The Annexation of Texas
*
THOUGH the precise date at which the Republic of Texas
was merged with the United States is of no practical
importance, it is a topic of intermittent popular discussion and
antiquarian interest. Puzzlement arises from the fact that the
process of annexation is confused with the dramatic ceremony
that accompanied the transition of the government from repub-
lic to state.
Briefly, the Congress of the United States passed the annex-
ation resolution on March 1, 1845. President John Tyler ap-
proved it and instructed Andrew Jackson Donelson, American
minister in Texas, to present it to the Texan authorities and
urge its prompt acceptance.
President Anson Jones called a special session of the Texas
Congress to meet in June and a convention of duly elected
delegates to assemble at Austin on July 4. Both Congress and
convention formally accepted the terms offered by the United
States, and the convention proceeded to frame the first state
constitution.
The constitution was ratified by popular vote in October and
was accepted by the Congress of the United States on Decem-
ber 29, 1845. By this act Texas became the twenty-eighth state
of the Union.
Following the admission of Texas, it was necessary for the
people to elect state officers. This being done, the legislature
assembled on February 16, and on February 19, 1846, President
Jones, in an impressive ceremony, delivered the government to
Governor J. Pinckney Henderson and declared, "The Republic
of Texas is no more." Calling attention to the happy merging
of the two republics, "not by violence and disorder, but by the
deliberate and free choice of its citizens," he closed his speech
with an eloquent peroration.
The lone star of Texas [he said], which ten years since arose amid
clouds over fields of carnage, and obscurely shone for a while, has cul-
minated, and following an inscrutable destiny has passed on and become
fixed forever in that glorious constellation which all freemen and lovers
if freedom in the world must reverence and adore--the American Union.
Blending its rays with its sister states, long may it continue to shine,
and may a gracious Heaven smile upon the consummation of the wishes
of the two republics now joined in one. May the Union be perpetual and
may it be the means of conferring benefit and blessings upon the people
of all the states, is my ardent prayer.
As he ended, the Lone Star flag was lowered, and the flag of
the United States took its place.
The question of annexation of Texas by the United States
was for ten years a subject of world importance.
At home, the subject aroused bitter sectional controversy
between the North and the South. Abolitionists, who were
determined to prevent further spread of slavery, declared that
annexation would be unconstitutional and would cause the dis-
solution of the Union, intimating that it would justify the
secession of the states that had abolished slavery. Southern
states, on the other hand, declared that refusal to annex would
justify secession of the South.
In international relations, Texas was an actual or potential
bone of contention between the United States, Mexico, England,
and possibly France. Since Mexico refused to accept the Battle
of San Jacinto as final and repeatedly declared its intention to
reconquer Texas, annexation might lead to war between the
United States and Mexico. British financial interests in Mex-
ico, desire to promote abolition of slavery, and commercial aims
shaped England's policy toward Mexico and Texas and caused
it to oppose annexation by the United States.
Evidence indicates that the British government had no de-
sire at any time to make Texas a part of the empire, but it
was willing to establish a protectorate over the rising republic
and guarantee Its independence to prevent its acceptance of
annexation by the United States. French policy was never
aggressive, but the government was ready to follow England's
lead in trying to prevent annexation by the United States.
The Texans used the international situation to their advan-
tage. Sam Houston, during his two administrations, was able to
feign an indifference toward annexation that he probably did
not feel, thereby stimulating anxieties of pro-annexationists in
the United States and encouraging British statesmen to hope
that Texas would remain independent. It is a notable fact that
neither American nor British diplomats ever felt quite sure of
Houston's preference. The same doubt was felt about Anson
Jones, under whom annexation was consummated.
M. B. Lamar, the second president of Texas, was frankly
against annexation, and his policy strengthened the uncertainty
about Houston and Jones when they later allowed it to be in-
ferred that they were playing a game. Jones confused the issue
further by attempting to prove that, but for his own interven-
tion, Houston would have completed treaty engagements with
England which would have made annexation difficult if not im-
possible.
The historian can neither prove nor disprove the sincerity
of Houston and Jones. In the light of the circumstances, con-
temporary documents can be construed to support the hypothesis
that they worked shrewdly to hasten annexation, or to defeat
it altogether. Naturally, after annexation was accomplished,
both contended they had always desired that end, and I believe
that they were sincere.
Whatever individual leaders may have thought about main-
taining independence, the people of Texas were never of two
minds. They had come from the United States to settle, and,
now that the revolution was successful, they wanted to return
to the United States, taking Texas with them.
The convention which declared Texas independent on March
2, 1836, adopted a constitution and elected a provisional gov-
ernment, making David G. Burnet temporary president, pend-
ing an election. After the Battle of San Jacinto and the retreat
of the Mexican army, Burnet called an election, to be held in
September. At the polls, the voters were to express themselves
on three subjects: (1) they were to ratify the constitution as
it had been written by the convention or authorize congress to
amend it; (2) they were to elect a president, vice-president,
congressmen, senators, and other officers; and (3) they were
to say whether or not they wished to be annexed to the United
States. As the result of the election, the constitution was ap-
proved unconditionally, Sam Houston was elected president,
and by a vote of 3,277 to 91 the people expressed their desire
for annexation to the United States. Though anybody who chose
to go to the polls could vote, without regard to length of pre-
vious residence in Texas, there is no reason to believe that the
returns misrepresented the will of the old settlers.
President Houston appointed Stephen F. Austin secretary of
state and selected William H. Wharton to represent Texas in
Washington. Austin had earlier opposed annexation but had
changed his views before the Declaration of Independence was
issued, and he now spent much of the last few weeks of his life
writing Wharton's instructions. Since he could not be received
officially until the government recognized the independence of
the new republic, Wharton's first mission was to strive for
recognition. After that question was out of the way, he was to
propose the annexation of Texas as a state. Austin took great
pains in defining the boundaries that Texas claimed. The line
that he proposed on the south and west followed the Rio Grande
from mouth to source, and thence north to the forty-second
parallel of latitude. The Texan congress subsequently adopted
this line by statute.
Much to Wharton's disappointment, President Jackson sent
a message to Congress on December 21 advising delay in rec-
ognizing Texas. The reasons that he assigned were plausible,
but probably nobody regarded them as expressing the Presi-
dent's real views. Wharton reported, after an interview with
him, that Jackson wished to force the responsibility upon Con-
gress; and this was probably true, though its strategy was
risky. The result indicates, however, that he knew what he
was about. On February 28, 1837, the House of Representatives
passed an appropriation to pay the salary of a diplomatic agent
to Texas when the President elected to send one, and on March
3, the Senate passed a resolution declaring explicitly that Texas
ought to be recognized. The President did not delay, but on
the last day of his administration, appointed a charge d'affaires
to Texas.
Wharton, who had already received permission to return to
Texas, departed immediately without broaching the subject of
annexation directly. Sailing on a Texan naval vessel from New
Orleans, he was captured by a Mexican ship and taken to Mata-
moros a prisoner, an unhappy situation from which he escaped
with the assistance of Captain Thomas M. Thompson, an Eng-
lishman in the Mexican Navy.
While William H. Wharton was still in Washington, fretting
over delay in the recognition of Texas, President Houston sent
General Memucan Hunt to assist him. He succeeded Wharton
in the post at Washington, and in August, 1837, after recogni-
tion, made the first and only proffer of Texas to the United
States.
He was handicapped by circumstances. Mexico was threat-
ening invasion to reconquer its truant province, and the new
republic, whatever its latent resources, was ill-prepared to
maintain a national government and wage a war of defense;
yet Hunt chose to present the subject in the light of a benefit
to the United States.
He began with a lengthy summary of the history of Mexico
since its independence, emphasizing the frequent revolutions
and political instability. Then he reviewed the history of Texas
during 1821-1836, showing its impressive development in the»
face of Mexican neglect and distrust. Arriving at the heart of
his discourse, he declared in the grandiloquent language of
which his generation was a master, on occasion, that Texas
desired an "amalgamation of flags" on terms consistent with
the honor of Texas. Annexation, he said, would give the United
States the great natural resources of Texas, would assure it a
growing market for American manufacturers from the North,
would enable it to avoid competition with Texas cotton and
sugar in Europe, and would strengthen American control of
the Gulf of Mexico. The United States would need to act
promptly, he added, because Texas was already negotiating
commercial treaties with European countries, and when they
were completed it would be difficult for Texas to withdraw and
accept annexation to the United States.
After a delay of three weeks, the American secretary of
state replied. He, too, indulged in a little bombast. In recog-
nizing Texan independence, he said, his government had not
overlooked the possibility of rivalry with certain Texan prod-
ucts in Europe, but it had believed that gratitude would
restrain the Texans from injuring the United States.
He then stated two reasons which prevented President Martin
Van Buren from accepting the Texas offer. The first was consti-
tutional; the second was the desire to avoid offense to Mexico.
The United States, he said, had never annexed a foreign inde-
pendent territory, and the President doubted the power of the
government, under the Constitution, to do so. True enough,
the,United States had annexed Louisiana and Florida without
the consent of their inhabitants, but President Van Buren did
not consider those acquisitions a precedent for incorporating
the territory of an independent nation with the consent of its
citizens. Nor did the President wish to reserve the question
for future consideration. As to the Mexican aspect of the sub-
ject, the President declared that, since Texas was still nominally
at war with Mexico, annexation would make the United States
a party to the war. Back of this thought was the possibility
that England might enter the war as an ally of Mexico. The
constitutional scruple seems absurd and insincere, but it was
urged also by spokesmen of the abolitionists, and, in extenua-
tion, we know that law and diplomacy make use of their peculiar
technicalities. Hunt had the. last word. He replied as best he
could, but it was obvious that Van Buren would have none of
Texas, and he would be President until 1841.
In September, 1837, following Van Buren's curt rejection of
the Texan proposal, John Quincy Adams offered in the House
of Representatives a resolution embodying the substance of the
President's scruples about the Constitution. He declared: "The
power of annexing the people of any independent foreign state
to this union is a power not delegated by the Constitution of
the United States to their Congress or to any department of
their government, but reserved to the people." In other words,
it would require an amendment of the Constitution to annex
Texas. He repeated the resolution toward the end of the next
session of Congress and, gaining the floor on June 16, spoke
for one hour daily with a few exceptions until Congress ad-
journed on July 9, 1838. The speech covered a wide range.
Had he been challenged, he would have maintained that all that
he said was germane to the resolution, but in fact he traveled
far afield. His view of the Texas question was that it was a
sordid plot to expand the slave territory of the United States
so as to give the South greater power in the Senate. It is not
likely that he wanted the House to vote on his resolution. More
Probably he offered it to gain an occasion for the speech. Later
he claimed that the speech laid the annexation question for
three years. But other conditions suspended the question.
Perhaps by inadvertence, the Texan government did not with-
draw its offer of annexation immediately after the United
States declined. President Houston ended this undignified sit-
uation, however, in 1838, instructing the Texan minister in
Washington to inform the government that the offer was no
longer pending. The Texan Senate approved this action in 1839.
Houston was succeeded by Mirabeau B. Lamar. He had won
an enviable reputation as leader of the cavalry in the Battle of
San Jacinto and had served as vice-president while Houston was
president. He was a poet and an orator. He had a great vision of
Texas as an independent nation and devoted much of his in-
augural address to the expression of his views. Of annexation
to the United States, he said:
I have never been able myself to perceive the policy of the desired
connexion, or discover in it any advantage ... which could possibly result
to Texas. But on the contrary a long train of consequences of the most
appalling character and magnitude have never failed to present themselves
whenever I have entertained the subject. ... The step, once taken, would
produce a lasting regret, and ultimately prove as disastrous to our liberty
and hopes as the triumphant sword of the enemy.
Annexation would deprive Texas of her public lands, of the
right to make appropriations therefrom for internal improve-
ments and education, to levy her own taxes, to control com-
merce . . . "pouring her abundant treasures into the lap of
another people than her own." When he turned from this
"dark and dreary picture" to the brilliant future that awaited
the independent republic, when he contemplated the "vast ex-
tent of territory, stretching from the Sabine to the Pacific and
away to the Southwest as far as the obstinacy of the enemy may
render it necessary for the sword to mark the boundary, .. ."
he could not regard the annexation of Texas to the American
Union "in any other light than as the grave of all her hopes
of happiness and greatness." And much more of the same sort.
The people of Texas did not share Lamar's views, however,
and it was at Washington on the Potomac rather than at Austin
on the Colorado that the fate of annexation was to be settled.
V. The Republic Gains Recognition in Europe
but Fails in Mexico
Henderson to London and Paris in 1837 to gain recognition
and treaties of commerce. Henderson had already begun a
distinguished career in Texas, though he was then only thirty
years of age. He was born in North Carolina and came to
Texas after a short residence in Mississippi. He arrived in
Texas in June, 1836, and was commissioned a major general
to enlist volunteers in the United States in preparation for the
renewed invasion by Mexico, which was then expected. Houston
made him attorney general of Texas, and after the death of
Austin, secretary of state. Later he represented Texas as a
special commissioner, with Isaac Van Zandt, in negotiating the
treaty of annexation with the United States, was the first gov-
ernor of the state of Texas, major general in the Mexican War,
and United States senator, succeeding Thomas J. Rusk. He
negotiated an unsatisfactory trading arrangement with Eng-
land in 1838, without recognition of Texan independence and,
in 1839, signed a treaty of commerce and recognition with
France.
President Lamar appointed James Hamilton of South Caro-
lina to cooperate with Henderson and, more particularly, to
negotiate a five million dollar loan. After the conclusion of
the French treaty, Henderson returned to Texas, and Hamilton
assumed the general diplomatic mission. Hamilton had served
South Carolina as legislator, congressman, and governor. He
had been a successful banker, planter, and railroad director;
had made a large fortune and lost much of it, but retained
enough to make generous loans to Texas. He did not succeed
in securing the five million dollar loan for Texas, fortunately
perhaps; but he concluded treaties of commerce and recognition
with England, Holland, and Belgium. He became a citizen of
Texas in 1855. Two years later, sailing from New Orleans to
Galveston, his ship was wrecked in a collision in the Gulf and
he was lost after giving his life belt to a woman and child.
President Houston's policy during his first administration
was to ignore Mexico, knowing that the government, was unable
to send another army to Texas. Lamar, characteristically, was
more active, even aggressive. During 1839-1841, he made three
efforts to negotiate with Mexico. Barnard E. Bee, early in
1839, and James Webb, Texas secretary of state, in 1841, were
not allowed by the government to land. James Treat, of New
York, was received and spent nine or ten months in Mexico
Treat deserves well of Texas, but our knowledge of him is
limited. The nearest approach to a sketch of his relations
with Texas can be drawn from Dr. Joseph Schmitz's Texan
Statecraft
(Naylor, 1941). He first appears in connection with
a New York company interested in Texas land. He had spent
much of his life in South America and in Mexico, where he had
lived seven years. He was educated, cultured, and experienced
and seems to have worked for Texas intelligently and unselfishly.
He was actually received by the Mexican government, through
the assistance of Richard Pakenham, the British minister in
Mexico City. He was prepared for Texas to assume part of
Mexico's foreign debt in return for Mexico's recognition of
independence. It seems evident now that the Mexicans were
merely trying to divert Texas from alliance with rebels in
northern Mexico. In the end, Treat became certain that the
only terms to be obtained would be the return of Texas to
Mexico as a state of the federal union. He was suffering from
tuberculosis and during his last few months in Mexico was
critically ill. He sailed for Galveston on the Texan warship
San
Antonio
in November, 1839, and died on board.
In December, 1841, John Quincy Adams recorded in his val-
uable diary that the subject of annexation seemed to be reviv-
ing. In fact, a number of events during 1841-1842 gave Texas
prominent space in the newspapers and helped to revive interest
in annexation. European recognition of Texan independence
stimulated interest and some apprehension. Above all, how-
ever, renewed hostilities between Mexico and Texas made the
subject of Texas live news.
During the summer of 1841 President Lamar authorized an
ambiguous expedition to Santa Fe, New Mexico. Three-fifths of
the present state of New Mexico was included in the statutory
boundary proclaimed by the Congress of Texas in December,
1836. Lamar's expedition was a mixed military and commercial
venture. He invited the inhabitants of the Santa Fe district to
unite with Texas. If they refused, a trading arrangement was
proposed. The accompanying soldiers were to safeguard the
wagon train of trade goods--or so it was argued. The expedi-
tion was poorly guided and suffered dreadfully from thirst and
hunger before encountering Mexican soldiers on the Pecos. They
surrendered and in the course of time were sent to prisons in
Mexico. George Wilkins Kendall, editor of the New Orleans
Picayune,
and other American citizens were among the pris-
oners and became a subject of diplomatic correspondence be-
tween Daniel Webster, then American secretary of state, and
the Mexican government. This correspondence in itself was
sufficient to arouse great public interest. Eventually the pris-
oners were released by Santa Anna's intervention.
The Mexicans retaliated for the Santa Fe expedition by a
raid on San Antonio, Goliad, and Refugio in March, 1842, and
by a second invasion the following fall. There was considerable
bloodshed in this second expedition. A volunteer Texan army
followed the retreating Mexicans to the Rio Grande. There
some two hundred men separated from the main Texan force
when General Alexander Somervell ordered a retreat. The
aggressive minority, led by Colonel William S. Fisher, attacked
the town of Mier, was defeated, and surrendered to a superior
Mexican force in December, 1842. On the march to Mexican
prisons, the captives escaped south of Saltillo. After great
suffering in the barren mountains, they were recaptured, and
Santa Anna decreed that one-tenth should be executed. The
victims were selected by lot, drawing black beans from an urn.
Meantime, public interest ran high in the United States.
Mass meetings adopted resolutions, encouraged "emigrants" to
go to Texas, and raised money to purchase arms and ammuni-
tion to enable the "emigrants" to support themselves by "hunt-
ing" until they could harvest crops. Such meetings were not
confined to southern cities. Some of the most enthusiastic were
held in Philadelphia and New York City.
Throughout the period of Texan independence American
statesmen were uneasy about British designs in Texas, and
their fears leaked out to the newspapers and aroused the people.
As early as May, 1836, a debate in the United States Senate
brought out warnings of Britain's plans for Texas. The debate
was started by the introduction of numerous petitions asking
Congress to recognize Texan independence. Daniel Webster, of
Massachusetts, declared that Texas ought to be recognized as
soon as the American government had official information of
the fact that Texas was independent and possessed resources
adequate to maintain independence. He was convinced that a
"European power" was greatly interested in Texas and might
take action that would injure the interest of the United States.
John C. Calhoun said that he was ready then to vote not only
for recognition but for annexation.
A little later, in August, 1836, Texas was the subject of a
question in the House of Commons. A speaker of the opposition
wanted to know what the government was doing to safeguard
British interests in Texas, his meaning being that Mexico's
ability to pay British creditors would be lessened if Texas
became independent. Henry G. Ward, who had been the first
British minister to Mexico, asked: "Shall we let the United
States pursue a policy of aggrandisement and annex Texas,
thereby shutting us out of the Gulf and trade with Mexico?
Shall we let Texas be annexed and perpetuate slavery in the
United States?" Lord Palmerston replied for the government
that action was not then necessary, and the questions were
withdrawn.
Influential newspapers in New Orleans, Washington, Phila-
delphia, and New York repeated charges that the Mexican
invasions during 1842 were financed by British loans. For
example, the Washington Globe,
quoting the New Orleans Bee
in April, 1842, declared that British capitalists advanced money
to Santa Anna for the invasions, that the British government
guaranteed the loans, and that Santa Anna had given the gov-
ernment a mortgage on church property in Mexico for security.
Some papers thought the rumor ridiculous and asked why
England should want control of Texas. To this question a
writer in the Philadelphia Public
Ledger
replied that British
possessions already surrounded the United States, Canada in
the north, the Bermudas and Bahamas on the east, islands in
the Pacific and Oregon on the west, and now England wanted a
nearer approach to the United States in Texas. Later the
Ledger
said that England had always taken everything she
could get and held what she took.
As the population of Texas increased, its trade came to be
appreciated by chambers of commerce in the East, and petitions
went to Congress urging members to bring about more advan-
tageous arrangements for American merchants. A petition
from merchants and traders of New York quoted statistics
from the New York Journal
of
Commerce
in February, 1844,
showing, in spite of the rapid increase of population, the decline
of trade with Texas since it was recognized by European powers.
Down to 1839, it was said that exports to Texas steadily in-
creased to a total of $1,687,000. By the end of 1843, the value
of exports had declined to $190,604. The accuracy of the figures
cannot be established perhaps, but they indicate that ports of
the United States were becoming trade-conscious concerning
Texas. The same article quoted a sea captain who said that
he saw in the port of Galveston in January, 1844, fourteen
vessels, only one of which was American. Seven were British,
he said, five German, and one Belgian.
It seems evident that England never wanted to annex Texas,
but equally evident that it was anxious to prevent annexation
by the United States. In furtherance of this design, it did all
that it could during 1843-1845 to induce Mexico to recognize
Texan independence, hoping thereby to lessen the desire of the
Texans for annexation.
It seems likely now that abolitionist sentiment was the chief
obstacle to annexation rather than opposition to territorial
expansion. In April, 1842, a New York congressman, Archi-
bald Linn, offered in the house a motion to strike from an
appropriation bill the salary of the minister to Mexico. No
doubt his purpose was simply to create an occasion for a speech.
"Recent events," he said, "have satisfied me that new and seri-
ous attempts will be made to accomplish the annexation of
Texas," an event, which he could regard "only as the annexa-
tion of a wen to an otherwise sound body." Annexation would
cause war with Mexico, he said, and England, for commercial
and other reasons, would join Mexico.
In September, 1842, John Quincy Adams addressed his con-
stituents at Braintree, Massachusetts. He repeated many of
the assertions that he had made in his long speech during June
and July of 1838 and warned them that annexation was again
an issue. As he represented it, the colonists had gone to Texas
to take it away from Mexico; they had revolted because Mexico
tried to abolish slavery; and now the southern states were
striving for annexation in order to win new territory to be
divided into slave states. Six months later, in March, 1843,
Adams and a score of other congressmen issued from Wash-
ington an address to "The People of the Free States of the
Union." The signers admitted that slavery was not the only
question involved in annexation, but they insisted that it was
the most important issue and declared that the object of the
South was "to add new weight to her end of the lever." They
said, in effect, that annexation would be unconstitutional and
would justify "dissolution of the Union" by the free states.
A typical paragraph said: "We hesitate not to say that
annexation ... would be identical with dissolution. It would
be a violation of our national compact, its objects, designs ...
and we not only assert that the people of the free states ought
not to submit to it, but we say with confidence, they would not
submit to it. ... To prevent the success of this nefarious project,
to preserve from such violation the Constitution of our coun-
try," and so forth, annexation must be defeated.
The legislatures of Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and
other southern states adopted resolutions arguing the right of
the United States to annex Texas and declaring annexation
necessary in order to prevent England from gaining control of
the province and using it as a base from which to work against
slavery in the United States. Indiana, Massachusetts, and other
northern legislatures protested emphatically against annexation.
The Whig State Convention of Connecticut adopted a reso-
lution in the fall of 1843 that gave great offence in the South.
It resolved,
that the annexation of the Republic of Texas, a foreign and independent
state, to our union will be a most palpable and flagrant infraction of the
Constitution of the United States, alike inconsistent with the healthful
administration of the government and dangerous to our liberties, and must
inevitably break up and destroy our glorious union.
These and many other declarations were addressed to Con-
gress and found their way into the newspapers. No action was
taken by Congress, but the agitation affected the question of
annexation.
Soon after coming to the presidency the second time, Presi-
dent Houston cautiously reopened the subject of annexation.
He instructed the Texas charge d'affaires in Washington to find
occasion to inform the government that Texas would consider
the subject. On December 23, 1842, Isaac Van Zandt, who had
recently taken the post at Washington, wrote that President
Tyler and the majority of his cabinet were anxious to annex
Texas but feared that a treaty for annexation might not com-
mand a two-thirds majority for ratification in the Senate.
A desultory correspondence continued through the first six
months of 1843, but no progress was made. In July, therefore,
Houston made an effort to stimulate action. He had Anson
Jones, Texan secretary of state, write Van Zandt that his earlier
instructions were withdrawn. The reason he assigned was that
he now hoped to settle relations with Mexico, after which the
United States Senate might be more willing to ratify a treaty
than if annexation should involve danger of war with Mexico.
But Van Zandt was simply to say that his instructions were
suspended. No doubt Houston expected the American govern-
ment to read between the lines. Recognition of independence
by Mexico, guaranteed by England, might make the Texans less
eager for annexation. Certainly President Tyler drew such an
inference.
President Tyler was, unfortunately, a man without a party.
A former Democrat, he had allowed himself to become a can-
didate for the vice-presidency on the Whig ticket. After a
boisterous campaign, the Whigs won the election of 1840, but
a month after inauguration their President, General William
Henry Harrison, died and Tyler became President. He soon
found himself under the necessity of vetoing nearly all of the
Whig program and was read out of the party. He was not in
the most fortunate position, therefore, to champion annexation,
being unable to carry either Whig or Democratic support.
In September, 1843, Van Zandt wrote the Texan government
that the American secretary of state, Abel P. Upshur, of Vir-
ginia, had discussed the matter of annexation frequently and
said that President Tyler "now contemplated an early action
thereon." He had been making investigation and believed that
the necessary two-thirds of the Senate would ratify a treaty.
On October 16, Upshur came to the point and proposed opening
negotiations for a treaty of annexation. Van Zandt was coy
and replied that he had no instructions on the subject but
would pass it on to his government.
President Houston was now in an advantageous position to
drive a bargain. Through the intervention of British agents,
Mexico had agreed to an armistice to discuss terms of peace,
Houston really expected nothing to come of the negotiations
but made use of the situation. He instructed Van Zandt tc
say that the opening of negotiations for annexation would cause
Mexico to break off the armistice and probably invade Texas,
while England would be offended and withdraw its good offers
In effect, he wanted assurance that a treaty of annexation would
be ratified by the Senate and, in the meantime, that the Presi-
dent of the United States would undertake to protect Texas
from an invasion. They were difficult assurances for Tyler
to give.
When Van Zandt delivered President Houston's questions to
Upshur, the American secretary of state, he was told that the
Senate would certainly ratify a treaty of annexation, but he
did not answer the demand for protection of Texas while the
treaty was pending. The overzealous American minister at
Galveston assured Anson Jones that the United States would
protect Texas, but later he had to admit that he spoke without
authority. As it turned out, the Senate rejected the treaty,
but Upshur may have thought that he had enough votes pledged
to ratify. He was killed in an accident while the negotiations
were in progress, and a roster of the Senate was found among
his papers on which he had written against each name "for"
or "against." Presumably, this was a forecast of the vote on
annexation.
As a matter of fact, President Houston had little apprehen-
sion of an invasion by Mexico and dropped temporarily the
demand for a pledge of protection. He sent J. Pinckney Hen-
derson to Washington to assist Van Zandt, and they had agreed
substantially upon the terms of a treaty when Upshur was
killed. A month intervened in which nothing was done; then
President Tyler induced John C. Calhoun to take the vacant
cabinet post. Calhoun accepted because he believed that he
might be able to assure and hasten annexation. The Texans
now renewed the demand for protection, and Calhoun probably
had an influence in inducing the President to go as far as his
constitutional powers permitted. Only Congress could declare
war, but he could order the army and the navy to positions that
might deter Mexico from an invasion. On April 11, 1844, Cal-
houn told Van Zandt and Henderson that President Tyler had
ordered a naval force to the Gulf and the army to the south-
western frontier. The next day the treaty was signed.
The treaty declared that Texas and the United States desired
annexation to further their mutual security and prosperity.
Texas ceded its public land and public property, such as naval
and military equipment, and the right to levy tariff duties;
and the United States agreed to annex Texas as a territory,
subject to constitutional provisions for the government of
territories. It would be admitted to the Union as a state as
soon as the constitutional provisions for the admission of
territories could be complied with. Since Texas, by the terms
of the treaty, would be deprived of means to pay its public
debt by taxes or by grants of public land, the United States
assumed the obligation to pay the debt of the Republic of Texas
up to a maximum of ten million dollars. The boundary claimed
by Texas was that laid down by the congress of the republic in
1836--the Rio Grande from mouth to source and thence north-
ward to the forty-second parallel of latitude. As successor to
the public lands of Texas, however, the government might make
adjustments of this boundary with Mexico. The terms were
none too favorable to Texas, but the people undoubtedly would
have accepted it. Fortunately for Texas, the Senate rejected
the treaty.
President Tyler sent the annexation treaty to the Senate on
April 22, 1844. In his message of transmittal, he sought to
emphasize the advantages that all sections of the country would
derive from annexation, arguing at the same time the right
to annex and the danger of British interference, if annexation
now failed. "The country itself thus obtained," said the Presi-
dent, "is of incalculable value in an agricultural and commercial
point of view. To a soil of inexhaustible fertility it unites a
genial and healthy climate, and is destined at a day not distant
to make large contributions to the commerce of the world."
Commerce, manufacturing, and navigation would enjoy a grow-
ing profit from the connection; this was an appeal to the eastern
states. The West would find a market in Texas for its beef,
pork, mules, horses, and wheat--his idea being that Texans
would devote themselves to cotton raising. The South would
benefit by security from interference with slavery by domestic
and foreign agents. "Nor do I indulge in any vague conjectures
of the future." He thought the conclusion inevitable, that "if
the boon now tendered [by Texas] be rejected, Texas will seek
for the friendship of others." Texas had maintained her inde-
pendence for eight years, he said, and Mexico had no right to
consider annexation an act of aggression. There was nothing
new in the President's argument, but he made a capable sum-
mary of all the considerations involved.
Apparently President Tyler had good reason to believe that
the Senate would promptly ratify the treaty when he so assured
President Houston in October, 1848. Ex-President Jackson
wrote Houston from the Hermitage that his friends assured
him that thirty-nine senators would vote to ratify, while only
thirty-five would be required. Six months passed, however,
after this prediction, before the treaty went to the Senate, on
April 22, 1844, and by that time the national conventions were
on the eve of nominating presidential candidates. It was an
unpropitious time to ask a senator to vote his convictions on a
controversial subject. Six weeks dragged by while the Senate
hesitated and deferred a vote. On June 8, however, a vote was
taken, and the treaty was defeated thirty-five to sixteen. Of
the thirty-five negative votes, fifteen came from Whig senators
of the slave states. Normally they would have been cast for
ratification, but Henry Clay, the Whig candidate for the presi-
dency, had declared against immediate annexation, and the
southern Whig senators followed the party, believing, no doubt,
that there would be another chance to annex Texas when the
political strain would be less tense. Even T. H. Benton, the
Democratic Senator from Missouri and a friend of Andrew
Jackson, voted to reject the treaty and explained his reasons in a
disingenuous speech that convinced nobody, probably not even
himself. Presumably, he wished to prevent Tyler from attach-
ing his name to the measure which Benton had periodically
advocated for a quarter of a century.
On June 10, two days after the vote in the Senate, President
Tyler sent all the papers concerning Texas to the House of
Representatives and asked for annexation by an act of Congress.
The date of adjournment was already set, and he knew that
Congress would not act, but he wished to leave the question
pending before the country. It had already become the leading
issue in the national presidential campaign.
XII. Texan Diplomacy Designed to Embarrass the
United States
Before signing the annexation treaty, the Texan representa-
tives, Van Zandt and Henderson, received from Calhoun Presi-
dent Tyler's pledge that he would order a strong naval force
to the Gulf of Mexico and strengthen the military forces on
the Texas frontier. President Houston did not consider this
guarantee of protection altogether adequate, but it went as far
as Tyler's constitutional authority permitted. Tyler thought
that the army and navy dispositions might deter Mexico from
attempting an invasion of Texas.
In the same letter that expressed his dissatisfaction to Van
Zandt and Henderson, Houston declared:
If from any cause we should be rejected, we must redouble our energies.
... Texas can be sovereign and independent, founded upon her own incal-
culable advantages of situation, and sustained by European influences
without the slightest compromittal of her nationality. ... I again declare
to you that every day which passes only convinces me more clearly that
it is the last effort at annexation that Texas will ever make.
After rejection by the Senate, the Texas government directed
a continuous correspondence to its agents in Washington and
to the American representative in Texas demanding fulfillment
of the pledge of protection. At the same time, Houston redou-
bled his efforts to convince the British agent in Texas, by sug-
gestion and implication, that he was done with annexation;
and in that endeavor he succeeded, thereby increasing the
anxiety of friends of annexation in the United States. In effect,
the American government reiterated many times its more or
less guarded promise of protection.
Toward the end of September, 1844, Houston wrote a short
memorandum to Anson Jones, who was then secretary of state
and president-elect of Texas. He instructed Jones to order Ash-
bel Smith, minister of Texas in London and Paris, to conclude
certain commercial arrangements with England and France.
There can be little doubt that Houston expected these instruc-
tions to leak out, but Jones took them seriously and declined
to forward them to Ashbel Smith. He wrote on the back of
Houston's note to him:
The within order cannot be obeyed for it would either defeat annexation
altogether, or lead to a war between Europe and America. Besides, it
would directly complicate our relations and entangle us with France and
England, produce disturbances and revolution at home, and probably render
it very difficult if not impossible for me to administer the government of
Texas successfully. General Houston has furnished no explanation of his
motives for this course of policy. If they be to defeat annexation, produce
a war, or break down my administration (about to commence), I cannot
favor any of these objects and can conceive of no other.
Later Jones himself was charged with desiring to prevent
annexation. This endorsement on Houston's note became an
alibi.
XIII. The Presidential Campaign op 1844 Determines
Annexation
The campaign of 1844 is said to have begun in 1840. To the
surprise of the country, Martin Van Buren, the Democratic
candidate in 1840, was defeated by the Whigs, who supported
William Henry Harrison and Tyler. The Democrats thought
it good strategy to continue to back their defeated candidate,
so that the nomination of Van Buren in 1844 seemed to be a
foregone conclusion. It was well understood in Whig councils
that Henry Clay would finally receive his reward and succeed
Harrison. He had earned the chance and had been a receptive
aspirant for many years. Harrison's death and Tyler's succes-
sion threatened Clay's hopes, while Tyler's raising of the annex-
ation issue ultimately sidetracked Van Buren's nomination and
defeated Clay for the presidency.
Just before the Whig national convention in Baltimore, Clay
published a letter declaring that he did not favor immediate
annexation of Texas. About the same time an officious friend
asked Van Buren's views, and he answered at great length.
Since 1837, when he rejected Memucan Hunt's overtures, he
had convinced himself that annexation would not violate the
Constitution, but he was not ready to act until Mexico recog-
nized Texan independence and made peace. Clay's views were
accepted even by southern Whigs in the national convention, and
he received the nomination on May 1, 1844. Van Buren already
had nearly enough votes pledged to nominate him, and many of
the instructed delegates were on the way to Baltimore when
his statement appeared. Those from the South knew that his
attitude was opposed to the wishes of their states, but there
was not sufficient time to hold new state conventions and get
other instructions. The traditional two-thirds rule of the Dem-
ocrats offered a way out. After a few ballots, delegates com-
placently decided that they had fulfilled their instructions and
switched to James K. Polk, of Tennessee, the first "dark horse"
in a national convention. Polk was known to favor annexation
and to have the support of Jackson, the old warrior in the
Hermitage. After the ninth ballot Van Buren's name was with-
drawn, and the convention stampeded to Polk.
The Democratic platform contained a strong expansion plank.
Controversy with England over the boundary of Oregon was
active, and Oregon and Texas were linked together in the
demand for "the re-occupation of Oregon and the re-annexa-
tion of Texas at the earliest practicable period." The play on
"re-occupation" and "re-annexation" begged important histori-
cal questions, but they were good slogans with which to excite
voters. In the November election Polk won a popular plurality
of 40,000 votes over Clay, and his electoral vote was 170 to 105.
England had used strong diplomatic pressure to induce Mex-
ico to recognize the independence of Texas and make a peace
guaranteed by England and France, hoping thereby to make
the prospect of national independence so attractive to Texas
leaders that they would reject annexation, but Mexico would
not yield. Then the governments of England and France con-
templated a joint declaration against annexation in the hope of
winning votes for Clay and the anti-annexationists. Fortu-
nately, they consulted their respective ministers in Washington
and were told that no action they might take could contribute
more to the victory of Polk and annexation.
Tyler and his advisers believed sincerely that there was
danger of losing Texas. The fear of British designs was very
real, and he did not wait for the incoming administration to
take action. In his message of December 3, 1844, he reviewed
the history of Texas to show that it was actually independent
and that there was no obstacle to annexation in international
law. The chief argument against ratification of the treaty, he
said, had been that "the question of annexation had not been
submitted to the ordeal of public opinion in the United States."
That objection no longer existed.
The great popular election which has just been terminated afforded the
best opportunity of ascertaining the will of the states and the people upon
it; .... the decision of the people and the states ... has been decisively
manifested. The question of annexation has been presented nakedly to
their consideration. ... A controlling majority of the people and a large
majority of the states have declared in favor of immediate annexation.
... It is the will of both the people and the states that Texas shall be
annexed to the Union promptly and immediately.
sented "nakedly" to the voters, as Tyler asserted. Many who
voted the Democratic ticket were indifferent to Texas, many
favored annexation, and others voted in spite of the platform.
Tyler was correct, however, in his assumption that the voters
clearly understood that Democratic victory would hasten an-
nexation.
Regardless of their attitude toward Tyler, members of Con-
gress were ready to act. First and last, eight or ten bills were
introduced proposing annexation on varying terms. One reso-
lution proposed to incorporate the defeated treaty into an act
of Congress and admit Texas as a territory. Another proposed
to annex Texas directly as a state. This proposal passed the
House of Representatives. The Senate made various amend-
ments. One amendment, offered by Benton of Missouri, gave
the President the option of proceeding to annex Texas directly,
with its consent, or of offering to negotiate a new treaty, a
procedure which might enable Texas to obtain advantages not
specified in the original resolution, but which, at the same time,
would expose annexation again to the hazard of ratification by
the Senate. The House accepted the Senate amendment. Which
alternative would the President adopt?
Perhaps it should be emphasized that Texas was annexed by
act of Congress, not by treaty. The original House resolution
for the annexation of Texas consisted of two paragraphs, The
first of these proposed that Texas should be admitted to the
Union as a state, with a republican form of government adopted
by the people of Texas and approved by Congress. The second
paragraph specified details: (1) boundary disputes with other
governments were to be adjusted by the United States, not by
Texas; (2) the Constitution of the new state must be submitted
to Congress on or before January 1, 1846; (3) Texas must
cede to the United States all fortifications, barracks, ports and
harbors, navy and navy yards, and all other property per-
taining to the public defense. At the same time, it was to retain
its public debt, and all vacant public lands were to be owned
and disposed of by the state. In no case was the public debt
to be a charge against the United States; (4) new states not
exceeding four in number "in addition to the said State of
Texas" might be formed out of the territory of Texas and
admitted to the Union according- to the terms of the Federal
Constitution.
The House bill was more favorable to Texas than the treaty
would have been. It admitted Texas as a state without requiring
it to pass through the territorial stage, and it permitted Texas
to retain its public lands and set up its own land system. The
public lands have been of incalculable benefit to Texas.
The Senate amended the House bill so as to give the President
of the United States the option of proposing to Texas the
negotiation of another treaty. Presumably, it was argued, Texas
might prefer such a negotiation in the hope of gaining addi-
tional advantages, such as assurances of improvement of rivers
and harbors. Undoubtedly, however, the Senate amendment
was a face-saving gesture on the part of some senators who
wished to tell their constituents that they did not vote for
immediate annexation.
The House concurred in the Senate amendment, and President
Tyler, without waiting for the inauguration of Polk three days
later, instructed the American minister in Texas to offer an-
nexation under the original terms of the House proposal. This
minister was Andrew Jackson Donelson, nephew of Andrew
Jackson. Anticipating efforts of the British and French diplo-
mats to defeat annexation, Tyler told Donelson to make every
effort to induce the Texas government to accept without delay.
Fears of British and French opposition were, of course, well
founded.
The attitude of the British government was plainly stated in
a letter to its representative in Texas dated January 23, 1845.
The election of Polk had indicated popular approval of annex-
ation, and Congress was then debating terms. Lord Aberdeen
wrote:
Her Majesty's Government are firmly convinced that the dignity and
prosperity of that country [Texas] are more secure in its own keeping
than under the institutions of any other government, however powerful.
... It must be long before a newly settled and comparatively thinly
peopled country would command the attention and the weight which would
make up for an abandonment of the privilege of self-government--if
indeed such a result should ever be attainable.
He said that the President of Mexico seemed to be leaning
toward recognition of Texan independence, and he hoped that
such recognition would make the Texans less anxious for an-
nexation.
Captain Charles Elliot, the British charge in Texas, believed
that "several leading men in the country are only waiting for
an opportunity, and will declare themselves against annexation
decisively and energetically as soon as they think they can do
so without mischief to their popularity." He said that Anson
Jones sincerely desired the maintenance of independence but
that he would be helpless against popular demand unless he
could offer, as an alternative to annexation, recognition of
independence by Mexico. Here again we are uncertain whether
this opinion was induced from a shrewd diplomatic ruse on
Jones's part or was a true statement of his views.
In order to hasten Mexico's decision, Elliot proposed to go
secretly to Mexico on a British warship and present demands
of the Texas government. First, the Texans wanted an official
announcement of the willingness of Mexico to recognize inde-
pendence. Second, Texas would agree, in return, for a period
of ninety days, not to enter into negotiations looking toward
annexation to any other country.
As expanded by Captain Elliot, the Texas proposal, or ulti-
matum, contained four articles:
(1) Mexico consents to acknowledge the independence of Texas, (2)
Texas engages that she will stipulate in the treaty not to annex herself
or become subject to any country whatever, (3) limits and other conditions
to be matter of arrangement in the final treaty, and (4) Texas will be
willing to remit disputed points respecting territory and other matters to
the arbitration of umpires.
This memorandum was dated March 29, 1845. Four weeks
earlier Congress had passed the resolution for annexation. Could
President Jones hold off the decision long enough to receive
the Mexican response?
After long delay, the Mexican government accepted the terms
offered by Texas, namely, recognition of Texan independence
on condition that Texas should maintain its independence. On
May 17, 1845, the British minister in Mexico delivered to Cap-
tain Charles Elliot the Mexican reply. In addition to accepting
the Texan proposals, it stipulated that its reply should be null
and void if Texas accepted annexation. In delivering the Mex-
ican document to Elliot his colleague in Mexico wrote:
It is a matter of regret ... that so much time has elapsed between
the presentation of the [Texan] articles to this government and the
moment of their acceptance, but you are too well acquainted with the
dilatory habits of Spaniards and Spanish Americans not to be able to
explain this circumstance to the President [of Texas].
Elliot made all haste back to Texas on board a French war-
ship and reported his arrival at Galveston to his home govern-
ment on May 30, 1845. He hastened to Washington-on-the-
Brazos and delivered the Mexican document, but President Jones
told him that the popular fever for annexation made its accept-
ance doubtful.
It is not likely that public opinion in Texas was disposed to
reject annexation, but the American government took no
chances. Donelson was instructed to urge acceptance and to
assure the Texans that objectionable conditions of the annex-
ation offer could be eliminated by Congress after annexation
was completed. Dr. Ashbel Smith, who played an influential
role in the diplomatic history of the republic, is authority for
the statement that agents from the United States were active
in promoting annexation sentiment and pledged the government
to shower benefits on Texas. He says:
The promises were among others to clear out our rivers for navigation,
to deepen the entrances of our harbors, to build lighthouses on our coast
for commerce, to erect military works, fortifications for the defense of the
coast, to execute important works of internal improvement, and to do
various and sundry other things for Texas which were beyond our means.
... Under the fostering protection of the United States it was gloriously
prophesied, with spread eagle magniloquence, that capital would flow into
Texas ... to develop and utilize our incalculable natural resources. Em-
ployment, wealth, and prosperity would reign in this land. Here in the
West lay the inexhaustible Orient.
But such oratorical exertions were unnecessary. Captain
Elliot easily read the writing on the wall and wrote Lord
Aberdeen on June 15 that he felt there was no reasonable doubt
of the result "and renewed reflection has strengthened me in
the impression that I had better not be here at the period of
... formal action upon the subject, be it what it may."
Though the American proposals were not laid formally before
the Texas government until the middle of April, 1845, a great
popular movement began as soon as the passage of the annex-
ation resolutions was known in Texas. Naturally, President
Jones could take no steps, even had he wished, until he received
the offer from the United States; but the impression was wide-
spread that he was opposed to annexation and.that he would
defeat the movement if he could. Numerous public meetings
demanded action. Ashbel Smith wrote President Jones from
Galveston on April 9, describing the public excitement. He said:
"I find everywhere very great, very intense feeling on the sub-
ject of annexation. ... I am forced to believe that the immense
majority of the citizens are in favor of annexation, that is
annexation as presented in the resolutions of the American
Congress." He went on to say that plans were formed in a
number of counties to force the meeting of a convention if the
government did not act.
On April 16, 1845, President Jones called Congress to meet
in special session on June 16. He explained later that flooded
streams would have made it difficult for members to meet earlier.
One problem that the Congress was expected to deal with was
passage of a redistricting act to equalize sectional representa-
tion. After a few days of consideration, however, he decided
to propose an extra-legal ratio of representation and did so in
a proclamation dated May 5. The convention was called to
meet in Austin on July 4, though the government had been
carried on from Washington-on-the-Brazos since 1842.
Meantime, Donelson, the American commissioner in Texas,
had learned that Sam Houston was opposed to the terms offered
by the United States and visited him at Huntsville to try to win
his support. Rumor had not misconstrued Houston's attitude.
He wanted Texas to reject the proposal to enter the Union on
the terms submitted and insist on the negotiation of a new
treaty. By such a treaty he thought that the United States
could be induced to buy the public property of Texas and to
guarantee citizens against loss in the adjustment of the bound-
ary with Mexico.
Fortunately, Donelson found it unnecessary to convert Hous-
ton. Both Congress and the convention met on the dates fixed
by the president's proclamations. Jones placed before them
the terms proposed by the United States and at the same time
submitted Mexico's agreement to recognize Texan independence
on condition that Texas should retain and preserve its inde-
pendence. Both bodies voted to frame a state constitution for
ratification by the people and submission to the Congress of
the United States.
Congress approved the Texas Constitution on December 29,
1845. From that date Texas was a member of the Union, but
the transition to state government was delayed for seven weeks.
The newly elected legislature met at Austin on February 16,
1846, and, after organizing, prepared for the ceremony of
ending the government of the republic. On February 19, the
ceremony took place.
Picturesque details that would be expected in a newspaper
today are lacking. An extra of the Austin Democrat,
issued the
next day, contents itself with the meager statement that
Preparations were made for this event by decorating the Capitol with
flags, etc. Their excellencies, the President and the Governor-elect, made
their appearance, attended by a joint committee of both Houses, and
escorted by the United States officers of this station. After being intro-
duced, seated, etc., a prayer rich with the fervor of the Christian patriot
was made by the Hon. R. E. B. Baylor. He was loudly applauded. The
President then arose and delivered his valedictory. He was loudly ap-
plauded. The oath of office was administered to the governor by the speaker
of the House and the inaugural followed.
President Jones's speech ended with an eloquent paragraph
that is often quoted:
The lone star of Texas, which ten years since arose amid cloud, over
fields of carnage, and obscurely shone for a while, has culminated, and,
following an inscrutable destiny, has passed on and become fixed forever
in that glorious constellation which all freemen and lovers of freedom in
the world must reverence and adore--the American Union. Blending its
rays with its sister stars, long may it continue to shine, and may a gracious
heaven smile upon this consummation of the wishes of the two republics,
now joined together in one. "May
the union be perpetual, and may it be
the means of conferring benefits and blessings upon the people of all the
States" is my ardent prayer. The final act in this great drama is now
performed. The Republic of Texas is no more.
FOOTNOTES:
of Texas was written at the request of the University of Texas news
service, for publication in weekly newspapers. The purpose was to com-
memorate the centennial of Texas statehood. Space requirements of the
papers made it necessary to present the story in twenty installments of
from three hundred to five hundred words each, as they here appear.
How to cite:
Eugene C. Barker, "Annexation of Texas", Volume 50, Number 1, Southwestern Historical Quarterly Online, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/publications/journals/shq/online/v050/n1/contrib_DIVL731.html
[Accessed Tue Dec 2 14:21:36 CST 2008]
