Life of General Don Manuel de
Mier y Terán
as it affected Texas-Mexican Relations
Stephen F. Austin furnished manuscript copies of his map of
Texas to various Mexican officials, ranging from the political
chief at Béxar to the president at Mexico City.
1 Mier y Terán
received a copy, at Tampico, on the day the Spaniards capitu-
lated. "My duties that day," he wrote to Austin, "were quite
different from the ones you saw me discharging in connection
with my peaceful trip to Texas."
2 He informed Austin, in this
same letter, that in all probability he would soon return to
Texas, as his health was failing in the fever-ridden region of
Tampico. At that time he expected early relief from his duties
in Tamaulipas and even feared for his life if it did not come
soon, but he was to remain in the vicinity until early in Jan-
uary, 1830.
The dictatorial powers which congress granted to President
Guerrero during the period of the Spanish invasion aroused
unfavorable comment in Texas. An editorial in The
Texas
Gazette
states that the people of Texas disapproved of these
extraordinary powers because they were unconstitutional and
"an usurpation of power in Congress to give him or any other
man such facilities."
3 The Anglo-Americans in Texas con-
sidered the observance of constitutional provisions imperative.
Among the few people in Mexico who feared that the United
States was getting a hold on Texas through Mexico's liberal
colonization policy was General José María Tornel, who had
considerable influence over President Guerrero. He felt that
the abolition of slavery would probably check the Anglo-
American movement into Texas; consequently, he persuaded
Guerrero to use his extraordinary powers to that end, and on
September 15, 1829, he obtained the presidential signature to
a decree abolishing slavery in the republic of Mexico.
4 A copy
of the decree was sent to Ramón Músquiz, departmental chief
at Béxar, who withheld its publication until he could write to
Governor Viesca and request that the department of Texas be
exempt from its provisions. Músquiz emphasized in his letter
that the colonization laws had guaranteed the property rights
of the colonists, and that the slaves had been considered prop-
erty before they were brought to Texas.
5
Although on October 29 Músquiz informed Austin of the
decree, and urged that he not discuss the matter, somehow the
news leaked out at Nacogdoches. Colonel de las Piedras wrote
Músquiz that many people there had heard about the decree
and wanted to know if the rumor were authentic. John Durst,
a prominent citizen of Nacogdoches, in a letter to Austin con-
cluded with a statement which just about summarizes the feel-
ings of the colonists toward the matter, so important was
slavery to the early Texans: ". . .--we are ruined for ever
Should this Measure be adopted."
6
Meanwhile, Governor Viesca asked the general government
to exempt Texas from the decree, expressing fear that the pub-
lication of the law would result in disturbances which the state
of Coahuila and Texas could not well withstand.
7 Guerrero's
minister of relations, succeeding Bocanegra, was Agustín Viesca,
a brother of the governor of Coahuila and Texas. On December
2 he obtained from Guerrero authority to allow the decree to
be inoperative in Texas.
8
Several days, however, before this letter was written, Presi-
dent Guerrero, in reply to a letter from Mier y Terán, had
authorized him to inform Austin and others in Texas that the
decree in question did not comprehend that department. On
November 20, Mier y Terán wrote Austin to that effect.
9
This letter of November 20 has brought forth some interest-
ing discussion.
10 The two extracts which follow attempt to
explain Guerrero's reasons for exempting Texas from the decree
and are both of incidental interest to a study of Mier y Terán:
Terán's letter is dated at Tampico, November 20,
1829, which raises an interesting question of chronol-
ogy. Terán declared that the president's instruction
to him was in the form of a private letter [carta par
-
ticular]
and that it was in response to a letter of his
own.
11 From this it would appear that the decision to
except Texas from the decree was formed several
weeks before the petitions of local authorities were re-
ceived, and perhaps before the Texans even knew that
the decree had been issued. While that need not imply
consideration for the Texans, but simply the desire to
avoid certain opposition from them, it would at least
prove that the suspension was not decreed under the
menace of insurrection.
12
Since this letter was dated November 20, twelve
days earlier than the communication of the Minister
of Relations to Governor Viesca, it appears that
Guerrero may have learned from a source other than
the governor that the decree had caused agitation in
Texas and thought that he could send news to the
settlements more quickly through the military authori-
ties.
13
ferred to his letter to Austin. 14 These facts seem to indicate
that the date, November 20, is correct, and not an inadvertent
slip for December 20. "Indeed, there is some evidence that
before the petitions from San Antonio and Saltillo reached the
capital Guerrero had already lifted the decree from Texas in
response to a letter from General Terán." 15
By the time the Texans received the news that their holdings
in slaves were secure as far as the Mexican government was
concerned, the regime of Guerrero had been overthrown. The
Bustamante government took charge of affairs on January 1,
1830. Much confusion developed in the various state govern-
ments over the interpretations of Article 4 of the Plan of
Jalapa; and what really happened was that those state officials
who were in accord with the Bustamante faction were retained
and those who opposed it were turned out. This applied to leg-
islators, governors, and in fact, all public functionaries. Small
revolutionary movements occurred in all the states; some of
these were put down by force; in other cases, elections, maneu-
vered by partisans of Bustamante, brought about the desired
changes with at least a show of legality.
16 The task of establish-
ing the Bustamante government in Tamaulipas necessitated
Mier y Terán's leaving Tampico the first week in January and
making his way northward to Victoria, the capital, where he
remained until the new government was installed and the Plan
of Jalapa was accepted without reservation on the part of the
officials.
17 His troops were in a pitiful condition, without proper
clothing, many sick or convalescent, and all on foot. Their
armaments were almost useless and their supply of ammunition
was practically exhausted. It is possibly for this reason that
Mier y Terán decided at Villa de Casas, January 13, to go into
Victoria, accompanied only by his secretary, and attempt to
establish order by a mere assertion of his authority as the duly
appointed commander of the eastern states, approved by both
the Guerrero and Bustamante governments,
18 The plan worked,
and on January 14, a committee from the state congress in-
formed the commandant that the state officials accepted without
"any restrictions or exceptions" the Plan of Jalapa and the
Bustamante government.
19 Thus, without any bloodshed, but
at the risk of his life, Mier y Terán accomplished alone what he
might not have done with a weak, poorly-equipped army.
20
With order established in Tamaulipas, Mier y Teran now
turned his attention to Texas. It is necessary to go back for
just a moment. The Spaniards willingly complied with the
terms of their capitulation and relieved the commander in
charge of any anxiety along that line. Hence, he was able to
begin plans for the district now under his command. The states
of Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, and the southern division of Coa-
huila and Texas were organized and needed little attention; it
was the department of Texas that caused him concern. That he
had given much thought to it is shown by a long communication
to the Minister of War and Navy, written November 14, 1829:
In reply to the supreme order of October 28, which
you sent me relative to an expedition to be made into
Texas, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that
this is a matter of serious importance, interest, and at
present, the most costly to the Mexican federation, and
for that reason demands from me a manifestation to
the Supreme Government which I ask your Excellency
to consider very carefully that it may contribute to the
national prosperity, to the conservation of national
territory, to the lustre of the President and to the in-
dividual honor of his ministers.
The department of Texas is contiguous to the most
avid nation in the world. The North Americans have
conquered whatever territory adjoins them. In less
than half a century, they have become masters of ex-
tensive colonies which formerly belonged to Spain and
France, and of even more spacious territories from
which have disappeared the former owners, the Indian
tribes. There is no Power like that to the north, which
by silent means, has made conquests of momentous
importance. Such dexterity, such constancy in their
designs, such uniformity of means of execution which
always are completely successful, arouses admiration.
Instead of armies, battles, or invasions, which make a
great noise and for the most part are unsuccessful,
these men lay hands on means, which, if considered
one by one, would be rejected as slow, ineffective, and
at times palpably absurd. They begin by assuming
rights, as in Texas, which it is impossible to sustain
in a serious discussion, making ridiculous pretensions
based on historical incidents which no one admits--
such as the voyage of La Salle, which was an absurd
fiasco, but serves as a basis for their claim to Texas.
Such extravagant claims as these are now being pre-
sented for the first time to the public by dissembling
writers; the efforts that others make to submit proofs
and reasons are by these men employed in reiterations
and in enlarging upon matters of administration in
order to attract the attention of their fellow-country-
men, not to the justice of the claim, but to the profit
to be gained from admitting it. At this stage it is
alleged that there is a national demand for the step
which the government meditates. In the meantime, the
territory against which these machinations are di-
rected, and which has usually remained unsettled, be-
gins to be visited by adventurers and empresarios;
some of these take up their residence in the country,
pretending that their location has no bearing upon the
question of their government's claim or the boundary
disputes; shortly, some of these forerunners develop
an interest which complicates the political administra-
tion of the coveted territory; complaints, even threats,
begin to be heard, working on the loyalty of the legiti-
mate settlers, discrediting the efficiency of the existing
authority and administration; and the matter having
arrived at this stage--which is precisely that of Texas
at this moment--diplomatic maneuvers begin: They
incite uprisings in the territory in question and usually
manifest a deep concern for the rights of the inhabi-
tants. There follows a matter of notes in which are
found equitable and moderate phrases, until with the
aid of other incidents, which are never lacking in the
course of diplomatic relations, comes finally the desired
conclusion of a transaction as onerous for one side as
advantageous for the other. They used such a method
to dispossess the Powers of Europe of vast territories,
which under the name of colonies, they once possessed
in America, but which were of secondary interest.
The question with respect to Mexico is quite different.
It is a matter of attacking primary interests intimate-
ly tied up with the political existence of our country.
Mexico, imitating the conduct of France and Spain,
might alienate or cede unproductive lands in Africa
or Asia. But, how can it be expected to cut itself off
from its own soil, give up to a rival Power territory
advantageously placed in the extremity of its states,
which joins some of them and serves as a buffer to
all? How can it be expected to alienate two hundred
and fifty leagues of coast, leaving on them vast re-
sources for the construction of boats, the shortest
channels for commerce and navigation, the most fertile
lands, and the most copious elements for providing
means of attack and defense? If Mexico should consent
to this base act, it would degenerate from the most
elevated class of the American Powers to that of a con-
temptible mediocrity, reduced to the necessity of buy-
ing a precarious existence at the cost of many humilia-
tions. In the act of ceding Texas it would have to re-
nounce all pretensions of having its own industries
with which to maintain and enrich its eight million
inhabitants, who within a few years could not avoid
seeing the bread and sugar, and even the maize and
beans consumed in the federal district, furnished by
the foreign harvest of Texas. The sale of this depart-
ment would reduce the territorial property, it would
reduce the value of land in all the rest of Mexico by
one half of that which it now has. These assertions,
which carry their own evidence, should be manifest to
such an extent, as space will not permit my enlarging
upon them, that they will establish a conviction in
every Mexican heart that he who consents to and does
not oppose the loss of Texas is an execrable traitor
who ought to be punished with every kind of death.
Coming now to the measures which your Excel-
lency ordered for the security of Texas, I have the
honor to inform your Excellency that I do not have at
my disposal a suitable corps for an immediate expedi-
tion: . . .
Mier y Terán then furnished a report on the troops under
him at Tampico at that time. They consisted of one battalion
of infantry and parts of three squadrons of cavalry. He insisted
that it would be necessary to increase the forces on the frontier,
and to maintain them on a firm basis for a long time. The
reasons for this recommendation will be brought out presently.
To continue with the letter,
If war should break out, it would be expedient to
suppress it in a single campaign--a less expensive
method than to be always on the defensive. But even
this would be useless until a colony of one thousand
native Mexican families is planted there, an economical
measure when it is remembered that the funds spent
once in establishing a colony would be spent many
times in maintaining garrisons.
The remainder of this letter is in the form of a private [muy
reservado]
report:
The Twelfth Battalion of infantry contains 150
men. It is on duty at Nacogdoches, and should be in-
creased to 500 men; to do this, it will be necessary to
make use of the contingents of deserters from the
states of San Luis, Guanajuato, and Zacatecas, or else
make a levy on the regular troops. It would not be
wise to relieve the Twelfth, for the reason that if an-
other battalion were sent, even though it should set out
with more than the full enrollment, it would arrive in
the same condition as the Twelfth and have to be re-
inforced.
The Ninth Regiment of cavalry has 250 men fit for
duty; its full complement is urgently needed. The duty
of this regiment is a continuous activity in Tamaulipas
and Texas. There are on hand arms and equipment
for the full number. The members who have survived
are acclimated and familiar with the country, and can
be depended upon; wherefore, it would be more prac-
ticable to fill out this body than to send another.
The Eleventh Battalion of infantry, with 100 men,
more or less, remains on guard in the Port of Tampico
de Tamaulipas; if it is not raised to its full number,
its effectiveness as a guard will be of small account,
a danger to the safety of one of our most important
seaports. To lessen the utter uselessness of this body,
I have detained here the Tenth Infantry; but it should
be at the rear, becoming acclimated in Victoria; for
to station it at once in Tampico will be to lose those
still surviving. It has 150 men reported as fit for duty,
but the truth is, all are sick.
The town of Matamoros is a most important mari-
time point; yet it lacks the most ordinary defence;
wherefore, it seems necessary to form a company of
coast guards numbering 150 men, who shall constitute
a part of the infantry militia, and in addition to this
a body of 40 artillerymen of the same class. These
bodies can easily be raised in the department of the
north [Texas]. This matter is so urgent that extra-
ordinary powers should be conferred upon the presi-
dent for the purpose of its execution. It is wholly an
accordance with his plans.
At the same time that the garrison of Nacogdoches
and the regular troops of Béxar and La Bahía are
being put in good condition, there should be placed at
Bexar a battalion—which I suggest should be the
Ninth or some other of not less than 500,—and also
a squadron with two field pieces. This unusual re-
inforcement, most urgent at this moment, would yet
be sufficient to cut short all those intrigues by which
the Department of Texas is undeniably agitated. To
avoid desertion, the above mentioned battalion should
embark at Vera Cruz and land at Matamoros, where
I will await it to conduct it to Béxar. It might be well
to make some stir over this movement, letting it ap-
pear that it is an expedition of 500 or 600 men, or
more, if the truth be known, from San Luís and
Guanajuato to Texas; perhaps by such means the con-
conclusion of the treaty may be hastened.
21
Why all this excitement and talk of an expedition to Texas?
The letter just referred to begins by citing a supreme order of
October 28, relative to an expedition to be made into Texas.
The contents of this order are not known, nor the occasion for
its being issued, but we do know that a number of influences
were operating on the fears of the Mexican government--fears
which had been sharpened since the Fredonian incident. The
boundary question was still not settled; Poinsett had been re-
called ; Andrew Jackson, who the Mexicans felt had designs on
Texas, was president of the United States. In August, 1829, a
widespread propaganda was launched in the United States by
the pro-Jackson press urging and foretelling the early acquisi-
tion of Texas.
22 This was met in Mexico by indignant articles
declaring that the cession of Texas would degrade the republic
and disgrace the minister who consented to it.
23
Mier y Terán's fears for the safety of Texas were aroused
early in the summer. His communication to the Minister of
War, July 24, 1829, has already been cited. Poinsett, before he
left Mexico, declared that General Mier y Terán had never
ceased to excite the fears of the government regarding the at-
titude of the United States towards Texas. Frequent insinua-
tions by Europeans, according to Poinsett, confirmed these
fears. He reported that he had seen a letter of June 3, from
the head of the boundary commission, "who has always been
attached to the English interests." "This person," wrote Poin-
sett, "assures the government in his last despatches that we are
making vast preparations to attack that country and have al-
ready fifteen thousand men on the frontier. Terán enlarged
on the great size, fertility and natural resources of Texas and
the consequent reasons why Mexico should never yield pos-
session."
24
The revolution growing out of the proclamation of the Plan
of Jalapa in December, 1829, interrupted temporarily the prepa-
rations for an expedition to Texas, but additional reasons for
such an expedition seemed to be piling up. On December 8,
Colonel de las Piedras wrote to Mier y Terán, from Nacog-
doches, that the United States was moving troops to the frontier
and that hundreds of North Americans were entering Texas;
he was sure that not all of these were colonists. He had also
heard that men were being recruited in New Orleans to start
a revolution in Texas. The main topic of conversation on the
frontier, according to the commander at Nacogdoches, was
President Jackson and his views on Texas.
25 Less than a week
later, news of a more disturbing nature came to the command-
ant general. Late in October and early in November, 1829, two
boats carrying twenty-six families landed on the Texas coast.
They were supposed to be Irish immigrants, but it seemed that
they were all North Americans directly from New York.
Furthermore, many of the colonists already in Texas, as well
as those recently arriving, were evading the religious restric-
tion requiring colonists to be Catholics. "In complying with
my duty," wrote Mier y Terán to the Minister of War, "I con-
sider it necessary to inform the Supreme Government through
you that if the colonization contracts in Texas by North Amer-
icans are not suspended, and if the conditions of the establish-
ments are not watched, it is necessary to say that the province
is already definitely delivered to the foreigners."
26
The success of the Bustamante revolution brought about a
change in ministers; and as soon as it became evident that his
old friend, Facio, would be the new Minister of War, Mier y
Terán prepared a more elaborate and complete report on the
Texas situation. The unsettled state of the country made the
ordinary means of communication unsafe, and for this reason
Constantino Tarnava, a member of the boundary commission
who, with Batres, had joined his chief at Tampico, was sent to
Mexico City to deliver the report in person and to enlarge upon
any part of it which might not be clearly stated. Tarnava and
Batres, it will be remembered, were both lieutenant-colonels in
the Mexican army. They arrived at Matamoros from Béxar
several days after Mier y Terán had gone to Tampico, but both
joined him at that place later. The report consisted in an even
more emphatic reiteration of the views and recommendations
which Mier y Terán had expressed in his letter to the Minister
of War and Navy of November 14th, with detailed suggestions
for combating the imminent loss of Texas to the Anglo-
American menace through the establishment of garrisons and
the fomentation of Mexican and European settlement. The
report is preserved in a letter written in its exposition by
Tarnava to Facio under date of January 6.
27 A few days later,
Tarnava added other reflections and suggestions to this report.
Whether these were his own, or had been transmitted to him
by Mier y Terán, is not known. The plan of colonization should
be continued for many years; it should keep pace with the west-
ward expansion of the North Americans and eventually should
contemplate the establishment of settlements on the Red and
Arkansas rivers. Tarnava asked if England could not be in-
duced to make a declaration against the designs of the United
States on Texas, such as the United States had made against
the conquest of Cuba by Mexico and Colombia. He suggested
that a Mexican consul should be placed at New Orleans to keep
an eye on the preparations of North Americans at that place.
Finally, the newspapers of Mexico should intimate that in case
of war any means would be justifiable against "so perfidious
an enemy," even to the stirring up of an insurrection of slaves
in Louisiana, thus retaliating with the same measures employed
by the North Americans in inciting the colonists and the Chero-
kee Indians to revolt in Texas (it was hard to forget the
Fredonian Rebellion!) "Louisiana is an open country, and its
extension along our frontier makes it an easy matter to pene-
trate it with a force even smaller than that of the enemy, and
by burning their own homes perhaps diminish the number of
those advocating the conquest of Texas."
28
The chief purpose, then, of placing more troops in Texas was
defense--defense against the designs of the United States and
to "cut short those intrigues by which the department of Texas
is undeniably agitated." Before he had time to learn what
action the government might take on his report and recom-
mendations, Mier y Terán assumed his duties as commandant
general. He wanted to return to Matamoros as soon as possible
and take over the affairs of the office which Felipe de la Garza
had vacated so hurriedly when news of the Spanish invasion
reached him. It is not clear just what were de la Garza's con-
nections with the Bustamante government, but the records
show that he did everything in his power to hinder the progress
of his successor in the office of commandant general of the
Eastern Interior Provinces. In reports to the Minister of War,
Mier y Terán charged de la Garza with interfering with his
attempts to discipline the troops under his command, with
seducing them to insubordination, and with urging them not to
allow themselves to be sent on a useless expedition to Texas.
29
These reports brought an order to de la Garza to do all in his
power to encourage the disaffected troops to be ready to start
upon the expedition to Texas when ordered to do so, and a
warning to the effect that failure to execute federal orders
might result in great danger to the welfare of the Republic.
30
On February 1, Mier y Terán made his final plea for action.
He informed the federal government that he had learned that
armed parties of North Americans were entering Texas and
he believed it necessary to move troops there immediately. He
further stated that he intended to go in a few days and look
the situation over for himself and see what should be done to
save the department.
31 He left Victoria on February 4, but if
he really intended to go to Texas at this time, his health did not
permit it. He reached San Fernando on February 10, and was
forced to remain a month at that place, being unable to do more
than attend to the most necessary correspondence.
32
Meanwhile, however, his friends in Mexico City were securing
action on at least a part of his recommendations. Facio, the
Minister of War, wrote him on January 30 that he was sending
at once the supplies and recruits for the Ninth Cavalry and
Tenth Infantry to Matamoros. He followed this information
six days later with a notice that he was naming Mier y Terán
general in chief of the division of troops which would operate
in Texas. This would necessitate the appointment of a second
in command for the Eastern Interior Provinces, and Felipe de
la Garza, who knew the duties already, was to receive this ap-
pointment. The following day the governors of Guadalajara,
Guanajuato, Zacatecas, and Durango were ordered to send
troops to the commandant general at Monterrey; there he would
distribute them as he saw fit among the Eleventh and Twelfth
Infantry and the Ninth Cavalry. This demand was repeated a
week later and Facio wrote Mier y Terán, ". . . his Excellency,
the Vice-president, hopes that your known ability and patriotism
will move you to the immediate execution of your plan simul-
taneously to occupy the points of Béxar and La Bahía before
the disloyal colonists rise in revolt and possess themselves of
the said points; but at the same time do not lose sight of the
safety of Matamoros, a highly important point in case the
enemy should attempt an invasion by way of the tributary
Santiago."33
Had Facio's plans worked out, and had the state governors
shown a willingness to aid in the projected expedition, there
would have been a total of 2,965 men in the division which
would operate in Texas. As a matter of fact, the number was
far below the proposed total. The states were slow in com-
plying with the order to send troops to Mier y Terán, and the
governor of Zacatecas refused outright, declaring that the fed-
eral government could not constitutionally order militia of one
state to do service in another.
34
On February 20, Mier y Terán informed de la Garza of his
appointment as ad interim commander of the Eastern Interior
Provinces, and instructed him to proceed to Matamoros and
receive the command "with all the formalities which the cir-
cumstances would permit."
35 Matters were now rapidly reach-
ing a crisis between these two men. Turning his attention next
to the action which had thus far been taken on his suggestions,
the commandant general wrote a long letter to Facio. He
acknowledged his appointment as general in chief of the Texas
division of troops and reported that he had informed de la
Garza of his appointment to act during his absence. Then he
asked that the government recall the measures which he had
proposed. The essential differences between these measures and
the government's proposals were such that Mier y Terán could
not hide his disappointment. He was perfectly willing to head
the division which was to operate in Texas, but he did not like
the plan of operation which would place it under the control
of the commandant general of the Eastern Interior Provinces.
Facio's proposals would place the Texas expedition under de la
Garza's supervision. "The success of this expedition demands
that the person who directs it maintain over the country which
produces the resources with which he must work, not only a
direct influence, but an authority without the least impediment."
He should not have to depend upon the good will of another
military chief whose interests possibly would be in another
direction. He should have full control of the revenue from the
custom houses of Tamaulipas and Matamoros. "All means of
transportation," argued the commandant general, "the purchase
of mounts, the building of military roads, the replacement of
men, will depend upon the whims of a person removed in a
physical sense from the needs. In a word, the commandancy of
Texas is now subject to an inevitable dependency upon Tamau-
lipas."
36 He cited instances during the period of the Spanish
invasion when the troops suffered because certain state officials
intercepted money, supplies, and even medicine destined for the
defending army. He then reiterated his willingness to proceed
under the proposed plan in spite of its defects and stated that
he was leaving for Matamoros as soon as his health would
permit. He did wish, however, that it might be so arranged
that all revenue from Texas could be used to support the troops
operating in that department. "The only real defense of Texas,"
he concluded, "is a permanent occupation."
37
Either as an after-thought or as a compromise measure, a
week later, Mier y Terán recommended the division of the
Eastern Interior Provinces into two military districts, one to
consist of Tamaulipas and Nuevo León, and the other of Coa-
huila and Texas. He wrote that a center of military control
nearer the settled portion of Texas would enable the command-
ant to handle that department much more effectively than was
possible under the existing organization.
38 De la Garza, mean-
while, wrote from Soto la Marina that an ailment in his chest
prevented his assuming command immediately and that he
would much prefer that Mier y Terán remain in command and
that he be allowed to serve under him.
39 It is to be hoped that
he was sincere in this expression of preference, because it is
exactly what he obtained in a few days. Mier y Terán's sug-
gestion to divide the district was immediately rejected; his ob-
jections to the proposal of the War Department to place him
under de la Garza were sustained, and on March 17, Facio
informed him that he was to remain in charge of the Eastern
Interior Provinces as commandant general; that the three states,
Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, and Coahuila and Texas were to be
united under his command; that de la Garza was to be second
in command in Tamaulipas only, during the absence of the
commandant general in Texas. The reason for this provision
was that it was felt that some military leader should be near
the coast in case of another Spanish invasion. Facio, on behalf
of the general government, thanked de la Garza for his services
in the past and expressed a hope that he would be as "zealous
in his future activities on behalf of his country."40
FOOTNOTES:
E. C. Barker, ed., The Austin Papers, II, 260-261.
the paragraphs following on the question of slavery in Texas, see E. C.
Barker, The Life of Stephen F. Austin, 243-250; E. C. Barker, "The Influ-
ence of Slavery in the Colonization of Texas," in The Southwestern His -
torical Quarterly, XXVIII, 1-33. An earlier study is that of Lester G.
Bugbee, "Slavery in Early Texas," in Political Science Quarterly, XIII,
389-412, 648-668.
Texas Gazette, January 23, 1830.
II, 285; E. C. Barker, The Life of Stephen F. Austin, 246.
in The Texas Gazette, January 30, 1830.
Gazette, January 30, 1830.
in The Austin Papers, II, 290.
terly, XIII, 655-658.
Land Office of Texas, Vol. 57, page 130.
in the Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXVIII, 23-24.
Patriot, 1782-1831, MS. (Doctoral dissertation), The University of Texas
Library, 1934, 228.
1822-1846, II, 150-151; F. de Paula de Arrangoiz, Méjico desde 1808 hasta
1867, II, 198.
tionary story in Tamaulipas from January 1 to January 14, 1830. See
Francisco Vital Fernández, Inspector of Militia, to Commandant General
of the States of the East, Victoria, January 1; Enrique Camilo Suárez,
Vice-governor of Tamaulipas, to Manuel de Mier y Terán, Victoria, Jan-
uary 1; Mier y Terán to Fernández, Rancho de Panocha, January 10; Mier
y Terán to Suárez, January 10; Suárez to Mier y Terán, January 12, Mier
y Terán to Suárez, Villa de Casas, January 13; Suárez to Mier y Terán,
January 13 and 14; and Juan Guerra and Garza García to Mier y Terán,
Victoria, January 14, in Archivo General de México, Guerra, Frac. 1, Leg.
14, op. mil., 1830. The University of Texas (Hatcher) Transcripts.
Guerra de Tejas, I, 155-156.
Archivo General de Mexico, Guerra, Frac. 1, Leg. 14, op. mil. 1830, Cuaderno
3, No. 102. The University of Texas (Hatcher) Transcripts. Extracts from
this letter and the private military report are translated by Alleine Howren
in her "Causes and Origin of the Decree of April 6, 1830," in The South -
western Historical Quarterly, XVI, 400-402, and wherever practicable, her
translation has been used. Some changes in the spelling of proper names
have been made in the translation above, as for example, the substitution of
the letter "j" for "x" in Guanajuato.
E. C. Barker, in The Life of Stephen F. Austin, 303, n. 11, in referring
to the statement of Mier y Terán that, "Such extravagant claims as these
are now being presented for the first time to the public by dissembling
writers; . . . ," says, "Knowledge of the facts gives one a good deal of
sympathy with Mexican impatience of American claims to Texas, but of
course Teran was in error in saying that the claim was now first presented."
The writer of this article makes reference to a similar expression of feeling
noted in El Sol, November 4, 1829.
and the Boundary Issue, 1822-1829," in The Southwestern Historical
Quarterly, XVII, 217-261.
Translations of Empresario Contracts, 343, General Land Office of Texas.
Piedras was also considerably disturbed over the arrival in Texas of
numerous bands of Cherokee and Chickasaw Indians from the United States.
Same to Same, December 20, 1829, Archivo General de Mexico, Guerra, Frac.
1, Leg. 14, op. mil. 1830, The University of Texas (Hatcher) Transcripts.
Relations, Mexico City, January 23, 1830. Facio quotes extracts from a
letter which Mier y Terán wrote him, November 14, 1829, from Tampico,
in which he included letters from Mariano Corio, Matagorda, October 31,
and Aranzazua, November 2, 1829, and Antonio Elosua, Béxar, November
9, 1829. All this correspondence is in The University of Texas Transcripts
from Department of Fomento, México, Legajo 5, Expediente 34.
January 6, 1830, in Alleine Howren, "Causes and Origin of the Decree of
April 6, 1830," in Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XVI, 403-404, and
407-413.
Transcripts from Department of Fomento, México, Legajo 5, Expediente 30.
Alamán, in a letter to Vice-president Bustamante written the same day,
treats the suggestions of Tarnava as having come from Mier y Terán.
MS., in Archivo General de la Nación, México, Guerra, Frac. 1, Leg. 7, op.
mil., 1836.
Archivo General de México, Guerra, Frac. 1, Leg. 14, op. mil. 1830, The
University of Texas (Hatcher) Transcripts.
General de la Nación, Legajo 14, op. mil. 1830.
to Minister of War, Mexico City, March 12, 1830, MS., Ibid.
1830, MS., Ibid.
and 13, 1830; Mier y Terán to Minister of War, San Fernando, February 20,
1830, MS., Ibid.
for Texas, Facio sent Alamán the following on February 16: "Federal
Infantry: The Twelfth Batallion, 250; State Troops (Infantry) : From San
Luis Potosi, 600; from Zacatecas, 400; from Nuevo León, 300; from Tamau-
lipas, 300; from Coahuila-Texas, 200; Federal Cavalry: the Ninth Regi-
ment, 315; the Ninth Company of Presidiales of the Eastern Interior States,
300; State Troops (Cavalry): from San Luis Potosi, 300; Total, 2,965.
Alleine Howren, "Causes and Origin of the Decree of April 6, 1830," in
The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XVI, 404-405.
General de México, Guerra, Frac. 1, Leg. 14, op. mil. 1830, The University
of Texas (Hatcher) Transcripts.
military authority in Tamaulipas; it was he who executed Iturbide. Busta-
mante had named him to the Eastern Interior commandancy, and Santa
Anna had deprived him of this command. While Mier y Terán does not
mention him by name, it is clear that the "dependency upon Tamaulipas"
refers to de la Garza. This naturally raises the question of the sincerity of
Mier y Terán's objections. Was he objecting to the plan of the War Depart-
ment or to the person who would be exercising authority over him?
Ibid.
Terán and de la Garza, but the idea was not being proposed for the first
time. A similar recommendation had been made in his communication of
October 20, 1829. Mier y Terán to Minister of War, Tampico, October 20,
1829, and San Fernando, February 27, 1830, Ibid.
Terán to Garza, San Fernando, March 2, and to Minister of War, March 7,
1830, Ibid.
1830; Mier y Terán to Minister of War, Matamoros, March 30, 1830, Ibid.
How to cite:
Ohland Morton, "Life of General Don Manuel de Mier y Teran", Volume 48, Number 1, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v048/n1/contrib_DIVL1149.html
[Accessed Mon Nov 23 15:42:35 CST 2009]
