LIFE OF GENERAL DON MANUEL
DE MIER Y TERAN
AS IT AFFECTED TEXAS-MEXICAN RELATIONS
In November, 1825, the last Spanish possession in Mexico,
the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, fell into the hands of the re-
public. But the capture did not put an end to the strife between
the mother country and the new republic. From 1825 to 1828,
Mexican ships raided Spanish commerce; in Mexico there was
a feeling of hatred towards Spaniards and things Spanish.
Every means was resorted to to keep up the fight against the
former ruling class, who were accused of being incessant con-
spirators against the national independence. Continued agita-
tion, fostered by Victoria and later by Guerrero, resulted in
1827 in a national decree of expulsion, which sorely wounded
the pride of the Spanish government. The exiles undoubtedly
exaggerated the far from ideal political and economic conditions
in Mexico, and Spain gathered reason to believe that a favorable
moment had arrived to reconquer her former domain. Not only
were the Spaniards reckless in their attempt at reconquest, but
their actions showed that they were seriously misinformed as
to the actual situation in Mexico. They had listened so eagerly
to reports of disorders that they had convinced themselves that
the Mexicans were disgusted with their experiment in self-
government and that the mere presence of a Spanish force in
their midst would cause the people to rise en
masse
to return
to their old allegiance.
News of Spanish preparations began to reach Mexico through
various channels early in the spring of 1829. While Berlandier
was in New Orleans, in April, he sent Mier y Terán a clipping
from a newspaper published at that place which gave an extract
from a letter from a merchant in Havana to a citizen in New
Orleans, announcing the imminent embarkation at Cádiz of a
force hoped to be sufficient to return Mexico to her proper
allegiance.
1
Reports were current through June and July that from three
to seven thousand men were preparing to invade the eastern
coast of
Mexico. T. M. Rodney, the United States commercial
agent at Havana, reported that the Spanish expedition was
preparing to sail from Havana on June 23. The commander
of the expedition, according to Rodney, was by no means san-
guine of any good resulting from a descent upon the Mexican
coast and feared the attempt would prove a sacrifice of his
army of "thirty-five thousand men."
2 On June 16, a French
frigate brought news that a Spanish armada was preparing to
attack Mexico at some point on the eastern coast. Not wishing
to compromise the French government, the officers of the frigate
would give no more definite information than that the armada
would embark from Havana.
3
The government of Mexico, in spite of all the rumors of in-
vasion, did nothing to prepare for it. Consequently, when a
Spanish force under General Isidoro Barradas landed at Cabo
Rojo, near Tampico, on July 28, the government was totally
unprepared to meet the invaders. President Guerrero called
an extra session of congress, but the Spaniards had been on
Mexican soil ten days before congress met.
Meanwhile, two independent forces moved into the Tampico
area to defend the country from attack. Santa Anna, governor
of Vera Cruz, asked the government to send him to meet the
Spaniards wherever they might disembark. When he learned
of Barradas' incursion, he gathered about two thousand men
in the vicinity of Vera Cruz and Jalapa, obtained a forced loan
of 20,000 pesos
from the merchants of those two places, and
on August 4 set sail with his infantry for Tampico, dispatching
his cavalry by land.
4 His improvised fleet might easily have
been overpowered, but Barradas had no naval support; the
Governor of Cuba had ordered the fleet to return for other
duties as soon as the troops were landed.
5
When Felipe de la Garza, commandant general of the Eastern
Interior Provinces, learned definitely that the Spaniards had
landed at Cabo Rojo, he informed General Mier y Terán, and
asked him to take charge of the military forces of the provinces
under his command. Mier y Terán, although Garza's military
superior, refused to accept this honor, but instead offered to
serve in any capacity, wherever he might be needed, under
Garza. Garza then set out for Tampico and ordered Mier y
Terán to gather all regular and militia troops available and
follow him with all haste:
6 The last eight pages of Mier y
Terán's boundary commission diary constitute a record of his
trip from Matamoros to Tampico from August 4 to 13, 1829. It
is interesting to note that not once in it does he mention the
Spanish invasion or other military matters; he writes in the
same vein as that of the first part of the diary except that the
observations are much more brief. It contains notes on the
streams crossed, their economic value, the condition of the soil,
and plant and animal life. One can almost see how reluctantly
he gave up the scientific side of the trip by reading his entry
for August 12: "Yesterday, I returned all my instruments,
books, and papers to Matamoros, keeping only those absolutely
necessary for military observations."
7
Mier y Terán arrived at Altamira eight days after de la Garza,
on August 15. The Mexican government had, on August 11,
named Santa Anna general in chief of the army of operations
against the Spaniards. The forces of Barradas marched toward
Tampico, suffering from the heat, scarcity of water, and
myriads of merciless insects. Acting under immediate orders
from de la Garza, Mier y Terán proceeded to bar the Spanish
advance. He built two redoubts to defend the road—one at
Villerias and the other a league and a half away. On the night
of August 16, the Spaniards took the first redoubt after tena-
cious resistance on the part of the Mexican troops, and the
second fell shortly after, whereupon the Mexican forces retired
to Altamira.
8
Barradas reached Tampico on August 18, and took possession
without any serious opposition. From there, however, he found
his advance checked by Mier y Terán. Tampico is built on a
rocky peninsula and the Mexican forces found it comparatively
easy to keep the Spaniards hemmed in. The Panuco River and
several miasmic lagoons separate Tampico from the mainland.
These lagoons were the breeding places of hordes of deadly
mosquitoes, carriers of the yellow fever germs. The Spanish
forces were suffering from the unaccustomed climate and fever.
General Barradas thought it might restore the courage of his
men if he could win a decisive victory over the Mexicans under
Mier y Terán. He left a garrison at Tampico, composed largely
of invalids, and went forth to give attack. Santa Anna had
landed across the bay from Tampico at Tuxpám; he sent word
to Mier y Terán to keep Barradas occupied and then prepared
to cross the river stealthily by night and surprise the garrison.
On August 20, Santa Anna launched an attack on Tampico
which lasted for several hours and ended in a truce. In the
meantime, a short distance away, Barradas and the main body
of his troops were kept busy by Mier y Terán and Garza.
"General Teran," wrote one of his men, "like a good
insurgent does nothing but form skirmishing parties
against the Spaniards and when he loses one soldier he
has killed 15 or 20 of the enemy. This General and the
Commandant General Garza appear to despise the
balls, and are certainly the thermometer of the cavalry
and infantry. Of Teran, they say that he was directing
the firing of the artillery, seated on a gun carriage,
in one hand his cup of chocolate and a piece of bread,
which he was very quietly taking, while the other con-
tained his sword with which he directed their move-
ments."
9
The Mexican troops received very little support from the
government; it was not until August 25 that congress seemed
to realize the seriousness of the situation and invested the presi-
dent with extraordinary powers. He was then authorized to
adopt such measures as he deemed necessary.
10 The national
and state governments lost no time after that in making prepa-
rations on an extensive scale. Many believed that the forces
under Barradas were but an advance guard of a large army.
The president organized a reserve army to occupy positions in
Jalapa, Córdoba, and Orizaba, whence it could operate north
and south, and placed the vice-president, Bustamante, in charge
of this reserve. At the same time, he put Montes de Oca in
charge of a large force in the south. He then urged the state
governments to raise militia for defense.
11
On August 29, Santa Anna was promoted to the rank of
general of division. The main outpost of the Spanish forces
was a fortress on the bar of Tampico. General de la Garza was
sent on a mission to Guerrero at Mexico City, and Santa Anna
promoted Mier y Terán to the position of second in command,
ordering him to occupy the pass of Doña Cecilia.
12 This pass
was located about halfway between the fortress on the bar and
Tampico.
Santa Anna's action in promoting Mier y Terán to Garza's
place is of particular importance to this study. Some mystery
surrounds the mission of de la Garza to Mexico City; Lorenzo
de Zavala hints that Garza was guilty either of treason or
cowardice and that Santa Anna wanted to be rid of him.
13 He
states that Mier y Terán often retreated under orders from
Garza, when a few more hours of fighting would have assured
victory for the Mexicans. Santa Anna, in his letter of Septem-
ber 1, to the Secretary of War and Navy, announced, "I have
named Teran second in chief subject to the approval of the
president. I have also named him commander of Garza's divi-
sion of troops, having sent Garza to the capital on a special
mission to the president." Regardless of why Garza went to
Mexico City, it remains that Mier y Terán became commander
of his troops and held the position of commandant general of
the Eastern Interior Provinces until his death in 1832.
By early September, the Spanish forces were materially re-
duced by casualties and illness. Santa Anna's ambition was to
force them to their knees, and he projected a night attack on
the fort at the bar. Mier y Teran advised against a night at-
tack, and urged, instead, a long bombardment and a well-
prepared assault, but he could not prevail over Santa Anna's
impetuous spirit. After several hours of bloody conflict, the
attacking forces had to retire, leaving the field littered with the
dead and wounded.
14 At the request of Barradas, Mier y Teran
reconciled his humanitarian instincts with military expediency
and allowed the wounded on both sides to be removed to Pueblo
Viejo where they would receive medical attention. He then
prepared for a sustained cannonading of the Spanish outpost.
This time, Santa Anna was willing to listen to his second in
command. Mier y Teran's tactics brought a request from
Barradas for an interview which resulted in the terms of capit-
ulation of September 11, 1829.
15
Barradas dressed with care to meet Mier y Teran and was
surprised to find the Mexican general covered with mud and
indistinguishable from the lowest soldier. "You," said Mier y
Terán, "have forced me to receive you like this." Barradas
was surprised by the good nature which Mier y Terán exhibited
and was much charmed by his gentlemanly manners.
16 The
articles of capitulation attracted wide attention by their leni-
ency, and are an index of the humane spirit of Mier y Terán.
The invaders were allowed to capitulate with the honors of
war, the officers retaining their swords, their lives and private
rights were solemnly guaranteed, care was pledged for the sick
and wounded, and quarters for them were provided at Victoria
pending their embarkation for Havana.
17
Whether these lenient terms required explanation or apology
we do not know, but Mier y Terán in his notification to Santa
Anna made his position clear:
"The termination of wars between civilized coun-
tries is a transaction in which reparations in propor-
tion to the offense are demanded; but on this occasion
it was not considered as a conclusion of a war between
Mexico and Spain, but rather, a single act of hostility
toward us in which Spain pitted her soldiers against
those of Vera Cruz and Tamaulipas, that is to say,
before using half the forces which came from the in-
terior, the enemy was completely checked. It was im-
possible to use more men in the field. In such terms
your Excellency has conceded a capitulation which is
the end of the campaign, in which the interests of the
republic are not in the least prejudiced. These might
have been gravely affected if the invading expedition
had been taken prisoners of war as doubtless they
could have been in two or three more days of blockade.
"Why imprison those of a government so justly
discredited as that of Spain, which was capable of
leaving its troops in perpetual imprisonment--even of
sacrificing them? It is a matter of incalculable gravity,
and it seems to me that your Excellency has stipulated
the best possible settlement of the case, that of dis-
missing the enemy and forcing it to return to the pres-
ence [vista]
of the tyrant who sent it. The result has
been a short, but painful campaign which exposed
momentarily the valor of the Mexican army. . . . There
has not been a single desertion out of the two thousand
men under my command."
18
Writers are inclined to disagree as to the relative merits of
Santa Anna and Mier y Terán at Tampico. Walter Edgar Han-
cock, who has made a creditable study of the early career of
Santa Anna, defends that chieftain most vigorously and cor-
rectly rebuts the insinuations often made to the effect that
Santa Anna arrived at Tampico later than Mier y Terán, and
that he usurped the command of troops belonging to the latter.
19
Mier y Terán's diary clears up the first point; he did not arrive
at Tampico until after August 13, and Santa Anna arrived at
Tuxpám on August 11. We have seen, also, that Mier y Terán
had no troops under his command, except as de la Garza's sub-
ordinate, until his promotion by Santa Anna. There remains,
however, the matter of services rendered the country. Two of
Santa Anna's recent biographers are surprisingly generous to
his second in command. Frank C. Hanighen accords Mier y
Terán and the mosquitoes equal credit for the repulse of the
invaders, and hints that Santa Anna arrogated to himself more
responsibility for the result than he deserved,
20 and Valadés also
minimizes Santa Anna's part in the campaign.
21
Of the contemporary historians, J. L. Mora was possibly the
most prejudiced in favor of Mier y Terán. The political con-
nections of Mora and Mier y Terán will be discussed in another
connection, but for the present the following will illustrate the
lengths to which some were willing to go to show that all honors
should not go to Santa Anna:
"Teran was a scholar who was worthy of a distin-
guished place in the Paris Academy of Sciences, and
furthermore he was a man of the highest distinction
with regard to integrity of conduct, social qualifica-
tions, polish of manner, and even personal appearance;
he fought always in the cause of independence, and
this with honor, purity of purpose, intelligence and
ability, during a period when examples of these virtues
were rare enough, and examples of their opposing
vices woefully frequent. In his political faith he was
a progressive. . . . Teran had ambition, but being honor-
able enough to realize that such should not be satisfied
at the price of civil war, he abandoned such a field
to the vulgarly ambitious. But when his country's
cause was endangered by Spanish invasion, he hastened
to the field of battle, where he won the laurels of a
victory due almost entirely to his efforts and genius."
22
News of the defeat of the Spaniards reached Mexico City on
September 20, and Santa Anna and Mier y Terán became the
heroes of the hour. They were glorified in prose and verse;
pageants were staged in which children represented the heroes.
23
Mier y Terán was advanced to the rank of general of division,
24
and the state congresses of Vera Cruz, Puebla, Jalisco, and
Zacatecas declared the two generals "beneméritos del estado, y
ciudadanos." The general congress, by decree of April 27, 1833,
granted to Mier y Terán's widow a gold medal, on the face of
which was the national coat of arms and the inscription, "He
overthrew the proud Spaniard at Tampico," and on the reverse,
"General Congress, 1833."
25
The task of seeing that the articles of capitulation were car-
ried out fell entirely on Mier y Terán's shoulders. Santa Anna,
on the plea of ill health, left Tampico for Vera Cruz on Septem-
ber 19, placing everything in the hands of his second in com-
mand. Santa Anna praised Mier y Terán to the Secretary of
War, Francisco Moctezuma, and recommended him for his
sterling qualities of leadership and lofty ideals.
26
The treaty of capitulation was fulfilled religiously on both
sides. The Spanish prisoners were treated kindly and every
effort was made to make their sojourn prior to departure as
comfortable as possible under the circumstances. Spain had
spent $1,500,000 in the futile attempt to reconquer Mexico.
Barradas, humiliated and broken in spirit, never returned to
Spain, but went from Mexico to New Orleans and from that
place to Paris, where he spent the remainder of his days. In
Paris, Barradas admitted that Mier y Terán had proved himself
to be a most adept general at Tampico. He further stated that
his men were deeply impressed by the Mexican general's kind-
ness and consideration, and that he formed a great liking for
him.
27
On October 2, a Spanish squadron of six vessels appeared off
the coast of Tampico. Mier y Terán sent José Batres, who by
this time had joined him, to the commander to inform him of
the capitulation. An exchange of messages followed but the
squadron left without making any attempt to communicate with
the Spaniards who were waiting for transportation to Havana.
28
Mier y Terán remained in the Tampico area until the end of
the year. In addition to carrying out the provisions of the
treaty with the Spaniards, he assumed the duties of commandant
general of the Eastern Interior Provinces and again turned his
attention to affairs in Texas. His work in this connection will
be taken up in the following chapters.
President Guerrero's cabinet consisted of Lorenzo de Zavala,
Minister of the Treasury and President of the Cabinet; José
M. Herrera, Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs;
Francisco Moctezuma, Minister of War and Navy; and José M.
Boqanegra, Minister of Interior and Foreign Administration.
29
Much opposition developed to the ministry. After the defeat
of the Spaniards there was a general lull in the attacks on the
government, but this was of only short duration. A coalition of
states was formed to oppose the government, and even to ignore
the federal authority. At a time when he should have shown
strength, Guerrero vacillated. His motive was to secure peace,
but his action was weak. He sought allies from among his
opponents and tried to disarm his enemies by acts of clemency.
The exiled leaders of the plan of Montano were pardoned.
Barragán and Bravo both returned to Mexico, and both caused
trouble later.
30 Bocanegra, under pressure, requested the recall
of Poinsett, and Zavala was practically forced to resign by the
state legislature of Mexico. Bocanegra was transferred to the
treasury department and Agustín Viesca became minister of
relations. After Zavala's retirement, the partisans of Guerrero
became divided among themselves. The vice-president, Busta-
mante, made use of the reserve army at Jalapa with which
Guerrero had entrusted him, and under the pretense of restoring
constitutional order, proclaimed the Plan of Jalapa on Decem-
ber 4, 1829. Santa Anna tried to prevent the movement;
31
Bustamante issued a circular to the states in which he asked
their cooperation. Guerrero hoped to prevent a revolution by
surrendering his dictatorial powers, but congress refused to
accept his offer. He then assumed personal control of the army
and Bocanegra was named president ad
interim.
32 A successful
revolution, of short duration, followed; before the end of 1829,
all the states except Vera Cruz accepted Bustamante's plan.
Santa Anna, who was in control there, declared that he would
defend the established government with his life. When he
learned that Guerrero had abandoned the fight, however, he
recognized Bustamante.
33
Article 4 of the Plan of Jalapa provided that there should be
a complete change in the officials of the government.
According to Lorenzo de Zavala,
Mier y Terán accepted the
plan of the conspirators, under condition that this provision
should not apply to such officials who had been elected "by
popular appointment," and Zavala disapproves at some length
of the mischievous nature of this condition. He further dis-
approves of Mier y Terán's action in turning over to Busta-
mante certain compromising letters from José María Alpuche,
who headed a group in the Chamber of Representatives who
looked to Santa Anna and Mier y Terán to lead a counter-
revolution against Bustamante's usurpation, Alpuche had
opposed Mier y Terán's appointment as plenipotentiary to
Britain; and Zavala indicates that personal resentment might
be the key to the latter's action.
34
On January 1, 1830, Bustamante, as vice-president, assumed
the office of chief executive of Mexico. He appointed to his
cabinet Lúcas Alamán, Minister of Interior and Foreign Rela-
tions; José Ignacio Espinosa Vidaurre, Minister of Justice and
Ecclesiastical Affairs; Rafael Mangino, Minister of the Treas-
ury; and José Antonio Facio, Minister of War and Navy. He
offered the war and navy post to General Mier y Terán, who
declined it.
35 Facio and Mier y Terán had been fellow-students
in the College of Mines,
36 and were close friends. Thus, when
Mier y Terán turned his attention to affairs in Texas, he had
three close, personal friends high in government positions who
promoted the operation of his plans. His friendship with
Alamán, as we have seen, began when they were members of the
ministry under the poder
ejecutivo.
His friendly relations with
Bustamante began when the boundary commission reached
Laredo in February, 1828.
FOOTNOTES:
Archivo General de Mexico, Guerra, Frac. 1, Leg. 7, op. mil. 1836. The
University of Texas (Barker) Transcripts.
in Correo de la Federación Mexicana, June 5, 1829; further discussions in
M. Rivera, Historia de Jalapa, II, 524-529; C. M. de Bustamante, in Voz de la
Patria, I, June 17, 1829.
No. 937, August 29, 1829; No. 940, September 19, 1829, p. 54.
Méjico, XI, 749.
MS., in Wagner Collection, Yale University Library. The University of
Texas Microfilm.
chea to Jesús de Ybarra, Camp, 3 leagues from Altamira, August 18, 1829,
in The Texas Gazette, September 25,1829. [Translated from the Constitu -
tional Gazette of Coahuil-texas, published at Leona Vicario, dated Sep-
tember 4.]
27, 1829, in The Texas Gazette, September 25, 1829. Carlos María de
Bustamante mentions Mier y Terán's serenity under fire at Tampico. "His
military and political conduct is applauded in North American newspapers,
and in one of them he is shown seated on the gun-carriage of a cannon
during an attack, placidly eating a chocolate bar as his only food for that
day . . ."—La Marimba, July 13, 1832.
Gazette, under "National Affairs", October 24, 1829.
September 1, 1829, in Correo de la Federación Mexicana, September 10, 1829.
This promotion was subject, of course, to Guerrero's approval, but that
was soon forthcoming. N. Zamacois, Historia de Méjico, XI, 768.
1829, announced Garza's arrival, and defended his ambiguous statements
about events at Tampico as a part of the government's plan of secrecy in
regard to operations there. See letter from Santa Anna to Guerrero in
Voz de la Patria, March 2, 1831.
y Terán as an able military strategist pleading with the reckless Santa
Anna without avail.
translation into English differing slightly in punctuation and in minor
details appears in Niles' Weekly Register, XXXVII, No. 947, November 7,
1829, p. 166. Several copies in Spanish are available. See Correo, Septem-
ber 22, 1829; N. Zamacois, Historia de Méjico, XI, n. (2), 793-794; J.
Suárez y Navarro, Historia de México, n. 159-160; C. M. de Bustamante,
Memorias para la Invasión, etc., 1921; since this paper was originally pre-
pared the writer has had the privilege of examining the rare manuscript
collection of Hernández y Dávalos, Documentos Inéditos para la Historia
de México. Expediente No. 20 contains a wealth of source material on the
Spanish Invasion but does not change the story as here told. Of particular
interest to this study are Relación de la expedición de Barradas sobre Tam-
pico en Julio de 1829 formada por el General Don Manuel Mier y Terán "La
voz de la Patria". 7 de agosto. [Letter táb Oct. 18,1830]; Partes de Garza
al Gral. Mier y Terán, de Julio 29, sobre una acción para impedir que los
españoles se apoderen del Puerto de Tampico; Carta del Gral. Santa
Anna al Gral. Mier y Terán, agosto 24 de 1829, nombrándolo general en se-
gundo del Ejército de operaciones. Besides these priceless manuscripts
Davalos preserved copies of El Boletín Oficial (Mexico, 1829) in which all
official correspondence concerning the attempted invasion was published,
See Nos. 22-34 inclusive.
Moreliano (Morelia), October 8, 1829; Correo, October 5, 1829.
1794-1833, MS. (Thesis, 1933) The University of Texas Library, 460-481,
Moreliano, October 12, 1829; ibid., October 15, and 22, November 2, 1829;
Francisco Ortega, "Aniversario de Tampico," in V. Filisola, La Guerra de
Tejas, I, 148-153.
Historia de Jalapa, II, 547.
Históricos de la Heroica Ciudad de Vera-Cruz, II, 345. Two short extracts
will serve to illustrate the attitude of Mexican historians towards the
leaders at Tampico: "We defended our Independence at Tampico, and if we
survive today as a nation, we owe it to the valor of Santa Anna, and to the
prudence of Terán." C. M. de Bustamante, Memorias para la Invasión,
etc., 29. "He [Santa Anna] with his activity, Terán with his prudence,
foresight, and knowledge, the officers with their intrepidity, the soldiers
with their bravery, and all with their patriotism and constancy in their
labors, contributed to bringing about a happy ending to the enterprise which
the government had entrusted to the first." N. Zamacois, Historia de
Méjico, XI, 803.
September 19,1829, in Correo, October 2, 1829; El Astro Moreliano, October
12, 1829, pp. 221-224.
October, 14, 1829. There is no need further to concern ourselves with the
Spanish invasion and its settlement. Further details of purely military
interest are given in the following correspondence: Mier y Terán to Vicente
Romero, Governor of San Luis Potosí, Doña Cecilia, September 9, 1829, in
Suplemento al Astro Moreliano, September 21, 1829; Same to Same, Pueblo
Viejo, October 17, 1829, in Correo, November 5, 1829, p. 250; Mier y Terán
to Carlos María de Bustamante, Pueblo Viejo, October 4, 1829, in Correo,
November 2, 1829, p. 246, and November 5, 1829, p. 250. See also, The
Texas Gazette, October 13, 1829. Rafael Maria Camargo wrote Mier y
Terán from Bordeaux, December 15, 1829, congratulating him on his victory
over his old enemy, Barradas. MS., in archives of Hospital de Jesús in
Archivo General de la Nación, México, Legajo 416, Expediente 1.
"Guerrero did the thinking; Herrera helped him; Zavala contradicted
him; Bocanegra put their thoughts in Spanish and Moctezuma carried
them out.
For the above mentioned affair
Two men were more than enough;
But they being such as they were
Four were necessary.
--Iriarte, Fable of the Four Cripples.
C. M. de Bustamante, in Voz de la Patria, January 21, 1830, p. 8.
Méjico, XI, 745-746.
of Mier y Terán's accusations Alpuche was exiled for a period of six years.
M. Rivera, Historia de Jalapa, II, 590. N. Zamacois, Historia de Méjico,
XI, 835, gives the date of Alpuche's letter, January 23, 1830, and says
that Mier y Terán sent all the evidence to Facio, Minister of War. See
also J. Suárez y Navarro, Historia de México, 199-200.
Méjico, XI, 831.
How to cite:
Ohland Morton, "Life of General Don Manuel de Mier y Teran", Volume 47, Number 3, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v047/n3/contrib_DIVL4461.html
[Accessed Thu Dec 4 12:25:39 CST 2008]
