ALMONTE'S INSPECTION OF TEXAS IN 1834
The inspection of Texas, made by Colonel Juan N. Almonte in
1834, had its origin in a decree issued by Vice-President Busta-
mante, of Mexico, on April 6, 1830. Article 3 of this decree stated:
The government shall name one or more commissioners to visit
the colonies of the frontier States, . . . to make arrangements
which they consider advisable for the security of the Republic,
with the colonies already established; to watch over the exact
compliance of contracts on the entrance of new colonists; and to
investigate how far the contracts already made have been com-
plied with.
1
It would have been too much to hope that two peoples as funda-
mentally different in racial and political background as the Anglo-
American and the Mexican could long live together in harmony
despite the conscientious efforts of such a leader as Stephen F.
Austin to further mutual cooperation and good feeling. In addi-
tion to the dislike and distrust of each people for the other,
specific causes of misunderstanding were not lacking, such as the
Fredonian rebellion, which looked like treason to Mexico; the
Texans' evasion, by the introduction of "contract labor," of the
Coahuila constitutional provision forbidding further importation
of slaves; and President Guerrero's proclamation of 1829 which
freed all slaves on Mexican soil and made Texans, although soon
declared exempt, feel that the federal government was not inter-
ested in their welfare. The same decre of April 6, 1830, which
manifested Mexican suspicion of Anglo-American Texas by au-
thorizing an inspection of the province, contained other terms which
further tended to estrange those settlers. This law, although gen-
eral in form, could only have been drafted with Texas in mind,
for the clauses which those settlers found most objectionable were:
(1) the restrictions regarding the importation of slaves as listed
in the Imperial Colonization Law of January 4, 1823, were re-
peated; (2) emigrants were not to be allowed to settle in any
province adjoining their native land; and (3) provision was made
for the establishment of military posts in Texas, so situated as
to guard most of the normal entrances.
2 The Texans resentfully
insisted that this law arrested the development of the territory
and prevented the reunion of families, and their resentment was
increased by the fact that the concession made to Austin in 1823
allowing the free importation of agricultural and household neces-
sities for a seven-year period would expire in September, 1830.
The next three years saw the gulf of misunderstanding between
Mexico and her liberty-loving Anglo-American citizens rapidly
widen. The Velasco incident occurred in June, 1832; Colonel
Mexia hastened to Texas with 400 troops the following month;
and the second San Felipe convention, meeting in April, 1833,
framed a constitution for the "State of Texas" and adopted peti-
tions asking for congressional approval of the constitution and
for a reform of the judicial system of Texas. Austin, who had
been selected to present the petitions, had been discouraged by
the delays which he had encountered in Mexico and, in tem-
porary despondency, had written to the ayuntamiento
of San
Antonio to urge it to take the lead in establishing a state gov-
ernment separate from that of Coahuila. This was the letter
which had led the government of Santa Anna, the Federalist
President, to arrest Austin at Saltillo on January 4, 1834, as
he was returning to Texas. This demand of Texas for statehood;
the radical attitude shown by the usually conservative and trust-
worthy Austin; the dissatisfaction manifested by Texas with the
Law of April 6; the insistence of that province that the tariff
exemptions conceded by the law under which Austin's colony had
been settled should be extended for a longer period; and the
rapidity with which the Anglo-American population of the province
was increasing made Mexico realize that her sovereignty was in
danger and that the inspection could no longer be postponed.
The Mexican government made a happy choice when it selected
Colonel Almonte to make the inspection of Texas, as this son of
Morelos had spent his youth ond obtained his education in the
United States. He spoke English fluently, and he already had
many points of contact with Texas, having begun his public
career by serving upon the staff of Iturbide's representative,
Governor Trespalacios. One of his best recommendations for the
post was that Austin knew him, counted him among his friends,
and had a high respect for his ability and integrity. The letter
from the Minister of Foreign Relations to Almonte, covering the
instructions relative to the commission entrusted to him; one set
of public instructions; and two sets of private instructions are
to be found in the Mexican National Archives. The covering
letter is dated January 17, 1834. Unquestionably the public in-
structions were issued at the same time, but, as both sets are
undated, it is impossible to determine which of the two sets of
private instructions accompanied the covering letter and which
was drawn up at a later time. It is barely possible that the set
bearing the most corrections and changes shows the evolution of
the designs of the government, and that it served as an outline
by which the other set was drafted, the authoritative copy having
been completed by January 17, 1834.
The covering letter suggested that Almonte show the public
instructions to the colonists in order that they might know
the official views of the government and its interest in their
welfare. The Minister also wished it made clear to the colonists
that the political disturbances in Mexico had previously pre-
vented the government from putting into practice the measures
which seemed opportune, now that peace was reestablished, and
that it was most earnestly desirous of improving their condition
and offered them the protection and guarantees which had been
so long desired. He was to say that nothing would be overlooked
which might contribute to their well-being. In conclusion, the
Minister said that the Vice-President, on entrusting such an
important commission to Almonte, had taken into consideration
his patriotism and ability, and that it was anticipated that the
inspection would have the most satisfactory results, putting an
end "to the fears which, not without foundation, have existed
concerning the situation in the colonies of Texas."
3
The public instructions ordered Almonte to make known to
the colonists that his commission authorized him to listen to their
complaints and to report them to the supreme government. He
was to assure them that the executive department had had a bill
initiated in the Chambers asking that the section called "Tejas"
be erected into a territory, and that this business was expected
to be concluded during the regular session of Congress. The
government had been unable to recommend the erection of Texas
into a state because it lacked the population required by the
constitution, but felt that territorial status would enable it better
to attend to the needs of the inhabitants, since the state govern-
ment of Coahuila and Texas had been careless of their welfare.
Territorial standing would give them a legislature elected by
themselves, their jefe
político
and other local authorities, and a
representative in the national congress. The government, realizing
that Almonte would be questioned concerning Austin and his
imprisonment, instructed him to say that Austin had been arrested
because he was accused of wishing to incite the colonists to rebel-
lion, but that it was thought he would soon be cleared of the
charge and released. As was to be expected, Almonte was given
wide discretionary powers, this being necessitated by the distance
of the colony and the possibility of conditions changing rapidly.
Therefore, as Secretary Lombardo said, he was to make any other
explanations which might be necessary, the supreme government
trusting in his integrity "and hoping that he will be able to
reconcile the interests of the colonists with those of the republic
of which they form an integral part."
4
Mention has already been made of the uncertainty resulting
from the existence of two sets of private instructions. It has
seemed advisable to discuss the most interlined set first, as mention
is made in it of several subjects which are not found in the
unmarked copy. For example, Almonte is instructed to make
certain that all wandering Indian tribes know that the Mexican
government is "disposed to admit them as an integral part of
the Federation," being willing to grant them lands in full owner-
ship and to lend them assistance in agriculture and commerce,
providing that they permanently establish themselves and build
their homes in the places in which they might be or that were
designated to them.
The section referring to slaves shows most careful consideration.
Almonte is to endeavor "by all possible and prudent means" to
bring to the attention of the slaves who had been introduced into
Texas in violation of the law "that the fact of having put foot
on the territory of the republic gives them freedom, and that
the supreme government and the authorities will declare them
free the moment that they invoke the protection of the law of
April 6, 1830, ... but Señor Almonte is prohibited under the
severest penalty from insinuating such a thing to the slaves that
have not been introduced into the republic."
5 Free people of
color, the term being used to include negroes, mulattoes, quarterns,
and various other degrees of racial blending, were to be guar-
anteed in their property and industrial rights and were to be made
to understand that their color, origin, or place of birth would not
disqualify them for official positions.
It seems clear that these instructions must have been in Almonte's
possession at some time. In them he is told to draw up separate
reports upon the following subjects: (1) the state in which he
found Coahuila and the best means for making its government
respected and obeyed in Texas; (2) the condition of Texas; and
(3) the Indian tribes, special attention being paid to the opinions
of each tribe and its chief, the means by which the tribes sus-
tained themselves, and the resources upon which they counted.
These orders were carefully followed by Almonte, and many de-
tailed reports were rendered upon each of these three subjects as
well as upon numerous other things which came under his keen
and critical observation.
6
The unmarked set of private instructions shows with startling
clearness the fear that Mexico felt for her sovereignty over her
rebellious and well-beloved province of Texas. This underlying
spirit of fear can best be grasped by quoting the instructions in
their entirety:
1. Sr. Almonte will successively visit all of the colonies; he
will inform himself as to the state of opinion; he will classify the
parties which there may be in each of them; he will carefully draw
up a report of the number of inhabitants and the degree of pros-
perity in which they are found, making special mention of loca-
tion and products.
2. As soon as it may be possible he will inform the government
which are the most populous places in the colonies and which can
offer the greatest resistance if the affair must be settled by force
[si
llega
el
caso
de
obrar
por
la
fuerza].
3. He will report the number of fighting men, more or less,
upon which the colonists might be able to count in the event of
necessity; and he will also give a report of the arms and munitions
which they may have at their disposal.
4. He will inform himself as to the most important men in
the colonies.
5. He will place himself in communication with the consular
agent in Natchitoches, with the Consul at New Orleans, with the
Charge d'Affaires in Washington, with the Commandant General
of the Provincias Internas and with the boundary commissioners
of said Commandancy General if that should be convenient.
6. Upon arrival at the Mexican settlements, as San Antonio
de Béxar, Bahía del Espíritu Santo and Nacogdoches, he will
investigate the condition of those settlements and will report upon
the condition in which they are found, as to population, resources
and soldiers upon which they may count for defense.
7. Sr. Almonte will offer the special protection of the govern-
ment to the colonists who are attached to it and shall even flatter
their ambition by promising them further grants of land.
8. Sr. Almonte shall attempt by as many means as may be
at his disposal to paralyze the movements of the colonists, with
the view of gaining time so that the supreme government, unbur-
dened by the cares with which it today finds itself surrounded, may
be able to dedicate all of its endeavors to the conservation of the
integrity of the territory of the republic.
9. As one of the reasons which must be advanced for Texas
not being made into a state is that it does not have the population
which the constitution requires, it may happen that the colonists
will answer that it does have it, and in this event Sr. Almonte
should find an excellent opportunity to gain time by saying that
he has orders from the government to ascertain if actually there is
or is not the required population, and by making an inspection of
each place, he will be able to waste all of the time which seems
prudent so as not to give rise to suspicions.
10. Finally, Sr. Almonte is authorized to do and promise
everything which is in the power of the supreme government and
which it can rightly grant, and of his Excellency, the Vice-
President, etc.
11. If the colonists wish to know anything about Sr. Austin,
Sr. Almonte will answer that he has only been arrested on account
of having been accused of having instigated a revolution in the
colonies against the supreme government, but that it is hoped that
he will clear himself, proving his innocence.
12. The purpose of his commission concluded, Sr. Almonte will
return to this capital and will make an oral report to the supreme
government, notwithstanding that he shall previously have made
one in writing from Texas.
7
Almonte reached New Orleans on his way to Texas on February
27, 1834. He was delayed a month in that city while measures
were taken to investigate reports that Austin's arrest would cause
the colonists to rise in arms and that there would be reprisals in
Béxar, Goliad, and Monclova, in which places there were no gar-
risons to oppose them. Regarding the business which had been
entrusted to him as being of the greatest importance, Almonte
considered it to be his duty to work with prudence so, in spite of
his personal preference to go direct to Galveston, he decided to
go to Natchitoches, from which point he could communicate with
his intimate friend, Colonel Bean, while correspondents in New
Orleans were investigating the sentiment in Texas. That plan
would enable him to obtain information from two different sources.
8
Ten days after his arrival at Natchitoches, Almonte reported to
the Secretary of Foreign Eelations that Austin's imprisonment
had not caused the alarm which had been feared; moreover, that
Austin had been censured by the colonists and judged imprudent;
and that this belief was based upon information from the interior
of Texas as well as upon that from Nacogdoches and from impres-
sions gained at Natchitoches. Therefore, he took a more hopeful
view of the situation, but still felt the imperative need of adequate
garrisons for Texas. His analysis of the situation was that the
Mexican authority could yet be maintained in the colonies pro-
vided 2,000 men were sent within four months, one section of
the force to disembark in Galveston or Brazoria and the other
to come by land to Béxar. Emigration from the United States
was increasing daily, and it could only be stopped by the presence
of troops.
9
More alarming news of which no record is available must have
reached Almonte almost immediately because the very next day
he recommended that two of the best battalions in active service
be sent to Texas without delay. One of them should embark at
Vera Cruz or Matamoras by the month of June, sail to New
Orleans under some pretext, ask permission to ascend the river
in steamships to Natchitoches (which permission Almonte thought
would be granted because of treaty arrangements), and pass from
there to Nacogdoches. This would enable the troops to be in
Nacogdoches within two months from the date of embarkation
and would be of value in two ways: it "would give an advan-
tageous idea of our power to these people [of Louisiana] who
regard us as capable of nothing . . .," and it would impress
the colonists with the belief that the government of the United
States was in accord with that of Mexico in maintaining order
in Texas. Since high waters commenced in Louisiana and Texas in
December and lasted until April, the troops must be on their
way by the coming June, or an entire year must elapse before
the move could be undertaken, and then, perhaps, it would be
useless. The other battalion should be sent at the same time to
Anahuac by way of Galveston. Almonte considered it desirable,
moreover, that two warships cruise between Galveston and Mata-
moras and that additional troops be sent to San Antonio. He
was convinced that the security of Texas would not be seriously
threatened for a long time if these steps were taken as he sug-
gested, but urged that there be no delay.
10
The true character of Almonte's mission was not known in
Natchitoches, and he was taken to be one of the boundary com-
missioners from Mexico. He cleverly allowed the mistake to go
uncorrected since it aided him in investigating the attitude of
the people and gave him a degree of authority in correcting
boundary disputes adverse to Mexico, as well as the belief that
Mexico was indifferent in regard to her frontier. One American
faction actually contended that the Neches instead of the Sabine
was the true boundary, basing its amazing argument on the tra-
dition that the Neches had been called the Sabine in earlier days
because the sabine [cypress] trees abounded on its banks, whereas
none of those trees were to be found on the banks of the Sabine in
1834. Therefore, the Neches was the true Sabine! Another faction,
however, opposed this attitude because it endangered land titles
held under Mexico.
11
The dissatisfaction with the treaty boundary between the two
republics which Almonte had encountered in Natchitoches was
even more noticeable in Nacogdoches upon his arrival there on
April 27, 1834. More credence was daily being given to the
rumor that new negotiations were to be entered into, in which
case the pretensions of the United States would be advanced to
the Neches River. This fear of possible territorial encroachment
led Almonte to recommend that a weekly mail service be estab-
lished between Nacogdoches and the Sabine, to connect with that
already being operated by the United States between the Sabine
and Natchitoches. Commercial as well as political gains would
result, but the greatest advantage of all would be the facility
with which authentic news could be transmitted, thus counter-
acting the erroneous reports that were constantly being circulated
among the lower classes by political malcontents.
12
A more cheerful aspect of the situation was encountered where
it was least expected. Almonte was astonished at the state of
abandonment in which he found the frontier and considered it
surprising that land speculators had not realized their project of
separation from Mexico. After the enforced withdrawal of Colonel
Piedras in January, 1832, following the Velasco episode, Colonel
Pedro Elias Bean was the sole person with military authority
remaining in Nacogdoches, and "only his good offices and pres-
tige . . . conserved order in this part of our territory in which
a soldier has not been seen for almost two years." That was
possible simply because the national government did have reliable
friends among the numerous Anglo-American settlers; wisdom,
however, dictated the assignment of troops to the frontier for the
security of the settlement and the support of the civil authority.
13
The impartiality and honesty of the Commissioner's inspection
is evidenced time and again. The privilege granted to the Texans
by a decree of May 19, 1832, which had provided for the duty-
free admittance of certain enumerated articles, expired shortly
after Almonte's arrival at Nacogdoches. He felt that the devel-
opment of the country necessitated the continuance of this policy
for at least four more years and even advised important additions
to the free list, including iron implements, steel tools, carts, wagons,
household and kitchen equipment, thick sacking for baling cotton,
and cords for the same purpose.
14 It is interesting to note that
these recommendations encompassed the very things for which the
conventions of 1832 and 1833 had petitioned.
The Indian problem constantly held a prominent place in
Almonte's thoughts throughout the entire period of the inspec-
tion. Many members of the Chacta tribe had already entered
Texas from the United States, and others also desired permission
to settle. Almonte recommended that such permission be granted,
believing that Mexico could place no better barrier before the
pretensions of the North Americans than the Chacta. Not only
did he regard them as good warriors and excellent riflemen and
agriculturalists; he believed that the treatment they had received
at the hands of the United States would make them invaluable
allies. Two other tribes were also desirous of settling, even offering
in return to make war upon the Comanches, enemies of all races
and tribes. The Commissioner felt that the national government
should award land to the Chacta and should take advantage of
every opportunity to secure friendly and industrious settlers and
a strong militia, whose only cost would be the ammunition used
and some inexpensive and occasional gifts. This was preferable
to allowing the states to attempt to subject them to the restrictions
applied to white settlers without regard to the fact that their lack of
civilization made it impossible for them to comprehend coloniza-
tion requirements.
15
A most interesting conference was held about forty miles north-
east of Nacogdoches on June 1, between Almonte, accompanied
by Colonel Bean, and some five hundred members of the Cherokee,
Choni, Kikapoo, Creek, Delaware, Chacta, and Nacogdoches tribes.
The plaint of the Chief of the Cherokees was that Mexico had
failed to allocate permanently lands to his people in conformity
with a promise made eight years earlier, and that consequently
they were exposed to the danger of being despoiled of their cul-
tivated lands by the Anglo-Americans, who had secured grants
from the state governments. Almonte diplomatically allayed the
fears of the Indians by assuring them that their welfare was a
matter of concern to the government, and that his visit was an
indication of the interest which Mexico and the President felt in
them. Rather naively he reported: "They seemed well satisfied."
Estimating that the membership of the aforesaid tribes on Texas
soil totaled 3,400 in 1834, Almonte concluded his report of the
conference by submitting a farsighted recommendation to the
Mexican government. He advised that these tribes be settled,
but not in the manner used with the white settlers; rather, that
they be assigned lands whose limits were marked by natural
features, such as rivers or hills, because they could understand
no other delineation.
16
As had been anticipated by the ministry when Almonte's instruc-
tions were drawn, the arrest and imprisonment of Austin had
important bearing upon the inspection of the province of Texas.
All evidence points to an agreeable relationship of long standing
between Austin and Almonte, but personal considerations neither
blinded Almonte to his duties as Mexican commissioner nor tem-
pered his recommendations. Nevertheless, it is pleasing to note
that Austin rightly placed confidence in the fairness of the inspector
and that their friendship was renewed after Almonte's return to
Mexico in the fall of 1834. In his earliest reports from Nacog-
doches, Almonte referred to the official reproof of Austin issued
by the ayuntamientos
of San Felipe, Brazoria, and Harrisburg.
How surprising it seems that Austin's innumerable services to
the province should have been so easily overlooked by those who
had benefited from them! This evident hostility of a group of
the colonists toward Austin caused Almonte to credit the rumor
that ten or twelve land speculators "associated with Austin" hoped
to erect Texas into a state so as to dispose of the lands advan-
tageously to themselves; but as the project had met with no
success they were now working to induce the United States to
buy Texas, hoping that a friendly reception of the proposal by
the government would secure many new land purchasers in the
United States.
17 About three weeks later Almonte learned that
these same ayuntamientos
of Brazoria, Harrisburg, and San Felipe
expected to petition formally the government for Austin's release.
Soon thereafter, that of Brazoria did solicit Almonte's intercession
in the matter. He was ignorant of the motive, but was inclined
to attribute it to fear that Austin might disclose the names of
those responsible for the revolutionary project and that they,
knowing themselves to be guilty, feared arrest upon the arrival
of the troops which everyone expected would soon be sent to the
frontier. Almonte felt that if Austin were liberated, it should
be only when troops could come to the frontier and when the
security of the territory was no longer in doubt; otherwise, such
leniency would be interpreted as a mark of weakness on the part
of the government and might encourage those who ordinarily
would not dare to sponsor the erection of Texas into a state.
18
At some time during his stay in Texas, Almonte collected some
anonymous letters bearing the signature "O. P. Q.", which with
good reason have been ascribed to Colonel Anthony Butler, the
American minister to Mexico.
19 It is unfortunate that specula-
tion in Texas lands, which was so closely connected with attempts
to induce the United States to purchase Texas or, that failing, to
seize it under some pretext, should have involved Butler. Although
Almonte was acquainted with the rumors that Butler was busy
stirring up revolutionary sentiment in Texas, which he hoped
might lead to annexation while his land claims were still pending,
the Mexican Commissioner at first found it impossible to believe
that the representative of a friendly power could so far forget
his duty as to write the "O. P. Q." letters. Among the least
offensive statements concerning Austin's arrest and the attitude
of the Mexican government we find:
It suffices that he is a native of the United States of America
for the hatred of this ignorant, fanatical and arrogant race to fall
upon him; moreover, he is an inhabitant of Texas and this must
increase and embitter that hatred. We may expect, therefore, to see
him treated with all the rigor that the cowards use when they can
do so with impunity. . . .
20
Continuing, "O. P. Q." sarcastically referred to the missions
entrusted to Almonte and to a land commissioner, Colonel Noriega,
as being intended to lull the Texans to sleep until Mexico had
the means to oppress them, because it was not the intention of the
government that they should ever be anything except slaves, and
he expressed the supposition that the colonists would allow the
Commissioners twenty-four hours in which to leave the country
or be hanged! Despite his original skepticism Almonte had become
convinced by July that Butler was the author of the seditious
letters and even believed that he might be acting on secret instruc-
tions. Consequently, he counselled Mexico to ask for Butler's
recall, basing this recommendation also upon the fact that Butler,
through holding some land in his own name, was subject to the
laws of the country and disqualified from serving as the diplomatic
representative of another nation.
21 We know, however, that Butler
was not recalled until the end of the following year, and then only
because of Jackson's displeasure with him.
Quarrels and dissensions in both the national government of
Mexico and that of the state of Coahuila and Texas greatly com-
plicated Almonte's mission and, at the same time, made such a
mission of inspection and understanding even more essential if
Texas were not to be lost to the federation. Santa Anna openly
adhered to Centralism and established his dictatorship in May,
1834, whereupon extreme Federalist opposition immediately mani-
fested itself and, to make matters yet worse, open strife devel-
oped between the two factions within the state of Coahuila and
Texas. For purely local reasons Monclova pronounced against
Santa Anna after Saltillo had declared itself favorable to him.
As Almonte justly feared that this factional strife might set fire
to the smouldering discontent of the Texans and transform it
into open rebellion, the warm welcome extended by the Austin
colonists upon his arrival in San Felipe on July 19 was an agree-
able surprise to the Commissioner, knowing as he did that there
had been talk earlier of arresting him and holding him as a hostage.
It seems to have given him real pleasure to report "that so far
there is no symptom of revolution in the colonies, and that pre-
viously its inhabitants were manifesting satisfaction with the
latest acts of the state and federal governments." Nevertheless,
Almonte recognized the danger latent in the situation, especially
as the troops which he had demanded so insistently from the
very beginning of his inspection could not be forthcoming now
that Santa Anna was confronted with a revolution. Altered con-
ditions made it seem advisable to Almonte that Austin should be
released, as that step would assist, at least temporarily, in main-
taining the peace.
22 Almonte further recommended that the
Supreme Government allow only a limited time for the state
factions to compose their differences and remove this pretext for
revolution from the colonists.
23
Almonte submitted to the ministry of Foreign Relations on
June 14, 1834, a formal report upon Texas which encompassed
the results of the inspection to that date and the conditions in
which he found the province.
24 This document, tucked away in
the archives of the Mexican government, has only recently become
available and, until this happened, the invaluable and unrivaled
source of information relative to Texas in 1834 was the Noticia
Estadística
sobre
Tejas
(Statistical Report on Texas), published
by Almonte in January, 1835.
25 As Almonte said in his intro-
duction, he had no intention of publishing such a report when
he returned to Mexico the preceding November because he had
not had time to become acquainted with the great wealth con-
tained in the vast territory of Texas and because, having made
the inspection as an agent of the government, he did not feel free
to make his findings public. However, so much interest had been
manifested in the province and so many questions asked regard-
ing it that he had asked for and obtained permission from the
government to publish the statistical data which had formed part
of his official reports.
Highly educated and cultured as he was, Almonte was always
intensely interested in advancing the cause of education. That
interest is clearly manifest in the printed Noticia
Estadística,
just as it was in his letters, which constantly advocated the
establishment of schools throughout the province. It dismayed
him to find that the one school which had formerly been main-
tained by the ayuntamiento
of Béxar had been forced to close
because of lack of funds, and that the department of Brazos had
only one, near Brazoria. The department of Nacogdoches was in
a much better condition from an educational standpoint than
either Béxar or Brazos, having three primary schools located at
Nacogdoches, San Augustine, and Johnsburg, but the Commis-
sioner saw the great need of one where Spanish might be taught.
Otherwise the language would disappear, as nothing but English
was then spoken in that part of the republic. In a letter to the
Governor of Coahuila and Texas, written on September 23, 1834,
in which he summed up and correlated his earlier reports and
recommendations, Almonte said:
I shall not end these recommendations without calling the very
particular attention of your Excellency to the need of primary-
schools in the towns of Nacogdoches, Béxar, Goliad, etc. If your
Excellency cannot effectively compel the ayuntamientos
of these
towns to apportion funds for each to sustain a school from their
taxes, rentals or sale of some land, etc., the unhappy youth will be
abandoned to the most degenerate condition.
26
As was natural, Almonte's confidential reports included infor-
mation which could scarcely be made public in the Noticia
Estadística.
In accordance with his private instructions, which
required him to report the number of fighting men upon whom
the colonists might count in the event of an uprising and to
inform himself as to the state of public opinion, he submitted
this information in his letter to the Secretary of Foreign Rela-
tions, dated June 14, 1834. Almonte estimated the number of
people who could bear arms as follows:
Personal observation led Almonte to believe that sentiment was
divided upon the question of erecting Texas into a state. The
influential men of the department of Béxar did not appear to
favor it; those of Nacogdoches considered it unwise to agitate
the matter at that time, although feeling that it could not long
be postponed; only in Brazos did a few constantly advocate the
idea. The farmers of the three departments opposed it, some of
them assuring Almonte that they were still very poor, that as
things then were they paid no taxes of any kind, that freedom
from taxation alone permitted them to provide the necessities,
and that they would be ruined if obliged to support a govern-
ment independent of that of Coahuila. This attitude, rational as
it seemed to Almonte, did not blind him to the danger involved
because, as he said, "the Anglo-American settlers are influenced
by self-interest and not by patriotism." Hence, the final words
of his formal report reiterated the wisdom of the Supreme Gov-
ernment making any sacrifice necessary in order to dispatch at
least 500 men under a good leader to the frontier.
27
In closing it might be well to reproduce one chart concerning
the commerce of Texas in 1834 and to condense into a second
chart some information on population scattered throughout the
Noticia
Estadística.
These two charts follow:
Texas State College for Women.
FOOTNOTES:
Oficial, II, 238.
versity of Texas transcripts, Fomento Archivo, Colonización y Terrenos
Baldíos, Leg. 8, exp. 66. Hereinafter referred to as Fom. Arch. C. y T.B.
existing slavery, the instructions probably refer to slaves introduced under
peonage contracts or even without that formality.
of Texas transcripts, Fom. Arch. C. y T.B., Leg. 8, exp. 66, No. 2;
Almonte to Governor of Coaliuila and Texas, March 4, 1834, University
of Texas transcripts, Saltillo Archives, Leg. 29, exp. 1271, vol. 38, p. 11.
of Texas transcripts, Fom. Arch. C. y T.B., Leg. 8, exp. 65, No. 10.
same to the same, May 20, 1834, ibid., No. 21.
Guerra, Frac. I, Leg. I, Operaciones Militares, Texas, 1834, pp. 35-37.
of Texas transcripts, Fom. Arch. C. y T.B., Leg. 8, exp. 65, No. 22.
of Texas transcripts, Fom, Arch. C. y T. B., Leg. 8, exp. 65, No. 19; same
to the same, June 16, 1834, ibid., No. 32.
of Texas transcripts, Fom. Arch. C. y T.B., Leg. 8, exp. 64, No. 1. See also
the letter signed "One who desires the prosperity of Texas," February 8,
1834, ibid., No. 2.
exp. 65, No. 37.
No. 44.
Carlos Castaneda (see note 28, infra ) .
versity of Texas transcripts, Saltillo Archives, Leg. 29, exp. 1292, vol. 38,
p. 114.
of Texas transcripts, Fom. Arch. C. y T.B., Leg. 8, exp. 65, No. 26.
lator), in The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXVIII, 212.
but the adjoining territory ruled by the ayuntamiento and corresponded
more nearly to our county than to a city or town. The figures of the
second column pertain to unorganized areas attached to the nearest
ayuntamientos.
Helen Willits Harris.
How to cite:
Helen Willits Harris, "Almonte's Inspection of Texas in 1834", Volume 41, Number 3, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v041/n3/contrib_DIVL4279.html
[Accessed Thu Dec 4 12:45:39 CST 2008]
