Vol. XVII.1 OCTOBER, 1913 No. 2
The publication committee and the editors disclaim responsibility for views expressed by contributors to The Quarterly.
Between the calling of the constitutional convention in 1849 and the meeting of the legislature in 1860, various efforts were made to divide California by a line running east and west. Writers on the history of California have obscured the real significance of the division movement by making it an incident in the national slavery controversy. Further investigation, however, reveals the incidental character of the slavery issue in the movement, and the priority of the struggle for the adjustment of local interests in a newly formed frontier.
The whole movement of population westward in the United States has been attended by conflicts of classes, nationalities, and developing interests. In particular has the struggle been manifest in the efforts of the older communities to retain a preponderance of control in determining social, economic, and political forms in which national or state life has found expression, as against the newer communities struggling to free themselves from that control, or rather to determine their own forms of expression.
The movement for the division of California in the first decade of the state's history was a part of this struggle known as sectionalism. But the struggle here had phases peculiar to itself, by reason of California's early settlement by the Spaniards, and of the sudden influx of a great new population, with interests and traditions different from those of the old, and so powerful that, instead of the newer community, as was usual, it was the older that was forced to struggle for equality and justice.
Before the discovery of gold, the dominant, almost the sole, interest in California was pastoral and agricultural. The province was held, in great estates, by a slender population subsisting easily by raising stock and grain. By far the larger portion of the population lived in the southern district. But with the discovery of gold the centers of population shifted to the north and to the Sierras, where the dominant interest was in the mines, and where the lands were not owned, but leased. In the middle of 1848, it is estimated, there were in California about 7500 Hispano-Californians, 6500 Americans, and a negligible number of foreigners.2 By the end of 1849 the population had increased to about 100,000, most of whom were newcomers seeking for gold. The sparse population of the southern part of the territory was still made up largely of Hispano-Californians, satisfied with old conditions, and glad to be left free to enjoy their landed estates. To these there was gradually added a new element, also interested primarily in agricultural and grazing pursuits. The two sections, therefore, were manifestly divergent, one an old, Mexican, sparsely settled, land-owning community, the other a new and numerous mining people, who leased their lands.
Under the military régime of the United States inaugurated by Commodore Sloat, when in July, 1846, he took Monterey and proclaimed California free from Mexican rule and a territory of the United States, there was not much occasion for sectionalism, and little opportunity for its expression within California territory. But the changes in population and interests which took place during the next three years prepared the way for a sectional struggle. A part of the American population, restless under military rule, with its few offices for which to run, and feeling the need for a wellorganized civil government, especially after the influx of population due to the gold excitement, set about securing what they desired. Through the interest of President Taylor, the co-operation of the military authorities in charge, and the zeal of some of the newly arrived citizens, those interested in civil government were able to see a convention gathered in Monterey September 3, 1849, for the purpose of forming a constitution for California.3 With this convention began the phase of the sectional struggle in California with which this paper deals.
1. In the Constitutional Convention.—The representation from the southern districts in the constitutional convention was about one-fourth the number from the whole territory. Seven members of the convention were native-born Californians. The greater number of the other members had been in California but a short time.4
It immediately became evident that the people of southern California did not desire to have their fortunes linked in civil government with the territory further north.
William M. Gwin, in his Memoirs, says of the attitude of the convention: “When they met to organize, the members showed a strange distrust of the motives of each other from various sections. The old settled portions of California sent members to the convention to vote against the formation of a state government. They were afraid of the newcomers, who formed a vast majority of the voting population.”5
In the preliminary discussion of September 5, the delegates from the southern section made their sentiments regarding this point known to the convention. At that time, the question arose as to whether the constitution to be formed was to be for a state or a territorial government. Some seemed to think it was understood that the purpose of the convention was to form a constitution for a state government. The chairman pointed out that Governor Riley in his proclamation referred to a territorial as well as to a state government.6 Mr. Carrillo, a native Californian from the Santa Barbara district, said
that he represented one of the most respectable communities in California, and he did not believe it to be to the interest of his constituents that a State Government should be formed. At the same time, as a great majority of this convention appeared to be in favor of a State Government, he proposed that the country should be divided by running a line west from San Luis Obispo, so that all north of that line might have a State Government, and all south thereof a Territorial Government.7
Further on in the discussion he said:
that he conceived it to be to the interests of his constituents, if a Territorial Government could not be formed for the whole country, that the country should be so divided as to allow them that form, while the northern population might adopt a State Government if they preferred it.8
When the vote was taken on the question of a state or a territorial government, 28 voted for and 8 against the formation of a state constitution. All six of the delegates who were present and voting from the extreme southern districts voted against the formation of a state government. A delegate from Monterey and one representing the San Jose district joined these.
The reason why the delegates from the southern districts desired their section to be left in the territorial condition was brought out in the debates on the representation of districts and on taxation. The native land-holding class felt that the representation should be on a basis that would take into consideration the permanence of their interests and the transitoriness of those of the population in the San Joaquin and Sacramento valleys. They saw the difference between a settled, land-holding class and a transitory population, and believed that injustice could easily be done the permanent class.9 The issue was even clearer when the subject of taxation was being discussed. It was revealed by this discussion that the people in the south10 had feared from the first that a state government would bear heavily upon them, and that they therefore wanted a territorial government, under which taxation would not be a burden.11 So great was the dissatisfaction of the southern delegates over what they believed were prospects of burdensome taxation that it was feared for a time that they would leave the convention and break it up. In speaking of the discussion and the situation at the time when taxation was the subject of debate, Gwin says:
It was impossible to avoid saying in the Constitution that the taxation should be equal, but the delegates from the settled portions of the state, who had land grants, and represented those who had vast grants of land from Spain and Mexico, would not listen to any proposition that would subject their real estate to taxation and the onus of supporting the state, while the great bulk of the population, the newcomers, had no real estate, in fact nothing that could be taxed, and nothing could be collected of them except a poll tax.12
Gwin goes on to state that in order to prevent the withdrawal of the representatives of the landed interests from the convention, a compromise was made by passing the provision which appears in the constitution giving constitutional power to local assessors of the counties, and to the boards of supervisors elected by the land-holders themselves and those they could influence, this being a guaranty against their being taxed oppressively.13
2. Admission opposed in southern California, and division asked.—The southern delegates remained in the convention and joined in its work; but it is evident that there was much dissatisfaction in the south with what was done in the convention, for in the early part of 1850 there was a movement on foot there to protest against the admission of California into the Union and to formulate plans for a division of the state. On February 10, 1850, a meeting was held in Los Angeles in this interest and a committee was appointed to formulate resolutions.14 On March 3, a large meeting was held on the plaza at the corner of the house of Don Ignacio del Valle. The main object of the meeting was to sign a petition against the admission of California with its proposed boundaries, and, in effect, to leave the southern part of the state as a territory. The petition was generally signed by the citizens.15 A letter containing the resolutions passed at this meeting was sent to San Luis Obispo, San Diego,16 and Santa Barbara.17
The petition, which was addressed to the Congress of the United States, gave reasons for the division suggested and presented arguments against the admission of the state with its proposed boundaries. It is of importance to refer to the reasons stated and arguments presented, for they continued to be urged with force for a decade by the people of southern California. The petition stated first the opposition of the southern section to the formation of a state government in the beginning, as was indicated by the votes of their delegates in the constitutional convention. One of the principal reasons given for their position was the lack of acquaintance of the former inhabitants with the character of American institutions because of the short time since the treaty of Querétaro. It was further set forth that the expenses of a state government must necessarily bear heavily upon landholders, even to working their ruin; the extent of territory, with dissimilar resources, was too great for a single state; the thinly populated south would be under the complete control, in political matters, of the northern part of the state with its many material advantages and large transient population; the great distance from the northern to the southern end of California territory would not only put a burden upon the south, but would also be an inconvenience to its people. For these reasons, Congress was petitioned to separate the southern part of the state from the north by a line beginning in the Pacific Ocean and drawn so as to include the district of San Luis Obispo and the regions to the south thereof, and that such section be erected into a territory to be known as the Territory of Southern California.18
3. Attempts in Congress to divide California.—The efforts made in Congress to divide the territory included in California before the admission of any part of it presented issues apart, in the main, from the issues being contested in California itself, but since the two contests have some points of contact, a brief discussion of the Congressional struggle is in place here.
When late in 1849 the newly elected representatives and senators19 from California began their journey to the national capital to present their credentials and to ask for the admission of the state into the Union, they were not unaware of the excited and divided state of public feeling in the East over the slavery question. On their arrival, they learned that President Taylor, in his annual message to Congress, announced that he had reason to believe that California had organized a state government and would soon seek admission into the Union, and that he recommended that the application be favorably received.20 On the 13th of February, having received from the California delegation an official copy of California's constitution. President Taylor submitted the proposed constitution to Congress.21 From the debate which occurred at the time, and from repeated objections to the free constitution of California, and because of suggestions that California might be admitted as far south as the line of 36 degrees 30 minutes,22 the California delegates saw that their petition for the admission of the state was certain to meet determined opposition. To meet the objections to admitting the state with the proposed boundaries, the senators and representatives elect from California prepared a memorial addressed to the senate and house of representatives. It was presented on March 13 by Senator Douglas.23
The memorial recited the early history of California, told of its gradual development, of its Mexican population, and of its acquisition by the United States. Then followed an account of the discovery of gold and the inrush of settlers as a result of the discovery, of the waiting on Congress for a territorial government, and of the determination of the people that some form of civil government must be had for their protection. Next came an account of the constitutional convention and the organization of the state government. Upon the question which caused all the difficulties in Congress, the California delegates had this to say:
Much misapprehension appears to have obtained in the Atlantic states relative to the question of slavery in California. The undersigned have no hesitation in saying that the provision in the constitution excluding that institution meets with the almost unanimous approval of that people. . . . Since the discovery of the mines, the feeling in opposition to the introduction of slavery is believed to have become, if possible, more unanimous than before. . . . There is no doubt, moreover, that two-fifths of those who voted in favor of the constitution were recent emigrants from slave-holding states. . . .
The question of the [eastern] boundary called out the most vehement and angry debate which was witnessed during the sitting of the convention. The project of fixing the southern boundary of the state on the parallel of 36° 30’ was never entertained by that body.24
The expression of a purpose to divide California before it was admitted came early in the congressional discussion of the subject. One of the chief spokesmen for division was Senator Foote. He said that he was in favor of admitting all of California north of the parallel of 36 degrees and 30 minutes.25 On May 9, he announced to the Senate the receipt of a letter telling of the meeting in Los Angeles in which a protest was made against admission and a desire expressed for a territorial government for the southern part of the state. At the same time, he presented a letter from a state senator of Los Angeles, addressed to one of the senators elect from California, in which the writer declared the opposition to statehood to be largely on the part of the old California residents, and urged that the protest be not taken seriously. The communications were not received by the Senate because they were addressed to individuals and not to the body, which caused objections to their reception.26 In the letter to Senator Foote, the writer, who had written in haste, indicated that documents would follow. There seems to be no record that the petition of the citizens was later presented.
The debate on the admission of California lasted all summer. During its progress, various efforts were made to provide for a division before consent for admission would be given. On August 1, Senator Foote offered an amendment to an amendment which had been proposed by Senator Douglas concerning public lands. Foote suggested that a division of California should be made by a line running along the parallel of 35 degrees 30 minutes, the southern part thus cut off to become the territory of Colorado. The amendment was lost by a vote of 23 ayes and 33 noes.27 On August 6, Senator Turney offered an amendment which provided that when the inhabitants of California in convention assembled should establish as a southern boundary a line not farther south than the parallel of 36 degrees 30 minutes, the state of California might be admitted into the Union, on the proclamation of the President. This amendment also provided for the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean. The Senate rejected this amendment by a vote of 24 ayes and 32 noes.28
Then Foote proposed an additional section. This provided that, as soon as practicable after the passage of the act admitting it as a state, California should ascertain by vote the feelings of its people on the question of so modifying the boundaries of the state as to make the line of 36 degrees 30 minutes, or some other line fixed by them, its southern boundary. It further provided that, when the people should declare for such a modification of boundaries by a majority vote, the portion cut off should at once become the territory of Colorado.29 On August 10, Senator Turney made another futile attempt to restrict the state to the portion falling above the line of 36 degrees 30 minutes.30
An examination of the proposals made will show a gradation. When it was seen that California's application for statehood was looked upon with favor by many, there were efforts to bring about division of the territory included in the proposed state. First an arbitrary division by Congress was proposed. When this plan was defeated, it was suggested that a convention of Californians should be given the privilege of deciding to limit the state above the line of 36 degrees and 30 minutes north latitude, whereupon the state would be admitted by proclamation of the President. When this failed to carry, it was proposed that the Californians be allowed to use their judgment as to the expediency of making a part of their state into a territory, without further action by Congress. But none of the proposals looking to division carried, and the bill admitting the state with boundaries as proposed in its constitution passed the Senate on August 13, the vote being 34 ayes and 18 noes.31
On September 7, the bill from the Senate came up in the House, where its passage was strenuously resisted. Strong opposition was shown to the admission of that part of California south of the Missouri Compromise line. On this, the last day of the bill's consideration, Thompson of Mississippi, who earlier in the session had spoken in favor of limiting the boundaries of the state line on the south to the parallel of 36 degrees 30 minutes, made a final speech of opposition to admission with the proposed constitutional boundaries. In his last plea he said, “the adoption of a territorial government for South California is demanded by the people of that country. The whole south asks for the division as an act of justice. Every consideration of sound policy demands this division.”32 But the bill, after several dilatory motions and votes, passed the House by a vote of 156 yeas to 56 nays. It was signed by the President September 9.
It is thus seen that while the movement in Congress for division was a part of the national slavery struggle, and quite distinct in character from the movement in California, the Southern Congressmen tried to use the California contest to further their own purposes.
1. The convention of 1851.—The objection to state government, and particularly to the union of northern and southern California under a single government, continued to find expression in California in a persistent effort to bring about a division of the state. An important period in this movement includes the first three years of California's statehood. When it was seen that the efforts to prevent admission were fruitless, definite plans were made to secure division.33 It was thought that a convention to discuss the situation would furnish a proper and effective means for crystallizing sentiment in regard to the movement.34
By the month of August, 1851, plans had taken somewhat definite form. In Los Angeles County all the candidates for the legislature pledged themselves to use their efforts to obtain a division of the state. The same test was to be made in other counties.35 Mr. Agostín Haraszthy, a prominent citizen of Southern California, who, acting for those opposing admission, had written to Senator Foote36 the sentiments of the south, set forth in a communication to the press some arguments of the divisionists. He said that there must be two sets of laws, one for the north and one for the south; the northern members of the legislature could have no interest in laws for the southern counties and vice versa; the distances of travel were so great as to impose an unnecessary burden of time and money upon the people of the south in the transaction of public and private business; different laws for the people and differing salaries for officials of different sections were a necessity; the south was an agricultural section, where the people were unable to pay the taxes necessary for supporting the extensive state system of government; and unless division should take place, the people of southern California would be impoverished and driven away, and, as a result, little but the land would be left in the south.37 These arguments, it is seen, are essentially the same as those which had been put forth in the constitutional convention and in the memorial to Congress.
That injustice was really being done to the southern part of the state seemed to be widely recognized at the time, both north and south.38 It was known that many persons had left southern California for Mexico to get away from what they believed to be the oppressions of the state government in the matter of taxation.39 There was a widespread feeling that in the enactment of laws, the wishes of the people in the south were not consulted and their interests seldom cared for. The northern part of the state admitted that the southern section was the most sparsely represented, and, in proportion to their means, the most heavily taxed portion of the state, while in the disposition of the general officers, neither party deemed the south worth conciliating even by a nomination. In short, the people of southern California were treated as step-children and they murmured.40 They did not feel that it was possible for their section to have a representation that would place them on a fair footing with respect to the mining portions of the state.41 To feel that they, long resident in the state, were being heavily taxed and regarded with little consideration, while the mining interests were courted and caressed,42 was not pleasant to the native Californians. Their objection to statehood came naturally out of their feeling that they were treated more like a conquered province than as a free and independent state,43 and the opinion that division was the only remedy for the ills suffered became quite general.44
The feelings of the people of the south found expression in action. The Daily Alta California, which had opposed every move to secure division of the state, in its issue of August 9, 1851, admitted that the movement to divide the state had gathered force, and published the plans being made for a convention to meet at Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, or Monterey to discuss the proposal.45 Owing to the extent of territory, it was difficult to secure concerted action in regard to the time and place of holding a convention. The first proposal was to hold the gathering at Monterey on the 15th of September, and arrangements were made for the meeting.46 Then a committee of citizens of San Diego held a meeting, August 30, in which Santa Barbara was suggested as the place for holding the convention, and the third Monday of October named as the date.47
The meeting at San Diego, in addition to urging the wisdom of a convention, gave to the public, in the form of resolutions, reasons for dividing the state. It was stated that
the great extent of the territory of the State, spreading itself over so many degrees of latitude along our sea coast, producing by the simple laws of nature such a vast difference of climate, . . . necessarily producing as great a diversity of industrial pursuits, and these differences being augmented by the natural formation and deposits of the Northern and Southern divisions of the country, have created and will ever create an utter impossibility for any Legislature of the State, however wise and patriotic, to enact laws adapted to the wants and necessities of a people, so widely differing in their circumstances and pursuits.
Besides this, it was urged that there were differences in means of transportation of the north and the south, the north having the advantage in its splendid streams of water, which reduce the cost of transportation; the means of transportation in the south were expensive, so that the agricultural products brought the people a bare subsistence. Because of these differences, it was argued that “any revenue law which levies the same per cent upon the dollar must fall heavier upon the lower than upon the upper country. This being the case, while the latter may sustain themselves under the burden of heavy taxation, the former will be oppressed and in the end absolutely impoverished.”48 In order to relieve themselves of the burden, the citizens had called the meeting to take into consideration the means of changing the civil status of the south.
In Los Angeles a public meeting, presided over by the mayor, was held on September 12 to urge division and make plans for a convention. The resolutions adopted begin:
Whereas, Experience has demonstrated that the political connection, which exists between the North and the South of California is beneficial to neither and prejudicial to both, therefore,
Resolved, That we, the citizens of Los Angeles County, will use every effort to produce a separation of the Southern portion of the State from the Northern, and the establishment of a separate and distinct Government.
The reasons given for a separation are similar to those given in the San Diego resolutions. The convention was invited to meet in Los Angeles because Santa Barbara had no public press.49
An attempt was made to hold the convention at Monterey as at first proposed. Owing to the misunderstanding about time and place, when it met in October there was not a full representation, but the delegates who were present issued an address in favor of division and stated their reasons for their position.50 Their address was dated October 8. It declared that in the beginning of the agitation for a state government, it had been feared that an attempt to form a constitution for so large a state would result in confusion, and that the laboring classes and property holders not situated in the gold districts would have to bear the larger portion of the cost of government; such had been the result; laws had been unjust and oppressive to a portion of the state; laws passed by the legislature had not been lawfully promulgated; disparity in taxation existed and as long as the state remained so large, the government would be oppressive to a portion of the people.51
It was finally agreed in the south that a convention should assemble at Santa Barbara on the third Monday of October, and to it delegates were quite generally elected.52 All the southern counties were represented except Santa Clara and Santa Cruz. Three of the delegates elected from Monterey did not go, fearing there would be no quorum present because of the misunderstanding about the place of meeting. The delegates met at the appointed place and opened the convention on October 20, remaining in session four days.53 The delegates present were as follows: From San Diego, W. C. Ferrell, Cave J. Couts, Agostín Haraszthy, G. P. Tibbets, P. C. Carrillo, Joaquin Ortega, T. W. Sutherland, and Antonio María Ortega; from Los Angeles, B. D. Wilson, J. L. Brent, John A. Lewis, Ignacio del Valle, A. F. Coronel, I. S. K. Ogier, Leonce Hoover, Francisco O'Campo, José Antonio Carrillo, Hugo Reid, Thomas Sánchez, and Jefferson Hunt; from Santa Barbara, Henry Carnes, Joaquin Carrillo, A. M. de la Guerra, C. R. V. Lee, Anastasia Carrillo, Samuel Barney, Estévan Ardisson, V. W. Hearn, Juan Camarillo, and Octaviana Gutiérrez; from Monterey, Frederick Russell.54 These names are given to show the composition of the convention. They speak for themselves. Fifteen clearly show their Spanish origin. Two others at least had Mexican wives.
The sessions of the convention were taken up with the discussion of what the people of the southern part of the state desired, and the formulation of their reasons therefor. The resolutions reported from the committee pointed to the necessities which gave a government to the state, but charged that the government erected and giving security and happiness to one section of the state had been obtained through the sacrifices of the other section, and that while the favored section, under the government provided, increased in all the elements which constitute the greatness of a state, the other gathered bitter experiences. They urged the dissolution of a political union which was antagonistic to the various interests which society had built up and which was “in contradiction to the eternal ordinances of nature, who herself had marked with an unerring hand the natural bounds between the great gold regions of the northern and internal sections of the state and the rich and agricultural valleys of the south.” It was said that the results of experience had demonstrated that no uniform system of civil, criminal, or revenue laws could be provided whereby the wants and requirements of the entire state could be satisfied; and a desire was expressed for the “formation of a territorial government in the southern counties of California under the paternal guardianship of the General Government.”55
Upon the necessity for a division of the state to insure justice to the southern portion, the convention was unanimous. The only matter upon which there was serious division was that of exact boundaries. After discussions and divisions which nearly broke up the convention, it was agreed to recommend to the legislature that in designating a boundary for the proposed southern territory,
the line should run from a point not farther north than the north-western boundary line of Santa Clara county, nor further south than he northern boundary of Monterey county, east to the main coast range of mountains, thence along said range of mountains, to a point due west of the northernmost point of the great Tulare Lake, thence due east to the point of said Lake, thence northeast to the eastern boundary line of the present State of California, thence down said boundary line, in a southeast direction to the boundary between Mexico and the United States ,thence along said boundary line to the Pacific Ocean, thence following up the coast to the place of beginning, including the adjacent Islands on the coast—and that only such agricultural and grazing counties as are identified with us in interest, be included in said boundaries.56
The general unanimity of the convention, and the frank, full statement in the resolutions of the conditions which were regarded as existing, made the people in the northern part of the state recognize the movement to divide the state as an important one. It was seen that questions had been presented that must be met by the legislature; and it was anticipated that they would be among the most important to come before that body at its next session.57
2. Misunderstanding of the California situation in the East.—After the admission of California and the beginning of agitation for a division of the state, there was some discussion in eastern papers as to the significance of the movement. Rumors from the East in September, 1851, indicated that agitation was rife in certain quarters for securing for slavery more territory, such as Cuba and certain provinces of Mexico, together with a part of California, which was to be divided for that purpose.58 In parts of the East, this agitation and the California division movement were treated as parts of the same problem. In discussing General Morehead's expedition into Mexico, the New York Courier and Enquirer claimed that a portion of the people of the Pacific Coast were agitating division for the purpose of erecting another state in which slavery should be permitted, and that there was a plan to induce a revolt in the province of Sonora or in Lower California, with the purpose of ultimately attaching this to the southern portion of California in order to form a new slave state on the Pacific Coast.59 But on the Pacific Coast it was asserted by the anti-divisionists that General Morehead's expedition had nothing to do with the division of California. More than this, the persons who favored state division were believed to look with disfavor on the acquisition of Lower California. And in any case, Lower California was known to be unsuited to slave labor.60 It was recognized, it is true, by many on the Pacific Coast, that to divide California might open up the discussion of the slavery question.61 But in California, in the various meetings and conventions of the year 1851, there was an entire absence of reference to the slavery matter.
3. The question in the legislature of 1852.—In the years 1852 and 1853, the movement for state division found voice in the state legislature. Here it became a potent factor in the attempts to provide for the calling of a constitutional convention for the purpose of revising the entire constitution of the state, it having been stated during the agitation of the previous year, by members of the legal profession, that a general convention of the people of the whole state would be necessary before separation could take place. It was suggested that at such a convention boundaries could be established, and attention given to other questions more or less connected with the division of the state.62
Governor McDougall, an Ohio man living at Sacramento, in his message to the legislature at the beginning of the session of 1852, called attention to the unsatisfactory condition of relations that existed between the northern and southern counties. Among other things, he said:
A subject which has assumed a degree of importance not to be overlooked, by the Executive and Legislative branches of the State Government, is that arising from the operation of our system of taxation, in the alleged inequality with which it operates upon the different sections of the State. It is declared by citizens of the Southern counties, which are essentially agricultural and grazing, that under the present State organization and laws, they are overburdened with taxation for the support of the State Government, from which they derive little benefit, while the Northern mining counties, more favored in this respect, bear but a small proportion of the burdens of taxation. They say, also, that while the taxes they pay are double those paid by the mining counties, their representation in the Legislature is only one-third as numerous. From an examination of the taxes assessed upon real and personal property, and of those returned as delinquent, which will be seen by reference to the Report of the Comptroller of State, the six Southern and grazing counties, with a population of 6,367 souls, as taken from the census returns, have paid into the treasury for the fiscal year ending the first of July last, the sum of $41,705.26, while the twelve mining counties, with a population of 119,917, have paid $21,253.66. The latter have a representation in the Legislature of forty-four, while the former have but twelve. The amount of capitation tax assessed in the twelve mining counties is $51,495.00, and the amount returned as delinquent $47,915.00, while the amount assessed in the grazing counties is $7,205.00, and the amount delinquent $3,291.50, showing that the southern counties with a population of 6,367, pay a capitation tax of $333.50 more than the twelve mining counties, which have a population of 119,917. It will be seen, also, by a reference to the same report, that the entire agricultural counties, with a population of 79,778, have paid into the Treasury during the last fiscal year $246,247.71, while the mining counties with a population, as before stated, of 119,917, pay only $21,253.66.63
The governor pointed out that the statement in the constitution that “all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation,” and that “taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state,” were true only in a legal sense, for the reason that the southern counties, which were mostly covered by grants and in the possession of individuals, paid a heavy tax upon every acre of land, which at best yielded but a moderate dividend on the valuation, while the mining counties, exceedingly prolific in the returns they made to their occupants, being almost entirely the property of the Federal Government, paid comparatively nothing into the state treasury. The results of this situation, he declared, were to force many citizens of the southern counties to alienate portions of their land and to sacrifice portions of their stock to meet what they considered an unjust burden. The worst thing of all was that the cords of amity between the sections were being broken. The constitution, he pointed out, prevented the legislature from remedying the evil. For this reason he recommended the calling of a convention to revise the constitution, at which time all inconveniences, of whatever nature, arising from the state charter, might be discussed, understood, and as far as possible obviated.64
On February 3, a joint resolution was introduced in the Assembly by Mr. Graham from Solano County providing for the calling of a convention to revise the constitution.65 It was referred to a special committee, which reported on February 11, Mr. Crabb of Stockton presenting the report for the majority. This report reviewed the history of the state since the territory came into possession of the United States, reiterated some of the facts of the governor's message, and, viewing the whole situation presented, approved heartily the complaints which came from the south. It was recommended that a convention be called “either to greatly reduce the limits of the state” or to give the legislature power of special legislation; the latter being somewhat equivocal and dangerous the former might be adopted as a dernier ressort.66 The minority report from the committee, while seeking to explain some of the things of which the south complained, recognized that the people of the southern part of the state believed that the nature of the government caused the troubles alleged.67
The question of the constitutional convention and state division were discussed outside the legislature. The Daily Alta California was bitter in its denunciations of the whole plan. It charged that such matters as were proposed were begun by slavery propagandists, and were seconded by less influential men and miserable, speculating politicians who acted with them, and whose purpose from the beginning was to divide the state and secure a portion for slavery.68 The assertion was made that the assembling of a convention to change the constitution would be the signal for opening upon the soil of California that hateful and baneful discussion of slavery that had so nearly severed the Union, and it was charged that the impracticable and deceitful scheme for the division of the state was mainly urged on by persons known to favor the establishment of slavery upon this coast.69
This charge was repudiated by the press of the south. The Los Angeles Star of February 7 said:
We believe our representatives in the Legislature are fully instructed as to the wishes of their constituents. Any other than a territorial government for the South would not be asked for nor desired, and if this cannot be obtained at present, we can wait and hope for justice from future Legislature. . . It might have been expected, perhaps, that irrelevant questions would be brought into the discussion, when the Legislature took up the matter, and so we see that Slavery is to be lugged in, undoubtedly with no other view than to stave off Division. The resolutions of the Santa Barbara Convention, express at this time, as they did at the period of their promulgation, the views and feelings of Southern California, and if the Senators and Representatives from the Southern counties are guided by them in their measures to consummate a Division of the State, they will but second the views of their constituents.70
Later this same paper said that the people of the south greatly resented the bringing of the slavery question into the discussion thus keeping the real issues out of their proper place.71
The Assembly on March 2, passed the bill providing for the election of delegates to a constitutional convention by a vote of 51 to 7.72 The bill came up in the Senate several times, but failed of passage in that body.73
4. In the legislature of 1853.—On January 13, 1853, Mr. Myres of Placer County, introduced in the Assembly, a bill entitled “an act recommending to the electors to vote for or against calling a constitutional convention.”74 The bill was referred to a special committee, was reported back to the Assembly, and on March 24, passed that body by a vote of 46 to 12.75 In the proceedings and report of the special committee, there is little to indicate a connection of the bill with a purpose to divide the state, except that both measures were unanimously supported by members from the south. The report of the committee, however, pointed out defects in the constitution, and among other things made reference to the dissatisfaction existing in the south due to the disparity of taxation between the two sections.76
In the Senate, where much discussion took place over the proposed measure, the purpose of those advocating a convention is more clearly brought out. On January 26, reports were received from the select committee to whom had been referred so much of the governor's message as referred to changes in the constitution. The majority report, submitted by Mr. Snyder and Mr. Lott, was against the calling of a constitutional convention. This report shows that it was generally understood that an effort to divide the state would be made should a convention be called. Division of the state at some future time was pointed to as a probability by the report, and was even held as desirable, but immediate division was opposed because, it was asserted, that in making a division it would be necessary for the southern part of the state to become a territory, where the population, free from taxation, would have no inducement to diminish their estates, as a consequence of which development would be slow in that section. Besides, the falling of a part of the territory back into pupilage would diminish the coast in the estimation of the world.77
The first minority report, in discussing the disparity of taxation complained of, pointed out that the same inequality existed between the agricultural and the mining counties throughout the state, and that southern California did not suffer more than the other agricultural regions. Figures were given showing that eight mining counties (Butte, Calaveras, Klamath, Placer, Shasta, Tuolumne, Trinity, and Yuba), with a population of 86,374 persons, paid taxes which amounted to $1.00 per head for each inhabitant, and that fifteen agricultural counties (Colusi, Contra Costa, Los Angeles, Marin, Monterey, Napa, San Francisco, Sacramento, San Joaquin, Santa Clara, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, Sonoma, Sutter, and Santa Cruz), with a population of 83,329 persons, paid taxes which amounted to $2.64 per head. The agricultural counties mentioned, with a smaller population than the mining counties mentioned, paid $1.65 more for each person than the mining counties. This was admitted by this section of the committee report to be unjust. But, at the same time, the report opposed a convention or state division, believing there were other remedies for the evils mentioned.78 Both this report and that of the majority were laid upon the table.79
A second minority report was presented by another section of the committee. About this report and the bill submitted with it, providing for a constitutional convention, the discussion of the Senate centered. The report was lengthy. It went into the history of the state and its constitution. Emphasis was put upon the inability of one state government to operate satisfactorily over so large an area as was included in California. Attention was called to the unjust operation of the revenue laws, the result of which was that a disproportionate share of the burden of the state government was borne by the commercial, agricultural, and grazing counties, while the mining counties enjoyed the controlling representation in the halls of the legislature. The report said:
Three revenue laws have been respectively passed at the three past sessions of the Legislature, and the result has proved that it is utterly impossible to prescribe any mode and description of taxation that will be practically “equal and uniform throughout the State.” . . . In fact, the revenue laws are as good, as just, as effective, as can be made under the existing constitution; and no relief can be looked for until the State is divided, and the mining counties and the agricultural counties are separated and placed under different governments.
As an additional reason for division, the report held that a larger representation in Congress from the Pacific Coast was a practical necessity. Moreover, since in 1841 Congress had passed a law donating to every state of the Union five hundred thousand acres of the public lands, if so much was embraced within its borders, division would entitle the territory to more land. It was even suggested that three states were desirable.
It had been asserted that difficulties might arise over the slavery question. The report, on this point, took an emphatic position. It read:
The friends and advocates of a convention are not now, and will not be at any time hereafter, in favor of engrafting any new Constitution with a slavery clause. They are composed alike of northern, western, and southern men—men from every state in the Union, and all are opposed to the agitation and discussion of this element of dissension and discord, and are resolved to leave it out of the controversy altogether, despite the efforts of some of their opponents to foist it upon them. . . . The first voice for a division of the State came from the native Californians, and the first public meeting in its favor was held in the County of Los Angeles. . . . When the three [or two] new States, present their Republican Constitutions to Congress and demand admission into the Union who can believe that they will not be promptly admitted? Did not the compromise measures of 1850 finally and forever set at rest the subject of slavery? . . . Let it be remembered that the friends of a convention disclaim all sectional feeling, and will not at any stage of the measure advocate or oppose, or in anywise discuss the subject of slavery.80
Public opinion, as indicated by the newspapers, seemed to be divided on the subject before the legislature. The Daily Alta California, which the preceding year had bitterly fought any suggestion of division, charging that the advocates were actuated by a desire to make slave territory in California, now admitted that there were good reasons for dividing the state, but insinuated that there were those who had sinister purposes, and said that until all was open the paper would make the most of the opposition to slavery it knew to exist in the minds of many.81 The Stockton Journal of February 15 charged that a scheme had been devised to elect to the legislature men from the southern states or with southern proclivities and implied that there were men working evil designs.82 But the Sacramento Union put these charges in their true light. The issue of February 2 said: “A division of the state into two or more states is a political necessity which will be recognized by all parties sooner or later.83 In a subsequent issue this paper said that it looked upon the effusions of those who professed to believe that there was any real danger of the introduction of slavery into any part of the state, as the production of a fevered fancy—of an imagination so diseased upon the subject of slavery as to be unable to view the subject through any other than a distorted medium.84 The religious press of the state was said to be generally opposed to division, fearing the possible introduction of slavery.85
The discussion of the bill in the legislature gathered largely about constitutional questions and questions that had to do with alleged defects in that instrument. It was charged during the discussion that the conventionists had motives they dared not divulge,86 but this was denied.87 The slavery question did not come to the fore in the discussion. The day before the final vote on the convention question, Mr. Hubbs sought to get a measure before the Senate providing for a vote of the people directly upon the question of dividing California into three states, the south to be called “El Dorado,” the middle “California,” and the northern “Sacramento.” This proposal was rejected without much discussion. On April 6 the vote on the constitutional convention bill showed a vote of 16 ayes to 10 noes, and the bill was lost, through lacking the necessary two-thirds majority.88
An analysis of the votes on the constitutional question in the two legislatures here discussed brings out the following facts: In 1852 all the votes in the Senate and the Assembly of members from the southern counties were cast in favor of a convention. Of the representatives from the northern counties who voted on the question in the Senate, seven voted for and eleven against a convention, and in the Assembly, forty voted for and seven against. The vote of 1853 shows a similar result. The southern representatives were all in favor of a convention; the northern delegates were divided. The northern delegates in the Senate cast fifteen votes for and nine against a convention, and in the Assembly thirty-one for and twelve against.
Comparing the votes of the mining and agricultural counties, using the classification made in the committee report at the time, it is seen that in 1853, in the Senate, the representatives of the mining counties cast two votes for and four against a convention, while those from the agricultural counties cast nine for and two against. Representatives of the mining counties in the Assembly divided the vote, giving seven for and ten against the plan for a convention, while the representatives from the agricultural counties voted twenty-three for and one against the proposal.89 In other words, the demand for a convention came from the agricultural counties, both northern and southern.
In the year 1854 state division did not become a vital issue in any form in the state legislature. But the subject continued to be agitated in the press of southern California,90 and had an interest in other quarters. It will be remembered that during this year, and for a number of succeeding years, there was a strenuous conflict within the Democratic party in California between Senator William M. Gwin and his followers on one hand and David C. Broderick and his followers on the other. By some in the East this struggle for leadership and the battle of diverse elements in a party were interpreted as a conflict of slavery and anti-slavery influences. Some, indeed, hoped this was the case, and that California might be divided and slavery introduced into a portion of it. It was even asserted that “southern California is peculiarly propitious to negro labor, and its inhabitants are very anxious that slaveholding should be introduced among them.”91 But this assertion was boldly denied in California by a northern paper, and the record of the state on the slavery question pointed out.92 Surprise was expressed by the Sacramento Union at the pertinacity with which the charge that there was a party in the state advocating a division of the state with the view of introducing slavery into southern California was iterated and reiterated in the state and out of it.93 The editor of the same paper declared that he had never “met a half dozen men known to be in favor of introducing slavery into any portion of the state,” and asserted that if the proposal were submitted to a direct vote he was confident that three-fourths of the immigrants in California from slave states would vote against it.94
The state division question came squarely before the legislature of 1855. On February 27 Jefferson Hunt, of San Bernardino, introduced in the Assembly a bill for creating a new state out of California.95 This new state was to be called “Columbia,” and was to embrace the territory included in the counties of Santa Cruz, Santa Clara, San Joaquin, Calaveras, Amador, Tuolumne, Stanislaus, Mariposa, Tulare, Monterey, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, and San Diego, together with the islands on the coast adjoining the counties included.96 The committee to whom the bill was referred reported on April 4, introducing as a substitute for the original bill an act to create three states out of the state of California.97 The first section of this act provided for enlarging the boundaries of California by making its eastern boundary a line running from the intersection of the forty-second degree of latitude with the one hundred and nineteenth of longitude, to the point where the Colorado river first touches California, and thence down this river to where Mexico joins California. Other sections provided for the division of the territory included within the enlarged bounds into a southern, a central, and a northern state, to be known respectively as “Colorado,” “California,” and “Shasta.”98
The full discussion of the proposed division, which occurred on April 17, indicated the general sentiment of the legislature towards the proposal, and the arguments made on the occasion are of interest. Douglas, of San Joaquin County, contended that the state was too extensive for one government; the supreme court was too inaccessible because of the distance from the extremities of the state; the representation in Congress was too small for so large a territory. Ferrell, of San Diego, argued for the bill as an act of justice to the southern part of the state; he thought the south suffered because of its distance from the capital; the state was too large with its 1,000 miles of sea coast and 188,000 square miles of territory. It was contended by Hunt, of San Bernardino, that the God of nature and of the constitution had forbidden that the southern portion of the state should be trampled under foot; he knew the situation of the people because of his long residence in the state; their property was exhausted day by day by the burdens of taxation placed upon them. Buffum, of San Francisco, argued along the same lines. The people of the south had a right to feel aggrieved at the north; bills had been introduced in the legislature inapplicable to both the north and the south; the creator had made the northern and southern portions of the state dissimilar in physical and geographical character. On the other hand, it was thought by Burke, of Mariposa County, that the portion to be set off as the state of California would not contain inhabitants sufficient to enable it to become a state, and for that reason he thought the bill premature and fraught with danger to the peace of society.
That there was any thought of their proposals and the slavery question becoming connected was disclaimed by Douglas and Hunt. Hunt declared that the negro question had not been so much as mooted in southern California for three years, and that two-thirds of the people were opposed to slavery. Flournoy, in reply to insinuations that slavery might become involved in the plan of division, said that Mariposa county was in favor of division, but that in the fight on the matter he had never heard the word “slavery,” and that to put it in this discussion was unfair. He said that although he was a southern man, he would put a clause in the constitution against the introduction of slavery in the southern state. He hoped that the house would not be influenced by the introduction of the slavery question.99
In the debate, little direct opposition to the proposal was shown, but there were grave differences of opinion as to its constitutionality. On motion of Mr. Douglas, the bill was recommitted to the select committee of nine members, with instructions to report an address to the people of California on the subject.100 In the address the committee incorporated the proposed act, and gave reasons for the proposal made. They set forth the capacities and resources of the several portions of the state, the impracticability of uniform legislation, the difficulty of distributing equal justice, the obstacles to the proper exercise of the executive functions, the impediments to harmonious action by the people, and the necessity of a larger representation in Congress from this coast in order to obtain political rights from the general government.101 It was stated in the address that but one serious objection to the division had been urged, namely the revival in the Congress of the United States of the question of slavery in states and territories. To this objection it was answered that the people of the state had settled for themselves the question of slavery. The only part where slavery could exist if permitted was in the central portion, but here popular sentiment had settled the question forever.102 The Daily Alta California, which had previously opposed the division of the state, now simply advised waiting. As to slavery, it said the movement for division was now divested of sectional character, and that it was not probable that, in present light, anyone could suppose slavery would come into California.103
The legislative session of 1855 came to an end before the subject got fairly before the Senate. It was expected that it would get through both houses the next year, but the political situation in 1856, with the Democratic party divided, the Know Nothings in power, the contest for the senatorship, and other pressing political issues, left little place for the question of state division. On February 26, Cosby, of Trinity and Klamath Counties introduced in the Senate a bill to create three states out of the state of California. This was read a first and second time, and referred to the Judiciary Committee.104 The Judiciary Committee, having considered the bill, on March 22 recommended its passage, but it seems not to have received further favorable consideration.105
The legislature of 1857 passed a bill providing for the submission to the people of the question of calling a constitutional convention to revise the entire constitution. The reasons urged for the necessity of making changes in the constitution were in part the same as those urged for division. Matters connected with the judiciary and taxation were prominent among them. Had there been a convention, it seems very likely that the state division matter would have come up, and perhaps some urged the convention for this reason. The vote on the question of a convention was very close, but resulted in the defeat of the measure.106
1. Proposed segregation of the southern counties.—Resolutions were introduced in the legislature of 1858, on April 13, by Andrés Pico, Senator from the district embracing Los Angeles, San Bernardino, and San Diego Counties, which are of importance as being the prelude to the action taken by the legislature the next year. These resolutions were in effect a request to the legislature to pass an act setting off as a territory the part of California lying south of parallel 35 degrees and 45 minutes. The reasons given for the request were the difference in climate, soil, and productions of the south and the north, the dissimilarity of the people in language, manners, costoms, and interests, and the separateness of the two sections made by geographical conditions.107 The resolutions were withdrawn by the friends of the measure because it was thought that their discussion would retard the business of the session, which was near its close.108
It was no surprise when, on February 5, 1859, Don Andrés Pico introduced resolutions in the Assembly looking toward action for the segregation of the southern part of the state from the northern part and the erecting of the segregated portion into a territory.109 The preamble to the resolutions stated reasons for the proposed division. The boundaries of the state, it was urged, enclosed an area too large and diversified for one state. Because uniform legislation was unjust and ruinous to the south, it was demanded that the untoward union be dissolved. The district which it was proposed to leave out of California and organize as the Territory of Colorado, with the consent of the Congress of the United States, was all that part of the state comprised in the counties of San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Bernardino, including the islands lying opposite to the adjacent coast. Provision was made for adjustment with California, and the Congress of the United States was asked to give immediate organization.110
At the request of Mr. Pico this matter was referred to a special committee,111 which submitted its reports on March 2. The majority report said:
They believe that there exist good and valid reasons why the inhabitants of the said territory should, or may, desire such separation, and, also, that it is expedient that the State should consent thereto, under the conditions, restrictions, and qualifications, provided in the accompanying bill, which they have instructed their Chairman to introduce in lieu of, and as a substitute for, the aforesaid resolutions. But while they fully endorse the expediency of the measure, they wish to leave the question of its constitutionality an open one, without expressing an opinion on the subject.112
A minority of the committee submitted a report in which it was held that the proposed separation could not take place except by the prescribed mode of amending the constitution, or by the action of a constitutional convention, in both of which cases the people of all the state would have to pass upon the changes proposed. By this report, the indefinite postponement of the whole matter was recommended.113
The proposed Act, which was submitted with the report of the majority of the special committee, described the desired boundaries of the new territory of Colorado as
all of that part, or portion of the present territory of this State [California], lying all south of a line drawn eastward from the west boundary of the State along the sixth standard of parallel south of the Mount Diablo meridian, east to the summit of the Coast Range; thence southerly, following said summit to the seventh standard parallel; thence due east, on said standard, parallel to its intersection with the northwest boundary of Los Angeles county; thence northeast along said boundary, to the eastern boundary of the State, including the counties of San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Los Angeles, San Diego, San Bernardino, and a part of Buena Vista.
The Act directed the governor in his proclamation for the next general election to instruct the voters in the territory proposed to be segregated to vote for or against such segregation, and provided that if two-thirds of the voters residing therein and voting thereon should vote for the proposed changes, the division should take place, subject to the consent of Congress. Provisions were made for adjustments with California should the proposed division carry.114
Evidence as to the motives of those favoring this measure is not abundant, except as stated by the committee report of March 2. But it will be seen that they are the reasons which had consistently and repeatedly been given; and it does not seem necessary to look for others. A noted writer, however, makes the assertion that, “The Lecomptonites, taking advantage of the fact that the native Californians had always been opposed to being taxed for the support of a state government, that they complained of the inequality of taxes as between agriculturists and miners, and maintained their right to carry slaves into any territory, had fixed upon this means of consummating their purpose of bringing slave property to the Pacific Coast.”115 A newspaper of the time wrote harsh words about pestilential politicians and political fortune hunters, who had easily imposed upon the weakness of the southern native citizens, whose political habits prior to the establishment of an American state on these shores was decidedly revolutionary.116
On the other hand, it is to be noted that in the discussions in the legislature there was much doubt as to the constitutionality of the measure, though there was no serious difference as to the desirability of the separation, and the south's sincere desire in reference to it.117 It was pointed out at the time that some weight should be given to the ability and character of Mr. Pico as a pledge that no personal or sinister motive was back of the proposal.118 There seemed to be sincere advocacy of the measure in the southern part of the state, where the method being followed was advocated as a proper one for a negotiation between the federal and state governments in looking toward the harmonious accomplishment of a result which the people of the south had so long desired.119 It seems fair to give some consideration to the words of a writer in the Sacramento Union, who, answering charges that had been made, pointed out how long and persistently the inhabitants of the south had sought division on legitimate grounds, and who said, “Why attribute it to ambitious plotting of political fortune hunters? . . . The members from the south in the convention to form a state constitution for California, desired to be left out, but as they were informed that great advantages would result to those counties, they willingly submitted. A ten years experience has convinced them that they were deceived.”120 Those interested in division reiterated the contentions that had been made since the constitutional convention, declaring over again that these same reasons were still actuating them, and contending that the present effort was but a part of the continued movement to get justice for the south.121
On March 25, the Assembly by a vote of 33 ayes to 25 noes passed the Act.122 It passed the Senate on April 14, by a vote of 15 ayes to 12 noes,123 and was approved by the governor April 19.124 All of the delegates from southern California, in the territory affected by the proposed segregation, voted for the bill. The legislators from the northern counties divided, in the Senate, eleven voting for and twelve against, and in the Assembly, 27 for and 24 against the Act.125
The election on the above measure took place at the appointed time. The returns from the election showed the following result:
These figures show that the measure carried by a good vote beyond the necessary two-thirds required.126
While the above measure was under consideration in the legislature, a bill was introduced in the Assembly on February 17, entitled “an Act to authorize the citizens of the state of California residing north of the fortieth degree of north latitude to withdraw from the state of California and organize a separate government.” The bill was referred to the committee on Colorado territory.127 The committee gave consideration to the bill, and made report, recommending that the matter be referred to the delegations included within the limits of the territory which it was proposed to withdraw, to-wit. Siskiyou, Del Norte, Klamath, Humboldt, Trinity, Shasta, Plumas, and Tehama.128 Nothing further came of it. It was felt at the time that the bill was proposed by northern members to offset or checkmate the demand of the southern delegates for a separate government for their constituents.129 The Sacramento Union considered it a sly satire on the southern movement, which its movers did not expect or desire to become a law130—like a bill later introduced to form a state below Tehachapi called “South Cafeteria.”
2 Final events of the decade.—On January 11, 1860, the legislature in joint session elected the governor, Milton S. Latham, a native of Ohio, United States Senator to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Senator David C. Broderick.131 On January 12 the senator-elect sent a communication to the legislature relative to the six southern counties which had voted in favor of segregation. The message stated that he had, in compliance with the Act authorizing the six southern counties to vote upon the question of separation from the balance of the state, transmitted to the president of the United States a certified copy thereof, a statement of the vote, and also a paper embodying his own views on the question. He then said: “As the people of the state are deeply interested in any action Congress may take in the matter, and as I may soon be required, as a Senator, to urge or oppose, the formation of a new government for these counties, I think it proper to send herewith a copy of the paper referred to.”
In the message to the president, Latham reviewed the action taken by the legislature and the results of the election under the legislative Act. He then declared the origin of this Act,
to be found in the dissatisfaction of the mass of people, in the southern counties of this state, with the expenses of a State Government. They are an agricultural people, thinly scattered over a large extent of country. They complain that the taxes upon their land and cattle are ruinous—entirely disproportioned to the taxes collected in the mining regions; that the policy of the State, hitherto, having been to exempt mining claims from taxation, and the mining population being migratory in its character, and hence contributing but little to the State revenue in proportion to their population, they are unjustly burdened; and that there is no remedy, save in a separation from the other portion of the State. In short, that the union of southern and northern California is unnatural.
It is well known that at the time of the formation of our State Constitution, the people of Southern California preferred a territorial to a State form of government. But, yielding their preference, they made commom mause with their brethren of the north, in the adoption of our present onstitution though from that time forward they seem to have regretted the step.
The argument presented by Latham favored the division, and contended that the Act of the legislature was valid, though it had never been submitted to the people of the whole state. He held that Article 4, Section 3 of the Federal Constitution contained all the requirements for a division of the state. This being true, if the people in a severed portion preferred to be organized under a territorial government, nothing in the Constitution prevented. The communication of the governor was referred to the committee on Federal Relations.132 On January 14, Rogers, of San Francisco, introduced in the Assembly a concurrent resolution relating to the separation of the southern counties. It instructed the Senators and Representatives of the state and people in Congress to oppose the execution of the Act of segregation.133 This resolution was also referred to the committee on Federal Relations.134
Majority and minority reports were received from the committee on Federal Relations on January 26.135 The majority report asserted its agreement with Governor Latham's contention that “the act of the California legislature is valid,” and that the Federal Constitution, which is superior to those of individual states, does not require any action by the people in case of a relinquishment of a part of a territory by a state to the Federal government. The report then took up the resolution introduced by Rogers, which it declared to be a “concurrent resolution of the legislature, brought forward and proposed without any demonstration in its favor on the part of the people,—to compel by instructions the Senators and Representatives of the state and people in Congress, to oppose the execution of their deliberate and solemn act of legislation, incorporated in the statutes of this state.” The report continues:
Your committee, convinced of the impropriety of this mode of defeating the objects of a law, and impressed with the conviction that the best interests not only of the inhabitants of the Territory under consideration, but the whole people of California, as well as the entire community of the Pacific coast of the United States, will be promoted by the separation and the organization of a greater number of States along its shores than was contemplated in one thousand eight hundred and forty nine, could but view the adoption of the resolution with unfeigned regret.
The minority report was an argument against the legality and constitutionality of the proposed mode of separation. It contended that the statement in the constitution that, “all political powers are inherent in the people—government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the people,” would not be worth a farthing if it could be destroyed by Congress in the manner proposed, whenever a legislature could be found complaisant enough to sanction such a proceeding. It was contended, further, that whenever a division should be made, it would have to be done in the same way as the constitution was adopted—by all concerned—and in a manner that gives them a voice in a way a mere enactment does not. There is also expressed the fear that in the present state of public feeling, growing out of the Kansas trouble, there would be opened another field to be fought over. The minority, therefore, would prevent the separation on the grounds of its illegality and of public policy.136
On March 1 arose the question of approving or rejecting the majority report of the committee on Federal Relations, and it was approved by a vote of 37 ayes to 26 noes.137 Immediately following this action, a bill was introduced to repeal the act providing for a vote on segregation passed by the last legislature,138 but this measure did not come to a vote.
In the Senate, a committee took up the questions involved in the governor's recommendation, and reported favorably a bill providing for the segregation of the southern counties in accordance with their vote.139 But there seems to have been no further action taken. The country was now facing the issues which culminated in the war between the states. Secession and approaching civil conflict left no place for the question of state division, and so the matter rested until after the Civil War and Reconstruction.
As has already been intimated, writers on California history quite generally have attributed the movement to divide the state, in the decade under discussion, to the influence of slavery and slavery propagandists, whose purpose from the beginning was to secure a part of California for slavery. Royce, in his California, asserts that William M. Gwin, with other southerners in the constitutional convention, was working a deep-laid scheme to effect a division of California, the purpose being to secure a part of it for the South's institution.140 Mr. J. M. Guinn, on the same point, is quite definite. He says:
The scheme of Gwin and his southern associates was to make the Rocky mountains the eastern boundary. This would create a state with an area of about four hundred thousand square miles. They reasoned that when the admission of the state came before Congress, the southern members would oppose the admission of so large an area under a free state constitution and that ultimately a compromise might be effected. California would be split in two from east to west, the old dividing line, the parallel of 36° 30’, would be established and Southern California come into the Union as a slave state.141
Other writers make similar statements as to the purposes of supposed slavery advocates in that convention.142 The writers then carry their assertions concerning the purposes of alleged slavery advocates to the question of state division after admission. Guinn says: The admission of California into the Union as a free state did not, in the opinion of the ultra pro-slavery faction, preclude the possibility of securing a part of its territory for the “peculiar institution” of the south. The question of state division which had come up in the constitutional convention was again agitated. The advocates of division hoped to cut off from the southern part, territory enough for a new state The ostensible purpose of division was kept concealed. The plea of unjust taxation was made prominent. The native Californians who under Mexican rule paid no taxes on their land were given to understand that they were bearing an undue proportion of the cost of government, while the mining counties, paying less tax, had the greater representation. The native Californians were opposed to slavery, an open advocacy of the real purpose would defeat the division scheme.143
Tuthill, in his History of California, makes the statement: “As early as 1852, the Chivalry had unsuccessfully attempted a convention with the secret purpose of dividing the State and erecting the southern half into Slave Territory.”144 A recent article says, “The Gwin party hoped to divide California into two states and hand the southern over to slavery”;145 while another writer has asserted that “From the adoption of the state constitution in 1849 to 1861, the southern wing of that party [the Democratic] did everything in their power to divide the State, their purpose being to make a Slave State out of the southern portion of it.”146
A study of the history of the state division movement, however, does not indicate that the pro-slavery motive had the preponderating influence in the movement which these writers have attributed to it. In fact, it shows that there is small basis for their assertions. In the first place, their statements concerning the purpose of slavery advocates in the constitutional convention are incorrect. A recent writer, by an analysis of the votes taken in the constitutional convention on the crucial question of the eastern boundary, has shown conclusively the baselessness of the repeated assertions concerning an alignment of northern and southern men, and of slavery and anti-slavery forces, with reference to the boundary question, and has demonstrated that the repeated charges that southerners were manipulating and working in that convention to secure conditions for the further extension of slavery cannot be deduced from a study of the debates and votes of the convention.147 But there was a purpose, on the part of some in that convention, to secure division. This, however, has been shown to have had its cause in the unalloyed desire of the native Californians to be placed under a territorial form of government, in order that they might avoid being united with a people they did not understand, and whose domination they feared.148
As to the movement carried on through the decade to divide the state, it must be said that the writers referred to, in assigning causes for it, seem to have had their views determined too much by reasoning from what they supposed was a deep-laid plan of slavery propagandists in the constitutional convention. During the decade of the agitation for division, charges were made that there was back of the movement the purpose to make slave territory out of a part of California. But these were denied, in several instances by the very newspapers which had made them, and beyond inferences, charges, and innuendo, the evidence to support the claim that slavery conspiracy was fundamental in the division movement is scant. To hold, as one writer does,149 that the ostensible purpose was kept concealed through a decade, is to ask much of prejudice and credulity. On the other hand, the history of the movement shows that during the years under discussion the facts of differences of country and people of the northern and southern parts of the state, the feeling that injustice was done to a section and a class, the desire of the native Californians for a separate territorial government, the developing life of the western frontier seeking a larger representation in Congress, and the continued problem of adjustment of a great and diverse population, were factors manifesting themselves in clear and definite form. Now and then slavery discussion was an incident in the movement, but at no time does the slavery propaganda appear as a determining factor. It is truer, on the basis of the evidence to say that slavery discussion was occasionally injected into the movement to divide the state than to say that the division movement grew out of the slavery propaganda.
III. EXPLORING EXPEDITIONS OF THE TEXAS FRONTIER
Jefferson had planned to explore Louisiana, or at least as much of it as was necessary to traverse in pursuing a direct route to the Pacific, long before he gained possession of the territory. Meriwether Lewis was already making preparations for his memorable journey, when his chief learned of the unexpected acquisition. He was thus in a position to turn his project to very practical account and be the first to acquire the definite information that would assist the President in determining just what he had bought from France. For this reason his undertaking becomes the premier event in a new epoch of Far Western exploration, and incidentally a prominent factor in the attempt to extend the Louisiana-Texas frontier to the Rio Grande. In the frontier area between that river and the Mississippi Lewis and Clark emphasize the northern route by way of the Missouri and Platte, which has Santa Fé as its objective point. Its consideration, then, belongs to another phase of our subject.150
After Jefferson knew of the acquisition of Louisiana, he perceived that the event gave a new impulse and purpose to his exploring plan. That work must be pursued on a more extensive scale to overcome the serious handicap of the United States in the inevitable territorial controversy with Spain. This will explain his statement in his letter of August 11, 1803, to Isaac Briggs, a government surveyor, that: “Congress would probably authorize the exploration of the principal streams of the Mississippi and Missouri,” to determine those “given points in the highlands enclosing those rivers” that “constitute the exterior boundary of the acquisition.”151 This exploration formed an important phase of the administration's policy in taking possession of Louisiana and aroused corresponding fears and efforts to combat it on the part of Spanish officials.
Jefferson's plan for the exploration of Louisiana, and the distinction which he wished to preserve between the expedition of Lewis and Clark and those he now had in mind, is best shown in his letter of November 16, 1803, to Meriwether Lewis:
The object of your mission is single, the direct water communication from sea to sea formed by the bed of the Missouri, and perhaps the Oregon. I have proposed in conversation, and it seems generally assented to, that Congress appropriate ten to twelve thousand dollars for exploring the principle waters of the Mississippi and Missouri. In that case I should send a party up the Red River to its head, then to cross over to the head of the Arkansas and come down that. A second party for the Panis and Padouca, and a third, perhaps, for the Morsigona and St. Peters. This [exploration] will be attempted distinctly from your mission, which we consider of major importance and therefore not to be delayed or hazarded by any episodes whatever.152
In a letter to Dunbar he elaborated the details of his plan. The surveyor general for the district north of the Ohio was to be authorized to explore the upper Mississippi. Upon obtaining the probable authorization of Congress he proposed to send an expedition up the Panis and down the Padoucas, exploring the entire course of both rivers, and another up the Arkansas and the Red. Each party was to take careful astronomical observations at the source of each river explored and from the data thus secured it would be possible to construct a skeleton map of Louisiana, which in contour and main streams would be perfectly correct, and whose details could be filled in at leisure. For details north of the Missouri, upon which stream Lewis and Clark were about to embark, he expected to depend upon British fur traders and explorers.153
The result of Jefferson's quiet personal work among the members of the Eighth Congress appeared in a report dated March 8, 1804, from the Committee on Commerce and Manufactures. After hazarding a surmise that the new territory extended to the Pacific, the report touched upon previous explorations of the Mississippi and of the Gulf Coast by Hutchins and Ellicott, mentioned the plans for penetrating the upper Mississippi and Missouri, and closed by advocating the Red and the Arkansas as affording the next most favorable field for exploration. For this purpose the services of private individuals should be utilized, wherever possible, and in addition an appropriation should be given the President to supplement such efforts.154
A few days later Jefferson, as above indicated, wrote Dunbar of his plan and asked him to direct the expedition up the Red and Arkansas, in case Congress should authorize the required appropriation. The preparations for the expedition were to be made at New Orleans and Natchez, and the collector of customs at the former place would honor all drafts for this purpose. The instructions to the leader were to be similar to those issued to Lewis and Clark, with such additional ones as Dunbar should think necessary to add. “Still, this is a matter of speculation,” added the President, warningly, for Congress was hastening matters to bring its session to a close, “and in that case all I have said will be as if I had not said it.” The action of this legislative body, owing to opposition in the Senate, was but partially favorable, for its hurried appropriation was only $3,000, barely sufficient for one party. This Jefferson determined to send upon the more interesting of his two proposed explorations; and without waiting for Dunbar's acceptance, he again wrote, asking him to superintend the preparations for the expedition up the Red and Arkansas, and to select its leader. For this position he suggested a Mr. Walker, of Mississippi, or a Mr. Gillespie, of North Carolina, both of whom had served with Ellicott. He mentioned the fact that a George Hunter, of Philadelphia, would accompany the expedition. Dr. Hunter's “fort,” the President wrote, “is chemistry, and in the practical part of that science he is supposed to have no equal in the United States.” He warned Dunbar that Hunter might attempt to turn the expedition into a prospecting tour for gold and silver mines, and that such an incidental object must not be allowed to defeat the main purpose of the expedition.155
In his replies of May 15th and June 1st, Dunbar tempered his expression of gratification over the fact that Congress had authorized the expedition by wishing that that body had displayed more liberality. The House committee in its report had seemed to take it for granted that scientific men would be led by patriotism to undertake their work of exploration. While many might be influenced by such a motive, yet in the case of a talented man of limited means it would be at the expense of precious time; and when a great empire spoke of compensation it should be adequate to the importance of the task. It would be difficult to find the proper man in the vicinity of Natchez. Of the two men mentioned by Jefferson, Gillespie was the better educated, while Walker, then serving in the Spanish army, possessed the greater natural talent; but neither had any particular qualification for the work aside from a knowledge of surveying. He believed they must choose a man possessing the requisite geographical knowledge and consider themselves fortunate if he knew anything of natural history, botany, or mineralogy. If a man of “only moderate talents” was needed, he suggested that Dr. Hunter should command the expedition.156
The instructions to Dunbar as director of the expedition accompanied the President's letter of April 13, 1804. In general they followed closely those previously issued to Meriwether Lewis. From Natchez, the point of departure, the leader was to conduct the party to the remotest source of the Red River, and thence to the highlands dividing the waters of this stream from those of the Bravo (Rio Grande) and the Pacific. After making a careful exploration of these highlands, he was to descend the Arkansas, noting upon this river, as upon the former, the important natural features and taking numerous astronomical observations. With regard to the Indians, he should tell them, in accordance with the later message borne by Lewis, that now the Spaniards had agreed to withdraw all their troops “from the Mississippi and Missouri and from all countries watered by any rivers running into them,” thus emphasizing the Jeffersonian idea of the extent of Louisiana. In view of the prospective withdrawal of these garrisons and the change in allegiance of any subjects residing upon these tributaries, they were to emphasize the probable advantage of trade relations with the United States and to arrange for the establishment of trading posts. In connection with his suggestions upon relations with “those people,” he warns the leader of the party not to persevere in his exploration, if threatened by a superior force, “authorized or not authorized by a nation.” The lives of the members of the expedition are too valuable to be exposed to probable destruction, and with the loss of the party would follow the loss of all results from the expedition. The fact that this warning, as in the case of the instructions to Lewis, follows the paragraphs devoted to the Indians, seems to imply that the President anticipated the use of this alternative only as a result of savage opposition. Yet, as a matter of fact, it was employed only in yielding to the Spaniards and was probably an expedient of Jeffersonian diplomacy to avoid direct mention of their possible opposition.
It so chanced that Stephen Minor, the last Spanish governor of the Natchez district, had remained in that region to keep watch upon the movements of the Americans and report to the Spanish authorities. Dunbar was on excellent terms with him and consulted him in regard to the President's plan for exploring the Red River. Minor told him that such an enterprise ought not to be undertaken before the limits of Louisiana were positively fixed. To send a party of soldiers to the sources of rivers in the disputed territory would be an insult to Spain and would cause that power to retaliate by forcing it to return. Minor thought that by this argument he had convinced Dunbar, but he did not feel any too confident of this result. He therefore lost no time in communicating his information to Casa Calvo at New Orleans, who quickly disseminated it amongst the interested Spanish authorities.157
Salcedo had already learned of the Lewis and Clark expedition some three months before Casa Calvo's communication telling of Jefferson's Red River project. This reiterated the previous admonitions to preserve “the vast dominions of His Majesty” by the immediate arrest of those who should engage in such work and, as before, Salcedo reported the warning to the viceroy, Iturrigaray. The latter suggested that Casa Calvo ought to have taken up the matter with Casa Yrujo, the minister, as the person best prepared to discuss these matters, and so at once cut off all possibility of danger. Salcedo stated that as in the previous case he had taken all possible precautions to anticipate the views of the American government, but for some reason his reports were not forwarded to Madrid and this later caused the state officials great concern. However, Cevellos learned of Minor's report to Casa Calvo and immediately suggested to the War Department the necessity of sending a party of soldiers to restrain any such efforts. American hunters must not be allowed to range over Spanish territory under pretext of scientific exploration.158
In addition to his negative work in attempting to break up Jefferson's exploring expeditions, Casa Calvo was also attempting in a positive way to justify his position as boundary commissioner by acquiring some definite information to guide him in his task. In this he was likely to encounter some opposition from his fellow officials unless he exercised care in selecting his agents, for upon receiving notice of this appointment Salcedo wrote to the Governor of Texas that no American should be permitted to approach its frontier or in any way be allowed to mark alone the limits of Louisiana. Two months later José Joaquin Ugarte, who commanded on the Texas frontier, dutifully wrote the governor, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Bautista Elguezabal, that in accordance with instructions, he should permit no Anglo-Americans to approach Spanish territory for fear they might mark the boundary without regard to Spanish interests.159
In July Casa Calvo wrote Salcedo that he desired to learn more of the rivers near the limits of Louisiana and for this purpose was sending Juan Minor, the brother of Stephen, to make a map of the region. He requested that John Walker, who had previously served on the Ellicott Commission, should assist in this work.160 Three days later, July 6, 1804, he issued the necessary passport, empowering Minor to visit Bahia and San Antonio upon necessary royal business, of which the character was not disclosed.161 This, however, was given in a letter of instructions sent by Salcedo to Governor Elguezabal. This letter stated that Minor had been commissioned by Casa Calvo to pass from Natchitoches to mark the boundary line of Louisiana, after a due examination of the rivers and of the coast. Salcedo instructed the governor, upon the appearance of Minor, to examine closely his commission, orders, and instructions; to have him state clearly what he had thus far done; and to show the means for carrying his plans into execution. He was especially to declare his citizenship; and if he claimed to be a subject of the King, he was to be furnished a guard to Chihuahua; if of the United States, he was not to be permitted to enter the province.
In his reply to the general commandant, the governor echoed his superior's suspicions regarding Minor and promised to obey his injunctions. On September 4th Ugarte at Nacogdoches reported to Elguezabal that he was watching closely the movements of Minor. On September 13th Minor presented himself at Nacogdoches, but he claimed that he had merely verbal instructions to pass from that place to the Trinity, to descend this river and explore the neighboring creeks and bays, and make a map for Casa Calvo. Later, the Governor of Texas advised Ugarte to detain him at Nacogdoches to await Salcedo's pleasure. On the 21st of the following November the governor again informed Salcedo that Juan Minor and two others, one of whom was Hugo Coyle, an Irish surveyor, had presented written petitions asking to be admitted into Texas, but that he had directed Minor to await Salcedo's determination. Evidently it was well that he did so, for he later received the order of Salcedo, dated October 22, withdrawing the permission to survey the boundary given to Minor on the 11th of the preceding August.162 The attitude of Salcedo from the very first emphasized the fact that the Texas officials were jealous of Casa Calvo and were going as far as they dared in thwarting his plans.
Meanwhile, during the month of May, 1804, Dr. George Hunter, acting under the instructions of the Secretary of War, had busied himself in Philadelphia in the purchase of provisions, Indian presents, medicines, and instruments for the proposed expedition up the Red River. His request to Casa Yrujo for a passport met with a curt refusal, for the Spanish minister believed that his purpose was to penetrate to New Mexico.163 Nothing deterred, on the 27th of May the doctor and his son set out on horseback for the overland journey to Pittsburg. After eight days they arrived at the latter place, where, with better success than Lewis the previous year, they spent only two weeks in superintending the construction of a flat-bottomed boat to convey themselves and stores to Natchez. The details of their journey to the latter town furnish a most interesting picture of pioneer travel upon the Ohio and Mississippi, but are not directly connected with our theme, and so may be omitted. The doctor records, “with a feeling of relief,” that, on the 24th day of July, they made fast to the shore at Natchez.
Although Hunter had consumed nearly two months on the trip from Philadelphia, he speedily learned from Mr. Dunbar that no preparations had been made for the expedition. Possibly Minor's protest may account for this inactivity. Lieutenant Colonel Constant Freeman, the commandant of the garrison at New Orleans, was to furnish the boat and military escort, but had deferred all measures until Hunter's arrival. Dunbar suggested that the doctor should proceed with his boat to New Orleans, and if no better one could be procured, have some alterations made in it, buy the necessary stores, and return as soon as possible with the military escort. Accordingly Hunter was obliged to spend the next two months in the trip to New Orleans and return, and in repairing his boat. This craft was constructed for use on a large river, but was the only one procurable and must perforce serve for the navigation of the smaller streams that they planned to explore. With a far from efficient crew, composed of a sergeant and twelve enlisted men from the New Orleans garrison, and with his makeshift boat, Hunter, in the latter part of September, again reached the proposed starting point of the expedition, St. Catherine's Landing, just below Natchez. In general, one gains the impression from the pages of the doctor's journal that only a very moderate degree of alacrity was displayed in following out the details of the President's plan.
During Hunter's stay in New Orleans there had been an entire change in the plan itself. On the 17th of July Jefferson wrote Dunbar that on account of the shifting of a part of the Osage Indians to the Arkansas two years before, the expedition was to be postponed until the following spring. The significance of this Indian movement had but just been explained to the President by Pierre Chouteau, then on a visit to Washington with White Hairs, the noted Osage chief, and some of his companions. Chouteau was to visit the Indians during the winter and endeavor to heal the schism, so that the Indians should not merely refrain from hindering the expedition, but even actively aid it. “In the meantime,” added the President, “we shall be able to remove the Spanish impediments.” But Dunbar was authorized to make use of the men and stores for a shorter excursion, and in the interim they might select a fully qualified leader. The President also suggested that Dunbar should try to forward the account of this preliminary trip in time for effective use with Congress.164
In his reply Dunbar announced that the expedition had fortunately not started, that no geographer had been engaged, and that no one, unless it were Dr. Hunter, could feel disappointed because of the postponement. He and the doctor together should visit the Hot Springs at the head waters of the Washita. This was a region of great natural interest which the main party in the spring would be unable to visit, and he would doubtless obtain much available information from the hunters who lived at the post on the Washita. As another reason for postponing the main expedition, he added the fact (probably based on Minor's protest) that the Spaniards would have stopped it a little above “Nakitosh.” In view of Salcedo's orders of the preceding May, that no American should be permitted to approach the Texas frontier, or to mark the boundaries of Louisiana, Dunbar's surmise appears to be well founded. The Washita offered the advantage of having its head waters protected by a group of rough, elevated hills from incursions of the predatory Osages, and it was likewise remote from the Spanish outposts. While not so important as either the Red or the Arkansas, the river promised to support a large future population, whose pioneer elements were already settling upon its banks, and its exploration was necessary to complete the chart of our new territorial acquisition. These considerations, to a certain extent, compensated for the postponement of Jefferson's more comprehensive plan of frontier exploration.
The route of the Hunter-Dunbar expedition was so prudently chosen that no untoward event occurred to render it memorable. On the afternoon of October 16th, 1804, the start was finally made from St. Catherine's Landing, near Dunbar's plantation, “The Forest.” The personnel of the party consisted of Sir William Dunbar, George Hunter and his son, a sergeant and twelve enlisted men and a negro servant of Dunbar's. The route covered the distance to the mouth of the Red River, up that stream to the Black, or Washita, to the Hot Springs, near the source of the latter, and thence the return by the same streams—the whole occupying some four months. Naturally the major part of the details of such an expedition consist of scientific descriptions of the country traversed and the trivial incidents of life in the wilderness. Except as tending to throw light upon the general methods of frontier exploration these details are now relatively unimportant. Yet observations upon the contemporary life encountered along the river banks and such experience as the party gained for the use of succeeding expeditions more than repaid the cost of the attempt.165
The population along the river was a never failing source of interest, especially to Dr. Hunter. The greater part consisted of Canadian French “of few wants and as little industry.” There were a number of Spanish and French Creole families, apparently of the same general character as the Canadians, but interspersed with them were some of a higher order of industry and intelligence. Mingled with the elements surviving from the previous régimes were a few German, Irish, and American settlers of the frontier type, and the soldiers of the post on the Washita. About this post were grouped some 150 families of this nondescript population. A few scattered cabins above and below this place, with an occasional house of more pretentious appearance, constituted the settled portion of the country. The upper sources of the river were marked only by an infrequent hunter's lodge or “cache,” utilized by the inhabitants, white and Indian, during the autumn hunting. The deer, bear, and wild fowl of the swamps and forests afforded the greater portion of the food supply of the region; but this was supplemented by an uncertain supply of Indian corn and by a few wild cattle, kept for beef rather than for dairy purposes. Two large land grants, affording a fertile field for future litigation, were located upon the Washita, that of the Marquis of Maison Rouge being located below Fort Miró, while the more recent one to the Baron de Bastrop, soon to be connected with Burr's ambitious filibustering project, extended, twelve leagues square, above it. The greater part of the inhabitants appeared to be satisfied with the sway of Lieutenant Bowmar, the military commandant at the post.
At the Island of Mallet the travelers discovered, on taking the observation of November 15th, that they were within half a minute of the new boundary line of Orleans Territory—the thirty-third degree. Here they lost the Spanish moss of the lower courses of the river, left the alluvial swamps for higher land, and observed other marked changes that differentiated the country above and below the new limit. A week later they passed the Caddo “trace” leading from the Red to the Arkansas, and a little above this the Ecores de Fabri, some sand hills where tradition, as detailed by the guide, reported that leaden plates once marked the boundary between the French and Spanish colonial possessions. Naturally they found no vestige of these plates.166 From occasional parties of hunters they learned many facts concerning the Red, the Arkansas, the Missouri, and the Platte rivers, the Indians living upon them, and the vast plains through which they flowed.
In a measure this method of procuring information answered the purpose of Jefferson's extensive plan. Far greater service was rendered in the acquisition of practical experience for the guidance of future expeditions. It was speedily discovered that a special boat was needed to navigate the shallow waters of these interior streams. It was likewise noted that the discipline of a detail of enlisted men could not be maintained simply by a non-commissioned officer. More important still was the result of the experiment in transferring some baggage from the head of navigation on the Washita (the Fourche de Chalfat) to the Hot Springs. Though the distance was less than nine miles and the loads carried by the soldiers purposely made very light, they complained bitterly, and, as Dunbar thought, with justice, of the difficulties of this method of transporting baggage. The experiment led Dunbar to consider the vastly increased difficulty in using this scheme for a much larger company, between the headwaters of the Red and the Arkansas, especially when they were wholly uncertain of the distance. In accordance with Dunbar's suggestion, the President afterwards modified this feature of his original plan.
The voyagers reached the head of navigation on the Washita on December 6th and started on their return journey on the 8th of January. The interval was employed in observations and excursions in the vicinity of the Hot Springs. On the 16th they were at the post on the Washita, where Dunbar left the party to return overland to his home. On the 31st Hunter brought the boat to St. Catherine's Landing, and on the 9th of the following month delivered the escort, safe and sound to a man, to Lieutenant Colonel Freeman at New Orleans.
In summarizing his work upon his return, Dunbar could report nothing of great importance. The Hot Springs formed a great natural curiosity, but the season was unfavorable for botanical work. The expedition, however, had afforded some experimental knowledge that might later prove useful. He had wished to prepare a brief abstract of the excursion, to be forwarded before the close of the session of Congress, but this was rendered impossible on account of the bad weather, the irregular mails, but, above all, by the loss of a month on account of their boat. Dr. Hunter's ideas in its construction were entirely wrong.167 Dunbar's unfortunate colleague had meanwhile taken passage at New Orleans for Philadelphia, where he arrived April 1st, 1805. His practice had suffered by his absence and he regretted that his medical knowledge had really been of so little service on the expedition. His son, in Philadelphia, and Dunbar, in Natchez, entered upon the tedious process of calculating their respective observations. After considerable delay their original journals and their summarized contents found appropriate resting places in the vault of the American Philosophical Society and in the documents of the Ninth Congress, where their lot was a century of almost uninterrupted repose. Nicholas King evidently made some use of these data in his government map of the following year, but it was not till 1810 that the publication of Pike's book with its accompanying maps first brought the information before the general public.
Although the Hunter-Dunbar expedition did not explore the Red River, as originally intended, the President, during this winter of 1804-5, received some information concerning that stream from another source. Dr. John Sibley was evidently emboldened by his previous correspondence with Claiborne over the limits of Louisiana to communicate directly with Jefferson, and he rightly approached by the scientific channel. After opening his first letter of March 20, 1804, with a few personal details, he devoted the remainder to a description of the bowwood tree. In closing, he begged leave to tender his services in any capacity the President might think proper to command.168 His reward came very quickly, first in the appointment as surgeon's mate for the forces stationed at Natchitoches, and later as Indian agent for Orleans Territory and the region south of the Arkansas.
Certain of Sibley's personal letters had already found their way into print and had aroused considerable comment in regard to his veracity. His personal reputation was by no means wholly proof against a storm of personal abuse that followed his appointment, late in 1804, as a member of Claiborne's council. The Governor doubted if this action of the President were wholly wise, but Jefferson did not believe that the charge of wife desertion and other attacks on Sibley's private character were sufficiently proven to count against his unquestionable good sense and information.169 Having discovered Jefferson's interest in the aborigines, Sibley kept him supplied with Indian vocabularies and so retained his good will and that of his successor. He heightened this impression by a description of the Red River Valley, based on his travels in 1803 and 1804 along the settled portions of that river.170 In addition he gathered information from others, particularly from his interpreter, Francois Grappe. The latter was well acquainted with the Louisiana-Texas frontier, but the fact that he was then in Spanish pay would tend to vitiate his testimony, just as his employer's exuberant imagination often made his own statements untrustworthy.
Dr. Sibley was in no sense a trained scientific observer, so his description was largely confined to subjects that would appeal to the casual traveler or prospective settler. He mentioned the names of the various settlements upon the banks of the river, such as Rapides, Avoyelles, Natchitoches, Campti, etc., and also of the more important isolated establishments. He described the chief affluents of the Red, either from personal observation, or from the reports of others, and gave a fair representation of the river system, the soil, and its productions, from his practical agricultural standpoint, and made predictions that succeeding years have not verified. His description of the population was interesting from the fact that he showed the numerous elements that composed it and that the more progressive were non-native. In this particular the Red simply repeated what others had observed on the Washita. Natchitoches, the most important town, was only a miserable settlement, containing less than half a dozen notable structures, and its general economic condition was worse than in 1762. All of the industries that were important were apparently in American hands, and had been even while Spain controlled affairs. His report, even if it added little to scientific knowledge, was a most effective commentary upon four decades of Spanish government.
In the latter part of 1804 John Walker, whom Jefferson as well as Casa Calvo had mentioned in connection with exploration on the Sabine and Red, was reported as doing some surveying for the Spaniards whom he now served, on the Rio Grande and the Guadalupe. Claiborne and Turner attached little importance to this report.171 As if to emphasize the fact that the religious hold of the Spaniards was more enduring that their political sway, the Bishop of Nuevo Leon, in whose diocese Texas belonged, paid a pastoral visit to the town and garrison of Natchitoches. Here he was respectfully received by Captain Turner, as the bishop himself reports “with the honors of a general.” The bishop further added that although he himself was very reserved and politic in his conversations, the French complained unceasingly of their situation under the new government. The malcontents expressed the desire to immigrate to Texas, which “those republicans” (the Americans) already claimed as far as the Rio Grande. Governor Claiborne was deeply impressed with the fact that the bishop kept a journal in which he recorded the latitude of many of the places visited and 173the results of his minute inquiries regarding the geography of Louisiana, and that upon leaving Natchitoches he took the most direct route to the City of Mexico. Accordingly he characterized his visit as political rather than ecclesiastical in character.172
We have already seen that Madison had objected to certain rumored changes in the garrison along the Florida and Texas frontiers as violating the status quo. This gave Casa Yrujo the opportunity to retort that his government had done nothing of the sort. But the Americans, in authorizing the expeditions of Lewis and Hunter and Dunbar, had broken the very condition they attempted to impose upon the Spaniards. His superiors had not expressly sanctioned the maintenance of the status quo, but had actually observed it; while the Americans, by exploring the country before they knew its limits, had authorized their troops to invade the possessions of the Spanish sovereign. The fact that this invasion was disguised as a scientific expedition did not render it a less hostile act. Madison did not carry on the controversy with Yrujo, with whom he was not on good terms, but informed Erving that they had communicated with him in regard to Lewis' expedition and had received no intimation that it was not satisfactory. Consequently they thought the other ones that were proposed equally unobjectionable. Claiborne, too, was ready to offer any necessary explanations on the subject. Erving was then temporarily filling Monroe's place in London, so many months were to pass before he could present these explanations in person to the Spanish court. Doubtless the delay was acceptable to the administration at home.
IV. BORDER RELATIONS WITH THE TEXAS INDIANS
During 1804 and 1805, in addition to the actual and contemplated exploring expeditions, the subject of Indian relations appealed strongly to the Louisiana and Texas officials. Indeed, Spanish authorities claimed that possible Indian alliances supplied the chief motive for Jefferson's interest in exploration. There was much in his instructions to Lewis and to Dunbar to justify this suspicion. But in addition there were numerous instances of mutual distrust among the officials along the disputed frontier that serve to throw additional light upon the critical events of 1806. While mere rumor had much to do with the reporting and interpretation of these events, there was sufficient truth to mark them as danger signals. This was particularly so in connection with the reported increase in frontier garrisons and other military movements which each nation was supposed to be undertaking.
The Indian situation had been a difficult one for Nimecio de Salcedo from the time that he became general commandant of the Interior Provinces. He was getting the situation well in hand when tidings of the prospective transfer redoubled his anxiety. At the same time, as if to give point to this feeling, he learned from Felix Vidal, the commandant at Concordia, that Robert Ashley and John House were organizing a party of fifty men in Natchez to visit the Comanches and other Indians in their vicinity. Ashley had been a member of Nolan's party and the mere mention of the latter's name in connection with this project aroused the worst fears of the Spaniard, and led him to request reinforcements from the militia of Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander. A portion of these responded promptly, but there seems to have been no occasion to employ them against a company rallying under a trading standard associated with the name of Nolan.174
Before the Americans took possession of Louisiana Sibley represented the Caddoes as anxiously anticipating their coming, because their presence meant higher prices for their furs. A few months after that eventful act Captain Turner, the commanding officer at Natchitoches, wrote Governor Claiborne that he had received a visit from the Caddo Indians, who said that the Spaniards used to give them a present each year and that they wished to receive the same from the Americans. A few gifts from Turner satisfied them temporarily, but the request opened a problem of grave importance in American frontier policy. Claiborne reported the matter to Madison, gave a brief description of the tribe, and said that he should invite them to New Orleans. A later letter from Turner informed Claiborne of the privilege enjoyed by Murphy and Davenport in trading with the Spanish Indians. As this trade included the privilege of supplying them with ammunition, the Americans, in case of difficulty with the Spaniards, might feel its evil effects. Accordingly he recommended the immediate establishment of American factories to divert the Indian trade from the Spaniards.175
While Captain Turner was approaching the subject of Indian relations through Governor Claiborne, Dr. Sibley was making similar representations directly to the President, and was likewise giving a political bias to his communications. In his letter of September 2, 1804, he wrote that the Indian trading company of Murphy, Davenport, et al., most of whom had been or still were American citizens, carried on their operations through a Spanish officer at Nacogdoches, Texas. Naturally this company and the Spanish officer did all in their power to excite the Indians against the United States. If this trade ministering to an estimated Indian population of from thirty to forty thousand could be turned into the proper channel and be supplied from an American post on the Red River, the Indians, and especially the Pawnees and Comanches might become fast friends of the Americans.176
Unauthorized trappers and traders did not await formal action by the government. On July 16, 1804, Captain Turner informed Claiborne of a typical instance of this sort. A certain American named Sanders had penetrated some five hundred miles up the Red River to the Panis Indians and found them anxious to trade with the Americans. Sanders was pursued by the Spaniards, but managed to elude them and arrived safely at Natchitoches.177 The Spanish authorities rightly feared such attempts far more than a regular expedition that moved forward openly under governmental responsibility. The latter was subject to diplomatic pressure; no amount of frontier precaution could circumvent among Indian allies the subtle influence of the ambitious trader and errant trapper. In the far Southwest the peril from these became especially threatening during this period and added not a little to the anxiety with which the general commandant watched American aggression, which he was too weak to check with efficiency. A later report in October that three Americans of this class had been killed by the Indians near Natchitoches, may represent an indirect attempt of the Spaniards to check these unauthorized expeditions.178
While still acting as governor of Louisiana Manuel Salcedo reported to his brother that the Tenzas Indians were unwilling to remain under the jurisdiction of the United States and that from their character and religious preference they would make good Spanish subjects. Thereupon Nimecio de Salcedo proposed to admit them under the following regulations. They must settle between the Sabine and Trinity rivers. They must obey the Governor of Texas and the commandant of Nacogdoches, but could expect no subsistence from either. They must give prompt information of any new occurrences in their vicinity.179
In this same summer of 1804 Nimecio de Salcedo also proposed to emphasize the opposite policy of retaining the Indians already under his control. He wrote to the Governor of Texas to prevent the removal of the Cadadachos Indians into Louisiana, if it could be done peaceably.180 The governor's opinion of the movement of the Indians seemed somewhat at variance with that of his superior. At least, he interpreted any movement of Indians from Louisiana into Texas as a bad omen. Possibly, in view of the trouble the Spaniards had to control the Indians already in Texas, his was the proper attitude. In a letter of the following month Salcedo favored presents of tobacco and clothing for the Indians as a proof of Spanish friendship.181
According to Captain Turner the Spaniards were at this time inviting the Alabama Indians to settle in Texas and assist in repelling the Americans. He also learned that the Aish Indians of Texas, instigated by his opponents, were trying to persuade the small tribe of the Casados to move from the Opelousas district east of the Sabine to some point west of that river, and threatening them with death if they did not. The Cousate warned an American settler near the head of the Sabine to move from that region, for the Spaniards were trying to stir up all the border Indians against the Americans.182
In view of these facts Claiborne made a vigorous protest to Casa Calvo. The latter believed that they were the exaggerated reports of interested traders, but promised to inform the General Commandant. At the same time Claiborne urged Turner to redouble his efforts to attach the Caddoes to the American cause and empowered him to give rations and small trifles to them and to other honest and well-disposed Indians. As the Caddoes were the intermediaries for the Pawnees, who desired American trade, he might regale them to the extent of two hundred dollars. The hostility of this tribe towards the Spaniards, possibly influenced by these measures, later caused the failure of a general council which the Spaniards attempted to assemble.183
In reporting these conditions to Madison, Claiborne promised to use the greatest prudence and caution in dealing with his Indian and Spanish neighbors, but he feared trouble on account of the unfriendly disposition of the latter. The situation became still more complicated when Turner informed him that the Spanish authorities had granted new privileges to the trading firm of Barr, Murphy, and Davenport. This gave them the exclusive right to trade with the Indians in furs and horses for a period of twelve years. They might also settle a tract of land near the Texas coast. Murphy was to be the commandant of this new settlement, while a certain Ormond was to ply the trade between Nacogdoches and the Washita and to introduce settlers from the latter place into Texas.184
With the outbreak of war between England and Spain, in December, 1804, Salcedo believed that a new danger threatened his command. Accordingly he ordered the Governor of Texas to use additional measures to preserve the allegiance of the Indians and to keep intact the pretense of friendship and harmony existing between Spain and the United States.185 These orders show that in the war waged by Spain and France against Great Britain he expected the United States to side with the latter, and, as on previous occasions, to plan first an attack upon the Spanish colonies. The natural corollary to this fear would be a reinforcement of the garrisons on the exposed frontier and to this task he seems to have devoted his insufficient resources.
On November 26, 1804, Captain Turner reported the first actual aggression by the Spaniards. A non-commissioned officer and ten men had taken up a position east of the Sabine at La Nana, near the ranch of William Murphy, the Indian trader, and about forty miles west of Natchitoches. The concession recently granted to this trading firm may have stimulated this movement. Turner, however, expressed no apprehension of any great force on the hither side of the Rio Grande, because of the scarcity of provisions. The very inhabitants were in danger of starvation from a failure of the crops and the rapacity of the priests, and depended upon the supplies obtained from Natchitoches, their nearest market, or from beyond the Rio Grande. The few settlers of Bayou Pierre enjoyed a fair crop that year, but this was merely sufficient for themselves. Turner thought the province of Texas could produce only enough beef and pork to supply five hundred men for a year.186
In his next monthly report Turner mentioned some recent arrivals at Nacogdoches and stated that a thousand families had been ordered from the populous parts of Mexico to the Texas frontier and that troops from Havana were to garrison Matagorda. His interpreter, Duforet, had received information that Don Antonio de Cordero, the governor of Coahuila, was to exercise control over Texas also, and that the present governor of the latter province was to take up his residence at Adaes.187 Claiborne did not concern himself greatly over these reports, for he anticipated an early amicable adjustment of all disputes between the United States and Spain. But he informed Madison, and the latter immediately dispatched a long résumé of these rumors to Armstrong at Paris. Doubtless his intention was something more than to interest the French government in idle frontier tales. He may have hoped to bring pressure upon its officials to aid Monroe in gaining the Floridas and in settling the western boundary.188
At the same time Madison addressed to Casa Yrujo at Washington a vigorous protest against these assumed aggressions that drew from the Spanish minister an equally vigorous rejoinder. The latter stated that though not informed of the increase in garrisons, of which Madison complained, yet the fact itself did not seem to him at all improbable. In view of Mr. Pinckney's conduct at Madrid and of certain disturbances on the Florida border, such action would be merely a matter of ordinary precaution. He believed that both governments were devoted to a policy of moderation, that Spain had no hostile intentions against the United States, nor the latter any desire to adopt retaliatory measures. He then went on to complain of the various exploring expeditions as a violation of the status quo upon which the Americans insisted.189 Madison vouchsafed no direct answer to this, but contented himself with inditing a long dispatch to Pinckney.
In December, 1804, as a result of Claiborne's representations and Sibley's political finesse, and as a necessary sequence to the creation of Orleans Territory, Secretary Dearborn requested the doctor to act occasionally as Indian agent. He was to hold conferences with the Indians in his vicinity. With an allowance for himself of four dollars per day and expenses, he should attempt to keep them well disposed towards the American government by a judicious distribution of some three thousand dollars worth of supplies and provisions. He might employ an interpreter in his dealings and he was to assure the Indians that if they remained friendly and peaceable they could rely on the justice and friendship of the United States. If they expected to be treated like children by the Great Father at Washington they must break off all relations with any other power. The instructions closed with the statement 190that the Secretary would expect a report in the course of six months.”
The first effect of this appointment was to unsettle Indian affairs, for Claiborne's new instructions did not permit him to interfere, while the functions of the new agent were greatly circumscribed. Traders passed to the Indian tribes with very little restraint, except from the frontier commandants, who, in keeping with Claiborne's suggestion, attempted to keep the trade simply a licensed traffic in peltries with the Indians and not a concealed horse trade with the Spaniards. Then, too, there was some question in Louisiana regarding Dr. Sibley's fitness for his position, that caused the Governor some uneasiness, but as we have seen this was apparently explained away to the satisfaction of the Washington authorities. Early in the following spring, Sibley exhibited the first result of his appointment in the form of a report upon the Indian tribes of his vast district. In commending this report Claiborne repeated his counsel to pay particular attention to the Caddoes, who seemed to have influence over the others and were well disposed toward the Americans.191
This report is the first attempt by the Americans to estimate the importance of the Indian alliance for which they and the Spaniards were striving. Sibley's information is based on his own observations and such knowledge as he could glean from the other meagre sources at his disposal. He relied especially upon his interpreter, Francois Grappe. The latter's father, while an officer in the French service, had acted as superintendent of Indian affairs at a post some five hundred miles above Natchitoches. Here Grappe was born and lived for thirty years. He was a man of influence among the Indians and likewise enjoyed Sibley's confidence; yet he was at the same time in Spanish pay.
In this report Sibley estimated the fighting strength of some thirty tribes in his jurisdiction at twenty-eight hundred men. This does not include the Comanches nor a coast tribe which he calls the Cances. Their combined strength (even granting the inexactness of the above estimate) would, indeed, have been a dreaded factor, had they united in favor of either Spaniard or American, or even against both; but no such union was possible. Sibley represented the greater part of these Indians as having been friendly to the French and later names a number of tribes as expressly acknowledging French jurisdiction. Such were those living near St. Bernard's Bay who were also equally well disposed towards their American successors. The Spanish officials claimed a nominal sovereignty over nearly all the tribes of the region, but their rule had not made their power respected, and in some cases the Indians terrorized and held in subjection the scattered settlements of the Spaniards, rather than endured their capricious attempts to govern them. On the whole, the advantage in the struggle for Indian allies were in favor of the greater resources and energy of the Americans.192
On the 23d of the following May, Dearborn expressed his gratification at the receipt of this report, and added:
At all times use all means to conciliate the Indians generally, and more especially such natives as might, in case of a rupture with Spain, be useful or mischievous to us. None ought to engage your attention so early as those who reside in the immediate vicinity of the Bay of St. Bernard, and from your description of their present temper and disposition, it will require no great exertion to draw them firmly to the interests of the United States. They may be assured that they and all other red people within the limits of the United States will be treated with undeviating friendship as long as they shall conduct themselves fairly and with good faith towards the government and citizens of the United States.193
This letter, significant for its territorial claims as well as for the Indian policy outlined, closed with the suggestion that Sibley prepare the minds of those Indians in the vicinity of the Red River, Attacapas, and Opelousas, for a proposed land survey by the United States government. If it should be necessary to run lines through their lands, in order to make the survey complete, they were not to be alarmed. “Not an acre will be taken,” the Secretary affirmed, “except with payment and treaty under the auspices of the United States and free concession on their part.” At the same time Jefferson wrote to Claiborne that “their rights and comfort would be sacredly cherished.”194
The number and strength of these Indians, as reported by Sibley, surprised the Washington authorities. Dearborn wrote that our general policy was to be one of friendship towards them and that suitable presents should be made to their chiefs when it could be done with propriety. Jefferson was doubly impressed with the necessity of retaining the friendship with which these natives regarded the Americans. Accordingly, October 17, 1805, Sibley was given a commission as regular Indian agent at a salary of $1000 per year. He was furnished with the customary goods for trading and instructed to urge some of the principal chiefs, especially of the Caddoes, to visit Washington, or at least New Orleans. When Jefferson repeated his stock request for Indian vocabularies, he reminded Sibley that he must spare no means to convince them of our justice and liberality and to attach them to our side.195
Salcedo and his subordinates were especially displeased with the policy of the American government in making Sibley an Indian agent. The general commandant refers to him as “a revolutionist, the friend of change and a most bitter enemy of public peace.” He bitterly denounced his policy of selling goods to the Indians at cost as a means of attracting their support in case of hostilities. The governor of Texas thought that the “revolutionary” Sibley should be forced to leave the frontier, but felt that the American government was equally responsible for his actions. He favored a vigorous protest through Casa Calvo or some other person near the American government.196 Hampered by the vast distances which separated the strategic points of his command, Salcedo requested reinforcements for Texas from the neighboring provinces, from Calleja at San Luis Potosi, and from the viceroy himself. He reported that he should need one hundred and fifty extra men to cope with Sibley's machinations in carrying out the policy of the American government. “Only a declaration of war,” he savagely wrote, “will reveal the perfidy of its emissaries among the Indians.”197 To his vigorous specific requests he obtained only a belated reply, deploring the situation and indefinitely promising to raise more troops, if necessary.
In the summer of 1805 Salcedo learned of a specific case of Sibley's activity. A certain Englishman (probably American) who had previously escaped from Spanish pursuit, conducted a party of thirteen men and women of the Tahuayas Indians to Natchitoches for the purpose of receiving gifts from Sibley. Dionisio Valle, now commandant at Nacogdoches in place of Ugarte, ordered the corporal in charge at Bayou Pierre to prevent the return of the party through that settlement. Governor Elguezabal approved of this order, but transmitted Valle's request for a reinforcement of one hundred men to Salcedo for action. Salcedo ordered Francois Grappe to Bayou Pierre to investigate the Tahuayas incident, and suggested that the garrison at Nacogdoches should be increased gradually by sending forward a few men at a time on pretext of carrying the mails and then permitting them to remain at the post. If the Tahuayas declare hostilities he should apply for help to the neighboring provinces.198 From Sibley we have an account that seems to supplement the above information. According to him the Spanish officer threatened a Caddo chief passing through Bayou Pierre to Natchitoches. When on his return the Spaniard tried to stop him the Indian threatened to wipe out the whole settlement; whereupon the other desisted from his attempt to interfere.199 This may refer to the incident in which the Tahuayas figured, or it may be an unfortunate mistake of the officer in attempting to stop the wrong Indians. At any rate, the incident aroused all the savages of the vicinity. Salcedo blamed Dr. Sibley for the whole affair, because of his machinations to gain the allegiance of the Indians. At the same time he bade the governor of Texas omit no means to gain the friendship of the Indians for the Spaniards. In keeping with this purpose he suggested the construction of canoes on the Trinity to ply between the two Spanish posts and to trade with the natives on its banks.200
Ever since the transfer the Spaniards had been kept informed of their rivals' movements in Louisiana through the activity of Felix Trudeau, the former commandant of Natchitoches and now a resident of that community. In an irregular way Samuel Davenport and Edward Murphy, naturalized Spanish subjects and fur traders, gave information to both parties, while Francois Grappe acted with equal readiness as Indian agent for Sibley or for Salcedo.201 In February, 1805, Dearborn wrote Wilkinson that it was highly desirable to learn the meaning of reported Spanish movements in “Louisiana and vicinity.” He desired particularly “to know of any such between the Bravo and Red Rivers and what was doing in San Antonio and St. Bernard Bay.” He was to employ trappers and hunters and to pay them while in government service.202
Sibley had already employed such a messenger among the Choctaws to spy upon the movements of the Spaniards. He now learned that the latter were erecting forts at Matagorda and on the Trinity. They were assuring the Indians that the Spaniards were their only true friends. The idea that the Americans would permanently hold the country west of the Mississippi was pure wind; the Indians, therefore, should come over into the service of their Great Father over the water, who welcomed them not only with his hand, but with his whole arm.203 Early in September Wilkinson reported from St. Louis that a certain Captain Stille “had again been despatched to the westward and I hope he may, before this reaches you, have been able to ascertain and apprize for you the disposition of the Spaniards at the Orcoquisanes [Orcoquisac=Trinity] and Matta Gorda. Captain Turner, too, may, I hope, from a [reconnaissance?] which he was instructed to make, have been able to give you information of the dispositions at Nacogdoches and St. Antonio.”204 These references show that the Americans were ready to counteract the work of their rivals by using the latter's own methods. The information thus obtained from the Indians was of such a character as to lead them to exaggerate the strength of their opponents and to misinterpret their movements. The others were equally misinformed, as was evident from a rumor, current in the fall of 1805, that Sibley, with a party of American traders, had penetrated to a village of the Tahuacanes and that another American party had erected a fortification at Palo de los Arcos.205
By the opening of 1805 the Americans were persuaded more firmly than ever that the Spaniards were augmenting their forces in Texas, and that Grimarest, the captain general of Cuba, was coming thither with four thousand troops. This led Claiborne to broach the subject in conversation with Casa Calvo. He stated that he thought this increase in the Texas garrisons, while negotiations were pending a distinct breach of the status quo which Jefferson desired to maintain. The Spanish commissioner asserted that the only military change in the disputed area was the augmenting of certain garrisons by the troops withdrawn from Louisiana the previous year. But he took occasion to point out that Pinckney's course at Madrid and the passage of the Mobile Act justified the supposed plan of the Spanish King to send Grimarest with reinforcements to Texas. However, he thought that Jefferson's recent representations had satisfied the King; at any rate, he had heard nothing of Grimarest's arrival in Texas, and did not expect to do so.206
Claiborne doubted the candor of the Marqués in giving this explanation, and his distrust was further strengthened by reports from the frontier obtained through the Choctaw spies employed by Sibley and Turner. These reports seem to be based merely on Spanish braggadocio, but Turner believed that their rivals were planning to gain the Indians and thus gradually to edge themselves along toward New Orleans. Claiborne reported the matter to Madison, but both the Secretary and the officials on the immediate frontier recognized that these boasts and the rumors of the enemy's forces in Texas were greatly exaggerated. Indeed, on April 1, 1805, the commandant at Nacogdoches reported but fifty-one soldiers at that post, while Sibley's Choctaw spies reported a small number only at Orcoquisac and could give no definite account of any at Matagorda.207
In his letter to Sibley of June 6, 1805, Claiborne mentioned another instance of apparent Spanish hostility. He stated that the utterances of the priests at Natchitoches had a tendency to arouse the inhabitants against the government. They represented the Americans as infidels with whom their charges should not associate, and asserted that the new authorities would not protect the religion under which their parents had lived and died. This was a much more serious charge than the characterization of the previous year that the Americans were “mere hogs,” who did not “live like Christians.” It was rendered more alarming by the recent pastoral visit of the Bishop of Nuevo Leon to Natchitoches. Claiborne believed that the geographical and political purposes of this visit far outweighed the religious motive. Indeed, in 1836 the Mexican minister at Washington cited this visit as evidence that Spain then exercised political jurisdiction to the Red River.208
From the exposed frontier the American officials continued to send alarming reports. Sibley mentioned the arrival of five hundred families at San Antonio—a manifest absurdity, for no such number ever arrived there during Spanish rule.209 The expected arrival of an additional hundred soldiers at Nacogdoches also excited considerable interest among the Americans. Turner later mentioned the anticipated arrival of Grimarest with seven companies of soldiers for San Antonio and a captain and full company for Nacogdoches. He gave more likelihood to his statement by saving that a certain Mr. Shabas of Natchitoches had been invited to come to San Antonio to meet the new Spanish official. The march of Creole troops, accompanied as usual by their families, may serve as a possible basis for the exaggerated reports of new settlers for Texas. As we know from other sources, colonial officials like Folch and Casa Calvo were advising the strengthening of Spanish garrisons in Texas and Florida, the creation of new posts on the gulf coast, and new settlements in Texas, but Spanish resources were not then equal to the enterprise.210 However, Salcedo did his best with the few forces at his disposal, despite the indecisive course of the viceroy, Iturrigaray. In July, 1805, the former complained that the building of fortifications at Natchitoches indicated the arrival of additional American troops and contrasted this with conditions in Texas, where he had only three hundred men to hold five frontier posts and guard the province against the Americans and Indians. In the following month he requested auxiliaries from Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander, and later ordered two hundred of these to be stationed at Espiritu Santo [Matagorda], in order to prevent the landing of a hostile expedition in that quarter. Previous orders show that this expected expedition may have been British, but the Spanish reinforcements could be used against the Americans, if necessary.211
In June, 1805, came the report from Natchitoches of the finding of Bernard La Harpe's Journal—a manuscript history of Louisiana from 1699 to 1723. This later proved a most effective aid to the American claim to the Rio Grande.212 In addition to this, early in September, Dr. Sibley collected and forwarded to Washington a mass of testimony designed to prove that previous to 1762 the French had made permanent settlements on the Red River, several hundred miles above Natchitoches, as well as at Bayou Pierre. President Jefferson used this information in his next annual message, and it and the Journal later formed the basis of much wordy diplomatic discussion.213
By midsummer 1805, the feeling of distrust and jealousy on the part of both Americans and Spaniards had brought about a situation on the western frontier that needed slight encouragement to break out into actual hostilities. In October some robberies on the part of the Spaniards reported from Opelousas and Bayou Pierre added to the feeling of resentment, and showed the danger to be anticipated from a continuance of unauthorized Indian trading in this region, while there was no settled policy on the part of either government.214 Wilkinson sums up the situation in a letter to Casa Calvo, in which he expresses regret at certain features of Burr's recent visit to New Orleans: “Of late the relations between our governments have not been the most cordial, but I hope they will be such by mutual concession.”215 Contemporary events on the still more critical Florida frontier and the course of negotiation at Madrid and at Washington, would seem to indicate a far different conclusion.
V. MONROE'S SPECIAL MISSION TO SPAIN
It was some months after Monroe received the instructions that were to guide him in his special mission to Madrid216 that he deemed it advisable to set out for that capital. Meanwhile Charles Pinckney, the American minister to Spain, disregarding his instructions to do no negotiating in regard to Louisiana, had involved himself in a diplomatic muddle which forced Jefferson and Madison to comply with a request for his recall.217 In regard to the western boundary of Louisiana he had done nothing more than report the displeasure of the Spanish officials at the near approach of the United States to their Mexican territories and obtain an inexact statement from the work of Lopez in favor of the Rio Grande as its western limit. He reported the prospect of war between Spain and Great Britain, and this was formally declared in December, 1804. He also mentioned the possible reinforcement of Spanish garrisons in the Floridas and Mexico.218 His interest as well as that of the majority of our officials was too closely centered upon the Floridas to permit greater attention to the western frontier.
Meanwhile the Spanish government had withdrawn its protest against the cession of Louisiana to the United States and had thus gained the covert support of Napoleon and Talleyrand. While this was likewise largely concerned with West Florida and certain claims for commercial spoliations, the crafty French minister did not neglect the western boundary of Louisiana. Cevallos sent him as those of Laussat a request to check such utterances upon this limit. In answer Talleyrand informed Turreau, the new French minister at Washington, that he should attempt unofficially to restrain the United States from any measures regarding its western boundary that might annoy Spain.219 At the same time he outlined to Gravina, the Spanish ambassador at Paris, a most conciliatory plan for settling this boundary, and claimed that Napoleon would have employed it had he taken possession of Louisiana. From the gulf the representatives of each nation were to draw a line connecting its scattered frontier settlements. Then somewhere in the intervening space, in a spirit of mutual frindship, they should designate the actual boundary.220
It is needless to point out that this plan differs widely from Victor's instructions and the utterances of Laussat, but Cevallos closely adhered to it in the succeeding negotiation with Monroe. Talleyrand further assured Cevallos that the United States could never use Louisiana as a basis for settlements on the Pacific, for any boundary agreed upon would be far removed from the western coast.221 In stating this, however, he is reassuring the Spaniard by greatly discounting the expansive spirit of the American people, as later voiced by John Quincy Adams. Despite his assurance to Gravina there were hints that in one way the French government might be led to favor the United States. Livingston suggested this when he mentioned that the desire of Spain to limit us on the west might be balanced by the needs of the French treasury.222 Marbois and his subordinates repeated this with greater emphasis when Monroe passed through Paris on his way to Madrid. Money, and plenty of it, would secure a successful result to his negotiations.223
A year before, just after the Louisiana Treaty, Monroe had been uncertain what action to take in regard to his joint commission with Pinckney to treat for the cession of the Floridas. Subsequent events show that by his indecision he then lost the opportunity to force Spain to cede them. At the same time his own ignorance in regard to Louisiana would probably have led him to some unwise concession west of the Mississippi. Then, too, Napoleon directly intimated that he should not go to Madrid and Monroe acquiesced. As the months were on neither he nor his superiors at home grew less perplexed. They desired him for the governorship of Louisiana, they needed him in London, and they wished to send him to Madrid, where he might undo Pinckney's blunders and wring concessions from Spain. Instead, when he reached Spain, he unqualifiedly approved Pinckney's course, and after battling in vain for four months against Spanish lethargy and French venality, returned discomfited to London. In this whole series of indecisive transactions Monroe certainly appears as a Hamlet of diplomacy with no final tragic scene to honor his pitiful play.
On his arrival in Paris, Monroe encountered Livingston, the retiring minister, whom he and his friends thoroughly distrusted, and Armstrong, his successor, upon whom they likewise bestowed their distrust. With the unwilling aid of these two doubting associates, he attempted to reanimate Napoleon's worthless promise of the previous year, to assist him in the Spanish negotiation. It is true that Napoleon had not intimated that the time was favorable for this, but Monroe felt certain that he could choose no better moment than the eve of hostilities between Spain and Great Britain. Accordingly, through Talleyrand, he addressed a long note to the Emperor, in which he discussed the claims of the United States against Spain and the boundaries of Louisiana. He explained that the American Congress had authorized the President to take possession of the ancient boundaries of that possession, but the executive had refrained from doing so in order to give time for explanations and adjustment. Thus he glosses over Napoleon's refusal to sanction his journey to Spain a year before. He presented a brief argument in favor of the American claim to the Bravo, but devoted a much greater space to West Florida, a matter then considered infinitely more important. Notwithstanding his generally conciliatory tone, Monroe suggested that war might follow the failure of his mission.224
His note remained unanswered until he had set out for Madrid. Both he and his colleagues looked upon his task as foredoomed to failure. Yet a regard for consistency, a vain striving after real independence in European diplomacy impelled him to go forward. Monroe was now forced to believe that the Spaniards, fortified by Talleyrand's assurance, and Casa Yrujo's representations, viewed his approach to Madrid with indifference. The French officials, with appetite whetted by the Louisiana transaction, looked upon his failure as the precursor of another excellent bargain for themselves and their government. Worse than all, he distrusted Livingston and Armstrong. Before he left Paris he received some intimation that Talleyrand would make an unfavorable report to Napoleon in regard to his memoir, and this confirmed the impression that his colleagues were not supporting his measures with sufficient vigor. From Bordeaux, December 16, 1804, he sent to Madison a most gloomy view of the situation in Paris. Nevertheless, he expressed himself to his friend, Fulwar Skipwith, then in the French capital, as determined to pursue the object entrusted to him “with zeal and diligence and [I] trust with success.”225 A few days later, at Paris, Armstrong received from Talleyrand a sarcastic note that removed every doubt of Monroe's failure.226
The administration at Washington did not need Armstrong's communication nor Monroe's mournful missive from Bordeaux to show the prospective failure of this special mission. Early in January Turreau and Casa Yrujo held their celebrated interview with Madison, when they verbally notified him of the conclusion reached by their respective governments that West Florida formed no part of the Louisiana Purchase and that the United States must abandon its commercial claims against Spain.227 While this information was hardly unexpected, Madison was exceedingly embarrassed at their method in expressing it as a joint decision. But he asserted that the United States would interpret these questions to suit itself. The Secretary made no mention of the western boundary and Turreau inferred that he placed little value upon it. The French minister believed that Madison emphasized West Florida in order to enhance the political effect of the Louisiana Purchase.228 We may believe that he forbore to mention the western boundary in order to avoid another crushing disappointment.
A few days before, while vaguely discussing this question with the French minister, Madison casually asked what sort of divisional line the other considered the best. Turreau favored river courses, but Madison suggested mountain chains, obviously having in view those of New Mexico. Casa Yrujo, to whom the French minister reported this conversation, coincided with the suggestions of Talleyrand to Gravina, mentioned above. This would place an extensive desert area between Spain and the United States. Such would form the best sort of barrier between the two powers.229 Casa Yrujo was very anxious to humiliate Madison, for whom he personally felt great contempt, and whom he regarded as the representative of an administration willing to profit from Spain's necessities. He thought the Americans should have made a more tempting offer for the Floridas. He believed that in exchange for the latter they were ready to offer a liberal cash payment, together with the greater part of the right bank of the Mississippi. In such a case he expected them to reserve for themselves the districts of Attakapas and Opelousas, together with the banks of the Washita and Red rivers, where the population was rapidly increasing.
Casa Yrujo believed that this interview with Madison would materially lighten the burden of Cevallos' negotiation with Monroe. But he was not equally successful in supplying his superior with information in regard to the general character of Louisiana and its western limits. He was far from this region and without books or other sources of information, so that any opinion that he could form was hardly worth while. He stated that Du Pratz had mentioned the Spanish settlement at Adaes, and suggested that a meridional line from this point, utilizing the north and south courses of certain rivers, would be sufficiently well marked to form a good boundary. This would also relieve their colonial authorities from any anxiety in regard to the presence of the Americans.230
Although Casa Yrujo frankly confessed his own ignorance, he suggested a most interesting source of information. A talented American gentleman, whom he thought a former correspondent of Cevallos and Godoy, had promised him a memoir upon the country. In his correspondence he refers to this gentleman as both No. 1 and No. 13, but he is none other than the many-sided James Wilkinson. Casa Yrujo had asked him to prepare a plan of the western limits of Louisiana, and to establish the line so as to preserve to Spain Adaes, Nacogdoches, and the Sabine River, and at the same time to utilize the other river courses as suggested above. Wilkinson possessed his confidence, and he hoped soon to forward the memoir by express. There is a possibility that Cevallos may have had this, if prepared, in time to use in his reply to Monroe and Pinckney, on April 26th, and, if so, it suggests an interesting situation in which the commander of the American army thwarts the diplomatic efforts of his chief. It is possible to perceive a more likely connection between this suggestion of the Spanish minister and the Neutral Ground Agreement that Wilkinson himself made with Herrera nearly two years later.
In the following month Talleyrand informed Turreau of his position in regard to the western boundary of Louisiana. The Americans must not extend their pretensions too far, for they had acquired the territory on the same terms as France. Turreau's task was to preserve harmony between the two contending nations. This was the only interest of France in the boundary question. The United States ought not to claim the settlements of New Mexico nor the country towards the Northwest. Between these regions and Louisiana they should leave an intervening desert region and should follow natural limits, wherever possible. The French government had no intention of intervening in the matter but simply wished the American as its successor, to know what plan it had proposed to follow.231
With such intimations, to use no stronger term, from the French and Spanish ministers at Washington, and with dispatches of a similar tenor from Armstrong, Jefferson began by March to doubt the possibility of Monroe's success. He still hoped to secure the privilege of navigating the Mobile and an agreement to maintain the status quo elsewhere.232 Both he and Madison derived some comfort from the fact that Talleyrand had not openly declared against them in regard to the western limits of Louisiana, but as we have seen, they had no reason to believe that the French Secretary would support them even upon this point.233 The dispatches of the English minister, Merry, show this much more clearly than the President's own communications.
After Monroe reached Madrid he found that the Spanish court had taken up its temporary residence at Aranjeuz and thither he and Pinckney determined to conduct their negotiation. Monroe had quickly determined to associate the latter with himself so far as signing the formal notes was concerned, but that he should personally conduct all interviews with the Spanish ministers. After reviewing Pinckney's course he came to the conclusion that the latter had taken a justifiable attitude towards Spain the previous summer and that he should participate in the present negotiation, as far as would serve its main purpose.234 The Spanish officials acquiesced in this arrangement with suspicious complacency, and accordingly, after the necessary formalities of presentation, the two American diplomats sent their first note to Cevallos.
After reviewing the subject of commercial claims they passed to a consideration of the boundaries of Louisiana. As a basis for a compromise they suggested that the American desire to possess the Floridas might be balanced by the Spanish desire to retard the western progress of the United States. At that very time the Florida frontier was in a state of jealous watchfulness that portended serious outbreaks, and this situation would soon be paralelled along the western border. It was possible to remove this condition, so provocative of misunderstanding, by the cession of the Floridas and the establishment of the western boundary upon just principles. The United States claimed to the Bravo, but if Spain ceded her territory east of the Mississippi, for which the United States would assume certain commercial claims, the latter agreed to form a neutral territory in the western part of Louisiana. The negotiators then followed their discussion with the project for a treaty covering these two main propositions.235
After submitting this joint note Monroe made a personal call on the Prince of the Peace. He found that Godoy wished to refer the question of limits to France. Monroe claimed that we had bought the right and title of that power, who had no further concern in the affair, and that as neighbors Spain and the United States should settle the question of boundaries for themselves. It is needless to observe that his contention would have been otherwise, had he believed that France would support him. He attempted to arouse Godoy, upon whose decision he believed the question to rest, by mentioning possible hostilities in case of a diplomatic rupture, but his opponent countered by referring to previous instances of British and French hostility against the United States. Monroe then essayed to tempt him by suggesting that his government would exercise greater restraint upon its western citizens, if the Florida cession were made, but this bribe was as little successful as his previous threat.236
Cevallos, the Spanish Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, was supposed to direct this negotiation for the Spaniards. In keeping with his superior's policy of diplomatic bluffing, he suggested that the Marqués de Casa Calvo, with a complete retinue, was then awaiting at New Orleans the arrival of American commissioners for the purpose of determining the true limits of Louisiana. All territorial questions should be deferred until this joint commission made its report. He then proceeded to discuss the subject of commercial claims,237 and this procedure caused Monroe to record in his Journal his belief that Cevallos only sought to delay the negotiation. He wrote to Madison that while some circumstances connected with the negotiation were so discouraging that it was impossible for him to predict the outcome, yet he believed that the Spaniards recognized the strength of the American position “with due discernment.” Unfortunately for him and his colleague they did. In their reply to Cevallos, the Americans observed that boundary commissioners could no nothing until their respective governments determined the principle to guide them. It was an important part of their negotiation to fix that principle.238
The first half of February passed without any progress in the negotiation. The Americans had fully opened up the discussion from their standpoint, and thought that the Spaniards should give an immediate answer to each proposition advanced. Instead Cevallos discussed the Mobile Act, paid his respects to those who were responsible for the furore over suspending the deposit at New Orleans, and applied to West Florida the Spanish interpretation of the confusing three clauses in the Treaty of San Idlefonso. In protesting against this delay, Monroe and his colleague formally requested Cevallos to give them a definite statement in regard to the boundaries of Louisiana and a possible neutral zone, and they both sent long letters detailing their lack of success to their home government and to the American minister in Paris. At the same time Monroe showed his distrust of Armstrong by writing to his friend Skipwith, and charging him to watch the situation at the French court, but to keep the other from knowing of his action. To both he directed requests for maps and papers to be used in discussing the western boundary. He had expected to obtain them in Madrid but had not found anything of value. In his letters to Armstrong he vacillated between an independent policy that should cause European nations to respect the United States and a willingness to gain French support by some minor concessions in regard to commercial claims and the western boundary. He intimated that the administration was willing to prolong the period during which the territory between the Colorado and the Bravo was to remain neutral, or even to make the Colorado the permanent boundary. These terms, however, were not to be divulged to the French authorities, unless it was absolutely necessary, and they must not be permitted to dictate. Manifestly he could hope to gain nothing from such a one-sided offer, but his uncertain course and his failure to break off the negotiation at one or two critical points did as little to strengthen his cause in either place.239
In his interview with Godoy on February 16, Monroe asked if Spain would cede the Floridas. The other replied in the affirmative, provided there should be an equivalent cession west of the Mississippi, but he did not wish to assume the responsibility of arranging for this. Godoy suggested that river as an excellent natural boundary, but Monroe insisted upon the Colorado. The other thought this came too near their Mexican settlements and believed that the Americans should have nothing west of the Red. He seemed fearful that the presence of the Americans in the Floridas would facilitate attacks upon their other colonies. Monroe showed him that our presence in Louisiana already gave us this opportunity, but tried to reassure him by repeating his statement that if our government gained Florida by friendly negotiation it would be inclined to restrain its citizens and others from attacking our neighbors. Godoy then spoke of the many years that must elapse before the western portion could be settled and in an indefinite way mentioned the interest of Spain and the United States to keep Great Britain and France out of South America. For some reason Monroe felt encouraged by this interview.240
On that day Cevallos dated a note for the American negotiators, but did not send it. In the course of this he stated that the representatives of each government should first discuss their respective rights upon the points at issue and then proceed to such negotiations as were convenient to both. This opened the way to an interminable discussion with no prospect of reaching a definite conclusion—precisely what Cevallos desired. Even this concession was not gained until the Americans, on the 18th, curtly informed him that they interpreted his silence as a wish to terminate the negotiation. Monroe reinforced his note by an audience that lasted for four hours, after which Cevallos sent his reply bearing the date of the 16th. In the course of this Cevallos stated that he considered the American claim to the Bravo as absolutely devoid of authority. These two interviews influenced Monroe to suggest the concession that he mentioned on February 26th in his letter to Armstrong.241
By the middle of March Monroe lost his patience. They had now discussed every subject connected with the negotiation except the western boundary of Louisiana, and he and Pinckney insisted that Cevallos should reply upon that. Despite their urgency, the minister kept them waiting for nearly a month longer. A personal interview on April 5 failed to elicit any definite date for his reply. Cevallos, who claimed to be studying the subject of the western boundary of Louisiana, thought that his government would probably cede its territory east of the Mississippi for an equivalent in the opposite quarter. His refusal to give a definite reply in regard to other points at issue and to let the western boundary go for the present, his insistence upon the fruitless West Florida discussion, while neglecting to make any statement in regard to the other territorial questions, led Monroe to think that he was simply amusing them by a pretense at negotiation. On the 9th of April the Americans intimate that they ought to terminate the discussion at once, but they weakly add that they are ready to renew it, if there is any prospect for a successful conclusion. Four days later, after vigorously protesting that he lacked time for a complete memoir, Cevallos submitted a résumé of Spanish claims to territory west of the Mississippi.242 The Americans had now lost a favorable opportunity to break off the negotiation with credit to themselves. The main purpose of their mission was to secure the Floridas, and by March 12th they knew that the Spanish government would never cede them upon any terms they could accept. To bring up at this time a forced discussion of the western limits was to court additional mortification for themselves.
Monroe's Journal and his letters during this trying period abundantly show his uncertainty. On March 7th he wrote Armstrong that if they allowed the French government to dictate in regard to the eastern boundary of Louisiana, it might adopt the same policy in the north and west and thus reduce their acquisition to a nullity. They must reject Talleyrand as an arbiter.243 But as the days passed with no proposition from Cevallos, with no word from Armstrong, and with no new instructions from Washington, he wondered if he ought to assume so decisive a tone. Casa Yrujo had probably assured his government that the American people would never fight for desert territory or old claims. The outcome of the whole negotiation rested with the French government and he believed that thoroughly corrupt motives then dictated its policy. He did not know what position it would take upon the western boundary, but it had supported the Spanish government on every other point and would probably do so on that. He might continue his present policy of acting without the assistance of France (as he strives to persuade himself that he is doing), or he could appeal to the cupidity or fear of that government. The later motive would probably have little weight, for American commerce was too thoroughly exposed to French confiscation. If they should tempt French cupidity in the case of the Floridas, they might later have to employ the same means in settling the western boundary. So he thought it would be safer to continue the negotiation and attempt single-handed to extort from Spain some statement on this important subject.
The Spanish authorities had hardly begun to assemble their vast documentary stores relating to the Texas-Louisiana boundary, so Cevallos probably had little definite knowledge to guide him in the hastily prepared memoir that he submitted. He reviewed the rights of Spain, based upon the early entradas in Texas, and claimed that the pretensions of the United States were founded upon irresponsible French voyages and explorations, and the grant of Louis XIV to Crozat. This grant had never been acknowledged by Spain. After this general review of their respective claims he expressed his idea of the extent of Texas, the crucial area in determining the western limits of Louisiana. In this he closely follows the dictum of Talleyrand. The advanced settlements of each nation were Natchitoches and Adaes; therefore the dividing line between Louisiana and Texas should run southward to the gulf, between these two places, following the watershed that separated the Calcasieu and the Mermentou. To the north, beyond the Red River, the boundary was wholly uncertain and commissioners should be appointed by each nation to present their respective claims and effect a final settlement. Spain had already appointed her commissioners, who were at New Orleans awaiting similar action by the United States.
Monroe was disappointed both in the character and content of the memoir that he had finally wrung from the reluctant Cevallos. The brief historical review of Spanish claims to Texas had left him more firmly convinced than ever of the strength, if not the justice, of the American claim to the same region. On the other hand, he had expected from Cevallos some definite propositions that might form the basis for a treaty and he was uncertain whether to demand such or answer the other's arguments. His definite move, however, was to ask for the recall of Casa Yrujo, and he did this with the greater pleasure, for he thought that the Spanish minister, by emphasizing the peaceful dispositions of the American people, was largely responsible for the apparent obstinacy of the Spanish government. Afterward he wrote Godoy, then at Madrid, concerning his last interview with Cevallos, although the other probably already knew of this from his own subordinates. Monroe perceived a reasonable excuse for answering the Spaniard's note in the fact that in his communication of April 13th, Cevallos had complained of some reflections on his character by the Americans and requested an explanation. A refusal to answer would imply that they lacked diplomatic courtesy, and while explaining this point they could take advantage of the occasion to express in greater detail their views on the western boundary. This action might favor their desire to obtain the definite proposals from Cevallos, for which they had thus far vainly sought.
In addition to the above reason for prolonging the negotiation, Monroe did not forget possible French interests. He knew that that government would not support him upon the other points at issue, but in view of its silence concerning the western boundary, he thought there could be no impropriety in the United States insisting upon its assumed rights. If the honor of France were untouched that nation might acquisce in a final adjustment that would be unfavorable to Spain. If Talleyrand had any personal motive in the position that he assumed, he believed that it concerned those points upon which he had already expressed himself; so Spain might lose French support upon the western boundary and be compelled to yield elsewhere to regain its advantage. This would be a just punishment for Cevallos, in view of the course he had pursued in the negotiation.244 Despite the faint hope suggested by this reasoning, Monroe reported to Armstrong that he saw little prospect for success at Aranjuez, for Spain was still wedded to the policy of Charles V, while her ally, France, hoped to convert the whole transaction into a species of jobbery.245 Yet the European situation did not favor a rupture in the negotiation, so Monroe and his colleague determined to answer Cevallos's memoir on the western boundary.
In the note which they submitted to him on April 20, they laid down three general principles for determining the limits of European colonies. In this they simply followed the lead of Jefferson. By the first of these principles the possession of a portion of unclaimed sea coast gave to a nation the exclusive right to the drainage areas of all rivers emptying into the sea within that region. Under this principle, by virtue of the explorations of Joliet, Marquette, and La Salle they claimed the whole of the Mississippi Valley.
The second principle concerned the possession by two nations of the same sea coast at points not far apart. In such a case a middle point became the boundary. The Americans interpreted this principle to favor their claim to the Rio Grande. At the time when La Salle planted his colony at San Bernardo Bay the nearest Spanish settlement was at the mouth of the Panuco River. Consequently the Bravo, or Rio Grande, the most prominent half-way point, then became the boundary between the French and Spanish possessions. In this they likewise repeat the ideas of Jefferson.
The third principle laid down by the American diplomats was to the effect that when one European nation had acquired a right to any territory upon this continent, no other nation could diminish or affect this right by purchases, grants, or conquests from the natives within its limits. In other words, the Indian had no rights that the white man was bound to respect. In this they touched upon the territorial principle that Spain had followed, but drew an erroneous conclusion from it. They argued that the various costly entradas into Texas, the mission and presidial foundations of a century, the scattered ranchos, and a formally organized municipality, none of which rested upon formal treaties with the Indians, were simply evidences of French toleration and as such gave Spain no legal right to Texas against the claims of the United States. They attempted to bolster this universal disclaimer of Spanish occupation by stating that if the contrary were true any nation could now enter New Mexico and act in a similar manner toward the Indians there. We must absolve Monroe from any suggestion of malice in giving this example, but in view of the reports Cevallos was then receiving from that very region, it probably had the force of the traditional red rag.
In addition to announcing these principles, laboriously copied from their superior, Monroe and his associate likewise presented a modest group of authorities in support of their claim. The works of Champigny, Vergennes, and Le Page du Pratz, and the maps of Lopez and DeLisle do not form a very imposing list, nor did they avail to convince Cevallos. Evidently Monroe's request to Skipwith and to Armstrong had not procured much material from Paris, or else the negotiators were unable to use it without previous instructions from home. They did, however, touch upon a very practical but obvious point, when they stated that it was important to settle the whole series of questions in some way, while the country on both sides of the Mississippi still remained largely unoccupied.246
Such, however, was not to be the case. Undoubtedly the Americans were stretching their three principles too far when by virtue of a few scattered French settlements, they attempted to include in the scope of their claims all the territory from the Rio Grande to the Canadian border. On the other hand, the Spanish occupation of Texas, while relatively more thorough than the French occupation of Louisiana, was not complete enough to justify a rigid insistence upon their claim to Adaes. Had Cevallos been in a humor to negotiate, or the French authorities to support the Americans, they might have reached some compromise on this and the other questions at issue not radically different from the treaty fourteen years later.
Monroe and Pinckney again experienced a tiresome peirod of waiting. The Spanish ministers of state, secure in French support, neither invited other propositions nor neglected Monroe's forced conferences. Buoyed up by the hope of French and Spanish success over the English blockading fleets (for Talfalgar had not yet occurred), Godoy exhibited no alarm at Monroe's suggestion that the Americans might prove disagreeable neighbors, unless he took measures to secure their good will. Beurnonville, the French ambassador, generally avoided Monroe, although he assured the latter that he had missed the opportunity to secure his ends by not coming to Madrid the previous year. On May 8th Cevallos told Monroe that he was preparing a memoir on the western limits of Louisiana, but that it would not be ready very soon, nor was he certain that it would contain any definite proposals for a treaty. The other's protests against further delay were unavailing. Godoy, when interviewed, simply told him that discussion was necessary and that time so employed was not lost. It is no wonder that the exasperated diplomat wrote to Madison that he could “give no idea of the vexation of the whole affair.”247
Despite the delay and vexation that they had so far vainly experienced the Americans determined to make one more effort to secure adjustment. Nearly three weeks had passed with no formal reply from Cevallos to their note of April 20, when on May 9, Monroe requested an interview for the purpose of submitting final propositions. It is true he was further weakening his position by offering to submit new terms before the previous ones were definitely rejected, but Monroe believed this was the only course to take. If his propositions were accepted a treaty would follow; if rejected, the negotiation would be at an end.
On May 11th, according to appointment, he called to present these propositions. They involved the submission of part of the American commercial claims to arbitration and the relinquishment of others and of their claim to West Florida, provided that that territory and the rest of the Floridas should be ceded to them. Furthermore, the Americans agreed to make the Colorado the western boundary, with or without a strip of neutral territory, as Spain preferred. Cevallos quickly replied that there was no recompense for Spain in these proposals. That power would never pay a sou on the commercial spoliations, did not acknowledge that the United States had any claim whatever to West Florida, and did not regard the proposed western limit as a concession. Monroe had not intended to do more than submit his propositions without comment, but this “high tone and pre-emptory manner” forced him to reply with equal spirit. The concession that he offered in the West, he told Cevallos, was worth more than the whole territory east of the Mississippi. The American people would never relinquish a foot of land east of the Bravo, except for some equivalent. Our commercial claims must be settled in some way and the method proposed was the most honorable for Spain. But the obdurate Cevallos simply repeated his previous statements. Monroe then asked him if that was the answer of his government; because, if so, the negotiation was at an end. Cavellos told him to put his propositions into writing and he would then give him an answer. Full of foreboding, the Americans did so on the following day, and also sent copies to Godoy, to make sure that both Spaniards thoroughly understood them.248
Monroe believed that nothing would be done in reference to the negotiation except possibly through fear—a fear that would equally impress France and Spain. Unfortunately both nations believed the United States absolutely wedded to a peace policy. He rather expected Cevallos to send him another long memoir on the western limits, for the Spaniard had mentioned that he should send to Madrid and later to Mexico for documents. Such a course of examination would consume years of time, as was actually the case when the work was seriously undertaken. But Cevallos for once did not delay his answer. On May 15th he sent a curt note rejecting the American propositions and reiterating his previous position in regard to the commercial claims, West Florida, and the western boundary. This reply had the expected effect of bring the negotiation to an abrupt close. Six days later Monroe took formal leave of His Majesty.249
In his dispatch of May 22, Pinckney summarized the negotiation from the preceding February. He stated that in Cevallos' position on the western boundary, he saw the grasping hand of Talleyrand, moved directly by Napoleon. Those men wished to be thrice paid for the territory west of the Mississippi. Once as they had already been, when the United States acquired Louisiana. In the second place by Spain, as that power was now doing to save West Florida and Texas. In the third place, when they should sell the Floridas to us, as they had already proposed to do, at a price comparable to that paid for Louisiana. In this as in the other cases France alone was to profit.250 In their joint note of the following day the diplomats dwelt upon the reasonableness of their claim to the Bravo —the ostensible object that broke up the negotiation. In their view this was as well founded as that of Spain to any vacant portion of Mexico.251
One can hardly say that Monroe and Pinckney conducted the negotiation in a manner to enhance their own or their nation's credit. They had attempted to force from an unwilling opponent certain concessions based on extravagant commercial and territorial claims and then had weakly offered to surrender the most significant of these. They had assumed that they were acting independently of any other nation, but were using every effort to attract French support and insisting that every phase of the negotiations should be submitted to the French Cabinet. Even in this affair Monroe did not work in conjunction with Armstrong, but continually directed his friend Skipwith to spy upon the latter's actions. Armstrong's letters, however, show that he was doing his best to reach Napoleon through Joseph Bonaparte and thus check the sinister influence of Talleyrand. In after years Monroe charged Armstrong with interest in a scheme for speculation in Texas lands and professed to believe that for this reason the other wished the negotiation transferred to Paris; but the evidence for this is not convincing.252 French hostility alone, from whatever motive, would account for the failure of the negotiation. A more forceful diplomat than Monroe would have realized this much sooner and retired from an embarrassing situation.
In their suggestions to the administration at home the negotiators apparently tried to make amends for the nerveless way in which they had thus far conducted affairs. They advocated the seizure of the territory they claimed, that is, both West Florida and Texas, and in addition East Florida, as compensation for commercial damages. They should dismantle the Spanish posts within the disputed area and then treat with aggrieved Spain. This would permit France to withdraw from the situation with honor. The apparent vigor of this policy may be greatly discounted. Armstrong had already informed Monroe that Talleyrand had told him that France would make common cause with Spain. Moreover, in a letter which Monroe had just received from Paris, Armstrong told him that France was using the whole matter to her own advantage. Spain and the United States were like two oranges that Napoleon was squeezing together and the one that yielded the more would be less harmed. He advised that the United States abandon the West Florida contention and the commercial claims and seize Texas. Napoleon had once ordered his subordinates to occupy this province as part of Louisiana, so he could not well object to this course, nor with his European entanglements was he likely to do so. Thus they might secure a definite diplomatic settlement. The proposal of the others, then, to seize the Floridas as well as Texas, may be due to Monroe's jealousy of Armstrong, which would lead him to suggest a somewhat different course. Yet, in July, when he passed through Paris on his way to London, he unconditionally approved the other's suggestion.253 Thus the Virginian a second time followed the lead of a New Yorker in the tangled diplomacy of the Louisiana Purchase, but their executive was not ready to accept such vigorous advice. Had Jefferson done so he would have avoided one of the most dishonorable diplomatic entanglements of our history. But the Texas question was not to be so quickly settled, nor was American diplomatic stock to rise in Europe until it had sunk to a much lower level.
KENNEDY TO ABERDEEN254
Private. British Consulate Galveston—August 6th. 1843. My Lord,
The information which I have the honor to submit to Your Lordship has been tendered to me by a party concerned in the transactions to which it refers, upon the condition that I would not Communicate it to any person now resident in Texas.
The facts set forth in documents placed before me relate to the islands of Cozumel and Mugeres, or “Mohair,” situated on the coast of Yucatan, and claimed as part of the territory of Mexico, but they bear more closely and immediately upon Cozumel, than upon Mugeres.—Subjoined is a rude outline of the form of Cozumel, with Sections marked for first, second, and third “choice.”
On his first expedition against Mexico, Cortes touched at Cozumel, then an inhabited island, and the ruins of buildings erected by that Commander are said to be still visible on its E. N. E. portion.—Its length is estimated at about ten leagues—its breadth at the widest part, about five, and it is distant about fifteen Miles from the Mainland.
The outside, or Eastern, coast of Cozumel is represented as iron-bound and inaccessible; the Southern and Western sides are said to have a firm, accessible beach, with deep and tranquil water, where “Vessels of any draft may anchor, within a Cable's length of the Shore”.— About three leagues from the Southern most point of the Island, lies “a fine Bay, well land-locked, having deep water inside, with a bar of nine feet water, at the entrance.” The whole Coast abounds in fresh water springs. The larger division, towards the South, is “completely covered” with a dense mass of valuable forest timber, and brushwood. The lesser division, towards the North, consists of “low Marshy ground mixed with small lagoons.” The arable land is a rich, West Indian Soil, “suitable,” (says an agent sent to examine it)—for the Culture of Sugar, Coffee, Cotton, &c. in a fairly healthy climate, where frost is never known and every inch of ground is covered with thick forest of the tallest trees, among them, Teak, Cedar, and dye stuffs,—with two excellent harbours, “Brutus Cove,” and “Port Thomson.”
Easy to be defended and offering many advantages for Shipping, Cozumel is said to be well adapted for the establishment of a Commercial Nation; possessing local facilities for supplying Southern Mexico, the Bay of Honduras and Colombia, and, in a measure, commanding the passage between Yucatan and Cuba.
On Arrowsmith's Map of Mexico, Cozumel is placed about two hundred Miles North from the Capital of the British settlement at Honduras, and about fifty Miles South from the little island of Mugeres.
Mugeres, which is estimated to be about three leagues in length, possesses hardly any agricultural value being chiefly composed of sand, but it is said to Command a harbour of ample extent and great security, having “not less than three and a half fathoms of water at the entrance.” A Vessel, once inside, cannot well be discovered, “the land surrounding the Bay, or Harbour, being high enough to hide a Ship's Masts”.—It has been commended by the French as “a most desirable Naval Station,” and the Texan Commander (Moore) thus writes concerning it, in a letter dated Sisal de Yucatan, 20th January, 1842.
—“I have had the island and harbour of Mugeres examined, and have sent a Chart of the Harbour to the Navy Department. (of Texas) It is an excellent Harbour, but there is very little good land, and scarcely any heavy timber on it. Before I return to Texas, I will examine the island of Cozumel myself.”
Cozumel, which contained an Indian population, when visited by Cortes, appears to have been long abandoned by its ancient inhabitants, whose fields have been overrun by the rank and rapid vegetation of a tropical Country.—Within the last few years, it has become the object of Speculating, and, perhaps, political cupidity in this quarter.
In 1837, it was visited by two Texan Privateers named the “Brutus” and the “Invincible.” At that time, it contained no Settled inhabitants. Some Indians who had crossed from the mainland in Canoes, were employed in catching turtle. “They had no knowledge of to whom the island might belong.” The Texan privateers, or “Men of War,” as they have been styled, took a nominal possession of the place, hoisting their flag, and commissioning Indians as representatives. When the privateers returned to Texas, they reported their proceedings to the Government, but the matter, with the view, as it would seem, to speculation, was not allowed to transpire.
In 1840, a project was devised, under the auspices of some leading Members of the (then) Texan Government, to open a way to the future occupation of the island. Taking advantage of dissention between Yucatan and Mexico, a plan was formed for its purchase by some Citizens of Texas, who proposed to offer their Government a rendezvous for its Navy; to encourage emigration, and, ultimately, when fit opportunity arose, to claim the right of self-government under Texan protection.—A Mr. Robinson, formerly United States Consul at Tampico, with certain associates, agreed to bring some hundreds of emigrants from New York, and to pay the Yucatan Government the sum of $100,000 (dollars) within three Months from the date of the contract. Owing to the pecuniary embarrassments of the Married friends of these parties at New York, this project fell to the ground.
An agricultural establishment had been made upon Cozumel in the year 1838, by the Governor of Yucatan, the first Alcalde of Merida, and Colonel Peraza, a man of influence among the Yucatans. They engaged in the cultivation of Cotton, sent to their plantation about thirty debtors and criminals taken from the prison of the City of Merida, and confided the Superintendence of the business, with a share of the profits, to Vicente Alvino a Spaniard well acquainted with the locality, and who had been navigating many years as a Contrabandista between Belize and Sisal.
In 1841 Colonel Peraza, then on a Mission from Yucatan to Texas, when passing through New Orleans, was requested to cooperate with a Military officer of Texas who hoped to succeed in organizing a Company in Tennessee, for the purchase of a large part of the island of Cozumel. The documents before me State that Colonel Peraza pledged himself to favour this individual “all that he could.”
The State of Yucatan embroiled with the general Government of Mexico, and, pressed for resources, issued a Law on the 5th of April, 1841, relative to the Sale and Conveyance of its vacant lands. On the 14th of October 1841, a Company was formed at Galveston, to purchase a portion of Cozumel, under the provisions of this Law. The first associates were three in number, and there were five others who were to have the privilege of joining them, if they came forward with funds “in good time.” Among the five were the Commodore of the Texan Navy and two officers of rank in the regular service of Texas.
One of the three original associates who had been Collector of Customs at Galveston, under the Mexican Government, was furnished with Money and instructions, and sent to Galveston, where he arrived in November 1841. He was Commissioned, in the first instance, to purchase two Square leagues of land in the island of Cozumel, proceeding according to the designated order of selection already shown in outline. With the sanction of the local Authorities, he surveyed six Square leagues of land, and assured his associates that, “with sufficient powers of attorney and funds in hand,” he could, “from time to time, acquire the whole island gradually, but not at once, in order to avoid suspicion.” In consequence of the failure of the New Orleans Banks, the necessary means was not forthcoming, and the agent, who seems to have been a person of considerable acuteness, but not over wise in his moral perceptions, returned to Galveston in July 1842, after an absence of Nine Months, transmitting to his associates “A contract and detailed Map of Survey of Six Leagues of land on the island of Cozumel, and Translations of Official documents accrediting the location, survey, and purchase of the said land, and the Sale by the Government of Yucatan confirmed, and the titles ready to issue whenever the provisions of the law upon the subject, as set forth in the said official Communication, are complied with.”
It is alleged that the right of pre-emption yet remains with the parties for whom the agent selected the six leagues of land
I now come to the last point in the proceedings respecting Cozumel, according to the information placed before me.
I am assured that the quiet occupation of the Island, by the path already opened, was suggested to M. de Saligny, Chargé d' Affaires of France in Texas, who is at present in Europe, by whom, it is alleged, the proposition was seriously entertained
Whatever may be the value of the present Communication, I have deemed it my duty to transmit it to Your Lordship, for the following reasons
1st.That—I believe the facts, as I have stated them, to be substantially true.
2nd.That—Americans are quick in discerning local advantages, and persevering in the endeavour to turn them to their own account.
3rd.That—The Government of Mexico, having been baffled in its attempts to reduce Yucatan to obedience, the latter state may be so far free to exercise an independent prerogative as to transfer its vacant lands to Foreigners for a trifling consideration
4th.—That desirous of insular aggrandizement, France might be willing to secure an early hold on a position near to Mexico, within a short sail of the British Settlement of Honduras, and not remote from the Isthmus of Panama.
5th.That—Without presuming to attach any special importance to the transactions under review, it is, at all events, the more prudent course to report them to Your Lordship.
William Kennedy. The Earl of Aberdeen, K. T.
ABERDEEN TO ELLIOTT.255
Draft. Captain Elliot. No. 10.256 F. O. August 18, 1843 Sir,
Your Despatches to No. 20 inclusive, with the exception of No. 13, have been received and laid before the Queen.
With reference to my Despatch No. 6, of the 3rd of June last, relative to the proposals made to Texas by Genl Santa Anna for the Settlement of the Contest between Texas and Mexico, I have to transmit to you herewith for your information, a Copy of a Despatch which I addressed to Mr. Doyle, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Mexico, on the 1st Ulto, upon the same subject.257
KENNEDY TO ABERDEEN258
Private. British Consulate. Galveston August 22d. 1843. My Lord.
I beg leave to transmit to Your Lordship a printed Article which I have extracted from the “New Orleans Bulletin” of Thursday, August 10th. It has been the Subject of Comment in this place.
By Statements in the London Newspapers recently received here, it would seem that parties in England entertain the impression that the people of this Country are willing to treat for the emancipation of their Slaves. I have been, and am, endeavouring to ascertain how far the impression is warranted by facts,—before I transmit a reply to the Queries contained in Your Lordship's Despatch marked “Sc Te No. 1,” and dated May 30th, 1843.
William Kennedy. The Earl of Aberdeen K. T.
KENNEDY TO ABERDEEN259
Private. British Consulate. Galveston August 23rd 1843 My Lord,
I have the honor to enclose a printed translation of the Land Law of the Mexican State of Yucatan, referred to in my despatch marked “Private” and dated the 6th Instant.
I hope soon to be enabled to transmit a Chart of the Harbour and Sketch of the Island of Mugeres, off the Yucatan Coast.
Information has been brought by the Texan War Vessels lately employed in aiding Yucatan, that the Government of that State had granted to American officers and Seamen, in their Service, the privilege of settling a certain portion of Vacant public land, and that the said officers and Seamen were making preparations,—when the Texan Vessels left Campeche—“to visit the island of Cozumel, and locate their Claims upon it.”
William Kennedy. The Earl of Aberdeen, K. T.
ELLIOTT TO ABERDEEN260
No. 24261 Galveston August 23r. 1843 My Lord,
I avail myself of a short delay in the departure of the Steam Boat to New Orleans to report the return (last Evening) of the Texian Custom House Vessel which took back to Matamoros the Mexican Officer who had brought in General Woll's dispatches of the 16th Ultimo to this Government
Mr. F. L. Giffard Her Majesty's Vice Consul at Matamoros went down from here to that place in the same vessel, and I learn by a Note from him dated on the 14th Instant that General Woll had assured him He would use his best efforts to induce the President of Mexico to release the remainder of the Texian prisoners. It does not appear to be determined whether the Commissioners for the arrangement of the Armistice are to meet at Laredo or at Matamoros, but it is probable that Matamoros may be preferred. They would meet about the 25th of next Month
I take the liberty of forwarding a Newspaper which will place Your Lordship in possession of all that has transpired respecting the result of the late attempts to obstruct the Santa Fé traders on their return to that place from Missouri. Your Lordship will remark that the order to the Texian Officer was dated on the 16th February last, that is, rather more than a Month before any prospect of Negotiation presented itself to this Government.
It appears probable that this interference of the Government of the United States in behalf of the Mexican traders would be pleaded in support of decided interference in behalf of Texas, in the event of a resumption of hostilities, and any recurrence of the incursionary Warfare of last year upon the part of Mexico against this Country.
Your Lordship's dispatches to No 9 inclusive have been received.
Charles Elliot. The Earl of Aberdeen, K. T.
KENNEDY TO ABERDEEN262
Private. British Consulate Galveston, August 29th 1843 My Lord,
In a despatch marked “Private,” and dated on the 23rd of the Month, I expressed a hope that I might “soon be enabled to transmit to Your Lordship a Chart of the Harbour and Sketch of the Island of Mugeres, off the Yucatan Coast.
Availing myself of the opportunity afforded by Her Majesty's Sloop of War “Scylla,” which sails today from Galveston for Vera Cruz, I have the honor to forward a Map of the Island of Mugeres, with the Survey of the Coast and Harbour made by order of the Texan Commodore.
I have incurred an outlay of a few dollars in this Matter, which I propose to include under the head of “Consular Contingencies”
William Kennedy P. S. The Map transmitted is enclosed in a tin case, and I have reserved another copy for transmission, should the one now sent by any accident fail to reach its destination W. K. The Earl of Aberdeen. K. T.
ELLIOTT TO ABERDEEN263
No. 25. Galveston September 5th 1843 My Lord,
I have the honor to report that Her Majesty's Sloop “Seylla” arrived here on the 28th Ultimo, bringing me a despatch from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Mexico dated on the 15th Ultimo,264 proposing on the part of General Santa Aña, an exchange of prisoners. The Inclosures are the Note265 I addressed to this Government upon the subject, and my reply to Mr Doyle, but Mr Jones's answer will hardly reach me in time to be despatched by this opportunity.
The Scylla sailed to Tampico and Vera Cruz on the 29th Ultimo.
Affairs in this quarter remain in the situation reported in my last despatches. I may mention however that the elections for the next Session of Congress closed yesterday, and I believe it is generally considered that the result has been favorable to the Administration
Charles Elliot To the Earl of Aberdeen. K. T.
ELLIOTT TO DOYLE266
[Enclosure]. Galveston. August 28th, 1843. Sir,
I have the honor to acknowledge your despatch of the 15th Instant (received this morning) and in reply I beg leave to forward the copy of a note which I have addressed to this Government.267 In the absence of General Houston on the Upper Trinity at an Indian Council, from which he is not expected back for the next fortnight, and under the circumstances of the other claims on the Services of the “Scylla,” I have not thought it right to request the Commander to remain 'till I can receive replies from Washington. She will therefore Sail again tomorrow.
Whilst I perceive no reason to doubt that General Houston will accede to General Santa Aña's proposal, I must beg it may be observed that I am speaking without authority, and must by no means be understood to commit him to that effect. The Mexican prisoners, however, are perfectly at large, and I am so sensible of General Houston's considerate dispositions toward them, that I am persuaded He would not offer the least objection to their return. It should be mentioned that many of them are engaged in profitable Employments, and it is possible some amongst them may prefer to remain by their property, more particularly under the hope that peace is about to be restored, and that they may have an opportunity of realizing it, and returning at their leisure.
It is very satisfactory to learn that the President of Mexico seems inclined to do whatever may be in his power, in the sense of conciliation, for the promotion of an honorable and lasting peace; and I am sure it may be depended upon, on the other hand, that this Government will cordially respond to those feelings.
Charles Elliot. Copy. Charles Elliot. Percy W. Doyle Esqre. H. M. Chargé d' Affaires Mexico. [Endorsed] Inclosure No 2 in Capt Elliot's despatch to The Earl of Aberdeen No 25. Sept. 5. 1843.
KENNEDY TO ABERDEEN268
Slave Trade. No 4. British Consulate Galveston. Septr 5th. 1843 My Lord,
I have the honor to enclose a Return to Your Lordship's despatch marked “Slave Trade No. 1,” and dated May 30th 1843.
In conformity with Your Lordship's instructions, I have endeavoured to make the reply to each question as concise as possible. Had Texas been an older Country, offering ampler materials for the return, some of the replies would have been more brief
William Kennedy The Earl of Aberdeen, K. T. [Enclosure.].
Republic of Texas. Consulate of Galveston.
Return to a Despatch Marked, Slave Trade No. 1—dated May 30th. 1843
Query 1st. Answer. No Census of the Republic of Texas having yet been taken, it is impossible to state, with accuracy, the amount of its population, or the respective Numbers of Whites and of Coloured people forming that population. According to election and other returns, the White population may be estimated at 80,000 (eighty thousand) souls, the Indians at 12,000 (twelve thousand) and the Slaves at 16,000 (sixteen thousand). The free persons of Colour are extremely few.
It is to be observed that this estimated population is embraced within the limits that designated Texas as a department of Republican Mexico. The additional territory claimed by Texas since the Revolution, but neither occupied by her Settlers, nor held by her troops, contains a considerable Mexican and Indian population, for estimating whose numbers, there are no reliable data. By far the greater portion of this territory is waste.
There is no Registry of Slaves in Texas. An Act of Congress “to raise a Revenue by direct taxation,” imposed a tax upon Slaves, and the Assessors appointed under the Act gave in returns for the year 1840, which produced the following result:—
There were no returns from nine (probably remote and thinly peopled) Counties.
Allowing for omitted and imperfect returns, the whole Slave population of Texas, at the close of the year 1840, may be set down, in round numbers, at 12,000 (twelve thousand). Owing to her unsettled relations with Mexico, the amount of Slaves introduced into Texas, since 1840, especially by sea, cannot have been considerable nor is there any substantial ground for supposing that the entire Slave population of the Republic, including a late accession by the adjustment of the North Eastern boundary line with the United States, at present exceeds 16,000 (sixteen thousand) souls.
Population in 1832. By calculations chiefly based upon the Statistical Report of a Commission, employed by the Mexican Government, the population of the, then, Department of Texas, in the year 1832, may be estimated at about 20,000 (twenty thousand) Whites, 2,000 (two thousand) Negroes, and 15,000 (fifteen thousand) Indians.
Population in 1837. The Texan Revolution in 1835 had, on the one hand, the effect of breaking up Settlements and dispersing Slaves, and, on the other, of attracting a crowd of Military Adventurers and speculators from the United States. No good estimate can be formed of the amount of the population in the year 1837. It may be remarked that, at this period, there was no material decrease in the numbers of the Indians of Texas. In subsequent years, the Cherokees, and other tribes from the United States, were treated as intruders on the soil, and expelled from the Republic by force of Arms.
Query 2d. Answer.—Information, drawn from competent private sources, warrants the conclusion that, within the last ten years, no Slaves have been imported direct from Africa, and indeed, that no vessel from the African Coast has, of late years, entered a Port of Texas. It is confidently alleged that the following list includes nearly all the Slaves that have been imported from every quarter, with the exception of the United States, since the year 1833.
1835. In this year, the notorious Munroe Edwards and a partner named Christopher Dart purchased 183 Slaves in Havanna, Shipped them openly on board an American Schooner called the “Shanadoah,” and landed them in Texas, at the river San Bernard, South of the Brazos, in the Neighbourhood of the Cotton plantations. These Slaves continued under the control of Edwards until 1838. A Mortgage had been executed to the factors at Havanna, to secure the payment of 35,000 dollars, the unliquidated balance of the purchase Money. Edwards endeavoured to avoid payment of this claim, and also refused to account to Dart for his interest in the purchase. The Slaves were placed under legal Sequestration, and Edwards filed a release from Dart for his share, which release proved to be a forgery. Edwards was arrested, but availing himself of enlargement on bail, he fled to the United States and passed from thence to England. By plausible representations and the use of fabricated letters of introduction, he succeeded in imposing on the friends of Negro Emancipation in both Countries. He is now imprisoned in New York, where he has been sentenced to undergo a long term of Confinement for swindling.—The Havanna firm, concerned as factors in the purchase of the Slaves for Edwards and Dart, have instituted legal proceedings in Texas for the recovery of the 35,000 dollars still owing to them, but, as yet, without effect.
In the same year (1835) 40 Slaves, Shipped at Cuba, on board the American Schooner Harriet, was landed at the river San Bernard.
1836. This year a Schooner (name unascertained) conveyed 40 Slaves from Cuba to the Port of Velasco, where part of them were landed, but a Collector of Customs being stationed at that Port, the Schooner was ordered off, and she landed the remainder at Caney Creek.
In the Autumn of the same year (1836) a Schooner under the Spanish flag, Commanded by one Moro, a Spaniard, and owned by a person named Coigly, born of American parents at Matanzas, and supposed to have carried 200 Slaves from Cuba, ran up the river Sabine, which divides the United States and Texas. It is not known, here, whether the Slaves were landed or not. There is a story that the owner, Coigly, who was on board, was murdered, and that the Spanish Master went off with Cargo and Schooner.
1837 and 1838. During these years, 41 Slaves, in two Shipments, were brought from Cuba and landed near the Brazos river, and thence distributed over the plantations
Excluding some persons of Colour, kidnapped from the British West India Islands, who do not belong to this classification, and who were claimed by the British Government, the total of ascertained imports of Slaves into Texas, within the last ten years, from all places except the United States, Amounts to 504.
The fact that there were few or no persons in Texas possessing sufficient Capital to enable them to undertake the risk of the Voyage, is the reason assigned for there having been no direct importation of Slaves from Africa.
There are no means for ascertaining the annual amount of Slaves imported from the United States. With the exception of some purchased by Europeans at New Orleans, nearly all have been introduced by American immigrants. By Section 9th of the “General Provisions” of the Constitution of Texas, the admission, or importation, of Africans, or Negroes, into the Republic, except from the United States of America, is for ever prohibited, and declared to be piracy. The same section provides that—“Congress shall pass no laws to prohibit emigrants from bringing their Slaves into the Republic with them, and holding them by the same tenure by which such Slaves were held in the United States.”
Query 3d. Answer. In criminal cases, the law does not extend either to the Slave, or to the free Man of Colour, the same protection that it yields to free White persons.—For example—a Slave, or free person of Colour, Convicted before a District Court of maiming a free White person, (which, in the case of Whites is punishable by fine and flagellation) incurs the penalty of death. By the same Act, it is provided that, for offences, not Capital, Slaves shall be tried before County Courts, at a special term to be immediately called, and “it shall not be necessary in such cases, that a bill be found by a Grand Jury, but the party shall be required to proceed to trial upon a charge made out and signed by the person holding the information, setting forth the offence, with which such Slave stands charged.”—It is further provided by said Act, that—“if any Slave, or free person of Colour, shall use insulting, or abusive language to, or threaten any free White person, upon complaint thereof before any Justice of the peace, such Justice shall cause such Negro to be arrested, and, upon Conviction, the Slave, or free person of Colour, shall be punished by stripes, not exceeding one hundred, nor less than twenty-five.
Query 4th. Answer. The law enacts that if—“Any person shall unreasonably, or cruelly treat, or otherwise abuse, any Slave, he, or she, shall be liable to be sued in any Court of Competent Jurisdiction, and on Conviction thereof, shall be fined in a Sum not less than 250, nor more than 2,000 dollars.” It is further provided that—“if any person, or persons, shall Murder any Slave, or so cruelly treat the same as to cause death, the same shall be felony, and punished as in other cases of Murder.” It is the duty of the District Judges to carry into effect the provisions of this law.
Query 5th. Answer. The evidence of a Slave is not received in Courts of law.
Query 6th. Answer. Opinion stigmatizes persons who maltreat their Slaves, and the general tendency is to feed them sufficiently, and to use them without rigour. Scanty fare and harsh treatment are generally confined to the Slaves of impoverished owners.
Query 7th Answer. The Negroes of Slaveholders in easy circumstances are considered to enjoy as good health, and to live as long as free persons, but it may well be supposed that this cannot be the case in regard to the Slaves of persons comparatively poor. Owing to the comparatively recent introduction of Slaves into Texas, there is no satisfactory test of their longevity. When the owners are poor, the dwellings of the Slaves will too often be insufficient to protect them from the variations of the Climate, which, in Winter, is cold even along the sea coast. The searching “Northers” cannot fail to operate keenly upon the African temperament, and to call for a supply of warm clothing, which insolvent owners are unable to afford. Nor are the Negroes on the low Alluvial lands that are subject to overflows exempt from the fevers peculiar to such localities. They suffer occasionally from attacks that require Medical remedies and care, and these, in a measure suited to their wants, their Masters are not always in a condition to provide.
Query 8th. Answer. The Slave population is annually increased by the introduction of Negroes from the United States, most of whom belong to immigrants—Owing to the unsettled state of the external relations of Texas, the increase has been comparatively small, and is chiefly exhibited in the Eastern Counties of the Republic. The Constitution declares that—“Congress shall pass no laws to prohibit emigrants from bringing their Slaves into the Republic with them, and holding them by the same tenure by which such Slaves were held in the United States.”
Query 9th Answer. The Manumission of Slaves is of rare occurrence.—Section 9th of the “General Provisions” of the Constitution of Texas has these words.—“Nor shall Congress have power to emancipate Slaves, nor shall any Slave-holder be allowed to emancipate his, or her, Slave or Slaves, without the consent of Congress, unless he, or she, shall send his, or her, Slave, or Slaves, without the limits of the Republic.”
Query 10th Answer.—The laws and regulations have become—in, the letter—less favourable to Slaves since Texas obtained the position of an independent State. The real condition of the Negroes is little, if at all, affected thereby, as, during the period of Mexican supremacy, the laws for the mitigation of Slavery were virtually unenforced.
Query 11th Answer. There is no professed or recognized section of Citizens in Texas favourable to the Abolition of Slavery. Whatever concurrence of opinion may exist among individuals, it has not yet developed itself through open Association, public Meetings, or the agency of the press.
Query 12th Answer. The difference in the eye of the law between a free White and a free Coloured Man, is extreme. Some evidence of this difference has been given in the answer to the third Query.
The Constitution declares that—“No free person of African descent, either in whole or in part, shall be permitted to reside permanently in the Republic without the Consent of Congress.”
An Act of Congress makes it unlawful for any free persons of Colour to emigrate to the Republic. Any person so emigrating is to be arrested, and required to give bail for 4,000 dollars with the security of an approved Citizen for his removal out of the Republic. If unable to comply with this requisition of the law, such person is to be committed to Jail, and, after Notice, to be sold into Slavery for the term of one year. During the year, he is open to liberation, on rendering the specified bond. Failing in this, he is to be returned to the Sheriff at the end of the term, to be by him sold, at public Auction, and—“Any such free person of Colour so sold, shall remain a Slave for life.”—The same Act prohibits Owners and Masters of Vessels from bringing, or aiding in bringing, free persons of Colour into the Republic, under a penalty varying between 1,000, and 10,000 dollars, with a reservation in favour of Ship Cooks and working hands.
Query 13th. Answer. Free Coloured Men have never been admitted to offices of the State.
Query 14th. Answer. No periodical Census has yet been taken of the population in the District of the Galveston Consulate.
William Kennedy. Consul at Galveston [Endorsed.] In Mr. Consul Kennedy's despatch of 5th Septem— ber 1843.
KENNEDY TO ABERDEEN269
Private. British Consulate. Galveston. Septr. 6th. 1843. My Lord,
In the return which I have had the honor to make to the questions in Your Lordship's despatch of 30th May, marked “Slave Trade No 1,” I have stated that there is, in Texas, no recognized party favourable to the Abolition of Slavery.—This statement has been made with a full knowledge of the fact that, within the present year, certain proceedings have occurred, in this Section of the Republic, having reference to the emancipation of the Slaves.
Some idea of the character and local effect of these proceedings may be gleaned from Newspaper publications, of which I beg leave to enclose extracts.270
On or about the 18th of last March, a Mr Andrews, who has been about three Years resident in this Country, and who, I understand, has been in the legal profession, at the town of Houston, accompanied by a Mr. League, visited Galveston, and began, cautiously, to unfold a project of Slave emancipation. The supporters they found were not, it appeared, numerous; they were not permitted to develope publicly the object of their Mission; and, ultimately, Mr Andrews was forced, by the unlicensed interference of the populace, to enter a boat and proceed to the Mainland, under an injunction not to revisit the Island. His Colleague, Mr. League, quietly withdrew, without abiding the risk of ejection by a Mob. At this point, the agitation of the project of emancipation ceased in Galveston, and I am not aware that it has been again commenced in any other part of the Republic.
The last of the Newspaper extracts which I have taken leave to transmit (No. 11) is from the avowed and admitted organ of the President of the United States at New Orleans. To that Article I would respectfully invite Your Lordship's attention, as I am assured, by a party whose trustworthiness I have long known, that Materials for its Composition, and of others in a similar vein, were received from a “qualified” source at the City of Washington (U. S.). I am told that the suggestion of the “New Orleans Republican,” recommendatory of the occupation of Texas by American troops, had (according to the writer from Washington) given “great satisfaction to the Secretary of State.”—The Journalist was counselled to avoid political extremes, so that, by appealing to the interests of all Sections, unanimity of action might be secured “When the question of Annexation came before Congress in December next,—at which period it would be submitted to that body, in the President's Annual Message.”
The New Orleans Journalist was farther advised to address the Southern interest on the topics most likely to stimulate—to expatiate, among other points, on the danger to be apprehended from the emancipation of the Texan Slaves—(estimated by his Correspondent at 15,000)—And the loss, by Texian rivaly, in the Cotton Market of England.—To the North, independent Texas was to be held up as a sort of British Colony, whose smuggling operations would defeat any Tariff, and whose Anti-American prejudices would be fostered by British Capital and emigration.—“Annexation”—it was added—“had become a leading question with the administration, and decided action would take place upon it.”
My informant, who has no connexion whatever with Newspapers, dates his communication on the 28th. of August, on which day he left New Orleans—the extract (No 11.) to which I have referred, appeared on the 29th of August.
William Kennedy. The Earl of Aberdeen, K. T.
BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES
Economic Beginnings of the Far West: How We Won the Land Beyond the Mississippi. By Katharine Coman. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912. Pp. xix, 418; ix, 450.)
The appearance of this book is significant. It foreshadows the time when the early history of the Trans-Mississippi West will be systematically studied as a whole, and given its due place in the history of the United States. As the first attempt to organize this field on a comprehensive scale, the work is deserving of commendation. The present reviewer by no means agrees with another who maintains that Miss Coman's task was pointless and impossible.
Since the book is new in scope, a brief statement of its contents is due. Volume I, entitled “Explorers and Colonizers,” includes: Part I, “The Spanish Occupation (1542-1846)”—the explorers, the colonizers; Part II, “Exploration and the Fur Trade”—The Northwest Coast, the overland search for the western sea, the fur trade. Volume II, entitled “American Settlers,” includes: Part III, “The Advance of the Settlers”—Louisiana, the Missouri Territory, the Santa Fé Trade, the colonization of Texas; Part IV, “The Transcontinental Migration”—The acquisition of Oregon, the Mormon migration, the conquest of California; Part V; “Free Land and Free Labor”—the curse of slavery, slavery in the territories, the victory in the North. The volume closes with the Homestead Act of 1862.
The problem of organizing this vast field, even from a single viewpoint, is not easy, and Professor Coman has not solved all the difficulties. In its most general aspect, her organization is correct, the reviewer believes. That is, she treats the Spanish, French, British and Russian activities, and the exploration and fur trading activities of the Americans in the Trans-Mississippi region, as the preparation for the American settler, and then goes back and traces the progress of American settlement, as the second stage of the development of the West. The work very properly begins with an extended statement of the Spanish and French occupation. Both of these topics are treated under the head of “the Spanish occupation,” which does injustice to France. However, this is a healthy reaction against the view that the Spaniards did nothing worthy of mention.
A very serious fault in the plan is a too rigid adherence to the topical method, and a failure to reveal the general historical process as a whole by which the West was opened. For example, the Spanish occupation is traced from Cortés to 1846 before British, American, or Russian activities are introduced. In this way concurrent events and forces are so far separated that the reader fails to see their interrelations. It would be better, in the opinion of the reviewer, to have carried the Spanish and French story to the end of the eighteenth century, when the Spanish influence was at its height, turning then to the British, Russian, and American developments, all of which constituted infractions of the Spanish frontiers.
This fault of a too rigid adherence to the topical plan is even more noticeable in the arrangement of the lesser subdivisions. By treating New Mexico, Louisiana, Texas, and California each separately, from beginning to end, the historical evolution of New Spain is completely lost sight of. What we really have, therefore, is a series of separate histories of the individual provinces, without relation to each other or to the general movement of Spanish-American and of Western American history. By placing the treatment of Louisiana under Spain, beginning with the cession of 1762, before the treatment of Texas in the seventeenth century, is completely to miss the point of the intimate relations between Texas and French Louisiana. Again, the sections devoted to “the Pike Expedition,” “the coming of the Americans,” and “commercial restrictions,” inserted in the chapters on New Mexico, Texas, and California, respectively, are more closely related to each other, historically, than to the chapters in which they stand. They should be brought into relations as parts of the whole Anglo-American southwestward movement in the early nineteenth century. This defect of organization extends to other parts of Volume I and to Volume II. In treating the Northwest, for example, “explorers” are separated from “furtraders”—as though Hanna, Meares, Kendrick, and Gray were primarily explorers and not furtraders.
In matters of proportion and emphasis the disparities are grave. Though the book purports to be an economic history, the longest chapters are those merely narrative. Thus forty-eight pages are given to the journey of Lewis and Clark, twenty-five to that of the Astoria expedition, ten to the Coronado expedition, ten to Pike, fifteen to La Salle (as against fourteen to the rest of Louisiana under both France and Spain), and six to Burr.
Nevertheless, the chief shortcomings of the book are not those of general plan, but of detail. This can be illustrated by the treatment given to the Spanish province of Texas. In the first place, and explaining all that follows, it is plain from both the bibliography and the text that the author was oblivious or indifferent to practically the whole product, not inconsiderable, of modern scholarship relating to this portion of her field. Not a reference is given, for example, to any one of the fifteen volumes of the Texas State Historical Quarterly, or to Clark's doctoral dissertation on The Beginnings of Texas. Had these and similar contributions been consulted, a host of inexcusable mistakes would have been avoided.
It will be a surprise to all students of early Texas to learn that in the first half of the seventeenth century “Franciscan friars made several attempts to reach the Tehas” (p. 67). Was a single known attempt made before 1650? If so, the discovery is so important that it should be supported by evidence. The map on p. 78 shows Joutel's route to be from the Cenis to the lower Natchitoches, when as a matter of fact he went to the Cadodacho, nearly two hundred miles to the northwest of the lower Natchitoches (a small matter, but about the same difference as between Boston and Albany). The Cenis visited by Joutel were living on the Neches, not on the Trinity. The Cadodacho were not on the Sabine, as the map shows, but near the great bend of the Red River. On page 80 a most surprising route is given for Tonti in his search for La Salle. Perhaps it makes little difference to state that Texas had its beginnings as a Spanish settlement on the Trinity instead of on the Neches (p. 95), but the error is comparable to confusing the Connecticut with the Merrimac, two streams about the same distance apart as the Trinity and the Neches. And who were the Cenis as distinguished from the Texas? The error in the map on this point on p. 78 is repeated in the text on p. 95, where it is made to appear that the two missions mentioned (San Francisco and Santísimo Nombre de María) were established for two distinct peoples. As a matter of fact, both were in the same sub-tribe of the Hasinai confederacy, the Nabedache, and within a few miles of eac hother. These missions were abandoned in October, 1693, and not in 1694 (p. 96).
The mission of “St. Francis de los Neches” was not the same as that of Nacogdoches (p. 97); one was on the Neches and the other forty miles or more eastward, beyond the Angelina, while they were founded by different missionary colleges. Ramón had twenty-four soldiers and ten religious, not “some fifty soldiers and twelve friars” (p. 96). It is implied that the Ramón expedition founded seven instead of six missions in eastern Texas (p. 97). The impression is given on page 97 that only one mission was founded on the San Antonio, instead of eight. The statement regarding the French invasion of Texas in 1719 is greatly overdrawn, to say the least (pp. 97-98). Not thirty, but fifteen, Canary Island families were taken to Texas to found the villa of San Fernando (p. 98). The colony on the Trinity described with some vividness on p. 99 never existed, hence the description is somewhat gratuitous.
The most fundamental misapprehension regarding early Texas is revealed in the description on pp. 99-100 of the mission régime among the “Tejas and the Cenis.” The description given would fit the situation on the San Antonio, three hundred miles away, fairly well, but it is a patent fact that the Tejas (Cenis) never consented to live in pueblos or to submit to mission discipline. Hence, so far as eastern Texas is concerned, the whole passage is incorrect and beside the point. This misapplication of an interesting passage is due in part to an inadequate study of the Indian situation. It is implied (p. 101) that secularization of the Texas missions was generally effected in 1794, but, as a matter of fact, only one mission, Valero, was then secularized, the process not being completed for all Texas till after the end of the Spanish régime.
It was not in 1777, but several years earlier, that the northern garrisons mentioned on p. 102 were withdrawn. It is a strange confusion of the Indian situation to state that the Comanche were incited by “their hereditary foes,” the Apache, to turn their arms against the Spaniards. What is meant is that the Spanish-Apache alliance made the comanche hostile to the Spaniards (102). It would probably be difficult to find facts to justify the graphic picture of contraband trade between Texas and Louisiana given on p. 105, and it is far from the truth to state that “when Natchitoches became a Spanish town this trade was no longer illicit.” As a matter of fact, for several years after 1770 it was unlawful for even the governor of Texas to so much as correspond with the lieutenant-governor at Natchitoches. Proposals for establishing free commerce between the provinces were discussed for years, and finally negatived, while frequent arrests were made of persons who attempted the trade. These facts have a bearing on the statement regarding contraband on p. 108.
It would be easy to present a vast body of evidence to refute the assertion that there was no attempt to restrict the sale of weapons and liquors among the Indians (p. 105). On the other hand, the statement regarding the suggestion of the governor of Louisiana relative to the distribution of “ardiente” (aguardiente) and cheap firearms suggests unfamiliarity with the lengthy “Instrucción” on this point issued by the viceroy in 1786.
If the statement on p. 106 is intended to mean that “many Americans crossed the Texas border” before 1800, it should be supported by evidence, for it is not well established. The Red River was not generally “held by the Spanish government to be both the natural and historic boundary” of Texas (p. 110). The Mexican rebellion broke out in 1810, not 1812 (p. 114). It is not true that the viceroy had no troops for the defence of Texas at the outbreak of the War of Independence. The defence by Arredondo was quite efficient and sufficient (p. 114). Magee's expedition was begun in 1812, not 1813 (p. 115). Magee died at La Bahía, and did not succeed “in getting possession of San Antonio,” nor did the declaration for the republic await that event (p. 115). Is the “1830” on p. 117 a misprint for “1820?” If so, the “Meantime” following is incorrect. If not, the statement is incorrect.
All of the foregoing citations of inaccuracies have been taken from the few pages devoted to the Spanish province of Texas. Similar misstatements are about as numerous in the pages devoted to Texas in the later period. But there is neither need of nor space for citing them. Perhaps few of the points cited are vital. But if they were worth mentioning at all, they were worth an attempt to state them correctly, which would have been possible in most of the cases. Moreover, one cannot fail to see that the effect of these inaccuracies is cumulative, and that incorrect general notions must accompany such inaccuracy of detail.
A more casual reading of other portions of the work reveals the same newness to the field on the part of the author. Perhaps the most suggestive comment left for the reviewer to make is that, clearly, four years are not enough to master so large and so new a field as that covered by Professor Coman's book.
Herbert E. Bolton.
History of the German Element in Texas from 1820-1850, and Historical Sketches of the German Texas Singers' League and Houston Turnverein from 1853-1913. By Moritz Tiling, Instructor in History, Houston Academy. (Houston, 1913. 12mo. Pp. viii, 225.)
This volume is one of the proofs of the increasing attention that is given to the part played by the Germans in the development of this State. In his preface the author calls attention to the brevity of the mention made of Germans in Texas by former historians. “This plain, unpretending monograph has been written,” he informs the reader, “for the purpose of preserving to posterity the records of German achievements in the colonization and upbuilding of the great State of Texas.” (Preface.)
The volume is divided into five parts: 1. The German Element in Texas, 1820-1850 (pages 1-131). 2. Historical sketch of the Texas German Singers' League, 1853-1913 (pages 135-159). 3. Historical sketch of the Houston Turnverein, 1854-1913 (pages 163-175). 4. German Day celebrations in Houston, 1889-1910 (pages 177-181). 5. Appendices (pages 183-225).
The section entitled, “The German Element in Texas, 1820-1850,” constitutes the principal part of the book. It is the least satisfactory part of the book. There is no valid reason why the author should select the years 1820 to 1850 as representative of the history of Germans in Texas. Few Germans came to Texas prior to 1830; most of them arrived after 1845. As a matter of fact, the author deals with less than five years of the history of the majority of Germans in Texas in 1850. No one will assert that only those years of disappointment and hardship deserve a special memorial, or that the Germans have not since greatly aided in the upbuilding of the State.
Almost half of this section of the book (pages 58-113) and a large part of the Appendix (pages 204-225) are devoted to the “Verein zum Schutze deutscher Einwanderer in Texas.” The mistakes made at the outset by this association are detailed, and the author severely denounces the whole course pursued by it with reference to the colonization of Texas. The author is too much concerned with the Verein as a business organization and not enough attention is paid to the movement, which the Verein inaugurated, for colonizing Texas with Germans. For instance, the author says (page 83), “This sending of 4,000 immigrants in the fall and winter of 1845 probably was the most inexcusable of the many blunders of the Adelsverein.” As a matter of fact, whether the Verein was swindled or not, whether its officers were efficient or ignorant, whether its objects were humanitarian or selfish are minor details viewed from the vantage ground the passing years have given us. The essential thing to the student of the history of Texas is that this Verein so successfully turned the tide of German emigration toward Texas in 1845 that emigrants continued to pour into this State for years after the Verein had been smashed.
On page 108 the author again speaks of “the senseless haste with which the emigrants were sent to Texas by the Adelsverein.” Yet when the direful catastrophe occurred and the Verein in 1847 was declared bankrupt, he notes (page 110) rather naïvely that “it proved well for them [the colonists] that they were forced to remain” in Texas, and that “after the first outbursts of despair and agony . . . they all set determinedly to work, and by hard and persistent labor . . . and living on the barest necessities of life for several years, they not only succeeded in establishing a firm existence for themselves, but in course of time made New Braunfels and Fredericksburg the garden spots of Texas.” The Verein failed, but the German colonists prospered.
The “Historical sketch of the Texas Staats Saengerbund, 1853-1913” is the best part of the book. The principal fault to be found with it is the partiality shown the Houston members of the Saengerbund; after 1891 only those of the biennial meetings are described which met at Houston. While the author is content to present a purely chronological sketch, he brings to the subject a fund of first hand information and shows an appreciation of the cultural worth of music and song when fostered by a people.
The History of the Houston Turnverein and the account of the German Day celebrations at Houston are also well written, but, of course, are primarily of local interest; similar organizations and events in other Texas cities are nowhere touched upon.
E. W. Winkler.
NEWS ITEMS
Miss Eleanor Buckley, who for some years has been calendaring the Bexar archives at the University of Texas, has gone to the University of Pennsylvania to continue study in history for the doctorate. Mrs. Mattie Austin Hatcher has taken up Miss Buckley's work in the archives.
Dr. Frederic Duncalf, for the past two years Adjunct Professor of Medieval history at the University of Texas, has accepted a similar position at the University of Illinois.
William Edward Dunn has been appointed instructor in Spanish American history at the University of Texas. He will offer graduate courses in early Texas history and in the history of the South-west, and during the summers will direct the work of making transcripts of historical documents in Mexican and other foreign archives.
The Brenham Daily Press on September 1 issued a special industrial edition, which contains a “Chronological History of Brenham” and the “Social History of Brenham,” by Mrs. R. E. Pennington, and the address delivered by Dr. Richard F. Brenham, at Austin, on April 21, 1840, copied from the Austin City Gazette May 13, 1840.
W. P. Zuber, perhaps the last survivor of those under the command of General Houston at San Jacinto, died at Austin, September 22, 1913. He was born in Twiggs county, Georgia, July 6, 1820. During the last few years he wrote his reminiscences and planned to publish them under the title, “Eighty Years in Texas.”
“Rev. R. H. Crozier, D. D., for twenty-one years pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, of Palestine, Texas, passed away at his home in that city, July 16th. . . . Dr. Crozier was born at Coffeeville, Mississippi, January 28, 1836, and was educated at Oxford University, being graduated in June, 1857. In April, 1861, he was made captain of Company I, Thirty-third Mississippi Regiment. . . . He was licensed to preach in April, 1873. . . . Besides being a strong preacher, he was known as an author.” [The titles of some of his books are “Araphel, or The Falling Stars of 1833;” “Fiery Trials;” “Deep Waters.”]—Christian Observer, August 6, 1913.
Captain William A. Pitts died at Austin, October 13, at the age of eighty-three. Since 1850, when he enlisted in Henry E. McCullough's company of Texas Rangers, he has been a prominent figure in the military and civil history of the State. A brief sketch of his career appears in the Dallas News, of October 14.
On February 1, 1913, John W. Curd died at his home in El Paso, of acute nephritis.
Mr. Curd was born August 29, 1876, at Paducah, Kentucky. In early boyhood he came to Texas, where he spent the remainder of his life. On July 31, 1901, he married Miss Anna Wallace at Abilene. He is survived by his wife and four children, two sons and two daughters.
Mr. Curd's career was typical of that of the American teacher. He was reared on a farm and his early education was secured in the public schools. After teaching three years, he entered the State University in 1901, and was graduated in 1904. At the time of graduation he was awarded a Fellowship in Physics, but instead became teacher of History, and later principal, in the El Paso School, where he established a reputation as one of the strongest History teachers in the State.
Recognizing the rich possibilities for local historical work in the El Paso region, Mr. Curd at once began to investigate that field, a work which took him to Mexico City and Chihuahua, and into the local archives at Juarez. Some of the results of his studies were published in historical articles in the local press. He also was active in the promotion of a local historical society.
It was Mr. Curd's purpose to continue his studies in the University of California, and in 1912 he resigned his position in the High School to enter business, with the hope of being able sooner to carry out that plan. Meanwhile he taught history in the El Paso Military Institute.
In the death of Mr. Curd the Southwest lost a man of sterling qualities, a history teacher of first rank, and a student of much promise.—H. E. B.
