Although the services rendered to revolutionary Texas by Jesus Cuellar were by no means inconsiderable, and are in part well known, his name appears but once in the archives of Texas, and not at all in any English account of the Texas Revolution. This was likely due to his own wishes, for there are indications that, with good reason, he preferred that the nature and extent of his services to Texas should not be known to the enemy. Aside from mention of him as an Alférez serving in the Mexican army in Tamaulipas in 1833, 67 the earliest reference to him that I have found is contained in a letter written by General Stephen F. Austin, then commanding the Texan Volunteers before Bexar, to the President of the General Consultation of Texas, under date of November 18, 1835, in which he says: 68
On the 14th I received information that Col. Ugartechea left Bexar the night before for Laredo, supposedly for the purpose of escorting the expected reinforcements. I immediately dispatched Col. Burleson with one hundred and thirty men in pursuit of him. I have since learned that Ugartechea had a man for a Pilot who has lived with the Comanches, and that he will make a great circuit by the hills on the head of the Medina. The prospect of Burleson's meeting him is therefore doubtful.
At a supremely opportune moment a few weeks later, this "Pilot who had lived with the Comanches," transferred his allegiance from Santa Anna to Texas. Some mention of this fact is found in all the Texan narratives of the Bexar Campaign, and among them the account of Col. Frank W. Johnson, who was then General Burleson's adjutant: 69
On the 4th, marching orders were issued and the Quarter Master was directed to have the trains loaded and ready to move with the Army on the 5th. About the middle of the afternoon, on the next day when most of the baggage wagons were loaded and everything in readiness for the march, a Lieutenant of the Mexican Army, a deserter, entered our camp and was taken to General Burleson's quarters. He reported the defences of the town weak, and that the place could be easily taken. After hearing his report, Col. Johnson suggested to Colonel Milam to call for volunteers.
This is corroborated by Captain W. G. Cooke, who commanded the first company of New Orleans Greys: 70
Immediate preparation for the retreat was commenced. The men commenced deserting in Squads of from ten to twenty. I saw that the citizens of the Country had despaired of success and given up the contest. There were three companies from the United States—First Company from New Orleans commanded by myself, consisting of 70 men; Second Company from New Orleans under Captain Breese, 50 men; and fifteen men under the command of Captain Peacock from Mississippi. About four o'clock I took up the line of march, and on arriving opposite the General's quarters was informed that a deserter—a Lieutenant—from the enemy—had come in and was then in conference with General Burleson and others. I saw it was a favorable opportunity to prevent the retreat, and called on my men to know if they would follow where I would lead. Their answer was a unanimous "Yes."
And is told in more picturesque detail by Herman Ehrenberg, a youthful German private in Breese's company: 71
Five horsemen came riding down the river on the side on which the camp was located. The leader, a little lean man, wore the uniform of a Mexican Lieutenant, which in reality he was. A white flag fluttered in his left hand. He asked hastily for the [headquarters of the] commander, where, after we had led him thither, he pledged himself to lead our troops unobserved near the center of the town. Yes, he even said that if part of the troops would follow him he would lead them under the window of General Cos. His offer, however, was not accepted, as we were afraid to trust him. Too many circumstances spoke against him. In the first place, he was a traitor. Secondly, he was a Mexican, and thirdly, some Comanche blood flowed in his veins. All of these made [Deaf] Smith's warning to be careful unnecessary, but his advice to attack the city as he suggested was accepted after some encouragement from Smith.
That the deserting Mexican Lieutenant did, in fact, guide the Texans into Bexar, notwithstanding the reasons enumerated so eloquently by Ehrenberg for not permitting him to do so, is sufficiently attested by Ehrenberg himself in his account of the march of Milam's columns to the assault: 72
The glances of our leader, the Mexican Lieutenant, hung constantly on the Alamo, which we could see to our left as a black colossus. Uneasily he peered through the darkness, as though he feared that our purpose had been betrayed. At last he broke his long silence, and said pointing toward the Alamo where several rockets were just rising: "The way is clear; we are safe. Yonder artistic, sparkling stars are calling part of the troops out of the town to help the Alamo. Now, briskly ahead that we may reach the town within ten minutes. Do you see yonder outposts at the fire? Let them run away unnoticed. Our shooting would kill a few, but would bring the whole garrison down on us. But after them quickly so that we will get to the [plaza] at the same time with them. The further ahead we get this morning the more stone buildings will fall into our hands." We were within twenty steps of the fire before the sentinels noticed us, and without uttering a sound, they fled, some even without their muskets.
On February 9, 1836, "The Advisory Committee to the Executive appointed by the General Council to act in that capacity in the absence of a quorum of said Council," suggested to "His Excellency, J. W. Robinson, acting Governor": 73
From information recently received that Juan N. Seguin, who was appointed Captain in the Cavalry corps has not accepted his appointment, the Advisory Committee would recommend to your excellency that ——, who so gallantly Piloted the brave army into Bexar the morning of the 5th, December last should be appointed to fill his place.
The "Acting Governor," as usual, followed the advice of the committee, and when, a month later, the remnant of the Council reported to the Convention at Washington its list of officers appointed to the regular army of Texas it named Jesus Cuellar, instead of Juan N. Seguin, who had been in the original list of appointments, as heading the roster of Captains of the Legion of Cavalry. 74 This is the only mention of the name of Jesus Cuellar in the archives of Texas, and the record of his subsequent unique service is preserved only in the account of Urrea's Campaign, taken by Filisola from the journal of Col. Francisco Garay, Urrea's second in command, who thus introduces him:
Among the guides who piloted General Urrea from Matamoros [to San Patricio] was Don Salvador Cuellar, whose brother, Don Jesus—better known by the name of "Comanche" from his having been a captive of that tribe, had, during the siege which General Don Martin Perfecto Cos sustained in Bexar, passed over to the enemy, and was now to be found with the forces of the so-called Colonel Fannin, at Bahia Del Espiritu Santo. For this reason the presence of the other in our ranks was at first viewed by the General with some distrust, but notwithstanding his brother's conduct, Don Salvador served throughout the campaign loyally and disinterestedly, and always accomplished honorably everything with which he was charged. 75
This brings us to the odd story of the battle that was not fought on Arroyo de las Ratas, where Fannin, had he taken advantage of the opportunity offered him, might have changed the whole course of Santa Anna's Texan campaign. General José Urrea, in his Diario Militar (entries for March 3-10, inclusive), presents a bald matter of fact account of this episode: 76
3d to 6th. In San Patricio, receiving intelligence from Goliad, and giving the troops daily instruction and drills.
7th. In San Patricio. The force which had remained at Matamoros joined me.
8th. I had notice that the enemy were in motion to attack me at San Patricio, and in the night I marched to encounter them with three hundred men and the four pounder which my division had. Ten leagues distant on the road to Goliad, I ambuscaded my force, awaiting the enemy.
9th. In the ambuscade along the Arroyo de las Ratas.
10th. I received intelligence that the enemy had changed his mind, and that he was preparing to march with four hundred men to the aid of those besieged in the fortress of the Alamo. I counter marched to San Patricio and ordered the Cavalry to make ready to reconnoiter ahead of our march.
But it is from Colonel Garay's journal that we learn what really happened: 77
On the night of March 7th the said Don Jesus, sent by Fannin to observe our force and position, presented himself to us at San Patricio, pretending that he had deserted the cause of the rebels and desired to be admitted to the clemency of the government, informing the General at the same time that the enemy were coming to attack him, and in order to do so had recalled the force which had occupied the Mission. He also offered to conduct us to a place where we could easily surprise, overwhelm and destroy them. For the other part he protested that he had deserted from the Plaza of Bexar with the sole object of serving his country in the camp of its enemies, which we could prove by taking advantage of the offer he made us, and since Don Salvador guaranteed the good conduct of his brother, General Urrea came to believe that he could put faith in his sincerity, and, consequently, ordered 200 infantry, with the cannon, and 150 cavalry, to march at daybreak next morning, March 8th, for a place on the road to the Mission of Refugio, eight leagues distant from San Patricio, called Arroyo de las Ratas. There the said Cuellar left us, and General Urrea gave orders to so dispose his small division as to accomplish the object of our march. It is with difficulty we could prove this, since in truth the position possessed many disadvantages. The wood in which we would have hidden was very small and open and was made up entirely of leafless trees, among which the enemy must necessarily have discovered us before he reached it. On our front, left and rear was a vast prairie, denuded of grass. The arroyo was entirely dry and its bed, in which our infantry was stationed, was insufficient to cover them. General Urrea no doubt recognized these disadvantages, since at midnight he ordered a retreat, at which we all rejoiced, for we were never easy in our minds about remaining at this place.
From the reminiscences of Andrew M. Boyle, a young artilleryman of Fannin's command, whose home was in San Patricio, and who was saved from the Goliad massacre through the intervention of Colonel Garay, we have a glimpse of this same episode from the viewpoint of Fannin's men. Boyle said: 78
Colonels Bowie and Crockett, then in command of the Alamo, sent a courier to Colonel Fannin, in the latter part of February, asking for reinforcements. A hundred men were at once detailed, and had crossed the San Antonio River on their way to the doomed garrison, when they were recalled on account of a report brought in by a scout named "Comanche" of the advance of the Mexican Army under General Urrea toward San Patricio. The main body of the enemy had marched directly from Laredo upon San Antonio. Our commander, by the advice of "Comanche," determined to march to San Patricio, Leaving one company in garrison at Goliad. The character of the scout was notoriously bad, and Colonel Fannin was informed of the fact, but gave no heed to the warning, although two of us volunteered to go to San Patricio and ascertain the truth of the report. Three day's rations were distributed and everything was in readiness to commence the march next morning, when an American named Ayers arrived from the old Mission . . . in the direction of San Patricio, and brought reliable news of the arrival of the Mexicans at that place.
From the journal of Lewis Ayers, preserved among the Lamar Papers, we learn that Ayers arrived at Goliad from Refugio about 8 p. in. on March 3, and was then informed that Fannin's first proposed expedition for the relief of Bexar had failed because: 79
All the force here insisted upon going with them, and none would consent to stay except the regulars, who wished to go but would obey orders under such circumstances. Col. Fannin called a council of officers, and it was concluded that as the enemy was in force at San Patricio and the army in such a peculiar state of mind, it was best to keep them together.
And with regard to the proposed attack on Urrea, Ayers, in his journal entry for March 12 adds: 80
A council of officers was held this morning in consequence of an express arriving from Gonzales with another call for assistance to be rendered to the brave defenders of the Alamo. I understand three hundred men will march there tomorrow.
I should have stated four days since that it was decided to march with three hundred men to San Patricio, which expedition failed for the same reason as the first for Bexar, all the volunteers insisted on going.
Cuellar's stratagem divided Urrea's army, and drew his advance division numerically weaker than Fannin's forces, to the Arroyo de las Ratas, twenty-five miles nearer to Goliad than was Urrea's base at San Patricio. Fannin then had about four hundred and fifty splendidly armed men, well disciplined and drilled for a Texan volunteer army, brave, spirited, and eager for action. They were wholly unsuited for garrison duty, and must be used aggressively if to be used at all with any hope of success. Fannin and Cuellar both knew that the Alamo would soon fall, and release a portion of Santa Anna's army at Bexar to act with Urrea against Fannin. It was imperative that Fannin should at once either retreat behind the Guadalupe, which he considered that his orders from the Provisional Government forbade his doing, or else beat Urrea before the latter could be reinforced by Santa Anna. Cuellar's Indian-like cleverness delivered Urrea into his hand, and offered him his opportunity to fight with every advantage of position, numbers, initiative, arms, morale and personnel. It is small wonder that when his irresolute commander failed to press home such an advantage the astute Cuellar quietly faded from the pages of Texan history.
68. THE QUARTERLY, XI, 49.
69. Johnson-Barker, History of Texas, I, 352.
70. William G. Cooke to Dr. James Cook, August 7, 1839, THE QUARTERLY, IX, 213.
71. W. A. Bartholomae's Manuscript translation of Ehrenberg's Narrative, page 82, University of Texas Library.
72. Id., page 86.
73. MS. Consultation Papers, Texas State Library.
74. Proceedings of Convention at Washington, page 60, in Gammel, Laws of Texas, I, 878.
75. Filisola, Memorias para la historia de la Guerra de Texas, II, 205. 76. José Urrea, Diario de las Operaciones Militares, de la Division que al mando del General José Urrea, hizo la Campaña de Texas, 9.
77. Filisola, II, 405-406.
78. THE QUARTERLY, XIII, 285. There is another version of Boyle's Reminiscences among the Comptroller's Military Records now in the Texas State Library, but the pages dealing with this episode are missing.
79. Lamar Papers No. 336; Printed Edition, I, 335-336. The printed copy has several errors.
80. Id., 336.
How to cite:
Davenport, Harbert, "CAPTAIN JESUS CUELLAR, TEXAS CAVALRY, OTHERWISE "COMANCHE" ", Volume 030, Number 1, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, Page 56 - 63. http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v030/n1/article_7.html
[Accessed Tue Nov 24 1:58:06 CST 2009]
