Attention has often been called to the varying degrees of success which attended the efforts of Spain to convert and civilize the Indian tribes of her northern frontier in New Spain, and it is well known that the causes for the comparative failure of the mission system in Texas may be traced in large part to the obstinate nature of the savages of that province. The share of the Apache Indians in this failure, however, has not until recently been adequately recognized, and only the barest outlines of the relations between the Apaches and the Spaniards in Texas have been known. The history of such relations falls roughly into three divisions: first, a period of mutual hostility, characterized by innumerable raids on the part of the Indians and retaliation by the Spaniards, from 1689 to 1750; second, a period of ostensible friendship and alliance, culminating in the establishment of missions for the Apaches, from 1750 to 1770; third, a return to open hostility, from about 1770 to the end of the Spanish régime. In a previous paper, 179 the writer has attempted to throw some light upon the events of the first period. The present paper deals with the second period, and traces the history of the Apache mission on the San Sabá River from its founding to its destruction. 180
II. APACHE RELATIONS BEFORE 1750
The hatred of the Apaches for the Spaniards dated from the beginning of the occupation of Texas in 1689. The first center of settlement was in eastern Texas, the region inhabited by the Tejas Indians, whom the Franciscan missionaries in Coahuila had so long hoped to reach, and the approximate scene of the luckless attempt at colonization by the French. 181 With the conversion of the Tejas uppermost in their minds, the Spaniards paid very little attention to the advisability of cultivating friendly relations with the tribes to the west. Indeed, they were so shortsighted as to aid the Tejas and their allies, the Comanches, Tonkawas, and other northern tribes, against their hereditary foes, the Apaches. It was an affront that the Apaches did not soon forget, and they lost no opportunity of revenging themselves upon the new enemy. Until San Antonio was founded in 1718, no convenient point for attack had been afforded them, but no sooner had that frontier post been established than they began the long series of outrages which was to make them a terror to the pioneer settlers and a troublesome thorn in the side of the viceregal government of New Spain. 182
During this early period the policy of the Spanish government toward the Apaches was the simple one of retaliation and punishment. When it was seen that this policy only increased the fury of the Indians, conciliatory measures came to be employed through the efforts of the priests, and only when peaceful methods failed was the strong arm of military force resorted to. This new policy was inaugurated at a time when the pressure of the Comanches and their allies upon the Apaches was beginning to be most severe, and there is little doubt that it was fear of their savage enemies rather than appreciation of unaccustomed kindness that induced the Apaches to turn to the Spaniards and accept the friendship which they had so steadfastly spurned. From the conclusion of a formal treaty of peace between a number of Apache tribes and the presidial authorities at San Antonio in 1749, there can be traced the beginning of the second period, during which the wily savages endeavored to gain the protection of the Spaniards against the advancing foe by feigning a desire to enter upon mission life and become dutiful subjects of the Most Catholic King. A few Apaches began to live in the missions at San Antonio at irregular intervals, attracted no doubt by the good food supplied and the numerous presents that were distributed by the fathers. 183 But on the whole, it was a huge “bluff” on the part of the Indians, and one that the viceregal authorities in Mexico did not fail to suspect. The frontier settlers and military officials likewise, as a rule, refused to believe in the sincerity of the Apaches. But the missionaries had full confidence in the promises of their savage wards, and it was their persistent efforts that finally overcame the misgivings of the secular authorities and led ultimately to the founding of the mission on the San Sabá.
The San Sabá Country.—The mountainous region north of San Antonio traversed by the Pedernales, Llano, and San Sabá Rivers had long been considered a suitable locality in which to found missions for the Apaches. It was the favorite dwelling place of these Indians, since its ruggedness afforded numerous strongholds against the hostile Northern tribes, and to its refuge the Apaches usually fled after one of their extended raids. Nowhere did they feel so secure as in their familiar haunts along the San Sabá.
The first specific proposal for the establishment of missions in this region, as far as the available sources show, was that made by Father Santa Ana, president of the San Antonio missions for many years, in 1743, when he urged that a presidio should be built in the Apache country in order to effect the conversion of that nation. Two years later he recommended the establishment of presidios on the San Sabá, Pedernales, Salado, and Colorado Rivers, by means of which he believed that not only the Apaches but the Comanches as well would be reduced to mission life. In 1749 Father Santa Ana introduced a radical innovation in his plan by proposing that the presidio at San Antonio should be removed to the Pedernales River, or if necessary to a site further north. This proposition naturally caused a storm of protest from the citizens of San Antonio, and the idea was declared impracticable. Similar schemes were proposed by Father Mariano de los Dolores, who succeeded Santa Ana as president, a notable compromise plan being his suggestion that the Guadalupe River be utilized as a site for the proposed missions.
Further attention was directed to the San Sabá region by the establishment in 1754 of a short-lived mission for some Apache tribes a few miles south of the Rio Grande. The founder of this mission was Father Alonso Giraldo de Terreros, a man destined to become the leading figure in the San Sabá project. After a residence of less than a year, the neophytes burned the buildings and fled to their accustomed haunts. The failure of the enterprise was attributed by the priests to the reluctance of the Apaches to live so far from their own country, and it was pointed out that no permanent success could be hoped for unless missions were founded further north in the region of the San Sabá. 184
Attention had been directed to the San Sabá country, however, for other than spiritual reasons. The campaigns against the Apaches had usually led the soldiers in that direction, and they had not failed to perceive evidences of the existence of valuable mines in the hills. From an early date there was a widespread belief that gold and silver could be found there in abundant quantity. The danger from the Apaches, however, had deterred prospectors from entering the country, and little definite knowledge had been obtained.
Exploration of the Apache Country.—With both religious and material interests at stake, it is not surprising that more and more attention was directed to the Apache country, and that efforts were
made to learn something definite concerning this much-heralded Eldorado. Between 1753 and 1755 three extensive exploring expeditions were made to the San Sabá country. The first one was a direct result of the ceaseless labors of Fathers Dolores and Santa Ana. The many documents and arguments with which they flooded the viceroy began to impress the mind of even that conservative official, and in 1753, it seems,
185 an order was given for the exploration of the country of the Apaches in order to ascertain whether or not there were good sites for missions as asserted by the missionaries. This first expedition was led by Lieutenant Juan Galban of the presidial company at San Antonio, and was accompanied by Father Miguel Aranda, who went in place of Father Dolores, the latter being occupied at the mission on the San Xavier.
186 The Pedernales and Llano Rivers were first examined, but no suitable sites for missions were discovered, and the party continued to the San Sabá. In the vicinity of this river they found good land, water, and pasturage, and two excellent sites were located.
187
In 1755 another expedition was undertaken by Don Bernardo de Miranda, Lieutenant-General of the province of Texas, with the primary purpose of investigating the section known as Los Almagres, where evidences of valuable ores had been most apparent. Much additional geographical knowledge was obtained from this exploration.
In the same year a third expedition was made, which was by far the most important of the three, since it was a powerful factor in the development of the San Sabá plan. It was made by Don Pedro de Rábago y Therán, commandant of the presidio on the San Xavier River. The close connection of the San Xavier mission establishment with that on the San Sabá necessitates some explanation of its condition at this time. In 1748-49, through the efforts of Fathers Santa Ana and Dolores, three missions had been founded on the San Xavier (now San Gabriel) River, near the modern town of Rockdale, for Indians of the Tonkawan family. No presidio had been erected until 1751, and instead of proving a benefit to the missions, it had led to their ruin. The vicious conduct of the soldiers and the captain, Phelipe de Rábago y Therán, culminated in the murder of one of the priests and a native. The captain was accused of complicity in the crime, and was suspended from his command, being assigned to another presidio pending the trial of the case. His brother, Pedro de Rábago, was appointed to succeed him in the same year, 1752. The neophytes became terrified, however, and deserted the missions. From this time on, the usefulness of the missions were at an end, and the garrison was a needless expense upon the royal treasury. 188 Wishing to retain his command, Pedro de Rábago probably saw in the Apache mission project a chance to prevent his company from being mustered out. He was therefore very friendly to the priests at San Antonio and in full sympathy with their efforts to convince the authorities of the sincerity of the Apaches. In the exploration which he made in 1755 he marked out possible sites for missions on the San Sabá, and in his report to the viceroy concerning his activities corroborated the statements of the missionaries in regard to the peaceful state of the Apaches, making the definite recommendation that missions should be established for them at the sites he had chosen. 189
The junta general de guerra y hacienda.—Captain Rábago's report reached Mexico just when the colonial officials were most perplexed over the question of missions for the Apaches. Father Santa Ana, although ill at Querétaro, had used every influence at his command to bring about definite action, and was making his final effort. 190 From Texas, Father Dolores continued his petitions concerning both the Apache missions and the disposition of the presidio on the San Xavier. 191. The Governor of Texas, Don Jacinto de Barrios, on the other hand, refused to recommend the establishment of missions for the Apaches. He could not forget their past treachery and did not believe they were sincere. 192 In view of these conflicting opinions, the whole Apache expediente was referred to various prominent men for advice, but their reports afforded the viceroy little help in arriving at a decision. Captain Rábago's hearty support of the enterprise, however, together with the necessity of making some disposition of the useless garrison on the San Xavier, appears to have been a decisive factor, and an order was issued by the viceroy for a general council (junta general de guerra y hacienda) to meet in Mexico City and settle definitely the long-agitated question. 193 The date set was February 27, 1756. 194 With matters at such a stage, a change took place in the viceregal administration, the Count of Revillagigedo being succeeded by the Marqués de las Amarillas. The new viceroy did not interfere with the plan of his predecessor, however, and ordered that the council should be held as originally provided for, on February 27. 195
The two problems to be settled, as has been indicated, were the establishment of missions for the Apaches in the San Sabá country and the disposition of the presidio of San Xavier. In discussing these questions, it was natural that the idea should arise of combining the two. Indeed it is probable that Captain Rábago had advised that such action be taken. There were really no substantial arguments against the founding of the missions, according to the documents that were submitted. It was admitted that a change had taken place in the conduct of the Apaches, and although such men as Governor Barrios refused to believe the change was permanent, they could not bring to bear any forcible arguments against the missions. The priests, on the other hand, were well supplied with arguments. Unless haste was made in founding the missions, and cementing the alliance with the Apaches, they said, there was danger that the French would attempt to advance their boundaries at the expense of Spain. Already French influence was paramount among the tribes of eastern Texas, and they were reported to have designs upon New Mexico. A presidio placed in the midst of the Apaches would serve as a safeguard against French encroachment, and would extend Spanish dominion far to the north. 196 Until that region should be settled, it was pointed out, no development of the rich mines there would be possible. The recent explorations of the San Sabá country had proved the existence of suitable sites for missions, and there was no doubt that that location would meet the approval of the Apaches. 197
With such arguments in favor of the missions, it is not surprising that the council decided to put an end to long procrastination. Its recommendations were as follows: The garrison of the presidio of San Xavier should be increased from fifty to one hundred men, and transferred to the San Sabá River at the site recommended by Captain Rábago; the few neophytes of the San Xavier missions who had not deserted should be distributed among the missions at San Antonio; and the missionaries who had been laboring at San Xavier should go to the San Sabá and establish three missions there under the shelter of the presidio for the conversion of the Apache tribes. 198 The recommendations amounted practically to the removal of the San Xavier missions to the San Sabá, and their diversion from the original purpose of converting the Tonkawan tribes to that of the reduction of the Apaches. Under this arrangement, the new missions would be under the control of the president of the San Antonio missions, Father Dolores, and such a determination was eminently satisfactory to that ambitious priest.
A Philanthropic Offer.—A new and remarkable proposition, however, was to divert the government from the original plan—a proposition which marks the return to the active field of Apache mission labor of Father Alonso Giraldo de Terreros, the founder of the Apache mission of San Lorenzo in Coahuila in 1754. 199 That Father Terreros had not been unmindful of the welfare of his wards after his return to Querétaro is evidenced by the fact that he had interested his cousin, Don Pedro Romero de Terreros, in his mission work and had induced him to contribute to the expenses of Apache reduction. Don Pedro de Terreros was one of the richest men in Mexico. He owned valuable mines at Pachuca and Real del Monte, was the founder of the National Pawnshop of Mexico, and a great patron of charitable enterprises in general. At a time when philanthropy was quite the fashion in Mexico, it was natural that Father Terreros should bethink himself of his wealthy kinsman in his efforts to accomplish the great work that was so dear to his heart. Don Pedro de Terreros agreed to bear for a period of three years all expenses that might be incurred in founding missions for the Apaches, and at the end of that time to turn them over to the government free of cost. 200 The expenses of military protection were not included. Certain conditions were imposed: The missions must be located in the country north of the Rio Grande missions in which the Apaches lived; his cousin, Fray Giraldo, must be placed in charge of them; the missionaries must be taken both from the College of Santa Cruz in Querétaro and that of San Fernando in Mexico City, the two colleges alternating in the founding of the missions. 201
There is little wonder that this generous offer was accepted and the original plan abandoned. The new plan would enable the work to be carried out upon an unprecedented scale, and the missions instead of being a heavy burden on the strained finances of the crown would entail comparatively slight additional expense. The viceroy did not long delay in accepting the terms of the offer. On August 24, 1756, a decree was issued substituting its provisions for those that had been recommended by the council. As a reward for his “pious labors” Terreros was given the title of Count of Regla and allowed a special dispensation in a law suit in which he was concerned. 202
The viceroy no doubt congratulated himself upon the prospect for the solution of a problem that had long troubled his predecessors. The extension of the royal domain and the conversion of a powerful gentile nation were certainly achievements that would win for him the approval of his royal master. But in far-away Texas the news of the offer must have been received with mingled feelings of joy and disappointment. The change of plans meant that the conversion of the Apaches was to be entrusted to other hands, and Father Dolores probably saw with chagrin the fruits of his long labor appropriated by a rival in the field. 203
Preliminary Provisions.—The preparations for the founding were begun with admirable promptitude. On May 18, 1756, the formal decree of the viceroy ordering the removal of the presidio of San Xavier to the San Sabá was promulgated, and eleven days later it was communicated to the officials in Texas. 204 A change in location had already taken place. In the latter part of 1755 Captain Pedro de Rábago, alleging the lack of water and pestilential conditions at the old site, had upon his own responsibility removed the garrison from the San Xavier to the San Marcos River. 205 Governor Barrios was much displeased at this insubordination, and in a complaint to the viceroy asked to be informed whether Rábago was still subject to his (Barrios') orders or had been given discretionary powers of his own. 206 The governor was assured that the presidio was still subject to his jurisdiction, and Rábago was severely reprimanded for his action. The move had been made, however, and the garrison was allowed to remain at the San Marcos. 207
Captain Rábago died not long after the removal, and in his place was appointed Don Diego Ortiz de Parrilla. The new commander was a colonel of dragoons and a man of ability. He had seen service both in Europe and New Spain. For five years he had been governor of the provinces of Sonora and Sinaloa, and had had much experience in Indian warfare through his campaigns against the Apaches of the Gila country. He was thoroughly familiar with frontier conditions, and well fitted for the command of the new establishment from which so much was expected. 208 On account of uncertainty as to whether the San Sabá country should be placed under the jurisdiction of the governor of Texas, of New Mexico, or of Coahuila, the viceroy resolved to maintain the new presidio directly under his own captaincy-general until further light should be obtained. As a result Parrilla was made practically independent of Governor Barrios, and was responsible only to the viceroy for the administration of the presidio. 209
Parrilla's instructions, dated September 1, 1756, contained the directions to be followed in the transfer of the presidio, the building of the missions, and the assembling of the Indians. 210 In conformity with the recommendations of the junta general, the garrison of the old presidio of San Xavier was to be increased to one hundred men, including officers. Twenty-two of the additional troops were to be taken from San Antonio, and the remaining twenty-seven secured by fresh recruiting. 211 The new company was well supplied with officers, a captain, two lieutenants, two alférezes (standard-bearers), four sergeants and a number of corporals being provided for. 212 The few neophytes of the San Xavier missions who had remained under the protection of the garrison were ordered to be distributed among the missions at San Antonio, and the missionaries who had been laboring there were to retire to their college. 213 The ornaments, sacred vessels, and other paraphernalia of the old missions were to be removed to the San Sabá as had been intended before the Terreros proposal had been made. 214 Upon his arrival at San Sabá, Captain Parrilla was to make a thorough examination of the country, so that in case a better site should be found than that recommended by Captain Rábago, the missions might be located there. He was admonished to bear in mind the possibility of the extension and growth of the missions in case it should be decided to establish a pueblo there. The buildings should be constructed of native timber, with the usual economy, and when the plans had been decided upon they should be submitted to the viceroy for his approval. 215 The captain was cautioned to see that the missionaries were given the best of treatment and protected from any persecution on the part of the soldiers. The use of the Spanish language among the neophytes was to be encouraged. Not only were the Indians to cultivate the soil, but the soldiers as well, when their military duties did not keep them otherwise occupied. Trade with other provinces was to be encouraged, and the viceroy expressed his hope that ultimately a flourishing town would be built up and the whole region developed. 216
The Arrival of the Leaders in San Antonio.—On September 4, 1756, Father Terreros received his formal appointment as president of the new missions on the San Sabá. 217 In the latter part of the year the leaders in the enterprise met in consultation at Mexico City, where plans were discussed and arrangements perfected. Father Terreros was given a free hand in the buying of supplies for the missions. In Mexico City and Querétaro large stocks of provisions, including luxuries for the priests and trinkets for the Indians, were purchased. The priests chosen were four in number: Fathers Joachin de Baños and Diego Ximenes from the College of Santa Cruz, and Fathers Joseph Santiesteban and Juan Andrés from the College of San Fernando. 218 Others were to join them in Texas. Captain Parrilla secured the new recruits required, and collected his train of military supplies. With such arrangements completed as could be attended to in Mexico, the journey to Texas was begun. At Saltillo nine families of Tlascaltecan Indians were obtained to be used as instructors for the neophytes. 219 In the province of Coahuila a number of Apaches were seen. They were probably on one of their customary raids to the south. Presents were given to them, and when they were shown the rich store of provisions for the new missions they promised to assemble without fail on the San Sabá. 220 The missionaries arrived at San Antonio in the early part of December, 1756, and Captain Parrilla with his train came in a few days later, on the 22d. 221
The Work Under Way.—Two days after his arrival Parrilla began his work. His first step was the removal of the garrison from the San Marcos River to San Antonio, in order that the troops might be fitted out with the necessary equipment. They were practically destitute of everything. 222 Messengers were then despatched to some Apache rancherías not far from San Antonio to urge the Indians to visit the settlement and meet the founders of the new missions. After about ten days a number of Indians, principally of the Lipan tribe, led by two chiefs of much distinction, presented themselves at Mission Valero. They apologized for the absence of their kinsmen, the Natajés, Mescaleros, Pelones, Come Nopales, and Come Cavallos, explaining that they were too far away to come. They gave repeated assurances of their anxiety to enter missions, and expressed a desire to become subjects of the king of the Spaniards. Captain Parrilla accepted their allegiance in the name of the king of Spain, and presented the two chiefs with canes as insignia of their office of alcalde under the Spanish government. At the conclusion of the ceremonies, presents were distributed by Fathers Dolores and Terreros. The Indians were so well pleased with the treatment accorded them that they remained in the missions for three days. Upon their departure all reiterated their willingness to become Christians and promised to assemble without fail on the San Sabá when the priests were ready to begin their ministrations. 223
Father Dolores was very much pleased that the conduct of the Apaches bore out the statement that he had made regarding their friendliness. In order to further establish his assertion, he drew up a formal declaration concerning the matter, and asked Parrilla and Father Terreros to add their testimony in substantiation. Father Terreros expressed satisfaction at the apparent sincerity of the Indians, with a reservation, however, to the effect that he feared that they were a bit too much interested from a selfish standpoint, since all who had come to San Antonio had asked for maize, sugar-cane, tobacco, and other articles. Parrilla accommodatingly added his testimony, certifying to the peaceful and friendly attitude of the Apaches, and diplomatically praising Father Dolores for his success in their pacification. 224
Captain Parrilla was far from stating his real opinion, or he soon changed his mind most radically concerning the outlook. The more he learned of the situation, it seems, the greater became his misgivings. In a letter to the viceroy of February 18, only a short while later, he said that the Apaches were still unpacified and as barbarous and treacherous as ever. It would require much time and labor, he believed, to effect their reduction. With the experienced eye of a soldier, he realized that all would not be smooth sailing in the San Sabá mission project, and from this time on he exhibited a lack of enthusiasm and much doubt as to the successful outcome of the undertaking. 225
A Winter of Discord.—While everything was being put in readiness for the move to the San Sabá, all was not harmony and brotherly love at San Antonio. There was constant bickering between the rival factions that arose among the priests, and life must have been anything but agreeable to those concerned. On one side were Father Dolores and his sympathizers, among whom Captain Parilla must be included. On the other were Father Terreros and Father Francisco de la Santísima Trinidad, the righthand man of the new president, with their supporters. The origin of the ill-feeling was doubtless the jealousy and pique of Father Dolores because he himself had not been entrusted with the direction of the enterprise for which he had labored so long. 226 But the immediate cause of trouble was the opposition of Father Terreros to a long-cherished plan proposed by Father Dolores.
In the preceding June Dolores had asked permission of the Father Visitor, Francisco Xavier Ortiz, then on his regular tour of inspection, to transfer the Indians who had been removed from the San Xavier missions to a site on the Guadalupe in order to form the nucleus of another mission for the Tonkawan tribe that had deserted. No presidio was to be requested, since it was thought that the absence of soldiers would prevent a recurrence of the troubles at San Xavier. The necessary authorization had been given by the Father Visitor, priests were assigned, and the Indians were being held until the viceroy should signify his pleasure in the matter. 227 This was the state of affairs when Parrilla arrived at San Antonio. Father Dolores had at once asked his co-operation in the plan. On January 25 Parrilla accompanied Father Dolores to the site on the Guadalupe, inspected the “mission,” 228 and certified to the advantages of the location. 229 Dolores now thought that the best way to obtain the necessary supplies for the new mission was to have it included under the terms of the Terreros gift, and he petitioned Father Terreros to this effect. Father Terreros immediately refused his consent. His cousin's intention, he said, was that missions should be founded for gentiles and not for apostate converts. Besides, the site on the Guadalupe was not situated in the territory prescribed by the conditions of the gift, and could not be included within his jurisdiction. He thus put an end to Father Dolores's hope in this direction, and thereby earned the latter's further enmity. 230
Father Dolores now declared open war, and showed his resentment, it is said, in many spiteful ways. Two incidents are especially amusing. First, he took from Father Terreros a servant (mozo) who had been assigned to wait upon the priest. When reminded that such action was not brotherly, he replied that he had rather lose life and honor than permit Terreros to keep the boy. He also refused to allow the supplies for the Apache missions to remain in the storerooms of Mission Valero, and forced Terreros to find a place for them at Mission Concepción. These occurrences are related by Father Santísima Trinidad, who is very bitter in his condemnation of Dolores's actions. Captain Parrilla also came in for his share of vituperation, and was accused of conspiring with Dolores to bring about the failure of the San Sabá project. It is very difficult to arrive at the truth of the controversy, but it is likely that there was some justification for Santísima Trinidad's attack. 231
Another cause of discord lay in Captain Parrilla's reluctance to proceed at once to the San Sabá River. The priests chafed under the inactivity forced upon them, and accused the captain of disobedience to the viceroy's orders. There seem to have been good reasons for the delay, however. Winter was on, and it was a very unsuitable time to begin operations in the cold, cheerless mountainous region. There was still much to do in the way of securing supplies. The cattle had to be bought and transported from the mission of Espiritu Santo near the Gulf. Parrilla saw no reason for haste, and much preferred to pass the cold season in comfort and perfect all arrangements for the founding. 232 The priests could not view the matter in this light, and their continual urging for the start to be made added to the disagreeable atmosphere in the little village.
Yet progress was being made in spite of the quarrels. By March 1400 head of cattle, and 700 head of sheep had been collected at San Antonio. 233 On account of lack of pasturage at San Antonio, Parrilla decided to remove them to the San Marcos, so for the second time the company went into camp on that river. Just why the whole mission establishment, including troops, priests, the nine families of Tlascaltecans, and most of the supplies, were also removed is hard to understand, unless it was planned to proceed in that direction to the San Sabá. Father Terreros and his fellow-priests thought it was solely for the purpose of squandering Don Pedro de Terreros's money. This statement should be accepted with reserve, however, for our only authority is the violent Santísima Trinidad. 234
The Removal to the San Sabá and the Founding of the Mission.—With the arrival of spring and warm weather there was no longer any reason for delay, and Captain Parrilla decided to begin the march to the San Sabá. Because he feared that the whole project was a hopeless one, he was unwilling to take the decisive step of transferring all of the supplies to the San Sabá before he had investigated the situation more thoroughly. He probably wished also to be as free as possible for rapid marching. Consequently most of the supplies were left on the San Marcos, with thirty-nine men to guard them. 235 The start was made on April 9th. Instead of going north to the Colorado River, and following that stream to the San Sabá, which would have been the shortest route, the expedition returned to San Antonio, and took up the march from there. This roundabout course was taken, according to Santísima Trinidad, because of Parrilla's ever-present desire to cause as much expense as possible, 236 but it seems more reasonable to conclude that the San Antonio route was chosen because it was better known to the Spaniards than the one up the Colorado. No details of the journey are at hand. The party probably followed the path taken by previous expeditions, striking into the hill country directly north of San Antonio, past the Pedernales and Llano Rivers, in a general northwesterly direction. Nine days were consumed in the trip, and the San Sabá River was reached on April 18th, 237 near the present town of Menard.
Following his instructions, Parrilla first made a thorough exploration of the river valley to its source. The sites recommended by Galban and Rábago 238 were examined, and on the 23rd a council was held to discuss the situation. Parrilla strongly opposed the establishment of the missions. He believed the undertaking was a chimerical one, and wished to postpone the founding. Not an Indian had been seen. In spite of this the priests believed that the Indians would soon assemble, and were firm in their determination to begin operations at once. If Parrilla did not consent, they threatened to return to Mexico and wash their hands of the whole affair. The captain was thus forced to yield against his better judgment, and preparations were made for the erection of the necessary buildings. 239
Plans were made for two missions, one to be in charge of the Querétaran priests and the other in charge of those from the College of San Fernando. The missions were to be located south of the river, some distance from the ford, while the presidio was to be placed on the north bank. A distance of two or three miles intervened, because it was thought advisable to separate the two establishments in order to avoid any evil consequences that might arise from the close association of the soldiers with the mission converts. Work at once began on the Querétaran mission, but it was decided to postpone the erection of the other one until need for it arose. It was never built. The usual plan of mission settlement was followed. Quarters for the priests, storerooms for the supplies, a rude church, and stables were erected. Around them a strong stockade was built, entered through a large gate secured by bars. Toward the river, plots of land were laid out, and crops planted. While Father Terreros was busy directing the work on the missions, Captain Parrilla was superintending the construction of the fort on the north side of the river. In honor of the viceroy the presidio was named San Luis de las Amarillas, but it was usually known as the presidio of San Sabá. 240 In accordance with the viceroy's instructions, the soldiers were assigned land to cultivate, and the soil was prepared for the sowing of grain. By May 4 most of these activities were well under way, and Captain Parrilla now ordered the removal of the rest of the supplies from the camp on the San Marcos. They arrived in the latter part of June. 241
The Fickleness of the Apaches.—The mission establishment was ready to begin operations, except for the fact that there were no Apaches present. Since they did not appear of their own accord, it was resolved to seek them out. Father Varela, who had long been stationed at San Antonio and was familiar with the language of the Apaches, was assigned the task of inducing them to “congregate.” He set out early in May in the direction of the San Marcos, where the camp was still located. It was the season for buffalo hunting, and he probably hoped to encounter the Indians while they were assembled for the hunt. But he failed to find any trace of Apaches, and after a fruitless search, arrived at the San Marcos. Here he got his first news of the missing Indians. A few days before, a squaw had reached the camp, reporting that her tribe had been attacked on the Colorado River by the Tejas Indians, among whom were four apostates from the San Antonio missions. 242
In the meantime, the Lipan chief, El chico or Chiquito, had visited Mission Valero. Father Dolores upbraided him for his failure to keep his promise, and ordered him to go to the San Sabá at once. The chief solemnly promised to obey. 243 Messengers were sent to search the neighboring country, and notify the different chiefs of a great assembly to be held on the San Sabá. The Lipans were beginning to arrive from the south, and by the middle of June about 3000 savages were encamped in the vicinity of the missions. They carried a large number of horses and mules with them, stolen no doubt from the settlements in Coahuila and along the Rio Grande. The Indians were very haughty and indifferent in their demeanor, and had it not been for the diplomacy of the fathers and the gifts that were distributed there might well have ensued a bloody conflict instead of a love feast between friends and allies. 244 The missionaries were very hopeful, however, and believed that the time for the formal reduction had finally arrived. But they were again to be disappointed. Upon making definite proposals to the Indians to enter the missions at once, the real nature of the gathering was revealed. The Indians had not assembled in order to enter the missions, but were merely on their annual buffalo hunt and ready for a campaign against their perpetual enemies, the northern tribes. Chief El Chico pretended to be willing to enter the missions, and a few other chiefs sided with him, but the majority supported Chief Casablanca, who was bent upon making a campaign against the Comanches and Tejas and avenging the recent attack upon the ranchería on the Colorado. 245 It was the same old story again. Although, the Indians declared, they wished to become Christians, they could not do so just yet. They wished to be the friends of Spaniards, however, and asked that some of the soldiers be allowed to accompany them on the buffalo hunt. As soon as they returned, they promised to accept the religion of the Spaniards and settle down at the missions. 246 No further satisfaction could be secured from them, and they departed on the hunt, leaving a very disconsolate group of missionaries to mourn their fickleness and a presidial commander to congratulate himself upon the accuracy of his predictions. 247
A New Scheme Proposed.—Captain Parrilla sent in a report to the viceroy a few days later, on June 30, in which he told of recent developments and repeated his disbelief in the sincerity of the Apaches. He said: “From the autos (official documents) which I transmit upon this occasion and from the consulta which accompanies them, Your Excellency will understand what a difficult undertaking is the formation of missions for the heathen Apache nation, and will see that the favorable reports that were sent in to that Captaincy General concerning the matter were direct results of the unreliability (lijereza) that has always characterized the missionaries and inhabitants of the province of Texas in every occurrence that has concerned them. this is proven by the history of the presidio and missions of San Xavier de Gigedo and of many others.” 248
Parrilla did not for a moment believe that the Indians would keep their last promise, and thought that the mission plans should be abandoned. He now proposed a counter plan to the central authorities. He asked to be permitted to remove the presidio to the Chanas (Llano) River with its full garrison of one hundred men, in order to afford protection for the mines at Los Almagres. There would still be an opportunity for the missionaries to continue their work among the Apaches, if they so desired, but the development of such remote mines in a country inhabited by barbarous savages would be in itself, he believed, a great credit to the viceroy and of much benefit to the royal treasury. 249 The Marqués de las Amarillas, however, was not ready to abandon the San Sabá enterprise, and he refused his consent to Parrilla's scheme, admonishing him to devote all of his energies to the original plan. 250 There was nothing to do, then, but to make the best of the situation and wait patiently for the return of the Indians.
The Departure of Three Priests.—Father Terreros was the only one of the priests who had any confidence in the ultimate success of the mission. Several of his companions wished to return at once to Mexico, but were persuaded to remain a little longer. Early in July it seemed as if Father Terreros's faith was to be rewarded. Chief El Chico appeared one day at the mission, his people loaded down with buffalo meat. The usual presents were given, and again prospects seem promising. The fathers were soon undeceived. The Indians refused to listen to arguments, but after a short stay speedily continued their journey toward the south as if impelled by some unseen danger. This was practically the death knell to the hopes of the missionaries, and several of the priests prepared for their departure. 251
The first to leave was Father Varela. He had long since lost faith in the Apaches, and had repeatedly asked permission to return to Querétaro. He was now given the desired license, entrusted with despatches to the authorities, and thus the first deserter shook the dust of San Sabá from his feet and returned to civilization. 252 Had Fathers Baños and Ximenes followed the promptings of their own desires, Father Varela would not have gone alone. But since they had been appointed by the Discretorio of the College of Santa Cruz, they must secure permission to leave from the guardian at Querétaro himself. In a letter of July 5 they asked for such permission, promising to await its arrival unless events should force them to leave before it came. Their attitude toward the mission is shown by the following extract from their letter:
The only motive that could detain us here is the administration of the presidio, for there is no hope whatever of the Indians. Neither is there any obligation on our part to serve the presidio, since we were deceived in coming, Father Terreros assuring us that the viceroy has asked the College to assign us to that administration. The falsity of this statement we clearly proved in San Antonio, for nowhere does there appear nor is mention made of such a thing. And since the said Father is indispensable to the undertaking in which he has embarked, as administrator of the property of Don Pedro transported by him for the foundation of the missions; and since at present there is no priest or son of that Holy College (Querétaro) to administer, and, in addition, since it seems fitting that some priest of the Apostolic College of San Fernando shall assist him lest there be presumed some intended plot against it on our part, it seems to us a wise thing that the said Father and priest of San Fernando shall remain alone to administer, awaiting as well the determination of the superior government.
The Apaches, they said, wanted a “workless” mission, if any at all. Even if “Don Pedro” should supply everything for three years, who could answer for the consequences at the end of that time? “Therefore,” they continued, “we find no reason why we should remain with this enterprise, which we consider ill-conceived and without foundation from the beginning. ... Having fully learned the wishes of the Indians, we find no other motive (for friendship) than the hope of receiving gifts.” 253 This letter throws a great deal of light upon the situation. It is to be observed, too, that the factions that had been formed at San Antonio had continued to exist after the removal to the San Sabá Some time during the autumn the desired permission was secured, and Baños and Ximenes left behind the scene of their fruitless labors. There were now left in the mission Fathers Terreros, Santiesteban, and Santísima Trinidad.
Disquieting Rumors.—Father Terreros seems to have accepted the situation in a philosophic way, and had no thought but to remain on the San Sabá until he should be ordered to retire. He reported the disappointing conduct of the Apaches to Don Pedro de Terreros, in order that the philanthropist might be better able to discuss the situation with the viceroy, and decide whether the undertaking should be continued. To the guardian at Querétaro the Father President, with true apostolic fortitude, said: “Be consoled, for however ill it may go with us, there will come to light a matter of much importance, and the cause of public welfare at least will be promoted.” Although Captain Parrilla in the past had not always been in accord with his plans, Terreros had only praise for him. “I doubt,” he said, “that America has two heads like his for matters of this nature. He is a gentleman and in all harmony with us.” 254
In spite of the gloomy reports, Don Pedro de Terreros was not discouraged, and after several conferences with the viceroy, expressed his desire that the work among the Apaches should go on. In a letter of September 30th, Father Terreros was informed of this decision. 255
It took no little courage to remain at the post in the wilderness. There was an ominous feeling of unrest in the air. From time to time small bands of Apaches stopped by for a few days to partake of the hospitality of the padres, but they always refused to linger in the vicinity. Their reluctance was due to the fact that the Comanches and their allies were reported to be on the war path. The Apache spies brought in tales of a great host of Norteños (Northern Indians) who were headed in the direction of the San Sabá, bent upon settling old scores. These reports explain the refusal of the Apaches to remain in the neighborhood of the missions. So tremendous was the invading host reported to be that they were unwilling even to trust to the protection of the Spanish soldiery, and hurriedly fled to the country south of the Rio Grande, to the fear and consternation of the isolated settlers of that region. 256
There seems, however, to have been no immediate cause for alarm. As the winter months passed by in monotonous succession, no sign of the Comanches was seen. Reports still came that they were preparing for a descent upon the Apache country, but these rumors soon ceased to cause excitement. Life at the frontier post went on in the usual channel. The three priests continued to live in their isolated quarters on the south side of the river, attended by their Indian servants and a guard of five soldiers. An occasional visit from straggling Apache bands was the only thing to break the dull monotony. In the early part of January Fray Miguel Molina arrived from the College of San Fernando, but the missionaries were again reduced to three on January 12, when Santísima Trinidad was sent to Mexico bearing letters and dispatches. 257
On the other side of the river the current of life ran equally smooth, but social life must have been more active. There were probably some three or four hundred persons at the presidio, two hundred and thirty-seven of these being women and children. The guarding of the cattle and horses, the securing of firewood, the changing of the watch, the occasional arrival of a supply train from San Antonio—such was life at this frontier post. But there was soon to be excitement enough to stir the blood of the most indolent mestizo trooper.
The Arrival of the Comanches.—The rumors concerning the gathering of the Comanche hosts had not been unfounded. It was not until March, 1758, however, that the dreaded visitation took place. On the second day of this month the savages announced their presence by a raid upon the horses of the presidio, which were pastured between the mission and the presidio. Sixty-two horses were stolen. A gingerly pursuit was made by fifteen soldiers, but they did not go far on account of their fear of an ambush. They returned to the presidio with wild tales with which to alarm the none too brave inhabitants. The whole country was said to be literally alive with hidden foes. On March 9th four prospectors on the Pedernales River were attacked by the Indians. The men succeeded in escaping, though not unhurt, and hurriedly made their way to the presidio for refuge. 258
In view of these occurrences, Captain Parrilla tried to induce Father Terreros and his companions to seek the shelter of the presidio. He made this request several times, but the missionaries did not fear the Indians and resolved to stay at their exposed location. Since they persisted in remaining, Parrilla was compelled to leave them, as he did not feel justified in forcing them to retire. 259 He refused to increase the guard of five soldiers at the mission, realizing that he needed every available man to defend the presidio. The mission was entirely at the mercy of a hostile force. The total number of persons there reached only seventeen, including four or five Indian servants. 260 There were two cannon, with a supply of ammunition, and the stockade, of course, was an additional means of defense. But attack by a large force of Indians could result only in the ultimate overpowering of the small garrison. The presidio itself was handicapped by a lack of men. Four of the soldiers were on the Guadalupe, seven were guarding the cattle at the rancho five leagues away, five were at the mission. The large number of women and children made Parrilla's task more difficult, for they were a great encumbrance in time of peril. Every precaution was taken against the attack which was expected at any moment. On the afternoon of the 15th, Captain Parrilla made a final appeal to the priests to retire to the presidio, making a personal trip for the purpose. Father Terreros was firm in his refusal, however, and the little company was reluctantly left to the uncertain mercy of a savage foe. 261
The Massacre.—A little after sunrise on the morning of March 16, after Father Terreros had said mass and just as Father Santiesteban was beginning the second service, a great commotion was heard in the direction of the river, and presently there could be distinguished in the mission shouts of “Indians! Indians!” The invaders had already begun their acts of violence. Coming upon some of the inhabitants who were astir in the early dawn, they stripped them of their clothing, beat them severely and held them for further torture. The main body of the Indians proceeded toward the mission, discharging their firearms as they went. In this volley Andres de Villareal was wounded, but escaped and started for the protection of the mission. 262
As soon as Father Molina discovered the cause of the excitement and saw the large number of Indians approaching, he ran to the church to warn Father Santiesteban to discontinue the services. The priest at once removed his vestments, but remained in the church, while Molina passed on to notify Father Terreros. A number of the occupants of the mission had already gathered in the room of Father Terreros, the soldiers took their posts, the gate of the stockade was closed, and every precaution taken to guard against injury in case the Indians meant mischief. When the Indians drew near, they saw that the Spaniards were on their guard, and realizing that they would not be able to storm the place without much loss to themselves, they resolved to resort to treachery. By dint of many signs and much bad Spanish they announced that they came as friends to offer their allegiance to the Spaniards. Hearing expressions of amity, the corporal of the guard, Asencio Cadena, mustered up courage enough to venture out into the patio or open space in front of the mission. Through the cracks in the stockade he could see Indians peering through, and he at once recognized representatives of the Tejas, Vidaes, Tancagues, and other northern tribes with whom he had often been associated. Seeing these old friends, he assured Father Terreros that the Indians meant no harm. Upon the strength of this assertion, Father Terreros and other bold ones went out into the patio. An impressive spectacle, according to the testimony of an eyewitness met their gaze. On all sides, as far as the eye could reach, there was a moving, swaying multitude of savages, arrayed in strange garbs and mounted on gaudily equipped horses. Their faces were painted black and crimson, decorated with the most horrifying and repulsive figures, and many wore the skins of wild beasts with the tails hanging down from their heads. The mere sight of them, we are told, was enough to strike terror to the heart of the bravest soldier. All appeared to be armed with guns, sabres, or spears. A number of small boys were present for the purpose of receiving practical instruction in the art of warfare. 263 From the ground that they occupied, it was estimated that the number of the Indians reached 2000, which, according to Father Molina, was a conservative estimate. He believed that at least 1000 bore firearms. 264 Upon closer inspection it was seen that Cadena had been right in his classification. The majority of the Indians were probably Comanches, but there were also present many Tejas, Tancagues, Vidaes, Yujuanes, and other tribes who professed friendship for the Spaniards in eastern Texas. 265
As soon as the savages saw the priests appear and noted the confidence that was placed in their promises, many dismounted and without awaiting permission removed the crossbars from the gate and flung it open. The space between the stockade and the buildings was soon crowded with Indians, who shook hands with the Spaniards and made other friendly demonstrations. The priests immediately brought out a supply of tobacco and other articles which they began to distribute among the throng. The leader seemed to be a big stolid Comanche, dressed in a French uniform, who had not deigned to get off his horse. When Father Molina presented him with four handfuls of tobacco, he accepted it in a very condescending manner, without the slightest show of appreciation, while all the time, in the language of the priest, a false smile played upon his horrible features. 266 The attitude of this chief aroused the suspicions of the Spaniards, and they began to doubt the good faith of the Indians. Especially was this true when it was seen that they were stealing food from the kitchen, appropriating the cloaks of the soldiers, and securing the horses in the corral. They had the boldness to ask for more horses, and when told that the mission had only a few, they inquired whether the presidio had any. The presidio, they were informed, had a great many horses, and was supplied with everything in abundance. This was said to leave the impression that the fort lacked nothing for defense. The Indians were then asked if they had come to visit the captain of the presidio. They replied that they wished to do so, but that they were afraid unless the priests should give them a letter for security. Hoping that this might be a means of getting rid of the undesirable guests, who were now searching openly for plunder in the storerooms, Father Terreros consented to give them a letter. While he was writing it, Villareal, who had succeeded in reaching the mission, told about the wound he had received near the river and of the undoubtedly evil purposes of the visitors. Terreros realized that he spoke the truth, but there was now no help for it. 267 He gave the Indians the letter, which was taken in charge by a chief of the Tejas tribe. This chief went to the corral and, taking out one of the Father President's horses which had been left undisturbed, signified his intention of riding to the presidio. Terreros objected to this, whereupon the Indian quickly seized his gun and placed the muzzle against the horse's head. At this action, the priest ceased his objections, and the Teja set out toward the presidio, accompanied by a large number of Indians.
Although the Indians were prowling around the premises stealing everything that took their fancy, the priests pretended not to notice it, and did everything possible to conciliate them. Terreros entered into a conversation with some Tejas Indians about their country, in which he had lived for a while. They assured the priest that they had no desire to harm the Spaniards, and wished only to fight the Apaches, who had killed some of their people. After a short time, the Tejas chief returned, announcing that not only had he been refused admission to the presidio, but that three of his warriors had been killed and one wounded. The short time that he had been gone convinced the Spaniards that he was lying, but, nevertheless, Father Terreros agreed to accompany him to see that he was given a kind reception. True to his word, the brave father prepared to start, accompanied by a soldier named Joseph García. When they were ready, the chief could not be seen, and Father Terreros, thinking to find him in the throng outside of the stockade, rode toward the gate. As the two men drew near a shot rang out, and with a cry Father Terreros fell from his horse, mortally wounded. At the same time, a murderous volley from the savages instantly killed Garcia. The thin veil of friendship was now torn aside, and a fierce combat began. The unfortunate Spaniards made a desperate effort to reach safety, but all did not succeed in escaping, and when the survivors had gained the President's room it was found that Father Santiesteban, Lázaro de Ayala and Enrique Gutiérrez, had also fallen victims to the sudden onslaught of the savages. There were now left Father Molina and eight other men. The Indian servants had escaped at the first news of the enemy. The priest had a broken arm, and several others were wounded, but with desperate energy they barricaded the doors and made ready to defend their lives to the last. 268
The Indians set fire to the stockade, to the buildings already sacked, and to the one occupied by the besieged, and busied themselves in plundering the storerooms of the rich provisions laid up there. The dead priests were despoiled of their habits and their bodies mutilated, that of Father Santiesteban being decapitated The images of the saints were profaned or destroyed, the cattle in the corral were killed, and all possible damage inflicted. This could be seen by the Spaniards through the loopholes of their quarters, and they did not doubt but that the flames would soon reach them and force them to expose themselves to the greater fury of the savages. The latter, however, seemed confident that the fire would do its work, and gave little concern to the prisoners, devoting their attention to the agreeable work of pillage and destruction. 269
Captain Parrilla Sends Aid.—At the first commotion caused by the assailants in the early morning, the Indian servants of the mission had made their escape, and one had reached the presidio, giving Captain Parrilla his first information concerning the approach of the Norteños. Parrilla had at once sent out a squad of nine men to reinforce the mission guard and report the state of affairs. Before this force reached the mission, they were fallen upon by a large number of Indians. Two were killed outright, Joseph Vasquez was wounded and fell from his horse, being left for dead by the Indians, who continued the pursuit of the remaining six. All were wounded, but succeeded in reaching the shelter of the presidio. The Indians did not dare assault the fort, and contented themselves with burning the isolated buildings and destroying the newly planted crops. They prevented, however, any immediate relief being sent to the missionaries, for Parrilla thought that he had all he could do to defend his post. 270
At about eight o'clock in the morning the imprisoned men in the mission were startled to hear a knocking at the door and a voice asking admittance and confession. The door was hastily opened, and Joseph Vasquez, one of the relief party, staggered into the room, naked, and bleeding from a bad wound in the chest. He told a wonderful story of his escape. When he fell from his horse, he said, the Indians had stripped him of his clothing and left him for dead. He had then dragged himself to the mission, where he was discovered by two Indians, who seized him and pitched him into the burning stockade, thinking that the fire would extinguish the little life left in him. From this new peril he had also miraculously escaped, and had then made his way to the room, unobserved by the feasting savages. 271
All day long and far into the night the Indians continued their orgies and the little company of Spaniards still lived. They remained in the room of the Father President until shortly after noon, when the flames reached them and forced them to flee. Thanks to the carelessness of the enemy, they succeeded in making their way into another room in the church building. Their escape being discovered, however, fire was again set to the new place of refuge, and a further retreat was made before the advancing flames. They went into the small chapel, which, although in flames, was less dilapidated than the other ruins. From this time, the Indians, believing them dead, paid no further attention to them. 272
But rescue was at hand. As soon as darkness fell, Parrilla sent out a sergeant with fourteen men to reconnoiter and to learn whether an attack upon the Indians would be feasible. No hope was entertained that the occupants of the mission were still alive, for the flames had been seen, and the presidio itself had experienced the hostility of the Indians. The soldiers were perceived as soon as they approached, and with shouts of warning the Indians prepared for defense. Had they known the small force they had to contend with, they could easily have overpowered the Spaniards. But they feared attack from a large force, and cautiously withdrew to a more advantageous position. 273
The withdrawl of the Indians afforded the imprisoned Spaniards the long hoped for chance of escape. Only four were still alive, and one of these, Juan Antonio Gutiérrez, was too badly wounded to leave the church. 274 Father Molina, a mule-driver named Nicolas, and a soldier (probably Joseph Vasquez), although wounded themselves, were able to abandon the ill-fated place. Nicolas was the first to go. 275 Then, according to the uncorroborated statement of the soldier, he had heroically ventured forth, bearing Father Molina upon his back. They were detected, he said, and fired at, whereupon he fell to the ground unconscious. When he recovered his senses, the priest was not to be seen. He himself did not rest until he reached San Antonio. He was wounded in the shoulder, and from the position of the wound it was judged that the bullet had passed entirely through the body of the priest. To the fact that its force had thus been spent, the soldier pointed out, he owed his life. 276
But Father Molina was not dead, and since he says nothing of the incident narrated by the soldier, we should accept that hero's statement with caution. According to Father Molina's own version, he struck out from the mission toward the south, seeking the most hidden paths, and on the morning of the 18th, having made a great detour to the north again, he arrived at the presidio. It had taken him a day and two nights to reach a point only three miles away. 277 He found the occupants of the presidio in a state of panic. Another attack was expected at any moment, and no one dared stir outside of the fort. 278
The Burial of the Dead.—Four days passed without further incident, and by the 20th Captain Parrilla judged it safe to investigate the damage that had been done at the mission. A scene of desolation met the eyes of the party. Practically everything had been destroyed. The first care was given to the burial of the dead. The following had been killed: Fathers Terreros and Santiesteban, Joseph García, Enrique Gutiérrez, Lázaro de Ayala, Asencio Cadena, Andrés de Villareal, and Juan Antonio Gutiérrez, who had succumbed to his wounds. 279 The bodies of Father Terreros and two soldiers were buried in the church cemetery. The others were interred at the places where their remains were found. Joaquin García and Luis Chirinos, of the first squad sent out by Parrilla, were buried where they fell. At first the searchers could not find the body of Father Santiesteban, and it was supposed that it had been entirely consumed by the flames. A few days later, however, it was discovered, the head having been completely severed from the body. He was also interred in the cemetery beside the grave of Father Terreros. The total number of victims of the treacherous attack was ten. 280
The Spread of the News.—On the night of the massacre, the 16th, Captain Parrilla sent two messengers to San Antonio to report the treachery of the Indians and to ask for aid. They were preceded by the fugitive soldier, who had arrived on the 19th, and the news was already known. In answer to the appeal for help, a lieutenant and eighteen men were immediately despatched to the San Saba. 281
There was great opposition to the sending of aid, for as much alarm was felt at San Antonio as at the presidio of San Luis de las Amarillas. Many rumors were rife that the Indians were en route to the capital, and it was feared that it would meet the same fate as the mission. The people at the little settlement on the Guadalupe River hurriedly retired to Béxar, horses and cattle were driven in for shelter, and every precaution taken against the coming of the savages. The news reached Governor Barrios on April 3 at Nacogdoches, where he was busy with the removal of the presidio of Orcoquisac. He at once started for San Antonio to take charge of the defense of the capital, but high water prevented the continuance of his journey. 282
On March 23d Captain Parrilla despatched two Indians to San Antonio with further details of the attack, and requested Father Dolores to send him a force of mission Indians. Four days later the Indians returned to the presidio, reporting that they had lost their horses on the Chanas (Llano) River, and had been compelled to return. Parrilla believed their return was due to fear of the enemy, and he did not censure them. But in order to ensure the transmission of the dispatches, he sent out Lieutenant Juan Galban with four soldiers. In Parrilla's letter to Father Dolores additional light is thrown upon the state of affairs at the presidio. All of the cattle, about 2000 head in all, had been abandoned because of the great danger of guarding them. There were only provisions enough to last a week, and haste was imperative. Unless help should be sent from San Antonio, he said, the destruction of the whole settlement was inevitable. 283
No more succor was sent from San Antonio. Father Dolores did not think it wise to send any mission Indians. While five hundred were available and might be of great service behind the mission walls, they would be of little value, he said, in an open battle such as they might have to fight if they went to San Sabá. Captain Urrutia of the presidio of Bexar had only five soldiers left, three being assigned to each of the five missions, and he was of course unable to send further aid. He despatched couriers to all of the neighboring settlements, however, notifying Adaes, La Bahía, Rio Grande, Monclova, Santa Rosa, and Nuevo León that unless reinforcements and ammunition were sent the entire province of Texas would be destroyed. 284
The news had reached the viceroy twenty-three days after the attack, and he immediately took steps to avert the threatened danger to the frontier province. On April 7th and 13th he issued decrees ordering the governors of Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Texas to send to San Sabá whatever aid might be demanded of them. On account of the general alarm, however, it was very hard to secure obedience. As late as August 23 he was forced to issue a third order to the same effect. 285 The whole country was frightened by the dastardly treachery of the hitherto friendly northern tribes.
The Causes for the Attack.—According to the best contemporary evidence at hand, the causes for the assault upon the mission were three in number: First and foremost, no doubt, was the jealousy felt by the northern tribes of the intimate relations between the Spaniards and the Apaches—a jealousy inspired not by affection but by fear. The establishment of the presidio upon the San Sabá River had from the first been regarded by the Comanches and their allies as a virtual declaration of war against themselves, and they believed that eventually the Apaches would induce the soldiers to aid them in a great campaign. 286 The Apaches had done much to increase this distrust for the Spaniards. When making raids into the territory of their enemies, they would often leave shoes and other articles of clothing worn by the soldiers in order to throw suspicion upon them. Then, too, the spies of the northern tribes, seeing the Apaches return to the neighborhood of the presidio. and observing the joint buffalo hunts that were made, naturally reported that the Spaniards were in active league with the Apaches against their own people. 287 That this belief was general and of long standing is shown by the statement of a Taguayas chief in eastern Texas in 1765, seven years later. He declared that he was unwilling to remain at peace with the Spaniards at San Sabá because they had aided his mortal enemies, the Apaches, who were great thieves and murderers. If the Spaniards would withdraw their protection from the Apaches, he said, the Taguayas would become friends. 288
Another reason for the attack was believed to be the instigation of the French. There was no doubt that the French were supplying the northern tribes with firearms through the trade that they carried on with them. But in Texas it was firmly believed that in addition to this indirect aid the French had encouraged the Indians by their presence at the massacre. This suspicion was increased by the reports that were brought back from Louisiana. Many of the horses and mules stolen from San Sabá were said to be in the French fort at Natchitoches, and many of the mission ornaments were said to have found their way into the hands of the French. No less a personage than Governor Barrios accused the French of complicity in the attack. The French indignantly denied the accusations, and there is little reason for believing that they were in any way directly responsible for the outrage. A third cause for the attack was the natural desire of the Indians to plunder the rich stores of the mission. The presence of eatables alone was a strong incentive. The primary cause, however, was undoubtedly jealousy of the Apaches. 289
Although the subsequent history of the Apache mission project must be reserved for a future paper, it may be added here that two years later a great campaign was made against the northern tribes, in which the Spaniards were so badly defeated that it was declared that never had such a disgraceful rout been experienced since the landing of Cortés in New Spain. The attempt to convert the Apaches was continued, however, two other missions being established for them a few years later—but not on the San Sabá River. For some ten years more the Apaches successfully hoodwinked the Spaniards, and the presidio remained at the San Sabá. Finally, however, the evident insincerity of the Indians could no longer be doubted, and a complete change in policy was made. An alliance was entered into with the northern tribes and a bitter war of extermination begun against the Apaches.
179. Apache Relations in Texas, 1718-1750,” in The Quarterly, XIV.
180. This study was made under the direction of Professor H. E. Bolton at Leland Stanford, Junior, University during the session of 1911-1912. It is based almost entirely upon the transcripts of original documents in the archives of Mexico collected by Dr. Bolton. The full titles of these documents will be given in the bibliography to be published at the conclusion of the whole study.
181. Dr. Bolton has exploded the old belief that the Spanish occupation of Texas in 1689 was due solely to fear of the French, and shows that it was a natural result of the expansion of the Coahuila mission frontier. See Bolton, “The Spanish Occupation of Texas, 1519-1690,” in The Quarterly, XVI, 24-26.
182. A detailed account of these outrages will be found in The Quarterly, XIV, 203-255.
183. I have at hand a list of supplies distributed among the Apaches by the missionaries at San Antonio for the years 1749 to 1756. A glance at some of the principal items will show the compensation received by the Indians for “being good.” More than 2670 fanegas (bushels) of maize were consumed; 133 beeves and 76 horses were eaten; 60 fanegas of beans; 91 strings of pepper; 7½ cargas and 16 tercios of salt; 22½ cargas of sugar cane; 13 cargas and 5 tercios of tobacco; 4555 varas of different kinds of cloth were donated; 239 hats; 642 blankets; 458 knives; 196 bridles; 17 kettles and boilers; 132 pesos' worth of ribbons, beads, and other trickets (Memoria de lo que se gasto en la pacificacion de los Apaches, 6 pp). This additional burden upon the slender resources of the missions made a separate establishment for the Apaches highly desirable.
184. A full account of these early plans will be found in “Missionary Activities Among the Eastern Apaches Previous to the Founding of the San Sabá Mission,” in The Quarterly, XV, 186-200.
185. The date is uncertain. It may have been in 1754.
186. Aranda to Dolores, in Arricivita, Crónica Seráfica y Apostólica, 358-359. A band of Apaches was encountered by the expedition, and when informed for what purpose the Spaniards were visiting their country, they expressed great joy. Gifts were distributed, a cross was fashioned, and a procession held, the savages kissing the hands of the priest and “worshiping God and his Holy Mother.” (Ibid.)
187. Testimony taken in support of the right of Béxar to exercise jurisdiction over San Sava, 13; Bonilla, Breve Compendio, 27.
188. The guardian to the Eminent Prefect of the Holy Congregation of Propaganda Fide, April, 1759, 2-6.
189. Arricivita, Crónica, 363; Report of the transfer of San Xavier, November 1, 1756, 2; Tanto de un decreto, September 4, 1756. Whether Captain Rábago also recommended that the presidio of San Xavier should be transferred to the San Sabá is not clear from the documents at hand, but there is no doubt that such was his idea, whether he suggested it in his report or not.
190. Tanto de lo que se presento en los Auttos de los Apaches, 4 pp. In this document Santa Ana gave a few facts concerning the San Sabá country. The site suggested for missions, he said, was about seventy leagues north-northwest of San Antonio and one hundred leagues north of the Rio Grande missions. The settlement of this region would make a straight frontier line from eastern Texas to New Mexico, and the union of the northern provinces would be a safeguard against French encroachment. The governor of Coahuila, he continued, was in favor of missions for the Apaches, and would co-operate in the enterprise. Not more than sixty Indian families, he believed, should be allowed to settle in one place, for a mission to be successful must begin with only a few neophytes, who would remain faithful and gradually attract their kinsmen (Ibid.).
191. Arricivita, Crónica, 359.
192. Ibid., 357-358; Tanto de lo que se presento, 1.
193. Arricivita, Crónica, 365-366.
194. Memorias de Nueva España, XXVIII, folio 151.
195. Report of the transfer of San Xavier, November 1, 1756, 2.
196. That the fear was not all on one side is shown by the protest made by Blans, the French commandant at Natchitoches, to Governor Barrios as early as 1753 against the establishment of a presidio for the Apaches. Barrios replied that since the Apaches were in the center of the province of Texas and far removed from French jurisdiction, the matter could not possibly concern him (Blans to Barrios, February 22, 1753; Barrios to Blans, May 15, 1753, in Investigation of French Trade, 15, 16).
197. Urrutia to the viceroy, May 25, 1756, in Memorias de Nueva España, XXVIII, folio 151; Investigation of French Trade, 15-16; Memoria de lo que se gasto en la pacificacion de los Apaches, 6 pp.
198. Report of the transfer of San Xavier, November 1, 1756, 2; Tanto de un decreto, September 4, 1756.
199. See page 382.
200. Bancroft states that no more than twenty missions were to be founded (North Mexican States and Texas, I, 626). In the documents that I have used no mention is made of such a limitation.
201. Proposal of Terreros, November 2, 1756, 5-6; Tanto de un decreto, September 4, 1756, 1; Memorial del R. P. Fr. Mariano, January 22, 1757, 9-10; Reales Cédulas, Tomo 78, No. 151, September 13, 1758; Arricivita, Crónica, 367.
202. Memorial del R. P. Fr. Mariano, 9; Reales Cédulas, Tomo, 78, No. 151, September 13, 1758; Correspondencia de los Virreyes, Second Series, April 21, 1759, 13.
203. There was always much rivalry in the Texas missionary field, even between priests of the same colleges, while that between different colleges often became bitter in its intensity. Cf. Bolton, “The Founding of Mission Rosario,” The Quarterly, X, 122-126.
204. Correspondencia de los Virreyes, Second Series, 1760, No. 79.
205. Report of the transfer of San Xavier presidio, 1-2.
206. Barrios to the viceroy, September 6, 1755, Historia, Vol. 95, 5-6.
207. The viceroy to Barrios, February 6, 1756, Ibid.
208. Testimonio de Parrilla, January 19, 1757, 7. Parrilla, like Pedro de Rábago, was appointed ad interim, since the case against the former commandant, Phelipe de Rábago, was still unsettled. Parrilla was left in undisturbed possession of his command, however, for more than fourteen years (the viceroy to Arriaga, July 4, 1760, in Correspondencia de los Virreyes, Second Series, 1760, No. 79, 2).
209. This matter was left unsettled for many years, and occasioned frequent reports and arguments from the governors of the three provinces. In November, 1756, Governor Barrios held an investigation at Adaes in order to obtain testimony proving the claim of Texas. This claim was based upon the proximity of San Sabá to San Antonio, former campaigns to that region, and general rights of priority in discovery and exploration (Testimony taken in support of the right of Béxar to exercise jurisdiction over San Sava, 19 pp.) The question was not finally decided until 1765, when it was settled in favor of Texas (Martos to the viceroy, April 26, 1765, Historia, Vol. 91, 205; same to same, April 6, 1766, Ibid., 212).
210. Ynstruccion, Historia, Vol. 95, 125-131.
211. Report of transfer, November 1, 1756, 2; Dictamen fiscal, in Autos fhos a pedimento, 92. There was naturally much opposition from the citizens of Béxar to the decrease in the presidial garrison there. Only twenty soldiers were left, ten of whom were assigned to the various missions. The pay-roll of the company, which was the most important source of revenue to the town, now amounted to only 8995 pesos. (Expediente formado sobre las variaciones, August 7, 1760, 3.)
212. Ynstruccion, 130.
213. Ibid., 125; Tanto de un decreto, 1-2.
214. Father Dolores would not agree to this. He claimed that the property belonged to the San Antonio missions, and that Terreros should pay for all of the equipment of the new missions in accordance with his agreement (Dolores to Bernad, April 14, 1757, in Papeles pertenecientes, 1).
215. Ynstruccion, 125-127.
216. Ibid., 127-129.
217. Tanto de un decreto, 1-2.
218. List given in Testimonio de Parrilla, 12.
219. Vindicta del Rio de San Saba, 6.
220. Cabello, Informe, 45.
221. Vindicta del Rio de San Saba, 1; Testimonio de Parrilla, 4-5.
222. Parrilla to the viceroy, February 18, 1757, Historia, Vol. 95, 134-135; Vindicta del Rio de San Saba, 2.
223. Testimonio de Parrilla, 5-7.
224. Testimonio de Parrilla, 11-12.
225. Parrilla to the viceroy, February 18, 1757, Historia, Vol. 95, 134-135.
226. Dolores, according to Santísima Trinidad, had the reputation of being of a domineering and contentious disposition (Vindicta del Rio de San Saba, 7). This accusation is supported by the controversies that had arisen in 1751 during the founding of Mission Rosario, when a bitter quarrel took place between Dolores and Father González of the mission of Espíritu Santo (See Bolton, “Founding of Mission Rosario,” The Quarterly, X, 122-126).
227. Memorial del R. P. Fr. Mariano, 1-4.
228. The Indians numbered forty-one persons in all, but the statement that fifteen were old men and women and the rest children throws light upon the true nature of the “congregation.” Four Spanish families were settled there, in addition to the two priests (Memorial del R. P. Fr. Mariano, 5-7).
229. Memorial del R. P. Fr. Mariano, 5-8.
230. Ibid., 12-14; Vindicta del Rio de San Saba, 5.
231. The priest embodied his accusations in a document which he called “Vindication of the San Sabá River” numbering seventeen pages. His object in writing it was stated to be to put on record the truth of the opposition to the enterprise so that it should not be concealed at some future time when there might be a desire to distort the facts.
232. Vindicta del Rio de San Saba, 2-3.
233. One hundred of the cattle belonged to Parrilla.
234. Vindicta, 6-8.
235. Arricivita, Crónica, 368.
236. Vindicta, 9.
237. Ibid.
238. See pages 383-384.
239. Vindicta, 9-10.
240. The correct Spanish form of this saint's name is San Sabás, but the “s” was very seldom added. The accent, of course, is upon the second syllable, and the pronuncia