TEXAS AND THE CONFEDERATE ARMY'S
MEAT PROBLEM
The vital issues contingent upon supplying an army with
munitions of war were illustrated in the British Eighth Army's
pursuit of Rommel from El Alamein to Tunis. Food is one of
these munitions of war. To keep the "British Eighth" ad-
vancing, food as well as ammunition and gasoline had to reach
the front. Manifestly the Tunisian campaign was, if not the
greatest, one of the greatest miracles of supply in modern war.
It is not to be forgotten, however, that the armies of the south-
ern Confederacy were confronted with a problem of supply;
theirs was the harder to solve because ways had to be found of
getting food out of the steadily contracting areas of the Con-
federacy, while the African problem was that of transporting
subsistence across a desert. Importation of food being negligi-
ble, the Confederate Government was forced to rely on the out-
put of the southern farmer and cattleman.
To an army whose personnel was from a section of the
country which raised large numbers of hogs and beef, meat was
a vital part of the ration. It is obvious that a study of all the
problems concerning meat which weighed on the South would
require much more than the space available; therefore, the
present inquiry will be confined, for the most part, to beef. It
is further hoped that this article may shed some light on all
the problems facing the Confederate Commissariat after the
loss of the Mississippi.
The Commissary-General, L. B. Northrop, found that his
troubles began in the early part of the war as 500,000 pork
hogs were considered necessary to feed the southern armies for
a year. Northrop did not think that that number could be ob-
tained in the Confederacy.
1 While he had his troubles in pro-
curing meat, the fact remains that the basic ration on which the
southern soldier lived was corn and beef.
2 In the early part of
the war, some, at least, of the Rebel camps fared well in the
matter of meat.
3 With all the meat the soldiers consumed, there
were still 40,000 cattle ready for packing in the Confederacy at
the end of 1861.
4 This indicates that the South started with
something. The real pinch began to be felt in early 1863 when
Lee's chief commissary informed him that he would not be able
to make the supply of beeves last through the month of January.
The condition of the beeves issued to the Army of Northern
Virginia was so bad that Lee recommended they be sent some-
where to fatten in the spring. In lieu of the ration of beef he
hoped his chief commissary had enough salt meat to issue.
5 Two
weeks later his available supply had dwindled to four days'
fresh beef. Following his usual practice, he refused to resort
to impressing any meat which the civilians in the vicinity of
the army might have. He told the Secretary of War that it
would gain the army little and would anger the people,
6 and
even if he had resorted to commandeering, it would have afford-
ed only temporary relief. He could not remedy a condition which
the Government could not, or would not remedy. That condition
was faulty transportation. The transportation system of the
South was the main adverse factor working against the com-
missary and quartermaster officials. The sad, and steadily de-
teriorating, condition of southern rail lines played a major part
in holding back the flow of provisions to Lee's army and to all
other Confederate forces.
7 The Government seemed powerless
to do anything about the railroads and the armies continued to
live on shorter rations. Another adverse factor, during the
latter part of the war, was the Federal blockade, which was
becoming steadily more efficient. Confederate coastwise ship-
ping, which, early in the war, had been transporting sub-
sistence, could no longer do so with any security.
8 The shortage
of wagons also told on any effort to collect supplies situated
around the bivouac of troops. The amount of rations tó be
taken on the march sometimes had to be reduced* because the
capacity of the commissary wagons was not sufficient to carry
the total.
9
All these factors, combined with the breakdown of Confed-
erate finances, continuously weakened the commissary depart-
ment, and Lee became so acutely aware of the pressing need for
food that he wrote Longstreet, in the West: "The great obstacle
everywhere is scarcity of supplies. That is the controlling ele-
ment to which everything has to yield."
10
General Joseph E. Johnston must have found this to be true
when the Secretary of War informed him that he should not
draw supplies from Atlanta or other depots which were con-
sidered general reserves for all the armies.
11 Johnston, it was
hoped, could get sufficient food from the country around his
army. This scheme originated in the mind of the Commissary-
General and seems to have been one of his favorites.
While the Commissary-General was employing all shifts to
husband the shrinking stores of food, his eyes, as well as those
of the Secretary of War, turned to North Carolina. The latter,
J. A. Seddon, felt this state to be the main reliance of the
South for foodstuffs, even though the enemy controlled the
main food producing counties.
12
Then came the fall of Vicksburg, July 4, 1863. The Govern-
ment's worries after that date, if they had been great before,
were crushing. The Confederacy no longer controlled the
Mississippi River, and Arkansas, western Louisiana, Indian
Territory, and Texas no longer were in direct connection with
the eastern Confederacy. The loss of Texas beef at once caused
the number of cattle east of the Mississippi to fall off; Northrop,
as a result of this, had to recommend a reduction of the meat
ration in late July.
13 The Army of Northern Virginia got tem-
porary relief by invading Pennsylvania, but the only significant
acquisition of beef cattle on this campaign was that of General
R. S. Ewell, who on the way to Carlisle captured and sent to
the main column some 3000 head. General John B. Imboden,
on guard detail with Lee's retreating wounded train after
Gettysburg, said that he had "a small lot of fine fat cattle"
which he had taken on the way to that place.
14
Regardless of what little additions there were to the number
of beeves by captures and the like, the amount of meat on the
eastern side of the Mississippi in December was enough for
only twenty-five days. Virginia had nothing, of course, above
the absolute wants of Lee's troops.
15 Even after cutting the
issue of salt meat to a fourth of a pound, Lee had only three
days' supply.
16
By November, the attention of most commissary officers was
directed toward Florida, which was generally recognized, since
the loss of the Texas source, as the last remaining area from
which beef might be drawn, as all other beef-producing areas
east of the Mississippi were in Federal hands or were being
devastated by raiding. Major J. F. Cummings, charged with
supplying Bragg's army, had written to Major P. W. White, the
chief commissary of Florida, on October 5, urging that he
should forward beef, as all other sources were exhausted. Cum-
mings was totally dependent on Florida for Bragg's beef supply.
On the 20th his letter said that the troops under Bragg were
getting half rations of beef and he feared that in a few days
they would be living on bread alone. Georgia was equally de-
pendent on Florida; the chief commissary of that state, Major
J. L. Locke, confessed that his only hope was in Major White.
South Carolina was in the same condition; Major Millen, at
Savannah, felt that the weekly collections by purchasing com-
missaries would have to be relied on. This was doubly so in
his case, as he had killed up all the beef cattle in his area and
was reduced to killing stock herds.
17
This alarming state of affairs seemed to jolt the Commissary-
General out of his lethargy and he made more strenuous efforts
to obtain beef. One of these was to try to swim beeves across
the Mississippi River. The cooperation of General E. Kirby
Smith, commanding the trans-Mississippi Department, was so-
licited in order to establish contact with General J. E. Johnston
and arrange the times and localities for crossing the cattle.
18
While this was going on, Northrop, by intercepting a communi-
cation from two Florida men to the Secretary of War,
19 cost
the Confederate States a million pounds of salt beef. The
Floridians, who owned the only steamboats in their section of
Florida, would have been willing to sell the beef to the Govern-
ment at a reduced price because it was exposed to raiding, and
would have transported it to the main rail line themselves.
Since they did not wish to deal with Northrop, they left Rich-
mond as soon as it came to their ears that he had intercepted
their letter, without the Secretary of War having heard of
their proposal.
20 Thus Northrop defeated himself. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to attempt to give a picture of the Con-
federate Commissary-General, but suffice it to say that he
seemed actually to enjoy the commanders' complaints of food
shortage, for these gave him opportunities to write long missives
stating that he had foreseen that the army would be reduced to
that state, and in one case he absolved himself "from all re-
sponsibility" for a shortage of supplies in Lee's army.
At Christmas time, luckily for them, Longstreet's troops were
encamped near Morristown, Tennessee, and according to Long-
street, himself, the country was heaven so far as food was con-
cerned; all varieties of victuals, long since forgotten to the
Rebels, were to be found in abundance.
21 What a time those ill-
fed veterans of Lee's must have had!
In striking contrast to this was the Department of South
Carolina, Georgia and Florida, commanded by General P. G.
T. Beauregard. On January 12, 1864, Morris Island was re-
ported out of meat for several days, and Northrop was forced
to comment that ante helium South Carolina had been depend-
ent on external sources for food and that under war conditions
it was certainly no different. The troops stationed there had
to be fed on provisions shipped in. The chief commissary of
that state, Major H. C. Guerin, indicated his desperation when
he said: "Purchases and impressments will be attempted. . .
but the main dependence for meat next summer is Florida."
22
It is little wonder that this was the case. By October, 1863,
the number of beef cattle in the eastern Confederacy had fallen
from the 40,000 of 1861 to less than half that number, and
Major P. W. White reported on April 15, 1864, that the supply
of beef in Florida was running low because of lack of rail trans-
portation.
23
The severe privation which seemed to be staring the army
in the face focused the attention, once more, of General Beau-
regard. Help was so urgently needed in the collection of sup-
plies of beef in Florida that Beauregard offered to pardon de-
serters in certain areas of that state if they would report to
commissary officers for duty.
24 This measure was all the more
necessary because the number of beef cattle in the east had
fallen to 5,959 in the spring of 1864,
25 and the main area of
reserve stores had been reduced to Georgia, Virginia and North
Carolina.
26 One of these areas was soon to be the objective of
General Sherman; on September 2, 1864, he entered the main
Confederate supply base of Atlanta. After Hood had started
his disastrous Tennessee campaign, Sherman began his "March
to the Sea," with the purpose of destroying the area from which
Lee's army was drawing so much of its food.
27 This marked
the beginning of the end for the Confederate States. With a
good portion of Georgia devastated by Sherman's "bummers,"
Northrop, contrary to his usual attitude, was optimistic in re-
porting to the Secretary of War, J. C. Breckinridge, February
9,1865, on the condition of the meat supply. He went into some
detail on this subject. Among other things, he said:
Some thousands of beeves have been obtained within the past few months
by swimming the Mississippi, and when the river is again in a suitable
state and the season admits of it, the proceeding should be continued.
In the same report he said that Florida had supplied a good
number of beeves and that he expected to get 20,000 more from
that source.
28
Whether or not Northrop obtained the beeves he seemed con-
fident of getting the records do not show, but one thing is clear:
the history of the Confederate food supply during the last
months of the war is one long string of pleas from commissary
officers for funds or transportation. With these requisites they
were certain they could maintain the armies;
29 without them
they were helpless. Because neither of these requisites could
be supplied, the eastern Confederate armies, especially Lee's,
ended the war practically starved.
The one remaining question is: What help would the trans-
Mississippi Department have been, if the Mississippi had been
a southern river after 1863? The inquiry would be incomplete
if we overlooked this most important of beef-producing areas.
This was certainly the most prolific part of the country for
beef, since Texas comprised most of the department. Northrop,
himself, pointed out that Texas had been one of the main sources
of beef and that he had obtained large numbers of animals
from there.
30
During the period of 1862-3 Northrop tried to bring herds
from Texas and put them on Virginia grasslands, but the lack
of good forage en route caused this attempt to fail. Later at-
tempts proved more successful, as Northrop, in his report to
the Secretary of War mentioned above, said that thousands had
been obtained by swimming them over the Mississippi.
31
The trans-Mississippi Department was not only concerned
with shipping beef to the east, but also with subsisting the
large numbers of troops stationed within its own limits. To
feed these men, cured meat, in all forms, had to be supplied.
Various ways of packing beef were practised, as evidenced by
Northrop's statement that large quantities of pickled beef came
from the west.
32 The great center of Jefferson, Texas, besides
being an important quartermaster depot,
33 was the site of a
number of commissary activities. One of these enterprises was
the meat-packing establishment of J. B. Dunn. In late 1863 this
firm entered into a contract with the Confederate States to
slaughter and pack 150 beef cattle per day. The manner of
packing was specifically stated: "The hind quarter. . . with the
bone extracted to be smoked and dried the balance of the
beef (or Such parts as are usually used in making a prime
article of mess beef) to be pickled in the best manner. . ."
Major W. H. Thomas, chief commissary of the trans-Mississippi
Department, was to furnish 440,000 pounds of New Iberia salt
to Dunn to enable him to cure the beef and to pack it. Major
Thomas was also to furnish Dunn with 4,000 head of beef
cattle before the 10th of January, 1864.
34 This is but one indi-
cation of the importance of the Texas beef supply.
Five days before all the beef should have been delivered,
Kirby Smith directed that a "Board of Survey" should convene
in Major Thomas' office to investigate the quality of beef packed
by Dunn. The board, on the same day, reported the meat to
be in good condition.
35
The soldier, himself, was much more concerned with what
he was issued in the way of meat than with how it was packed
or by whom. And luckily the boy in butternut west of the
Mississippi fared generally very well. He might complain of
the quality of the beef given him, but rarely of the quantity,
for he usually had plenty.
36 As the war dragged on and the
east suffered more and more, the troops in the west continued
in moderate comfort. Texas, as late as January of 1865, had
abundant herds of beef, but the commissary officials found that
they were hampered in getting them because the people refused
to accept the currency which the commissaries were forced
to use.
37
The foregoing evidence clearly shows that the trans-Missis-
sippi Department--of which Texas was the major part--could
have been of immeasurable help to the eastern Confederacy
had the two been in direct communication. It would certainly
be too much to claim that such communication might have
turned the tide in favor of the South, but it is not too much to
say that it would have been of great instrumentality in pro-
longing the conflict.
FOOTNOTES:
MS. letter. This letter, with several others, is in the possession of Mrs.
Sallie Lee Boner of Austin, Texas. This collection, edited by the writer,
will appear in the Louisiana Historical Quarterly.
1880-1901, 130 vols. Cited hereafter as O. R.), Series IV, vol. 2, 192.
meat in the South see Ella Lonn, Salt as a Factor in the Confederacy.
in The American Historical Review, XXII, 810.
April 23,1862. MS. letter in the writer's possession.
lection, Confederate Army Papers, Louisiana State University Archives.
For shortage of wagon transportation see C. W. Ramsdell, "General Robert
E. Lee's Horse Supply, 1862-1865" in The American Historical Review,
XXXV, 758-77.
20, 1863.
Government" in The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, VIII, 247; O. R.,
Ser. I, vol. 51, pt. 2, 738; and Howard Swiggett (ed.), A Rebel War Clerk's
Diary (New York, 1935), I, 385.
War (New York, 1887), III, 426.
be recalled, recommended this ration in July, 1863, see supra.
to kill up stock herds as the Confederate Congress forbade the impress-
ment of these animals. See C. W. Ramsdell (ed.), Laws of the Last Con -
federate Congress (Durham, N. C, 1941), 151.
would seem to indicate that J. A. Seddon is meant; see A Rebel War Clerk's
Diary, II, 109.
Feb. 16, 1864.
4, 1864.
pressing officers, and obviously thinking that the "Act to Regulate Im-
pressments," 3rd. Sess., Ist Cong. (James M. Matthews (ed.)> Statutes at
Large of the Confederate States of America, St. III, Chap. X.) was not
specific enough, passed another act which specifically authorized the im-
pressment of meat for the army ("An Act to authorize the impressment
of meat for the army, under certain circumstances," ibid., St. IV, Chap.
LIL). This could not have been of much help, for it must have followed
the path of all other Confederate impressment acts, and broken down.
See Frank L. Owsley, State Rights in the Confederacy (Chicago Univer-
sity Press, 1925), 4, 242.
J. Moses, 51, 70. Major Moses had been chief commissary of Long-
street's Corps and was later made chief commissary of Georgia. These
Reminiscences are in the possession of Major Moses' granddaughter Mrs
S. Silverman, Austin, Texas. The writer is much indebted to her for
allowing him the use of them.
versity Press, 1943), 134, note 7.
The University of Texas Archives.
erate States, and J. B. Dunn, Sept. 19, 1863, in the Confederate Army
Papers, Department of Archives, Louisiana State University.
5, 1864, and appended report of the Board of Survey. MSS. in the Reid
Collection of the Confederate Army Papers, L. S. U. Archives. There is
some doubt about the date of the board's report, but the date given in
the text is probably correct.
The quality of the packing by Dunn must have fallen off later, as it
caused widespread complaint. MS. Letter, Maj. W. H. Thomas to Maj.
John Reid, Jan. 11, 1865, in Reid Collection, loc. cit.
Sallie Lee Boner's collection, see supra, note 3; also B. I. Wiley, The Life
of Johnny Reb, 95.
Collection, Confederate Army Papers, L. S. U. Archives.
How to cite:
Frank E. Vandiver, "Texas and the Confederate Army's Meat Problem", Volume 47, Number 3, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v047/n3/contrib_DIVL4139.html
[Accessed Thu Dec 4 12:55:22 CST 2008]
