JACKSON'S NECHES CLAIM, 1829-1836
The Florida treaty of February, 1819, defined the southwest-
ern boundary of the United States as the Sabine River from its
mouth to the thirty-second parallel, from thence a line due north
to the Red River, and ultimately the line of the forty-second par-
allel westward to the Pacific Ocean--"the whole being as laid
down in Melish's map of the United States, published at Phila-
delphia, improved to the first of January, 1818," so Article III
of the treaty states. Melish's map properly labels the more east-
ern of the two rivers which separately flow into Sabine Bay the
"Sabine," and labels the more western river "Rio de Nieves or
Neches R."
1 It would seem that there could have been no ques-
tion or honest doubt about the true southwestern boundary
after 1819.
Nevertheless, the American-Texas land speculators and expan-
sionists of the southwestern border region conceived the conven-
ient notion at an early date that the Rio Neches, the western of
the two rivers, might feasibly be considered the Sabine referred
to in the Spanish treaty of 1819. Unfortunately for this pre-
tension (which grew up after 1819),
2 the Neches did not inter-
sect the thirty-second parallel and therefore could not fulfill the
treaty specification, even if the treaty had not designated the
Sabine as indicated on Melish's map.
3 And in this respect
Melish's map was quite correct.
The western river, the Neches, had never been known as the
Sabine, nor the eastern, the Sabine, as the Neches. An examina-
tion of old Spanish maps shows, however, that up to the end of
the 18th Century there was a very widespread ignorance and un-
certainty regarding the topography of East Texas, then largely
uninhabited. Thus some Spanish maps, failing to show Sabine
Bay, had pictured the two rivers as flowing directly and inde-
pendently into the Gulf of Mexico, while other maps pictured the
two rivers as joining to form one river before entering the Gulf,
while yet other maps showed only one river where the two should
have been. Also the superfluous designation "Rio Mexicano" had
by some Spaniards been applied to the Neches and by others to
the Sabine. The Spaniard Pichardo, who made a close study of
the Louisiana-Texas boundary matter in the first decade of the
19th Century, reports all of this past confusion, pointing out at
the same time that in general the then fixed designations of the
two streams--Neches or Rio de Nievas for the western and Rio
de Sabinas for the eastern--had been well established for years.
And when the Rio Mexicano designation had been used it had
only properly applied, in his opinion, to the Neches. Pichardo
points out that Fray Puelles in his map of Texas at the begin-
ning of the 19th Century was thus careless in labeling the Sabine
as the "Sabinas, or Mexicano, or de las Flores."
4 From all this
it appears there was some confusion and redundancy in nomen-
clature, but nowhere does it appear that the Neches had ever been
called the "Sabine."
The American speculators of the Southwest, anxious to have
the extensive territory (with Nacogdoches as center) between the
Sabine and Neches and south of Red River come into the posses-
sion of the United States--though preferable would be the acqui-
sition of all of Texas--, found grounds easily in this ancient con-
fusion in nomenclature for their assertion that the Neches was
the real Sabine. And so they came to find it easy to claim and
perhaps to imagine, quite contrary to actual fact, that the Neches
was the more considerable of the two streams and must for that
additional reason have been the river intended as boundary by
the negotiators of the Florida treaty--as if Adams and Onis did
not know what they were doing when they ran the line according
to the Melish map! John Sibley, an old resident of Natchitoches,
Louisiana, who had some expectation of being appointed by Presi-
dent Monroe as one of the joint commissioners to survey the treaty
boundary with Spain's commissioners, wrote on October 29, 1821,
privately:
There will be a difficulty about the River Sabine. The Main
Branch is the Nechez, which is beyond Nacogdoches. The treaty
obliges the Commissioners to begin in the Sea at the Mouth of
Sabine &
keep up on the West Bank. By the old maps it lost the
name of Sabine from the Junction of the Nechez which is about
sixty miles from its mouth. & the Branch that Modens [moderns ?]
calls Sabine used to be called the Mexicano River. Should we be
able to fix the Netchez as the Boundary it will give us an acces-
sion of a tract of country of abount one hundred miles by three
hundred . . . many Intelligent Gentlemen are of my opin-
ion, on this subject.
5
Such argument, in face of the treaty stipulation, justified the
Mexican General Teran in his comment on the imperialistic
Americans:
They begin by assuming rights . . . impossible to sustain
in a serious discussion, making ridiculous pretensions based on
historical incidents which no one admits. . . . The efforts
that others make to submit proofs and reasons are by these men
employed in reiterations ... to attract the attention of their
fellow countrymen, not to the justice of their claim but to the
profit to be gained from admitting it. ... In the meantime,
the territory against which these machinations are directed, and
which has usually remained unsettled, begins to be visited by
adventurers and empresarios.
Some of these take up their resi-
dence in the country, pretending that their location has no bear-
ing upon the question of their government's claim or the bound-
ary disputes . . . and the matter having arrived at this stage,
. . . diplomatic maneuvers begin."
6
Teran thus exactly describes the situation that developed south
of the Red River and between the Sabine and Neches Rivers.
One of the Texas-land speculators tells us that "In the year
1819 about the time Mr. Adams was negotiating with Don Onis
. . . several persons passed over to Texas, and purchased
lands lying between the Naches river and the Sabine, in antici-
pation that the Naches would be the line between the two coun-
tries. This was not the result of the negotiation."
7
The Mexican revolution intervened, and the boundary survey
lay unaccomplished for many years; for the American govern-
ment, eager to acquire Texas, delayed confirming the line of 1819
with Mexico as long as possible. The Neches claim was revived
in August, 1829, when Colonel Anthony Butler of Mississippi, a
speculator in Texas lands near
Nacogdoches,
as Jackson probably
knew,
8 appeared at Washington to urge President Jackson to
try to buy Texas from Mexico. Butler suggested to Jackson that
the Neches might feasibly be claimed as the "Sabine" of the
Florida treaty. Butler's ludicrous arguments for this view were
those noted above.
Jackson was ready to believe that there could be a doubt. It
might prove useful. The Neches claim, accordingly, first appears
in American diplomacy in Jackson's instructions to Poinsett of
August 25, 1829, authorizing him to offer Mexico $5,000,000 for
a cession of the whole of Texas. Certain possible points of dis-
pute, said Jackson, would be obviated by a cession of Texas to
the United States, and as one of these he put forth the Neches
claim in the following language:
It is represented to us that, of the two streams which empty
into the Sabine Bay through the same channel, the one farthest
west is the most considerable, and may with reason be claimed to
be the one referred to in the treaty. The distance between them,
although only four miles where they enter the bay, at some places
approaches to one hundred. That there is much ignorance of the
localities of the province, and consequently confusion and error
in the maps of it which are extant, is certain. Whether the rep-
resentations which have been made upon the subject to this Gov-
ernment be founded in truth, or are the suggestions of interested
individuals to subserve particular views, remains to be seen.
Jackson adds: "But this is not the only nor the strongest ob-
jection" to viewing the real Sabine as the boundary, and he goes
on to show that the Neches should be the boundary because it
would be more profitable to the United States to have the more
westward river as boundary!
9 The fact that Jackson mentions
possible "interested individuals" suggests that he was well aware
of their existence and anxious to avoid appearance of being iden-
tified with them.
Jackson made no effort through the years thereafter to fortify
the claim, which could find no justification; but merely continued
to the end to speak of the Neches as "represented to him" to be
the true Sabine, avoiding as much responsibility as he could.
10
Jackson observed to Poinsett--and to his successor as ambassador
to Mexico, Anthony Butler--that if the line of 1819 were run
according to Melish's map the United States would "lose" some
territory south of Red River in which Americans had settled and
which at the time formed "two populous counties" of Arkansas
Territory. (What had these Americans expected when they set-
tled south of the American boundary?) Jackson instructed Gov-
ernor Pope of Arkansas to exercise jurisdiction over this territory
south of Red River pending a settlement with Mexico,
11 and re-
peatedly expressed his unwillingness that Mexico should have
these "Arkansas counties."
In order to obtain a commercial treaty from Mexico, the
reluctant Poinsett had at last been forced in 1828 to sign a bound-
ary treaty confirming the southwestern boundary of the Florida
treaty. The treaty of 1828 remained unratified. But in 1831
the Mexican government forced Butler to sign a new treaty, again
confirming that of 1819.
12 In the spring of 1832, after Mexican
ratification, Butler sent this treaty to President Jackson, urging
him not to submit it to the Senate and to repudiate the Florida
treaty settlement. But Jackson put the treaty before the Senate
(which, despite his private request that action be delayed,
promptly ratified it), and replied to Butler on February 25, 1832,
that he could not utterly repudiate the treaty, as the national
honor was compromitted. But he privately assured Butler that
he would instruct the commissioners to be sent to survey the
boundary with Mexico to insist upon the Neches, and that he
would never yield this claim, while the Mexican commissioners
would never agree to it, and that in this way he would defeat the
treaty of 1831 and keep the whole Texas question open.
Jackson had fully discovered the usefulness of claiming the
Neches, for imperialistic reasons; and was determined to enforce
the claim, forcibly if necessary, as will be seen. Though doubt-
less knowing better, Jackson conveniently viewed the Neches as a
"branch" or "fork" of the Sabine—"the west fork of that river,
which formerly was called the Sabine," he writes Butler, adding:
"I am told Mexico will contend for the line to run up the East
fork which they say is the Sabine, and call the west branch by
another name, which we cannot agree to, as it would take from
us two populous counties."
13 The National
Intelligencer,
August
6, 1836, ejaculated upon the President's geography: "A branch
of a Bay!
Who ever heard of such a thing before? . . . James
River ... a branch
of Hampton Roads!"
of which he might have to seize the whole of Texas forthwith to
protect the American border from Indian depredations! 14 He
again wrote Butler on April 19 of his survey commissioners:
Our instructions will pursue the express words of the Treaty,
which declares, it shall commence on the gulf of Mexico, on the
west bank of the Sabine and run up the west bank etc. etc. there-
fore it must, when the Sabine forks, take the west bank of the
west fork. This by us will not be abandoned and it is intimated
that Mexico will contend for the East fork. This we will not
consent to.
15
Of course Jackson knew
that Mexico would contend for the true
Sabine; his mode of expression may well strike a reader as some-
what pharisaical.
16
We learn, on what seems good authority, that Jackson told Sam
Houston in the spring of 1832 (on the eve of Houston's departure
for Texas) that he was claiming the Neches and "would defend
and fight for that line."
17 This understanding with Jackson,
which Houston remembered well, seems to play a large part in
Houston's retreat in 1836 during the Texas war for independ-
ence. Jackson's Neches claim was, in fact, public knowledge in
Texas as early as October, 1832, and the Texans were indignant
at "this hitherto unheard-of claim."
18
The survey of the line of 1819 was never made with Mexico,
though as late as 1836 Jackson was hypocritically expressing his
great desire to have the line run. Revolutionary conditions in
Mexico caused delay in sending commissioners, while Jackson was
only too glad to have the matter put off. T. M. Marshall, who
has made a careful study of the matter, shows Jackson's policy
to have been one of procrastination, at which the Mexican dip-
lomats complained more than once.
19 At his great leisure Butler
negotiated a new survey article in the spring of 1835 and sent
it to Jackson, reminding him of the usefulness of adhering firmly
to the Neches claim, this not merely to obtain the territory around
Nacogdoches and the "Arkansas counties," but as a means of
coercing Mexico into a cession of all of Texas.
20 In private let-
ters in the fall of 1833 and spring of 1834 Butler urged Jackson
to seize the "disputed" territory east of the Neches as a means
of encouraging the Texans to revolt from Mexico.
21
Did the American government ever bring the Neches claim be-
fore the Mexican government and offer to negotiate about it?
Jackson and Butler seem to have been not a little secretive about
their claim. Butler told the Mexican Foreign Minister, Alaman,
in June, 1832, that a cession of Texas would make it unnecessary
for President Jackson to decide whether or not he had the con-
stitutional power to yield territory inhabited by Americans, if
and when the line of 1819 were run—an insinuating allusion to
the "Arkansas counties."
22 Later Butler mysteriously informed
the Mexican Minister in September, 1833, that he was instructed
"to propose a review of the question of limits, for the purpose of
defining more exactly and clearly the landmarks of such line than
had been done by the treaty of 1819."
23 But Colonel Butler did
not explain. Later still, and for the last time, Butler alluded to
the Neches claim in a note to the Mexican government of Decem-
ber 21, 1834, in which
he would only observe, that Mexico was actually occupying a large
territory which the government of the undersigned considered as
justly belonging to the citizens of the United States . . . and
as it was well known, that not only the government of Mexico,
but that of the United States, had already granted a large part
of this territory to various natives and foreigners, the prompt con-
clusion of this affair became every day more urgent.
Writing Jackson on March 7, 1834, Butler intimated that Mexico
was aware of Jackson's Neches claim and considered it a mere
pretext, and he assured the President that Mexico would never
admit the claim. He recommended again that Jackson simply
occupy the "disputed" territory.
General Almonte, who made for the Mexican government a tour
of inspection in Texas during the early half of 1834, heard while
at Natchitoches, in April, of the Neches claim among the Ameri-
cans. On inquiring he was told that the Sabine had once been
known as the Mexicano and that inasmuch as many sabine
(cypress) trees bordered the Neches the latter must be the real
Sabine!
24
Thus the matter rested until the outbreak of the Texas Revo-
lution, when at Jackson's request Secretary of State Forsyth
apprised the Mexican chargé,
Castillo, in an oral
conversation
on
November 4, 1835, that pending the struggle between the Mexi-
cans and the revolted Texan colonists the American President
would view the region between the Sabine and Neches as "neutral
territory" and would permit neither of the belligerents to "vio-
late" that territory.
25 Jackson's declaration in his annual mes-
sage of December, 1835, "It has been thought necessary to apprise
the government of Mexico, that we should require the integrity
of our territory to be scrupulously respected by both parties" to
the Texan war, thus takes on a sinister meaning. Secretary
Forsyth refused to discuss Jackson's Neches claim with Castillo.
In consequence of Forsyth's intimation to Castillo of Jackson's
arbitrary "neutral territory" pretension, the Mexican government
sent Gorostiza as "Minister Extraordinary" to Washington to pro-
test and to protect Mexican interests. When Gorostiza inquired
why the American government had never brought the Neches
claim openly into diplomacy, Forsyth, known well as "the Talley-
rand of America," blandly responded:
If the true demarcation according to that treaty has not been fully
made known to Mexico, it is because there has been on the part of
that government a delay to proceed to the execution of that instru-
ment. Questions belonging to the duties of the commissioners and
surveyors, could not be properly presented or considered until they
met to enter upon those duties. A correspondence between the
United States and Mexico, for the treaty of limits . . . was
no place to look for traces of the pretensions of the two govern-
ments, founded on a construction of that instrument. . . .To
discuss them in advance, would have been useless, if not suspi-
cious. . . . Whatever may have been done or omitted prior
to that time, it is certain that want of information on this point
since November last, cannot be complained of by the Mexican
government. The undersigned had the honour to give to the
Mexican charge d'affaires, Mr. Castillo, in a conference in that
month, the most distinct intimation of the claims and expecta-
tions of the government of the United States under the treaty of
limits ... a conference which the undersigned has supposed
was the chief cause of the subsequent extraordinary mission of
Mr. Gorostiza to the United States.
26
Gorostiza justly replied that upon Melish's map, "the only au-
thority which the Mexican government will recognize agreeably
to the treaty, . . . Nacogdoches is situated several miles
beyond the Sabine river, and consequently far within the indis-
putable territory of Mexico."
27
One would be amply justified in the belief that Jackson had
for years been secretly planning to use the Neches claim as a
means of intervening in Texas to aid the colonists and annex the
Texas territory whenever a Texas revolution (an event which he
had anticipated ever since 1829) should occur. Jackson was an
unscrupulous opportunist, seemingly, of subtle and deep calcula-
tion, a master of duplicity and intrigue.
28
The contemporary belief that President Jackson connived at
his friend Sam Houston's schemes, from 1829 to 1832, of filibus-
tering against and revolutionizing Texas seems to the present
writer to be justified by the very documentary "proofs" by which
Jackson intended to prove the contrary.
29 Besides the testimony
of Anson Jones as to a Jackson-Houston understanding that Jack-
son would on suitable occasion "defend the fight for" the terri-
tory between the Sabine and Neches Rivers, we have also the tes-
timony of J. F. H. Claiborne and Henry A. Wise to the same
effect.
30
Jackson's and Houston's actions in the early part of 1836 would
point to this putative understanding between them: namely, that
Jackson would use the Neches claim to aid or join the Texan
insurgents in their struggle with Mexico. Besides wishing to
obtain Texas, Jackson would in his desire for California and New
Mexico (a large part of which he had instructed Butler in August,
1835, to try to buy from Mexico) have a further motive for war
with Mexico.
31 The evidence tending to show that Houston in-
tended to retreat to the "neutral" Sabine-Neches region to lure
the Mexican army under Santa Anna across the Neches and into
conflict with the American army seems conclusive to the writer.
Houston seems to have been preparing his soldiers for a later dis-
closure of this policy when he told them, on ordering retreat east-
ward from the Colorado: "Fellow Soldiers: . . . we cannot
expect reinforcements. . . . There are but a few of us, and
if we are beaten the fate of Texas is sealed! The salvation of
the country depends upon the first battle with the enemy. For
this reason I intend to retreat, till I find I can beat the Mexicans
in battle, if I am obliged to go even to the banks of the Sabine."
32
On reaching the Brazos Houston told several of his associates,
Anson Jones included, that he intended to retreat to the Neches
or even the Sabine if necessary "to gain a bloodless victory."
33
That this was his intention was the general belief among his sol-
diers and officers. But there is even more definite evidence, fully
attested, which leaves even less room for doubt: Houston sent
messages ahead to the Trinity River ordering volunteers coming
from the east to halt and await his arrival there, and he borrowed
a Mrs. Mann's pair of oxen expressly to help transport his equi-
page to the Trinity along the Nacogdoches road. Houston had
clearly in mind his understandings with President Jackson, and
wrote his friend Colonel Henry Raguet of Nacogdoches on April
7, 1836: "Don't get scared. Remember Old Hickory claims
Nacogdoches as 'nutural [neutral] territory.'"
34 Houston's use
of the Jacksonian vernacular is suggestive.
to Houston with orders that the General stop retreating and fight
the Mexicans. But Rusk went over to Houston's program, and
the retreat continued. As Burnet remarked later in the year,
"His presence in the army produced no apparent change in the
policy of General Houston, and I believe it can be proved by in-
disputable evidence, that a retreat to the river Trinity was
intended, until the irresistible impulse of public opinion in the
army compelled that happy movement which resulted in the mem-
orable battle of San Jacinto." 35 For, eventually, about April 15
the soldiers forced Houston to deflect southward from the Nacog-
doches road to meet the Mexican army at San Jacinto, as we are
told by a mass of testimony by participants in the campaign.
On being thus forced to yield his own plans, Houston told a num-
ber of his subordinates that he was only marching to Lynchburg
or San Jacinto at the order of his government, against his own
judgment, and would take no responsibility for the outcome.
There is even strong evidence that even to the last he wished to
continue the retreat. 36
The Texans fought and won the battle of San Jacinto on April
21. On April 24 the French correspondent Bar adere writes from
Galveston Island, where the Provisional Government of Texas
had taken refuge: "Yesterday, while it was being deliberated
whether it was necessary to flee further, letters came from the
army telling us that the soldiers have forced
Houston to fight."
37
It was only after
the Texan victory that Houston claimed credit
for it.
This is not to censure Houston's retreat policy, which may well
be viewed as farsighted and statesmanlike, and find its explana-
tion in his understanding with Jackson. By involving Mexico in
war with the United States he would not only have ensured the
success of the Texas Revolution but enabled Jackson to fulfil his
further expansionist desires at Mexican expense.
Let us turn to Jackson's maneuvers, to see how they jibe with
Houston's retreat. Jackson was well informed by Butler that
Mexico would not observe his absurd "neutral territory" preten-
sion. Butler apprised him by letter of December 19, 1835, of
Santa Anna's declarations to the foreign diplomatic corps on the
eve of his departure for Texas:
He spoke of our desire to possess that country, declared his
full
knowledge
that we had instigated and were supporting the revolt,
and that he would in due season chastise
us
for it. Yes Sir, he
said chastise
us:
he continued, I understand that Gen. Jackson
sets up a claim to pass the Sabine, and that in running the divi-
sion line, hopes to acquire the country as far as the Naches. "Sir
said he, (turning to Gentlemen present) I mean to run that line
at the Mouth of my Cannon, and after the line is Established, if
the Nation will only give me the means, only afford me the nec-
essary supply of money I will march to the Capital, I will lay
Washington City in ashes, as it has already been once done,"
(turning and bowing to the British Minister). . . . There is
little doubt but that Genl. Santa Anna, will be taught a lesson
by the people of Texas themselves, how difficult it would be to
reach even the Sabine River much less visit our Capital. . . .
Nay that he may become so placable as to permit boundary yet
westward of the Naches.
38
Thus when Jackson gave General E. P. Gaines discretionary
orders, and encouraged
him, to march over the Sabine in the
spring of 1836, he was wittingly inviting war with Mexico. If
Games should comply with Jackson's hinted desire that he pro-
tect the "disputed" territory, and if the Texans should retreat to
that region pursued by the Mexican troops, what could result
but war?
Jackson ordered Gaines to the southwestern border on January
23, 1836, with instructions to protect "American territory" from
encroachment by the contending forces in Texas and to protect
the inhabitants on both sides of the boundary from possible
Indian ravages. But at the same time Gaines was told to pre-
serve American neutrality. Gaines knew of Jackson's Neches
claim; but whether or not he was at once informed of it, pri-
vately or otherwise, by Jackson does not appear. However, the
Secretary of War on April 25, 1836, sent Gaines instructions
encouraging him to view the Neches as the American boundary,
authorizing him to advance if he
should think necessary to Nacog-
doches, and enclosing "as a part of your instructions" a memo-
randum of an interview between Secretary Forsyth and Gorostiza
of April 20, in which Forsyth had stated that the President con-
sidered the Neches the rightful boundary.
39 In this conference
Forsyth told Gorostiza vaguely that in consequence of appre-
hended Indian disturbances on the frontier
orders would be given to General Games to take such a position
with the troops of the United States as would enable him to pre-
serve the territory of the United States from any violation by the
Mexicans, Texians, or Indians. . . . That, should the troops
. . . be advanced beyond the point Mexico might suppose was
within the territory of the United States, the occupation of the
position was not to be taken as an indication of any hostile feel-
ing, or of a desire to establish a possession or claim not justified
by the treaty of limits; the occupation would be precautionary
and provisional; and that the position would be abandoned when-
ever (the line being run, and the true limits marked) the dis-
turbances in that region should cease.
40
This seems to show clearly that Jackson intended and expected
Games to advance to Nacogdoches under his orders (then prepar-
ing) of April 25. This view is, in fact, almost forced on us by
Jackson's later expression of chagrin at Gaines' failure to advance
promptly to Nacogdoches to occupy the territory he claimed: "I
have very little doubt but Genl Gaines wishes were to give the
possession to Texas that their claim might be strengthened . . .
because he was ordered at first to take a position as far advanced
as Nacogdoches, but he did not, and by a late order was directed
to occupy it, neither Texas nor Mexico being in possession, and
there keep our Indians at peace and sustain our neutrality."
41
General Gaines, though not over-anxious to accept the respon-
sibility of crossing the Sabine at Jackson's equivocal invitation,
was apparently ready, long before he received his orders of April
25, to aid the Texans, if they were reduced to the last extremity,
by protecting the "disputed" territory. Early in April, on his
way to confer with Gaines, the Texan Secretary of State, S. P.
Carson (also a one-time friend of Jackson's, when Congressman
from North Carolina), heard a rumor that Gaines had already
sent a battalion of troops to the Neches: "I
believe it to be true.
General Gaines is there and doubtless my letter by Parmer had
the desired effect. Jackson will protect the neutral ground." On
April 13, after reaching Gaines at Natchitoches, Carson reported
"a full and satisfactory
conversation. His position at present is
a delicate one ... to protect the frontier and neutral ground,
and also to keep the Indians in check."
42 Carson himself favored
Houston's policy of retreat, writing the General on April 14:
"My view is, that you should fall back, if necessary,
to the Sabine.
I am warranted in saying that volunteer troops will come on in
number from the United States. . . . You must fall back,
and hold out, and let nothing goad or provoke you to battle, un-
less you can, without
doubt,
whip them, or unless you are com-
pelled to fight."
43 Just before the unexpected battle at San
Jacinto Gaines was telling the Americans who were crossing the
Sabine to join the Texan army that the American boundary was
the Neches.
44 Had the Texans retreated further and drawn Santa
Anna into the "neutral" territory Gaines would doubtless have
engaged the Mexicans.
It was almost the general belief of contemporaries that Jackson
deliberately intended through Gaines to bring on war with Mex-
ico to save the Texans; and in view of the circumstances above
seen it can hardly be doubted that such indeed was his secret
design, despite his many professions of neutrality and despite his
(rather unsuccessful) attempt to repudiate Gaines after San
Jacinto and shift upon Gaines the public odium which attached
to his own unneutral policy and instructions.
45 Even Jackson's
mouthpiece, Blair's Washington Globe,
defended Jackson's bound-
ary claim and instructions to Gaines very vaguely and evasively,
on May 12, 1836, while loudly denouncing as "pro-Mexican" and
"foreign in all its aspects" the public criticism of Jackson's policy
and conduct.
Gaines was justly wroth at Jackson's inconsistent conduct towards
him, not appreciating being made Jackson's scapegoat.
46 The
President's anger at Gaines was not owing to the General's ad-
vance to Nacogdoches in June-July, 1836,
47 but apparently to the
fact that Gaines instead of advancing much earlier had only "let
the cat out of the bag" (as Gaines later expressed it, in review
of the matter) by calling, even as his orders authorized him, upon
the governors of several western states for a vast army, too
plainly exposing an unneutral intention. The instructions sent
Gaines by Jackson had intentionally been most equivocal, encour-
aging him to aggression upon Mexico and at the same time being
so worded as to leave the government free to repudiate him with
show of virtue if he advanced.
48 In that respect as in others this
southwestern border episode bears a remarkable resemblance to
that of 1845-46, which brought on the Mexican War.
49 This
would suggest that President Polk consciously followed the pat-
tern set by his predecessor and former patron.
The Texan victory at San Jacinto put an end to Jackson's and
Gaines' immediate expectation of joining war with Mexico. Even
if that unexpected event had not intervened, the ambitious Gaines
was far too hopeful if he fancied that he would become the great
hero of a Mexican war, and the "Second Cortez." (General Jack-
son had no love or consideration for Gaines or for any other of the
professional military leaders of his day, among whom a most intense
mutual jealousy reigned.) Gaines' anger at Jackson for his unjust
treatment would have been greater still had he known that his
chief part in the prospective war with Mexico would have been
limited to serving usefully as Jackson's cat's-paw in provoking
it! For the supreme command and conduct of the expected war
President Jackson had privately determined to place in the hands
of Colonel Thomas H. Benton, his one-time military aid and now
faithful and powerful political lieutenant in the Senate. As a
means of ensuring the fulfilment of Jackson's well-known pro-
gram for the "line of succession"—Van Buren after Jackson and
then Benton for two terms in the White House--this appoint-
ment was exceedingly well conceived.
50 It is worth noting Ben-
ton's remarks in the Senate in defense of the war that seemed
impending in consequence of the President's orders to Gaines.
Benton spoke on May 4, 1836,
at the most critical moment of the contest, and when the reported
advance of the Mexicans upon Nacogdoches, and the actual move-
ment of General Games and our own troops in that direction,
gave reason to apprehend the encounter of flags, or the collision
of arms. . . . It was then that I used those words . . .
that there might be emergencies in which the obligation of duty
[of neutrality] could have no force . . . when, in fact, a
man should have no head to think! nothing but a heart to feel!
and an arm to strike. . . . It was after the affair of Goliad,
and the imputed order to unpeople the country. . . . I de-
clared it to be my sentiment that treaties were nothing, books
were nothing, laws were nothing! . . . and that the Ameri-
can soldier, hearing the cries of helplessness and weakness [of
the Texans] . . . should fly to the rescue, and strike to pre-
vent the perpetration of crimes which shock humanity and dis-
honor the age. I uttered this sentiment not upon impulsion, but
with consideration . . . as a rule for action . . . and
with a view to the public justification of General Gaines and his
men, if under circumstances appalling to humanity, they should
nobly resolve to obey the impulsions of the heart.
51
The history of the Neches claim came to an end in Decem-
ber, 1836, when Jackson withdrew the American troops from
Nacogdoches, apparently no longer feeling the need of asserting
it. When the United States and the Eepublic of Texas ran the
boundary in 1840 the joint-commissioners readily agreed that the
Neches was not the Sabine.
52
FOOTNOTES:
An Excursion Through the United States and Canada During the Years
1822-23, By an English Gentleman (London, 1824). A facsimile of the
map was reproduced in National Intelligencer (Washington), August 6,
1836, to refute President Jackson.
boundary pretension, in 1836: "The boundary set up by our Government
in the place of the Sabine, contrary to the treaty, contrary to all the maps,
and to the continued assertions of Louisiana, is something entirely new
to me. . . . I never heard of another Sabine; nor did it ever enter
into the head of any one, while I was in Louisiana, to claim the post of
Nacogdoches excepting under the general pretension to the whole as far
as the Rio del Norte, which was abandoned by the treaty. I think the
case too plain even for the pretense of claim." Brackenridge's letter,
August 1, 1836, in National Intelligencer, August 24, 1836.
Samuel Swartwout, December 30, 1840, quoted in Southwestern Social
Science Quarterly, XV, 241 note; G. W. Featherstonehaugh, Excursion
Through the Slave States (London, 1844), II, 155.
rivers, Pichardo concludes: "In view of this can we not say quot capita
tot sentie" --or, more correctly, "quot homines, tot sententiae," i. e., as
many opinions as men. C. W. Hackett, ed., Pichardo's Treatise on the
Limits of Louisiana and Texas, I, 378-379, 397-402. A number of the old
Spanish maps may be found in Professor Hackett's work and in H. E.
Bolton's Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century. Fray Puelles wrote a
Texas boundary question (published as a pamphlet in Mexico in 1828;
reprinted in Louisiana Historical Quarterly, I, 21-43), in which he speaks
of the "Sabinas or Mexican River" some leagues east of Nacogdoches.
Jedidiah Morse, in his American Gazetteer (Boston, 1804), also evidently
refers to the Sabine when he speaks of the "Mexicano River or Adayes, in
Louisiana," for he adds: "Fort Adayes stands on its north-eastern side,
20 miles from Natchitoches."
origin of the name of the later short-lived "Fredonian Republic" in Texas,
that Morse in the 1804 edition of his American Gazetteer (Introduction
and Appendix) suggested and argued at length for "Fredonia" as a new
and more suitable name for the United States, a "generic name" which
"shall honourably distinguish our country from the rest of the world,"
being more eloquent of our political principles than "America" or
"Columbia."
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, X, 507.
Alleine Howren in this Quarterly, XVI, 400.
MSS., in the University of Texas Archives.
1827: "I have been into Texas, and have a long letter to write you on
the soil climate and local advantages of that country—It must belong to
the United States; and I hope that it may be one of the acts of your
administration to obtain it for us." Jackson MSS., Vol. 67, in Library
of Congress.
App. 128.
Kendall: "We contend, from the words and spirit of the treaty, that
all the navigable waters of the Sabine belong to the United States . . .
and as I am advised will be able to show from the ancient map of Spain
that the western branch . . . was known by the name of the Sabine
at the time Louisiana was ceded. . . . We have been anxious to
run this line for a long time." J. S. Bassett, ed., The Correspondence of
Andrew Jackson, V, 420.
of Jackson, IV, 185.
Treaties, Conventions, . . . between the United States and Other
Powers, I, 1082-85. The Florida treaty may be found in Am. State Pap.,
For. Rel, IV, 623.
25, 1832, in Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, IV, 390, 409-410. Jack-
son's instructions to Poinsett of August, 1829, above noted, show that he
was well aware of Saibine Bay, and it is difficult to believe that he hon-
estly came to think that the Neches and Sabine joined to form one river.
True, we have only too many astonishing illustrations on record of Jack-
son's "irrepressible ignorance" in geographical matters . (see, e. g., C. F.
Adams, ed., The Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, VIII, 324, and Bassett,
Correspondence of Jackson, IV, 60 and note); but as to Texas topography
we have it on Poinsett's authority that Jackson was well posted. Poin-
sett, who on his return from Mexico conversed with Jackson early in
1830, tells us of the President's anxiety to obtain Texas: "He appeared
perfectly acquainted with Mexican affairs, and enquired earnestly of
Texas . . . what prospect there was of our acquiring that Territory
by purchase. He seemed much disappointed when I replied that there
was not the remotest probability of our doing so; that the Mexicans were
a proud people, and would never consent to sell one foot of their terri-
tory: that I had not made the offer officially, because I had ascertained
that such a proposal would not only be rejected, but would be regarded
as an insult." Poinsett spoke of the revolutionary feeling in Texas and
of his conviction that its revolt and annexation to the United States
were "inevitable," and declared that "the Americans in Texas, although
they would loyally fulfil their compact with the Mexican Government,
would not submit to any violation of it; and that, sooner or later, cir-
cumstances would force them into our Confederation. On hearing this,
the General took down an enormous map of that country . . . and
pouring over its bays, rivers and mountains, he pointed out the impor-
tance of its acquisition, exhibiting throughout all his observations an
intimate and even minute acquaintance with the advantages and resources
of that country, and showing that he had examined the whole subject
and every circumstance connected with it, with careful solicitude." Ora -
tion on the Life and Character of Andrew Jackson, Delivered on the 4th
of July, 1845, by J. R. Poinsett, at Greenville, S. C. (1845), 6-7.
of Texas are given in the writer's papers, "Jackson, Anthony Butler, and
Texas" and "The Texas Schemes, of Jackson and Houston, 1829-1836," in
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XIII, 264-286; XV, 229-250.
son, IV, 436.
to Butler, of September 4, 1832, and November 27, 1833, in Ibid., IV, 472;
V, 229-230. In that of November 27, 1833, Jackson writes that he must
soon be told if the desired boundary (ceding all or a large part of Texas)
could not be obtained, so "we may proceed to make one ourselves . . .
and take possession of Nachedages."
Republic of Texas, 32, 82-83.
Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, I, 489.
Jackson wrote his adopted son on December 19, 1832, that he has nomi-
nated John Donelson as a commissioner, but that "from the convulsed
state of Mexico, it may be a long time before he is called upon to perform
this duty." Jackson MSS. J. Gutierrez wrote Van Buren, May 29, 1834
(in Van Buren MSS., in Library of Congress), that the Mexican charge
at Washington "complained to his government ... of the difficulties
or delays opposed by the cabinet of Washington to bringing the negotia-
tion to a conclusion." The writer is indebted to Professor E. C. Barker
for a copy of Gutierrez's letter.
han, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations, 72; Callahan in-
cludes the part of Butler's dispatch which was expurgated from the dis-
patch as published in the congressional documents.
March 7, 1834, in Anthony Butler MSS., in the University of Texas
Archives and in the Texas State Library Archives; Southwestern Social
Science Quarterly, XIII, 277-278.
versity of Texas transcripts from the Mexican Archives. This fact was
called to the writer's attention by Professor Barker.
ably broached this ex parte declaration of "neutral territory" orally to
Mexico so that the matter should not appear too plainly in black and
white in the public records. See Castillo's correspondence with Forsyth,
October, 1835, to March, 1836, in Ibid., 6-30.
No. 190, pp. 85-87.
Houston above cited, note 14, see the writer's "Jackson, Buchanan, and the
'Corrupt Bargain' Calumny," in Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Bi -
ography, LVIII, 61-85, where a probable forgery made by Jackson is indi-
cated (p. 61 note). The writer has in preparation an extensive critique
of Jackson's career.
ter of December 10, 1830, have all the appearances of being mere hoaxes,
in the writer's opinion. See Southwestern Social Science Quarterly XIII,
265-266; XV, 230-239.
Wise, Seven Decades of the Union, 148-152. Claiborne's testimony, from
personal knowledge, that William M. Gwin, Jackson's friend and Marshall
of Mississippi, visited Houston at Nacogdoches at Jackson's instance "and
that the great programme was then planned which was subsequently fol-
lowed as closely as events permitted," is corroborated by a memoir in the
Gwin MSS. in California archives, which records Gwin's visit to Hous-
ton soon after his visit with Jackson at the Hermitage. C. R. Wharton,
Texas under Many Flags (1930), I, 430. Another Mississippi protege of
Jackson's, Robert J. Walker, whom Jackson supported in his senatorial
campaign against George Poindexter, was declaring in speeches in the
fall of 1835 that Texas was an integral part of the Union under the
Louisiana Purchase. See Mississippian (Jackson), September 25, 1835.
Slacum. Also noteworthy is Aaron Leggett's letter to Marcy of October
16, 1846: "The Mexican Government, through General Tornel, Secy, at
War, agreed while I was there in 1835-6 to settle my claims on Mexico
by a grant of a great portion of the best part of Upper California. This
agreement which I sent home to Mr. Forsyth was frustrated, and, as I
believe, through English influence. . . . I have looked to California
as the best means that Mexico had of paying our claims and I advised
Mr. Forsyth in 1835 to seize upon that whole country to pay them."
California Historical Quarterly, XI, 34.
Coleman, Houston Displayed, or, Who Won the Battle of San Jacinto
(Velasco, 1837), 13-14; W. R. Hogan, "Pamelia Mann: Texas Frontiers-
woman," in The Southwest Review (Dallas), XX, 361-362; J. J. Linn,
Reminiscences of Fifty Years in Texas (New York, 1883), 252.
sity of Texas Archives. Houston added: "Col Rusk is here ... He
proves himself a Patriot and a soldier."
Register (Columbia), September 6, 1836.
Houston's intention of retreating to the "disputed" territory in South -
western Social Science Quarterly, XV, 248-249, note. To these should be
added: Mosely Baker to Houston, December, 1844, MS. in Texas State
Library (copy in University of Texas Archives), published in part by
Professor Barker in Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association,
IV, 273-287; R. M. Potter, "The San Jacinto Campaign," in Magazine of
American History, IV (New York, 1880), 321-350; R. M. Potter and R. J.
Calder, in ibid., VIII, Pt. 1 (1882), 55-59; D. G. Wooten, A Compre -
hensive History of Texas, I, 272; Biographical Encyclopedia of Texas
(New York, 1880), 172; H. Smither, ed., The Papers of M. B. Lamar,
IV, 68-69, 290-292; A. H. Dana to Swartwout, March 24, 1849, in Swart-
wout MSS., in the University of Texas Archives.
May 30, 1836. Italics in original.
Jackson, V, 381-382. This letter of Butler's was read by R. J. Walker in
the Senate on May 9, 1836, as an argument for the immediate recogni-
tion of Texas. Cong. Globe, 24 cong., 1 sess., 436-437; a more detailed
account of Walker's reading of the Butler letter, and the effect produced,
is given by a Washington correspondent in National Gazette (Phila.),
May 12, 1836. A German gentleman, who, at Mexico City at the time,
was informed of Santa Anna's declarations by the British Minister, visited
New Orleans later, and there gave out the substance of Santa Anna's
threatening remarks in terms practically identical with Butler's report
of them. See El Correo Atlantico (New Orleans), May 2, 1836. Cf.
Santa Anna's similar comment on the boundary matter in dispatch of
February 16, 1836, to the Mexican Secretary of War, in C. E. Castañeda,
ed., The Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution, 69.
1 sess., No. 256, pp. 40-41, 43-44.
Jackson, V, 420-421. Cf. Jackson's endorsement on his copy of Acting
Secretary Asbury Dickens to Gorostiza, August 1, 1836: "The answer is
proper--Mr Gorostiza is well advised that Texas claims her independ-
ence and sets up a claim by conquest, to the eastern branch of the
sabine when we claim the western navigable branch--we are ready to
run this boundary line and Mr Gorostiza is well assured of the motives
we have in taking possession of this disputed territory, not to injure
Mexico, as he is assured, when the line is run, if we are west of our
boundary, we will withdraw our troops." Jackson MSS., Vol. 95.
284-286; and may be found also in other Texas histories.
II, 169 note; italics in Yoakum.
iscences," in Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, IV, 168.
San Jacinto arrived, were full of indignation at Santa Anna and scarcely
veiled threats against Mexico. See Yoakum, History of Texas, II, 169-170;
Washington correspondents writing on April 14 and May 4, in El Correo
Atlantico (New Orleans), May 2, 30, 1836; New Orleans Bulletin, May
28, 1836. Cf. Correspondence of Jackson, V, 419.
Natchitoches, September 2, in National Intelligencer, October 12, 1836;
letter written by one of Gaines' young officers, in Washington (Globe,
April 5, 1837 (from Mobile Advertiser, November 11, 1836); Gaines to
Secretary Marcy, September 10, 1845, in Sen. Docs., 29 cong., 1 sess.,
No. 378, p. 40.
ter of July 18, 1836: "We expect to hear of some hard fighting in Texas
soon--I am still convinced that nothing but force, and that of a number
and description rendering it disposable and imposing, will preserve this
frontier and the disputed territory from assault." Quoted from the
Charleston Courier in El Correo Atlantico, August 15, 1836. Cf. Gaines
"to the officer commanding the U. S. troops at or near Nacogdoches," July
10, 1836, explaining the advance as based on Jackson's instructions, in
National Intelligencer, August 10, 1836. The Texans were in fear of a
renewal of the war by Mexico, which fact caused Gaines to cross the
Sabine.
Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 144 ff.
1845," in Pacific Historical Review, IV, 39-68.
army against Mexico--General Jackson himself proposed it in 1836, when
our affairs with that country looked warlike, and then, as now, I agreed
to take it," Benton says, in a speech in the Senate, January 25, 1847, on
the Lieutenant-General bill. Cong. Globe, 29 cong., 2 sess., 247.
son's policy was made by Senator Garland of Louisiana in his speech of
May 7, 1836, in Ibid., XII, Pt. III, 3530-3540.
How to cite:
Richard R. Stenberg, "Jackson's Neches Claim, 1829-1836", Volume 39, Number 4, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v039/n4/contrib_DIVL3270.html
[Accessed Sat Jul 4 16:24:26 CDT 2009]
