The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution . By  Paul C. Phillips , Assistant Professor of History, University of  Montana. University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences,  Volume II, Nos. 2-3. (Urbana. 1913. Pp. 427. $1.25.)

The Mississippi Valley in the last half of the eighteenth century has been a fruitful field of labor for historical scholars. Parkman, Winsor, Turner, Roosevelt, and Alvord have made scholarly contributions to our knowledge of its early history. The dramatic period of the American Revolution has likewise been the subject of a great literature. Dr. Phillips is concerned with the Mississippi Valley as an important factor in the diplomacy of the Revolution. The international phases of the Revolution have been elucidated by the work of Wharton, Doniol, Tower and the biographers of Franklin, Jay, and Adams. But it is the author's opinion that the subject demanded new examination for the simple reason that all the evidence bearing on the matter had not been searched out and critically analyzed. He has used the published sources, but more important is the fact that he has utilized a wealth of unexploited manuscript material reposing in the archives of Washington, London, and Paris. This fact alone entitles the dissertation to an important place in the literature of the subject. As a result the whole question is more fully comprehended, additional light has been thrown upon established facts and new conclusions have been drawn.

Much of this scholarly and well written monograph is concerned with the great and perplexing problem which confronted the French minister, Vergennes, of reconciling the widely conflicting interests of his allies, Spain and the United States. French foreign policy after 1763 was dominated by the one grand aim of humiliating England. The revolt of the English colonies was France's opportunity and the common object of American independence made easy the conclusion of a Franco-American alliance. France wanted no territory; she desired merely to disrupt England's empire and to assist in the creation of a new power bound to her as an ally against the strength and prestige of her rival. A Franco-Spanish alliance was a matter of difficulty. Vergennes insisted upon the recognition of American independence; Spain, among other reasons of hostility to the revolting English colonies, feared the rise of a new power to contest her control in the West. The crux of the situation was the conflicting claims of Spain and the United States to the West, for the control of the Mississippi River and its eastern bank was a matter of vital concern to both. Here was a dilemma for Vergennes. Against Spain he insisted on the recognition of American independence, and against the United States he denied the validity of their claims by charter to the West. Vergennes stood steadily for American independence and the guarantee of the boundaries to the United States as he conceived them, but Canada and the West were not of them. He would do nothing to help the United States to gain the West nor oppose any attempts to conquer the region. His attitude was interpreted as unfriendly. The vigorous meddling of the French agents in Congress on behalf of Spanish interests, unwarranted by the instructions from Vergennes, created an anti-Gallican party distrustful of French policy. As a result Jay and Adams were selected as commissioners who carried into the final negotiations suspicions of Vergennes. As the author shows with a wealth of evidence, Vergennes was perforce entangled in a policy bound to create adverse feeling, but he was not guilty of duplicity, made no promises he could not keep, took no measures he could not support, and through all remained a loyal friend to the new nation.

W. T. Root .

How to cite:
Root, W. T., "The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution", Volume 018, Number 3, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, Page 332 - 334. http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v018/n3/review_22.html
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