ANALYSTS OF THE WORK OR THE GENERAL COUNCIL,
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OR TEXAS, 1835-1836
Throughout the period of the revolution, the regular army of
Texas was a paper army, consisting simply of elaborate plans, nu-
merous officers, and empty ranks. Independence was won by volun-
teers who came and went largely at their own pleasure, but who
were present in sufficient numbers at San Jacinto. When the Gen-
eral Council convened a volunteer army under command of Austin
was besieging the Mexican forces in San Antonio, and it was but
natural that the Council should immediately turn its attention to
the welfare of this group of men.
This army of volunteers had come into being before the organi-
zation of the Consultation, and as a result that body saw fit to
make it largely independent of the government. A resolution
adopted by the Consultation declared the volunteers were under
no obligation to submit to control by the Provisional Government.
Consequently, the Provisional Government could do no more than
make advisory communications and furnish supplies.
1 A resolu-
tion adopted by the Council, November 15, stated that "the Gov-
ernor and Council should not appoint or commission any officers
for the command of said army, unless previously elected or rec-
ommended by themselves . . . this body will do all in their
power to sustain them and provide for their comfort."
2
A select committee to investigate the condition of the army
reported November 18, but the report contained little more than
a recommendation for the appointment of a contractor for the
army, and the establishment of an express route between army
headquarters and San Felipe.
3 An ordinance which accompanied
the report was subjected to some minor amendments and passed.
It provided for the appointment of John W. Moore as contractor
for the army; and made it his duty to procure and transmit to
the army a given list of provisions, including "666
Cotton Shirts,"
"333 Vests," "666 Pr. Socks," "1,000 lbs. Coffee," "20 Axes, 2
dozen Spades," and numerous other articles of use to an army.
Moore was clothed with ample power to pledge the public credit in
obtaining these supplies.
4 This was the first ordinance approved
by Governor Smith.
This was followed, November 27, by a measure ordering the
purchase of artillery, rifles, powder, shot, tomahawks, drums,
bugles, "2,000 suits grey uniforms, with proper number 'Sergeants'
and 'Corporals'," and other war supplies. This act also ordered
the purchase of additional provisions, including flour, bacon, coffee,
whiskey, French brandy, Port wine, and Kentucky chewing tobacco,
as well as certain books and instruments necessary to the proper
operation of an army.
5 The supplies mentioned in this ordinance
were probably intended for the regular army, but since the regular
army never became a reality it is safe to assume that such sup-
plies as arrived were used to best advantage by the volunteers.
On the day following the passage of the above measure, another
was passed appointing John Dunn as commissary to purchase
flour, bread, and beans for the volunteer army. These supplies
were to be shipped to Copano and then transported overland to
Béxar as soon as possible.
6
Two acts of interest in connection with the volunteer army
were passed November 27. One of these acts provided for the
stationing of a commissary at San Felipe, whose duty it was to
supply volunteers on their way to the army with suitable clothing
and provisions, and to keep an accurate record of his disburse-
ments.
7 The other made an appropriation of $1,500 for the use
of the volunteer army. This money was to be forwarded to Austin,
and used at his discretion.
8 Before this ordinance was carried into
effect Austin arrived in San Felipe, having left the army in order
to enter upon his duties as commissioner to the United States.
He presented to the Council a report as to the condition of the
volunteer army, and returned unused his instructions concerning
the appropriation for the volunteer army.
9 Having heard Austin's
report concerning the volunteers, and having had their instruc-
tions returned, the Council, December 1, repealed the appropria-
tion of $1,500 and substituted a new one of only $800. As in the
first case, the money was to be used at the discretion of the com-
mander.
10 This reduction in amount was of no actual importance,
for it is certain that the government did not have $1,500 for the
use of the army, and it is doubtful if the commander ever received
any part of the $800.
If the passing of laws could have created supplies, the army
would never have suffered. The Council created the office of con-
tractor for the volunteer army, December 5, and appointed William
Pettus to that position, thereby confirming him in the position to
which he had been appointed by the commander at Béxar.
11 He
was ordered to proceed immediately to the coast towns and pur-
chase supplies for the army.
12
Meanwhile the army before Béxar had not been inactive, and
developments at that point had influenced the Council on several
occasions. A report had been received from Austin, November 19,
in which he explained the hopeless position of the enemy, and
requested reinforcements in order that he might bring the cam-
paign to a speedy conclusion. This report was ordered published,
and with it an address prepared by Barrett, Parker, and Hanks.
In the address the committee declared: "God and Liberty is the
watchword, peace and tranquillity your reward."
13 Soon there-
after came the report of the "Grass Fight," and the Council adopted
enthusiastic resolutions, presented by Barrett, extending to the
volunteers the thanks and congratulations of the government.
14
The Council became feverishly active, December 9, upon receipt
of a letter from Ben R. Milam and Edward Burleson stating that
the siege of Béxar was in progress, and asking for powder, lead,
and men.
15 The Council promptly requested Governor Smith to
issue his proclamation calling for volunteers, and as promptly
appointed three special committees: one to procure what powder
and lead they could in San Felipe, and forward it to the army;
another to send expresses to different sections of the country for
volunteers and ammunition; and the other to procure "expresses and
horses."
16 The committee to procure powder and lead in San
Felipe later reported the acquisition of more than four kegs of
powder, and some lead, all of which was forwarded to the army.
They bought some of the powder at $15 per keg, some at $14
per keg, and some was donated to them.
17
Not content with requesting the governor to issue his procla-
mation calling for volunteers, the Council, December 10, prepared
an address urging men to join the army before Béxar. At the
same time resolutions were adopted authorizing J. W. Fannin and
Thomas J. Rusk to collect reinforcements to aid in the reduction
of Béxar. These reinforcements were to he enlisted for thirty
days, and were to receive the same pay and immunities as the
most favored soldiers of Texas. Fannin and Rusk were also made
contractors to secure all supplies needed for their volunteers, by
purchase if possible, but by pressure if necessary.
18 All of these
plans came to nothing, however, with the arrival of news that
Cos had surrendered.
Official reports of the capitulation reached San Felipe, Decem-
ber 15, and spirited resolutions of congratulation, prepared by
Barrett, Royall, and Power, were adopted by the Council. A
somewhat euphemistic account of the engagement was sent to the
commissioners to the United States, with a suggestion that they
enter upon their work with renewed energy. A memorial on the
death of Ben Milam was presented, and it was resolved that officers
of the Provisional Government wear crepe on the left arm for
thirty days as a tribute to him.
19 Texas was no longer endangered
by the presence of Mexican troops, and with the temporary pass-
ing of danger personalities took precedence over patriotism, and
the Provisional Government was soon disrupted.
The capture of Béxar by no means had the effect of dispersing
the volunteer army, and the General Council was frequently called
upon to recognize the existence of this force. A paymaster for
these troops was suggested, but the committee on military affairs
reported that a paymaster was unnecessary since there was no
money in the treasury to pay the soldiers, and, in addition, a pay-
master had already been appointed. They added, inconsistently,
that as soon as they had money to pay the troops, it would be
necessary to appoint a paymaster.
20 The condition at Béxar was
becoming serious, and January 5, the commandant was instructed
to dispose of any public property for which he had no immediate
need and apply the proceeds to the benefit of the post.
21
Conditions at the post remained unsatisfactory, and January 16
the commandant was authorized to employ Mexicans, or other
citizens, to drive up beeves for the troops. No provision was made
for securing the beeves, and doubtless they were to be pressed for
the army on the excuse of necessity. Men employed for this work
were not to be paid more than men in the volunteer army, that is,
not more than twenty dollars per month. John W. Smith was
empowered to collect $1,000 of public dues in the department of
Béxar, and give the same to the commanding officer for the sup-
port of his troops.
22 This resolution, signed by Robinson, had
little effect upon conditions at Béxar.
It was generally understood that the volunteers were to receive
ample reward for their services. The government had no money,
but there was an abundant public domain, and the accepted idea
was that the soldiers were to receive grants of land. The Con-
sultation had fixed the pay of soldiers who served with the volunteer
army until the fall of Béxar at $20 per month,
23 but made no
promises concerning grants of land. There was passed by the
General Council, December 11, an ordinance making a grant of
640 acres of land to the heirs of any person losing his life while
a member of the volunteer army.
24 No provision was made for
those volunteers who managed to live through the struggle, but
generous grants of land were offered to persons enlisting in the
regular army. The purpose of this discrimination may have been
to encourage enlistment in the regular army, and at the same
time bring to an end the somewhat independent force of volunteers.
At any rate, no grants were made for the volunteers. An act
passed by the Congress of the Republic of Texas in December,
1837, granted to all who had served in the army land on the basis
of time served. By this act, which included members of the vol-
unteer army, a person who had served three months was entitled
to 320 acres of land, one having served six months was entitled
to 640 acres, while larger grants were made for longer periods
of service.
25
Some of the volunteers remained at Béxar to meet their death
in the Alamo. These volunteers, under the command of Colonel
J. C. Neill, were given occasional attention by the advisory com-
mittee which represented the General Council after January 17,
1836. Governor Robinson issued a proclamation January 19, in
answer to a request from Neill, calling for volunteers to proceed
to the frontier.
26 This call must have met with some success, for
the advisory committee informed the governor, January 31, that
a sufficient number of troops were at Béxar, and that newcomers
should proceed to Goliad or Copano. At the same time, they
informed the governor that Houston had ordered Béxar aban-
doned, and all fortifications destroyed. Robinson was instructed
to countermand this order, and assure Neill that every effort
would be made to strengthen the garrison and supply it with pro-
visions.
27 This order was obeyed by Robinson and Neill. Less
than six weeks later the Alamo fell before the regulars of Santa
Anna, but its importance in gaining the independence of Texas
can hardly be overestimated.
According to the military section of the organic law, the regular
army of Texas was to consist of 1,120 men, rank and file. Men
were to be enlisted for terms of two years and the duration of the
war. The commander-in-chief, Sam Houston, was chosen by the
Consultation, commissioned by Governor Smith, and was subject
to orders of the governor and Council. The staff was to consist
of one adjutant general, one inspector general, one quartermaster
general, one paymaster general, one surgeon general, and four
aides-de-camp; all of whom were to be appointed by the com-
mander-in-chief and commissioned by the governor.
28
The Council gave its earliest attention to the volunteer army,
but at an early date ordinances were passed authorizing the
organization of the regular army. According to Bancroft, the
ordinances were framed and passed under the guidance of General
Houston who had remained in San Felipe for that purpose.
29 The
ordinance to raise a regular army was presented to the Council by
the military affairs committee November 21, and was accompanied
by a recommendation for the appointment of "at least one-half
of the officers, immediately, from the Captains down," in order
that they might report to the commanding officer and proceed
with the recruiting.
30 The measure was passed November 24, and
in keeping with the declaration of the organic law it stated that
the regular army was to consist of 1,120 men, who were to be
enlisted for two years, or for the duration of the war. There were
to be two regiments in the army, one of infantry, and one of
artillery. Each regiment was to consist of two battalions, and
each battalion of five companies of fifty-six men each, rank and
file. The regiment of artillery was to be officered by one colonel,
two lieutenant colonels, and two majors; and for each company
there was to be one captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieu-
tenant, one third lieutenant, four sergeants, and four corporals.
The regiment of infantry was to be officered by one colonel, one
lieutenant colonel, and one major; and for each company there
was to be one captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant,
four sergeants, and four corporals. Officers and privates were to
receive the same pay as persons of similar rank in the army of
the United States. In addition each private and non-commissioned
officer was to receive 640 acres of land, a bounty which was later
increased to 800 acres of land and $24 in cash.
31 In view of the
division of the army into infantry and artillery, it is well to note
the requirement that the infantry should be drilled in artillery
service as well as in infantry service, and the artillery in infantry
service as well as in artillery service.
32 Whether or not this ordi-
nance was the work of Houston, it is certain that the Council
was willing to show him some consideration, for two days before
the measure was passed James Bonnel had been made a member
of the staff at Houston's request.
33 The harmony between Houston
and the Council was further demonstrated, December 11, when
Houston presented to the Council for approval a proclamation
which he planned to issue calling for volunteers for the regular
army. The proclamation was approved by the Council, and on
motion of Barrett a number of copies were ordered printed for
use by the Provisional Government.
34
After providing for the organization of the army, the Council
proceeded to appoint a number of company officers.
35 General
Houston was not satisfied with this, as he desired the election
of regimental officers as well as company officers, and he so
informed the Council. In reply to the request of General Houston,
the committee on military affairs reported, December 6, that the
Council had acted as rapidly as possible under the circumstances,
and had of necessity given much time to consideration of the
volunteer army upon whom rested "the hopes and fortunes of
the people of Texas." The committee recommended the appointment
of
a lieutenant colonel for the artillery, and the regimental officers
for the infantry, hut thought it unwise to appoint all officers, as
this would leave no room for promotion and no incentive for
qualified men to come from the United States.
36 In keeping with
the recommendation of its committee the Council selected James W.
Fannin, Colonel of Artillery; James C. Neill, Lieutenant Colonel
of Artillery; Philip A. Sublett, Colonel of Infantry; Henry Millard,
a member of the Council, Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry; and
William Oldham, Major of Infantry. Fannin, Neill, and Oldham
were nominees of Barrett. On the following day the Council
appointed David B. Macomb, Lieutenant Colonel of Artillery;
W. B. Travis, First Major of Artillery; and T. F. L. Barrett,
Second Major of Artillery.
37 This completed the list of regi-
mental officers for the regular army, and met the request of General
Houston that all regimental officers be appointed.
In choosing company officers the Council had made no state-
ment as to seniority of rank, and, as it was apparent that ques-
tions would arise over this matter, a resolution was passed, Decem-
ber 12, declaring that seniority should be determined by drawing
numbers.
38 On the same day the secretary of the Council was
required to furnish the commander-in-chief with a list of the officers
elected for the regular army, a list of all contractors, and copies
of the ordinances relating to the regular army and auxiliary vol-
unteer corps.
39 This information was of course essential to the
commanding officer, but the resolution was not always complied
with. On December 12, Governor Smith was requested to issue
his order instructing the commanding general to move his head-
quarters to the town of Washington for the purpose of recruiting
and organizing the regular army.
40
Council in making appropriations necessary for the organization
of the army. The Council replied, December 21, with an appro-
priation of $40,000 to be used by Houston in raising and organ-
izing the regular army. 41 General Houston was now provided with
an ample number of officers and a paper appropriation with which
to begin the business of recruiting, but efforts to fill the ranks
met with consistent failure. A committee of the Convention re-
ported, March 10, 1836, the number of privates in the regular
army as sixty; thirty of whom were stationed at Goliad and thirty
at Béxar. The thirty privates stationed at Béxar should not have
been counted, for the Alamo had fallen and with it exactly half
the enlisted men in the regular army of Texas. 42 Following the
dispute between Smith and the Council, Colonel Travis, who had
been in charge of the recruiting service, was ordered by Smith
to proceed to Béxar. Smith, it seems, failed to fill the vacancy
he had created, "thus destroying all hope of filling the ranks of
the regular army." 43
From time to time the Council created such offices as it thought
necessary for the army. Houston was authorized, December 6, to
send one or more agents to the United States with the commis-
sioners for the purpose of purchasing supplies and ammunition.
44
The Council resolved, December 11, to appoint a judge advocate
general, who was to have the rank and pay of a colonel, and whose
duties were to be the same as those of the judge advocate general
in the United States in time of war.
45 The office was given to
D. C. Barrett, a member of the council, and to this appointment
the governor objected in a most ungentlemanly manner, but his
objections must be reserved for later discussion. An ordinance of
December 18 listed the duties of the commissary general, the pay-
master general and the quartermaster general, and, theoretically
at least, endowed them with sufficient power to perform their
functions.
46 Several weeks later, January 9, at the request of
General Houston, the Council created the office of sutler to the
army, and placed upon him the same duties as rested upon the
sutler to the army of the United States.
47 Wyatt Hanks, a mem-
ber of the Council, was appointed to this position. Some time
before this an ordinance had been introduced prohibiting officers
of the army from holding other offices, but action on the measure
was postponed "until the fourth day of July next."
48
Numerous other resolutions were adopted concerning the army,
the number being so great as to make impracticable a considera-
tion of all of them. These resolutions had to do with such matters
as sending a copy of the ordinances governing the army to-
"Thomas Hooper of Alexandria, La.", and requesting that he
have them published in newspapers throughout the United States.
Another extended the thanks of the Council to "Dr. M. Estis"
for the offer of his services as surgeon for the regular army of
Texas. No surgeon was to be elected until the army was organized,
but the name of Dr. Estis was placed on the list of applicants
49
The Council made an honest effort to bring into being a regular
army. While it is true that the efforts of General Houston to
organize the army were almost entirely futile, the great part of
the blame must be placed upon conditions beyond control of the
Council. The greatest error on the part of the Council was prob-
ably the creation of numerous independent establishments. Ample
legislative provision was made for a corps of rangers, a militia,
an auxiliary volunteer corps, a legion of cavalry, and an "Army
of Reserve for the protection of the Liberties of Texas." This
profusion of military organizations doubtless tended to breed con-
fusion and discourage enlistment in the regular army.
The ordinance creating a corps of rangers was passed Novem-
ber 24, the same day as that creating the regular army. The corps
was to be divided into three companies of fifty-six men each.
Bach company was to have one captain, one lieutenant and one
second lieutenant, while the entire corps was to be commanded
by a major who was to be subject to orders of the commander-in-
chief. Members of the corps were to furnish their own food,
clothing, horses, ammunition, and other necessary supplies, and
in return were to receive $1.25 per day.
50 Having created a corps
of rangers the Council lost little time in appointing the necessary
officers, including R. M. Williamson as major. The ordinance took
some liberties with the organic law, which had ordered the estab-
lishment of a corps of rangers to "consist of one hundred and fifty
men."
51 By adding eighteen men to this number the Council was
able to make the ranger companies consist of the same number
of men as companies in the regular army. This independence on
the part of the Council may be subject to any number of theoretical
objections, but none is of actual importance, since the corps of
rangers was never able to approach either number.
A report of the advisory committee to the governor, February 4,
1836, stated that men refused to join the ranging companies
because they were not permitted to elect their own officers. The
governor was requested to order the immediate organization of
two companies of rangers--allowing the men to choose their own
officers. One company was to be raised in Gonzales and the other
in Milam.
52 The advisory committee, February 14, recommended
that Major Williamson attempt to fortify strategic points so as
to more surely protect the frontier from Indian depredations. The
governor was advised, February 26, to order a company of rangers
under command of Captain Tomlinson to Béxar. At the same time
it was made the duty of the militia in the municipality of Mina to
guard the frontier from Indian depredations.
53
Under specific orders from the organic law the Council, Novem-
ber 25, made provision for organizing the militia. Every free,
white male who suffered no physical defect of a serious nature
was made subject to militia duty. Municipalities were to be
divided into precincts, and militia officers were to be elected from
these precincts. As was the case with the regular army, each com-
pany was to be composed of fifty-six men. This number was not
to be rigidly adhered to, however, and a precinct was not to be
subdivided unless it contained as many as one hundred and twelve
men. Company officers were to be elected from the various pre-
cincts by ballot, and they in turn were to elect the higher officers.
A municipality having three companies was to elect a major, while
one having four companies was to elect a lieutenant colonel, and
one having five companies was to elect a colonel. Five companies
were to constitute a regiment, and any municipality having more
than one regiment was entitled to elect a brigadier general, who
was to be chosen by all officers of that municipality. The governor
was made commander-in-chief of the militia.
54
As was the case with so many plans of the Consultation and
the Council, this proposed organization of the militia came to
naught. Before sufficient time had elapsed for the beginning of
actual organization there came the plea of Burleson and Milam
for men to aid in the siege of San Antonio, and this was soon
followed by the report that the Mexicans had surrendered and
were leaving Texas. With the retreat of the Mexicans enthusiasm
declined, and nothing was done. Some public-spirited citizen urged
upon Governor Robinson the importance of organizing the militia,
and January 20, Robinson submitted the matter to the advisory
committee and suggested that it be given immediate attention.
55
There is no indication that the requested advice was ever given.
After having made provision for organizing the militia, the
Council turned its attention to the creation of an "Auxiliary
Volunteer Corps" to be composed of "Permanent Volunteers" who
were enlisted for the duration of the war, and others who might
enlist for a definite, though supposedly shorter, period. As was the
case with soldiers of the regular army, these volunteers were to
receive the pay, clothing and rations of soldiers in the army of
the United States, and in addition, all who volunteered for the
duration of the war, and served accordingly, were to receive a
bounty of one section of land, while those volunteering for a
shorter period were to receive the pay, but not the bounty--with
the exception that persons enlisting for three months were to be
granted a half section of land. In case of the death of the volunteer
the land was to be given his heirs.
56 This ordinance was followed,
December 12, by a resolution which authorized the commander-in-
chief to accept the services of five thousand "Auxiliary Volunteers
in addition to the local volunteers, agreeably to the Organic Law
and the Ordinances and Decrees of the General Council of Texas."
57
The auxiliary volunteers were evidently intended to be volunteers
from outside Texas.
In a long report, containing some interesting philosophy, the
committee on military affairs, December 16, suggested the organi-
zation of a legion of cavalry. The proposal had the support of
such eminent Texans as Austin, Houston, Travis, and Fannin.
58
The measure was passed two days later and was signed by the
governor. The legion of cavalry was to consist of 286 privates and
numerous officers. One-half of the legion was to be equipped with
"double barrel shot guns," while the other was to be equipped
with "American Yaugers," a broadsword, and a brace of pistols.
The uniform, the only one designed by the Council, was to be "a
suit of cadet grey cloth coats, yellow bullet buttons, and pantaloons
for winter, and two suits of grey cottonade roundabouts and panta-
loons for summer, and fur caps, black socks and cowhide boots."
Each trooper was also to have a Spanish saddle and a pair of
heavy brass spurs. Privates in this legion were to receive the
same pay as privates in the cavalry of the United States and a
bounty of one section of land.
59 Equipment for the cavalry was
to be purchased by the agents to the United States, but this was
not done.
A second ordinance concerning the cavalry was passed by the
Council, January 7, but no copy of it is available. In all prob-
ability it was one of several acts kept by Governor Smith when
he was deposed by the Council.
60
The final act of the Council with reference to the organization
of military forces was passed January 7, and accepted a proposi-
tion made by Judge Thomas J. Chambers to raise a force in the
United States for use in Texas. Chambers was given authority
to raise a division of 1,145 officers and men. The division was to
be divided into six battalions, and the entire force was to be called
"The Army of Reserve for the protection of the Liberties of Texas."
There were to be three battalions of infantry, one of riflemen, one
of cavalry, and one of artillery. Chambers was to organize, arm,
and equip the force, and was given power to pledge the public
faith of Texas in order that this might be accomplished. He
had agreed to use $10,000 of his personal money in raising the
division, and the Council pledged the public faith of Texas for
the repayment of this sum. Volunteers raised by Chambers were
to receive the same pay and emoluments as other volunteers, and
were to be subject to the same rules and regulations.
61 Chambers
was instructed to have his force ready by May 15, 1836, but when
that date arrived Mexicans and Texans had matched arms at San
Jacinto, and the Mexican dictator was a prisoner in Texas. The
ordinance making provision for this army was not signed by a
governor, but "was enrolled and handed Governor Smith for ap-
proval, but never returned."
62
The creation of so many forces was doubtless a major error, but
it should be remembered that in practically every case the Council
was merely following instructions of the Consultation. Then, too,
the failure of General Houston to bring the regular army into
actual existence may have encouraged them to make provision for
auxiliary forces; finally, it was the general belief that the 1,120
men to which the regular army was limited would never be a suffi-
cient force to oppose the hordes of Mexicans who were thought to
be on their way to Texas.
In the Declaration of November 7, the Consultation had pledged
aid and assistance to "such members of the Mexican Confederacy
as will take up arms against military despotism."
63 The Council
was controlled by men who were not members of the Independence
party, and who were in favor of abiding by the terms of this decla-
ration; the governor, on the other hand, was a most radical believer
in independence, and was opposed to cooperation in any way with
Mexican liberals. Governor Smith wished to disregard the declara-
tion of the Consultation, and proceed as though Texas were inde-
pendent. This difference of opinion was not long in causing
friction.
The first of the Mexican liberals to offer services to the Provi-
sional Government was Colonel José María Gonzales, who appeared
before the Council, November 30, gave his ideas concerning the
attack on Béxar, and expressed a desire to aid in the reduction of
that city. The general plan of the Texans was explained to him;
and he offered his services—with those of his men—on the same
terms as other volunteers.
64 His offer was accepted, and the treas-
urer was instructed to advance him $800 to assist in moving his
force to Béxar.
65 Gonzales and his men proceeded to San Antonio.
Colonel Sandoval, a Mexican held as a prisoner of war, having
seen the ease with which Gonzales became a member of the Texan
army, immediately became strongly opposed to Santa Anna, and
requested that he be allowed to join Gonzales. The Council ques-
tioned his sincerity, and he was ordered removed to San Augustine,
where he was to be kept by the committee of vigilance and safety.
This order was never carried out, and Sandoval remained a prisoner
in San Felipe. Some time later he was paroled by the Council,
on condition that he would not take up arms against the federal
system of government, or against Texas "during this war."
66
There was no open disagreement between governor and Council
over Gonzales and Sandoval as neither matter was referred to the
governor. Matters were not to pass in this manner, however, for
the Council had taken seriously the proffered assistance of General
José Antonio Mexía, who had directed an unfortunate expedition
from New Orleans against Tampico.
67 The defeat at Tampico in
no way cooled the desire of this Mexican liberal to carry the war
against Santa Anna into Mexico. Upon landing in Texas he
appealed to the Council for aid. The Council considered the
matter, and adopted a resolution, presented by Barrett, requiring
army contractors to furnish Mexía with supplies in order that he
might move against Mexico. The same resolution required the
General to report his plan of operations to the Provisional Govern-
ment.
68 This resolution was vetoed by the governor as he con-
sidered "it bad policy to fit out, or trust Mexicans in any matter
connected with our Government, as I am well satisfied that we will
in the end find them inimical and treacherous."
69 The message
of the governor was read to the Council and the measure was
unanimously passed over the veto.
70
In the policy of aiding Mexía and other liberals the Council
had the support of Austin. In a letter to the Provisional Govern-
ment, December 14, 1835, he declared that the government should
accept the services of Mexía, and cooperate in every way possible
with the Federal party of Mexico. Austin expressed every confi-
dence in the faith and sincerity of Mexía, and in his ability to be
of service to Texas. He urged the government to adhere strictly
to the Declaration of November 7, and not even whisper the word
"independence," as it would gain nothing for Texas, and would
cost the support of the Mexican federals.
71
Having determined to aid Mexía, the Council felt justified in
calling upon him for assistance. He was invited by a resolution
of December 10, to proceed to Béxar, and there cooperate with
the volunteer army. Power, a member of the Council, volunteered
to inform Mexía of this resolution, and his services were promptly
accepted.
72 He performed his mission and reported to the Council
that General Mexía was unwilling to risk his military reputation
by accepting a post under the Provisional Government of Texas.
Mexía had planned, and intended to carry out, an expedition to
Matamoras. He sent word by Power that he would come to San
Felipe in a short time to confer with the Council.
73
The policy pursued by Governor Smith in refusing to extend
recognition of any kind to Mexia may have had something to do
with his refusal to cooperate at Béxar, or it may be that he was
unwilling to let anything interfere with his plans for taking
Matamoras. After his refusal to proceed to Béxar, the Council
became less enthusiastic in his behalf, and, December 23, adopted
a committee report providing for recognition of advances made
to Mexía by government agents, but advising against future
advances or responsibilities. This advice was given, so the report
said, because of the embarrassed condition of the treasury, and
because Mexican liberals could depend upon the resources of
Mexico as easily as the Texans could depend upon the resources
of Texas.
74 On the day before this resolution was adopted Austin
had written a letter to a number of men at San Felipe, including
several members of the Council, in which he declared that aid
furnished Mexican liberals by Texas should be auxiliary aid.
75
This simply indicates that Austin and members of the Council
who were followers of his policy arrived at similar conclusions at
practically the same time.
On December 23, the day the above resolutions were adopted
by the Council, Mexía wrote to Smith from Quintana. He com-
plained that since his arrival in Texas he had communicated his
every move to Smith, and had not received one official communica-
tion in return. Mexia said that this policy on the part of Smith,
coupled with the recent success at Béxar convinced him his services
were neither desired nor needed; consequently he was returning
to New Orleans. Mexía left with Thomas F. McKinney the
cannon, arms, and ammunition which belonged to his expedition
in order that they might be sent on to Copano in keeping with
the desire of the Council.
76 Before Mexía wrote this letter Austin
had written to McKinney that the position of Mexía was very
unpleasant, as he had scarcely escaped insult.
77 Mexía did return
to New Orleans, and ceased to be a factor in the dispute between
the governor and the Council.
Few Texans had given thought to an expedition against Mata-
moras before the arrival of General Mexía, but when once pre-
sented the plan proved to be quite popular. General Mexía left
Texas late in December, 1835, but the proposed expedition to
Matamoras continued to haunt the minds of ambitious Texans,
and, in time, greatly widened the gulf between governor and
Council. Even before the Council began a serious considera-
tion of the proposals of Mexía, they had been furnished with a
letter written December 9, 1835, by Lorenzo de Zavala to Dimmitt.
In this letter Zavala expressed himself as being highly in favor
of an expedition to Matamoras.
78 Dr. James Grant, and others
who liad interests of various kinds below the Rio Grande, helped
encourage the expedition. Governor Smith seems to have been
charmed with the possibilities of such an expedition, for it would
certainly be of great service in bringing about a complete separa-
tion of Texas from Mexico. Accordingly, the executive order was
issued directing an expedition against Matamoras. Houston, who
had taken no part in the siege of Béxar, had no desire to lead such
an expedition, and December 17, issued his orders to Colonel James
Bowie to raise the necessary number of men and proceed to Mata-
moras. If possible, Bowie was to capture the city, and retain pos-
session of it until he received further orders.
79 Nothing came as
an immediate result of this order, and Houston later wrote Smith
that the order was not received by Bowie, who knew nothing of it
until he arrived in San Felipe from Béxar late in December, 1835.
80
The first aggressive action on the part of the Council concerning
an expedition to Matamoras came December 27, when it adopted a
report of the military committee which had been presented two
days earlier. The report pointed out the importance of Matamoras,
and the advantages which would accrue to Texas through control
of that point. The committee also advised the Council that Texas
had 750 soldiers at various points, and the expense of keeping
these troops was entirely too great, unless they could be used in
some campaign. Consequently it was resolved that the governor
be requested to concentrate all of his troops, "by his proper officers,"
at Copano and San Patricio for the purpose of making a cam-
paign against Matamoras.
81 From this it appears that in the
first action taken concerning an expedition to Matamoras, the
governor acted with neither the advice nor the consent of the
Council, and ordered Houston to lead the expedition; the Council,
on the other hand, made their resolution in the form of a request
that the governor order the expedition through the proper officers.
When it is remembered that the organic law provided that the
commander-in-chief should be "subject to the orders of the Gov-
ernor and Council," it appears that the governor evaded the organic
law to some extent, while the Council moved in a strictly consti-
tutional manner.
Colonel Bowie appeared before the Council, December 28, and
presented his views concerning the proposed expedition. He was
definitely in favor of the plan, and next day the Council requested
Governor Smith to authorize Bowie to raise and "rendezvous all
the troops he possibly can," and proceed with them to Goliad.
These troops were to be enrolled under the provisions of the
ordinance creating an auxiliary volunteer corps.
82
Meanwhile an expedition was actually on the march from Béxar
with Matamoras as its goal. General Frank W. Johnson, who had
been chosen to command the volunteer army at Béxar after the
retirement of General Burleson, informed the Council, January 3,
that he had ordered and was leading "an expedition against Mata-
moras of five hundred and thirty men, volunteers of Texas and
from the United States--by whom I have been appointed to the
command."
83 This communication was referred to the committee
on military affairs which promptly reported favorably upon the
expedition. The committee based its decision upon a belief that
such an expedition would give employment to the volunteers until
a regular army could be raised, and that the city itself was impor-
tant. Johnson, the choice of the volunteers, was approved as leader
of the expedition, and was to have command of all troops he could
raise. The Council was to do what it could to support, sustain,
and provide for the expedition.
84 The Council apparently decided
that General Houston was not going to make the expedition, as he
had been instructed, and turned therefore to the volunteer army--
the only army having more than a paper existence.
After having adopted the report of its committee, the Council
continued to investigate the wisdom of such an expedition, and
January 5, a committee reported the result of an interview with
Johnson and Fannin. These two gentlemen were of the opinion
that such an expedition was not only practicable, but necessary.
85
Matters were complicated the following day, however, when James
Bowie appeared before the Council and exhibited his orders from
the Commander-in-chief to proceed against Matamoras.
86 The
Council was unwilling to abandon the proposed expedition of
the volunteer army, and when Johnson, January 6, declined to
have anything more to do with the expedition, made search for
another leader. J. W. Fannin was chosen by the Council, and,
January 7, was made an agent to collect and concentrate all
volunteer troops willing to make the expedition to Matamoras.
He was given authority to negotiate a loan of $3,000, and was
instructed to call upon Thomas F. McKinney or any other public
agent for necessary supplies and munitions. When he had con-
centrated his troops, Fannin was to report to the commanding
general, the governor or the Council as he chose, and his troops
were to elect a commanding officer.
87
The editor of the Telegraph
and
Texas
Register,
a newspaper
published at San Felipe, took notice of the expedition in the issue
of January 9, 1836, and hoped a sufficient number would volunteer
"to enable them to carry on offensive operations." In the opinion
of the editor, the advantages already gained by the volunteers
should serve as an encouragement to further exertions.
88
Johnson complicated matters still more by again changing his
mind, and deciding that he would like to go. Johnson reported
to the house that he had refused the first commission offered him
as he was already in possession of a commission--having been
left in charge at Béxar by Burleson. He had also been influenced
by the objections of Governor Smith to volunteers taking part in
the expedition. Burleson, it should be noted, had been commis-
sioned by Smith without the knowledge of the Council. The
Council, January 14, approved the grant which had earlier been
made to Johnson, and he was instructed to unite his men with
those being raised by Fannin. Before the two groups were united,
each was to elect its own officers, and then the entire body was
to elect a commander for the expedition.
89 It follows, therefore,
that the Council planned and authorized only one expedition
against Matamoras. It is entirely true that two men were in-
structed to raise troops for the expedition, but the two forces
were to be united, and a commander chosen by the volunteers;
rhis was in keeping with the precedent of the volunteer army,
md with the provisions of the ordinance creating an auxiliary
volunteer corps.
Meanwhile, General Houston had finally seen fit to make a
trip to the frontier. He made speeches in opposition to the expe-
dition to the volunteers at Goliad and Refugio, with the result
that no force was large enough to venture into Mexico. He then
returned to San Felipe and was given a furlough, by Smith,
which was to last until March 1. He then proceeded to east Texas
to make a treaty with the Indians.
90 When Houston returned to
San Felipe from the west he seems to have convinced Smith that
the expedition was inherently wrong. The break between gov-
ernor and Council soon rendered both impotent, and the troops
remained disunited to fall an easy prey to advancing Mexicans
in the spring of 1836.
The disruption of the government did not cause the leaders of the
Council to change their opinions concerning the expedition. The
advisory committee constantly urged that the expedition go for-
ward. The complete failure of the Texans to understand their
predicament is shown by the fact that as late as February 22,
the advisory committee was urging Fannin to advance, and seemed
thoroughly convinced that the Texans had ample time to prepare
to meet Santa Anna and his troops.
91
The Council also passed a number of acts, and gave consideration
to a number of matters, which cannot be classified as belonging to
any particular branch of the service, but deal with the military
situation as a whole. Ordinances were passed directing the pur-
chase of arms and munitions, making provision for volunteers on
their way to the army, defining the procedure to be used by the
volunteers in presenting their accounts to the government, and
many other matters of a similar nature.
92
From this brief discussion of the military activities of the
Council, it can be seen that they made ample legislative provision
for the creation of a regular army and various auxiliary forces.
That these forces did not come into being is not the fault of the
Council alone, for it was not the duty of the legislative body to
execute its own decrees. The blame rests primarily with the dis-
turbed conditions of the time--for Texas had few provisions and
no money; and there seems ample evidence to prove that the
men placed in the most responsible positions were strangely lacking
in the ability to lead.
Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College.
FOOTNOTES:
tation Papers, Vol. I, Texas State Library.
This is a long communication and only the advice concerning Bexar will
be quoted:
"... The Advisory Committee have understood with much surprise that
the Commanding General Houston has lately issued an order to the Com-
mandant of Bejar advising or directing the destruction of all the works
of defence and an abandonment of that Post. Your committee therefore
advise that an express be sent immediately to Bejar, with orders from the
Acting Governor countermanding the orders of Genl Houston and that
the Commandant be required to put the place in the best possible state for
defence, with assurances that every possible effort is making to strengthen
supply and provision the Garrison. And in no case to abandon or sur-
render the place unless in the last extremity. . . ."
cisco, 1889), II, 192.
Council also devoted much of its time to the appointment of officers. See
Advisory Committee to the Acting Governor, January 24, 1836; February
4, 1836; February 6, 1836; February 8, 1836; February 9, 1836, in Consul-
tation Papers, Vol. I, Texas State Library.
terly of the Texas State Historical Association, IX, 236; E. C. Barker and
E. W. Winkler (eds.), Frank W. Johnson, A History of Texas and Texans
(Chicago, 1914), I, 321.
Houston. See Houston to Barrett, December 11, 1835, in Barrett Papers,
University of Texas Library.
the appointment of Hanks to this office.
January 2, 1836, Houston wrote Barrett as follows:
"I learn from Judge Hanks that you are about to make Sutlers ! I have
recommended him for one -- . . . Would you have thought that the judge
would ask my recommendation? The age of wonders is not passed -- I
would like to know what is going on but I know you will guard my rights!"
January 17, 1836, S. H. Everett of Jasper wrote Barrett asking the
appointment of a friend to office. He stated that the member from Jasper,
Hanks, was too interested in his own family, as he had had both of his
brothers and his stepson appointed to places in the army. With the
appointment of Hanks as sutler it would seem that the family was well
cared for.
Papers, Vol. I, Texas State Library. The report indicates that a company
of rangers had actually been raised by J. G. Robinson, and suggests that
the same rules apply to it as to the companies at Gonzales and Milam.
In the more important part of the reports (there were two almost identi-
cal reports on this day) the committee advises "That Matthew Caldwell,
Wm. A. Matthews & Thos. B. Miller of Gonzales, be appointed agents to
raise as many mounted volunteers, not exceeding fifty six, as can be
obtained to be concentrated at Gonzales - for choosing officers & for
the purpose of acting plan (sic.) of rangers against hostile Indiana as they
may be directed and that Daniel B. Fryar, Joseph A. Parker, &
David Folkinberg of the municipality of Milam be appointed agents
for the same purpose . . . and that the Gov-- give all necessary instruc-
tions for the most effective operations against hostile Savages."
On February 14, 1836, the Governor was again requested to give his
attention to the problem of organizing the rangers, in order that the
frontier might be protected. Advisory Committee to the Governor, Febru-
ary 14, 1836, Consultation Papers, Vol. I, Texas State Library.
tion Papers, Vol. I, Texas State Library.
"The advisory committee appointed to act in the absence of a quorum,
being informed that a company of rangers commanded by Cpt. Tomlinson,
are ready for service, and also being informed that a large force of the
enemy are now at Bejar, would therefore advise your excellency that you
issue your order to Cpt. Tomlinson, to immediately proceed to Bejar to
aid the army there, -- and that the millitia class'd No I that are above
the San Antonio road in the municipality of Mina, be ordered out to
guard the frontier from Indian depredations -- and signify the same to
Major Williamson --- . . ."
Only two members of the committee, Thomson and Patillo, were present
at this time.
Papers, Vol. I, Texas State Library.
Expedition," in The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association,
VI, 169-186.
Texas State Library.
Texas State Library.
Smith "The Quarrel Between Governor Smith and the Council of the
Provisional Government of the Republic," in The Quarterly of the Texas
State Historical Association, IV, 316.
Texas State Historical Association, IX, 255.
1836, February 22, 1836. All are to be found in Consultation Papers,
Vol.I, Texas State Library. They are of sufficient interest to justify
quotation.
Advisory Committee to the Governor, February 9, 1836:
"The advisory committee are of opinion that the paine [?] volunteers:
whose names are herewith, should be furnished with the enclosed articles
to be receipted for by the commander, Gennl -- Sprague -- and that they
be ordered to Copano there to report to the commanding officer, for orders
to ioin the Matamoras expedition and that they be furnished with an
order to the comdr -- at Goliad, & all other places where public stores
are kept, to be furnished with the necessary and proper supplies in the
usual manner & form."
Advisory Committee to the Governor, February 15, 1836:
"The advisory Committee to the Executive appointed by the General
Council to act in that capacity in the absence of a quorum of the Council
Are of opinion that the advices from the interior are not of so certain
and definite a character as to require a retrograde movement on the part
of Col Fannin, or any of the troops designed for Matamoras, more espe-
cially when the forces at Bejar have considerably increased and the Militia
of Texas are now called upon to move upon the Western frontier, and
where all volunteers are now directed. Which, together, we believe will be
amply sufficient to sustain the posts of Bejar and Goliad independent of the
forces first designed for Matamoras expedition, and to meet any forces of
the enemy which may come from the upper crossings of the Rio Grande.
"The Committee therefore advise that Col. Fannin be required to main-
tain his position at Copano and if possible at San Patricio, until the
movements of the Enemy shall be well ascertained. When circumstances
must govern the movements of the Commander, which, if possible, should
be directed to the accomplishment of the expedition.
"The committee further advise that a copy of this together with the
corresponding orders from the acting Governor, be forwarded to Col.
Fannin by express."
Advisory Committee to the Governor, February 22, 1836:
"The advisory committee appointed to act in the absence of a quorum
would state to your excellency, that they have had the letters and com-
munications reed, last evening from Col. Fannin under date of the 14
Inst. under consideration, and would say that they rejoice that the
enemy is not quite so near us as was believed from the last information
lecd. And although no doubt should be entertained that the enemy is
actively engaged, yet his being farther off than we were led to believe
from the last communication gives us time to organize, and get our
volunteers and militia into the field, which to us, at present, is of great
importance. As the principal part of his communication has been antici-
pated in your last Instructions to him, they deem it unnecessary to repeat
the same again, there seems however a necessity, that some few points
should be treated on, and would therefore advise your excellency, that
you inform Col. Fannin, that upon the receipt of his last a call was
instantly made on the people, and that he may expect to receive such aid
as will be sufficient to answer his need -- also send him some of the
printed addresses --
With regard to the settlers on the Nueces, we think that situated as
they are, and have been for some time past, unprotected, and the enemy
close at hand, we believe that great allowance should be made for, and
much lenity shown them, by the commander, but would advise that those
that have been actively employed against us, and are proven to be enemies,
should be sent on to the seat of government to be disposed of as the
government may think proper -- We would further recommend that
orders be given to Col. Fannin, that should it be in his power, to have
a sufficient number of light mounted horsemen to drive, or have drove,
all the stock from or near the Rio Grande, to the nueces, or if by him
thought best, to have them brought on the east side of the sd. river -
and further advise that all possible aid should be given immediately to
the frontier settlement on the Nueces, and if possible sustain them, by
sending a strong force there, and as many as can be well mounted west
of sd. river to act as scouts, to harras and scour the country, and watch
his movements, and convey information to the different posts -
"They would further advise, that you enquire of Col. Fannin, if an
election has been held with, or by, the volunteers now with Johnson and
if there has not been an election held, for him to order Col. Johnson to
hold one, and require a stipulated time for the volunteers to engage for,
at the same time informing them, that they cannot be under the sanction
of the government, unless they do so, And also, to press on Col.
Fannin, the great importance of a speedy march forward, as soon as Ms
force, and circumstances will permit, in order to obtain the object of the
expedition."
At the time this last message was written the advisory committee had
moved to Washington, and only two members--Thomson and Pattillo--
were present.
Ralph W. Steen.
How to cite:
Ralph W. Steen, "Analysis of the Work of the General Council, Provisional Government of Texas, 1835-1836", Volume 41, Number 4, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v041/n4/contrib_DIVL5893.html
[Accessed Thu Dec 4 12:56:22 CST 2008]
