THE LOUISIANA-TEXAS FRONTIER  III

ISAAC JOSLIN COX

Part II—The American Occupation of the Louisiana-Texas  Frontier—(Continued.)

III. EXPLORING EXPEDITIONS OF THE TEXAS FRONTIER

Jefferson had planned to explore Louisiana, or at least as much of it as was necessary to traverse in pursuing a direct route to the Pacific, long before he gained possession of the territory. Meriwether Lewis was already making preparations for his memorable journey, when his chief learned of the unexpected acquisition. He was thus in a position to turn his project to very practical account and be the first to acquire the definite information that would assist the President in determining just what he had bought from France. For this reason his undertaking becomes the premier event in a new epoch of Far Western exploration, and incidentally a prominent factor in the attempt to extend the Louisiana-Texas frontier to the Rio Grande. In the frontier area between that river and the Mississippi Lewis and Clark emphasize the northern route by way of the Missouri and Platte, which has Santa Fé as its objective point. Its consideration, then, belongs to another phase of our subject. ¹⁵⁰

After Jefferson knew of the acquisition of Louisiana, he perceived that the event gave a new impulse and purpose to his exploring plan. That work must be pursued on a more extensive scale to overcome the serious handicap of the United States in the inevitable territorial controversy with Spain. This will explain his statement in his letter of August 11, 1803, to Isaac Briggs, a government surveyor, that: “Congress would probably authorize the exploration of the principal streams of the Mississippi and Missouri,” to determine those “given points in the highlands enclosing those rivers” that “constitute the exterior boundary of the acquisition.” ¹⁵¹ This exploration formed an important phase of the administration's policy in taking possession of Louisiana and aroused corresponding fears and efforts to combat it on the part of Spanish officials.

Jefferson's plan for the exploration of Louisiana, and the distinction which he wished to preserve between the expedition of Lewis and Clark and those he now had in mind, is best shown in his letter of November 16, 1803, to Meriwether Lewis:

The object of your mission is single, the direct water communication from sea to sea formed by the bed of the Missouri, and perhaps the Oregon. I have proposed in conversation, and it seems generally assented to, that Congress appropriate ten to twelve thousand dollars for exploring the principle waters of the Mississippi and Missouri. In that case I should send a party up the Red River to its head, then to cross over to the head of the Arkansas and come down that. A second party for the Panis and Padouca, and a third, perhaps, for the Morsigona and St. Peters. This [exploration] will be attempted distinctly from your mission, which we consider of major importance and therefore not to be delayed or hazarded by any episodes whatever. ¹⁵²

In a letter to Dunbar he elaborated the details of his plan. The surveyor general for the district north of the Ohio was to be authorized to explore the upper Mississippi. Upon obtaining the probable authorization of Congress he proposed to send an expedition up the Panis and down the Padoucas, exploring the entire course of both rivers, and another up the Arkansas and the Red. Each party was to take careful astronomical observations at the source of each river explored and from the data thus secured it would be possible to construct a skeleton map of Louisiana, which in contour and main streams would be perfectly correct, and whose details could be filled in at leisure. For details north of the Missouri, upon which stream Lewis and Clark were about to embark, he expected to depend upon British fur traders and explorers. ¹⁵³

The result of Jefferson's quiet personal work among the members of the Eighth Congress appeared in a report dated March 8, 1804, from the Committee on Commerce and Manufactures. After hazarding a surmise that the new territory extended to the Pacific, the report touched upon previous explorations of the Mississippi and of the Gulf Coast by Hutchins and Ellicott, mentioned the plans for penetrating the upper Mississippi and Missouri, and closed by advocating the Red and the Arkansas as affording the next most favorable field for exploration. For this purpose the services of private individuals should be utilized, wherever possible, and in addition an appropriation should be given the President to supplement such efforts. ¹⁵⁴

A few days later Jefferson, as above indicated, wrote Dunbar of his plan and asked him to direct the expedition up the Red and Arkansas, in case Congress should authorize the required appropriation. The preparations for the expedition were to be made at New Orleans and Natchez, and the collector of customs at the former place would honor all drafts for this purpose. The instructions to the leader were to be similar to those issued to Lewis and Clark, with such additional ones as Dunbar should think necessary to add. “Still, this is a matter of speculation,” added the President, warningly, for Congress was hastening matters to bring its session to a close, “and in that case all I have said will be as if I had not said it.” The action of this legislative body, owing to opposition in the Senate, was but partially favorable, for its hurried appropriation was only $3,000, barely sufficient for one party. This Jefferson determined to send upon the more interesting of his two proposed explorations; and without waiting for Dunbar's acceptance, he again wrote, asking him to superintend the preparations for the expedition up the Red and Arkansas, and to select its leader. For this position he suggested a Mr. Walker, of Mississippi, or a Mr. Gillespie, of North Carolina, both of whom had served with Ellicott. He mentioned the fact that a George Hunter, of Philadelphia, would accompany the expedition. Dr. Hunter's “fort,” the President wrote, “is chemistry, and in the practical part of that science he is supposed to have no equal in the United States.” He warned Dunbar that Hunter might attempt to turn the expedition into a prospecting tour for gold and silver mines, and that such an incidental object must not be allowed to defeat the main purpose of the expedition. ¹⁵⁵

In his replies of May 15th and June 1st, Dunbar tempered his expression of gratification over the fact that Congress had authorized the expedition by wishing that that body had displayed more liberality. The House committee in its report had seemed to take it for granted that scientific men would be led by patriotism to undertake their work of exploration. While many might be influenced by such a motive, yet in the case of a talented man of limited means it would be at the expense of precious time; and when a great empire spoke of compensation it should be adequate to the importance of the task. It would be difficult to find the proper man in the vicinity of Natchez. Of the two men mentioned by Jefferson, Gillespie was the better educated, while Walker, then serving in the Spanish army, possessed the greater natural talent; but neither had any particular qualification for the work aside from a knowledge of surveying. He believed they must choose a man possessing the requisite geographical knowledge and consider themselves fortunate if he knew anything of natural history, botany, or mineralogy. If a man of “only moderate talents” was needed, he suggested that Dr. Hunter should command the expedition. ¹⁵⁶

The instructions to Dunbar as director of the expedition accompanied the President's letter of April 13, 1804. In general they followed closely those previously issued to Meriwether Lewis. From Natchez, the point of departure, the leader was to conduct the party to the remotest source of the Red River, and thence to the highlands dividing the waters of this stream from those of the Bravo (Rio Grande) and the Pacific. After making a careful exploration of these highlands, he was to descend the Arkansas, noting upon this river, as upon the former, the important natural features and taking numerous astronomical observations. With regard to the Indians, he should tell them, in accordance with the later message borne by Lewis, that now the Spaniards had agreed to withdraw all their troops “from the Mississippi and Missouri and from all countries watered by any rivers running into them,” thus emphasizing the Jeffersonian idea of the extent of Louisiana. In view of the prospective withdrawal of these garrisons and the change in allegiance of any subjects residing upon these tributaries, they were to emphasize the probable advantage of trade relations with the United States and to arrange for the establishment of trading posts. In connection with his suggestions upon relations with “those people,” he warns the leader of the party not to persevere in his exploration, if threatened by a superior force, “authorized or not authorized by a nation.” The lives of the members of the expedition are too valuable to be exposed to probable destruction, and with the loss of the party would follow the loss of all results from the expedition. The fact that this warning, as in the case of the instructions to Lewis, follows the paragraphs devoted to the Indians, seems to imply that the President anticipated the use of this alternative only as a result of savage opposition. Yet, as a matter of fact, it was employed only in yielding to the Spaniards and was probably an expedient of Jeffersonian diplomacy to avoid direct mention of their possible opposition.

It so chanced that Stephen Minor, the last Spanish governor of the Natchez district, had remained in that region to keep watch upon the movements of the Americans and report to the Spanish authorities. Dunbar was on excellent terms with him and consulted him in regard to the President's plan for exploring the Red River. Minor told him that such an enterprise ought not to be undertaken before the limits of Louisiana were positively fixed. To send a party of soldiers to the sources of rivers in the disputed territory would be an insult to Spain and would cause that power to retaliate by forcing it to return. Minor thought that by this argument he had convinced Dunbar, but he did not feel any too confident of this result. He therefore lost no time in communicating his information to Casa Calvo at New Orleans, who quickly disseminated it amongst the interested Spanish authorities. ¹⁵⁷

Salcedo had already learned of the Lewis and Clark expedition some three months before Casa Calvo's communication telling of Jefferson's Red River project. This reiterated the previous admonitions to preserve “the vast dominions of His Majesty” by the immediate arrest of those who should engage in such work and, as before, Salcedo reported the warning to the viceroy, Iturrigaray. The latter suggested that Casa Calvo ought to have taken up the matter with Casa Yrujo, the minister, as the person best prepared to discuss these matters, and so at once cut off all possibility of danger. Salcedo stated that as in the previous case he had taken all possible precautions to anticipate the views of the American government, but for some reason his reports were not forwarded to Madrid and this later caused the state officials great concern. However, Cevellos learned of Minor's report to Casa Calvo and immediately suggested to the War Department the necessity of sending a party of soldiers to restrain any such efforts. American hunters must not be allowed to range over Spanish territory under pretext of scientific exploration. ¹⁵⁸

In addition to his negative work in attempting to break up Jefferson's exploring expeditions, Casa Calvo was also attempting in a positive way to justify his position as boundary commissioner by acquiring some definite information to guide him in his task. In this he was likely to encounter some opposition from his fellow officials unless he exercised care in selecting his agents, for upon receiving notice of this appointment Salcedo wrote to the Governor of Texas that no American should be permitted to approach its frontier or in any way be allowed to mark alone the limits of Louisiana. Two months later José Joaquin Ugarte, who commanded on the Texas frontier, dutifully wrote the governor, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Bautista Elguezabal, that in accordance with instructions, he should permit no Anglo-Americans to approach Spanish territory for fear they might mark the boundary without regard to Spanish interests. ¹⁵⁹

In July Casa Calvo wrote Salcedo that he desired to learn more of the rivers near the limits of Louisiana and for this purpose was sending Juan Minor, the brother of Stephen, to make a map of the region. He requested that John Walker, who had previously served on the Ellicott Commission, should assist in this work. ¹⁶⁰ Three days later, July 6, 1804, he issued the necessary passport, empowering Minor to visit Bahia and San Antonio upon necessary royal business, of which the character was not disclosed. ¹⁶¹ This, however, was given in a letter of instructions sent by Salcedo to Governor Elguezabal. This letter stated that Minor had been commissioned by Casa Calvo to pass from Natchitoches to mark the boundary line of Louisiana, after a due examination of the rivers and of the coast. Salcedo instructed the governor, upon the appearance of Minor, to examine closely his commission, orders, and instructions; to have him state clearly what he had thus far done; and to show the means for carrying his plans into execution. He was especially to declare his citizenship; and if he claimed to be a subject of the King, he was to be furnished a guard to Chihuahua; if of the United States, he was not to be permitted to enter the province.

In his reply to the general commandant, the governor echoed his superior's suspicions regarding Minor and promised to obey his injunctions. On September 4th Ugarte at Nacogdoches reported to Elguezabal that he was watching closely the movements of Minor. On September 13th Minor presented himself at Nacogdoches, but he claimed that he had merely verbal instructions to pass from that place to the Trinity, to descend this river and explore the neighboring creeks and bays, and make a map for Casa Calvo. Later, the Governor of Texas advised Ugarte to detain him at Nacogdoches to await Salcedo's pleasure. On the 21st of the following November the governor again informed Salcedo that Juan Minor and two others, one of whom was Hugo Coyle, an Irish surveyor, had presented written petitions asking to be admitted into Texas, but that he had directed Minor to await Salcedo's determination. Evidently it was well that he did so, for he later received the order of Salcedo, dated October 22, withdrawing the permission to survey the boundary given to Minor on the 11th of the preceding August. ¹⁶² The attitude of Salcedo from the very first emphasized the fact that the Texas officials were jealous of Casa Calvo and were going as far as they dared in thwarting his plans.

Meanwhile, during the month of May, 1804, Dr. George Hunter, acting under the instructions of the Secretary of War, had busied himself in Philadelphia in the purchase of provisions, Indian presents, medicines, and instruments for the proposed expedition up the Red River. His request to Casa Yrujo for a passport met with a curt refusal, for the Spanish minister believed that his purpose was to penetrate to New Mexico. ¹⁶³ Nothing deterred, on the 27th of May the doctor and his son set out on horseback for the overland journey to Pittsburg. After eight days they arrived at the latter place, where, with better success than Lewis the previous year, they spent only two weeks in superintending the construction of a flat-bottomed boat to convey themselves and stores to Natchez. The details of their journey to the latter town furnish a most interesting picture of pioneer travel upon the Ohio and Mississippi, but are not directly connected with our theme, and so may be omitted. The doctor records, “with a feeling of relief,” that, on the 24th day of July, they made fast to the shore at Natchez.

Although Hunter had consumed nearly two months on the trip from Philadelphia, he speedily learned from Mr. Dunbar that no preparations had been made for the expedition. Possibly Minor's protest may account for this inactivity. Lieutenant Colonel Constant Freeman, the commandant of the garrison at New Orleans, was to furnish the boat and military escort, but had deferred all measures until Hunter's arrival. Dunbar suggested that the doctor should proceed with his boat to New Orleans, and if no better one could be procured, have some alterations made in it, buy the necessary stores, and return as soon as possible with the military escort. Accordingly Hunter was obliged to spend the next two months in the trip to New Orleans and return, and in repairing his boat. This craft was constructed for use on a large river, but was the only one procurable and must perforce serve for the navigation of the smaller streams that they planned to explore. With a far from efficient crew, composed of a sergeant and twelve enlisted men from the New Orleans garrison, and with his makeshift boat, Hunter, in the latter part of September, again reached the proposed starting point of the expedition, St. Catherine's Landing, just below Natchez. In general, one gains the impression from the pages of the doctor's journal that only a very moderate degree of alacrity was displayed in following out the details of the President's plan.

During Hunter's stay in New Orleans there had been an entire change in the plan itself. On the 17th of July Jefferson wrote Dunbar that on account of the shifting of a part of the Osage Indians to the Arkansas two years before, the expedition was to be postponed until the following spring. The significance of this Indian movement had but just been explained to the President by Pierre Chouteau, then on a visit to Washington with White Hairs, the noted Osage chief, and some of his companions. Chouteau was to visit the Indians during the winter and endeavor to heal the schism, so that the Indians should not merely refrain from hindering the expedition, but even actively aid it. “In the meantime,” added the President, “we shall be able to remove the Spanish impediments.” But Dunbar was authorized to make use of the men and stores for a shorter excursion, and in the interim they might select a fully qualified leader. The President also suggested that Dunbar should try to forward the account of this preliminary trip in time for effective use with Congress. ¹⁶⁴

In his reply Dunbar announced that the expedition had fortunately not started, that no geographer had been engaged, and that no one, unless it were Dr. Hunter, could feel disappointed because of the postponement. He and the doctor together should visit the Hot Springs at the head waters of the Washita. This was a region of great natural interest which the main party in the spring would be unable to visit, and he would doubtless obtain much available information from the hunters who lived at the post on the Washita. As another reason for postponing the main expedition, he added the fact (probably based on Minor's protest) that the Spaniards would have stopped it a little above “Nakitosh.” In view of Salcedo's orders of the preceding May, that no American should be permitted to approach the Texas frontier, or to mark the boundaries of Louisiana, Dunbar's surmise appears to be well founded. The Washita offered the advantage of having its head waters protected by a group of rough, elevated hills from incursions of the predatory Osages, and it was likewise remote from the Spanish outposts. While not so important as either the Red or the Arkansas, the river promised to support a large future population, whose pioneer elements were already settling upon its banks, and its exploration was necessary to complete the chart of our new territorial acquisition. These considerations, to a certain extent, compensated for the postponement of Jefferson's more comprehensive plan of frontier exploration.

The route of the Hunter-Dunbar expedition was so prudently chosen that no untoward event occurred to render it memorable. On the afternoon of October 16th, 1804, the start was finally made from St. Catherine's Landing, near Dunbar's plantation, “The Forest.” The personnel of the party consisted of Sir William Dunbar, George Hunter and his son, a sergeant and twelve enlisted men and a negro servant of Dunbar's. The route covered the distance to the mouth of the Red River, up that stream to the Black, or Washita, to the Hot Springs, near the source of the latter, and thence the return by the same streams—the whole occupying some four months. Naturally the major part of the details of such an expedition consist of scientific descriptions of the country traversed and the trivial incidents of life in the wilderness. Except as tending to throw light upon the general methods of frontier exploration these details are now relatively unimportant. Yet observations upon the contemporary life encountered along the river banks and such experience as the party gained for the use of succeeding expeditions more than repaid the cost of the attempt. ¹⁶⁵

The population along the river was a never failing source of interest, especially to Dr. Hunter. The greater part consisted of Canadian French “of few wants and as little industry.” There were a number of Spanish and French Creole families, apparently of the same general character as the Canadians, but interspersed with them were some of a higher order of industry and intelligence. Mingled with the elements surviving from the previous régimes were a few German, Irish, and American settlers of the frontier type, and the soldiers of the post on the Washita. About this post were grouped some 150 families of this nondescript population. A few scattered cabins above and below this place, with an occasional house of more pretentious appearance, constituted the settled portion of the country. The upper sources of the river were marked only by an infrequent hunter's lodge or “cache,” utilized by the inhabitants, white and Indian, during the autumn hunting. The deer, bear, and wild fowl of the swamps and forests afforded the greater portion of the food supply of the region; but this was supplemented by an uncertain supply of Indian corn and by a few wild cattle, kept for beef rather than for dairy purposes. Two large land grants, affording a fertile field for future litigation, were located upon the Washita, that of the Marquis of Maison Rouge being located below Fort Miró, while the more recent one to the Baron de Bastrop, soon to be connected with Burr's ambitious filibustering project, extended, twelve leagues square, above it. The greater part of the inhabitants appeared to be satisfied with the sway of Lieutenant Bowmar, the military commandant at the post.

At the Island of Mallet the travelers discovered, on taking the observation of November 15th, that they were within half a minute of the new boundary line of Orleans Territory—the thirty-third degree. Here they lost the Spanish moss of the lower courses of the river, left the alluvial swamps for higher land, and observed other marked changes that differentiated the country above and below the new limit. A week later they passed the Caddo “trace” leading from the Red to the Arkansas, and a little above this the Ecores de Fabri, some sand hills where tradition, as detailed by the guide, reported that leaden plates once marked the boundary between the French and Spanish colonial possessions. Naturally they found no vestige of these plates. ¹⁶⁶ From occasional parties of hunters they learned many facts concerning the Red, the Arkansas, the Missouri, and the Platte rivers, the Indians living upon them, and the vast plains through which they flowed.

In a measure this method of procuring information answered the purpose of Jefferson's extensive plan. Far greater service was rendered in the acquisition of practical experience for the guidance of future expeditions. It was speedily discovered that a special boat was needed to navigate the shallow waters of these interior streams. It was likewise noted that the discipline of a detail of enlisted men could not be maintained simply by a non-commissioned officer. More important still was the result of the experiment in transferring some baggage from the head of navigation on the Washita (the Fourche de Chalfat) to the Hot Springs. Though the distance was less than nine miles and the loads carried by the soldiers purposely made very light, they complained bitterly, and, as Dunbar thought, with justice, of the difficulties of this method of transporting baggage. The experiment led Dunbar to consider the vastly increased difficulty in using this scheme for a much larger company, between the headwaters of the Red and the Arkansas, especially when they were wholly uncertain of the distance. In accordance with Dunbar's suggestion, the President afterwards modified this feature of his original plan.

The voyagers reached the head of navigation on the Washita on December 6th and started on their return journey on the 8th of January. The interval was employed in observations and excursions in the vicinity of the Hot Springs. On the 16th they were at the post on the Washita, where Dunbar left the party to return overland to his home. On the 31st Hunter brought the boat to St. Catherine's Landing, and on the 9th of the following month delivered the escort, safe and sound to a man, to Lieutenant Colonel Freeman at New Orleans.

In summarizing his work upon his return, Dunbar could report nothing of great importance. The Hot Springs formed a great natural curiosity, but the season was unfavorable for botanical work. The expedition, however, had afforded some experimental knowledge that might later prove useful. He had wished to prepare a brief abstract of the excursion, to be forwarded before the close of the session of Congress, but this was rendered impossible on account of the bad weather, the irregular mails, but, above all, by the loss of a month on account of their boat. Dr. Hunter's ideas in its construction were entirely wrong. ¹⁶⁷ Dunbar's unfortunate colleague had meanwhile taken passage at New Orleans for Philadelphia, where he arrived April 1st, 1805. His practice had suffered by his absence and he regretted that his medical knowledge had really been of so little service on the expedition. His son, in Philadelphia, and Dunbar, in Natchez, entered upon the tedious process of calculating their respective observations. After considerable delay their original journals and their summarized contents found appropriate resting places in the vault of the American Philosophical Society and in the documents of the Ninth Congress, where their lot was a century of almost uninterrupted repose. Nicholas King evidently made some use of these data in his government map of the following year, but it was not till 1810 that the publication of Pike's book with its accompanying maps first brought the information before the general public.

Although the Hunter-Dunbar expedition did not explore the Red River, as originally intended, the President, during this winter of 1804-5, received some information concerning that stream from another source. Dr. John Sibley was evidently emboldened by his previous correspondence with Claiborne over the limits of Louisiana to communicate directly with Jefferson, and he rightly approached by the scientific channel. After opening his first letter of March 20, 1804, with a few personal details, he devoted the remainder to a description of the bowwood tree. In closing, he begged leave to tender his services in any capacity the President might think proper to command. ¹⁶⁸ His reward came very quickly, first in the appointment as surgeon's mate for the forces stationed at Natchitoches, and later as Indian agent for Orleans Territory and the region south of the Arkansas.

Certain of Sibley's personal letters had already found their way into print and had aroused considerable comment in regard to his veracity. His personal reputation was by no means wholly proof against a storm of personal abuse that followed his appointment, late in 1804, as a member of Claiborne's council. The Governor doubted if this action of the President were wholly wise, but Jefferson did not believe that the charge of wife desertion and other attacks on Sibley's private character were sufficiently proven to count against his unquestionable good sense and information. ¹⁶⁹ Having discovered Jefferson's interest in the aborigines, Sibley kept him supplied with Indian vocabularies and so retained his good will and that of his successor. He heightened this impression by a description of the Red River Valley, based on his travels in 1803 and 1804 along the settled portions of that river. ¹⁷⁰ In addition he gathered information from others, particularly from his interpreter, Francois Grappe. The latter was well acquainted with the Louisiana-Texas frontier, but the fact that he was then in Spanish pay would tend to vitiate his testimony, just as his employer's exuberant imagination often made his own statements untrustworthy.

Dr. Sibley was in no sense a trained scientific observer, so his description was largely confined to subjects that would appeal to the casual traveler or prospective settler. He mentioned the names of the various settlements upon the banks of the river, such as Rapides, Avoyelles, Natchitoches, Campti, etc., and also of the more important isolated establishments. He described the chief affluents of the Red, either from personal observation, or from the reports of others, and gave a fair representation of the river system, the soil, and its productions, from his practical agricultural standpoint, and made predictions that succeeding years have not verified. His description of the population was interesting from the fact that he showed the numerous elements that composed it and that the more progressive were non-native. In this particular the Red simply repeated what others had observed on the Washita. Natchitoches, the most important town, was only a miserable settlement, containing less than half a dozen notable structures, and its general economic condition was worse than in 1762. All of the industries that were important were apparently in American hands, and had been even while Spain controlled affairs. His report, even if it added little to scientific knowledge, was a most effective commentary upon four decades of Spanish government.

In the latter part of 1804 John Walker, whom Jefferson as well as Casa Calvo had mentioned in connection with exploration on the Sabine and Red, was reported as doing some surveying for the Spaniards whom he now served, on the Rio Grande and the Guadalupe. Claiborne and Turner attached little importance to this report. ¹⁷¹ As if to emphasize the fact that the religious hold of the Spaniards was more enduring that their political sway, the Bishop of Nuevo Leon, in whose diocese Texas belonged, paid a pastoral visit to the town and garrison of Natchitoches. Here he was respectfully received by Captain Turner, as the bishop himself reports “with the honors of a general.” The bishop further added that although he himself was very reserved and politic in his conversations, the French complained unceasingly of their situation under the new government. The malcontents expressed the desire to immigrate to Texas, which “those republicans” (the Americans) already claimed as far as the Rio Grande. Governor Claiborne was deeply impressed with the fact that the bishop kept a journal in which he recorded the latitude of many of the places visited and ¹⁷³the results of his minute inquiries regarding the geography of Louisiana, and that upon leaving Natchitoches he took the most direct route to the City of Mexico. Accordingly he characterized his visit as political rather than ecclesiastical in character. ¹⁷²

We have already seen that Madison had objected to certain rumored changes in the garrison along the Florida and Texas frontiers as violating the status quo. This gave Casa Yrujo the opportunity to retort that his government had done nothing of the sort. But the Americans, in authorizing the expeditions of Lewis and Hunter and Dunbar, had broken the very condition they attempted to impose upon the Spaniards. His superiors had not expressly sanctioned the maintenance of the status quo, but had actually observed it; while the Americans, by exploring the country before they knew its limits, had authorized their troops to invade the possessions of the Spanish sovereign. The fact that this invasion was disguised as a scientific expedition did not render it a less hostile act. Madison did not carry on the controversy with Yrujo, with whom he was not on good terms, but informed Erving that they had communicated with him in regard to Lewis' expedition and had received no intimation that it was not satisfactory. Consequently they thought the other ones that were proposed equally unobjectionable. Claiborne, too, was ready to offer any necessary explanations on the subject. Erving was then temporarily filling Monroe's place in London, so many months were to pass before he could present these explanations in person to the Spanish court. Doubtless the delay was acceptable to the administration at home.

IV. BORDER RELATIONS WITH THE TEXAS INDIANS

During 1804 and 1805, in addition to the actual and contemplated exploring expeditions, the subject of Indian relations appealed strongly to the Louisiana and Texas officials. Indeed, Spanish authorities claimed that possible Indian alliances supplied the chief motive for Jefferson's interest in exploration. There was much in his instructions to Lewis and to Dunbar to justify this suspicion. But in addition there were numerous instances of mutual distrust among the officials along the disputed frontier that serve to throw additional light upon the critical events of 1806. While mere rumor had much to do with the reporting and interpretation of these events, there was sufficient truth to mark them as danger signals. This was particularly so in connection with the reported increase in frontier garrisons and other military movements which each nation was supposed to be undertaking.

The Indian situation had been a difficult one for Nimecio de Salcedo from the time that he became general commandant of the Interior Provinces. He was getting the situation well in hand when tidings of the prospective transfer redoubled his anxiety. At the same time, as if to give point to this feeling, he learned from Felix Vidal, the commandant at Concordia, that Robert Ashley and John House were organizing a party of fifty men in Natchez to visit the Comanches and other Indians in their vicinity. Ashley had been a member of Nolan's party and the mere mention of the latter's name in connection with this project aroused the worst fears of the Spaniard, and led him to request reinforcements from the militia of Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander. A portion of these responded promptly, but there seems to have been no occasion to employ them against a company rallying under a trading standard associated with the name of Nolan. ¹⁷⁴

Before the Americans took possession of Louisiana Sibley represented the Caddoes as anxiously anticipating their coming, because their presence meant higher prices for their furs. A few months after that eventful act Captain Turner, the commanding officer at Natchitoches, wrote Governor Claiborne that he had received a visit from the Caddo Indians, who said that the Spaniards used to give them a present each year and that they wished to receive the same from the Americans. A few gifts from Turner satisfied them temporarily, but the request opened a problem of grave importance in American frontier policy. Claiborne reported the matter to Madison, gave a brief description of the tribe, and said that he should invite them to New Orleans. A later letter from Turner informed Claiborne of the privilege enjoyed by Murphy and Davenport in trading with the Spanish Indians. As this trade included the privilege of supplying them with ammunition, the Americans, in case of difficulty with the Spaniards, might feel its evil effects. Accordingly he recommended the immediate establishment of American factories to divert the Indian trade from the Spaniards. ¹⁷⁵

While Captain Turner was approaching the subject of Indian relations through Governor Claiborne, Dr. Sibley was making similar representations directly to the President, and was likewise giving a political bias to his communications. In his letter of September 2, 1804, he wrote that the Indian trading company of Murphy, Davenport, et al., most of whom had been or still were American citizens, carried on their operations through a Spanish officer at Nacogdoches, Texas. Naturally this company and the Spanish officer did all in their power to excite the Indians against the United States. If this trade ministering to an estimated Indian population of from thirty to forty thousand could be turned into the proper channel and be supplied from an American post on the Red River, the Indians, and especially the Pawnees and Comanches might become fast friends of the Americans. ¹⁷⁶

Unauthorized trappers and traders did not await formal action by the government. On July 16, 1804, Captain Turner informed Claiborne of a typical instance of this sort. A certain American named Sanders had penetrated some five hundred miles up the Red River to the Panis Indians and found them anxious to trade with the Americans. Sanders was pursued by the Spaniards, but managed to elude them and arrived safely at Natchitoches. ¹⁷⁷ The Spanish authorities rightly feared such attempts far more than a regular expedition that moved forward openly under governmental responsibility. The latter was subject to diplomatic pressure; no amount of frontier precaution could circumvent among Indian allies the subtle influence of the ambitious trader and errant trapper. In the far Southwest the peril from these became especially threatening during this period and added not a little to the anxiety with which the general commandant watched American aggression, which he was too weak to check with efficiency. A later report in October that three Americans of this class had been killed by the Indians near Natchitoches, may represent an indirect attempt of the Spaniards to check these unauthorized expeditions. ¹⁷⁸

While still acting as governor of Louisiana Manuel Salcedo reported to his brother that the Tenzas Indians were unwilling to remain under the jurisdiction of the United States and that from their character and religious preference they would make good Spanish subjects. Thereupon Nimecio de Salcedo proposed to admit them under the following regulations. They must settle between the Sabine and Trinity rivers. They must obey the Governor of Texas and the commandant of Nacogdoches, but could expect no subsistence from either. They must give prompt information of any new occurrences in their vicinity. ¹⁷⁹

In this same summer of 1804 Nimecio de Salcedo also proposed to emphasize the opposite policy of retaining the Indians already under his control. He wrote to the Governor of Texas to prevent the removal of the Cadadachos Indians into Louisiana, if it could be done peaceably. ¹⁸⁰ The governor's opinion of the movement of the Indians seemed somewhat at variance with that of his superior. At least, he interpreted any movement of Indians from Louisiana into Texas as a bad omen. Possibly, in view of the trouble the Spaniards had to control the Indians already in Texas, his was the proper attitude. In a letter of the following month Salcedo favored presents of tobacco and clothing for the Indians as a proof of Spanish friendship. ¹⁸¹

According to Captain Turner the Spaniards were at this time inviting the Alabama Indians to settle in Texas and assist in repelling the Americans. He also learned that the Aish Indians of Texas, instigated by his opponents, were trying to persuade the small tribe of the Casados to move from the Opelousas district east of the Sabine to some point west of that river, and threatening them with death if they did not. The Cousate warned an American settler near the head of the Sabine to move from that region, for the Spaniards were trying to stir up all the border Indians against the Americans. ¹⁸²

In view of these facts Claiborne made a vigorous protest to Casa Calvo. The latter believed that they were the exaggerated reports of interested traders, but promised to inform the General Commandant. At the same time Claiborne urged Turner to redouble his efforts to attach the Caddoes to the American cause and empowered him to give rations and small trifles to them and to other honest and well-disposed Indians. As the Caddoes were the intermediaries for the Pawnees, who desired American trade, he might regale them to the extent of two hundred dollars. The hostility of this tribe towards the Spaniards, possibly influenced by these measures, later caused the failure of a general council which the Spaniards attempted to assemble. ¹⁸³

In reporting these conditions to Madison, Claiborne promised to use the greatest prudence and caution in dealing with his Indian and Spanish neighbors, but he feared trouble on account of the unfriendly disposition of the latter. The situation became still more complicated when Turner informed him that the Spanish authorities had granted new privileges to the trading firm of Barr, Murphy, and Davenport. This gave them the exclusive right to trade with the Indians in furs and horses for a period of twelve years. They might also settle a tract of land near the Texas coast. Murphy was to be the commandant of this new settlement, while a certain Ormond was to ply the trade between Nacogdoches and the Washita and to introduce settlers from the latter place into Texas. ¹⁸⁴

With the outbreak of war between England and Spain, in December, 1804, Salcedo believed that a new danger threatened his command. Accordingly he ordered the Governor of Texas to use additional measures to preserve the allegiance of the Indians and to keep intact the pretense of friendship and harmony existing between Spain and the United States. ¹⁸⁵ These orders show that in the war waged by Spain and France against Great Britain he expected the United States to side with the latter, and, as on previous occasions, to plan first an attack upon the Spanish colonies. The natural corollary to this fear would be a reinforcement of the garrisons on the exposed frontier and to this task he seems to have devoted his insufficient resources.

On November 26, 1804, Captain Turner reported the first actual aggression by the Spaniards. A non-commissioned officer and ten men had taken up a position east of the Sabine at La Nana, near the ranch of William Murphy, the Indian trader, and about forty miles west of Natchitoches. The concession recently granted to this trading firm may have stimulated this movement. Turner, however, expressed no apprehension of any great force on the hither side of the Rio Grande, because of the scarcity of provisions. The very inhabitants were in danger of starvation from a failure of the crops and the rapacity of the priests, and depended upon the supplies obtained from Natchitoches, their nearest market, or from beyond the Rio Grande. The few settlers of Bayou Pierre enjoyed a fair crop that year, but this was merely sufficient for themselves. Turner thought the province of Texas could produce only enough beef and pork to supply five hundred men for a year. ¹⁸⁶

In his next monthly report Turner mentioned some recent arrivals at Nacogdoches and stated that a thousand families had been ordered from the populous parts of Mexico to the Texas frontier and that troops from Havana were to garrison Matagorda. His interpreter, Duforet, had received information that Don Antonio de Cordero, the governor of Coahuila, was to exercise control over Texas also, and that the present governor of the latter province was to take up his residence at Adaes. ¹⁸⁷ Claiborne did not concern himself greatly over these reports, for he anticipated an early amicable adjustment of all disputes between the United States and Spain. But he informed Madison, and the latter immediately dispatched a long résumé of these rumors to Armstrong at Paris. Doubtless his intention was something more than to interest the French government in idle frontier tales. He may have hoped to bring pressure upon its officials to aid Monroe in gaining the Floridas and in settling the western boundary. ¹⁸⁸

At the same time Madison addressed to Casa Yrujo at Washington a vigorous protest against these assumed aggressions that drew from the Spanish minister an equally vigorous rejoinder. The latter stated that though not informed of the increase in garrisons, of which Madison complained, yet the fact itself did not seem to him at all improbable. In view of Mr. Pinckney's conduct at Madrid and of certain disturbances on the Florida border, such action would be merely a matter of ordinary precaution. He believed that both governments were devoted to a policy of moderation, that Spain had no hostile intentions against the United States, nor the latter any desire to adopt retaliatory measures. He then went on to complain of the various exploring expeditions as a violation of the status quo upon which the Americans insisted. ¹⁸⁹ Madison vouchsafed no direct answer to this, but contented himself with inditing a long dispatch to Pinckney.

In December, 1804, as a result of Claiborne's representations and Sibley's political finesse, and as a necessary sequence to the creation of Orleans Territory, Secretary Dearborn requested the doctor to act occasionally as Indian agent. He was to hold conferences with the Indians in his vicinity. With an allowance for himself of four dollars per day and expenses, he should attempt to keep them well disposed towards the American government by a judicious distribution of some three thousand dollars worth of supplies and provisions. He might employ an interpreter in his dealings and he was to assure the Indians that if they remained friendly and peaceable they could rely on the justice and friendship of the United States. If they expected to be treated like children by the Great Father at Washington they must break off all relations with any other power. The instructions closed with the statement ¹⁹⁰that the Secretary would expect a report in the course of six months.”

The first effect of this appointment was to unsettle Indian affairs, for Claiborne's new instructions did not permit him to interfere, while the functions of the new agent were greatly circumscribed. Traders passed to the Indian tribes with very little restraint, except from the frontier commandants, who, in keeping with Claiborne's suggestion, attempted to keep the trade simply a licensed traffic in peltries with the Indians and not a concealed horse trade with the Spaniards. Then, too, there was some question in Louisiana regarding Dr. Sibley's fitness for his position, that caused the Governor some uneasiness, but as we have seen this was apparently explained away to the satisfaction of the Washington authorities. Early in the following spring, Sibley exhibited the first result of his appointment in the form of a report upon the Indian tribes of his vast district. In commending this report Claiborne repeated his counsel to pay particular attention to the Caddoes, who seemed to have influence over the others and were well disposed toward the Americans. ¹⁹¹

This report is the first attempt by the Americans to estimate the importance of the Indian alliance for which they and the Spaniards were striving. Sibley's information is based on his own observations and such knowledge as he could glean from the other meagre sources at his disposal. He relied especially upon his interpreter, Francois Grappe. The latter's father, while an officer in the French service, had acted as superintendent of Indian affairs at a post some five hundred miles above Natchitoches. Here Grappe was born and lived for thirty years. He was a man of influence among the Indians and likewise enjoyed Sibley's confidence; yet he was at the same time in Spanish pay.

In this report Sibley estimated the fighting strength of some thirty tribes in his jurisdiction at twenty-eight hundred men. This does not include the Comanches nor a coast tribe which he calls the Cances. Their combined strength (even granting the inexactness of the above estimate) would, indeed, have been a dreaded factor, had they united in favor of either Spaniard or American, or even against both; but no such union was possible. Sibley represented the greater part of these Indians as having been friendly to the French and later names a number of tribes as expressly acknowledging French jurisdiction. Such were those living near St. Bernard's Bay who were also equally well disposed towards their American successors. The Spanish officials claimed a nominal sovereignty over nearly all the tribes of the region, but their rule had not made their power respected, and in some cases the Indians terrorized and held in subjection the scattered settlements of the Spaniards, rather than endured their capricious attempts to govern them. On the whole, the advantage in the struggle for Indian allies were in favor of the greater resources and energy of the Americans. ¹⁹²

On the 23d of the following May, Dearborn expressed his gratification at the receipt of this report, and added:

At all times use all means to conciliate the Indians generally, and more especially such natives as might, in case of a rupture with Spain, be useful or mischievous to us. None ought to engage your attention so early as those who reside in the immediate vicinity of the Bay of St. Bernard, and from your description of their present temper and disposition, it will require no great exertion to draw them firmly to the interests of the United States. They may be assured that they and all other red people within the limits of the United States will be treated with undeviating friendship as long as they shall conduct themselves fairly and with good faith towards the government and citizens of the United States. ¹⁹³

This letter, significant for its territorial claims as well as for the Indian policy outlined, closed with the suggestion that Sibley prepare the minds of those Indians in the vicinity of the Red River, Attacapas, and Opelousas, for a proposed land survey by the United States government. If it should be necessary to run lines through their lands, in order to make the survey complete, they were not to be alarmed. “Not an acre will be taken,” the Secretary affirmed, “except with payment and treaty under the auspices of the United States and free concession on their part.” At the same time Jefferson wrote to Claiborne that “their rights and comfort would be sacredly cherished.” ¹⁹⁴

The number and strength of these Indians, as reported by Sibley, surprised the Washington authorities. Dearborn wrote that our general policy was to be one of friendship towards them and that suitable presents should be made to their chiefs when it could be done with propriety. Jefferson was doubly impressed with the necessity of retaining the friendship with which these natives regarded the Americans. Accordingly, October 17, 1805, Sibley was given a commission as regular Indian agent at a salary of $1000 per year. He was furnished with the customary goods for trading and instructed to urge some of the principal chiefs, especially of the Caddoes, to visit Washington, or at least New Orleans. When Jefferson repeated his stock request for Indian vocabularies, he reminded Sibley that he must spare no means to convince them of our justice and liberality and to attach them to our side. ¹⁹⁵

Salcedo and his subordinates were especially displeased with the policy of the American government in making Sibley an Indian agent. The general commandant refers to him as “a revolutionist, the friend of change and a most bitter enemy of public peace.” He bitterly denounced his policy of selling goods to the Indians at cost as a means of attracting their support in case of hostilities. The governor of Texas thought that the “revolutionary” Sibley should be forced to leave the frontier, but felt that the American government was equally responsible for his actions. He favored a vigorous protest through Casa Calvo or some other person near the American government. ¹⁹⁶ Hampered by the vast distances which separated the strategic points of his command, Salcedo requested reinforcements for Texas from the neighboring provinces, from Calleja at San Luis Potosi, and from the viceroy himself. He reported that he should need one hundred and fifty extra men to cope with Sibley's machinations in carrying out the policy of the American government. “Only a declaration of war,” he savagely wrote, “will reveal the perfidy of its emissaries among the Indians.” ¹⁹⁷ To his vigorous specific requests he obtained only a belated reply, deploring the situation and indefinitely promising to raise more troops, if necessary.

In the summer of 1805 Salcedo learned of a specific case of Sibley's activity. A certain Englishman (probably American) who had previously escaped from Spanish pursuit, conducted a party of thirteen men and women of the Tahuayas Indians to Natchitoches for the purpose of receiving gifts from Sibley. Dionisio Valle, now commandant at Nacogdoches in place of Ugarte, ordered the corporal in charge at Bayou Pierre to prevent the return of the party through that settlement. Governor Elguezabal approved of this order, but transmitted Valle's request for a reinforcement of one hundred men to Salcedo for action. Salcedo ordered Francois Grappe to Bayou Pierre to investigate the Tahuayas incident, and suggested that the garrison at Nacogdoches should be increased gradually by sending forward a few men at a time on pretext of carrying the mails and then permitting them to remain at the post. If the Tahuayas declare hostilities he should apply for help to the neighboring provinces. ¹⁹⁸ From Sibley we have an account that seems to supplement the above information. According to him the Spanish officer threatened a Caddo chief passing through Bayou Pierre to Natchitoches. When on his return the Spaniard tried to stop him the Indian threatened to wipe out the whole settlement; whereupon the other desisted from his attempt to interfere. ¹⁹⁹ This may refer to the incident in which the Tahuayas figured, or it may be an unfortunate mistake of the officer in attempting to stop the wrong Indians. At any rate, the incident aroused all the savages of the vicinity. Salcedo blamed Dr. Sibley for the whole affair, because of his machinations to gain the allegiance of the Indians. At the same time he bade the governor of Texas omit no means to gain the friendship of the Indians for the Spaniards. In keeping with this purpose he suggested the construction of canoes on the Trinity to ply between the two Spanish posts and to trade with the natives on its banks. ²⁰⁰

Ever since the transfer the Spaniards had been kept informed of their rivals' movements in Louisiana through the activity of Felix Trudeau, the former commandant of Natchitoches and now a resident of that community. In an irregular way Samuel Davenport and Edward Murphy, naturalized Spanish subjects and fur traders, gave information to both parties, while Francois Grappe acted with equal readiness as Indian agent for Sibley or for Salcedo. ²⁰¹ In February, 1805, Dearborn wrote Wilkinson that it was highly desirable to learn the meaning of reported Spanish movements in “Louisiana and vicinity.” He desired particularly “to know of any such between the Bravo and Red Rivers and what was doing in San Antonio and St. Bernard Bay.” He was to employ trappers and hunters and to pay them while in government service. ²⁰²

Sibley had already employed such a messenger among the Choctaws to spy upon the movements of the Spaniards. He now learned that the latter were erecting forts at Matagorda and on the Trinity. They were assuring the Indians that the Spaniards were their only true friends. The idea that the Americans would permanently hold the country west of the Mississippi was pure wind; the Indians, therefore, should come over into the service of their Great Father over the water, who welcomed them not only with his hand, but with his whole arm. ²⁰³ Early in September Wilkinson reported from St. Louis that a certain Captain Stille “had again been despatched to the westward and I hope he may, before this reaches you, have been able to ascertain and apprize for you the disposition of the Spaniards at the Orcoquisanes [Orcoquisac=Trinity] and Matta Gorda. Captain Turner, too, may, I hope, from a [reconnaissance?] which he was instructed to make, have been able to give you information of the dispositions at Nacogdoches and St. Antonio.” ²⁰⁴ These references show that the Americans were ready to counteract the work of their rivals by using the latter's own methods. The information thus obtained from the Indians was of such a character as to lead them to exaggerate the strength of their opponents and to misinterpret their movements. The others were equally misinformed, as was evident from a rumor, current in the fall of 1805, that Sibley, with a party of American traders, had penetrated to a village of the Tahuacanes and that another American party had erected a fortification at Palo de los Arcos. ²⁰⁵

By the opening of 1805 the Americans were persuaded more firmly than ever that the Spaniards were augmenting their forces in Texas, and that Grimarest, the captain general of Cuba, was coming thither with four thousand troops. This led Claiborne to broach the subject in conversation with Casa Calvo. He stated that he thought this increase in the Texas garrisons, while negotiations were pending a distinct breach of the status quo which Jefferson desired to maintain. The Spanish commissioner asserted that the only military change in the disputed area was the augmenting of certain garrisons by the troops withdrawn from Louisiana the previous year. But he took occasion to point out that Pinckney's course at Madrid and the passage of the Mobile Act justified the supposed plan of the Spanish King to send Grimarest with reinforcements to Texas. However, he thought that Jefferson's recent representations had satisfied the King; at any rate, he had heard nothing of Grimarest's arrival in Texas, and did not expect to do so. ²⁰⁶

Claiborne doubted the candor of the Marqués in giving this explanation, and his distrust was further strengthened by reports from the frontier obtained through the Choctaw spies employed by Sibley and Turner. These reports seem to be based merely on Spanish braggadocio, but Turner believed that their rivals were planning to gain the Indians and thus gradually to edge themselves along toward New Orleans. Claiborne reported the matter to Madison, but both the Secretary and the officials on the immediate frontier recognized that these boasts and the rumors of the enemy's forces in Texas were greatly exaggerated. Indeed, on April 1, 1805, the commandant at Nacogdoches reported but fifty-one soldiers at that post, while Sibley's Choctaw spies reported a small number only at Orcoquisac and could give no definite account of any at Matagorda. ²⁰⁷

In his letter to Sibley of June 6, 1805, Claiborne mentioned another instance of apparent Spanish hostility. He stated that the utterances of the priests at Natchitoches had a tendency to arouse the inhabitants against the government. They represented the Americans as infidels with whom their charges should not associate, and asserted that the new authorities would not protect the religion under which their parents had lived and died. This was a much more serious charge than the characterization of the previous year that the Americans were “mere hogs,” who did not “live like Christians.” It was rendered more alarming by the recent pastoral visit of the Bishop of Nuevo Leon to Natchitoches. Claiborne believed that the geographical and political purposes of this visit far outweighed the religious motive. Indeed, in 1836 the Mexican minister at Washington cited this visit as evidence that Spain then exercised political jurisdiction to the Red River. ²⁰⁸

From the exposed frontier the American officials continued to send alarming reports. Sibley mentioned the arrival of five hundred families at San Antonio—a manifest absurdity, for no such number ever arrived there during Spanish rule. ²⁰⁹ The expected arrival of an additional hundred soldiers at Nacogdoches also excited considerable interest among the Americans. Turner later mentioned the anticipated arrival of Grimarest with seven companies of soldiers for San Antonio and a captain and full company for Nacogdoches. He gave more likelihood to his statement by saving that a certain Mr. Shabas of Natchitoches had been invited to come to San Antonio to meet the new Spanish official. The march of Creole troops, accompanied as usual by their families, may serve as a possible basis for the exaggerated reports of new settlers for Texas. As we know from other sources, colonial officials like Folch and Casa Calvo were advising the strengthening of Spanish garrisons in Texas and Florida, the creation of new posts on the gulf coast, and new settlements in Texas, but Spanish resources were not then equal to the enterprise. ²¹⁰ However, Salcedo did his best with the few forces at his disposal, despite the indecisive course of the viceroy, Iturrigaray. In July, 1805, the former complained that the building of fortifications at Natchitoches indicated the arrival of additional American troops and contrasted this with conditions in Texas, where he had only three hundred men to hold five frontier posts and guard the province against the Americans and Indians. In the following month he requested auxiliaries from Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander, and later ordered two hundred of these to be stationed at Espiritu Santo [Matagorda], in order to prevent the landing of a hostile expedition in that quarter. Previous orders show that this expected expedition may have been British, but the Spanish reinforcements could be used against the Americans, if necessary. ²¹¹

In June, 1805, came the report from Natchitoches of the finding of Bernard La Harpe's Journal—a manuscript history of Louisiana from 1699 to 1723. This later proved a most effective aid to the American claim to the Rio Grande. ²¹² In addition to this, early in September, Dr. Sibley collected and forwarded to Washington a mass of testimony designed to prove that previous to 1762 the French had made permanent settlements on the Red River, several hundred miles above Natchitoches, as well as at Bayou Pierre. President Jefferson used this information in his next annual message, and it and the Journal later formed the basis of much wordy diplomatic discussion. ²¹³

By midsummer 1805, the feeling of distrust and jealousy on the part of both Americans and Spaniards had brought about a situation on the western frontier that needed slight encouragement to break out into actual hostilities. In October some robberies on the part of the Spaniards reported from Opelousas and Bayou Pierre added to the feeling of resentment, and showed the danger to be anticipated from a continuance of unauthorized Indian trading in this region, while there was no settled policy on the part of either government. ²¹⁴ Wilkinson sums up the situation in a letter to Casa Calvo, in which he expresses regret at certain features of Burr's recent visit to New Orleans: “Of late the relations between our governments have not been the most cordial, but I hope they will be such by mutual concession.” ²¹⁵ Contemporary events on the still more critical Florida frontier and the course of negotiation at Madrid and at Washington, would seem to indicate a far different conclusion.

V. MONROE'S SPECIAL MISSION TO SPAIN

It was some months after Monroe received the instructions that were to guide him in his special mission to Madrid ²¹⁶ that he deemed it advisable to set out for that capital. Meanwhile Charles Pinckney, the American minister to Spain, disregarding his instructions to do no negotiating in regard to Louisiana, had involved himself in a diplomatic muddle which forced Jefferson and Madison to comply with a request for his recall. ²¹⁷ In regard to the western boundary of Louisiana he had done nothing more than report the displeasure of the Spanish officials at the near approach of the United States to their Mexican territories and obtain an inexact statement from the work of Lopez in favor of the Rio Grande as its western limit. He reported the prospect of war between Spain and Great Britain, and this was formally declared in December, 1804. He also mentioned the possible reinforcement of Spanish garrisons in the Floridas and Mexico. ²¹⁸ His interest as well as that of the majority of our officials was too closely centered upon the Floridas to permit greater attention to the western frontier.

Meanwhile the Spanish government had withdrawn its protest against the cession of Louisiana to the United States and had thus gained the covert support of Napoleon and Talleyrand. While this was likewise largely concerned with West Florida and certain claims for commercial spoliations, the crafty French minister did not neglect the western boundary of Louisiana. Cevallos sent him as those of Laussat a request to check such utterances upon this limit. In answer Talleyrand informed Turreau, the new French minister at Washington, that he should attempt unofficially to restrain the United States from any measures regarding its western boundary that might annoy Spain. ²¹⁹ At the same time he outlined to Gravina, the Spanish ambassador at Paris, a most conciliatory plan for settling this boundary, and claimed that Napoleon would have employed it had he taken possession of Louisiana. From the gulf the representatives of each nation were to draw a line connecting its scattered frontier settlements. Then somewhere in the intervening space, in a spirit of mutual frindship, they should designate the actual boundary. ²²⁰

It is needless to point out that this plan differs widely from Victor's instructions and the utterances of Laussat, but Cevallos closely adhered to it in the succeeding negotiation with Monroe. Talleyrand further assured Cevallos that the United States could never use Louisiana as a basis for settlements on the Pacific, for any boundary agreed upon would be far removed from the western coast. ²²¹ In stating this, however, he is reassuring the Spaniard by greatly discounting the expansive spirit of the American people, as later voiced by John Quincy Adams. Despite his assurance to Gravina there were hints that in one way the French government might be led to favor the United States. Livingston suggested this when he mentioned that the desire of Spain to limit us on the west might be balanced by the needs of the French treasury. ²²² Marbois and his subordinates repeated this with greater emphasis when Monroe passed through Paris on his way to Madrid. Money, and plenty of it, would secure a successful result to his negotiations. ²²³

A year before, just after the Louisiana Treaty, Monroe had been uncertain what action to take in regard to his joint commission with Pinckney to treat for the cession of the Floridas. Subsequent events show that by his indecision he then lost the opportunity to force Spain to cede them. At the same time his own ignorance in regard to Louisiana would probably have led him to some unwise concession west of the Mississippi. Then, too, Napoleon directly intimated that he should not go to Madrid and Monroe acquiesced. As the months were on neither he nor his superiors at home grew less perplexed. They desired him for the governorship of Louisiana, they needed him in London, and they wished to send him to Madrid, where he might undo Pinckney's blunders and wring concessions from Spain. Instead, when he reached Spain, he unqualifiedly approved Pinckney's course, and after battling in vain for four months against Spanish lethargy and French venality, returned discomfited to London. In this whole series of indecisive transactions Monroe certainly appears as a Hamlet of diplomacy with no final tragic scene to honor his pitiful play.

On his arrival in Paris, Monroe encountered Livingston, the retiring minister, whom he and his friends thoroughly distrusted, and Armstrong, his successor, upon whom they likewise bestowed their distrust. With the unwilling aid of these two doubting associates, he attempted to reanimate Napoleon's worthless promise of the previous year, to assist him in the Spanish negotiation. It is true that Napoleon had not intimated that the time was favorable for this, but Monroe felt certain that he could choose no better moment than the eve of hostilities between Spain and Great Britain. Accordingly, through Talleyrand, he addressed a long note to the Emperor, in which he discussed the claims of the United States against Spain and the boundaries of Louisiana. He explained that the American Congress had authorized the President to take possession of the ancient boundaries of that possession, but the executive had refrained from doing so in order to give time for explanations and adjustment. Thus he glosses over Napoleon's refusal to sanction his journey to Spain a year before. He presented a brief argument in favor of the American claim to the Bravo, but devoted a much greater space to West Florida, a matter then considered infinitely more important. Notwithstanding his generally conciliatory tone, Monroe suggested that war might follow the failure of his mission. ²²⁴

His note remained unanswered until he had set out for Madrid. Both he and his colleagues looked upon his task as foredoomed to failure. Yet a regard for consistency, a vain striving after real independence in European diplomacy impelled him to go forward. Monroe was now forced to believe that the Spaniards, fortified by Talleyrand's assurance, and Casa Yrujo's representations, viewed his approach to Madrid with indifference. The French officials, with appetite whetted by the Louisiana transaction, looked upon his failure as the precursor of another excellent bargain for themselves and their government. Worse than all, he distrusted Livingston and Armstrong. Before he left Paris he received some intimation that Talleyrand would make an unfavorable report to Napoleon in regard to his memoir, and this confirmed the impression that his colleagues were not supporting his measures with sufficient vigor. From Bordeaux, December 16, 1804, he sent to Madison a most gloomy view of the situation in Paris. Nevertheless, he expressed himself to his friend, Fulwar Skipwith, then in the French capital, as determined to pursue the object entrusted to him “with zeal and diligence and [I] trust with success.” ²²⁵ A few days later, at Paris, Armstrong received from Talleyrand a sarcastic note that removed every doubt of Monroe's failure. ²²⁶

The administration at Washington did not need Armstrong's communication nor Monroe's mournful missive from Bordeaux to show the prospective failure of this special mission. Early in January Turreau and Casa Yrujo held their celebrated interview with Madison, when they verbally notified him of the conclusion reached by their respective governments that West Florida formed no part of the Louisiana Purchase and that the United States must abandon its commercial claims against Spain. ²²⁷ While this information was hardly unexpected, Madison was exceedingly embarrassed at their method in expressing it as a joint decision. But he asserted that the United States would interpret these questions to suit itself. The Secretary made no mention of the western boundary and Turreau inferred that he placed little value upon it. The French minister believed that Madison emphasized West Florida in order to enhance the political effect of the Louisiana Purchase. ²²⁸ We may believe that he forbore to mention the western boundary in order to avoid another crushing disappointment.

A few days before, while vaguely discussing this question with the French minister, Madison casually asked what sort of divisional line the other considered the best. Turreau favored river courses, but Madison suggested mountain chains, obviously having in view those of New Mexico. Casa Yrujo, to whom the French minister reported this conversation, coincided with the suggestions of Talleyrand to Gravina, mentioned above. This would place an extensive desert area between Spain and the United States. Such would form the best sort of barrier between the two powers. ²²⁹ Casa Yrujo was very anxious to humiliate Madison, for whom he personally felt great contempt, and whom he regarded as the representative of an administration willing to profit from Spain's necessities. He thought the Americans should have made a more tempting offer for the Floridas. He believed that in exchange for the latter they were ready to offer a liberal cash payment, together with the greater part of the right bank of the Mississippi. In such a case he expected them to reserve for themselves the districts of Attakapas and Opelousas, together with the banks of the Washita and Red rivers, where the population was rapidly increasing.

Casa Yrujo believed that this interview with Madison would materially lighten the burden of Cevallos' negotiation with Monroe. But he was not equally successful in supplying his superior with information in regard to the general character of Louisiana and its western limits. He was far from this region and without books or other sources of information, so that any opinion that he could form was hardly worth while. He stated that Du Pratz had mentioned the Spanish settlement at Adaes, and suggested that a meridional line from this point, utilizing the north and south courses of certain rivers, would be sufficiently well marked to form a good boundary. This would also relieve their colonial authorities from any anxiety in regard to the presence of the Americans. ²³⁰

Although Casa Yrujo frankly confessed his own ignorance, he suggested a most interesting source of information. A talented American gentleman, whom he thought a former correspondent of Cevallos and Godoy, had promised him a memoir upon the country. In his correspondence he refers to this gentleman as both No. 1 and No. 13, but he is none other than the many-sided James Wilkinson. Casa Yrujo had asked him to prepare a plan of the western limits of Louisiana, and to establish the line so as to preserve to Spain Adaes, Nacogdoches, and the Sabine River, and at the same time to utilize the other river courses as suggested above. Wilkinson possessed his confidence, and he hoped soon to forward the memoir by express. There is a possibility that Cevallos may have had this, if prepared, in time to use in his reply to Monroe and Pinckney, on April 26th, and, if so, it suggests an interesting situation in which the commander of the American army thwarts the diplomatic efforts of his chief. It is possible to perceive a more likely connection between this suggestion of the Spanish minister and the Neutral Ground Agreement that Wilkinson himself made with Herrera nearly two years later.

In the following month Talleyrand informed Turreau of his position in regard to the western boundary of Louisiana. The Americans must not extend their pretensions too far, for they had acquired the territory on the same terms as France. Turreau's task was to preserve harmony between the two contending nations. This was the only interest of France in the boundary question. The United States ought not to claim the settlements of New Mexico nor the country towards the Northwest. Between these regions and Louisiana they should leave an intervening desert region and should follow natural limits, wherever possible. The French government had no intention of intervening in the matter but simply wished the American as its successor, to know what plan it had proposed to follow. ²³¹

With such intimations, to use no stronger term, from the French and Spanish ministers at Washington, and with dispatches of a similar tenor from Armstrong, Jefferson began by March to doubt the possibility of Monroe's success. He still hoped to secure the privilege of navigating the Mobile and an agreement to maintain the status quo elsewhere. ²³² Both he and Madison derived some comfort from the fact that Talleyrand had not openly declared against them in regard to the western limits of Louisiana, but as we have seen, they had no reason to believe that the French Secretary would support them even upon this point. ²³³ The dispatches of the English minister, Merry, show this much more clearly than the President's own communications.

After Monroe reached Madrid he found that the Spanish court had taken up its temporary residence at Aranjeuz and thither he and Pinckney determined to conduct their negotiation. Monroe had quickly determined to associate the latter with himself so far as signing the formal notes was concerned, but that he should personally conduct all interviews with the Spanish ministers. After reviewing Pinckney's course he came to the conclusion that the latter had taken a justifiable attitude towards Spain the previous summer and that he should participate in the present negotiation, as far as would serve its main purpose. ²³⁴ The Spanish officials acquiesced in this arrangement with suspicious complacency, and accordingly, after the necessary formalities of presentation, the two American diplomats sent their first note to Cevallos.

After reviewing the subject of commercial claims they passed to a consideration of the boundaries of Louisiana. As a basis for a compromise they suggested that the American desire to possess the Floridas might be balanced by the Spanish desire to retard the western progress of the United States. At that very time the Florida frontier was in a state of jealous watchfulness that portended serious outbreaks, and this situation would soon be paralelled along the western border. It was possible to remove this condition, so provocative of misunderstanding, by the cession of the Floridas and the establishment of the western boundary upon just principles. The United States claimed to the Bravo, but if Spain ceded her territory east of the Mississippi, for which the United States would assume certain commercial claims, the latter agreed to form a neutral territory in the western part of Louisiana. The negotiators then followed their discussion with the project for a treaty covering these two main propositions. ²³⁵

After submitting this joint note Monroe made a personal call on the Prince of the Peace. He found that Godoy wished to refer the question of limits to France. Monroe claimed that we had bought the right and title of that power, who had no further concern in the affair, and that as neighbors Spain and the United States should settle the question of boundaries for themselves. It is needless to observe that his contention would have been otherwise, had he believed that France would support him. He attempted to arouse Godoy, upon whose decision he believed the question to rest, by mentioning possible hostilities in case of a diplomatic rupture, but his opponent countered by referring to previous instances of British and French hostility against the United States. Monroe then essayed to tempt him by suggesting that his government would exercise greater restraint upon its western citizens, if the Florida cession were made, but this bribe was as little successful as his previous threat. ²³⁶

Cevallos, the Spanish Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, was supposed to direct this negotiation for the Spaniards. In keeping with his superior's policy of diplomatic bluffing, he suggested that the Marqués de Casa Calvo, with a complete retinue, was then awaiting at New Orleans the arrival of American commissioners for the purpose of determining the true limits of Louisiana. All territorial questions should be deferred until this joint commission made its report. He then proceeded to discuss the subject of commercial claims, ²³⁷ and this procedure caused Monroe to record in his Journal his belief that Cevallos only sought to delay the negotiation. He wrote to Madison that while some circumstances connected with the negotiation were so discouraging that it was impossible for him to predict the outcome, yet he believed that the Spaniards recognized the strength of the American position “with due discernment.” Unfortunately for him and his colleague they did. In their reply to Cevallos, the Americans observed that boundary commissioners could no nothing until their respective governments determined the principle to guide them. It was an important part of their negotiation to fix that principle. ²³⁸

The first half of February passed without any progress in the negotiation. The Americans had fully opened up the discussion from their standpoint, and thought that the Spaniards should give an immediate answer to each proposition advanced. Instead Cevallos discussed the Mobile Act, paid his respects to those who were responsible for the furore over suspending the deposit at New Orleans, and applied to West Florida the Spanish interpretation of the confusing three clauses in the Treaty of San Idlefonso. In protesting against this delay, Monroe and his colleague formally requested Cevallos to give them a definite statement in regard to the boundaries of Louisiana and a possible neutral zone, and they both sent long letters detailing their lack of success to their home government and to the American minister in Paris. At the same time Monroe showed his distrust of Armstrong by writing to his friend Skipwith, and charging him to watch the situation at the French court, but to keep the other from knowing of his action. To both he directed requests for maps and papers to be used in discussing the western boundary. He had expected to obtain them in Madrid but had not found anything of value. In his letters to Armstrong he vacillated between an independent policy that should cause European nations to respect the United States and a willingness to gain French support by some minor concessions in regard to commercial claims and the western boundary. He intimated that the administration was willing to prolong the period during which the territory between the Colorado and the Bravo was to remain neutral, or even to make the Colorado the permanent boundary. These terms, however, were not to be divulged to the French authorities, unless it was absolutely necessary, and they must not be permitted to dictate. Manifestly he could hope to gain nothing from such a one-sided offer, but his uncertain course and his failure to break off the negotiation at one or two critical points did as little to strengthen his cause in either place. ²³⁹

In his interview with Godoy on February 16, Monroe asked if Spain would cede the Floridas. The other replied in the affirmative, provided there should be an equivalent cession west of the Mississippi, but he did not wish to assume the responsibility of arranging for this. Godoy suggested that river as an excellent natural boundary, but Monroe insisted upon the Colorado. The other thought this came too near their Mexican settlements and believed that the Americans should have nothing west of the Red. He seemed fearful that the presence of the Americans in the Floridas would facilitate attacks upon their other colonies. Monroe showed him that our presence in Louisiana already gave us this opportunity, but tried to reassure him by repeating his statement that if our government gained Florida by friendly negotiation it would be inclined to restrain its citizens and others from attacking our neighbors. Godoy then spoke of the many years that must elapse before the western portion could be settled and in an indefinite way mentioned the interest of Spain and the United States to keep Great Britain and France out of South America. For some reason Monroe felt encouraged by this interview. ²⁴⁰

On that day Cevallos dated a note for the American negotiators, but did not send it. In the course of this he stated that the representatives of each government should first discuss their respective rights upon the points at issue and then proceed to such negotiations as were convenient to both. This opened the way to an interminable discussion with no prospect of reaching a definite conclusion—precisely what Cevallos desired. Even this concession was not gained until the Americans, on the 18th, curtly informed him that they interpreted his silence as a wish to terminate the negotiation. Monroe reinforced his note by an audience that lasted for four hours, after which Cevallos sent his reply bearing the date of the 16th. In the course of this Cevallos stated that he considered the American claim to the Bravo as absolutely devoid of authority. These two interviews influenced Monroe to suggest the concession that he mentioned on February 26th in his letter to Armstrong. ²⁴¹

By the middle of March Monroe lost his patience. They had now discussed every subject connected with the negotiation except the western boundary of Louisiana, and he and Pinckney insisted that Cevallos should reply upon that. Despite their urgency, the minister kept them waiting for nearly a month longer. A personal interview on April 5 failed to elicit any definite date for his reply. Cevallos, who claimed to be studying the subject of the western boundary of Louisiana, thought that his government would probably cede its territory east of the Mississippi for an equivalent in the opposite quarter. His refusal to give a definite reply in regard to other points at issue and to let the western boundary go for the present, his insistence upon the fruitless West Florida discussion, while neglecting to make any statement in regard to the other territorial questions, led Monroe to think that he was simply amusing them by a pretense at negotiation. On the 9th of April the Americans intimate that they ought to terminate the discussion at once, but they weakly add that they are ready to renew it, if there is any prospect for a successful conclusion. Four days later, after vigorously protesting that he lacked time for a complete memoir, Cevallos submitted a résumé of Spanish claims to territory west of the Mississippi. ²⁴² The Americans had now lost a favorable opportunity to break off the negotiation with credit to themselves. The main purpose of their mission was to secure the Floridas, and by March 12th they knew that the Spanish government would never cede them upon any terms they could accept. To bring up at this time a forced discussion of the western limits was to court additional mortification for themselves.

Monroe's Journal and his letters during this trying period abundantly show his uncertainty. On March 7th he wrote Armstrong that if they allowed the French government to dictate in regard to the eastern boundary of Louisiana, it might adopt the same policy in the north and west and thus reduce their acquisition to a nullity. They must reject Talleyrand as an arbiter. ²⁴³ But as the days passed with no proposition from Cevallos, with no word from Armstrong, and with no new instructions from Washington, he wondered if he ought to assume so decisive a tone. Casa Yrujo had probably assured his government that the American people would never fight for desert territory or old claims. The outcome of the whole negotiation rested with the French government and he believed that thoroughly corrupt motives then dictated its policy. He did not know what position it would take upon the western boundary, but it had supported the Spanish government on every other point and would probably do so on that. He might continue his present policy of acting without the assistance of France (as he strives to persuade himself that he is doing), or he could appeal to the cupidity or fear of that government. The later motive would probably have little weight, for American commerce was too thoroughly exposed to French confiscation. If they should tempt French cupidity in the case of the Floridas, they might later have to employ the same means in settling the western boundary. So he thought it would be safer to continue the negotiation and attempt single-handed to extort from Spain some statement on this important subject.

The Spanish authorities had hardly begun to assemble their vast documentary stores relating to the Texas-Louisiana boundary, so Cevallos probably had little definite knowledge to guide him in the hastily prepared memoir that he submitted. He reviewed the rights of Spain, based upon the early entradas in Texas, and claimed that the pretensions of the United States were founded upon irresponsible French voyages and explorations, and the grant of Louis XIV to Crozat. This grant had never been acknowledged by Spain. After this general review of their respective claims he expressed his idea of the extent of Texas, the crucial area in determining the western limits of Louisiana. In this he closely follows the dictum of Talleyrand. The advanced settlements of each nation were Natchitoches and Adaes; therefore the dividing line between Louisiana and Texas should run southward to the gulf, between these two places, following the watershed that separated the Calcasieu and the Mermentou. To the north, beyond the Red River, the boundary was wholly uncertain and commissioners should be appointed by each nation to present their respective claims and effect a final settlement. Spain had already appointed her commissioners, who were at New Orleans awaiting similar action by the United States.

Monroe was disappointed both in the character and content of the memoir that he had finally wrung from the reluctant Cevallos. The brief historical review of Spanish claims to Texas had left him more firmly convinced than ever of the strength, if not the justice, of the American claim to the same region. On the other hand, he had expected from Cevallos some definite propositions that might form the basis for a treaty and he was uncertain whether to demand such or answer the other's arguments. His definite move, however, was to ask for the recall of Casa Yrujo, and he did this with the greater pleasure, for he thought that the Spanish minister, by emphasizing the peaceful dispositions of the American people, was largely responsible for the apparent obstinacy of the Spanish government. Afterward he wrote Godoy, then at Madrid, concerning his last interview with Cevallos, although the other probably already knew of this from his own subordinates. Monroe perceived a reasonable excuse for answering the Spaniard's note in the fact that in his communication of April 13th, Cevallos had complained of some reflections on his character by the Americans and requested an explanation. A refusal to answer would imply that they lacked diplomatic courtesy, and while explaining this point they could take advantage of the occasion to express in greater detail their views on the western boundary. This action might favor their desire to obtain the definite proposals from Cevallos, for which they had thus far vainly sought.

In addition to the above reason for prolonging the negotiation, Monroe did not forget possible French interests. He knew that that government would not support him upon the other points at issue, but in view of its silence concerning the western boundary, he thought there could be no impropriety in the United States insisting upon its assumed rights. If the honor of France were untouched that nation might acquisce in a final adjustment that would be unfavorable to Sp