Having traced the course of the Tyler administration with regard to California, we must now turn to the internal affairs of the province and the growth of popular interest throughout the country in its concerns. During 1842 no emigration of any importance took place from the United States. 2 But the friends of the movement were busy; 3 and toward the close of the year, General Almonte, the Mexican minister at Washington, found it necessary to counteract their representations by an article denying the report that California officials extended a ready welcome to foreigners. 4 In this, however, he was giving the views of the Mexican government, and not those of the authorities of the province. 5
Immigration and Commerce.—In 1843 two considerable parties reached California under the direction of leaders who, having already made the journey, had returned to the western states to encourage others of their countrymen to follow their example. One of these companies, numbering perhaps forty individuals, was led by Lansford W. Hastings and came by way of Oregon. 6 The other, slightly larger, left Missouri in May under Joseph B. Chiles, a member of the Bartleson company of 1841. Dividing at Fort Hall, part of the emigrants completed their journey with Chiles, while the remainder followed Walker over a more difficult southern route. 7
The year 1844 saw still further reinforcement of the American population in California, 8 accompanied by increased interest throughout the United States. Notice of the repeal of the law against foreigners by the Mexican government was published in the newspapers; 9 the state department was assured that Americans were looked upon with favor in California; 10 and numerous books and communications setting forth the advantages of the province were placed in the hands of American leaders. 11 Commercial relations with the United States showed little change during this period. 12 The year 1843 was one of hard times, and the trading vessels had difficulty in securing even a fraction of their accustomed cargo of hides. 13 Whaling ships in larger numbers 14 continued to use the California ports, especially San Francisco, as depots, for reprovisioning and refitting. But until the middle of 1844 nothing of importance occurred to break the ordinary routine of trade conditions along the coast.
In that year, however, certain changes were made in the California tariff laws that benefited one class of American commerce and injured another. The practice had become common for vessels flying the Mexican flag to pay duties at Mazatlan; and thus, through the ruling of the Mexican law, to secure free access for their cargoes into California. This custom, however, was playing sad havoc with the profits of the Boston ships and with the revenues of the province, all of which were derived from customs receipts, as well. So, in order to protect the threatened provincial treasury and keep the New England trade, the assembly and governor calmly set the Mexican law aside and required all goods, whether paying duties at a port of the home government or not, to abide by the regulation of the custom house at Monterey; 15 while a further disregard for the national authority was shown, as indeed it long had been, by permitting the introduction of various commodities prohibited by Mexican law, upon the payment of local duties. 16
The second alteration in the regulations governing trade along the coast, while of advantage to the Boston merchants, worked no slight temporary hardship upon the whaling vessels touching at California ports. This was a prohibition upon the long established practice of trading a limited amount of goods for needed supplies; 17 and was doubtless justified, as the privilege had been greatly abused, both to the detriment of the regular trade and the loss of revenue receipts. 18 At least one instance, however, is recorded where, if the captain's complaint be true, the new edict caused much inconvenience if not actual suffering. 19 The subject was reported by Larkin to the state department and was considered of sufficient importance to receive the notice of the President. 20 But, as a matter of fact, the new law seems to have had only a short existence; and whalers found little difficulty, after the first few months, in securing their share of the California trade. 21
Various other occurrences during their period that had some bearing upon the American interests were the arrival of John C. Frémont at Sutter's Fort early in the spring of 1844 on his second exploring expedition; 22 the return of Lansford W. Hastings to the United States to encourage further emigration to California, in order to bring about its separation from Mexico; and the revolt of the native Californians against the Mexican governor, Micheltorena. As all of these incidents receive subsequent mention they need not detain us here, and we shall pass on to a consideration of Polk's diplomatic attempts to secure the province.
Announcement of Polk's Policy.—When Polk came into office on the 4th of March, 1845, the attention of the American people, as has been shown, had already turned toward California. 23 Two presidents, Jackson and Tyler, had made earnest efforts to purchase it from Mexico, in the name of the United States. It is not surprising, then, to find the annexation of this province figuring as one of the four important measures which the new President, even before his inauguration, had set his heart upon carrying into effect. 24 Polk's intentions, moreover, were not long kept to himself. Official announcement of his desire to acquire California was made to the cabinet on September 16; 25 and the day following, the Washington correspondent of the New Orleans Picayune wrote: “It is predicted that Mr. Polk's administration will be signalized by the settlement of the Oregon question satisfactory to the American people; by the peaceful acquisition of the Californias, and by the adjustment of all our claims upon Mexico.” 26
For the accomplishment of this plan of annexation, four possible methods presented themselves—(1) By direct purchase from Mexico; (2) by revolt of the Californians, aided by resident Americans, against Mexico, and a request for admission into the United States; (3) by quiet delay, until a stimulated emigration from this country should overrun the province and declare its independence, even against the wishes of the Californians; (4) by forcible seizure of the territory in case of an outbreak of war, for whatever cause, with Mexico.
Polk did not lose much time after his accession to office in putting the first of these methods to a practical test. On March 6, General Almonte, the Mexican minister, demanded his passports because of the passage of the joint resolution for the admission of Texas; while Wilson Shannon, much to the regret of his own government, assumed the responsibility of breaking off diplomatic relations with Mexico because of his treatment at the hands of the minister of foreign affairs. 27
Appointment of Parrott.—Almonte left New York on April 3, and on the same ship went Polk's confidential agent, William S. Parrott, for the purpose of securing Mexico's consent to the reception of a minister from the United States. 28 The choice of Parrott for this mission was ill-advised. 29 He had been a resident of Mexico for some years but apparently had little else to recommend him. On the contrary his record there had been anything but favorable. As one of the creditors against the Mexican government in 1842, he had put in a claim that Thompson, his own countryman, had characterized as “exaggerated to a disgusting degree.” 30 His business dealings had also brought him into some disrepute even with men of his own nationality. 31 Furthermore, though this cannot be held wholly to his account, he was suspected of bringing with him authority to spend a million dollars in bribing Mexican officials. 32 And altogether he was a person very much disliked in the southern Republic. 33
In spite of this handicap, however, and the more serious one that the purpose of his coming was openly proclaimed in Mexico, 34 Parrott managed after a fashion to fulfill his mission. On August 26, he wrote Buchanan that an envoy of the United States with proper abilities might “with comparative ease settle over a breakfast the most important national question,” and that such a commissioner was almost daily expected. 35 As this opinion was confirmed by later dispatches from Dimond and Black, 36 the American consuls, the President and his cabinet resolved to send John Slidell of Louisiana secretly to Mexico, as the official representative of this Government.
Failure of Slidell's Mission.—The real purpose of Slidell's appointment, as announced at this time by Polk, was the purchase of Upper California and New Mexico. These, the President thought, might be obtained for fifteen or twenty millions of dollars; but he was willing to give twice the latter amount, if necessary. Indeed, Polk considered the worth of the territory involved, to the United States, as almost beyond reckoning in mere financial terms. With this appraisement the cabinet unanimously agreed. 37
The day following the decision to attempt the reopening of diplomatic intercourse with Mexico, however, less reassuring reports from that country caused a temporary stay in the proceedings. And it was deemed best to delay Slidell's departure until the receipt of official assurance from the Mexican government, or at least of very definite information from the administration's agents, regarding his reception. 38 Black, accordingly, was instructed to secure a definite pledge from those in authority that an American minister, if sent, should not be rejected, while Slidell was told of his selection for the mission and instructed to hold himself ready for secret departure at a moment's notice. 39
On November 6 despatches were received through Commodore Connor, commanding the United States Squadron in the Gulf of Mexico, that Mexico was ready to renew friendly relations and “receive a Minister from the U. States.” 40 The President and secretary of state, therefore, decided to send Slidell at once, and agreed upon the general character of his instructions, which the latter drafted in rough form for cabinet discussion. 41 Two days later, Parrott arrived from Mexico with the original note of the secretary of foreign affairs, agreeing to the reception of a diplomatic agent from the United States; and also with assurances that the question of boundaries could be adjusted with Mexico in a satisfactory manner. 42 That same night a commission as “Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Mexico,” and official instructions were forwarded by special bearer to Slidell at Pensacola. 43
These instructions, which had been agreed to unanimously by the cabinet, were of considerable length and, except as they relate to California, need not detain us here. 44 In regard to that territory, however, Buchanan wrote: “There is another subject of vast importance to the United States, which will demand your particular attention.” 45 . . .
The government of California is now but nominally dependent on Mexico; and it is more than doubtful whether her authority will ever be reinstated. Under these circumstances, it is the desire of the President that you shall use your best efforts to obtain a cession of that Province from Mexico to the United States. . . . Money would be no object when compared with the value of this acquisition. . . . The President would not hesitate to give, in addition to the assumption of the just claims of our citizens on Mexico, twenty-five millions of dollars for the cession. 46
This offer of twenty-five millions, continued the instructions, was to be made for a line extending west from the southern boundary of New Mexico; or for any line that should include Monterey within the territory ceded to the United States. If this could not be obtained twenty millions were to be offered for a boundary “commencing at any point on the western line of New Mexico, and running due West to the Pacific, so as to include the bay and harbor of San Francisco.” Elsewhere the importance attached to the acquisition of San Francisco by the administration was similarly shown. “The possession of the Bay and harbor of San Francisco,” Slidell had been told, “is all important to the United States. The advantages to us of its acquisition are so striking that it would be a waste of time to enumerate them here.” It is well to remember this in connection with the question of the influence of slavery upon Polk's determination to possess California.
The difficulties Slidell met with in Mexico and his final rejection by the Paredes government are too well known to require mention at this time. 47 His despatches to the state department relating to California, also, for the most part belong to a subsequent discussion. It should be noted, however, that a certain phase of the administration's policy received considerable emphasis at this time. On December 17, Buchanan sent a communication to Slidell again urging upon him the importance of securing the cession of the California territory specified in his instructions, as it “would secure incalculable advantages” to the United States. At the same time he was authorized to make the payment of six millions of dollars, cash, upon the exchange of treaty ratifications. 48
In February, after Slidell had left Mexico City, there seemed to be some prospect of making good use of this cash payment plan because of the pressing financial needs of the new government. “Aware that financial embarrassments alone can induce those in power to enter upon negotiations with the United States,” wrote Slidell on the 6th, “I took care before leaving the Capital to convey through a person having confidential relations with the President a hint that those embarrassments might be relieved if satisfactory arrangements for boundary should be made.” 49
To this Buchanan replied that the United States would readily come to the assistance of Paredes, if he should bring about a satisfactory settlement of the boundary question; and that funds would be available immediately for the Mexican President upon the ratification of the treaty by his government. 50 A few days later Polk took preliminary steps to have such funds as might be necessary for the carrying out of this purpose placed at his disposal by confidentially arranging with C. J. Ingersoll, chairman of the house committee on foreign affairs, and with Representative Cullom of Tennessee to introduce a bill authorizing a million dollars for this object, if at any time such method of procedure should be deemed advisable. 51 Here, then, we have the beginning of a policy the administration was to follow pretty consistently throughout the whole course of the Mexican War. It was embodied, it is scarcely necessary to remark, in the “two million” and “three million” bills of Wilmot Proviso fame; and, indirectly, in the return of Santa Anna.
But before this despatch reached Slidell, he was on his way home, thoroughly disgusted and disgruntled with the tortuous course of Mexican diplomacy. Polk had failed in his attempt to purchase California as Jackson and Tyler had failed before him, and for precisely the same reason, namely, the fear of the ruling faction in Mexico that any alienation of territory would be followed by a revolution before which they would go down in ruin. 52
Demoralized situation in California.—Though nothing had come of Slidell's attempt to secure California by negotiation, Polk's line of effort, as has been said, was by no means limited to this one method. Even while his minister was seeking to obtain recognition from the Mexican government, the President was setting another agency at work to bring about the desired acquisition. But before considering what may be called Polk's internal policy regarding California, we must devote some space to the conditions existing there, especially with respect to the feeling of the inhabitants toward Mexico, and the significance of American immigration.
At the time Polk came into office, affairs were in such a state in California that it was generally recognized that the native leaders would soon throw off allegiance to Mexico and attempt an independent government or seek the protection of some more powerful nation, either the United States, England, or France. The hold of Mexico was miserably weak and ineffective. Internal discords and national debility rendered the task of preserving her own autonomy sufficiently difficult, and made the just government or adequate protection of so distant a province impossible. Upon this point there is universal agreement among writers. Sir George Simpson, describing California as it was in 1842, has given an un-exaggerated picture of the lack of intercourse between the parent government and her political offspring.
“From what has been said,” he writes near the close of his book,
It will not appear strange that the intercourse between California and Mexico has never been active. . . . Mexico has more intercourse with China than with California. . . . Advices are not received in Mexico from Monterey above once or twice in a year. The last deputy elected by California to the Mexican Congress informed me that during the two years he served, he only received two letters from California while in Mexico. 53
Wilkes, too, on his voyage of exploration, though “prepared for anarchy and confusion” was surprised to find “a total absence of all government in California and even its form and ceremonies thrown aside.” 54
Nor was the military oversight exercised by Mexico any more efficient than the political. The fort at Monterey, the capital, and port of entry for the whole province, had not sufficient powder to salute the vessel upon which Simpson was a passenger, but had to borrow from the ship itself for the purpose. 55 Guarding the long inland reaches of San Francisco Bay, “where all the navies of the world might ride in safety,” and through whose gates men thought the commerce of the east would shortly pass, Wilkes found a garrison of a single officer, in charge of a single barefooted private, and the former was absent when Wilkes arrived. 56 The naval force consisted of but one vessel. That mounted no gun of any kind, and was so poorly manned that it could not make progress beating against the wind. 57
Further citations might be made, almost ad libitum, to show the complete neglect of the civil and military needs of California by the home government. But these would be useless. The local officials, continually appealing for aid, were met with nothing more substantial than promises, exhortations to defend the country themselves from threatened dangers; or, as we shall see presently, with that which was worse than even this utter lack of assistance. 58
Revolution against Micheltorena.—Under such circumstances it is not surprising to find the Californians setting aside Mexican laws whenever it suited their fancy, and almost as frequently deposing the governor sent out by the supreme government. 59 The revolution of 1836, resulting in the overthrow of Gutierrez, has already been mentioned. But this was only one of a numerous series. One writer has remarked that between 1831 and 1841, the government of California changed hands on an average of once a year; while the province not infrequently was “blessed with two governors at a time and once with triplets.” 60
The period between 1841 and the occupation of Monterey by Commodore Sloat, was scarcely less free than the decade just mentioned from civil disturbances. In 1842, General Micheltorena was sent from Mexico as governor, with an “army” for the defense of the province. The army consisted of some two or three hundred choice spirits picked, for the most part, from the national jails, and was a cause of constant bitterness and annoyance, even of actual fear, to the Californians. 61
“Not one individual among them,” said Robinson, who was present in California when the battalion arrived, “possessed a jacket or pantaloons; but naked and like savage Indians, they concealed their nudity with dirty, miserable blankets.” 62 And what was even worse, he adds, a drill by daylight was usually followed by thieving expeditions at night. So that the general feeling in California over this latest acquisition from Mexico was similar to that of a former Governor of the province, who wrote respecting the colonists sent by Spain to aid in the settlement of the country, that, to take a charitable view of the subject, their absence “for a couple of centuries, at a distance of a million of leagues would prove beneficial to the province and redound to the service of God and the glory of the king.” 63
The presence of Micheltorena's thieving soldiers and the general character of his rule soon furnished the California leaders, Castro and Alvarado, an excuse for revolt. The first outbreak occurred in November, 1844; and on December 1st, Micheltorena signed a treaty binding himself to ship his undesirable followers out of the country within three months. The agreement, however, was not kept, and the Californians again took up arms. With the details of this revolution we have no concern, except to note the rather curious fact that of the foreigner residents who took any part at all in it, some joined with Micheltorena, and some with Castro and Alvarado. In the single battle of the campaign, however, they did no actual fighting on either side, as the list of casualties for the whole day's encounter—two horses killed by the one force and a mule wounded by the other—fully testifies. 64
After this slaughter, Micheltorena was ready to capitulate, and in March, 1845, left California with the most of his ragged soldiery. 65 Although there were rumors at the time that this revolt was aimed to bring about separation from Mexico, these probably contained little truth. The Californians desired freedom in local affairs; and many of them cherished no great love for Mexico; but they hesitated to abrogate her authority entirely, not feeling strong enough to stand alone and fearing lest the protection afforded by a stronger power might prove more of a calamity than the neglect of Mexico. 66 In the northern part of the province, nevertheless, men of influence were driven by the desperate condition of affairs into recognizing the necessity of some radical change, either along the lines of complete imdependence or of coming under the protection of a more stable government than that of Mexico.
This feeling was greatly increased by the internal discord that prevailed even after the departure of the Mexican governor. Pio Pico, one of the southern leaders against Micheltorena, was chosen by vote of the assembly to take his place; while José Castro held the office of comandante general. Between these two, the latter representing the party of the north, the former the party of the south, peace was destined to be short lived. The removal of the capital from Monterey to Los Angeles, and the resultant separation of the civil offices by a distance of more than four hundred miles from the military headquarters, custom house, and treasury, made harmony among the native authorities still more unlikely.
During the summer of 1845 various dissensions arose. Civil war seemed imminent, and especially to foreign residents and Californians with property at stake the outlook was most discouraging. 67 “The country never was in a more disorderly, miserable condition than at the present moment,” wrote a friend to Alfred Robinson, who was then in New York, “we have no government. Pio Pico who was nominally governor has been arrested and imprisoned. The people at the north, as usual, are opposed to those of the south, and will be satisfied by none other than Alvarado for chief magistrate.” 68
Such disorganization and political uncertainty, together with the lax control exercised by Mexico, and the actual hostility to her interference in local affairs, had a three-fold result. Many of the Californians became reconciled to exchanging their allegiance to Mexico for any form of government that furnished protection and peace; it became generally recognized by those outside of California that the time was near for some such change to take place; and, finally, Polk was led to take active measures to bring the separation, when it came, to good account for the United States.
As the political conditions in California were favorable to the American interests during the opening months of Polk's administration, so also was the influx of immigration from across the mountains. From the chance and temporary bands of hunters who followed Jedediah Smith and the Patties, this movement had grown in 1844 to the organized companies of Bartleson and Kelsey. A year later the tide had come to a full head and the annual arrivals were numbered by the hundreds.
Frémont's report.—Then, as now, California had her publicity agents whose duty it was to attract settlers. By order of the government, Frémont, whose second exploring expedition 69 had led him across the Sierras, 70 published a report of his wanderings during the first part of 1845. His book was immediately seized upon by a public hungering for news of the regions west of the Rocky Mountains. 71 Written in a terse and interesting style, it at once brought its author into prominence and drew the attention of hundreds of readers to the country of which he wrote.
Though only a portion of the complete report dealt with California, 72 no other part was equal to this in graphic description. After a month of constant battle with the snows and starvation of the mountains, 73 Frémont and his party had reached the valley of the Sacramento at a time of the year when it was to be seen at its best. The contrast between the life and death struggle in the Sierras and this land of grass and flowers, well watered and timbered, full of game, and with the same “deep-blue sky and sunny climate of Smyrna and Palermo,” was most dramatic in its appeal to the imagination. 74 One does not wonder that visitors, eager to hear more of this new land, so crowded upon the American explorer that he was compelled to secure a separate building for his workshop; 75 while Webster, still the friend of annexation, invited him to dine and “talk about California.” 76
Magazine and newspaper activities.—But Frémont was only one of a numerous band of writers who sang the praises of California, and preached, either directly or indirectly, its acquisition during this period. Alfred Robinson (whose book has already been quoted in these pages) published his Life in California, during the early part of 1846. The author had been for many years a resident of the country of which he wrote, as agent for the large Boston firm of Bryant and Sturgis, and his work at once found wide popularity. Its influence upon the public—and the same may be said of most of the contemporaneous writings of a similar nature—is shown by the following extract from a review of that day in Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, which also gives us pretty accurately the spirit of the time regarding California.
“When we reflect,” said the writer, after speaking of the importance of California to the United States,
that this superb region is adequate to the sustaining of twenty millions of people; has for several hundred years been in the possession of an indolent and limited population, incapable from their character of appreciating its resources—that no improvement can be expected under its present control, we cannot but hope that thousands of our fellow countrymen will pour in and accelerate the happy period (which the work before us assures us cannot be distant) when Alta California will become part and parcel of our great confederation; and the cry of Oregon is only a precursor to the actual settlement of this more southern, more beautiful and far more valuable region. 77
But California was not compelled to rely altogether upon such formal publications, as we have mentioned, for publicity. Americans residing there wrote constantly to friends at home or to the newspapers of “the States” in such a vein as was best calculated to attract the attention of future emigrants. 78 Emphasis in these communications, as usual, was laid upon the advantages of California from commercial and agricultural standpoints, San Francisco, especially, being held up as a necessary possession for the welfare of the United States. And, in addition, assurances were given that nothing stood in the way of those desiring to settle in the new region, either in the nature of passports, or of difficulties in securing land.
“A foreigner,” said an authoritative article in the New York Sun, “can become a citizen of California by obtaining two signatures to his petition. He then possesses the right to take up vacant land, and may secure as much as eleven square leagues upon the payment of $26 in fees. Many grants held by such owners are 33 miles long and 3 miles wide.” 79 “The fertile plains of Oregon and California,” said another communication to the same paper, “are resounding with the busy hum of industry; all around us are the germs of empire, prosperity and wealth. Those who would reap a harvest should come out young, secure their lands, and in ten years they will have their fortunes.” 80
These articles descriptive of California and urging its annexation to the United States, were not confined to the papers of any one locality or party. The New York Journal of Commerce of March 5, contained an article entitled, “California Coming,” which declared the advantages to be gained from an acquisition of that territory would prove as great as those derived from the annexation of Texas and asserted that throughout the country there was general agreement as to the advisability of securing it. 81 “Information in regard to this favored portion of the globe,” said the New Orleans Courier, in referring to California, “is eagerly sought after by our citizens as it is destined ere long to be annexed to the United States. 82 And even the American Review, the stanch organ of the Whigs, in a long and carefully written article urged the importance of securing California for the commercial and agricultural advantages that would thereby result to this government; and because of the inability of Mexico to make use of its resources. 83
The New York papers, especially the Sun, Herald, and Journal of Commerce, were among the most active of the publications in keeping California before the public eye. They took pains to print any article coming within their notice regarding it; and, in addition, had a regular correspondent living in Monterey in the person of Thomas O. Larkin. 84 Indeed, it may be said without fear of exaggeration, that most of the communications published in these three papers on the subject of California originated with Larkin. And, owing to the custom of “exchange” prevalent at the time, most of these found space in other journals throughout the country. 85
Proposed railroad to California.—The interest of the Sun in this subject was rather strikingly shown by a letter from one of its editors, A. E. Beach, to his correspondent mentioned above. After thanking Larkin for the valuable information already furnished, Beach continued:
News from your quarter is looked for with deep interest here. Just now there are strong opinions that California will be joined to the United States. . . . We flatter ourselves that the New York Sun, will, if such a thing be possible, cause the measure to be carried into execution. Texas, owing almost entirely to the influence of this paper, has been annexed, and now, our editors say, “Why not California?” A letter which you wrote us some time since describing Monterey and harbor . . . seemed to have acted strongly on the public mind, and owing to what we have since said, they now look with a longing eye toward California. We have urged the purchase of it and that the contemplated railroad to Oregon should be turned to Monterey.
We wish, if convenient, you would give us your opinion of having a R. R. to Monterey and tell us where would be the best point to have it terminate.
You may judge what influence we have, from the fact that since we have spoken of Monterey as the terminus several persons are on the eve of starting for that place to purchase lands. 86
This railroad project mentioned by Beach was at that time a subject of considerable speculation throughout the country, and the idea of securing the rich trade of China and the Sandwich Islands, without the long journey around the Horn, appealed to all those interested in commercial ventures. Asa Whitney's plan for a transcontinental line to Oregon received much attention and was laid before Congress near the close of October, 1845. 87 Many, however, who believed in the ultimate success of the undertaking, as in the case of the editor of the New York paper, advocated Monterey or San Francisco as the terminus, 88 thereby making the acquisition of these communities by the United States still more desirable.
Increased Immigration.—The western papers, in addition to such descriptions as were contained in those of the eastern states, were concerned with the actual organization and departure of emigrant companies. 89 Any report of the discovery of a shorter route to the new land at once received public notice; 90 while not infrequently such an advertisement as the following made its appearance in a local paper, to be copied by many another western editor:
“Emigration” (read the headline of this sample notice) For California—A large party of settlers propose leaving Arkansas for California, next May. 91 The chairman of the Committee of Arrangements gives notice in the Little Rock Gazette that the Californians will rendezvous at Fort Smith, Arkansas, on the first Monday in April next, preparatory to taking up the line of march for the Pacific Coast. Every person starting is expected to be well armed with a rifle or heavy shot-gun, 16 pounds of shot or lead, 4 pounds of powder, etc. 92
As a result of all this publicity, emigration to California received a decided impetus. In May, 1845, it was commonly reported that 7000 persons had assembled at Independence, Missouri, ready to take the road to Oregon and California. 93 In November, Larkin informed the state department that some three hundred or four hundred of this company had arrived at the headwaters of San Francisco Bay. 94 From this time on, arrivals continued in a steady stream; while exaggerated rumors of future immigration were flying thickly through the province.
As early as July 15, Sutter had predicted the arrival of “more as 1000 Souls” within six or eight weeks. 95 Marsh was confident that two thousand immigrants would shortly be in the territory. 96 Stephen Smith, writing to Calhoun from Bodega, placed the number actually on the border at one thousand. 97 And a little later a report reached Larkin that the number would soon be increased by ten or twenty thousand, though the writer added that he himself did not believe more than two or three thousand would really come. 98
Mention has been made of the emigration from Oregon to California in the years previous to 1845. The same movement continued to supply the latter territory with much of its American population. Many of these came directly from the northern country; others starting originally for the Columbia, decided èn route to change their destination to California. 99 The usual division point for such parties was at Fort Hall, which still remained in the hands of the Hudson's Bay Company; and it was reported that British officers at the Fort were taking a hand in this proceeding, persuading Oregon bound settlers to turn off for California in order to preserve the Columbia to England. 100 On the other hand, it should be remarked that English papers condemned the so-called emigration to Oregon, which was creating so much excitement throughout the United States, as simply a ruse for the occupation of California. 101
Between the Americans most interested in the respective settlement of the two territories, a good deal of rivalry prevailed. Among the Oregon enthusiasts a committee was organized to counteract the representations of the California agents; 102 while the latter pursued an even more aggressive campaign in winning recruits for the colonization of the southern country. 103
“The Texas Game.”—This emigration to California, during 1845 and the first months in 1846, of which we have just been speaking, was prompted by more than a desire for mere settlement. “Once let the tide . . . flow toward California,” wrote one of Larkin's New York friends, “and the American population will be sufficiently numerous to play the Texas game.” 104 “Are there not enough wild Yankees in California to take the management of affairs in their own hands?” asked another, adding that the United States must eventually spread south of the 42d parallel, “as our territory on the Pacific is too narrow altogether, the outlet is not sufficient for the back country.” 105 A third believed two or three hundred Yankee riflemen, in conjunction with the Californians, could bring about a separation from Mexico, and suggested that as the thirty Americans taken by the British Government in the Canadian revolt and sent to New South Wales, were even then at Honolulu on their way home, they might find more congenial occupation in California than in the States. 106
“We only want the Flag of the U. S. and a good lot of Yankees and you would soon see the immense natural riches of the country developed, and her commerce in a flourishing condition. To see that Flag planted here would be most acceptable to the Sons of Uncle Sam, and by no means repugnant to the native population,” 107 wrote Stephen Smith, who had recently been released, for lack of evidence, from a charge of conspiring to declare California independent. 108 It was probably, therefore, with some idea of fulfilling these expectations that many of the immigrants reached the province.
Proposed union with Texas.—Aside from the plan of uniting California with the United States after its separation from Mexico, the idea also prevailed of making it an independent nation, dominating the commerce of the Pacific and enriching itself from the Asiatic trade. In the early years, as we have seen, the plan had been broached of annexing it to Texas. 109 And as late as 1844, 110 Houston wrote to Murphy that a nation embracing Texas, California, Oregon and the two provinces of Chihuahua and Sonora would “not be less than a rival power to any of the nations now in existence. . . . It is impossible to look upon the map of North America and not perceive the rationale of the project.” 111 A few months later Donelson found him awaiting the action of the United States Congress on annexation, but still revolving a plan for the increase of Texan domain, dwelling with some fondness “upon the capacity of Texas to extend her territory to the Pacific and even detach Oregon from us, because there are no Alleghanies to separate them; 112 while in April, 1845, the London Times was urging the adoption of a similar measure, so that the territory in question might possess “an original character and an independent existence.” 113
California and Oregon as an independent nation.—All of these schemes, however, came to an end with the annexation of Texas by the United States. But the conception of an autonomous nation, composed of Oregon and California, still proved very attractive to many minds. It was an old idea, tracing its origin back at least to 1812, when the father of American expansionists expressed his conviction that men of his own nationality would one day “spread themselves through the whole length of that coast [the Pacific], covering it with free and independent Americans, unconnected with us but by the ties of blood and interest, and employing like us the rights of self-government.” 114
The attention drawn to the whole Pacific coast by the Oregon controversy and the rapidly growing necessity for a change in the control of California, made Jefferson's prophecy appear to many the best solution for both problems. For it had long been felt that the vast distance separating Oregon and the United States, and the appalling difficulties of the route, would prevent its adequate government by the authorities at Washington. Nor did it seem possible to some minds that the western boundary of the Republic should extend beyond the Rocky Mountains. 115 To those who held such views it appeared both natural and expedient that California and Oregon should be united into a strong, independent country, settled by American emigrants, and standing on the Pacific as a sort of complementary nation to the United States.
“The situation of California,” said Wilkes in his official report, “will cause its separation from Mexico before many years. It is very probable that the country will become united with Oregon with which it will perhaps form a state that is designed to control the destiny of the Pacific. 116 A year or two later, Waddy Thompson assures us, he was told of a definite plot to separate California from Mexico and asked if the United States would be willing to surrender her title to Oregon so that that territory and California might be made into a Republic. 117 Benjamin E. Green sent much the same report to Calhoun, adding, however, that the Oregon settlers were not anxious for the plan, provided they could receive aid and encouragement from the United States in maintaining their hold upon Oregon. 118 In England, also, the idea of an independent state on the Pacific seems to have obtained some favor. Lord Ashburton wrote Webster that the power possessing Oregon and California should be independent of Great Britain and the United States, but of the English race; 119 while Louis McLane, when ambassador to England, in one of his despatches to Buchanan, spoke of the plan as having been “suggested simultaneously by certain classes on both sides of the Atlantic,” adding, it may be remarked, that such an arrangement would work untold disadvantage to this government. 120
References to this plan, likewise, were frequently met with in the debates in Congress. As late as March, 1846, in a discussion of the Oregon question, Senator Evans of Maine declared the union of that territory and California, separated as they were from the United States by an almost impassable barrier of mountains, would promote the interests of this country much more as an independent nation than as a territorial possession. 121 On the other hand, an opponent of Evans assured the senate that unless some action was speedily taken to settle the status of the region around the Columbia, the settlers there would place themselves under French or English protection, be joined by the Californians, and eventually control the coast from the Isthmus of Darien to the southern boundaries of Alaska. 122
As a local affair, the proposed union with Oregon aroused considerable speculation in California. Lansford W. Hastings had come to the province in 1842 with the express purpose, as we have seen, of bringing about its separation from Mexico and uniting it either with Texas or with Oregon, in the latter event making himself president of the new Republic. 123
In the intervening years his time had been occupied in efforts to encourage emigration throughout the United States, and with the conducting of parties, thus organized, into California. 124 By 1845 the idea of independence and union with Oregon was frequently mentioned in the correspondence of American residents, some of whom favored it above annexation to the United States. 125 Dr. John Marsh, one of the older settlers, communicated his views at some length to Larkin, but took the ground that California must first become part of the American Union and not attempt a separate existence with Oregon until immigration should render such a step advisable. 126 Continuing, Marsh said that the settlers on the Willamette were anxious to unite with the Californians, while some expressed a desire to join with Oregon. Under such circumstances he thought it would be wise if Larkin were to feel the pulse of Alvarado on the subject; and prophesied that, if the union could be accomplished, a new empire would arise on the Pacific, whose capital located on San Francisco Bay, “possibly on the site occupied by the miserable village of Yerba Buena,” would “in the next century become one of the great emporii 127 of the world.”
Rumors of Mormon Hegira.—In addition to this plan of uniting Oregon and California, another movement was reported to be on foot in the United States that would result in the separation of the latter from Mexico. “California now offers a field for the prettiest enterprise that has been undertaken in modern times,” Governor Ford is said to have written to Brigham Young, leader of the Mormons, early in 1845. “Why should it not be a pretty operation for your people to go out there, take possession of and capture a portion of that vacant country and establish an independent government of your own, subject only to the laws of nations?” 128
Whether, as appears very doubtful, such a letter were ever written is immaterial. 129 The fact remains that the conception of a Mormon empire on the Pacific proved so attractive to the leaders of this sect 130 that preparation was made to emigrate as a body to the region around San Francisco. Lansford W. Hastings, who had returned again to the United States to obtain more settlers, was easily prevailed upon to make himself a sort of advance agent for the host and made his way back to California to prepare the ground for their coming. 131
Reports of the design spread throughout the United States and aroused no little opposition, 132 the president, even, being petitioned to prevent the movement, but refusing because “the right of emigration or expatriation was one which any citizen possessed.” 133 Plans were made for an overland journey, to include the larger part of the Prophet's followers; while a smaller number were to be sent around by sea. This latter party, numbering nearly two hundred and forty, left New York in the Brooklyn on February 4, 1846, under the command of Samuel Brannan; while the main body, under Young, began its slow and toilsome way across the continent.
With neither of these companies has the present account much further concern. The one reached San Francisco on July 31, three weeks after Commodore Sloat's arrival, and tradition says that Brannan's first remark upon entering the harbor was, “There is that damned flag again.” 134 The other, so it is said, stopped at Salt Lake because messengers from California met them there with word of the American occupation.
New activities of Lansford W. Hastings.—Hastings, meanwhile, in California was prophesying its speedy independence and claiming the connivance of the United States government in his project. As early as November, a friend in Boston had written Larkin to conduct his business as he would have done had he been in Texas ten years before, with a knowledge of the changes that were to occur there. Capital, he went on, was to be spent colonizing California; and a revolution, backed by American men and money, would soon result. The settlement of Oregon was only a blind for the occupation of the Mexican province. “The egg is already laid not a thousand miles from Yerba Buena and in New York the chicken will be picked. Our men of war are not ordered to California for nothing.” 135 . . .
Hastings, as has been said, was advancing much the same idea of a strong backing in the United States, and even the sanction of the government. Thousands of people, he wrote Larkin, had their eyes turned to Oregon and California, determined to make a final move and establish a permanent home. The firm of Benson and Company was about to establish a large commercial house somewhere in the territory, and send two ships a year to the coast for the free transportation of colonists. Under pledge of secrecy he concluded, “The arrangement is a confidential government arrangement. The expense thus incurred is not borne by that house, but by our government, for the promotion of what object you will readily perceive.” 136
How much ground Hastings had for this statement cannot be known. His project plainly embraced a much wider scope than the single element of the Mormon settlement; and it is probable that the commercial firm mentioned in his letter was actually concerned in a scheme for colonizing certain portions of the country. It is scarcely possible, however, that the government had any hand in it, as he insisted and doubtless believed. 137
Native attitude toward the Americans.—Having spoken at length of the conditions existing in California, the feeling of the United States regarding its acquisition, the flow of immigration across the mountains that formed its eastern boundary, and the various rumors of independence current during the period, we come again to a discussion of the president's policy as it was affected by these circumstances. A further word, however, will be necessary to understand the attitude of the native Californians toward the Americans.
Naturally, the influx of strangers during the year 1845, and the known wish of the United States to possess California, caused some apprehension among those of its inhabitants who desired to see the province remain under Mexican control. But on the whole there was little in the treatment accorded the immigrants by the Californians of which they had a right to complain. Frequent orders requiring their expulsion came from Mexico, but they were uniformly set aside by the California officials. 138 Though sub-Prefect Guerrero, perhaps with much justification, wrote to Castro: “Friend, the idea these gentlemen have formed for themselves is, that God made the world and them also, therefore what there is in the world belongs to them as sons of God, 139 he seems to have taken no measures to expel the foreigners from his own district. And while Castro, with some heat, declared before a junta at Monterey, “these Americans are so contriving that some day they will build ladders to touch the sky, and once in the heavens they will change the whole face of the universe and even the color of the stars,” 140 he perhaps thought it useless to endeavor to keep them from changing the destiny of California.
Indeed, the only measures that looked toward putting a stop to immigration, aside from juntas and meetings of the assembly (which came to nothing), were a recommendation made by Castro and Vallejo to the central government to purchase the fort at New Helvetia from Sutter; 141 and an abortive expedition from Mexico that was intended to cope with the incoming Americans. The control of New Helvetia, had it been in California hands, could have been made a serious obstacle to the arrival of parties across the Sierras; but though Sutter encouraged the suggested purchase, the proposition got no further than the Mexican archives. The second expedient met with no better success, ending in charges of extravagance, corruption, and the final revolt of such soldiers as had been assembled, even before they left Mexico, most of them turning from the expedition to aid Paredes in his contest with Herrera. 142
Larkin as Polk's informant.—Of the progress of all these events in California, Polk was well informed. Not merely did he have the usual channels of news, which, as we have seen, kept the public aware of much that transpired in the province; but in Thomas O. Larkin he had an additional source of reliable and frequent information. 143 The American consul's despatches, from the time of his appointment, dealt with the four or five broad topics that were of vital interest to the authorities at Washington in forming their California policy. These were, first, the condition of California from a political and military point of view and the strength of its loyalty to Mexico; second, the sentiment among the inhabitants toward the United States; third, the progress of American immigration and the reception of American settlers; fourth, the influence of European nations in the affairs of the province.
Omitting his references to the last subject, for the present, we find that on the remaining questions Larkin's communications to the state department gave full and important information. Especially did he emphasize the friendly feeling existing toward the American residents and the lack of attachment to Mexico. The military strength of the province he placed at two hundred and eighty Mexican troops and a smaller number of Californians, with a militia theoretically numbering one thousand, but practically not amounting to one-tenth of that force. The effectiveness of even this small army was decreased by half, he added, as part of it was stationed at San Francisco, in the northern part of the state, and part at San Diego, in the southern. Monterey had no cannon; and, to complete the demoralization, the Californians feared the Mexican troops more than those of a foreign nation, and would gladly welcome the return of an American squadron such as Jones had brought. 144
The revolt against Micheltorena was made the subject of considerable comment, Larkin mentioning as an aside that within twelve years four revolutions had occurred, all of which had been won by the Californians; and that five of the six Mexican generals, arriving during that time, had been sent back, while the remaining one had died. In conclusion he left the impression that the movement had resulted in the independence of the country, de facto, if not de jure. 145
The effect of this early information is seen in the despatches sent to Commodore Sloat by the secretary of the navy, when, in the summer of 1845, war between this country and Mexico seemed imminent. “The Mexican ports on the Pacific,” wrote George Bancroft in these confidential instructions, are said to be open and defenceless. If you ascertain with certainty that Mexico has declared war against the United States, you will at once possess yourself of the harbor of San Francisco and blockade or occupy such other ports as your force may permit. . . . You will be careful to preserve, if possible, the most friendly relations with the inhabitants, and, where you can do so, you will encourage them to adopt a course of neutrality. 146
Two later despatches from Larkin, received in the fall of that year, 147 simply reiterated the opinions he had expressed in his former communication, laying emphasis in addition upon the designs of France and England on the province, a matter, as we shall see, that caused the administration no small anxiety.
Larkin's instructions.—At this time Polk was making arrangements to send Slidell upon the mission already mentioned. On October 17, while the question of the American minister's reception was so much in doubt as to delay his departure, Buchanan addressed a long, confidential letter to the consul, who, from Monterey, had furnished the government with so much of its valuable information. In this letter to Larkin, the internal policy the administration was determined to pursue regarding California was clearly outlined; and, by the appointment of Larkin as confidential agent to carry out the terms, definitely set in motion.
So much has been written regarding this despatch, since Bancroft first brought it to light, and it has been printed, either wholly or in part, so frequently that, important as it is, a mere summary of its contents will be sufficient here. 148 Aside from the notification it carried to Larkin of his appointment as confidential agent, it instructed him to guard against the encroachments and influence of foreign nations in California; to cultivate friendly relations with the inhabitants in every way possible on behalf of this government, and assure them that, if they declared their independence, the United States stood ready to receive them under her protection, whenever this could be done “without affording Mexico just cause of complaint”; and finally, to forward frequent communications to the department regarding the internal conditions of the province (with a list of its leading citizens and officials), its trade and commercial affairs, and the amount and character of the American immigration.
Three copies of this despatch left Washington. One went to Slidell to aid him in his negotiations with Mexico; 149 one was sent by way of Cape Horn and Honolulu on the U. S. S. Congress; and the third was entrusted to Lieutenant Archibald H. Gillespie of the marine corps. Going overland through Mexico, Gillespie was forced to destroy the written document in his possession, but before doing so memorized its contents.
Gillespie, however, was much more than a bearer of despatches. To him, as to Larkin, Polk had entrusted the carrying out of his policy in California, and an effort was made to keep his identity a secret. So, travelling as an invalid merchant seeking health, he reached Monterey on April 17, 1846, 150 delivering to Larkin the news of his appointment and writing out from memory the instructions Buchanan had drawn up six months before. 151
Bear Flag Revolt.—For the most part, the actual proceedings of Larkin and Gillespie in California after this time lie beyond the scope of the present narrative. In connection with the Bear Flag Revolt, and Frémont's participation therein, however, it will be necessary to go into some detail to determine whether or not it was a part of the president's policy to put such a movement into operation. To understand clearly the situation, we must note again that California's separation from Mexico could be achieved in two ways—by a revolt of the native Californians, aided by American residents; or by an uprising of the American residents against the native Californians. This condition was distinctly different, as will be readily seen, from that which had existed in Texas when Houston led the settlers there in the struggle for independence.
We have mentioned that Gillespie and Larkin were to serve as Polk's agents in California. The same mission was also entrusted to John C. Frémont, whose first arrival in California has been spoken of, and who had returned on his third exploring tour at the head of sixty-five men, reaching the province early in December, 1845. 152 It is not our purpose to follow the story of his difficulties with the California authorities (after they had given him permission to winter in the territory under their jurisdiction) and the affair at Hawk's Peak. 153
It is worth while, however, to add a suggestion to account for the sudden change of front on the part of Prefect Manuel Castro and his peremptory order of March 5 that the American commander quit the country. The reasons for this have been variously given as the receipt of orders from Mexico (none of which Castro would have obeyed unless he pleased); 154 the violation of a tacit agreement by Frémont to remain at some distance from the California settlements; 155 and the mere desire of the prefect to send a report of his zeal to Mexico, without having any hostile intentions whatever toward the strangers. 156 There seems to be sufficient ground, however, for adding as a fourth explanation, the influence of the British vice-consul, Alexander Forbes, who protested formally in the name of his government against the presence of Frémont and his followers in the department. 157 Castro, not only willing to make a show of pleasing Forbes, but fearing the displeasure of the Mexican government if he paid no heed to this remonstrance, had nothing else to do than bid the intruder be gone.
It was not long after this that Gillespie reached Monterey. In addition to the instructions for Larkin, he carried a note of introduction from Buchanan to Frémont and a package of letters to the same individual from Senator Benton, Frémont's father-in-law. 158 Without lingering long at Monterey, Gillespie hastened on to Yerba Buena in pursuit of Frémont, who, by this time, was well on his way to Oregon. At Yerba Buena, Gillespie spent some days with the American vice-consul, W. A. Leidesdorff, and then continued his journey, finally overtaking the explorer in the heart of the Oregon woods.
What passed between Gillespie and Frémont it would be interesting to know. No written instructions were sent to the latter by Buchanan, and even those given to Gillespie are not on file. Yet, both from the testimony of Frémont and Gillespie, and the nature of the case, these could not have differed in substance from those received by Larkin. 159 Gillespie, however, believed in active measures and was well aware of the probable outbreak of a war with Mexico. 160 In addition Frémont had the letters of Benton, which, under guise of family matters, “contained certain passages enigmatical and obscure,” 161 bearing upon the subject of California's destiny. How largely responsible these were for the subsequent course of Frémont, will probably never be known.
He and Gillespie, returning at once to California, found the settlers on the Sacramento in a fit mood to revolt against the Californians. By encouraging these, if not actually becoming the leaders of the movement, they gave to it the aspect of having been begun with the sanction of the United States government; when, in reality, it was exactly contrary to the policy Polk had endeavored to carry into execution; and, furthermore, distinctly at variance with the course pursued by Larkin, the third of the administration's agents.
The consul, it is true, expected Frémont's arrival to result in important changes in the destiny of California. 162 And Gillespie had written him from San Francisco, on his way to find Frémont, that the Americans of that region had voluntarily expressed themselves in favor of a change, while one of them was already circulating the constitution of Texas. 163 But he had added that the Californians themselves were dissatisfied, and inferred that they were ready also to join the movement.
It needs scarcely be said that this latter idea constituted the sum and substance of Larkin's plan. 164 Moreover, he was in a fair way of bringing about a unification of the Californians with the American cause when the settlers' revolt completely upset his calculations, caused the California leaders to forget their mutual jealousies, 165 and joined them in common cause against the United States.
Larkin's activities, between his appointment as confidential agent and the outbreak of the Bear Flag revolution, had taken various forms. To several of the leading Americans, who had become Mexican citizens, he wrote a circular letter, embodying much of the news contained in the despatch from Buchanan, and urging them to aid in winning over the Californians. 166 One of these, Abel Stearns, he appointed his confidential assistant in the south. 167 By personal interviews with the most influential men of the north, with all of whom he was well acquainted, and by promises of future reward to those who advanced the interests of the United States, he sought to bring his plan into favor with the native leaders. 168 And, finally, he endeavored to influence the action of various juntas by persuading those known to be friendly to the American interests to attend as delegates. 169
As has been said, these efforts gave promise of succeeding. Several of the principal Californians had come over definitely to Larkin's side. 170 And General Castro, in the presence of other influential men of the department, had drawn up “a short history of his plans for declaring California independent in 1847-8, as soon as a sufficient number of foreigners should arrive.” 171 From the southern portion of the province equally encouraging reports were received; 172 and it is no wonder that the word of the taking of Sonora and the imprisonment of several of the California leaders, among whom was M. G. Vallejo, the most powerful man of the province, and a chief supporter of American annexation, caused Larkin unwelcome perplexity and surprise. 173
“Why this affair has happened—how or by who[m] I cannot imagine—I am not sure it is true,” 174 he wrote when the report first reached him. Frémont he considered “culpable for moving in the affair of the Bear Party, and perhaps putting the party in motion.” “The Bear Party have broke all friendship and good feeling in Cala. towards our government,” 175 was his final judgment on the matter. And with this judgment, it would seem, history must agree.
Why Gillespie and Frémont pursued the course they did will never be known with certainty. Nor is it our purpose to examine into the possible causes they later claimed in justification of their act. 176 Whether, as some insist, it was through a desire to assume the rôle in California that Houston filled in Texas, 177 cannot be stated with positiveness; yet this seems the most reasonable explanation. The influence of Benton in the proceedings may also have played an important part. Three years after the event, a former member of Polk's cabinet wrote, “The utter prostration of Van Buren and of course his [Benton's] own hopes has made him frantic—rumor speaks of his emigration to California and it may be to carry out some such scheme as many attributed to him when Frémont was sent out with his proclamation.” 178
But whatever the motive—and it may have been entirely patriotic—Frémont and Gillespie certainly had no official sanction for what they did. Bancroft, Royce, and others, have shown how utterly inconsistent it would have been had Polk instructed Larkin to do all in his power to conciliate the native inhabitants and assure them of the friendship of the United States; and at the same time advised the two remaining agents to stir up a revolution against those very inhabitants. The whole policy of Polk with regard to California, on the contrary, was one of pacification. Even after war had been declared against Mexico, those who had the conquest of that province in charge were ordered to follow out this idea, and “to endeavor to establish the supremacy of the American flag without any strife with the people of California.” 179
Polk's own statement, moreover, clears up any remaining doubt. “A false statement is being attempted by the opposition,” reads his diary for March 21, 1848, “to be made to the effect that this letter to Mr. Larkin contained instructions to produce a revolution in California before Mexico commenced the War against the U. S., and that Col. Frémont had the authority to make the revolution. The publication of the letter will prove the falsehood of such an inference.” 180
In summing up Polk's policy with regard to California, we may therefore say that it involved no scheme of rebellion on the part of the American settlers against the provincial authorities. It did, however, include a most earnest attempt at purchase; and, in addition, a systematic effort to win over the Californians to a desire for the protection of the United States, and tacit encouragement to separate from Mexico. Whether or not Polk actually brought on the Mexican War as a more certain method of securing the coveted territory (or as Winthrop expressed it, “had there been no California there would have been no Mexican War”) we are not now prepared to say. Two remaining topics, however, must receive some attention before we bring this discussion to a close. The one concerns the effect of the rumored attempts of European nations to secure a foothold in California, and the other the part played by the slave holding south in its acquisition.
3. Niles' Register, LXIII, 242; Larkin to James G. Bennett of the New York Herald, Feb. 2, 1842. Larkin MSS., II, No. 6.
4. Baltimore American, Dec. 24, 1842, reprinted in Niles' Register, LXIII, 277.
5. For the order against foreigners issued by the Mexican government, see above, The Quarterly, XVIII, 35-36. The Californians opposed no objection or obstacle to the coming of the Americans. Bancroft, XXI, 380.
6. Bancroft, XXI, 389-392; Hinckley to Larkin, July 20, 1843, notes the arrival of forty immigrants of respectable character under Hastings. He thought the country would soon be overstocked if the influx continued. Larkin MSS., II, No. 24.
7. Bancroft, XXI, 393-395.
8. Ibid., 444 et seq., notes two considerable parties—one under Andrew Kelsey of thirty-six persons, and the other under Elisha Stevens of nearly one hundred. The latter brought the first wagon ever used in a complete overland trip. See also Sutter to Larkin, July 7 and Aug. 8; Bidwell to Larkin, Dec. 13, 1844; Larkin MSS., II, Nos. 140, 157, 286.
From this on no attempt is made to follow in detail the arrival of emigrant parties, though note is usually made of the more important.
9. Niles' Register, LXV, 353.
10. Larkin to Secretary of State, Aug. 16, 1844. Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 4; same to same, Aug. 18, Ibid., No. 9; same to R. J. Walker, Aug. 4, Ibid., No. 11.
11. Among these may be mentioned Thomas Jefferson Farnham's Travels in California and Scenes in the Pacific Ocean (New York. 1844); Charles Wilkes' Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition (Philadelphia.Lea and Blanchard. 1844, 1845); L. W. Hastings, Emigrant's Guide to Oregon to Oregon and California (Cincinnati. 1845), etc. Most of these gave the usual descriptions of the political conditions of California, and of its commercial and agricultural advantages. All devote considerable space to San Francisco. For the influence exerted in this way, especially by Farnham, see Thwaites, Early Western Travels, XXVIII, 14; and McMaster, History of the United States, VII, 297. Hastings's efforts in connection with immigration will be considered later. Wilkes's narrative, only a small part of which dealt with California, ran through several editions. A somewhat scathing review of the contributions made by Wilkes is to be found in the North American Review, XVI, 54-107.
Larkin also was busy at this time encouraging immigration. Besides his despatches to the State Department, already noted, he collected information regarding all arrivals and sent communications to the American papers tending to arouse an interest in California. See, for example, Larkin to Sutter, April 29, 1844; Larkin, Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 7; Robinson to Larkin, Sept. 24, 1844; Larkin MSS., II, No. 210.
12. For a general description of trading conditions along the coast, see Larkin, Description of California (Commerce). Duties of the principal vessels amounted to sums ranging from $5000 to $25,000. A storage charge of twelve and a half cents (one real) was made for each large bale, and half the amount for wharfage. Tonnage dues were $1.50 per ton. There were no health or quarantine regulations, and no further port charges or fees. There were no prohibitions or restrictions as to the class of imports, no bounty or navigation acts and no drawbacks. Smuggling was common, and the bribery of California customs officials a recognized part of the trade.
The following table of customs receipts shows pretty clearly the relative volume of trade from 1839 to 1845:
Larkin to Secretary of State, Dec. 31, 1845. Larkin, Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 32.
13. There were only 63,000 hides available for sixteen vessels. Bancroft, XXI, 339.
14. Davis, Sixty Years in California (214-215) says that as many as thirty or forty whaling vessels were in the port of San Francisco at one time during 1843, 1844, and 1845. See also Larkin to Calhoun, Aug. 24, 1844. MS., State Department; same to same, Dec. 12—Thinks there will be six hundred American vessels on northwest coast within three years. Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 13.
15. The Californians claimed they did this because the Mazatlan officials, with the hope of lining their own pockets, allowed a lower rate of duty than the law specified, and that a receipt for customs duties was frequently given when only a bribe had been paid by the ship owner or captain.
16. Larkin to Secretary of State, Sept. 16, 1844. Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 10; same to same, Oct. 16; Bancroft, XXI, 376-377.
17. Larkin to Calhoun, Aug. 24, 1844. MS., State Department; same to United States Minister in Mexico, Aug. 14, 1844. Ibid.
18. Bancroft, XXI, 376.
19. Thos. A. Norton, captain of the Chas. W. Morgan, to Consul Larkin, Aug. 12, 1844—Has just put into port after a cruise of thirty-four months. Men down with scurvy—custom of all ports in Pacific to allow whalers to sell goods and reprovision—will work a great hardship if denied him at San Francisco (Larkin Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 13). Larkin sent this letter to Governor Micheltorena.
20. Calhoun to Larkin, Dec. 28, 1844. Ibid., No. 303. It was brought by the president in turn to the attention of Congress.
21. Larkin to Calhoun, Aug. 19, 1844. MS., State Department; same to Henry Lindsey, Editor of the New Bedford Whaleman's Shipping List, Dec. 11. Larkin Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 11.
22. Sutter to Larkin, March 28, 1844. Larkin MSS., II, No. 73. Frémont reached New Helvetia March 6.
23. It was a singular coincidence, if nothing more, that caused the editor of the New York Journal of Commerce to publish in his paper of March 5, directly beneath Polk's inaugural address, an article headed, “California Coming.”
24. The remaining three were the settlement of the Oregon boundary line, a reduction of the tariff, and the establishment of a subtreasury. See Edward G. Bourne, Essays in Historical Criticism (Yale bicentennial publications, II), 229; and various other authorities.
25. The Diary of James K. Polk, edited by Milo M. Quaife. Chicago Historical Society's Collections, Vol. VI (Chicago, A. C. McClurg &Co. 1910), I, 34.
26. New Orleans Daily Picayune, Sept. 27, 1845.
27. The Works of James Buchanan (collected and edited by John Bassett Moore. Philadelphia and London. J. B. Lippincott Company. 1909), VI, 134-135.
28. Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, 269. For the full text of Parrott's instructions see Buchanan, Works, VI, 132-134.
29. Reeves, 269.
30. Thompson to Webster, Nov. 30, 1842. MS., State Department.
31. Larkin-Parrott Correspondence. Larkin MSS., passim.
32. Black to Buchanan, July 3, 1845. MS., State Department.
33. Black to Slidell, Dec. 25, 1845—“The Mexican ministry positively refuse to receive Parrott as Secretary of Legation.” MS., State Department.
Polk's choice of confidential agent would have been much more suitable had he selected either Black, the American consul at Mexico City, or Dimond, who filled a like position at Vera Cruz.
34. Reeves, 270.
35. Parrott to Buchanan, Aug. 26. MS., State Department; also Reeves, 271.
36. Polk, Diary, I, 34.
37. Ibid., I, 34-35.
The line desired by Polk ran up the Rio Grande to El Paso and thence west to the Pacific. For the instructions to Slidell, however, see below, p. 129. If Jackson's offer, as Adams said, was only $500,000 for the more valuable part of this territory but ten years before, one is tempted to think the present day promoters of California real estate are not without historical example for their claims.
38. Ibid., 35-36, entry for Sept. 17.
39. Ibid.; also Buchanan to Black, Sept. 17. Buchanan, Works, VI, 260-261. Slidell was dubious as to his reception in Mexico, but prepared to leave whenever word should reach him from Washington. Slidell to Buchanan, Sept. 25, Ibid., 264-265.
40. Polk, Diary, I, 91. The quotation is important owing to the subsequent rejection of Slidell because of the wording of his commission. It is evident that Polk thought the Mexican government, as here stated, had agreed to receive him as minister. But see Tyler's, Tylers, III, 176-177.
41. Polk, Diary, I, 91-92. A partial draft of these had already been prepared. Ibid; also entry for Sept. 22.
42. Ibid., 93.
43. Ibid.
44. “His instructions were chiefly verbal.” Schouler, History of the United States, V, 525. On the contrary, they were carefully written out and very explicit, filling twelve pages in printed form, of Buchanan's Works.
45. For this omission, see Chapter V.
46. For complete instructions, see Buchanan, Works, VI, 294-306. The part relating to California is on pp. 304-306.
47. For Slidell's course in Mexico, see Reeves, 282-287; Schouler, V, 525-526; Jay, Mexican War, 211-220 (an account biased as usual); Rives, The United States and Mexico, II, 53-80 (perhaps the best account.) Slidell's desire to hasten his recognition by the Mexican government can be fairly accounted for on two grounds—his wish to be recognized by the Herrera administration before it should be turned out of office; and the urging of the president, who desired to end the uncertain condition of affairs with Mexico before the adjournment of Congress. Buchanan, Works, VI, 312.
48. Buchanan to Slidell, Ibid., 345; see also Polk, Diary, I, 125.
49. Slidell to Buchanan, Feb. 6, 1846. MS., State Department.
50. Buchanan to Slidell, March 12. Buchanan, Works, VI, 403.
51. Polk, Diary, I, 303, entry for March 25. Polk had probably already interviewed Ingersoll on the subject a week previously. Ibid.; and entry for March 18, page 282.
52. President Herrera asserted that the mere willingness to listen to Slidell's propositions had served as sufficient pretext for inciting the revolution that caused his overthrow. See a letter from Herrera, cited by Cass in the senate, on March 27, 1848. Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 1 sess., page 493.
53. Sir George Simpson, Narrative of a voyage around the world during the years 1841 and 1842. (London. 1847), I, 298-299. Simpson was governor of the Hudson's Bay Company.
54. Wilkes, Narrative, V, 163.
55. Simpson, Narrative, I, 190.
56. Wilkes, Narrative, V, 152.
57. Simpson, Narrative, I, 197.
58. For example: Commandancia General to Ministro de Guerra y Marina, April 25, 1840 (Vallejo, Documentos, IX, No. 124); Vallejo to Ministro de Guerra, May 18, 1841 (Ibid., No. 147); Alvarado to Vallejo, Nov. 30, 1841 (Ibid., No. 369); Bustamente to Vallejo, April 25, 1840—Government trusts in his ability to defend the province from invasion. Civil war in Mexico prevents aid being sent immediately (Ibid., No. 122).
59. Dana noted the wretched policy pursued by Mexico in the character of men she sent out as officials. “The administradores,” he wrote, “are strangers sent from Mexico, having no interest in the country; not identified in any way with their charge, and for the most part, men of desperate fortunes—broken down politicians and soldiers,—whose only object is to retrieve their condition as soon as possible. Two Years before the Mast, 195.
60. J. M. Guinn, Capture of Monterey in Historical Society of Southern California, Publications, III, 70.
One is reminded by this of Houston's declaration that Mexico had seen three revolutions in twelve months, and Benton's interjection, “She has had seventeen in twenty-five years.” Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 459.
61. Larkin to Secretary of State, Sept. 16, 1844. Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 10. Jones to Larkin, Oct. 22, 1842—Thinks Mexico is going to make California the Botany Bay of America. Larkin MSS., I, No. 354. See also Nos. 364-367, for further discussion.
62. Robinson, Life in California, 207.
63. Blackmar, Spanish Colonization in the Southwest in Johns Hopkins University Studies, VIII, 183.
64. For complete description, see Baneroft, XXI, 455-517.
65. I. C. Jones to Larkin, Feb. 26, 1845. Larkin MSS., III. No. 37.
Upon his arrival in Mexico, Micheltorena represented his expulsion as an act for which Americans were largely responsible. Baneroft, XXI, 513. This aroused considerable bitterness against the United States. Shannon to Calhoun, April 6, 1845. MS., State Department.
66. Bidwell (California, 139), speaks of the “anomalous position” of the Californians, “as enemies to the United States as Mexicans, enemies to Mexico as regarded their local government, afraid of the former, not able to rely upon the latter, and not strong enough in themselves for independence.”
67. Jones-Larkin correspondence during this period (Larkin MSS.); Juan B. Alvarado, Historia de California (MSS., Baneroft Collection), II, 130-131; Baneroft, XXI, 518-543; Ibid., XXII, 30 et seq. Prefect Manuel Castro to Andrés Castillero, Dec. 10, 1845, concerning measures to prevent civil war. Castro, Documentos, I, No. 238.
68. Robinson, Life in California, 213-214.
69. Frémont's first expedition had taken place in 1842 but had gone no farther than the South Pass and Frémont's Peak in the Rocky Mountains.
70. Report of the Exploring Expedition in the year 1842 and to Oregon and North California in the years 1843-44, by Brevet Capt. J. C. Frémont . . . printed by order of the House of Representatives (Washington, Blair, and Reeves, 1845), 228-229; Larkin to the State Department, April 12, 1844, enclosing a letter from Sutter. Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 3.
71. The report ran through four editions within two years. It is interesting to note that one of Frémont's chief objects was to discover whether or not the mythical Buenaventura River flowed from the basin east of the Rocky Mountains into the Pacific, thus opening up a waterway for the western outlet of the Mississippi Valley and a transcontinental route for the Chinese trade. Because no such river was found to exist he placed much more importance on obtaining the Columbia for the United States. Report, 255-256.
72. The description of Frémont's passage of the Sierras and his stay in California occupies pages 229-256 of the Report.
73. Two men went temporarily insane; half their mules were killed for food. Report, 229-244. Sutter wrote to Larkin, March 28, 1844, “. . . for a month . . . the company had subsisted entirely on horse or mule flesh—the starvation and fatigue they had endured rendered them truly deplorable objects.” Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 3. The passage of the mountains occupied nearly a month. The party reached Sutter's March 6th.
74. Frémont's description of California cannot be given by separate quotations. The whole of it must be read to be appreciated. One sentence, written after his departure, may be cited merely as an example. “One might travel the world over,” he wrote, “without finding a valley more fresh and verdant—more floral and sylvan—more alive with birds and animals—more bounteously watered—than we had left in the San Joaquin.” Report, 256.
75. John Charles Frémont, Memoirs of My Life (Chicago and New York. Bedford, Clarke and Company, 1887), I, 413.
76. Ibid., 420.
77. Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, April, 1846, 350-353.
78. Larkin, John Marsh, and Hastings were especially active in this respect.
79. Larkin to N. Y. Sun, May 28, 1845. Larkin MSS., III, 168.
80. N. Y. Sun, Oct. (?), 1845; quoted in the Washington Daily Union, Oct. 11.
81. New York Journal of Commerce, March 5, 1845; copied also in Charleston Mercury, March 10.
82. Quoted in Niles' Register, LXVIII, 162.
83. American Review, Jan., 1846; see also comment upon this in Richmond Enquirer, Jan. 26.
84. Larkin to Journal of Commerce, July 31, 1845 (Larkin MSS., III, No. 235). Same to James G. Bennett of the New York Herald, May 26, 1846 (Ibid., IV, No. 129); N. Y. Herald to Larkin, Oct. 14, 1845 (Ibid., No. 306); Hudson [for Bennett] to Childs [Larkin's brother-in-law in Washington], Dec. 5, 1846—“When you write to Mr. Larkin . . . please say . . . that so far as we can we will take care of California. We have always been in favor of the acquisition of that territory” (Ibid., No. 337); see also Polk's Diary, I, 126-127. Larkin's communications were likewise sent to the Boston Daily Advertiser.
85. For example, Larkin's letter of July 31 to the Journal of Commerce was reprinted from that paper in the Washington Daily Union of Oct. 21, 1845, and in the Charleston Mercury of Oct. 22. In how many other papers it appeared cannot be stated.
86. Beach to Larkin, Dec. 24, 1845. Larkin MSS., III, No. 307.
87. Letter of Whitney printed in Washington Daily Union, Feb. 6, 1846.
88. Daily Union, Oct. 16, 1845, giving an outline of transcontinental routes, as follows: 1. Canal across the Isthmus of Darien. 2. Railroad along the Rio del Norte to San Francisco. 3. Line from St. Louis through the Rocky Mts. to Oregon (“California is henceforth to be the promised land to the emigrant seeking a home on the Pacific”). The New Orleans Picayune of Nov. 22 had a statement from Albert M. Gilliam, “late U. S. consul at California”—[Gilliam was appointed for San Francisco but never assumed his duties]—that California would soon fall into Anglo-Saxon hands and a railroad would be needed to terminate at San Francisco.
89. Extracts upon this subject from the St. Louis New Era, the Burlington Hawkeye, the St. Louis Reporter, the Missouri Era, were printed in the single issue of the Daily Union for May 20, 1845.
90. Extract from the Western Expositor stating that Frémont's return from California would probably result in the discovery of a route 300 or 400 miles shorter than the one already in use, and the saving of two months' time on the trip. Daily Union, July 31, 1845: New Orleans Picayune, April 22, 1846.
91. Parties for California always left in the spring in order to cross the mountains during the summer, and arrived in California during the fall. A late passage of the Sierras was accompanied with great danger, as for example, in the case of the Donner party.
92. Daily Union, Jan. 9, 1846. This project had been conceived some time before: 1000 persons were to be enlisted, their goods shipped by sea while they themselves went overland. Ibid., Sept. 17, 1845.
93. Daily Union, May 20, 1845; Robinson [from N. Y.] to Larkin, May 29. Larkin MSS., III, No. 170.
94. Larkin to Secretary of State, Nov. 4, 1845 (Official Correspondence, Part II, No. 28); also same to same, June 16, 1846 (Ibid., 94-96); same to F. M. Dimond, United States consul at Vera Cruz, March 1, 1846 (Ibid., No. 91); same to United States minister at Mexico, April 3, 1846 (Ibid., No. 78).
95. Sutter to Larkin (Larkin MSS., III, No. 220); same to same, Oct. 8, 1845. Thousands coming within the year. Mexico cannot stem the stream; if she tried they would “fight like Lyons.” Ibid., No. 315.
96. Marsh to Larkin, Aug. 12. Ibid., No. 247.
97. Jameson, The Correspondence of John C. Calhoun (Washington. American Historical Association. 1900), 1069.
98. Sutter to Larkin, March 2, 1846 (Larkin MSS., IV, No. 53); Hastings to Larkin, March 3, 1846. Ibid., No. 55.
99. See for example statements of Ide, Swasey, and Clyman in their published works.
100. Letter from an Oregon immigrant to the Ohio Patriot, copied in the Daily Union, Dec. 30, 1845; also extract from Sangamon Journal in the Daily Union, Jan. 1, 1846.
101. The London Athenaeum, July 11, 1846, in reviewing Robinson's Life in California, said that emigrants leaving ostensibly for the Willamette Valley were really bound for California and that the whole country was determined to possess San Francisco; the London Illustrated News, Oct. 11, 1845, said the majority of emigrants to Oregon leave as soon as possible for California; letter of Sir George Simpson in Niles' Register, LXVIII, 393-1000 of 5000 Oregon emigrants have left for California; New Orleans Picayune, Aug. 7, 1845—statement to same effect.
102. Bancroft, XXIX, 552, n.
103. Marsh to Larkin, Aug. 12, 1845. Has seen the newspaper articles by Oregonians derogatory to California. Will write in defence a reply setting forth the merits and advantages of the province. Larkin MSS., III, No. 247.
104. Robinson to Larkin, May 29, 1845. Larkin MSS., III, No. 170. Robinson added that the papers were filled with such suggestions.
105. Atherton to Larkin, March 4, 1846. Ibid., IV, No. 58.
106. Hooper to Larkin (from Honolulu), April 29, 1845. Ibid., III.
107. Smith to Calhoun, Dec. 30, 1845. Calhoun Correspondence, 1069.
108. Bancroft, XXI, 601.
109. The Quarterly, XVIII, 17, n. 53.
110. See also Green's report of Hasting's scheme, The Quarterly, XVIII, 36-37.
111. William Carey Crane, Life and literary remains of Sam Houston of Texas (Philadelphia. J. B. Lippincott &Co., 1884), 366-370.
112. Donelson to Jackson, Dec. 28, 1844. Jackson MSS.
113. Niles' Register, LXVIII, 205.
114. Thomas Jefferson to John Jacob Astor, May 24, 1812 (The writings of Thomas Jefferson. Ford ed. New York. G. P. Putman's Sons. 1898), IX, 351.
115. Annals of Congress, XL, 422-423; 598-599; Thomas H. Benton. Thirty years' view (New York. D. Appleton and Company, 1854), II, 430; McMaster, History of the United States, VII, 296-297; 300-301, and authorities quoted.
116. Wilkes' Narrative, V, 182-183.
117. Thompson, Recollections, 232. His informant was Lansford W. Hastings.
118. Green to Calhoun, April 11, 1844. Calhoun Correspondence, 946.
119. George Bancroft to Polk, April 27, 1845. Polk MSS.
120. McLane to Buchanan, Dec. 1, 1845. MS., State Department.
121. Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., p. 478.
122. Ibid., 350.
123. Bidwell, Life in California, 110-112; 116; Calhoun Correspondence, 940 et seq.; Bancroft, XXI, 578.
124. Hartnell to Wyllie, March 17, 1844. Vallejo Documentos, XXXII, No. 14.
125. Stephen Reynolds (Oahu) to Larkin, April 19, 1845—Believes if California unites with the United States the nation will be too unwieldly to last (Larkin MSS., III, No. 116); Atherton to Larkin, Feb. 11, 1845. Ibid., No. 25.
126. Marsh to Larkin. Larkin MSS., III, No. 247. Marsh included the territory north of the Columbia in his scheme, perhaps as far as the 54th parallel. From the tone of this letter Larkin had evidently expressed himself in favor of the Oregon union.
127. Marsh was a Harvard College graduate.
128. Ford to Young, April 8, 1845, in Edward W. Tullidge, History of Salt Lake City and Its Founders (Salt Lake City. Edward W. Tullidge), 8.
129. Polk, Diary, I, 205-206.
130. Tullidge claims the plan originated as early as 1842, and that in 1844 Brigham Young instructed the twelve apostles to send out a delegation to investigate Oregon and California. Ibid., 4-6.
131. He arrived at Sutter's on Dec. 25, 1845. Diary of New Helvetia Events, MS., p. 25; Leese to Larkin, Jan. 12, 1846. Larkin MSS., IV, No. 12.
132. Editorial in the New York Sun, and a letter from Bennett of the New York Herald, stating that 25 companies of 100 families were bound for San Francisco Bay, and would become troublesome to the United States, either in Oregon or California and the government should look to the matter. Reprinted in the Washington Daily Union, Nov. 20, 1845.
John H. Everett (Boston) to Larkin, Dec. 12, 1845—Mormons will be in California next spring and act as the Israelites did toward the nations among whom they came—“kill you all and take your possessions. . . . One of today's papers says . . . 10,000 are to start for California. Look out for an avalanche.” Larkin MSS., III. Beach (New York Sun) to Larkin, Dec. 24, 1845—100,000 Mormons will be in California by spring. Ibid., No. 407.
133. Diary, I, 205-206.
134. Baneroft, XXII, 550.
135. Samuel J. Hastings to Larkin, Nov. 9, 1845. Larkin MSS., III, No. 570. This Hastings had frequently been on the California coast as master of the brig Tasso. Whether he was a kinsman of the Lansford Hastings so frequently mentioned is uncertain; but evidently he had knowledge of his plans. See also Everett (Boston) to Larkin, Sept. 15—“if the plan of a colony succeeds we may soon expect a declaration of independence or a desire of annexation from your part of the world.” Ibid., No. 290.
136. L. W. Hastings to Larkin, March 3, 1846. Larkin MSS., IV, No. 55. Hastings was even then on his way to Oregon after more settlers. He had placed the number expected during the following year at 20,000.
137. Tullidge insists that Brannan learned that the government was preparing to hinder the emigration of the Mormons (because it was feared they would join with the English or Mexican interests in California against the United States) and that Amos Kendall and other prominent men in Washington undertook to prevent this, provided Young and his followers would deed to them “through A. G. Benson and Co.,” half the lands and town lots they secured in California. It was also said that Polk was a silent partner to the scheme.
Some interesting light is thrown on this assertion by Polk's Diary. Kendall seems to have taken a pretty active interest in Mormon affairs, as the Salt Lake historian says; and Polk refused, as we have shown, to prevent their emigration. But the president scarcely would have lent himself to any such scheme of petty blackmail. Diary, I, 444; 449-450; 455-456.
138. Larkin to State Department, June 5, 1845—3 or 4 orders received from Mexico. Commandante General informs him he is perfectly willing to lay these aside and allow men to proceed to any place they desire (Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 22); also, Castro, Documentos, I, Nos. 152, 214; Bancroft, XXI, 604-605.
139. Guerrero to Castro, Jan. 24, 1846. Castro, Documentos, VI, No. 309.
140. Alvarado, Historia de California, II, 133-134.
141. Lancey, Cruise of the Dale, 41; Swasey, Statement (MS., Bancroft Collection); Bancroft, XXI, 614.
142. The rumors of this expedition filled California for many months, the force being reported as numbering from 500 to 18,000. Larkin to New York Sun, Sept. 30, 1845. Larkin MSS., III, No. 305; Pini to Larkin (from Mazatlan) July 3, Ibid., No. 211; McKinley to Larkin, July 12. Ibid., No. 218; Stearns to Larkin, June 19. Ibid., No. 196. See also Bancroft, XXII, 33.
143. See also Parrott to Buchanan, Oct. 11, 1845. MS., State Department. L. W. Hastings had likewise called upon the president and acquainted him with the conditions in California, when in Washington. Hastings to Larkin, Larkin MSS., III, No. 13.
144. Larkin to Calhoun, Aug. 18, 1844. Larkin Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 9. Same to same, Sept. 16. Ibid., No. 10.
145. Larkin to Calhoun, March 22, 1845. Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 19.
146. H. Ex. Docs., 29 Cong., 2 sess., No. 19, page 75. These are also printed in whole or in part in most of the secondary works on the period.
147. Larkin to Secretary of State, June 5, 1845. MS., State Department; also Larkin Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 22. Same to same, July 10. MS. State Department; Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 25.
148. Bancroft, XXI, 596-597; Century Magazine, XIX, 928-929. For the complete despatch see Buchanan, Works, VI, 275-278; Rayner Wickersham Kelsey, The United States Consulate in California. Publications of the Academy of Pacific Coast History, Vol. I, No. 5, June, 1910, pp. 100-103.
149. Buchanan, Works, VI, 304; Kelsey, 58 n.
150. Bancroft; XXII; 26-27; Kelsey, 64.
151. Ibid., also Larkin MSS., III, No. 337.
152. Bancroft, XXI, 581-585. It is not considered necessary to go into detail regarding the division of the party. Frémont spent from Jan. 27 to Feb. 9 at Monterey. upon Larkin's invitation, buying supplies and discussing the political affairs of the country with the American consul. Kelsey, 52.
153. For the permission granted by the California authorities, see Larkin to Manuel Castro (Larkin Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 76); Gov. Pio Pico to Castro, Feb. 18, 1846. Castro, Documentos, II, No. 23, copy. For the Hawk's Peak affair see Bancroft, XXII, 5-21, and citations; Kelsey, 98-99.
154. This was the reason assigned officially but it was recognized as only a blind. Larkin to Commander of any American ship at Mazatlan, March 9, 1846. Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 38; same to Secretary of State (Ibid.) Frémont, Memoirs, I, 461.
155. Bancroft, XXI, 596-597.
156. Larkin to Secretary of State, April 18. Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 41.
157. Forbes to Oliveria, Jan. 28, 1846, in Ephraim Douglas Adams, British interests and activities in Texas, 1838-46 [Addendum, English interests in the annexation of California]. (Baltimore. The Johns Hopkins Press. 1910), p. 251. See also Guerrero to Castro (from San Francisco), Jan. 24, 1846. Castro, Documentos.
158. Bancroft, XXII, 86, citations from the subsequent testimony of Gillespie and Frémont. Gillespie had also held several private interviews with Polk before leaving Washington. Polk, Diary, I, 84-85.
159. Bancroft, XXII, 86.
160. He had been detained some months in Mexico and hence knew of Slidell's probable rejection. Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, 282.
161. Bancroft, XXII, 86 n., quotation from Frémont's later testimony.
162. Larkin to Stearns, March 19, 1846. Official Correspondence, Pt. II. No. 90. Marsh to Larkin, Feb. 15—“The distant rumors of mighty events have made me leave the retirement of my farm . . . and I have come to this place on a visit to Capt. Frémont. It appears that the present year will bring great changes on the face of California.” Larkin, MSS., IV, No. 39.
163. Gillespie to Larkin, April 25, 1846. Ibid., No. 144.
164. Larkin to Secretary of State, April 2, 1846—“The undersigned believes that a flag if respectfully planted will receive the good will of much of the wealth and respectability of the country.” Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 40. See also Leidesdorf to Larkin, May 7. Larkin MSS., IV, No. 111.
165. A civil war between Castro and other northern leaders on one side, and Governor Pio Pico on the other was about to break out. Bancroft, XXII, 30-53.
166. Larkin to Abel Stearns, Los Angeles; John Warner, San Diego, and Jacob Leese, Sonoma, April 17. Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 100.
167. Kelsey, 67-68.
168. Larkin to Secretary of State, July 20, 1846, “Address to Californians.” Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 13. Larkin also advised many of the Californians to take up land before the change came. A copy of a grant of eleven square leagues along the San Joaquin is among the Larkin papers of this period. MSS., IV, No. 41.
169. Larkin to Lease, May 21, 1846. Larkin, MSS., IV, No. 102. Same to Stearns, May 21. Ibid., No. 101. Same to Secretary of State, June 1. Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 44.
170. See Larkin to Secretary of State, June 1st, Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 44.
171. Larkin to Secretary of State, July 20, 1846. Official Correspondence, Pt. II, No. 54.
172. Stearns to Larkin, June 12, 1846. Larkin MSS., IV, No. 151. Warner to Larkin, June 11. Ibid., 156.
173. For Vallejo's friendliness to the United States see Bancroft, XXII, 758.
174. Larkin to Mott, Talbot &Co., Mazatlan, June 18. Larkin MSS., IV, No. 165. Neither Leidesdorf nor Sutter had any knowledge of the plans or purposes of the revolt. Leidesdorf to Larkin, June 16, Ibid., No. 159; Sutter to Larkin. Ibid., No. 160.
175. Larkin to Buchanan, June 30, 1847. Official Correspondence, Pt. II, 67. See also Bancroft, XXII, 98, and citations.
176. Benton, Thirty years' view, II, 688-689; John Bigelow, Memoirs of the Life and Public Service of John Charles Frémont (New York. Derby &Jackson, 1856), 141-145.
177. This is the view taken by Bancroft. The same idea was expressed very positively to me by Dr. Willey, founder of the University of California, in an interview Nov. 29, 1911. Dr. Willey was personally acquainted both with Larkin and Frémont. See, also, the discussion in Rives, The United States and Mexico, 164-194.
178. Cave Johnston to Polk, March 20, 1849. Polk MSS. Same to same, March 22. Ibid.
179. Bancroft, XXII, 196-197 (citations from U. S. Gov. Docs., containing instructions to Sloat, Kearney, etc.).
180. Polk, Diary, III, entry for March 21.
How to cite:
Cleland, Robert Glass, "THE EARLY SENTIMENT FOR THE ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA: AN ACOUNT OF THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN INTEREST IN CALI- FORNIA, 1835-1846 ", Volume 018, Number 2, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, Page 121 - 161. http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v018/n2/article_1.html
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