Many historians have written upon the Civil War from the military standpoint, but not until recently has attention been given to the vital economic and governmental problems of the period. In the following article upon one of these important non-military subjects the author realizes he has made only a preliminary survey of a very wide field, but the work will not be entirely valueless if someone else is led to go deeper into it.
As the sessions of the Confederate Congress were closed to the public and secrecy strictly maintained as to the most of its proceedings, while no records were kept of its debates, the account of any of its activities must necessarily be based upon fragmentary sources. From these, however, it is possible to derive a fairly accurate picture of those internal dissensions between the President and Congress against which the fortunes of the Confederacy had to contend. No attempt has been made in this article to portray the effect of such disagreements in specific instances; the aim has been rather to show in what fashion the government was conducted and over what questions the legislative and executive branches were divided.
The Confederate Government was first set into operation by the Southern constitutional convention, which met at Montgomery, Alabama, on the 4th of February, 1861. 1 After adopting a temporary constitution, 2 the assembly elected Jefferson Davis and Alexander H. Stevens President and Vice-President, respectively, of the new government. In this election there seems to have been little of intrigue or political scheming. “The qualifications of Davis, Cobb, and Toombs were quietly canvassed, but the differences were not so pressed as to cause delay of action or any ill feeling. Some deputies favored Cobb, some Toombs, but Davis received unanimous and cordial support.” 3
The choice of Davis was warranted by many considerations. A long and honorable career in the public service as representative, senator, and cabinet member had given him the necessary training for the presidency. He had, moreover, won merited fame in the war with Mexico and as secretary of war under Pierce had further increased his knowledge of military tactics and organization. It was natural, also, that the South should look to this conservative successor of Calhoun in the defense of slavery and the sovereignty of the State as their leader during the uncertain times that lay before them. 4
Yet Davis probably preferred a high military commission to the position of executive. He says that he took what he considered “adequate precautions” to prevent his selection by the Montgomery assembly; 5 while Mrs. Davis notes that the sudden news of his nomination so deeply pained him that he spoke of it “as a man might speak of a sentence of death.” 6 His acceptance of the place, however, was not long delayed and he soon appeared before Congress to take the oath of office.
His relations with this body were at first sincerely cordial. The Congress itself, probably the strongest legislative assembly in the history of the Confederacy, was characterized by Stephens as the “ablest, soberest, most intelligent and conservative body” of which he had ever been a member. 7 And Davis found that the delegates were generously inclined “to yield their preconceived opinions” to his suggestions, and particularly that the absence of factional rivalries made possible the selection of a desirable cabinet without the necessity of compromise. 8
The removal of the seat of government from Montgomery to Richmond was the cause of much adverse comment on the part of certain members from the cotton growing states, 9 but this was not aimed at Davis personally; 10 and it was not until the battle of Manassas that anything like serious criticism of the President by members of Congress can be found. 11 The failure of the confederate forces to follow up their remarkable victory after the defeat of the Union troops was soon regarded as a serious military blunder; and Davis, who had been present on the battle-field and taken an active voice in a conference of the Southern generals the night following McDowell's disaster, was directly charged, both by a certain element in Richmond, naturally given to criticism, and by members of Congress, with responsibility for the mistake. 12 The official reports of Beauregard and Johnston tended to confirm this impression, 13 and as one writer has fitly remarked, “The first great success in arms achieved by the South was to originate questions tending to excite distrust in the executive, and subsequently distrust of his treatment of those who were under his authority. 14 Davis, also, in a letter to Johnston at this time speaks of the charges brought against the President as “tending to create distrust, to excite disappointment and . . . embarrass the Administration in its further efforts to reinforce the Army of the Potomac.” 15
Other sources of criticism were not lacking. “The apparent indifference on the part of the Administration to the affairs of Missouri and the failure to appoint General Price an officer in the Confederacy” led to frequent complaint. 16 While the policy pursued by Benjamin, secretary of war, and Winder, whom Davis had placed in charge of the forces in Richmond, of issuing passports through the Confederate lines and of discharging suspected prisoners on their own responsibility, was severely censured by members of Congress as well as by the hostile press. 17 The papers most opposed to Davis were the Richmond Examiner and the Charleston Mercury. In the South at large, however, there was as yet no dissatisfaction worth recording. And even in those cities where opposition was developing, it still lacked organization and confined itself to discussion without political action. Accordingly, when the election for the permanent government was held on the 6th of November, 1861, Davis and Stephens were unanimously re-elected to the offices they had held under the provisional constitution. 18 At the same time, senators and congressmen were chosen to take the place of the delegates to the provisional congress and the regular Confederate Government began its activities. 19
The new Congress met for the first time on February 18, 1862. In the House, Thomas S. Bocock of Virginia was chosen Speaker without a dissenting vote; and by the 25th the members of the standing committees had been appointed. 20 The organization of the Senate was also effected with the loss of little time. 21 While the roll of this body bore many more names familiar to the student of national politics than did that of the House, the personnel of neither gave promise of remarkable ability; and within a few months one hostile critic was bold enough to say that in the whole Congress there were not a dozen members “with any pretensions to statesmanship.” 22
Almost from the outset, the relations of the executive and Congress were somewhat strained because of military reverses. Not more than three days after Davis's inaugural address, Smith of North Carolina and Foote of Tennessee had introduced resolutions in the House calling for the investigation of the capture of Fort Donelson with the consequent evacuation of Nashville, and of the capitulation of Roanoke Island. 23 The committee appointed to look into the disasters of western Tennessee, reported to the House without endeavoring to fix the responsibility, 24 but the committee in charge of the Roanoke inquiry, after a severe arraignment of the negligence shown in fortifying the island, closed its report by laying the blame for the Confederate loss upon “Major General B. Huger and the late Secretary of War, J. P. Benjamin.” 25 This stricture on Benjamin was not meant merely for the late “Secretary of War,” but through him was aimed at the President. For the opposition, while still in the minority, were becoming more united and encouraged by the hostile press, vigorously denounced the war policy of the administration. 26 This dissatisfaction, however, was partially dispelled by the military success of the following summer.
Beside the conduct of the war, another source of criticism that arose about this time was the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 27 It is true that both houses of Congress by an almost unanimous vote sanctioned this action, but Davis made a great mistake in continuing Winder in command at Richmond when his power could no longer be seriously checked by civil authority. If we may believe many contemporary charges, Winder, if not openly corrupt, was woefully lacking in judgment and ability and so administered his position as to cause widespread complaint in Richmond. 28 This, combined with the opposition on constitutional grounds of some of the ablest men in the South to the suspension of the writ, 29 threw Davis more or less on the defensive, particularly as the declaration of martial law gave his opponents grounds for charging him with seeking a dictatorship. Even his baptism and confirmation in the Episcopal church were declared to be mere blinds toward a despotic end, and a comparison was drawn between his new religious professions and similar action on the part of Cromwell and Richard III. 30
The Impressment and Conscription Acts passed at this session of Congress were also looked upon as oppressive and unconstitutional, 31 and since Davis had urgently advocated their enactment, whatever popular clamor arose naturally directed itself against him, or vented itself by denouncing Congress as wholly subservient to the President's will. In this latter charge there was a decided element of truth. For while in fact a minority element of opposition existed in both houses, it had not yet developed sufficient power to hinder materially the plans of the administration, and for the most part contented itself with striking at Benjamin and other unpopular members of the cabinet. One bill was carried, however, that evidently aimed to reduce the military power of the President and make his secretary of war a mere bureau clerk. It provided for the creation of the “office of a commanding general of the armies of the Confederate States,” and assigned powers to the new official which, as Davis pointed out in his veto message, were lodged by the constitution in the hands of the President alone as commander-in-chief. 32 The bill was first passed by large majorities 33 both in the Senate and in the House, but when the attempt was made to carry it over the executive veto it failed by an overwhelming vote. Thus, when the session ended on April 21, 34 Davis had met defeat on no important point, while the emergencies of war were gradually throwing more and more power into his hands, though he was careful not to assume new authority without the consent of Congress. 35
Shortly after the adjournment of Congress, the Confederacy suffered disastrous military reverses, first in the loss of New Orleans and shortly afterwards in the surrender of Norfolk and the enforced destruction of the iron-clad, Merrimac. It was a period of great discouragement throughout the South and of fear in Richmond. Davis was openly censured; and even Robert E. Lee, who was now acting as the President's military adviser, came in for a full share of criticism. 36 With the turn of the tide, however, in the victories of Jackson and Lee over McClellan the depression gave place to a feeling of exultation and for the time being dissatisfaction ceased. Early in June, Lee was placed in command of all the Southern forces and from that time on possessed the full confidence of the Confederacy. His cooperation with Davis was hearty and sincere, and instead of charges and counter-charges there was a refreshing harmony between the President and his leading general “which was never marred by dictation on the one side or complaint on the other.” 37
In the midst of this era of better feeling, Congress reconvened on the 18th of August. Complaints of the lack of supplies and provisions for the army had become so numerous that the matter could no longer be overlooked. And on the first day of the session, even before the President's message had been received, a resolution was carried instructing the Committee on Military Affairs “to inquire into the expediency and necessity of enacting some effective law requiring and compelling the Commissary Department to furnish more and better food for the Army. . . .” 38 While the framers of the motion doubtless hoped to discredit Davis as well as the Commissary Department by their action, they were unsuccessful in arousing any effective opposition and most of the bills favored by the administration went through with clock-like regularity. 39 The veto was used but sparingly, for the most part only where bills were plainly unconstitutional or possessed of some technical defect. In no instance was there the slightest danger of its being overridden. 40
The third session of Congress, lasting from January 12 to May 1, 1863, may be dismissed in a few words. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation had kindled afresh the fire of Southern opposition to the Northern government, and for a time internal dissensions were lost in this new burst of enthusiasm. During this period, also, no great defeat could be pointed to as an evidence of the administration's incompetency, so that Congress for the most part became merely a register of the President's will. Some hostility, however, was able to manifest itself in an effort to convict the Commissary Department of gross frauds 41 and in a refusal to submit tamely to the veto. The bill which brought this opposition most prominently to the front provided for an increase of “strength and efficiency of heavy artillery for sea coast defense” and was vetoed by Davis because it seemed to him an infringement on the powers of the executive. 42 When the bill was returned to the Senate it was repassed by a vote of 18 to 5, 43 but failed to secure even so much as a majority in the House. 44
The adjournment of Congress was the subject of a sharp attack in the Richmond Examiner, 45 since it left many important matters relating principally to finance, impressment, and conscription inadequately provided for; and in the crisis to which the Confederacy was rapidly approaching, such lack of preparation made necessary a further concentration of power in the hands of the executive. The following summer was especially disheartening because of Lee's failure in Pennsylvania and the fall of Vicksburg. 46 In addition the crushing burden of the war, with its impressments, conscriptions, demoralized finance, and prohibitions on trade, caused widespread dissatisfaction among all but the most loyal. As Congress was not in session, the greater part of this was concentrated against the President. He was accused of trying to make himself supreme by “denying all participation in the affairs of government to the great men who were the authors of secession.” 47 His cabinet members, particularly Benjamin, Mallory, and Memminger, together with the commissary general, Northrop, were spoken of as incompetents if not scoundrels. 48 His military appointments were condemned as the cause of the Confederate losses and his very life was threatened by some of his enemies. 49
As the 7th of December approached, the day upon which Congress was to reassemble, the prospects of the Confederacy grew still more gloomy 50 and the hardships of the individual citizen more intense. All of this brought the administration into further discredit with the dissatisfied element and made it inevitable that an effort should be put forth to give tangible expression to this opposition in the coming Congress. The President's message set forth, in language as hopeful as possible, 51 the condition of affairs and urged the passage of stricter measures to maintain the efficiency of the Army, increase the revenue, and provide for a wider extension of martial law. 52
These recommendations were all eventually embodied in appropriate bills, but the opposition were able to include many amendments undesirable to the administration, and in some cases mustered a formidable number of votes against the measures. That the bills went through at all was due more to the necessities of the war than to the willingness of Congress to follow Davis's leadership. 53 Yet the Examiner spoke of Congress as the “subservient tool” of the President; 54 and Jones records that the executive was so completely master of the situation that in advance of congressional action, “the Secretary of the Treasury had prepared plates, etc., for the new issue of notes before the bill passed calling in the old.” 55
In spite of this general acquiescence on the part of the majority, however, there were those in Congress who attacked the administration at every opportunity. The cabinet, as constituted, had long been a thorn in the flesh to the opposition and its members were frequently called upon to defend themselves against congressional action. On December 10, Senator Johnston of Arkansas brought forward a bill to limit the term of all heads of departments to two years. 56 This was directed at Benjamin, Memminger, and, as the President rightly conceived, at himself. 57 It was referred to the Judiciary Committee, a majority of whom reported in its favor, but never came to a vote in the Senate though called up from time to time until the end of the session. 58
Another never failing source of contention was the commissary department, which was repeatedly censured for incompetency and gross dishonesty. A special committee charged with the investigation of its affairs was appointed by the House early in the session; 59 while later Henry S. Foote of Tennessee, the chief spokesman of the opposition, introduced a resolution calling for the removal of the quartermaster general. The motion was laid on the table by a vote of 46 to 20; 60 but in the Senate the matter was not so easily disposed of. Col. A. C. Myers, the former quartermaster general, had been relieved the preceding August and General Lawton appointed by Davis in his stead Lawton's name, however, had never been sent to the Senate for confirmation. A resolution was therefore reported from the Committee on Military Affairs in January declaring Myers still to be the quartermaster general. When put to a vote this motion carried by a majority of 15 to 6; 61 necessarily widening the breach between the President and the Senate. Matters of minor importance, relating chiefly to passports, exemptions from military service, appointments, etc., similarly developed friction between the two departments of government and by the time adjournment came Congress and the President were decidedly at outs and parted in “bad temper.” 62
This was the last session of the old Congress. The new body began its duties on May 2, 1864, 63 in a spirit of seeming cooperation with the President. A strong majority sided with him on every important measure, and the opposition was weaker than at any other session; while there is good reason to believe that most of the bills were “dictated by the executive and written in the departments.” 64
In spite of such apparent harmony, however, criticism of the President was not entirely hushed. In the Senate the appointment of Bragg (a few days after the adjournment of the preceding Congress) was bitterly assailed by Orr of South Carolina and Wigfall of Texas, the latter going so far as to say that there was an entire want of confidence in the executive. 65 In the House a severe attack was made upon Memminger, secretary of the treasury. Foote, as ever active in harassing the administration, introduced a resolution calling for the removal of Memminger because of his lack of financial ability. A motion to lay the matter on the table was at once made, but failed by a vote of 37 to 45. 66 The bill was eventually referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, from which it was not reported before the end of the session. 67 Shortly after the adjournment of Congress, however, Memminger resigned his position and Trenholm assumed the office in his stead.
The congressional recess lasted nearly five months. When the members finally reconvened on November 7, their attitude toward Davis was unmistakably hostile, probably more so indeed than it had ever been before. Some members doubtless resented the charges of the press that they were but a “secret power for registering the will of the President”; 68 while others, realizing the desperate condition of the Confederacy and deeply dissatisfied with the course of affairs, voted almost in sullen despair against the plans of the administration. 69 Evidence of this new spirit was soon manifest. One of the chief recommendations in the President's message was for the employment of 40,000 slaves in the Confederate armies, but as soldiers only in the last extremity. It was also recommended that such negroes as were taken into government service should be emancipated at the close of the war. 70 This proposition was not very cordially received. Not only did it involve great pecuniary loss to the owners of impressed slaves but seemed to strike at the very basis of the entire system, as well as to involve a serious question of constitutionality. “We have been denying all along,” said one opponent of the plan, “that freedom is a good thing for the negro; yet now we promise to give him that freedom in return for enlistment in our armies.” But in the existing crisis practical necessity had more weight with Davis than any argument based upon mere consistency of opinion. “Strenuously,” he says, “I argued the question with members of Congress who called to confer with me . . . and finally . . . used the expression . . . `If the Confederacy falls, there should be written over its tombstone, Died of a theory.' ” 71
Although General Lee added his influence to the efforts of the executive to secure an immediate passage of a bill embodying Davis's recommendation, it was not brought to a vote in the House until February 20 when it went through by the narrow margin of 40 to 37. 72 In the Senate the contest was even sharper. Here the opposition succeeded in delaying final action until March 8 when they came within one vote of defeating the measure. 73 While in a second trial of strength on another matter they came off victorious. On December 8 the House, by a vote of 50 to 44, 74 had made provision for a renewed suspension of the writ of habeas corpus; but when the bill was presented in the Senate, its opponents, after delaying action upon it until March 16, were able to defeat it by a vote of 6 to 9. 75 The President's veto, which was more freely used at this session of Congress than at any other, was almost uniformly overridden by the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate, and not infrequently in the House as well. 76
Many bitter attacks, likewise, were made at this session against individual members of the cabinet, and much ill feeling resulted from the President's refusal to dismiss those who had long been out of favor with Congress. The principal assaults were made upon Benjamin and Seddon, who was now secretary of war. Resolutions censuring the former for a speech made in Richmond were brought forward in the House, 77 while his moral integrity was called into question by the Louisiana Representatives on the ground that he had taken bribes for passports. 78 A demand for his resignation submitted by Wigfall to the Senate failed only by a tie ballot, the vote standing 11 to 11. 79 As for Seddon, his position became so uncomfortable that he left the cabinet on February 9, J. C. Breckenridge being appointed in his stead. 80
Nor were these denunciations confined merely to the cabinet. Davis himself was characterized on the floor of Congress as “mediocre and malicious,” 81 while the disasters of the South encouraged the most radical of the opposition in a desperate movement to place General Lee at the head of the government as dictator, and only the refusal of the latter to act against Davis prevented a counter revolution. 82
In addition to the sources of discord which have just been mentioned there were certain others that should be touched upon in closing. The refusal of Davis to begin peace negotiations at the urgent request of the Senate; 83 his removal of Johnston and stubborn unwillingness to reappoint him even at the request of a concurrent resolution of the two houses; 84 his attitude toward the question of trade as it affected various states; 85 the tone of his last message which a select committee of the Senate regarded as tending to destroy the “legitimate and constitutional influence” of the legislative branch “by Executive admonitions” 86—all of these helped to destroy the President's influence over Congress and weaken his leadership. Yet with the people at large Davis seems to have regained some measure of his popularity toward the end. His remarkable speech in the African church at Richmond on February 6 greatly strengthened his position throughout Virginia and created a new enthusiasm for a dying cause. 87 Congress, also, to a large extent lost popular sympathy by its continued “crimination of the President and a certain contemptible frivolity.” 88 Indeed, as late as February 22, when all of its powers should have been employed in averting threatened ruin, this body was occupied in devising a new flag. 89 Even its final adjournment was marked by a pitiable exhibition of ill humor against the executive. 90
It is difficult to say how far this lack of harmony that existed between the President and Congress was responsible for the defeat of the South. Although Davis was frequently annoyed by the opposition, which became strong or weak as the tides of Southern misfortune rose or fell, and at times perhaps seriously handicapped, 91 it is nevertheless true that he was master of the situation during his entire administration. His mastery, however, was often secured at the expense of concord; and while Congress yielded to his will they did so often without enthusiasm and gave him but lukewarm support. The President himself was probably much to blame for this. Stubborn in his likes and dislikes, he allowed them to influence his appointments, whether civil or military, to the serious detriment of his own government and of the Confederate arms. In a jealous desire to maintain the prerogatives of his office, he sometimes alienated those whose cooperation was most valuable, or created needless dissatisfaction. Yet for all this, it must be confessed that the executive showed himself superior to Congress in ability and handled an impossible task in no mean fashion. Unless our judgment is at fault, no then man in the South could have maintained the Confederacy so long as did Jefferson Davis.
2. This constitution was for the most part a copy of the Constitution of 1787. Some important changes, however, were made, the chief of which dealt with the executive department. Provision was made for a single presidential term of six years; the right of vetoing any single item in an appropriation bill without invalidating the whole was permitted; no general appropriation of funds could be made unless asked for by the head of a department, except by a two-thirds vote of each house; the President's power of removal was somewhat curtailed; and, lastly, Congress was authorized to grant a seat on the floor of either house to members of the cabinet, who then had the privilege of discussing any measure touching their departments. According to Davis this last provision, “which would have tended to obviate much delay and misunderstanding,” was never put into operation because of the failure of Congress to enact the necessary legislation (Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, I, 260). The provisional Congress consisted of a single chamber whose members voted by States. Both the provisional and permanent constitutions are printed in Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, Vol. I.
3. Curry, Civil History of the Confederate States, 52. On the other hand, Stephens thought that Toombs would have been the choice of the Congress had a misunderstanding not arisen in the Georgia delegation. Stephens, War between the States, II, 329-331. See also Pollard, Life of Jefferson Davis and Secret History of the Confederacy, 64, who states that R. M. T. Hunter was slated for the presidency, with Jefferson Davis as secretary of war. A further discussion is given in Dodd's Jefferson Davis, 216-222, and in Phillips' Life of Robert Toombs, 22-226.
4. “He was selected because the opponents of secession and the conservative Virginians could unite upon him.” Dodd, 226.
5. Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, II, 18. The same idea was brought out in his inaugural address.
6. Mrs. Davis, Memoirs, II, 19.
7. Johnston and Browne, Alexander H. Stephens, 392.
8. Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, I, 304; II, 241. The cabinet consisted of Toombs of Georgia, secretary of state; Walker of Alabama, secretary of war; Memminger of South Carolina (whom Davis chose somewhat reluctantly, as he preferred Barnwell), secretary of the treasury; Mallory of Florida, secretary of the navy; and Reagan of Texas, postmaster general. Benjamin, the attorney general, was soon afterwards given a seat in the cabinet and became Davis's right hand man. For an estimate of these officials, see Alfriend, Life of Jefferson Davis, 246-7; Butler, Judah P. Benjamin, 229-230.
9. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I, 41, 44. The Richmond Congress was not equal in ability to the Montgomery assembly. Stephens, War between the States, II, 464.
10. Davis vetoed the first bill for removing the capital upon technical grounds. Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States, I, 242-243.
11. The evacuation of Harper's Ferry seems to have resulted in some slight criticism of the executive even before this. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I, 52.
12. Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, I, 362, 442.
13. Ibid., 363, 367.
14. Alfriend, Life of Jefferson Davis, 314. See also Pollard, Secret History of the Confederacy, 150; Lost Cause, 152-153.
15. Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, I, 362-363.
16. Ibid., I, 427.
17. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I, 96; Journal, I, 682. Benjamin was transferred to the war department in September. The vetoing of two bills granting furloughs and discharges in case of sickness, etc., was another source of friction. Messages and Papers, I, 156-158; 162-164.
18. The total electoral vote was 109. Journal, II, 8. The election was without excitement and only a light vote was cast.—A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I, 89. The inauguration took place on February 22 under a gloomy and depressing sky. The President's address was severely criticised by his enemies.—Lost Cause, 215.
19. There were five sessions of the Provisional Congress as follows: February 4 to March 16, 1861, at Montgomery; April 29 to May 21, at Montgomery (called by Davis); July 20 to August 31, at Richmond; September 3, adjourned same day, at Richmond (called by Davis); November 18 to February 17, 1862, at Richmond.
20. The following were the Committee Chairmen: Smith, North Carolina, Elections; Kenner, Louisiana, Ways and Means; Miles, South Carolina, Military Affairs; Foote, Tennessee, Foreign Affairs; Conrad, Louisiana, Naval Affairs; Gartrell, Georgia, Judiciary.—Journal, V, 7, 21.
21. The Senate Committee Chairmen were as follows: Orr, South Carolina, Foreign Affairs; Barnwell, also of South Carolina, Finance; Sparrow, Louisiana, Military Affairs; Brown, Mississippi, Naval Affairs; Hill (one of Davis's most consistent supporters), Georgia, Judiciary; Clay, Alabama, Commerce.—Journal, II, 19-20.
22. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I, 157. “The first Confederate Congress . . . contained all the elements of discord and disagreement it was possible to assemble under one roof in the South at this time.” Dodd, 257.
23. Journal, V, 28. Foote had previously brought in a motion calling for a vigorous prosecution of the war as against Davis's defensive plan. Confederate Military History, I, 431.
24. Nevertheless almost the entire Tennessee delegation waited upon the President and asked for the removal of Albert Sidney Johnston. Davis's reply was, “If Johnston is not a general, the Confederacy has none to give you.”—Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, II, 38.
25. Journal, V, 243. Benjamin was transferred to the state department because of such criticism. Moore of Kentucky had previously introduced a motion in the House requesting the resignation of Benjamin from the war portfolio since he did not have “the confidence of the Confederacy, nor of the Army to such an extent as to meet the exigencies of the present crisis.”—Journal, V, 57. See also A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I, 119; editorial from the Examiner quoted by Butler, 254-255, Lost Cause, 213.
26. It was about this time that two parties arose, the one demanding the resignation of Davis, the other that he be made dictator. Du Bose, Life of Yancey, 678; Alfriend, 367.
27. James Ford Rhodes censures Davis for criticising Lincoln's suspension of the writ and then following the same policy himself a few days later. The criticism is misplaced, since Lincoln's proclamation was issued on his own responsibility, while Davis refused to act at all until Congress had given its sanction to the measure. See Rhodes, History of the United States, III, 603.
28. The following is a fair sample of the hostile criticism against Winder's administration: “The Baltimore detectives [Winder's police] are lords of the ascendency. They crook a finger, and the best carriages in the street pause, turn around and are subject to their will. They loll and roll in glory. . . . One word of remonstrance, and the poor victim is sent to Castle Gordon.” A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I, 123. See also Rhodes, History of the United States, III, 603. The popular opposition was such that the bill was eventually modified. Journal, V, 235.
29. Stephens and Toombs were particularly opposed to the measure. War between the States, II. 270. The Georgia Legislature passed resolutions condemning the bill. Ibid., 789; Pollard, Secret History of the Confederacy, 336. See also Confederate Military History, I, 448-450, for debates in Congress over the conscription bill.
30. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I, 120; editorial from the Richmond Examiner quoted in Rhodes, IV, 8, note. It was probably this same writer who sarcastically commented in another issue of the Examiner on the President's religious professions that “when Hercules saw the condition of the Augean stables, he did not roll up his eyes to Jupiter but turned a river into them.” Writings of J. M. Daniel, collected by Fred S. Daniel, 152. Daniel's Writings were editorials of the Richmond Examiner.
31. Rhodes, V, 431-432; Official Records, War of the Rebellion, Series IV, Vol. I, 1133-1138; II, 2-3; Johnstone and Browne, Life of Stephens, 415; Secret History of the Confederacy, 336.
32. Journal, V, 36, 107.
33. In the House the vote stood 50 for to 16 against. In the Senate the votes were not recorded.
34. The first Congress held the following sessions: February 18 to April 21, 1862; August 18 to October 13, 1862; January 12 to May 1, 1863; December 7 to February 17, 1864.
35. General Meigs wrote Senator Wilson, “ . . . they [the Confederate forces] are directed by one mind, prompt, decisive, bold. They are not distracted by divided councils, are not restrained by rules, customs, precedents.” Quoted by Weeden, War Government, Federal and State, p. xxiii. See also Rhodes, V, 471.
36. See Rhodes, IV, 7, 8, 9, and notes.
37. Alfriend, 409.
38. Journal, V, 296.
39. The bill which developed the greatest opposition was one providing for a new suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. In the House it mustered a majority of only 9. See, in addition, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I, 159; Rhodes, V, 464.
40. For example, Journal, V, 500; 557-558; II, 431, 447.
41. Ibid., VI, 9, 49; index.
42. Ibid., III, 228.
43. Ibid., 237.
44. The vote stood 22 for, and 59 against, repassing the bill. Ibid., V, 303. The popular discontent in Richmond was about evenly divided at this time against Davis and the members of Congress. Largely owing to the President's physical condition, he was unable to participate in the social affairs of the Capital and this led to the charge that he was becoming inaccessible (Mrs. Davis, Memoirs, II, 161; A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I, 184). In the Richmond Examiner of March 14 Daniels wrote, “There is a feeling of resentment, deep-seated and widely pervading the best class of the community against Government . . . ; and there are high officers in this goodly city who fancy they are popular in the land, but whose names are held in execration by the staunch classes which control public opinion.” Daniel, however, was not partial in his sarcasm. On May 4 he dealt with Congress as follows, “Never . . . was there a deliberative assembly intrusted with the high responsibilities of legislation in a momentous crisis less gifted with commanding talent, or signalized by initiative power than the Confederate Congress” (Writings of J. M. Daniel, 75, 77). Jones wrote in his never failing diary to similar effect, “Never did such little men rule such a great people. Our rulers are like children or drunken men riding docile horses that absolutely keep the rider from falling off. . . . There is no rule for anything, and no stability in any policy.” Davis, though master of Congress, by some was regarded as only a “small specimen of a statesman and no military chieftain at all.”—A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I, 174, 178. For further details concerning the secrecy of Congress, character of its proceedings, and popular ridicule of its members, see Callahan, Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy, Ch. II, passim, and quotations.
45. Writings of J. M. Daniel, 111-112.
46. Alfriend, 462.
47. Editorial in the Examiner of July 30. It was written on the occasion of the death of William L. Yancey who had been estranged from Davis over a question touching the purchase of arms in Europe. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I, 391; Du Bose, Life of Yancey, 652-653.
48. See the attitude of the Charleston Mercury as given by Jones, Diary, II, 15; also Mrs. Davis, Memoirs, II, 412. About this time Stephens wrote, “Our President is aiming at the obtainment of power inconsistent with public safety.” Life of Stephens, 441. Scarcely an issue of the Examiner appeared without strictures on the administration. The following may be considered a fair example:
“Had the people dreamed that Davis would carry all his chronic antipathies, his bitter prejudices, his puerile partialities, and his doting favoritisms into the President's chair, they never would have allowed him to fill it. . . . Mr. Davis has alienated the hearts of the people by his stubborn follies, and the injustice he has heaped upon those whom they regarded as their ablest generals and truest friends. . . . God forbid that our fair and beloved land should be ruined by our own mal-administration, or that our people should lack the proper energy and independence to teach their executive that he is their servant, not their master—their instrument, not their dictator.”—Examiner, August 5, 1863, quoted in Writings of J. M. Daniel, 107-109. See also Ibid., 95-96.
49. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, II, 15.
50. On the 31st Daniels wrote, “Today closes the gloomiest year of our struggle. No sanguine hope of foreign intervention buoys up the spirit of the Confederate public as at the end of 1861. No brilliant victory like that of Fredericksburg encourages us to look forward to a speedy and successful termination of the war, as in the last weeks of 1862.”—Writings, 155. Stephens and Governor Joseph E. Brown were particularly active in creating dissatisfaction throughout Georgia. Rhett and Vance, aided by the Mercury, carried out a like program in the Carolinas. Dodd, 300-301. I thing Dodd is wrong in classing H. V. Johnson as an opponent of the administration, at any rate before the latter part of 1864. See Official Records, Series IV, Vol. III, pp. 278-281, 552, 544-9, 662-3.
51. The Examiner, while elaborately praising the literary merits of the document, concluded by saying that Davis might prove “a worthy rival to another ruler who never said the foolish thing, and never did the wise one.” Ibid., 154.
52. This was again urged in a special message. Journal, VI, 744-746.
53. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, II, 161.
54. Writings of J. M. Daniel, 215.
55. Diary, II, 153.
56. Journal, III, 454.
57. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, II, 132.
58. Journal, III, 566.
59. Ibid., VI, 525.
60. Ibid., 681. Jones states that twenty votes upon which Foote counted failed him. Diary, II, 136.
61. Journal, III, 621; Diary, II, 134; Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, I. 392-394.
62. Ibid., 161. In February Benjamin voiced the administration's disapproval of Congress. “There has been less promptness and energy in the legislation by Congress than we had hoped for, and less than the magnitude of the interest at stake warranted us in expecting.” Benjamin to Mann, in Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, II, 623. For the deplorable condition of the country at large, see the special message of Davis, February 1, 1864. Ibid., I, 395-400.
63. Forty members of the old Congress were not re-elected. Ibid., p. 153. Owing to his opposition to Davis—an opposition which I have touched upon only incidentally—Stephens absented himself from the seat of government. R. M. T. Hunter was elected President of the Senate pro tem. Bocock was chosen again as Speaker in the House.
64. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, II, 215. Rhodes, V, 479. Davis, however, vetoed five bills during this session.
65. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, II, 220. The Examiner spoke of Bragg's appointment as “an illustration of that strong common sense which forms the basis of the President's character,” and continued, “this happy announcement should enliven the fires of confidence and enthusiasm, reviving among the people, like a bucket of water on a newly kindled grate.” See also Alfriend, 489.
66. Journal, VII, 110; A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, II, 222.
67. Ibid., 119. The second Congress held the following sessions: May 2 to June 14, 1864; November 7, 1864, to March 18, 1865.
68. The Examiner and the Mercury were particularly loud in their denunciations of weak kneed Congressmen who made no efforts to check the executive. See Pollard, Secret History of the Confederacy, 418, and Daniel's editorials in the Examiner. In Georgia the Legislature, at the bidding of Brown, Johnson, and Stephens, had passed resolutions criticising Davis and condemning his conduct of the war. Dodd, 336; Pendleton, Alexander H. Stephens, Ch. XV.
69. On January 8 Howell Cobb wrote Seddon, “I regret to say that gloom and despondency rule the hour, and bitter opposition to the Administration, mingled with dissatisfaction and disloyalty is manifesting itself.” As a remedy Cobb urged the reinstatement of Johnston and Beauregard and the institution of a popularly demanded system of recruiting. Official Records, Series IV, Vol. III, p. 1010.
70. Journal, VII, 254-255.
71. Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, I, 158. Benjamin, the practical, had probably influenced Davis to take this step.
72. Journal, VII, 612. The bill had been greatly enlarged in its scope by the time the vote was taken. For an excellent discussion of the various bills relating to the use of negroes as soldiers introduced both in Senate and House, and the delays and defeats experienced, see Stephenson, “The Question of Arming the Slaves,” American Historical Review, XVIII, 295-308.
73. The Journal (IV, 670) records nine affirmative and eight negative votes in the Senate. The Senate bill introduced on February 7 was indefinitely postponed on the 21st by a vote of 11 to 10. Stephenson gives as the reason the constitutional difficulty of State authority. American Historical Review, XVIII, 300-301. In the bill finally passed this was avoided.
74. Ibid., VII, 350.
75. Ibid., 721; A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, II, 451. One reason for this, according to Jones, was the retention of Benjamin in the cabinet.
76. Journal, IV, 490, 502, 687; VII, 502, 523, 645, 790.
77. Journal, VII, 582.
78. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, II, 416.
79. Journal, IV, 552, 553.
80. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, II, 415; Rhodes, V, 65. See also Bocock's letter to Davis, January 21, 1865, in which he advises Davis to reconstruct his cabinet in order to forestall a vote of lack of confidence in its members by Congress, three-fourths of whom will approve such a resolution if presented. Official Records, Series I, Vol. XLVI, pt. 2, p. 1118.
81. By Haynes of Tennessee and Wigfall of Texas.
82. Its backers were Stephens, Atkins of Tennessee, and Rives of Virginia. Dodd, 346. Writings of J. M. Daniel, 217. The proposition was put forward in at least two numbers of the Examiner, that of December 29, 1864, and that of January 17, 1865. See also A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, II, 372, 389, 390.
83. Rhodes, V, 79, and authorities quoted; Dodd, 347, shows even more clearly how strongly the current was running against Davis in both houses.
84. Journal, IV, 454; VII, 463; Rhodes, V, 110.
85. Messages and Papers, I, 505-513.
86. Journal, IV, 731; A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, II, 454; Lost Cause, 653-654.
87. Stephens, War between the States, II, 623-624; Alfriend, 611; Rhodes, V, 72.
88. Alfriend, 599. The requests for “information” upon trivial matters, and the heckling “resolutions” directed against the President bear out this opinion. See Messages and Papers, I, 499-570, passim.
89. Ibid.; A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, II, 409. Pollard styles the legislation of Congress during this session as “puerile, absurd, and contemptible” to the last degree. Lost Cause, 660.
90. Congress, owing to an urgent request from Davis, who hoped for foreign assistance, prolonged its sitting from March 10 to 18, when it adjourned sine die. For the diplomatic phase of these last days, see Callahan, 239-276.
91. Alfriend's censure of Congress does not fall far wide of the mark. “Mr. Davis,” he says, “never could consolidate the resources of the South as he desired, being constantly hampered by demagogism in Congress, which could at all times be coerced by the press hostile to the Administration, or influenced by the slightest display of popular displeasure. Pretending to place the whole means of the country at the disposal of the President, Congress yet invariably rendered its measures inoperative by emasculating clauses providing exemptions and immunities of every description.” Alfriend, 576. A later biographer asserts that the opposition outside of Congress, created by Stephens, Rhett, Brown [Yancey and Vance] was “a most important, if not the greatest, cause of the final collapse of the Confederacy.” Dodd, 268. Of the two, the opposition mentioned by Dodd was unquestionably the more injurious to the Southern cause, but Congress also played its responsible part. The truth of the saying was confirmed—“A house divided against itself can not stand.”
How to cite:
Cleland, Robert Glass, "JEFFERSON DAVIS AND THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS ", Volume 019, Number 3, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, Page 213 - 231. http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v019/n3/article_1.html
[Accessed Tue Nov 24 0:46:57 CST 2009]
