Having traced the course of the Tyler administration with regard to California, we must now turn to the internal affairs of the province and the growth of popular interest throughout the country in its concerns. During 1842 no emigration of any importance took place from the United States. 2 But the friends of the movement were busy; 3 and toward the close of the year, General Almonte, the Mexican minister at Washington, found it necessary to counteract their representations by an article denying the report that California officials extended a ready welcome to foreigners. 4 In this, however, he was giving the views of the Mexican government, and not those of the authorities of the province. 5
Immigration and Commerce.—In 1843 two considerable parties reached California under the direction of leaders who, having already made the journey, had returned to the western states to encourage others of their countrymen to follow their example. One of these companies, numbering perhaps forty individuals, was led by Lansford W. Hastings and came by way of Oregon. 6 The other, slightly larger, left Missouri in May under Joseph B. Chiles, a member of the Bartleson company of 1841. Dividing at Fort Hall, part of the emigrants completed their journey with Chiles, while the remainder followed Walker over a more difficult southern route. 7
The year 1844 saw still further reinforcement of the American population in California, 8 accompanied by increased interest throughout the United States. Notice of the repeal of the law against foreigners by the Mexican government was published in the newspapers; 9 the state department was assured that Americans were looked upon with favor in California; 10 and numerous books and communications setting forth the advantages of the province were placed in the hands of American leaders. 11 Commercial relations with the United States showed little change during this period. 12 The year 1843 was one of hard times, and the trading vessels had difficulty in securing even a fraction of their accustomed cargo of hides. 13 Whaling ships in larger numbers 14 continued to use the California ports, especially San Francisco, as depots, for reprovisioning and refitting. But until the middle of 1844 nothing of importance occurred to break the ordinary routine of trade conditions along the coast.
In that year, however, certain changes were made in the California tariff laws that benefited one class of American commerce and injured another. The practice had become common for vessels flying the Mexican flag to pay duties at Mazatlan; and thus, through the ruling of the Mexican law, to secure free access for their cargoes into California. This custom, however, was playing sad havoc with the profits of the Boston ships and with the revenues of the province, all of which were derived from customs receipts, as well. So, in order to protect the threatened provincial treasury and keep the New England trade, the assembly and governor calmly set the Mexican law aside and required all goods, whether paying duties at a port of the home government or not, to abide by the regulation of the custom house at Monterey; 15 while a further disregard for the national authority was shown, as indeed it long had been, by permitting the introduction of various commodities prohibited by Mexican law, upon the payment of local duties. 16
The second alteration in the regulations governing trade along the coast, while of advantage to the Boston merchants, worked no slight temporary hardship upon the whaling vessels touching at California ports. This was a prohibition upon the long established practice of trading a limited amount of goods for needed supplies; 17 and was doubtless justified, as the privilege had been greatly abused, both to the detriment of the regular trade and the loss of revenue receipts. 18 At least one instance, however, is recorded where, if the captain's complaint be true, the new edict caused much inconvenience if not actual suffering. 19 The subject was reported by Larkin to the state department and was considered of sufficient importance to receive the notice of the President. 20 But, as a matter of fact, the new law seems to have had only a short existence; and whalers found little difficulty, after the first few months, in securing their share of the California trade. 21
Various other occurrences during their period that had some bearing upon the American interests were the arrival of John C. Frémont at Sutter's Fort early in the spring of 1844 on his second exploring expedition; 22 the return of Lansford W. Hastings to the United States to encourage further emigration to California, in order to bring about its separation from Mexico; and the revolt of the native Californians against the Mexican governor, Micheltorena. As all of these incidents receive subsequent mention they need not detain us here, and we shall pass on to a consideration of Polk's diplomatic attempts to secure the province.
Announcement of Polk's Policy.—When Polk came into office on the 4th of March, 1845, the attention of the American people, as has been shown, had already turned toward California. 23 Two presidents, Jackson and Tyler, had made earnest efforts to purchase it from Mexico, in the name of the United States. It is not surprising, then, to find the annexation of this province figuring as one of the four important measures which the new President, even before his inauguration, had set his heart upon carrying into effect. 24 Polk's intentions, moreover, were not long kept to himself. Official announcement of his desire to acquire California was made to the cabinet on September 16; 25 and the day following, the Washington correspondent of the New Orleans Picayune wrote: “It is predicted that Mr. Polk's administration will be signalized by the settlement of the Oregon question satisfactory to the American people; by the peaceful acquisition of the Californias, and by the adjustment of all our claims upon Mexico.” 26
For the accomplishment of this plan of annexation, four possible methods presented themselves—(1) By direct purchase from Mexico; (2) by revolt of the Californians, aided by resident Americans, against Mexico, and a request for admission into the United States; (3) by quiet delay, until a stimulated emigration from this country should overrun the province and declare its independence, even against the wishes of the Californians; (4) by forcible seizure of the territory in case of an outbreak of war, for whatever cause, with Mexico.
Polk did not lose much time after his accession to office in putting the first of these methods to a practical test. On March 6, General Almonte, the Mexican minister, demanded his passports because of the passage of the joint resolution for the admission of Texas; while Wilson Shannon, much to the regret of his own government, assumed the responsibility of breaking off diplomatic relations with Mexico because of his treatment at the hands of the minister of foreign affairs. 27
Appointment of Parrott.—Almonte left New York on April 3, and on the same ship went Polk's confidential agent, William S. Parrott, for the purpose of securing Mexico's consent to the reception of a minister from the United States. 28 The choice of Parrott for this mission was ill-advised. 29 He had been a resident of Mexico for some years but apparently had little else to recommend him. On the contrary his record there had been anything but favorable. As one of the creditors against the Mexican government in 1842, he had put in a claim that Thompson, his own countryman, had characterized as “exaggerated to a disgusting degree.” 30 His business dealings had also brought him into some disrepute even with men of his own nationality. 31 Furthermore, though this cannot be held wholly to his account, he was suspected of bringing with him authority to spend a million dollars in bribing Mexican officials. 32 And altogether he was a person very much disliked in the southern Republic. 33
In spite of this handicap, however, and the more serious one that the purpose of his coming was openly proclaimed in Mexico, 34 Parrott managed after a fashion to fulfill his mission. On August 26, he wrote Buchanan that an envoy of the United States with proper abilities might “with comparative ease settle over a breakfast the most important national question,” and that such a commissioner was almost daily expected. 35 As this opinion was confirmed by later dispatches from Dimond and Black, 36 the American consuls, the President and his cabinet resolved to send John Slidell of Louisiana secretly to Mexico, as the official representative of this Government.
Failure of Slidell's Mission.—The real purpose of Slidell's appointment, as announced at this time by Polk, was the purchase of Upper California and New Mexico. These, the President thought, might be obtained for fifteen or twenty millions of dollars; but he was willing to give twice the latter amount, if necessary. Indeed, Polk considered the worth of the territory involved, to the United States, as almost beyond reckoning in mere financial terms. With this appraisement the cabinet unanimously agreed. 37
The day following the decision to attempt the reopening of diplomatic intercourse with Mexico, however, less reassuring reports from that country caused a temporary stay in the proceedings. And it was deemed best to delay Slidell's departure until the receipt of official assurance from the Mexican government, or at least of very definite information from the administration's agents, regarding his reception. 38 Black, accordingly, was instructed to secure a definite pledge from those in authority that an American minister, if sent, should not be rejected, while Slidell was told of his selection for the mission and instructed to hold himself ready for secret departure at a moment's notice. 39
On November 6 despatches were received through Commodore Connor, commanding the United States Squadron in the Gulf of Mexico, that Mexico was ready to renew friendly relations and “receive a Minister from the U. States.” 40 The President and secretary of state, therefore, decided to send Slidell at once, and agreed upon the general character of his instructions, which the latter drafted in rough form for cabinet discussion. 41 Two days later, Parrott arrived from Mexico with the original note of the secretary of foreign affairs, agreeing to the reception of a diplomatic agent from the United States; and also with assurances that the question of boundaries could be adjusted with Mexico in a satisfactory manner. 42 That same night a commission as “Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Mexico,” and official instructions were forwarded by special bearer to Slidell at Pensacola. 43
These instructions, which had been agreed to unanimously by the cabinet, were of considerable length and, except as they relate to California, need not detain us here. 44 In regard to that territory, however, Buchanan wrote: “There is another subject of vast importance to the United States, which will demand your particular attention.” 45 . . .
The government of California is now but nominally dependent on Mexico; and it is more than doubtful whether her authority will ever be reinstated. Under these circumstances, it is the desire of the President that you shall use your best efforts to obtain a cession of that Province from Mexico to the United States. . . . Money would be no object when compared with the value of this acquisition. . . . The President would not hesitate to give, in addition to the assumption of the just claims of our citizens on Mexico, twenty-five millions of dollars for the cession. 46
This offer of twenty-five millions, continued the instructions, was to be made for a line extending west from the southern boundary of New Mexico; or for any line that should include Monterey within the territory ceded to the United States. If this could not be obtained twenty millions were to be offered for a boundary “commencing at any point on the western line of New Mexico, and running due West to the Pacific, so as to include the bay and harbor of San Francisco.” Elsewhere the importance attached to the acquisition of San Francisco by the administration was similarly shown. “The possession of the Bay and harbor of San Francisco,” Slidell had been told, “is all important to the United States. The advantages to us of its acquisition are so striking that it would be a waste of time to enumerate them here.” It is well to remember this in connection with the question of the influence of slavery upon Polk's determination to possess California.
The difficulties Slidell met with in Mexico and his final rejection by the Paredes government are too well known to require mention at this time. 47 His despatches to the state department relating to California, also, for the most part belong to a subsequent discussion. It should be noted, however, that a certain phase of the administration's policy received considerable emphasis at this time. On December 17, Buchanan sent a communication to Slidell again urging upon him the importance of securing the cession of the California territory specified in his instructions, as it “would secure incalculable advantages” to the United States. At the same time he was authorized to make the payment of six millions of dollars, cash, upon the exchange of treaty ratifications. 48
In February, after Slidell had left Mexico City, there seemed to be some prospect of making good use of this cash payment plan because of the pressing financial needs of the new government. “Aware that financial embarrassments alone can induce those in power to enter upon negotiations with the United States,” wrote Slidell on the 6th, “I took care before leaving the Capital to convey through a person having confidential relations with the President a hint that those embarrassments might be relieved if satisfactory arrangements for boundary should be made.” 49
To this Buchanan replied that the United States would readily come to the assistance of Paredes, if he should bring about a satisfactory settlement of the boundary question; and that funds would be available immediately for the Mexican President upon the ratification of the treaty by his government. 50 A few days later Polk took preliminary steps to have such funds as might be necessary for the carrying out of this purpose placed at his disposal by confidentially arranging with C. J. Ingersoll, chairman of the house committee on foreign affairs, and with Representative Cullom of Tennessee to introduce a bill authorizing a million dollars for this object, if at any time such method of procedure should be deemed advisable. 51 Here, then, we have the beginning of a policy the administration was to follow pretty consistently throughout the whole course of the Mexican War. It was embodied, it is scarcely necessary to remark, in the “two million” and “three million” bills of Wilmot Proviso fame; and, indirectly, in the return of Santa Anna.
But before this despatch reached Slidell, he was on his way home, thoroughly disgusted and disgruntled with the tortuous course of Mexican diplomacy. Polk had failed in his attempt to purchase California as Jackson and Tyler had failed before him, and for precisely the same reason, namely, the fear of the ruling faction in Mexico that any alienation of territory would be followed by a revolution before which they would go down in ruin. 52
Demoralized situation in California.—Though nothing had come of Slidell's attempt to secure California by negotiation, Polk's line of effort, as has been said, was by no means limited to this one method. Even while his minister was seeking to obtain recognition from the Mexican government, the President was setting another agency at work to bring about the desired acquisition. But before considering what may be called Polk's internal policy regarding California, we must devote some space to the conditions existing there, especially with respect to the feeling of the inhabitants toward Mexico, and the significance of American immigration.
At the time Polk came into office, affairs were in such a state in California that it was generally recognized that the native leaders would soon throw off allegiance to Mexico and attempt an independent government or seek the protection of some more powerful nation, either the United States, England, or France. The hold of Mexico was miserably weak and ineffective. Internal discords and national debility rendered the task of preserving her own autonomy sufficiently difficult, and made the just government or adequate protection of so distant a province impossible. Upon this point there is universal agreement among writers. Sir George Simpson, describing California as it was in 1842, has given an un-exaggerated picture of the lack of intercourse between the parent government and her political offspring.
“From what has been said,” he writes near the close of his book,
It will not appear strange that the intercourse between California and Mexico has never been active. . . . Mexico has more intercourse with China than with California. . . . Advices are not received in Mexico from Monterey above once or twice in a year. The last deputy elected by California to the Mexican Congress informed me that during the two years he served, he only received two letters from California while in Mexico. 53
Wilkes, too, on his voyage of exploration, though “prepared for anarchy and confusion” was surprised to find “a total absence of all government in California and even its form and ceremonies thrown aside.” 54
Nor was the military oversight exercised by Mexico any more efficient than the political. The fort at Monterey, the capital, and port of entry for the whole province, had not sufficient powder to salute the vessel upon which Simpson was a passenger, but had to borrow from the ship itself for the purpose. 55 Guarding the long inland reaches of San Francisco Bay, “where all the navies of the world might ride in safety,” and through whose gates men thought the commerce of the east would shortly pass, Wilkes found a garrison of a single officer, in charge of a single barefooted private, and the former was absent when Wilkes arrived. 56 The naval force consisted of but one vessel. That mounted no gun of any kind, and was so poorly manned that it could not make progress beating against the wind. 57
Further citations might be made, almost ad libitum, to show the complete neglect of the civil and military needs of California by the home government. But these would be useless. The local officials, continually appealing for aid, were met with nothing more substantial than promises, exhortations to defend the country themselves from threatened dangers; or, as we shall see presently, with that which was worse than even this utter lack of assistance. 58
Revolution against Micheltorena.—Under such circumstances it is not surprising to find the Californians setting aside Mexican laws whenever it suited their fancy, and almost as frequently deposing the governor sent out by the supreme government. 59 The revolution of 1836, resulting in the overthrow of Gutierrez, has already been mentioned. But this was only one of a numerous series. One writer has remarked that between 1831 and 1841, the government of California changed hands on an average of once a year; while the province not infrequently was “blessed with two governors at a time and once with triplets.” 60
The period between 1841 and the occupation of Monterey by Commodore Sloat, was scarcely less free than the decade just mentioned from civil disturbances. In 1842, General Micheltorena was sent from Mexico as governor, with an “army” for the defense of the province. The army consisted of some two or three hundred choice spirits picked, for the most part, from the national jails, and was a cause of constant bitterness and annoyance, even of actual fear, to the Californians. 61
“Not one individual among them,” said Robinson, who was present in California when the battalion arrived, “possessed a jacket or pantaloons; but naked and like savage Indians, they concealed their nudity with dirty, miserable blankets.” 62 And what was even worse, he adds, a drill by daylight was usually followed by thieving expeditions at night. So that the general feeling in California over this latest acquisition from Mexico was similar to that of a former Governor of the province, who wrote respecting the colonists sent by Spain to aid in the settlement of the country, that, to take a charitable view of the subject, their absence “for a couple of centuries, at a distance of a million of leagues would prove beneficial to the province and redound to the service of God and the glory of the king.” 63
The presence of Micheltorena's thieving soldiers and the general character of his rule soon furnished the California leaders, Castro and Alvarado, an excuse for revolt. The first outbreak occurred in November, 1844; and on December 1st, Micheltorena signed a treaty binding himself to ship his undesirable followers out of the country within three months. The agreement, however, was not kept, and the Californians again took up arms. With the details of this revolution we have no concern, except to note the rather curious fact that of the foreigner residents who took any part at all in it, some joined with Micheltorena, and some with Castro and Alvarado. In the single battle of the campaign, however, they did no actual fighting on either side, as the list of casualties for the whole day's encounter—two horses killed by the one force and a mule wounded by the other—fully testifies. 64
After this slaughter, Micheltorena was ready to capitulate, and in March, 1845, left California with the most of his ragged soldiery. 65 Although there were rumors at the time that this revolt was aimed to bring about separation from Mexico, these probably contained little truth. The Californians desired freedom in local affairs; and many of them cherished no great love for Mexico; but they hesitated to abrogate her authority entirely, not feeling strong enough to stand alone and fearing lest the protection afforded by a stronger power might prove more of a calamity than the neglect of Mexico. 66 In the northern part of the province, nevertheless, men of influence were driven by the desperate condition of affairs into recognizing the necessity of some radical change, either along the lines of complete imdependence or of coming under the protection of a more stable government than that of Mexico.
This feeling was greatly increased by the internal discord that prevailed even after the departure of the Mexican governor. Pio Pico, one of the southern leaders against Micheltorena, was chosen by vote of the assembly to take his place; while José Castro held the office of comandante general. Between these two, the latter representing the party of the north, the former the party of the south, peace was destined to be short lived. The removal of the capital from Monterey to Los Angeles, and the resultant separation of the civil offices by a distance of more than four hundred miles from the military headquarters, custom house, and treasury, made harmony among the native authorities still more unlikely.
During the summer of 1845 various dissensions arose. Civil war seemed imminent, and especially to foreign residents and Californians with property at stake the outlook was most discouraging. 67 “The country never was in a more disorderly, miserable condition than at the present moment,” wrote a friend to Alfred Robinson, who was then in New York, “we have no government. Pio Pico who was nominally governor has been arrested and imprisoned. The people at the north, as usual, are opposed to those of the south, and will be satisfied by none other than Alvarado for chief magistrate.” 68
Such disorganization and political uncertainty, together with the lax control exercised by Mexico, and the actual hostility to her interference in local affairs, had a three-fold result. Many of the Californians became reconciled to exchanging their allegiance to Mexico for any form of government that furnished protection and peace; it became generally recognized by those outside of California that the time was near for some such change to take place; and, finally, Polk was led to take active measures to bring the separation, when it came, to good account for the United States.
As the political conditions in California were favorable to the American interests during the opening months of Polk's administration, so also was the influx of immigration from across the mountains. From the chance and temporary bands of hunters who followed Jedediah Smith and the Patties, this movement had grown in 1844 to the organized companies of Bartleson and Kelsey. A year later the tide had come to a full head and the annual arrivals were numbered by the hundreds.
Frémont's report.—Then, as now, California had her publicity agents whose duty it was to attract settlers. By order of the government, Frémont, whose second exploring expedition 69 had led him across the Sierras, 70 published a report of his wanderings during the first part of 1845. His book was immediately seized upon by a public hungering for news of the regions west of the Rocky Mountains. 71 Written in a terse and interesting style, it at once brought its author into prominence and drew the attention of hundreds of readers to the country of which he wrote.
Though only a portion of the complete report dealt with California, 72 no other part was equal to this in graphic description. After a month of constant battle with the snows and starvation of the mountains, 73 Frémont and his party had reached the valley of the Sacramento at a time of the year when it was to be seen at its best. The contrast between the life and death struggle in the Sierras and this land of grass and flowers, well watered and timbered, full of game, and with the same “deep-blue sky and sunny climate of Smyrna and Palermo,” was most dramatic in its appeal to the imagination. 74 One does not wonder that visitors, eager to hear more of this new land, so crowded upon the American explorer that he was compelled to secure a separate building for his workshop; 75 while Webster, still the friend of annexation, invited him to dine and “talk about California.” 76
Magazine and newspaper activities.—But Frémont was only one of a numerous band of writers who sang the praises of California, and preached, either directly or indirectly, its acquisition during this period. Alfred Robinson (whose book has already been quoted in these pages) published his Life in California, during the early part of 1846. The author had been for many years a resident of the country of which he wrote, as agent for the large Boston firm of Bryant and Sturgis, and his work at once found wide popularity. Its influence upon the public—and the same may be said of most of the contemporaneous writings of a similar nature—is shown by the following extract from a review of that day in Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, which also gives us pretty accurately the spirit of the time regarding California.
“When we reflect,” said the writer, after speaking of the importance of California to the United States,
that this superb region is adequate to the sustaining of twenty millions of people; has for several hundred years been in the possession of an indolent and limited population, incapable from their character of appreciating its resources—that no improvement can be expected under its present control, we cannot but hope that thousands of our fellow countrymen will pour in and accelerate the happy period (which the work before us assures us cannot be distant) when Alta California will become part and parcel of our great confederation; and the cry of Oregon is only a precursor to the actual settlement of this more southern, more beautiful and far more valuable region. 77
But California was not compelled to rely altogether upon such formal publications, as we have mentioned, for publicity. Americans residing there wrote constantly to friends at home or to the newspapers of “the States” in such a vein as was best calculated to attract the attention of future emigrants. 78 Emphasis in these communications, as usual, was laid upon the advantages of California from commercial and agricultural standpoints, San Francisco, especially, being held up as a necessary possession for the welfare of the United States. And, in addition, assurances were given that nothing stood in the way of those desiring to settle in the new region, either in the nature of passports, or of difficulties in securing land.
“A foreigner,” said an authoritative article in the New York Sun, “can become a citizen of California by obtaining two signatures to his petition. He then possesses the right to take up vacant land, and may secure as much as eleven square leagues upon the payment of $26 in fees. Many grants held by such owners are 33 miles long and 3 miles wide.” 79 “The fertile plains of Oregon and California,” said another communication to the same paper, “are resounding with the busy hum of industry; all around us are the germs of empire, prosperity and wealth. Those who would reap a harvest should come out young, secure their lands, and in ten years they will have their fortunes.” 80
These articles descriptive of California and urging its annexation to the United States, were not confined to the papers of any one locality or party. The New York Journal of Commerce of March 5, contained an article entitled, “California Coming,” which declared the advantages to be gained from an acquisition of that territory would prove as great as those derived from the annexation of Texas and asserted that throughout the country there was general agreement as to the advisability of securing it. 81 “Information in regard to this favored portion of the globe,” said the New Orleans Courier, in referring to California, “is eagerly sought after by our citizens as it is destined ere long to be annexed to the United States. 82 And even the American Review, the stanch organ of the Whigs, in a long and carefully written article urged the importance of securing California for the commercial and agricultural advantages that would thereby result to this government; and because of the inability of Mexico to make use of its resources. 83
The New York papers, especially the Sun, Herald, and Journal of Commerce, were among the most active of the publications in keeping California before the public eye. They took pains to print any article coming within their notice regarding it; and, in addition, had a regular correspondent living in Monterey in the person of Thomas O. Larkin. 84 Indeed, it may be said without fear of exaggeration, that most of the communications published in these three papers on the subject of California originated with Larkin. And, owing to the custom of “exchange” prevalent at the time, most of these found space in other journals throughout the country. 85
Proposed railroad to California.—The interest of the Sun in this subject was rather strikingly shown by a letter from one of its editors, A. E. Beach, to his correspondent mentioned above. After thanking Larkin for the valuable information already furnished, Beach continued:
News from your quarter is looked for with deep interest here. Just now there are strong opinions that California will be joined to the United States. . . . We flatter ourselves that the New York Sun, will, if such a thing be possible, cause the measure to be carried into execution. Texas, owing almost entirely to the influence of this paper, has been annexed, and now, our editors say, “Why not California?” A letter which you wrote us some time since describing Monterey and harbor . . . seemed to have acted strongly on the public mind, and owing to what we have since said, they now look with a longing eye toward California. We have urged the purchase of it and that the contemplated railroad to Oregon should be turned to Monterey.
We wish, if convenient, you would give us your opinion of having a R. R. to Monterey and tell us where would be the best point to have it terminate.
You may judge what influence we have, from the fact that since we have spoken of Monterey as the terminus several persons are on the eve of starting for that place to purchase lands. 86
This railroad project mentioned by Beach was at that time a subject of considerable speculation throughout the country, and the idea of securing the rich trade of China and the Sandwich Islands, without the long journey around the Horn, appealed to all those interested in commercial ventures. Asa Whitney's plan for a transcontinental line to Oregon received much attention and was laid before Congress near the close of October, 1845. 87 Many, however, who believed in the ultimate success of the undertaking, as in the case of the editor of the New York paper, advocated Monterey or San Francisco as the terminus, 88 thereby making the acquisition of these communities by the United States still more desirable.
Increased Immigration.—The western papers, in addition to such descriptions as were contained in those of the eastern states, were concerned with the actual organization and departure of emigrant companies. 89 Any report of the discovery of a shorter route to the new land at once received public notice; 90 while not infrequently such an advertisement as the following made its appearance in a local paper, to be copied by many another western editor:
“Emigration” (read the headline of this sample notice) For California—A large party of settlers propose leaving Arkansas for California, next May. 91 The chairman of the Committee of Arrangements gives notice in the Little Rock Gazette that the Californians will rendezvous at Fort Smith, Arkansas, on the first Monday in April next, preparatory to taking up the line of march for the Pacific Coast. Every person starting is expected to be well armed with a rifle or heavy shot-gun, 16 pounds of shot or lead, 4 pounds of powder, etc. 92
As a result of all this publicity, emigration to California received a decided impetus. In May, 1845, it was commonly reported that 7000 persons had assembled at Independence, Missouri, ready to take the road to Oregon and California. 93 In November, Larkin informed the state department that some three hundred or four hundred of this company had arrived at the headwaters of San Francisco Bay. 94 From this time on, arrivals continued in a steady stream; while exaggerated rumors of future immigration were flying thickly through the province.
As early as July 15, Sutter had predicted the arrival of “more as 1000 Souls” within six or eight weeks. 95 Marsh was confident that two thousand immigrants would shortly be in the territory. 96 Stephen Smith, writing to Calhoun from Bodega, placed the number actually on the border at one thousand. 97 And a little later a report reached Larkin that the number would soon be increased by ten or twenty thousand, though the writer added that he himself did not believe more than two or three thousand would really come. 98
Mention has been made of the emigration from Oregon to California in the years previous to 1845. The same movement continued to supply the latter territory with much of its American population. Many of these came directly from the northern country; others starting originally for the Columbia, decided èn route to change their destination to California. 99 The usual division point for such parties was at Fort Hall, which still remained in the hands of the Hudson's Bay Company; and it was reported that British officers at the Fort were taking a hand in this proceeding, persuading Oregon bound settlers to turn off for California in order to preserve the Columbia to England. 100 On the other hand, it should be remarked that English papers condemned the so-called emigration to Oregon, which was creating so much excitement throughout the United States, as simply a ruse for the occupation of California. 101
Between the Americans most interested in the respective settlement of the two territories, a good deal of rivalry prevailed. Among the Oregon enthusiasts a committee was organized to counteract the representations of the California agents; 102 while the latter pursued an even more aggressive campaign in winning recruits for the colonization of the southern country. 103
“The Texas Game.”—This emigration to California, during 1845 and the first months in 1846, of which we have just been speaking, was prompted by more than a desire for mere settlement. “Once let the tide . . . flow toward California,” wrote one of Larkin's New York friends, “and the American population will be sufficiently numerous to play the Texas game.” 104 “Are there not enough wild Yankees in California to take the management of affairs in their own hands?” asked another, adding that the United States must eventually spread south of the 42d parallel, “as our territory on the Pacific is too narrow altogether, the outlet is not sufficient for the back country.” 105 A third believed two or three hundred Yankee riflemen, in conjunction with the Californians, could bring about a separation from Mexico, and suggested that as the thirty Americans taken by the British Government in the Canadian revolt and sent to New South Wales, were even then at Honolulu on their way home, they might find more congenial occupation in California than in the States. 106
“We only want the Flag of the U. S. and a good lot of Yankees and you would soon see the immense natural riches of the country developed, and her commerce in a flourishing condition. To see that Flag planted here would be most acceptable to the Sons of Uncle Sam, and by no means repugnant to the native population,” 107 wrote Stephen Smith, who had recently been released, for lack of evidence, from a charge of conspiring to declare California independent. 108 It was probably, therefore, with some idea of fulfilling these expectations that many of the immigrants reached the province.
Proposed union with Texas.—Aside from the plan of uniting California with the United States after its separation from Mexico, the idea also prevailed of making it an independent nation, dominating the commerce of the Pacific and enriching itself from the Asiatic trade. In the early years, as we have seen, the plan had been broached of annexing it to Texas. 109 And as late as 1844, 110 Houston wrote to Murphy that a nation embracing Texas, California, Oregon and the two provinces of Chihuahua and Sonora would “not be less than a rival power to any of the nations now in existence. . . . It is impossible to look upon the map of North America and not perceive the rationale of the project.” 111 A few months later Donelson found him awaiting the action of the United States Congress on annexation, but still revolving a plan for the increase of Texan domain, dwelling with some fondness “upon the capacity of Texas to extend her territory to the Pacific and even detach Oregon from us, because there are no Alleghanies to separate them; 112 while in April, 1845, the London Times was urging the adoption of a similar measure, so that the territory in question might possess “an original character and an independent existence.” 113
California and Oregon as an independent nation.—All of these schemes, however, came to an end with the annexation of Texas by the United States. But the conception of an autonomous nation, composed of Oregon and California, still proved very attractive to many minds. It was an old idea, tracing its origin back at least to 1812, when the father of American expansionists expressed his conviction that men of his own nationality would one day “spread themselves through the whole length of that coast [the Pacific], covering it with free and independent Americans, unconnected with us but by the ties of blood and interest, and employing like us the rights of self-government.” 114
The attention drawn to the whole Pacific coast by the Oregon controversy and the rapidly growing necessity for a change in the control of California, made Jefferson's prophecy appear to many the best solution for both problems. For it had long been felt that the vast distance separating Oregon and the United States, and the appalling difficulties of the route, would prevent its adequate government by the authorities at Washington. Nor did it seem possible to some minds that the western boundary of the Republic should extend beyond the Rocky Mountains. 115 To those who held such views it appeared both natural and expedient that California and Oregon should be united into a strong, independent country, settled by American emigrants, and standing on the Pacific as a sort of complementary nation to the United States.
“The situation of California,” said Wilkes in his official report, “will cause its separation from Mexico before many years. It is very probable that the country will become united with Oregon with which it will perhaps form a state that is designed to control the destiny of the Pacific. 116 A year or two later, Waddy Thompson assures us, he was told of a definite plot to separate California from Mexico and asked if the United States would be willing to surrender her title to Oregon so that that territory and California might be made into a Republic. 117 Benjamin E. Green sent much the same report to Calhoun, adding, however, that the Oregon settlers were not anxious for the plan, provided they could receive aid and encouragement from the United States in maintaining their hold upon Oregon. 118 In England, also, the idea of an independent state on the Pacific seems to have obtained some favor. Lord Ashburton wrote Webster that the power possessing Oregon and California should be independent of Great Britain and the United States, but of the English race; 119 while Louis McLane, when ambassador to England, in one of his despatches to Buchanan, spoke of the plan as having been “suggested simultaneously by certain classes on both sides of the Atlantic,” adding, it may be remarked, that such an arrangement would work untold disadvantage to this government. 120
References to this plan, likewise, were frequently met with in the debates in Congress. As late as March, 1846, in a discussion of the Oregon question, Senator Evans of Maine declared the union of that territory and California, separated as they were from the United States by an almost impassable barrier of mountains, would promote the interests of this country much more as an independent nation than as a territorial possession. 121 On the other hand, an opponent of Evans assured the senate that unless some action was speedily taken to settle the status of the region around the Columbia, the settlers there would place themselves under French or English protection, be joined by the Californians, and eventually control the coast from the Isthmus of Darien to the southern boundaries of Alaska. 122
As a local affair, the proposed union with Oregon aroused considerable speculation in California. Lansford W. Hastings had come to the province in 1842 with the express purpose, as we have seen, of bringing about its separation from Mexico and uniting it either with Texas or with Oregon, in the latter event making himself president of the new Republic. 123
In the intervening years his time had been occupied in efforts to encourage emigration throughout the United States, and with the conducting of parties, thus organized, into California. 124 By 1845 the idea of independence and union with Oregon was frequently mentioned in the correspondence of American residents, some of whom favored it above annexation to the United States. 125 Dr. John Marsh, one of the older settlers, communicated his views at some length to Larkin, but took the ground that California must first become part of the American Union and not attempt a separate existence with Oregon until immigration should render such a step advisable. 126 Continuing, Marsh said that the settlers on the Willamette were anxious to unite with the Californians, while some expressed a desire to join with Oregon. Under such circumstances he thought it would be wise if Larkin were to feel the pulse of Alvarado on the subject; and prophesied that, if the union could be accomplished, a new empire would arise on the Pacific, whose capital located on San Francisco Bay, “possibly on the site occupied by the miserable village of Yerba Buena,” would “in the next century become one of the great emporii 127 of the world.”
Rumors of Mormon Hegira.—In addition to this plan of uniting Oregon and California, another movement was reported to be on foot in the United States that would result in the separation of the latter from Mexico. “California now offers a field for the prettiest enterprise that has been undertaken in modern times,” Governor Ford is said to have written to Brigham Young, leader of the Mormons, early in 1845. “Why should it not be a pretty operation for your people to go out there, take possession of and capture a portion of that vacant country and establish an independent government of your own, subject only to the laws of nations?” 128
Whether, as appears very doubtful, such a letter were ever written is immaterial. 129 The fact remains that the conception of a Mormon empire on the Pacific proved so attractive to the leaders of this sect 130 that preparation was made to emigrate as a body to the region around San Francisco. Lansford W. Hastings, who had returned again to the United States to obtain more settlers, was easily prevailed upon to make himself a sort of advance agent for the host and made his way back to California to prepare the ground for their coming. 131
Reports of the design spread throughout the United States and aroused no little opposition, 132 the president, even, being petitioned to prevent the movement, but refusing because “the right of emigration or expatriation was one which any citizen possessed.” 133 Plans were made for an overland journey, to include the larger part of the Prophet's followers; while a smaller number were to be sent around by sea. This latter party, numbering nearly two hundred and forty, left New York in the Brooklyn on February 4, 1846, under the command of Samuel Brannan; while the main body, under Young, began its slow and toilsome way across the continent.
With neither of these companies has the present account much further concern. The one reached San Francisco on July 31, three weeks after Commodore Sloat's arrival, and tradition says that Brannan's first remark upon entering the harbor was, “There is that damned flag again.” 134 The other, so it is said, stopped at Salt Lake because messengers from California met them there with word of the American occupation.
New activities of Lansford W. Hastings.—Hastings, meanwhile, in California was prophesying its speedy independence and claiming the connivance of the United States government in his project. As early as November, a friend in Boston had written Larkin to conduct his business as he would have done had he been in Texas ten years before, with a knowledge of the changes that were to occur there. Capital, he went on, was to be spent colonizing California; and a revolution, backed by American men and money, would soon result. The settlement of Oregon was only a blind for the occupation of the Mexican province. “The egg is already laid not a thousand miles from Yerba Buena and in New York the chicken will be picked. Our men of war are not ordered to California for nothing.” 135 . . .
Hastings, as has been said, was advancing much the same idea of a strong backing in the United States, and even the sanction of the government. Thousands of people, he wrote Larkin, had their eyes turned to Oregon and California, determined to make a final move and establish a permanent home. The firm of Benson and Company was about to establish a large commercial house somewhere in the territory, and send two ships a year to the coast for the free transportation of colonists. Under pledge of secrecy he concluded, “The arrangement is a confidential government arrangement. The expense thus incurred is not borne by that house, but by our government, for the promotion of what object you will readily perceive.” 136
How much ground Hastings had for this statement cannot be known. His project plainly embraced a much wider scope than the single element of the Mormon settlement; and it is probable that the commercial firm mentioned in his letter was actually concerned in a scheme for colonizing certain portions of the country. It is scarcely possible, however, that the government had any hand in it, as he insisted and doubtless believed. 137
Native attitude toward the Americans.—Having spoken at length of the conditions existing in California, the feeling of the United States regarding its acquisition, the flow of immigration across the mountains that formed its eastern boundary, and the various rumors of independence current during the period, we come again to a discussion of the president's policy as it was affected by these circumstances. A further word, however, will be necessary to understand the attitude of the native Californians toward the Americans.
Naturally, the influx of strangers during the year 1845, and the known wish of the United States to possess California, caused some apprehension among those of its inhabitants who desired to see the province remain under Mexican control. But on the whole there was little in the treatment accorded the immigrants by the Californians of which they had a right to complain. Frequent orders requiring their expulsion came from Mexico, but they were uniformly set aside by the California officials. 138 Though sub-Prefect Guerrero, perhaps with much justification, wrote to Castro: “Friend, the idea these gentlemen have formed for themselves is, that God made the world and them also, therefore what there is in the world belongs to them as sons of God, 139 he seems to have taken no measures to expel the foreigners from his own district. And while Castro, with some heat, declared before a junta at Monterey, “these Americans are so contriving that some day they will build ladders to touch the sky, and once in the heavens they will change the whole face of the universe and even the color of the stars,” 140 he perhaps thought it useless to endeavor to keep them from changing the destiny of California.
Indeed, the only measures that looked toward putting a stop to immigration, aside from juntas and meetings of the assembly (which came to nothing), were a recommendation made by Castro and Vallejo to the central government to purchase the fort at New Helvetia from Sutter; 141 and an abortive expedition from Mexico that was intended to cope with the incoming Americans. The control of New Helvetia, had it been in California hands, could have been made a serious obstacle to the arrival of parties across the Sierras; but though Sutter encouraged the suggested purchase, the proposition got no further than the Mexican archives. The second expedient met with no better success, ending in charges of extravagance, corruption, and the final revolt of such soldiers as had been assembled, even before they left Mexico, most of them turning from the expedition to aid Paredes in his contest with Herrera. 142
Larkin as Polk's informant.—Of the progress of all these events in California, Polk was well informed. Not merely did he have the usual channels of news, which, as we have seen, kept the public aware of much that transpired in the province; but in Thomas O. Larkin he had an additional source of reliable and frequent information. 143 The American consul's despatches, from the time of his appointment, dealt with the four or five broad topics that were of vital interest to the authorities at Washington in forming their California policy. These were, first, the condition of California from a political and military point of view and the strength of its loyalty to Mexico; second, the sentiment among the inhabitants toward the United States; third, the progress of American immigration and the reception of American settlers; fourth, the influence of European nations in the affairs of the province.
Omitting his references to the last subject, for the present, we find that on the remaining questions Larkin's communications to the state department gave full and important information. Especially did he emphasize the friendly feeling existing toward the American residents and the lack of attachment to Mexico. The military strength of the province he placed at two hundred and eighty Mexican troops and a smaller number of Californians, with a militia theoretically numbering one thousand, but practically not amounting to one-tenth of that force. The effectiveness of even this small army was decreased by half, he added, as part of it was stationed at San Francisco, in the northern part of the state, and part at San Diego, in the southern. Monterey had no cannon; and, to complete the demoralization, the Californians feared the Mexican troops more than those of a foreign nation, and would gladly welcome the return of an American squadron such as Jones had brought. 144
The revolt against Micheltorena was made the subject of considerable comment, Larkin mentioning as an aside that within twelve years four revolutions had occurred, all of which had been won by the Californians; and that five of the six Mexican generals, arriving during that time, had been sent back, while the remaining one had died. In conclusion he left the impression that the movement had resulted in the independence of the country, de facto, if not de jure. 145
The effect of this early information is seen in the despatches sent to Commodore Sloat by the secretary of the navy, when, in the summer of 1845, war between this country and Mexico seemed imminent. “The Mexican ports on the Pacific,” wrote George Bancroft in these confidential instructions, are said to be open and defenceless. If you ascertain with certainty that Mexico has declared war against the United States, you will at once possess yourself of the harbor of San Francisco and blockade or occupy such other ports as your force may permit. . . . You will be careful to preserve, if possible, the most friendly relations with the inhabitants, and, where you can do so, you will encourage them to adopt a course of neutrality. 146
Two later despatches from Larkin, received in the fall of that year, 147 simply reiterated the opinions he had expressed in his former communication, laying emphasis in addition upon the designs of France and England on the province, a matter, as we shall see, that caused the administration no small anxiety.
Larkin's instructions.—At this time Polk was making arrangements to send Slidell upon the mission already mentioned. On October 17, while the question of the American minister's reception was so much in doubt as to delay his departure, Buchanan addressed a long, confidential letter to the consul, who, from Monterey, had furnished the government with so much of its valuable information. In this letter to Larkin, the internal policy the administration was determined to pursue regarding California was clearly outlined; and, by the appointment of Larkin as confidential agent to carry out the terms, definitely set in motion.
So much has been written regarding this despatch, since Bancroft first brought it to light, and it has been printed, either wholly or in part, so frequently that, important as it is, a mere summary of its contents will be sufficient here. 148 Aside from the notification it carried to Larkin of his appointment as confidential agent, it instructed him to guard against the encroachments and influence of foreign nations in California; to cultivate friendly relations with the inhabitants in every way possible on behalf of this government, and assure them that, if they declared their independence, the United States stood ready to receive them under her protection, whenever this could be done “without affording Mexico just cause of complaint”; and finally, to forward frequent communications to the department regarding the internal conditions of the province (with a list of its leading citizens and officials), its trade and commercial affairs, and the amount and character of the American immigration.
Three copies of this despatch left Washington. One went to Slidell to aid him in his negotiations with Mexico; 149 one was sent by way of Cape Horn and Honolulu on the U. S. S. Congress; and the third was entrusted to Lieutenant Archibald H. Gillespie of the marine corps. Going overland through Mexico, Gillespie was forced to destroy the written document in his possession, but before doing so memorized its contents.
Gillespie, however, was much more than a bearer of despatches. To him, as to Larkin, Polk had entrusted the carrying out of his policy in California, and an effort was made to keep his identity a secret. So, travelling as an invalid merchant seeking health, he reached Monterey on April 17, 1846, 150 delivering to Larkin the news of his appointment and writing out from memory the instructions Buchanan had drawn up six months before. 151
Bear Flag Revolt.—For the most part, the actual proceedings of Larkin and Gillespie in California after this time lie beyond the scope of the present narrative. In connection with the Bear Flag Revolt, and Frémont's participation therein, however, it will be necessary to go into some detail to determine whether or not it was a part of the president's policy to put such a movement into operation. To understand clearly the situation, we must note again that California's separation from Mexico could be achieved in two ways—by a revolt of the native Californians, aided by American residents; or by an uprising of the American residents against the native Californians. This condition was distinctly different, as will be readily seen, from that which had existed in Texas when Houston led the settlers there in the struggle for independence.
We have mentioned that Gillespie and Larkin were to serve as Polk's agents in California. The same mission was also entrusted to John C. Frémont, whose first arrival in California has been spoken of, and who had returned on his third exploring tour at the head of sixty-five men, reaching the province early in December, 1845. 152 It is not our purpose to follow the story of his difficulties with the California authorities (after they had given him permission to winter in the territory under their jurisdiction) and the affair at Hawk's Peak. 153
It is worth while, however, to add a suggestion to account for the sudden change of front on the part of Prefect Manuel Castro and his peremptory order of March 5 that the American commander quit the country. The reasons for this have been variously given as the receipt of orders from Mexico (none of which Castro would have obeyed unless he pleased); 154 the violation of a tacit agreement by Frémont to remain at some distance from the California settlements; 155 and the mere desire of the prefect to send a report of his zeal to Mexico, without having any hostile intentions whatever toward the strangers. 156 There seems to be sufficient ground, however, for adding as a fourth explanation, the influence of the British vice-consul, Alexander Forbes, who protested formally in the name of his government against the presence of Frémont and his followers in the department. 157 Castro, not only willing to make a show of pleasing Forbes, but fearing the displeasure of the Mexican government if he paid no heed to this remonstrance, had nothing else to do than bid the intruder be gone.
It was not long after this that Gillespie reached Monterey. In addition to the instructions for Larkin, he carried a note of introduction from Buchanan to Frémont and a package of letters to the same individual from Senator Benton, Frémont's father-in-law. 158 Without lingering long at Monterey, Gillespie hastened on to Yerba Buena in pursuit of Frémont, who, by this time, was well on his way to Oregon. At Yerba Buena, Gillespie spent some days with the American vice-consul, W. A. Leidesdorff, and then continued his journey, finally overtaking the explorer in the heart of the Oregon woods.
What passed between Gillespie and Frémont it would be interesting to know. No written instructions were sent to the latter by Buchanan, and even those given to Gillespie are not on file. Yet, both from the testimony of Fr&eacut