Vol. XVIII 1 JANUARY, 1915 No. 3
The publication committee and the editors disclaim responsibility for views expressed by contributors to The Quarterly.
The reported designs of England and France to secure control of California before its annexation by the United States have led, first and last, to a vast amount of surmise and historically unprofitable speculation. So far as France is concerned, the actual purposes and plans of the government (if indeed they existed) remain still unknown. But within the last few years an examination of the British Public Record Office has cleared the subject of English aggression of most of its mystery. 2
This investigation has shown that while, indeed, the British government, as such, had no intentions of acquiring California and in fact manifested comparatively little interest in its affairs, yet English officials in Mexico, California, and on board Her Majesty's vessels of the Pacific, on the contrary, were exceedingly anxious to place the province under English control; or, if that could not be, to thwart the ambitions of the United States. 3
The activities of these British representatives and the occasional rumor of French intrigue naturally aroused no little concern throughout this country and created a genuine alarm lest one or the other power should endeavor to forestall our own plans regarding the province. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to examine, not the actual designs of France or England, but the effect of reports and rumors regarding these designs upon the government and people of the United States.
The earliest fears of English aggression seem to have arisen shortly after the publication of the history of California by Alexander Forbes in 1839. The book was intended not so much to convey historical information as to encourage the colonization of California by British subjects; and contained a plan, worked out in some detail, by which a cession of that territory might be made by Mexico in payment of her debt of $50,000,000 to English bondholders. A company, composed of these creditors, was to be formed, and to it were to be given many of the same prerogatives of territorial sovereignty as those enjoyed by the British East India Company. 4
Forbes's publication had a wide circulation, and, 5 as its whole tone was frankly a plea for English domination in California, aroused considerable comment throughout this country. It was said that negotiations, such as Forbes had suggested, were already in progress, and that England was taking this method of shutting the United States away from the Pacific and confining her domain to the country east of the Rocky Mountains—thus giving over to British control a monopoly of the East India and China trade. 6
With the beginning of Tyler's administration the fear of English encroachments had become very real. Owing to the strained relations over the Texas, Oregon, and northeastern boundary questions, the faintest rumor of an attempt on the part of Great Britain to gain a foothold in California was sufficient not merely to excite the press of the country but to penetrate even into official circles.
Seizure of Monterey.—In 1842 came the seizure of Monterey by Commodore Jones, who gave as the compelling motive of his action that both he and other high officers of his fleet wished to preserve California from falling into the hands of “our great commercial rival,” England. “The Creole affair,” he wrote,
the question of the right of search, the mission of Lord Ashburton . . . the well founded rumor of a cession of the Californias, and lastly the secret movements of the English naval force in this quarter . . . have all occurred since the date of your last despatch. Consequently I am without instructions . . . upon what I consider a vital question to the United States . . . the occupation of California by Great Britain under a secret treaty with Mexico. 7
Warnings of Waddy Thompson.—But Jones was not the only one in government employ who looked askance at England's motives. From Mexico City, Waddy Thompson was urging in his despatches to Tyler and Webster British aggression as an important reason for the acquisition of California by the United States. In the first of these he said:
France and England both have [had] their eyes upon it [California]; the latter has yet.—She has already control of the Sandwich Islands, of the Society Islands, New Zealand, etc., etc., and through the agency of that Embryo East India Monopoly, the Hudson Bay Co. she will ere long have a monopoly of the commerce of the Pacific, and not an American flag will fly on its Coasts. 8
Webster, however, appeared to treat this communication as of little moment, writing Thompson on June 27th that he thought England had no present designs upon California or even any objection to its acquisition by the United States. 9 But such an assurance was not sufficient for Thompson. In reply he wrote,
I have information upon which I can rely that an agent of this government is now in England negotiating for the sale, or what is precisely the same thing, the mortgage of Upper California for the loan of fifteen millions. In my first despatch, I glanced at the advantages which would result to our country from the acquisition. Great as those advantages would be, they sink in comparison with the evils to our commerce and other interests, even more important, from a cession of that country to England. 10
Even this seems to have caused Webster no alarm; while with word of the seizure of Monterey, the subject disappears for the time from Thompson's correspondence. In January, however, he began again his refrain of warning, perhaps exaggerating his own fears to arouse the secretary of state whom he considered entirely too indifferent to the danger. After speaking of his earlier despatches upon England's purpose, and expressing some resentment that they had been treated so lightly, Thompson went on:
I know that England has designs on California and has actually made a treaty with Mexico securing to British creditors the right to lands there in payment of their debts and that England will interpose this treaty in the way of a cession of California and that in ten years she will own the country. 11
To all of this, however, Webster had the assurance of Everett and Ashburton regarding the tripartite agreement as sufficient answer. 12 But the country at large did not possess such reassuring evidence. So general became the feeling that Mexico had entered into such a treaty with England that the president was called upon by unanimous consent of the house to furnish any information in his possession as to the truth of the report. 13 To this he replied that the administration had no knowledge that confirmed the rumored negotiations. 14
Perhaps rebuffed by the reception of his information, Thompson had little more to say regarding England and California for some months; when, as we have seen, his views underwent a complete change and for the moment he hoped that an English-Mexican war might thrown the province into the lap of the United States. 15 Following Thompson's resignation as minister, Benjamin E. Green, Shannon, and Duff Green, from time to time issued similar warnings to those Webster had received, and of which we have just spoken.
English mortgage.—Mexico, cultivating friendly relations with England, 16 was said to have mortgaged California to that country for $26,000,000. The pledge expired in 1847 and, unless paid before that time, would result in the transfer of the country to Great Britain, whose control in this way would be extended not only over the whole of California, but eventually over Oregon as well. 17 Donelson, on his special mission to Texas, was sufficiently interested in this report to inquire directly of Elliot as to its truth; but learned nothing of a satisfactory nature, and came to the conclusion that it rested on insufficient evidence. 18
The Hudson's Bay Company.—Larkin, meanwhile, from California, had been doing his part by calling attention to the rapid encroachments of the Hudson's Bay Company, whose employees were trapping, cultivating land, building mills and establishing themselves in various ways in that country and also in Oregon. The San Francisco agent had asked for extensive grants of land upon which to settle colonists and had no intention of quitting the province when game became scarce. 19 These statements, sufficiently grave in themselves, received further emphasis from a letter of Henry A. Pierce, of Boston, read on the floor of the house about this time. 20
Report of Santa Anna's dealings with England.—But even more disquieting reports came from Shannon. Santa Anna had been captured but a few days before by the forces of the opposition, and important documents were found on his person. Certain of these had been published by the new administration to discredit him with the people, and the rest laid before the Mexican Congress in secret session. “From a portion of this correspondence,” concluded Shannon's despatch,
the fact has been disclosed that a negotiation was going on between President Santa Anna and the English Minister for the sale and purchase of the two Californias—That portion of the correspondence relating to this subject has not been published in the papers, but it has been laid before Congress in secret session and the pendency of such a negotiation may be relied upon as true—The English Minister has no doubt in this matter acted under instructions from his government; it may therefore be assumed that it is the settled policy of the English government to acquire the two Californias. You are aware that the English creditors have now a mortgage on them for twenty-six millions. 21
For the present, however, Shannon thought the designs of England had received a set back in the overthrow of Santa Anna; and as the new administration were making political capital out of the disclosures regarding California, they would not themselves dare favor a measure similar to that of their discredited opponent. The report of Santa Anna's secret dealings received considerable publicity, both in this country and in Europe; 22 but exactly what foundation there was in fact for the rumor is not clear. It was about this time that Forbes, the British vice-consul at Monterey, was submitting his suggestion for an English protectorate through Barron; 23 and it may have been that some correspondence passed between the British representatives in Mexico and Santa Anna.
Polk's suspicions.—It was with such reports, as have already been cited, from Thompson, Green, Larkin and Shannon in the official files of the state department, and with even wilder rumors in the air, that Polk came to the President's office. Every outside influence, moreover, tended to make the new executive suspicious of England's policy. The unsettled Oregon boundary; the mutual spirit of animosity shown by the press of the two countries; 24 the whole western attitude and his schooling at the hands of Andrew Jackson; above all, the course of Great Britain with regard to Texas; 25 prepared him to accept the stories of English designs upon California with little hesitation.
McNamarra project.—Fresh reports, also, soon strengthened this belief. On May 13, the confidential agent, Wm. S. Parrott, wrote that the British fleet in the Pacific had been reenforced for the rumored purpose of taking and holding California in case of war between Mexico and the United States, using as an excuse for the action, the protection of English citizens in their mortgage claims on that province. 26 Later, Parrott said that the force bound from Mexico to California, to subdue the insurrection against Michel-torena, was to be commanded by an officer educated in France; and that the influence of this commander in California, according to reliable information, was to be used to the advantage of that nation by the French legation in Mexico. At any rate, said Parrott, “he certainly takes with him a large number of Frenchmen for some reason or other.” 27
A few days afterward, however, the American agent had occasion to change his Frenchmen into Irishmen, writing that the expedition had been delayed for lack of funds; while with it, “a young Irish Priest by the name of McNamarrah” was preparing to leave for California for the purpose of introducing Irish immigrants. 28 In this, it should be remarked, Parrott was not building wholly on his imagination. 29
Larkin's despatch of July 10th.—In the fall, more emphatic despatches reached the state department. On October 11, Buchanan received a communication from Parrott which said that the least news coming from California excited great interest in English circles, especially among the members of the British legation. 30 On the same day a despatch, written July 10, reached Washington from the American consul at Monterey. This communication of Larkin's deserves special mention. In it he stated that the Hudson's Bay Company 31 had furnished the native Californians with arms and ammunitions to expel the Mexican governor, General Micheltorena, 32 in the preceding year. At the time his despatch was being written, however, Larkin said,
There is no doubt in this country, but the troops now expected here in September [from Mexico] are sent at the instigation of the British Government under the plea that the American settlers in California want to revolutionize the country; it is rumored that two English houses in Mexico have become bound to the new general to accept his drafts as funds to pay his troops for eighteen months. 33
Of even greater importance was the information in the same despatch that both France and England had appointed salaried consuls in California, neither of whom had any apparent commercial business. The British representative, 34 especially, was a fit subject for suspicion. His ranch was located forty miles inland; he had permission to carry on his private business, while receiving pay from the government; as there was no English commerce his appointment became a mere blind; and finally, he was concerned in the affairs of the “gigantic” Hudson's Bay Company.
The effect exerted by these despatches upon the policy of the administration will be considered later. It remains for the present to note further communications that were well calculated to arouse a like suspicion against England.
Slidell, when upon his mission to Mexico, at first was unable to learn “anything that would authorize the belief that attempts are making by any European Power, to obtain a cession of any territory on the Pacific Coast,” though the late arrival of a son of Sir Robert Peel, as bearer of despatches, from the British fleet in the Pacific, had caused some comment. 35 Some ten or twelve days later, however, Slidell was writing for instructions as to the course he should pursue regarding the British mortgage on Mexican territory, in case a treaty was negotiated. The same despatch likewise carried information that England was hindering his reception by the Mexican government. 36
The rumored monarchy.—About this time, also, reports came to the administration of a plan to establish a monarchy in Mexico and call in a European prince—an arrangement necessarily fatal to Polk's purpose of securing California. John Black, the American consul at Mexico City, first called attention to this danger, saying that it was commonly reported that the revolution then in progress had such an end in view. Reliable persons had informed him that agents were in Europe soliciting a foreign prince; while France, England and Spain, having countenanced the plan, were being looked to as the backers and sustainers of the new monarch. 37
Shortly after the receipt of Black's despatch, a private letter, equally positive in tone, came to Polk from the American ambassador at London. “It need not surprise you to discover at no distant day,” wrote McLane, “that a favorite scheme with the leading Powers of Europe is to compose the Mexican trouble by giving her a Monarchial form of government and supplying the monarch from one of their own families.” 38
Slidell soon added his voice to this testimony of Black and McLane, calling attention to the fact that El Tiempo, the official organ of the Paredes administration, had come out openly in favor of the monarchy. 39 Three weeks later, the consul at Vera Cruz wrote that the Mexican government was bent, beyond question, on putting the plan into operation, in order to secure foreign intervention against the United States. 40 These reports later called out a reply from Buchanan to Slidell stating that this report had been corroborated from other sources, but implying a doubt as to its foundation. 41 However, Slidell was to ferret the matter out, for it was a thing the American people could by no means permit. Later, Slidell wrote that a feeling favorable to the United States was arising among those in Mexico who opposed the idea; and in a second despatch outlined the difficulties its supporters had to overcome. 42 Still, he advised prompt and decisive measures on the part of the authorities at Washington to forestall its success. Two days after the receipt of this communication, the president consulted with Senator Benton as to what these measures should be. 43
Agitation in the press.—While the reports of England's designs upon California, and the establishment of a Mexican monarchy were reaching the state department, the same accounts were finding their way into the public prints. Larkin's despatch of July 10, in somewhat stronger form, was sent by him to the New York Sun, and from that journal copied by many of the other newspapers. 44 In it only two alternatives were given—either California, with all its resources and the mile-wide bay of San Francisco, must belong to the United States or pass into the hands of France or England. With California also went the possession of Oregon. “Why they are in service,” said the published despatch in referring to the recently appointed foreign consuls against which the state department had likewise been warned, “their government best knows, and Uncle Sam will know to his cost.”
“The exhaustless wealth of the mines of Mexico, the broad and fertile acres of the Californias will fall a prey to British rapacity should there be none to interpose,” was the opinion of the New Orleans Picayune. 45 And even the staid American Review lifted up a voice of warning against English aggressions and in favor of American occupation. 46 The report of the proposed monarchy likewise received due publicity and unfavorable comment. 47 While the bitter attacks of the London Times against the United States as a nation of land-grabbers, and the repeated calls it made upon the British government to secure California or at least prevent its acquisition by the Americans, aroused no little indignation. 48
Effect upon the policy of the administration.—The importance of the question of foreign interference in California lies not so much, however, in its effect upon the popular mind as upon the policy pursued by the government. On September 16, when considering the instructions for Slidell, Polk records that even the fact of his mission was to be kept secret, lest British or French influences should thwart its purpose. And from this time on the numerous despatches on the subject of foreign interference, of which mention has been made, figured prominently in the administration's course of action.
The importance especially of Larkin's communication of July 10 in this connection has never been duly appreciated. Three days after its receipt, Buchanan wrote privately to McLane regarding the Oregon controversy, mentioning several reasons why the compromise measure would meet defeat in the senate. The chief of these he gave as follows:
The disposition of the two nations [France and England] to meddle in the concern of this continent, the strong suspicions entertained that they are now intriguing both in Mexico and California in relation to the latter:—all these have conspired to excite American feeling against Great Britain to a very high pitch. By advices from Monterey of the 10th of July last, we are informed of the arrival of a British and French consul in upper California without any ostensible commercial business—[Here followed the substance of Larkin's despatch, with a considerable portion of it in direct quotation] . . . I need not say to you what a flame would be kindled throughout the Union should Great Britain obtain a cession of California from Mexico or attempt to take possession of that province. 49
As affairs were in such a state, Buchanan further advised McLane that he himself thought the time too critical for urging the Oregon question, although the president was determined to give the year's notice. 50
It may be mentioned in this connection, simply as a matter of interest, that not long before, Polk had received from Robert Armstrong, his close personal friend and newly appointed consul to Liverpool, a letter strongly advising him never to settle the Oregon question short of 54° unless England gave up all pretensions to California. “England must never have California,” were his words, “and it seems to be advisable to make Oregon the bone of contention to prevent it. The whole country will sustain you on Oregon.” 51
England and Larkin's appointment.—In addition to Buchanan's letter to McLane, the administration's fear of foreign interference was similarly shown in the instructions sent to Larkin and Slidell. Larkin's appointment as confidential agent has often been condemned as an act smacking of international dishonor. Yet it should be remembered that Polk had every reason to believe that an English and a French agent were likewise masquerading under the guise of consul for the purpose of influencing the political future of California.
In the instructions to Larkin, therefore, we should naturally expect much space to be devoted to the subject of British and French designs. 52 And we are not disappointed. The commercial interests of the United States demand that the American consul shall “exert the greatest vigilance in discovering and defeating any attempts which may be made by foreign governments to acquire a control” over California. The president cannot “view with indifference the transfer of California to Great Britain or any other European Power.” European colonization on the North American constinent must cease, as it can only work hurt to the United States and equal harm to the nations attempting it. The Californians, therefore, are to be warned of the danger of such domination to their peace and prosperity. They are to let events take their course along political lines unless Mexico endeavors to transfer them to Great Britain or France; then they are to resist with force—and the United States will assist them. Lastly, Larkin is not to awaken “the jealousy of the British or French agents” by assuming other than his consular character. 53
England and Slidell's instructions.—The instructions to Slidell, first drawn up on September 16, but amended after the receipt of Larkin's 10th of July despatch, 54 laid an equally strong emphasis on the matter of foreign interference. One of the new minister's duties was “to counteract the influence of foreign Powers exerted against the United States in Mexico.” Also—a point frequently lost sight of—Slidell was expected to accomplish, at that particular time, the object for which he was sent, not merely because of “the wretched condition of the internal affairs of Mexico,” but also on account of “the misunderstanding which exists between the Government and the Ministers of France and England.” 55
The same determination to resist European colonization that had been expressed to Larkin was contained, even in a stronger form, in this document received by Slidell. He was instructed to ascertain whether Mexico proposed ceding California to France or England, and to take steps to prevent any such action, “so fraught with danger to the best interests of the United States.” For if all the advantages of San Francisco harbor “should be turned against our country, by the cession of California to Great Britain our principal commercial rival, the consequences would be most disastrous.” 56
Polk's re-statement of the Monroe Doctrine.—Polk, however, did not rest content with these secret efforts to thwart European influence in California. On December 2, came his first annual message with its enlarged affirmation of the Monroe Doctrine. California was not specifically mentioned in this document, but the wording was such as to be meaningless if applied to Oregon alone. This was so recognized at the time. 57 Moreover, Polk told Benton definitely, while the message was in the course of preparation late in October, that he had California in mind as well as Oregon. Great Britain, he said, had her eye upon California, intending to possess it if possible; but the people of the United States would see that she did not. “California and the fine Bay of San Francisco” were to be protected from English aggression as well as Oregon. Like Cuba, California might main under its present owners but never pass into the hands of a more powerful nation. 58
It has sometimes been held that this application of the Monroe Doctrine was merely a bogey used by Polk to alarm the country and justify his subsequent course in the eyes of the nation. Enough, it is believed, has already been said to show the falsity of such a charge. When he wrote—“the people of this continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny. Should any portion of them, constituting an independent state, propose to unite themselves with our confederacy, this will be a question for them and for us to determine without any foreign interference” 59—Polk desired to warn England that the United States would brook no interference in case the program entrusted to Larkin in California was a success, and the inhabitants sought annexation to this country.
Similarly, when he announced that “no future European colony or dominion, shall with our consent, be planted or established on any part of the North American continent,” 60 he wished to announce clearly and distinctly to the British government that any attempt she might make to gain control of California would be opposed, with arms if necessary, by the United States.
Did Polk's fear of England hasten the Mexican War?—The foregoing discussion, it is hoped, has shown something of the apprehension that existed in the mind of President Polk and his advisers, lest, either directly or indirectly, European influence should hinder the acquisition of California by the United States. How large a part this played in bringing on the Mexican War, would be interesting, but impossible, to say. In arriving at the effect of this apprehension, however, it should be remembered that Polk's attitude on all great public questions was moulded largely by Andrew Jackson, who had warned him against England both in her relation to Texas and California, 61 and that he had every reason to believe, and did thoroughly believe, from the reports that came from Mexico and California that European influence was at work to defeat his purpose. He laid the blame for Slidell's rejection directly at England's door. 62 And even as late as the outbreak of the war, his secretary of state feared that if England learned of his determination to acquire California, she, and perhaps France, would join Mexico against the United States. 63 But whatever influence this may have exerted upon Polk's determination to commence hostilities, it surely was not with insincerity that he wrote after the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, “The immense value of ceded territory does not consist alone in the amount of money for which the public lands may be sold . . . the fact that it has become a part of the Union and cannot be subject to European power, constitutes ample indemnity for the past.” 64
Before bringing to a close this discussion of American interest in California prior to the Mexican War, a word must be said regarding the idea that Polk's desire for California was prompted largely by his wish to extend the area of slavery, and that the acquisition of the territory itself was brought about chiefly through Southern efforts. Of late years, with the clearing away of much of the historic mist and fog, arising from the bitter controversies before the Civil War, the whole subject of slavery in its relation to territorial expansion is seen in a clearer and less distorted light. Even the annexation of Texas is coming to be considered chiefly as a phase of the westward progress of the American people and no longer a mere device of slave holding states.
To a much more marked degree, is this true of the new attitude toward the acquisition of California. Yet the charge has been made so frequently in one form or another that `the Southerners were after bigger pens to cram with slaves'—“having acquired Texas they longed for New Mexico and California,”—it seems well to point out a few salient facts that such writers as Rhodes, 66 Henry Wilson, 67 Jay, 68 H. H. Bancroft, 69 Henry Cabot Lodge 70 and other members of the older 71 school of American historians, have apparently overlooked.
One indeed has difficulty in finding any true grounds at all for the opinion of this group. Their argument, however, runs about as follows: The Mexican War had as its object the acquisition of California; it occurred during the administration of a southern president, and was largely the product of his own devising; it was therefore fought simply to extend the area of slavery. As Henry Wilson expressed it in The Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, the “march into territory inhabited by Mexicans . . . meant more than `to defend our own and the rights of Texas.' It could only mean, it did mean, the acquisition of more territory, in which to establish slavery, and by which the further extension and development of slave holding institutions could be promoted.”
Those who adopt this course of reasoning, however, leave out of consideration a most essential fact. The movement for the annexation of California, as we have endeavored to show, did not begin with the presidency of James K. Polk, nor with the outbreak of the Mexican War. It originated more than a decade before either of these events and by 1846 had developed such strength and headway that its successful culmination was merely a matter of time, as was even then pretty generally recognized. After 1846 the course of the movement was obscured bv the acrimonious debates over the conduct of the war, and the Wilmot Proviso—the latter especially precipitating a conflict of principle in which the south took an active and determined part. It is scarcely possible, however, to maintain, as some have done, that the pro-slavery forces originated and gave vigor to the actual movement for annexation, because they opposed the Wilmot Proviso. We shall save ourselves from this error if we remember that the question at issue from 1846 until 1850 was, after all, not so much one of acquisition, per se, as of method and status. We are not concerned at this time with the way in which California was secured nor with the contest as to whether it should be free territory or slave. Our contention is simply this, that the keen desire for Mexican territory on the Pacific, which developed among the American people prior to 1846 and found its gratification in the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, was not inspired by sectional issues, and in no sense deserves to be called a slavery measure.
California as an off-set to Texas.—There are a number of reasons upon which we venture to base this assertion. In the first place, contrary to the generally accepted view of the matter, before 1845 the south proposed the acquisition of California as free territory in order to neutralize the opposition of the north to the annexation of Texas.
We have already seen that Jackson urged upon Wharton the necessity of including California within the limits of Texas in order to reconcile the commercial interests of the north and east to the program of annexation by giving them a harbor on the Pacific. 72 Waddy Thompson, Calhoun's friend and political disciple, did not expect to see slavery established in the territory whose acquisition he so strenuously urged, but thought the north would favor his project because of their commercial and fishing interests. 73 The same idea was present in Tyler's plan of a tripartite agreement when early in 1843 he wrote Webster:
The mere recognition of Texas, would have the effect . . . of separating that question from California . . . and using up all the agitations which you anticipated. Whereas introduced into the same treaty the three interests would be united and would satisfy all sections of the country. Texas might not stand alone nor would the line proposed for Oregon. Texas would reconcile all to the line, while California would reconcile or pacify all to Oregon. 74
As late, too, as March 10, 1846, the Charleston Mercury credited the rumored annexation of California to the Whigs as an offset to the annexation of Texas, and congratulated that party on thus endeavoring to regain popular favor. While even that knight errant of the anti-slavery cause, Joshua R. Giddings, seems to have thought of the annexation movement from beginning to end solely as a free soil movement. Speaking on the floor of the house on July 14, 1846, he charged President Polk with seeking the annexation, not of California, but of the Mexican states north of the 22d parallel in order to establish slavery in the territory so secured, “at the moment,” as he said, “when our rapidly increasing population is flowing into Oregon and California,—when free states are growing up in the former and the latter gives promise of preparation for annexation as a counterpart of Texas . . .” 75
Favorable attitude in the north.—A second reason for the belief that the annexation of California was not a slavery measure, is the fact that the movement found its strongest popular favor in the north. Most of the contemporary newspaper and magazine articles which advocated the acquisition of this portion of Mexican territory first appeared in New York or New England. Thomas O. Larkin and other American residents of California were regular correspondents, not for southern newspapers, but for the Boston Daily Advertiser, the New York Journal of Commerce, and the New York Sun—the editor of the Sun, especially making it the settled policy of his paper to create a sentiment for annexation by publishing the most glowing accounts of California obtainable, and seeking to arouse public interest in other ways best known to members of his profession.
In this connection it may be of passing interest to call attention to articles that appeared in two leading American periodicals of January, 1846. One published in the American Review, known to its opponents as the “Text Book of the Whig Party,” gave a complete, though somewhat exaggerated picture of the rich resources of California, spoke of the miserable control exercised by Mexico over the province, and urged its immediate annexation to the United States, provided this could be accomplished by peaceful means. 76 In De Bow's Review, afterwards the most influential journal of the south, an important place was also given to a discussion of California. The picture here drawn, however, was, in marked contrast to the glowing description of the northern writer, dreary in the extreme. California's soil was hopelessly sterile and cursed with drought, while its other resources were so limited that the country “would never become of any great importance in the history of the world or advance to any conspicuous position, either agriculturally, commercially, or politically.” 77
De Bow's article probably did not represent the common opinion of the south. Yet the interest with which the commercial states of the north regarded the future of California was unquestionably greater than that of any other section of the country, with the possible exception of the extreme west. For it was natural that those who had important trade relations not merely with California, but with India, China, and the Sandwich Islands, beside extensive whale fisheries, should of all others desire most eagerly a harbor and territory on the Pacific. It was for this reason, as much as any other, that Webster, who would scarcely be called the champion of slavery, considered San Francisco as twenty times more valuable than all Texas, and was so desirous of securing California while secretary of state that he even proposed to take Everett's place as ambassador to England in order to facilitate the adoption of the tripartite agreement. 78
Character of immigration.—So far, also, as forces were at work locally in California to bring about a cession of the province to the United States, one finds the influence almost wholly of northern origin. Indeed, the charge that southern immigrants and southern leaders acted dishonorably in Texan affairs, can be returned (if in either case the charges are valid) with good interest against the north in the case of California. Lansford W. Hastings, the leader of a very ambitious scheme for independence, came from Connecticut, Marsh, his associate, Alfred Robinson, and J. T. Farnham, whose writings stimulated widespread interest in California throughout the United States, were also natives of New England; while Abel Stearns, Larkin's confidential advisor in Southern California, and Larkin himself, who played such an important part in the whole annexation movement, were from Massachusetts. Indeed it is hard to find more than one or two resident Americans of any prominence in California at this time who were not of New England origin. 79 As for the rank and file of immigrants who arrived in California up to 1846, it cannot be said that they came from any one section of the Union. Some were from the south and some from New England; while the great majority were from the frontier states of the west. Many had set out originally for Oregon but for one reason or another had changed their destination to California. They were trappers, farmers, mechanics and laborers who thought as little of establishing slavery as of setting up a monarchial government. 80
Proposed boundary lines.—One further point remains to be discussed, which of itself precludes any idea that the desire to establish slavery in California furnished the motive for its annexation. On August 6, 1835, the United States government made its first attempt to purchase California. Forsyth's instructions of that date to Butler placed the desired line of boundary on the 37th parallel and expressly disclaimed any purpose of securing territory further south, or below the Bay of San Francisco. Something like a year later, Jackson offered the captured president of the Mexican Republic, who had been sent to Washington by the victorious Texans, three and one-half million dollars on behalf of the United States, for a line extending along the 38th parallel from the Rio Grande to the Pacific. On June 17, 1842, Webster instructed Thompson to secure, if possible, territory on the Pacific in return for the American claims against Mexico. The main object of the negotiations, according to the despatch, was to secure the harbor of San Francisco, although other territory might be added. Later, this same purpose was expressed in the terms of the tripartite agreement forwarded to Edward Everett at London.
On Nov. 8, 1845, Secretary of State Buchanan sent to Slidell, Polk's confidential Mexican agent, his official instructions, by which he was empowered to offer the Mexican government something over $25,000,000 for a line extending west from the southern boundary of New Mexico, or “for any line that should include Monterey within the territory ceded to the United States.” If this could not be obtained, he was to offer $20,000,000 for a “line commencing at any point on the Western line of New Mexico and running due West, so as to include the Bay and Harbor of San Francisco. 81
It is surely a puzzling problem, why, if the acquisition of California owed its origin to slavery, these official instructions for its purchase, constituting all that were issued between 1835 and the outbreak of the Mexican War, without exception should have placed the desired line of boundary above, or only slightly below. the 36° 30’’ parallel, where under no circumstances could slavery hope to exist.
Southern opposition to President Polk.—Up to 1846, therefore, the matter of acquiring California, both in the province itself and throughout the United States, can scarcely be considered as a slavery, or even a sectional measure. With the outbreak of the Mexican War and the bitter controversy arising over the Wilmot Proviso a few months later, the entire aspect of affairs was changed, and the subject becomes too complicated to be susceptible of adequate treatment in this place. And yet even from this time on there is certainly no such clear sectional division on the question as many writers of a past generation would have us believe. On the contrary, it found its advocates as well as its opponents both in the north and in the south. It was Alexander Stephens of Georgia who introduced a resolution on January 22, 1847, in the house, that no portion of Mexican territory should be acquired as the result of the war; while Berrien of the same state attempted to secure the passage of a like resolution in the senate as an amendment to the three million bill, some ten days later. 82
“I say in my humble judgment and speaking as a southern senator representing a southern state,” said Berrien on this subject, “that the duty of the south—the interests of the south—the safety of the south—demands that we should oppose ourselves to any and every acquisition of territory.” 83 Badger, of North Carolina, echoed Berrien's statement and denied that the people of his state desired an addition of territory from Mexico to any considerable extent. 84 Butler, of South Carolina, cared only for the port of San Francisco and rejoiced that this lay above the line of the Missouri Compromise. 85 Toombs was opposed to taking “an inch” of Mexican territory. 86
In his own party, also, Polk found his strongest opponents to be southern men. Of the twelve Democrats opposing the war resolution in the house, eleven came from the south. 87 Calhoun and his followers were of course against the president, and cared so little for California that they were willing to imperil its acquisition for the sake of discrediting the administration. 88
Polk's views.—Turning to Polk's own conception of slavery in its relation to California, we shall find it, also, entirely different from what some writers have led us to believe. Though Polk wanted the line of boundary to run somewhat farther south, 89 Slidell's instructions laid emphasis only upon the possession of San Francisco; and it was this harbor, and not a new area for slavery, that was considered “all important to the United States.” 90 An added proof of the lack of sectional bias in Polk's efforts to secure the territory is shown by the fact that when he wished to send a regiment, whose members should eventually become citizens of California, he chose New York as the field for enrollment and not one of the southern states as he might well have done. 91
The president's own words, however, unless we are to believe him absolutely insincere, best explain his position. He regarded the Wilmot proviso as “a mischievous and foolish amendment”; and believed that slavery should in no way be connected with the peace negotiations with Mexico, or with the war. Those who insisted upon joining the two called forth his condemnation, as working ruin to the country. 92
His own plan for the settlement of the question was stated repeatedly in his Diary, and can in no way be construed as favoring the south against the north. In referring to a visit from Senator Crittenden, the Whig senator from Kentucky, to whom he had spoken of securing New Mexico and California as indemnity, he wrote,
I told him I deprecated the agitation of the slavery question in Congress, and though a South-Western man and from a slave-holding state as well as himself I did not desire to acquire a more Southern Territory than that which I had indicated, because I did not desire by so doing to give occasion for the agitation of a question which might serve to endanger the Union itself. I told him the question would probably never be a practical one if we acquired New Mexico and California because there would be but a narrow ribbon of territory south of the Missouri Compromise line of 36° 30‐ and in it slavery would probably never exist. 93
Exactly why Polk should send Slidell to Mexico, appoint a confidential agent in California, offer twenty-five millions of dollars, and perhaps go to war for the purpose of securing a “narrow ribbon of territory” in which to establish an abstract slavery, does not clearly appear. So far from being an ardent champion of the south, on the contrary, the president was far more open to the criticism of his opponents that he was favoring the north. 94 The larger part of the territory, and the only part considered of much value, lay above the Missouri Compromise line. 95 Though refusing to have anything to do with the Wilmot Proviso, Polk expressed a willingness, even against southern opposition, to sign a bill prohibiting slavery in Oregon. 96 And when urged by Calhoun to appoint southern men to control the government in California and New Mexico, he declined to commit himself. 97
In the complete bewilderment with which the president saw the injection of the slavery question into the debates on the acquisition of California; and in the middle ground he occupied between the extremists both of the north and of the south, 98 one sees how sincerely he regarded the measure as national and not sectional in scope. We may perhaps blame Polk for failing to perceive that his desire for empire would inevitably bring the great issues of slavery before the American people. But we can scarcely say he had anything less than the interest of the whole nation at heart. Like Jackson he was more the product of the west than of the south, and he looked through the eyes neither of Calhoun nor of Adams, but of Jackson. He was not sectional, and if he overlooked the significance of slavery in its bearing upon California, it was because his thoughts ran to national greatness. His object was not to secure `bigger pens to cram with slaves,' but to give to the United States wide boundaries and the mastery of the Pacific.
A. Of Major Importance
Bancroft Collection:
Larkin, Thomas O., Official Correspondence, 1844-1846.
Larkin, Thomas O., Private Correspondence, 1842-1846.
Department of State:
Despatches: England, to and from, 1840-1846.
Despatches: Mexico, to and from, consular and diplomatic, 1829-1846.
Library of Congress:
Jackson Manuscripts (chronologically arranged, one portfolio to each year, otherwise unclassified or catalogued).
Polk Manuscripts (chronologically arranged, one portfolio to each year, otherwise unclassified or catalogued).
B. Of Minor Importance
Bancroft Collection:
Alvarado, Juan B., Historia de California. 5 vols.
Belden, Josiah, Historical Statement.
Bidwell, John, California, 1841-8.
Castro, Manuel, Documentos para la Historia de California. 2 vols.
Morris, Albert J., Diary of a Crazy Man, or an Account of the Graham Affair.
General Works
Adams, Ephraim Douglas, British Interests and Activities in Texas.
Bancroft, Hubert Howe, Works. 39 vols.
Bigelow, John, Memoirs of the Life and Public Service of John Charles Fremont.
Bourne, Edward Gaylord, Essays in Historical Criticism.
Bruce, H. Addington, Romance of American Expansion.
Chittenden, Hiram Martin, The History of the American Fur Trade of the Far West. 3 vols.
Crane, William Carey, Life and Literary Remains of Sam Houston of Texas.
Curtis, George Tichnor, Life of Daniel Webster. 2 vols.
Davis, William Heath, Sixty Years in California.
Forbes, Alexander, California: A History of Upper and Lower California.
Green, Duff, Facts and Suggestions.
Greenhow, Robert, History of Oregon and California.
Jay, William, A Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican War.
Jones, Anson, The Republic of Texas.
Laut, Agnes C., Vikings of the Pacific.
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Daniel Webster.
McMaster, John Bach, History of the People of the United States from the Revolution to the Civil War. 7 vols.
Reeves, Jesse S., American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk.
Rhodes, James Ford, History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850. 7 vols.
Richman, Irving B., California under Spain and Mexico.
Rives, John Lockhart, The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848. 2 vols.
Schouler, James, History of the United States. 6 vols.
Tullidge, Edward W., History of Salt Lake City and Its Founders.
Tuthill, Franklin H., History of California.
Von Holst, H., The Constitutional and Political History of the United States. 8 vols.
Wilson, Henry, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America. 3 vols.
The large share of the citizens of Harris County in winning the independence of Texas from Mexico has never been announced with a blare of trumpets; the facts have simply been recorded in history.
That the citizens of Harris County were important factors in the early revolutionary period, will be shown in the following pages.
In the summer of 1829 about thirty citizens met at Harrisburg and organized for an expedition against a predatory band of Indians. They marched to Groce's, a place of rendezvous, where, uniting with others, about eighty in number, under Colonel John Nail, they marched to within twelve miles of the Waco village, encountered and defeated about two hundred Indians, and returned home with the loss of only two men.
When the first trouble with Mexicans at Anahuac occurred in 1832, many of the citizens of Harrisburg marched under Colonel Frank Johnson to the aid of the Texans at Anahuac.
From the beginning of American colonization, in this part of Texas, there had been considerable trade between the settlement on the Trinity, called by the Mexicans, Anahuac, and Harrisburg, the chief trading point between the mouth of the Trinity, and Bell's landing on the Brazos River; it was natural that any interference with this right should be strongly resented and resisted by the citizens of both towns, and the occasion which arose early in 1835 proved they were determined to stand together in defense of that right.
In 1835 Anahuac was in the heyday of its prosperity. There had been no attempt to collect custom dues since 1832, but a change of policy on the part of the Mexican government caused the re-establishment of a collector of customs, and in the latter part of January, 1835, a body of Mexican soldiers under command of Antonio Tenorio was sent to enforce the collection of duties on goods received at the port, which was then known as the port of Galveston.
Opposition to the contemplated infringement of the license which the colonists had enjoyed since 1832 was not slow in manifesting itself among the citizens, especially as they claimed that such dues were not collected at any other point in Texas. Captain Tenorio soon found himself surrounded with difficulties. In response to his letter of complaint to the government, he, on May 1, received a reinforcement of men, together with guns and flints, and money for the payment of his garrison, several of whom had already deserted to the Texas colonists.
In the meantime, lumber which had been sent for the purpose of rebuilding Fort Davis had been burned on the night of the 3d, and upon his reporting this outrage to the commissary of police at Anahuac, as the work of one Mores, no steps were taken to arrest the supposed offender. In fact, the citizens of Anahuac had so little relish for the establishment of a Mexican garrison among them that they resolutely determined to resist the exactions of its officers in every particular. To carry out this determination in the most forcible manner, they held a public meeting on May 4, of which I submit the following report, clipped from the Texas Republican of August 8, 1835, published at Columbia.
Anahuac, May 4, 1835.
A respectable number of citizens of this jurisdiction convened this day at the house of Benjamin Freeman of this place, according to previous notice. Gen. William Hardin was called to the chair, and I. N. Moreland was appointed Secretary. The object of the meeting was explained by Mr. A. Briscoe who presented the following resolutions and preamble, which, after a short discussion, were unanimously adopted.
Whereas, There is no custom house organized in any part of the colonies of Texas, nor any duty upon importation collected, and whereas, duties have been collected here for the last three months, this being the poorest part of a poor country, there being an insufficiency of money to pay the duties on what importations have been made, trade every day decreasing, therefore,
Resolved, That the proceedings of the individuals claiming to be custom house officers at this place have neither been reasonable, just, or regularly legal, it being unreasonable and unjust to demand the whole duties of one small settlement, while the whole coast, and border besides, is free and open; and illegal, because they have never presented themselves or their credentials to the civil authorities for their recognition, nor have the said authorities been notified by the Government that any such officers have been appointed for this port.
Resolved, That the country, as we believe, is not able to pay the regular duties according to the regulations of the general tariff; therefore, it is resolved that we send to the political chief of this department, by him to be forwarded to the Governor of the State, the foregoing memorial expressive of our opinion with regard to the situation of this part of the country, and its inability to comply with the tariff law, and praying him to intercede with the General Government for an exemption for these colonies for five or six years, from the restrictions upon commerce imposed by the general tariff.
Resolved, That until the object of the preceding resolution can be carried into effect, no duties should be collected in this port unless the collection is also equally enforced throughout the province; nor until then will we pay any duties on importations into this port.
Resolved, That these proceedings be signed by the chairman and secretary, and that copies be forwarded to the Judge of the First Instance, to the editor of the Texas Republican, to Don Jose Gonzales and to the political chief of the department, to be sent by him to the Governor.
I. N. Moreland.
Attached to these resolutions and also published, was an address to the Governor of the Free State of Coahuila and Texas, and a letter from Andrew Briscoe, dated July 11, to the editor of the Texas Republican, further justifying the action thus taken by him and his fellow citizens. The people were divided in their view as to the advisability of resistance, and the Columbia settlement held a meeting expressing strong disapproval of the course pursued at the Anahuac meeting.
Moreover, immediately after the meeting at Anahuac, General Hardin, the chairman, left for the United States before copies could be made out and signed by him, so that any regular proceedings were blocked by this action of the chairman. These circumstances and the sharp criticism of the Columbia meeting, are the subject matter of the letter of Andrew Briscoe.
The lines were now beginning to be firmly drawn between the opposition and the non-resisting or peace party, and for good and sufficient reasons the Anahuac people, with Mr. Briscoe at their head, having made their resolutions to resist the unlawful collection of duties, stood firmly by them.
Of Andrew Briscoe's willingness to prove his stern purpose by his acts, he gave ample proof a few weeks afterward, when he took an important step toward precipitating the long threatening revolution of Texas against Mexico. The story of his adventure, the first act of resistance to Mexican authority in 1835, connects the towns of Anahuac and Harrisburg very closely in history.
From his home in Harrisburg, on June 10, DeWitt Clinton Harris, a youth about eighteen years old, went by sail boat to Anahuac to purchase goods of Mr. Briscoe. The collector refused to allow the goods bought by him to be removed without a permit from the custom house, for which, of course, a certain sum of money was demanded. With this demand, both Briscoe and Harris refused to comply. A guard was accordingly placed around the store on the night of the 12th, to prevent any attempt at moving the goods. While matters were in this state, a young man came into the store and asked for a goods box to put ballast in, which was given him, and he started to the beach rolling a wheelbarrow containing the box, which was filled with brickbats. Harris remarked to Briscoe that they could now ascertain whether the Mexicans would really prevent him from moving his goods. In a few minutes they heard the young man with the wheelbarrow calling for Mr. Smith, the interpreter; they both went out and found he had been stopped by the guard. When the interpreter came up and informed the Mexican guard of the contents of the box, they seemed satisfied, and allowed it to be taken to the beach and put on board the boat. But when Briscoe and Harris were about returning to the store, they were set upon by ten or twelve Mexican soldiers and ordered to stand, while a young man named William Smith, who was coming down the hill towards them, was shot down.
They were made prisoners and confined in the calaboose. Harhis, being a mere youth, and not an arch offender, was released the next day and returned to Harrisburg, but without his goods. He immediately sent a report of the adventure to the authorities at San Felipe. On the 21st of June a public meeting was held there, and resolutions passed authorizing William B. Travis to collect a company of volunteers and eject Tenorio from the garrison at Anahuac. Friendship, as well as patriotism required Travis to act in this manner, for, as he said, “Some of his friends who were principal citizens of the place were suffering under the despotic rule of the military.” This expedition started from Harrisburg, where the sloop Ohio belonging to the Harrises, was chartered; a six-pound cannon, mounted on a pair of saw mill truck wheels, constituted its armament.
There were about twenty-five volunteers, who were probably armed. Some of them, who at first signed an agreement at San Felipe to march against the garrison reconsidered, and failed to go, but other recruits were taken up at Lynchburg and Spillman's Island. At Clopper's Point, now known as Morgan's Point, an election of officers was held, which made Travis, captain; Ritson Morris, first lieutenant, and John W. Moore was appointed orderly sergeant. Arriving within about half a mile of Anahuac, the boat grounded, a shot was fired by way of warning, and the cannon was then placed in a small boat, and they rowed ashore. The Mexicans fled to the woods, and the fort was found deserted. An interview was had with Tenorio, who agreed to sign articles of capitulation, the next morning. So, on June 30 the following terms were agreed upon: The Mexican officers pledged themselves not to take up arms against Texas, and were to be allowed to proceed to San Antonio. Twelve of the soldiers were granted the privilege of retaining their arms as a protection against Indians on the march. All the arms, sixty-four stands of muskets and bayonets, ammunition, etc., were turned over to the Texans. Mr. Briscoe was released and the Mexican custom house in Texas done away with forever.
The Mexicans and Texans returned to Harrisburg, where they arrived in time to attend a Fourth of July barbecue and ball. Captain Tenorio is said to have been a fine looking man of varied accomplishments.
He not only participated in the amusements of the barbecue, but attended the ball, where he waltzed and talked French with the handsome Mrs. Kokernot, who was a fine linguist. On the whole he was treated with civility, and some people who were there thought he acted as if he was the hero of the occasion. The truth is, he was probably only too glad to be relieved from his duties at Anahuac, and hailed his deliverers with no ill feeling. But, the action of disarming the fort was condemned by all but the most outspoken of the war party, and Travis, on his return to San Felipe, had to bear the reaction of opinion. In a letter to the public on the subject, he was reduced to the necessity of justifying his course. I quote the closing lines of a letter which bears favorable comparison for heroic sentiment with any that he sent out from the Alamo:
I discharged what I conceived to be my duty to my country to the best of my ability. Time alone will show whether the step was correct or not. And time will show, that when this country is in danger that I will show myself as patriotic and ready to serve her as those who, to save themselves, have disavowed the act, and denounced me to the usurping military. [San Felipe, Sep. 1, 1835.]
The following letter from Travis to Briscoe, written at about the same time, gives a fair account of the state of public feeling:
San Felipe, Texas, Aug 31, 1835. My dear Sir:—
I have not written to you before because I was ashamed to tell what was going on. It is different now. Although the Mexican or Tory party made a tremendous effort to put us down, principle has triumphed over prejudice, passion, cowardice and knavery. All their measures have recoiled upon them, and they are routed horse and foot. The extent of their glory was to denounce us to the military at San Antonio and Matamoras, and demand our arrest. An order was accordingly issued to Ugartachea, and repeated by Cos, to arrest seven of us and send us to Bexar to be tried by martial law. This was too much for the people to bear. When they were called on by an usurping political chief to carry these orders into execution, the sacrifice was too great. Their wrath was turned against the Tories and Spanish-Americans, who now dare not to hold up their heads. The people call now loudly for a convention in which their voices shall be heard. They have become almost completely united. And now let Tories, submission men and Spanish invaders look out.
There is to be a great meeting here on the 12th of September on the subject of a convention. The Tories are dying a violent death, and their last expiring struggle will be made on that day. Therefore, I invite you to attend and hope you will do so. But I wish to see them overwhelmed. I have seen your publication. It does you credit. You have shown yourself the real white man and uncompromising patriot. Stick to the text and Texas is saved.
I have at this moment finished conversing with a Mexican just from San Antonio. He says marching orders have been given to the troops. They are to be here by the 12th or 13th of September to garrison this town, Tenoxtitlan, and Nacogdoches, with 200 men each; and it is concerted that 200 men shall arrive by water at Anahuac at about the same time to garrison that place. They have sworn vengeance against all engaged in the late expedition, and in that of 1832 at Anahuac and Velasco.
They calculate to take up these men with the aid of other Americans, by which time they will gradually bring in troops enough to overrun the people and keep them in vile submission. They cannot do it.
We will not submit to be garrisoned here. I hope you will not there. We shall give them hell if they come here. Keep a bright lookout to sea. Allow no pilots in the bay to assist them, and they cannot land before you have time to prepare for them. Secure all the powder and lead.
Remember that war is not to be waged without means. Let us be men and Texas will triumph. I know you can be relied on; therefore, I exhort you to be active in preparing the minds of men for the scenes that are to be enacted.
News from New Orleans that we will be liberally aided with men, money, and arms, has arrived. Already we have five pieces of cannon, 100 kegs of powder, and lead and shot to correspond, landed in Matagorda and sent from New Orleans.
Come over if you can on the 12th. My respects to Wilcox and others. Please write soon.
Your Friend, W. B. Travis.
As is well known Travis was one of the leaders of the war party, and the authorities at Columbia were urged by General Cos to secure “the apprehension of that ungrateful and bad citizen, W. B. Travis.”
He, who at that time was blamed by some of his own people for precipitating the revolution, and called by his enemies, “an ungrateful and bad citizen,” has earned a fame which shall give him through all the ages the noble title of hero, the birthright of such a determined nature.
The first act of the revolution of 1835, in which Andrew Briscoe and DeWitt Clinton Harris took the initial steps, and were ably seconded by Travis and others, was of the same character, and marked by the same determination, as the closing act of Wm. B. Travis, at the Alamo. They were the acts of men, who were determined to live in the enjoyment of constitutional rights, or die in defense of them.
At Anahuac, the Mexicans were few in numbers, badly scared, and yielded without firing a gun.
Another letter from Travis at the same time gives important evidence as to the state of public opinion two months after the attack on Anahuac. 100
San Felipe, August 31st, 1835. Dear Sir:—
Huzza for Texas! Huzza for Liberty, and the rights of man!
My friend, when I returned from your place, I found the tories and cowards, making a strong effort, and for a time they were but too successful. I was, therefore, disgusted and wrote you but little, as I had nothing to communicate but what I was ashamed of, as a free man and a friend of my country. It is different now, thank God! principle has triumphed over prejudice, passion, cowardice and slavery. Texas is herself again. The people in the whole upper country are unanimous for a convention in which the voice of the people will be freely expressed. Every part of the country has pronounced against the dictation and humiliating course of the tories and friends of the Spaniards. The pitiful faction which has dominated here has expired, and those who supported the doctrine of abject submission to the military, have sunk too low, ever to rise again.
Principle was gradually working out this glorious end, and preparing the way for the march of freedom when the order came for my being arrested and given up to the military to be shot, for engaging in the expedition to Anahuac, etc. That was too much for the people to bear; it was too great a sacrifice for them to make, and they unanimously exclaimed against this order and its supporters. The devil has shown his cloven foot, and his lies will be believed no longer.
A tremendous reaction has taken place, and the tories are almost as bad off as they were in 1832. “Heaven's hangman will lash the rascals round the world.”
The word now is, a convention of all Texas, to declare our sentiments, and to prepare for defense, if necessary.
The Harrisburgers want to stimulus to patriotism. They have always been the foremost in favor of liberal republican principle.
They have always been on one side; the right side. They have never barked up the wrong tree, and I hope, never will. God grant that all Texas may stand as firm as Harrisburg in the “hour that will try men's souls.”
I feel the triumph we have gained, and I glory in it. Let Texas stand firm and be true to herself, and we have nothing to fear. We have many rumors afloat here. There is no doubt of one thing, they mean to flood the country with troops, and garrison the towns.
San Felipe, Nacogdoches, and all the ports, are to be garrisoned in a month or two. They are determined to punish those engaged in the expedition of Anahuac in 1832, and in 1835 and that of Velasco, in 1832. If we submit to these things, we are slaves and deserve not the name of freeman.
We are to have a great meeting here on the 12th of September to vote for and against a Convention. The citizens of the whole jurisdiction are invited to attend. I hope you will come and bring all the Harrisburg boys you can. Those who cannot come, please get them to sign a paper similar to the one signed at Columbia, expressing their wishes for a Convention.
Tender my best respects to all the boys—tell them never fear, fortune favors the brave.
Your friend, W. Barret Travis.
Many of the best people of Austin's colony were strongly opposed to the policy of separation from Mexico, and this attitude on their part in the beginning served to multiply the difficulties which beset the course of those who advocated independence at any cost. The following letter from the Hon. Wm. Hardin to Don Antonio Gil Hernandez, dated Liberty, July 27th, 1835, will illustrate the attitude of the peace party:
Dear Sir:
Some short time since I wrote you a few lines in which I stated that I would be down soon, and I expected to have come down before this time, but my health will not yet admit of my riding. I have understood that you wish to leave for the interior. I wish you to make yourself easy and remain in Anahuac as I am determined to give you any assistance that you may need. If there should arrive any vessel, I wish you to inform me of it immediately, and I will furnish you with as many men as may be necessary for the collection of the duties. I am determined that no vessel shall enter without paying the duties. I understand that goods are landing at the Neches. If you wish to go there I will furnish you with men sufficient to go with you. If I had been at home and in health you would not have been without troops at Anahuac.
Very respectfully, Your Friend, Etc. Wm. Hardin. We certify the above to be a true copy from the original in the hands of Don Anto Gil Hernandez, Anahuac, Sept. 25, 1835. Joseph Bryan Adam Smith Geo. W. Miles A. Briscoe. 101
Whether this certified copy was procured to prove Hardin's loyalty to the cause of Mexico, or his disapproval of the independence movement in Texas is not known. While it seems to prove both, at that time there were many others occupying the same political position, who afterwards gladly joined their fortunes to those of the independence party, and it is presumed that he was of this number, as one of the counties of Texas was later named in his honor.
The sentiments expressed in the foregoing letters furnish an excellent index to the general feeling of the Texans up to this time; they show how widely the views of good citizens were separated as to their proper course. But, events immediately following the affair at Anahuac, among them orders from Mexico for the arrest of Zavala, Travis and other leading citizens, drew all factions of Texans together, precipitated the organization of committees, who were authorized to adopt resolutions proclaiming the lawful rights of the people under the Constitution of 1824, and hastened the formation of military companies for the defence of those rights. When it became plain that Texans must prepare to defend their homes by force of arms, it was natural that the two chief towns of Harris County should occupy the front rank in the organization of volunteer companies, but, it is doubtful whether any official records of the membership of these companies have been preserved. Volunteers were soon merged into the regular army, and their significance as first volunteers was lost sight of in the greater importance of the large military body acting under duly constituted authority. However, we are fortunate in having some details regarding the organization of two companies of volunteers,—one at Lynchburg and the other at Harrisburg.
An undated clipping in my possession from the Galveston News contains an account of the organization of the Lynchburg company, and of the making of the first flag in Texas bearing the Lone Star and the word “Independence.” It was written by James S. McGahey, an officer of the company, who signed himself “An old Texian and an old Texas Veteran.”
Hempstead, Texas, May 30th. To the News:
At this time viz: September 15, 1835, the writer hereof (a Virginian by birth) was at Captain William Scott's, San Jacinto, assisting in the organization of a company, upon the Captain's proposition. . . .
Wm. Scott (a Kentuckian) was a wealthy man and patriotic to the core. He proposed to equip in full any one who would volunteer to fight for the cause of Texas, giving him a good horse, saddle, bridle, gun, accountrements, provisions and a suit of clothes, and making his house headquarters until they were ready to march.
About thirty men organized into a company, electing William Scott Captain, Peter J. Duncan of Alabama, first Lieutenant, and James S. McGahey, second Lieutenant. One morning while their preparations were going forward, Scott said to McGahey, “Mack, I have a piece of beautiful silk, solid blue. If you'll make a staff, we'll have a flag.” McGahey took the four yards of silk to Lynchburg, where a staff was made, and Mrs. Lynch sewed a piece of domestic to the silk to protect its edge from fraying, where it was attached to the staff. Charles Lanco, 102 a painter by trade, by order of McGahey, painted, in the center, a large five-pointed white star. Having done this, Lanco remarked, “Well now, that looks naked, let me paint something under it. What shall it be?” McGahey replied, “put the word `Independence,' ” and it was done.
Some men from Eastern Texas on their way to San Felipe, stopped, looked at the flag, admired it, and said, “It is just the course for Texas to take.” Passing on to Harrisburg where there was another Volunteer Company, they told them of the Lynchburg flag, and its “Independence motto.” Some of the men at Harrisburg denounced the display of this motto, and said “they would shoot any man who attempted to raise a flag with the word Independence on it before it had been officially declared by the proper authorities.” An angry message to this effect was sent by courier to the Lynchburg Company, and a reply was returned, inviting the senders of the message to come down the next day and see the flag hoisted.
McGahey had acted without authority in the matter of the motto, and in the message to the Harrisburg Company, but, when Captain Scott was told of it, he said, “By blood, Mack, that was a little rash, but I'll sustain you in it.”
The next day about noon, there came down the Bayou, two large yawl boats, each carrying eight armed men, and pulled up to the shore. Captain Scott's company was formed in line, under command of Lieutenant Duncan, between the shore and Mrs. Lynch's house, every man with a loaded gun. “Not a man got out of either boat, nor was there a word spoken by any one.” McGahey set his gun against the house, stepped into the house, took the flag from a rack, returned to the center of his company, unfurled the flag, and “planted the staff with a firm stroke in the ground, on the bank of the San Jacinto, and the lone star with the magic word Independence floated proudly on the breeze. For some minutes not a word was spoken; presently the captain of one of the boats ordered his men to push away from the bank, and when out a short distance in the stream stood up, and taking off his hat, flourished it around his head, shouting, “Hurra for the Lone Star.” Every man of his crew did likewise, but the other boat pulled away up stream, and departed without any demonstration of any kind whatever. 103
The action of these two boatloads of men illustrated the feeling of the Texans in general, some full of fearless enthusiasm for resistance at any cost to the methods of tyrannical government recently adopted by Mexico, others in favor of temporizing and waiting for authoritative action. But, when was a revolutionary movement ever carried successfully forward by regular methods?
McGahey of the Lynchburg Company bore his flag on its staff to San Felipe, thence carried it in a knapsack, until after the battle of Concepción. Having been badly wounded in this engagement he was furloughed and returned home after confiding the flag for safe keeping to Thomas Bell, who had fought by his side.
The Company that was organized at Harrisburg at about the same time as the one at Lynchburg, was commanded by Captain Andrew Robinson, and its first lieutenant was Archelaus 104 Bynum Dodson. Its membership was evidently conservative in sentiment, and the flag which was presented to it was made by the hands of the wife of its first lieutenant, to whom she had been married only a few months. This flag was made of calico, blue, red, and white, of equal sized pieces or squares. The blue was set with a single white star, next came the white, then the red, the pieces being arranged in the manner of the Mexican flag then in use in Texas.