112. The Spanish Conquest of New Mexico, 297-8.
113. Historical Sketches of New Mexico, 195.
114. “Autto (de Otermín),” in Auttos tocantes, 29.
115. Auto of Xavier, in Auttos tocantes, 30.
116. Auto of Otermín, in Auttos tocantes, 31.
117. The Spanish Conquest of New Mexico, 297.
118. Auto of Otermín, in Auttos tocantes, 31.
119. Autto Y dilijencia,” in Auttos tocantes, 43.
120. Auto of Otermín, in Auttos tocantes, 31.
121. Carta in Auttos tocantes, 31-2.
How to cite:
Hackett, Charles Wilson, "THE RETREAT OF THE SPANIARDS FROM NEW MEXICO IN 1680, AND THE BEGINNINGS OF EL PASO I ", Volume 016, Number 2, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, Page 137 - 168. http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v016/n2/article_2.html
[Accessed Mon Nov 23 19:10:52 CST 2009]
