THE PARRILLA EXPEDITION TO THE RED RIVER
IN 1759
The documentary material used in the preparation of this paper is
from transcripts in the personal collection of Dr. H. E. Bolton. The three
expedientes
cited are in the Archivo General de Indias, 92-6-22, at Sevilla.
Their abbreviated titles are: Autos
sobre
el
Asalto,
Autos
sobre
el
Auxilio,
and Autos
sobre
la
Campaña,
respectively referred to in the notes as
Asalto,
Auxilio,
and Campaña.
Among the graphic episodes during the Spanish period in Texas
history, one of the most notable is the attempt to reduce the eastern
Apaches to mission life. Dr. W. E. Dunn has told the story of
early Spanish relations with the Apaches and the founding of the
San Sabá mission, with its subsequent destruction by northern
tribes. This attack marked the beginning of a new phase of
frontier contacts.
1
It is the purpose of this article to give an account of the first
attempt of the Spaniards to solve the new problem. The story of
the Parrilla expedition and its failure not only forms the sequel
to Dr. Dunn's study referred to above but provides one angle of
introduction to the study of the work of Athanase de Méziéres,
who, after the acquisition of Louisiana by the Spaniards, success-
fully carried out the task of pacifying the Indians of northern
Texas.
2
The incident is not only interesting for its own sake, but the
material on the official actions affords ample opportunity to observe
the workings of Spanish colonial administration on the frontier.
About the middle of the eighteenth century there was a current
of expansion in the Spanish province of Texas. The motives were
partly political and partly religious. As Dunn relates, one of these
colonization enterprises was the settlement on the San Sabá River
near the present town of Menard. There had been a cessation of
the long period of hostility between the Spaniards and the Apaches,
and the time was regarded as propitious for the reduction of these
Indians to mission life. Accordingly, in the spring of 1757, the
mission of San Sabá and the protecting presidio of San Luís de
las Amarillas were established for that purpose.
The founders were soon disappointed in their hopes of per-
suading the Apaches to submit. The natives were friendly, but
were firm in their refusal to abandon their life of freedom. After
a year everyone but Father Terreros, the president of the mission,
had given up hope for its success, and its future was being debated
when it was attacked and destroyed by a large number of northern
tribes, chiefly Comanches and Wichitas.
Early on the sixteenth of March, 1758, these hostile Indians
appeared outside the mission. As they had professed peaceful
intentions, they were allowed to enter. After a short time fighting
suddenly started and soon the buildings were in flames. Most
of the inhabitants escaped but several, including two of the three
missionaries, were killed. A relief party sent out from the presidio
was driven back. In fact, as most of its garrison was absent at
the time, it was feared that the military post itself might suffer
the same fate. The Indians, however, only made demonstra-
tions and departed early on the morning of the eighteenth.
Don Diego Ortiz Parrilla, the commander of the presidio,
immediately sent out calls for aid, but all other places were too
anxious about their own safety to respond. Even in the more
distant province of Coahuila, where Apache treachery was sus-
pected as the cause of the attack, there was fear of a similar fate.
In Mexico City the viceroy contented himself with ordering the
presidios nearest to San Antonio and San Sabá to send any avail-
able troops. Naturally none felt that it could afford to send any
aid. Before anything further was done, the official report on
the attack was awaited.
3
others and, in view of this and the Apaches' evident fear, he
realized that the Apaches could never be induced to settle per-
manently at San Sabá. He thought that the pretexts of the Apaches
bad been exposed: their unwillingness to enter the mission was
due to fear of the Comanches and, in a lesser degree, to the long
winters with ice, snow, and wind. 4
After having collected all the necessary documents, Parrilla
prepared his own report. It was in the form of three consultas,
or statements. The first dealt with the circumstances attending
the collection of evidence. In this he set forth the disadvantages
of the location at San Sabá, referring to letters of the previous
year in which he had reported conditions. He expatiated at some
length upon the strength of the northern tribes and the difficulty
of obtaining aid in case of attack. With this situation in view
he advised that extensive preparation be made before making a
punitive expedition. He offered to lead the enterprise and asked
for permission to call a junta
at San Antonio for the purpose of
a formal consideration of the problems connected with it.
5
In the other two communications he discussed the proposition
of moving the settlement. He agreed with Father Molina in
recommending, as a location for the mission, the San Marcos or
the Guadalupe. He strongly advocated placing the presidio at
the prospective mining site of Los Almagres on the Chañas River.
He claimed that enough taxes could be collected from such a
settlement to pay for the post and that with forty additional men
he could also protect the mission on the San Marcos. He expressed
the opinion that the country north of San Antonio should not be
entirely abandoned, as such a policy would make it appear that
they were retreating. His recommendations were buttressed by
statements from the priests and officers at the presidio.
6
It was a month and a half after the San Sabá episode before
Parrilla's consultas
reached Mexico City. They were sent to the
fiscal, and it was three weeks more before he made his report. He
reviewed at great length all of the incidents related to the San
Sabá enterprise, and then added his recommendations.
He agreed in general with Parrilla. He realized that the Apaches
could never be induced to settle at San Sabá. He doubted that
they could be induced to settle at any place, but the importance
of their reduction and the belief of the people on the ground that
now was the most propitious of all times led him to recommend
a continuation of the efforts. The fiscal frowned upon the sug-
gestion of Parrilla that the presidio be located on the Chañas.
The experience had been that the chief gainers from the mines
were the settlers and not the royal treasury. The productivity of
the mines was not proved and, until it was, he could see little
use of putting a presidio there. Even if it should be a paying
proposition, the distance from Los Almagres was too great to
protect a settlement on the San Marcos, and, he argued with a
wisdom gained from knowledge of things as they were, the interests
of religion would suffer in case there was any division of interests
between the mine and the mission.
7
As for the expedition, he recommended delay. The enemy were
numerous and well armed, their habitat was unknown, and the
matter of distinguishing innocent from guilty would be difficult.
A long time would be necessary to make the necessary preparations
for such a long and difficult campaign, as it would necessarily be.
The fiscal concluded by asking that a council be called to discuss
the matter and to decide what to report to the king. In this, as
well as in other matters, the auditor, Domingo de Valcarcel, con-
curred. Accordingly the viceroy called a meeting of the junta
de
guerra
y
hacienda
for June 27.
8
In discussing the moving of the presidio the junta
finally decided
that to do so would have the appearance of a retreat, consequently
it was agreed to keep it at San Sabá. This decision altered the
whole viewpoint. If weak-hearted action on the part of the Span-
iards would inspire the Indians with contempt so that "even the
Apaches would disdain to seek their friendship and the protection
of their presidios," then it would be necessary not only to maintain
the San Sabá garrison but also to punish the northern tribes. The
details of the campaign, were to be left to a junta
to meet at San
Antonio. These decisions were approved by the viceroy on July 5,
and the necessary orders were issued.
9
Since the Lipanes, one of the Apache tribes, had settled near
San Antonio they were easily accessible and, when Parrilla arrived
in October, steps were taken to sound the Indians as to their
willingness to enter missions. Chief Chiquito and several of his
tribe were invited to San Antonio, where a determined effort was
made to persuade them to abandon their savage life. The priests
held up before them the solid comfort and happiness in the mis-
sions. Chiquito replied that it was the firm intention of his tribe
to enter Spanish establishments but that they could not adopt a
settled life until the Comanches had been punished. With this
answer the missionaries had to be satisfied, writing to the viceroy
that they thought that a successful expedition against the Norteños
would do much toward the reduction of the Apaches, whom they
had begun to distrust. All other tribes of Texas, except the Texas
Indians themselves, were in communication with the French, chiefly
for the purpose of procuring firearms. Such allies as the Spaniards
had, as in the case of the Apaches, were so only because of their
own extremity and not because of any friendship for the Spanish.
The declaration ended by expressing the belief that the Apaches
should be required to enter missions in case of a successful issue
to the expedition.
10
In the meantime the northern tribes had been giving signs of
restlessness. An attack on the Apaches by the Tojoanes served to
keep alive the fears of the frontier inhabitants, especially as small
raiding parties continued to appear. In the middle of December
the Comanches surprised a party of thirty-four Apaches, killing
all but thirteen of them. These survivors had seen the enemy
heading toward San Sabá. For several days the presidio remained
in a state of fear. On the night of the twenty-second the raiders
hovered around the presidio but departed without making an
attack. The Apaches said that the enemy force was comprised
of members from eleven nations and was armed with muskets.
11
On the thirtieth of the same month Cortinas, in temporary charge
of the presidio, again wrote Parrilla, telling him of the arrival of
an Apache woman who had escaped from the Comanches. She had
stolen a horse and after five days was able to get to San Sabá.
She reported that the Comanches were travelling in two large
groups. With this news Cortinas had sent messengers to warn
the guard at the horse herd, but his messengers had been met
by one from the guard coming to report that the herd had already
been raided. A small ranchería
of Apaches who had moved back
to the San Sabá now camped close to the presidio in order to avail
itself of its protection. In spite of their fears, nothing further
happened. In east Texas there had also been some minor incidents.
In January, 1759, Barrios, governor of Texas, received a letter
from Father Calahorra stating that the Indians of east Texas
were preparing to join a large body of different nations in order
to attack San Sabá and San Antonio. All these things showed
the need of a vigorous policy in order to assure the safety of
frontier posts.
12
Parrilla had gone to San Antonio in the early part of October,
but the junta
was not finally assembled until the third of January,
1759. Barrios presided, the meeting being within his jurisdiction.
The members included Martos y Navarrete, soon to be governor
of Texas, and several commanders of presidios of the frontier.
The junta
continued in session till the thirtieth of January, when
it made a report of its decisions.
province approved the request of the junta, transmitting his order
to the settlements through his sergeant-major, Urresti. The action
of the citizens is eloquent. They refused to serve. From over the
whole province came protests. The following is an abbreviated
translation of the reply sent by the people of Valle de Guadalupe
de Salinas: "On the thirty-first of January we received an order
to report, armed and supplied, on the twelfth of February, under
the pain of fifty pesos fine. If we do this our families will perish.
We want you to understand the intolerable burden upon us. Many
years we have labored with risk and pain, suffering repeated wars.
Sir, is it not true that we have maintained ourselves at our own
cost and that all our misfortunes originate in the aid which we are
continually giving to assist in the conquest of new colonies ? Many
of us have served in the defense of Coahuila, leaving our families
in danger and our cattle to perish from the lack of attention. Not
only are our cattle our only means of subsistence, but to send us
upon an expedition would cause a loss to the treasury of a large
portion of the taxes which we usually pay. Is it possible, after
such a hard year as we have just had, that we are asked to go to
the defense of such a distant province as Texas? Would not our
families perish? Our families would be weeping now if it were
not for the fact that the law protects us. By order of our natural
lord and king we are not compelled to go on a march which calls
us from our own province, except in some very particular and
important case." 13
Citizens from other places had similar complaints. The only
comments at Mexico City were, "Why not tell them that they will
get a peso
a day?" and "We can expect such troubles when we
try to raise five hundred men." The last remark came from the
auditor who opposed the expedition, and used the troubles in
Nuevo León as one of his arguments.
14
The most difficult task that confronted the junta
was finding
the necessary number of soldiers. It had been found by experience
that smaller expeditions had not had uniform success even against
single tribes of Apaches, so it was necessary to have a relatively
large troop in order to insure success against the Comanches and
their allies. Spain was guarding her frontier with a minimum
number of soldiers, few of whom could be spared from their
respective places without some danger to the frontier defense. On
account of this fact an expedition of any size had to consist largely
of militia and mission Indians. In order that it should not be
composed wholly of raw troops, it was recommended that certain
posts send regular, or presidial, soldiers, who were to be replaced
during the campaign by an equal number of militia. In this
manner a force of five hundred men was planned: one hundred
and thirty-nine presidiáis and officers, two hundred and forty-one
militia, thirty Tlascalteco Indians, and ninety mission Indians.
15
The total length of time necessary for the campaign was esti-
mated at four and a half months. It was proposed to pay the
soldiers thirty pesos
per month and to require them to furnish
their own food and horses. This expense was estimated to be a
little more than fifty-two thousand pesos,
the regulars already
being provided for. Besides this, there would be the cost of trans-
port and the money or supplies given to the heathen Indians for
their help or friendship. A pack train of two hundred mules would
be needed with one man for every five mules. Enough cattle were
to be taken to provide one pound of meat per day for each person.
Other supplies included maize biscuit, frijoles, condiments, four
thousand pounds of shot, powder, cannon, and a great variety of
other equipment. It can be seen that only a rough estimate of
total expense could be made. There was no way of telling how
much of this material might be used or ruined in the course of
a campaign.
16
The junta
recommended that only the Tonkawa, Tawakoni,
Yscani, and Wichita tribes be punished. The Comanches and the
other tribes were to be spared till another time. The reason given
was that the Comanches were so distant, their location was un-
known, and the forces were too small to deal with such fierce
Indians. It was not thought that the expedition could be
assembled before June 1, but that any time after June would be
too late to start. This date would allow ample time to reach and
chastize the tribes that were known. The information about these
Indians had come through the Legumbres and Mayeyes, who hunted
buffalo over the same grounds as the enemy.
17
The question of Apache relations formed a knotty problem.
Only the Lipanes among them were regarded as friends, and it
was expected that force would have to be used to establish them
in missions. In any case their loyalty was so doubtful that it was
decided to allow only a few to accompany the expedition.
18
When the report of the junta
was received in Mexico City it
became the subject of argument between the fiscal and the auditor.
The latter opposed the expedition. Among other reasons he ob-
jected to the expense, saying, "These matters always cost more than
is estimated," and he doubted that the Spaniards would be able
to bring the Indians to a decisive engagement. The question was
referred to Echevarri, the decano
of the audiencia,
who supported
the fiscal. The decisive point in his mind was that the Indians
must be shown that "even in their most remote haunts they would
not be secure from the long arm of Spanish vengeance." Upon the
receipt of this opinion the viceroy ordered preparations to begin.
19
The work of raising soldiers proceeded slowly. By July 15,
1759, all of the contingents had arrived and the number was
sixty-five short of the five hundred. One reason for the lack of
speed was a series of raids by the Chichimecos on some of the
provinces. Another was the reluctance of the citizens to serve in
a distant campaign. We have already noted the actions of the
citizens of Nuevo León. At other places the conscripts used
"every means to escape service, even fleeing secretly." Some
of those who were inducted managed to desert while on the road
to San Antonio. To cap the climax, officials of different places
engaged in unseemly quarrels as to responsibility for various
conditions.
20
Very soon after mobilization started, Gatuno, at Potosi, requested
that something be done to support the soldiers who did not have
any money or means of maintenance to make the trip to San
Antonio, where their pay started. Many of the men lived from
day to day on the wages of their labor, and they would have no
opportunity to earn anything on a march of nearly a month's
duration. After the usual round of discussion at the capital it
was decided to allow half pay for the time estimated as necessary
to bring them to San Antonio.
21
When the time came for departure each soldier was allowed his
"travel money," which he drew in the form of rations or other
equipment. He was allowed to choose from a limited list. For
example, the Tlascalans of Nadadores received a credit of ten pesos
each. One took soap, valued at two pesos;
a knife, three pesos;
and
a pair of spurs at five pesos.
Another received soap to the value
of three pesos,
a bundle of tobacco at one peso
and two reales,
and
eleven and a half pounds of sugar at five pesos
and six reales.
Individual supplies varied, but everyone took soap and most of
them took tobacco.
22
The "travel orders" of one the detachments is still in existence.
Gatuno y Lemos, alcalde mayor of Potosí, gave a "list of orders
to be observed on the road to San Antonio." This list contains
injunctions to refrain from violence, to keep together, to maintain
proper guard at night, and to report all infractions to Gatuno.
If it were necessary to procure extra food on the route they were
to do so only after they had presented their travel orders. The
list closed with, "Do not embarrass the troops with too much work,
nor the citizens who are met with words under any pretext."
23
In following these preparations one can catch a glimpse of the
position of the central government of New Spain. It was, of
course, acknowledged to be the final and absolute authority, subject
only to the laws of the king. In practice, this was not so. The
bureaucratic administration of the Spanish colonies was fairly well
developed and both by law and by custom the respective spheres
of the local administrator and the central executive were well
defined. The history of New Spain is full of examples of the
nullification of royal and viceregal orders, either by active opposi-
tion or by the equally effective inertia of the citizenry.
In the discussions at Mexico City there was a general tone that
seemed to show a realization that the viceroy could with difficulty
enforce the orders which were in direct opposition to the wishes
of the people and their local magistrates. The auditor, Valcarcel,
made several references to this condition when he tried to dis-
courage the idea of an expedition. Since the central power was
weak it is not surprising that effective co-operation between the
governors of the different provinces was almost impossible.
The memorials presented by the inhabitants of Nuevo Leon
showed the independent feeling and spirit of the frontier settlers,
as well as the lack of interest in the welfare of other regions than
their own. The reference to their rights under the "laws of the
king" remind one of the similar claim to the "rights of English-
men" put forward in the English colonies about the same time.
Even in the official circles at Mexico City the viceroy was far
from supreme. The predominating feature was the advice of the
chief officials, the fiscal, the auditor, and the members of the
audiencia.
With rare exceptions the decrees of the viceroy say,
with minor variations, "As the fiscal asks and the auditor sub-
scribes." This does not include the numerous orders connected
with routine administration. In these cases the viceroy depended
upon his secretarial staff. It is not to be supposed from what has
been said that an active and aggressive viceroy might not have
been able to dominate the formation of policies, but only that con-
ditions were such that the ordinary human would find it much more
convenient to let affairs take their course.
As soon as the work of the junta
at San Antonio was completed
Parrilla returned to San Sabá. There, on the thirtieth of March,
1759, the Indians made a raid upon the horse herd. All twenty of
the soldiers comprising the guard were killed and all of the horses
and mules were taken. As soon as he heard of the raid Parrilla
dispatched a troop, but by the time it arrived there were only the
dead bodies despoiled of arms and clothing. Some attempt was
made at pursuit, but it was found that the enemy were too numerous
to be attacked. It was noted that all of the dead were marked with
bullet wounds only, and not a single arrow could be found. From
this it was concluded that all of the Indians were armed with
muskets.
24
When the news reached the capital it caused each official to
present the same line of argument that he had previously pre-
sented and ended in an order by the viceroy that preparations be
hastened. The attack showed the need of peace or a vigorous
campaign, and since the campaign had already been decided upon,
the best policy was to push the expedition as speedily and as
thoroughly as possible. Although more than twice as many were
killed by the Indians in this raid as had perished at the time of
the destruction of the mission, little excitement was manifested.
It was but an incident, while the attack of the previous year had
marked the beginning of the hostility of the Norteños, and had
the additional importance of involving the fate of a missionary
post.
25
In the meantime information was being collected as to the
position and circumstances of the enemy. Most of this information
was gathered from the French and the east Texas tribes. It was
known that some of the tribes of the northern Indians had united
and, as reports indicated, were fortified somewhere north of the
Brazos. According to Father Zedano, a missionary at Guadalupe,
near the Angelina, there was an Indian stockade located on a
plain and surrounded by a fosse so as to be secure from surprise.
The French reported that they had ceased to trade with the
offending Indians but declared that they would not consent to
the establishment of a Spanish presidio among them since they
were under the French banner. The exact knowledge displayed
by the French in their letters showed that their traders had been
among the Taovayos after the fort had been completed and
possibly had given the Indians instruction in the building of it.
26
Although it had been planned to start the expedition in June,
Parrilla was still in San Antonio in August. He then gave up
hope of receiving any more soldiers and, being pressed for time
enough to complete the campaign before the approach of cold
weather, left for San Sabá. At that place the final organization
of the force was made and the little army set out.
It bore little resemblance to our conception of a military expe-
dition. Even the presidials were more vaqueros
than soldiers. The
militia consisted of "cowboys, tailors, laborers, cigar-dealers, hat-
ters, peons from the mines, and persons of similar occupations,
who cannot be instructed."
27 All these soldiers, together with the
Tlascalan Indians, were armed with muskets and swords. Many
of them carried additional weapons; blunderbusses, knives, or
other arms.
28
In addition to these troops there were the mission Indians and
a small body of Apaches. They were armed with native weapons,
chiefly bows and arrows. Besides the fighting force there was a
pack train of about two hundred mules. Not only was each soldier
mounted but, as a rule, each had two spare mounts. One can
imagine the motley appearance of the troop as it marched league
after league over the dusty plains of Texas: Spaniards, mestizos
(both soldiers and cargadores),
Tlascaltecos who were descendants
of the allies of Cortez, mission Indians in the process of being
civilized, savage Apaches, pack train, horse herd, and cattle herd.
Altogether there were more than five hundred men and over
sixteen hundred head of horses, mules, and cattle.
No Spanish expedition would be complete without its friars.
This one had two, the Franciscan Fathers Acayos and Peláez.
Friars were never men of one accomplishment; their duties were
as varied as the demands that were made upon them. Father
Acayos was the chaplain and Father Peláez was the official
surgeon.
29
While many of the frontier presidials were veterans of Indian
warfare, there were relatively few among those in Parrilla's force
who had such experience. In spite of the inferior troops, Parrilla
was confident of success. He was an old campaigner himself. He
had been born in Spain of noble parents. For several years during
his youth he saw service against the Moors at Oran and Ceuta.
At the time of the war of the Austrian Succession he was sent
to Cuba and, when that conflict was over, went to Vera Cruz as
commander of the dragoons. His first task was the quelling of
riots at Puebla. This was followed by a punitive expedition which
he led against the Indians of the Sierra de Soquitlán. For these
achievements he was rewarded with the interim governorship of
Sinaloa and Sonora where he conducted a successful campaign
against the Seri Indians on the island of Tiburón in 1749. He
further distinguished himself, both for good judgment and per-
sonal bravery, in the suppression of the Pima revolt which broke
out in 1751. He had every reason to believe that he was headed
for still other honors.
30
The chief problem, so Parrilla thought, was to find out where
the enemy was located. Too many previous Indian campaigns
had been fruitless on account of failure to bring the foe to a
decisive engagement. Bearing in mind the information of Father
Zedano, he directed his course towards the northeast. For some
time no Indians were encountered. On the second of October, how-
ever, a Tonkawa village on the north side of the Brazos was sur-
prised. Several of the warriors were killed and one hundred and
forty-nine inhabitants were captured. Parrilla continued his march
without delay and when he found that the savages whom he had
just taken knew the location of the Taovayas he embraced the
opportunity to utilize them as guides. He now felt that he could
bring the expedition to a successful conclusion. The prisoners,
who were bound with chains and surrounded with guards to pre-
vent their escape, pointed out the way. On the morning of the
seventh of October the captives told Parrilla that the day's march
would bring them to the "Tahuayas" and "Yscanes." They said
that they could locate a camp for the Spaniards which would be
suitable for grazing the horses and for reconnaissance. This infor-
mation was corroborated by the Apaches who were familiar with
the general nature of the country.
31
About one o'clock in the afternoon, when they had travelled
six leagues, a band of sixty or seventy Indians came out to attack
the Spaniards. Quickly Parrilla formed his men into line of
battle, the horses not in use being taken to the rear along with
the prisoners. The animals were fastened head to head and a
detachment was detailed to guard them. By this time more of
the enemy had appeared and "arrogantly" attacked Parrilla's forces.
One determined charge was enough to disperse them. The Span-
iards followed them closely through the woods.
32
As the pursuers emerged from the far edge of the woods they
were astonished by the sight of a fortification on the bank of a
large river. From the safety of their refuge the Indians laughed
at the Spaniards and challenged them to enter. Finding that the
fort could not easily be entered, Parrilla withdrew his troops a
short distance to reform and to consider the situation. "At a dis-
tance of a short musket shot were clearly seen the high oval-shaped
huts, which were surrounded by a fosse, and the road by which
they entered was encircled in the same manner, since it was
winding, with the entrance by the river, which flowed by at ä
depth of about one and a half yards,"
33 Upstream from the village
were several fields which were planted in maize, pumpkins, frijoles,
and watermelons. Only a portion of the village was sur-
rounded by a palisade, in the center of which a French flag was
floating, and, upon the appearance of the Spaniards the inhab-
itants of the huts outside the fortification fled to the stockade.
Inside was a corral where the Indians kept their horses. Just
below the settlement was a ford, where a large force was stationed
to prevent the attackers from crossing. It was evident that several
tribes were represented. The Comanches were among them, their
tents being in plain view. During the afternoon re-enforcements
for the Indians continued to arrive. The total number of the
enemy was variously estimated, some of the Spaniards saying that
there were six thousand warriors altogether, of whom five hundred
were mounted. Parrilla conservatively stated that they were at
least as numerous as his own force. As a check on these estimates
it is worth noting that the Taovavas alone had more than five
hundred warriors, according to Athanase de Méziéres. Parrilla had
three hundred men engaged in the fight.
34
During the period of these observations, Parrilla had arranged
his troops. The main body of Spaniards was placed in the center,
the mission Indians and the Tlascaltecos on the right wing, and
the Apaches, with some Spaniards, on the left. "The attack was
delayed until we should take counsel, but the enemy, who con-
sidered himself secure in his fortress, both on the outside and on
the inside began to fire and attempted to cut off our retreat into
the woods in order to place our troops between two fires as they
sent troops to both flanks." Parrilla's object was to stop the
enemy's fire by an overwhelming rush and then to.force entrance
to the stockade by means of the winding road. His intentions
were thwarted by the Indian attack, but he did not lose sight of
his objective and continually tried to gain the initiative. Time
after time the Spaniards charged only to be stopped by the con-
centrated fire of the defenders. In return, the Indians outside
the palisade would make sudden attacks and then just as quickly
retreat to the fosse, where they would be met by Indians on foot
who gave them loaded muskets in exchange for their empty ones.
The Taovayas chief was the spirited leader of these attacks. "Their
captain showed in all his movements a well ordered valor and a
great dexterity in the management of his horse and arms. He
had a jacket of white buckskin, a helmet of the same material
with flesh-colored plumes, and was mounted on a well-kept horse
that was suited to that kind of warfare. He had many men sim-
ilarly equipped, but none of such spirit and conduct, and all were
encouraged by his fighting." The chieftain fell in one of these
attacks, but buoyed up by their success and by the noise of fifes
and drums from within the stockade, the Indians kept up their
attacks. Even the possession of the cannon did not aid the Span-
iards. So little was the effect that, after eleven volleys, the Indians
still greeted each shot with a shout of laughter.
35
The Spanish retreat was a foregone conclusion. As night began
to fall the Indians redoubled their efforts to cut off the line of
retreat. A sustained attack was made upon the left wing, which
was forced to give way. Under various pretexts or none at all,
some of the soldiers left the field of battle. The whole body then
retired through the woods to the place where the fight had first
started. In this retreat the cannon were lost. The troops refused
to obey orders and the few who did try to save the artillery were
cut down by the Indians. With great difficulty Parrilla managed
to repulse several charges which the Indians made on their new
positions. When night came the Indians withdrew and some degree
of calm returned.
36
At first Parrilla considered recommencing the battle on the next
day, but he soon found out that the soldiers had "a lack of spirit
for fighting the kind of Indians which have been seen." The officers
presented Parrilla with a petition asking him to retreat. They
argued the losses that had been suffered, the disintegration of the
troops, the amount of good already done, and the fact that "the
greater part of our troops have not the means of resting, especially
with such an intrepid and vigorous enemy near; since to the dis-
grace of being without discipline are added individual faults and a
total ignorance in handling arms, because no one in their prov-
inces has taken the trouble to train them in the use of arms, and
because many of them are strangers to the professions. . . . Since
we have seen them fail once under fire, we do not believe that it is
to the best interests of the king and these dominions to risk them
again."
37
Father Acayos and Father Peláez both thought that retreat
was wise, as did Parrilla himself, so he issued instructions to that
effect. Information brought in by stragglers revealed that the
enemy were still receiving re-enforcements and were so confident
that they had engaged in a big celebration and made no pretense
at keeping watch. Satisfied by this information Parrilla proceeded
with other duties, the first of which was to ascertain the amount
of damage done. He found that eleven Spaniards, one Tlascalteco,
and one Apache were killed, and that fourteen Spaniards and one
Apache were wounded. There were nine desertions among the
Spaniards and four others, not including the Apaches, all of whom
had left in a body, and, "having begun their flight, took their
horses and many of ours." Most of the missing men showed up
during the night and the following morning. The cannon had
been lost, as well as many muskets, saddles, and other equipment.
On the other hand the Indians had not escaped without loss. In
the two engagements more than a hundred were known to have
been killed, and the Spaniards still had in their possession the one
hundred and forty-nine captives from the first fight.
38
During the morning after the conflict, the camp was moved
closer to the woods to allow the fugitives of the day before to join
the main body. After this was accomplished Parrilla set out for
San Sabá, travelling by the same route he had come. It was
reached on the twenty-fifth of October, 1759, and thus ended the
expedition. It certainly can be classed as a failure so far as the
vindication of Spanish arms is concerned, and that was the prin-
cipal motive urged in Mexico City in favor of the campaign.
39
The reasons for the defeat were doubtless the unexpected position,
arms, and discipline of the Indians. Parrilla thought that, on the
whole, the Indians showed a greater degree of training than the
Spanish presidials, and he believed that the French had imparted
military information to them as well as furnishing them with arms.
This last is undoubtedly true. The sight of a French flag on a pole
within the stockade and the sound of fifes and drums was all the
evidence that the Spaniards needed. There were other causes for
the defeat. The troops were from widely scattered places and
lacked the cohesion of a true military unit. Many had no previous
military training and it is only fair to assume that the poorest
specimens were drafted from each place. Parrilla, in a letter
written long before the campaign had taken place, says of colonials,
"The soldiers here are in no way similar to those I commanded
and saw in service there [Morocco], they are difficult to reduce to
obedience and subordination, since they are gathered with them
the most worthless loafers in breeding and instincts that their
Fatherland affords."
40
Parrilla himself cannot escape his share of the blame. He had
an excellent reputation as an Indian fighter. This campaign would
have assured his fame as the foremost of the frontier campaigners
had it been successful. Trained in Spain and Morocco, he un-
doubtedly had the faults which European regulars often displayed
in American fighting. Instead of complaining of the qualities of
his soldiers, he should have planned his campaign accordingly.
Perhaps it is expecting too much, as we must remember that it
was not until thirty-five years later that Anglo-Americans evolved
battle tactics that would usually assure them of success against
an equal body of Indians.
The principal motive in founding the mission on the San Saba
had been to Christianize the eastern Apaches and to settle perma-
nently the question of the relations with this group of Indians.
Not only did the mission fail to attract those for whom it was
meant, but the project aroused the hostility of the numerous
northern tribes, all of whom were mortal enemies of the Apaches.
The destruction of the settlement raised up a new problem in
Indian relations, which it was decided to solve by the chastizement
of the offenders.
The delays and difficulties in getting the expedition started
illustrate the conditions which led, in a few years, to the appoint-
ing of a general commander for all the border provinces. Even
with all its troubles the campaign apparently should have been
successful, but the Spaniards ran into a different kind of Indian,
in spirit and arms, than they had previously encountered on the
northern frontier. Consequently they met defeat.
This defeat seriously injured Spain's prestige with the natives,
but it is impossible to tell what ultimate effect it might have had.
In a few years Spain was to displace France as the possessor of
Louisiana. By virtue of this change the Spaniards were able to
make peace with the Norteños, especially as the rupture of the
peace with the Apaches removed the cause for friction with the
northern tribes.
FOOTNOTES:
Historical Association, Quarterly, XIV, pp. 198-274; "Missionary activ-
ities among the eastern Apaches," in the same Quarterly, Vol. XV, pp.
186-200; "The Apache mission on the San Saba river," in Southwestern
Historical Quarterly, XVII, pp. 379-414.
1768-1780, Cleveland, 1914.
roy, Mar. 25, 1758, Asalto, pp. 21, 25-6. Parrilla, auto, Mar. 27, 1758,
Asalto, pp. 89-90. Rivera testimony, Apr. 2, 1758, Asalto, p. 94. Trujillo,
testimony Apr. 2 1758 Asalto, pp. 92-3. Viceroy, decrees, Apr. 9, 1758,
and Apr. 19, 1758, Asalto, pp. 33-34, 37.
Indians treacherous in their conduct and arrogant in their preparations,
so magnificent and numerous, are unique among the tribes of the Indies.
They are similar to [the Moors] in their manner of attack."
129-34. 134-40.
June 12, 1758, Asalto, pp. 198-208. Viceroy, decree, June 15, 1758,
Asalto, p. 208.
decree, June 28, 1758, Asalto, pp. 215-6. [Viceroy], instrucción, July 5,
1758, Asalto, pp. 217-21.
viceroy Oct. 23, 1758, Asalto, pp. 286-93. Parrilla, autos, Oct. 17, 1758,
Oct. 18, 1758, and Oct. 25, 1758, Asalto, pp. 278-9, 282-3, 293. Parrilla to
viceroy Oct. 26, 1758, Asalto, p. 284. Parrilla and Dolores diligencia,
Oct. 18, 1758, Asalto, p. 283. Parrilla, Dolores, López, and Aparicio,
declaración, Oct. 17, 1758, Asalto, pp. 279-82.
Dec. 30, 1758, Asalto, pp. 340-1. Cortinas to Parrilla, Dec. 30, 1758,
Asalto, pp. 339-40.
Urresti to Villaviceneio, Jan. 29, 1759, Asalto, p. 250. Villaviceneio, auto,
Jan. 30, 1759, Asalto, 249-50. Vecinos del Valle de Guadalupe de Salinas y
Carrizal to [Urresti], Feb. 3, 1759, Asalto, pp. 259-61.
268-71. Vecinos de Santa Catalina to Urresti, Feb. 3, 1759, Asalto, pp.
251-3. Vecinos del Valle to Urresti, [Feb. 4, 1759]5 Asalto, pp. 263-4.
Vecinos de Cadereita to the cabildo of the same place, Feb. 4, 1759,
Asalto, pp. 257-8. Cabildo of Cadereita, auto, Feb. 5, 1759, Asalto, pp.
258-9. Vecinos del Valle de Mota to Urresti, Feb. 8, 1759, Asalto, pp.
254-6.
pp. 311-5.
315-326.
viceroy, Mar. 25, 1759, Asalto, pp. 369-72. Echevarri to viceroy, Mar. 30,
1759, Asalto, pp. 375-81. Viceroy, decrees, Apr. 1, 1759 and Mar. 30,
1759, Asalto, pp. 384-5, 381-2. Viceroy to Parrilla, Apr. 4, 1759, Asalto,
p. 387.
July 15, 1759, Auxilio, pp. 124-5. Gatuno to viceroy, Apr. 14, 1759,
Auxilio, p. 2. Martos to Goyo, July 21, 1759, Auxilio, pp. 155-6. Martos
to viceroy, May 31, 1759 and July 21, 1759, Auxilio, pp. 196-7, 156-7.
Parrilla to viceroy, July 15, 1759, Auxilio, p. 222. Villavicencio to viceroy,
Apr. 27, 1759, Auxilio, pp. 28-9.
Apr. 27, 1759, Auxilio, pp. 4-6. Auditor to viceroy, Apr. 29, 1759, Auxilio,
pp. 6-9. Echevarri to viceroy, May 1, 1759, Auxilio, pp. 9-10. Viceroy,
decree, May 1, 1759, Auxilio, p. 11.
10, 1759, Auxilio, pp. 37-38. Frexomil, list, May 16, 1759, Auxilio, pp.
100-3. Goyo, list, May 4, 1759, Auxilio, pp. 159-61. Hoyos, list, [May,
1759], Auxilio, pp. 49-50. Urresti, list, [May, 1759], Auxilio, pp. 40-44.
viceroy, Mar. 30, 1759, Auxilio, pp. 18-20.
Mar. 30, 1759, Auxilio, p. 17.
July 15, 1759, Auxilio, p. 222. Zedano to [Marios], . . . , Auxilio, p. 198.
In this paper the terms Taovayos and Wichitas are used indiscriminately.
See Hodge's Handbook.
eral y Público de la Nación (Mexico), Provincias Internas.
Nov. 8, 1759, Campaña, pp. 7-8.
7, 1759, Compaña, p. 7. Parrilla, testimonio, Nov. 8, 1759, Campaña.
pp. 20-25.
viceroy, Feb. 6, 1760, Campaña, p. 40.
How to cite:
Henry Easton Allen, "Parrilla Expedition to the Red River in 1759", Volume 43, Number 1, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v043/n1/contrib_DIVL1845.html
[Accessed Thu Dec 4 12:52:06 CST 2008]
