Diplomacy and the Borderlands: The Adams-Onís Treaty of
1819. By Philip Coolidge Brooks.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1939. Pp. x, 262. Cloth,
$2.50; paper, $2.00.

Mr. Brooks indicates by the first part of the title of his
admirable study, Diplomacy and the Borderlands: The Adams-
Onís Treaty of 1819, that the agreement had a significance
much broader than is implied by the term "Purchase of Florida,"
which the settlement of 1819 has often erroneously been called.
The borderlands over which the negotiators chiefly wrangled
were not those of Florida but of the American West. Both
Adams and Onís regarded the treaty as the greatest diplomatic
achievement of their careers. In summarizing the importance
of this treaty, the author says: "By its terms the United States
received the Floridas, rounding out its domain east of the Mis-
sissippi; Spain was confirmed in her title to Texas; Santa Fé
was protected by the bending of the line to leave 360 miles
between that town and the border; and in the Northwest the
ambitious republic acquired all of Spain's rights north of what
is now the California-Oregon boundary, thus being for the
first time assured of a transcontinental domain."

Brooks points out that although the Spanish patriot assembly,
the Junta Central of Aranjuez, sent Don Luis de Onís as its
minister to the United States in the summer of 1809, the pro-
French policy of the Madison administration and the revolu-
tion in Spain restrained this government from recognizing his
credentials until December, 1815. Actually it was not until late
in 1817, after John Quincy Adams assumed his duties as Presi-
dent Monroe's Secretary of State, that any real progress was
made toward a treaty. Notwithstanding the numerous other
questions in controversy, Adams and Onis made the definition
of a boundary line between the United States and Spanish
North America a sine qua non for a settlement. Despite the
temporary suspension and transfer of negotiations to Madrid,
Adams and Onis stuck tenaciously to their task until they
reached an agreement.

The Spanish foreign ministry, by successive instructions,
authorized Onis to propose various lines from the Mississippi
to the Sabine as the western limits of the United States, but
Adams insisted upon the Colorado River flowing into Mata-
gorda Bay as the minimum western delimitation. Onís resorted
to subterfuge in contending that the only Colorado the Span-
iards knew was the Red River passing by Natchitoches, Louisi-
ana. When news of Jackson's invasion of Florida reached the
capital in July, 1818, only Adams among the Washington offi-
cials defended Jackson, in order "to bolster his diplomatic
strategy." Uneasy lest the United States occupy other Spanish
territory, Onís expedited his discussions with Adams. At these
conferences Adams first mentioned extending the boundary line
to the Pacific Ocean.

In January, 1819, Onís received instructions to agree first
to the Colorado if necessary to avoid a rupture in the negotia-
tions, and second, to grant the extension to the Pacific. But
Onís offered only the Sabine as the western limit; then north
and west to the Pacific, however, the proposed line followed
approximately the course finally agreed upon. Adams regretted
giving up Texas, but he considered that concession requisite
for an agreement, since Onís concealed his instructions to yield
to the Colorado. Furthermore, Adams was securing a major
point in his demands--the first title by treaty of the United
States to land on the Pacific.

Adams and Onís, fearing that opposition to the provisions
of the treaty whereby Spain would retain Texas might jeop-
ardize the whole arrangement, then hastened to reach an ac-
cord. Two days after they signed the treaty on February 22,
1819, the United States Senate ratified it unanimously. The
treaty provided that ratifications should be exchanged within
six months. It was at first favorably received in Spain, but
the intrigues of court favorites soon produced such an adverse
reaction that the Spanish government did not approve the treaty
until October, 1820. Ratifications were finally exchanged in
Washington on February 22, 1821.

Brooks emphasizes the fact that the Adams-Onís Treaty pro-
vided for no "purchase" of the Floridas. The section relative
to the cession of the Floridas was nicely phrased so as to
satisfy both contracting parties. The author feels certain that
the Spanish ministry made use of Pichardo's Treatise in prepar-
ing instructions to Onis. He suggests that possibly John Jacob
Astor influenced Adams to propose the extension of the bound-
ary line to the Pacific. The role played by the Spanish gov-
ernment in the negotiations, which historians have most neg-
lected in discussing the treaty, forms the dominant theme of
the narrative. Brooks is the first student to incorporate in a
single volume the results of a thorough examination of all
available materials in the archives of the United States, Spain,
England, and France bearing upon the treaty. Copious notes
at the end of each chapter testify to the prodigious extent of
his research. Reproduction of maps and the inclusion of help-
ful appendices contribute to the excellence of this compre-
hensive study.

Southwestern Louisiana Institute.

Grady D. Price.

How to cite:
"Diplomacy and the Borderlands", Volume 45, Number 4, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v045/n4/review_DIVL6916.html
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